Spec Pro Cases

G.R. No. 188773. September 10, 2014.
HEIRS OF VALENTIN BASBAS, ANSELMA B. ENDRINAL, GERTRUDES BASBAS, RUFINA BASBAS,

CEFERINA B. CARTECIANO, ANACLETO BASBAS, ARSENIA BASBAS, ANASTACIO BASBAS, BEDACIO
BASBAS, TEODOCIA B. OCAMPO, SEGUNDO C. BASBAS, MARIA B. RAMOS and EUGENIO BASBAS in
representation of PEDRO BASBAS; HERINO T. BASBAS and NESTOR T. BASBAS in representation of
LUCAS BASBAS; ADELAIDA B. FLORENTINO, RODRIGO BASBAS, FELIX BASBAS, JR., TEODULO
BASBAS, ANDRESITO BASBAS, LARRY BASBAS and JOEY BASBAS in representation of FELIX BASBAS,
SR., VICTOR BEATO, ALIPIO BEATO, EUTIQUIO BEATO, JULIANA B. DIAZ, PABLO BEATO and
ALEJANDRO BEATO in representation of REMIGIA B. BEATO, as represented by RODRIGO BASBAS,
petitioners, vs. RICARDO BASBAS as represented by EUGENIO BASBAS, respondents.
Civil Law; Succession; Valentin’s long possessed status as a legitimate child and thus, heir of Severo,
need no longer be the subject of a special proceeding for declaration of heirship as envisioned by the
Court of Appeals (CA).—In all, Valentin’s long possessed status as a legitimate child and thus, heir of
Severo, need no longer be the subject of a special proceeding for declaration of heirship as envisioned
by the Court of Appeals. There is no need to re-declare his status as an heir of Severo. And,
contraposed to the fact that Valentin’s status as a legitimate child of Severo is already established,
Nicolas’ status as a purported heir of Severo can no longer be established, Nicolas’ right thereto
expiring upon his death. Glaringly, there is no pretension from respondent’s end that Nicolas was
born of a valid marriage, only that he is Severo’s son. Nonetheless, even if respondents were minded
to establish the status of Nicolas, whether he is a legitimate or an illegitimate child of Severo, such
can no longer be done.
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* FIRST DIVISION.
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs. Basbas

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Pura Ferrer-Calleja and Napoleon C. Banzuela, Jr. for petitioners.
Public Attorney’s Office for respondent.
PEREZ, J.:
A claim of status as heir of a decedent must always be substantially supported by evidence as

required under our law. The resolution of a case, in this instance, an action for annulment of title and
reconveyance of real property, cannot be further stalled and waylaid by a mere assertion of a party
of an ostensible conflicting claims of heirship of the common decedent. Not all rights to property and
incidents thereof, such as titling, ought to be preceded by a declaration of heirship, albeit supposedly
traced to a single decedent and original titleholder.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 998531 which reversed and set aside the rulings,
after trial and then on appeal, of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC), Sta.
Rosa, Laguna in Civil Case No. 19132 and Civil Case No. B--6334,3 respectively. The trial courts
annulled TCT No. 294295 issued in the name of Crispiniano Talampas Basbas (Crispiniano) and
herein respondent Ricardo Talampas Basbas (Ricardo), covering Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa
Detached
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1 Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos, with Associate Justices Edgardo F. Sundiam and
Ramon M. Bato, Jr., concurring. Rollo, pp. 54-67.
2 Id., at pp. 78-89.
3 Id., at pp. 129-135.

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VOL. 734, SEPTEMBER 10, 2014
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Estate, the subject property, and originally titled to the decedent, Severo Basbas (Severo) under
Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 (N.A.). Crispiniano and Ricardo and all their successors-in-interest
were ordered to reconvey the subject property to petitioners.
Both parties, petitioners, Heirs of Valentin Basbas (Valentin), and respondent Ricardo trace their
claim of ownership over herein subject property to Severo.
Petitioners filed an Action for Annulment of Title, Reconveyance with Damages against Crispiniano
and respondent Ricardo seeking to: (1) annul Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-294295 issued in the
names of Crispiniano and Ricardo covering the contested lot, and (2) recover possession of the
subject property before the Municipal Trial Court, Santa Rosa, Laguna, docketed as Civil Case No.
1913.
Countering petitioners’ allegations, Crispiniano and Ricardo denied petitioners’ ownership over Lot
No. 39 and contended that upon Severo’s death, he was survived by two heirs, Valentin (grandfather
of petitioners) and Nicolas Basbas (Nicolas) (paternal grandfather of Crispiniano and Ricardo) who
evenly divided Severo’s estate, comprising of two lots, herein subject property, Lot No. 39 of the Santa
Rosa Detached Estate, and Lot No. 40, adjacent thereto, among them. Lot No. 40 was inherited by
Valentin, while Lot No. 39 went to Nicolas.
The pertinent documents presented in evidence by both parties include:
(1) Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 (N.A.) in the name of Severo;

(2) Order of the Land Registration Court, Regional Trial Court, Biñan, Laguna dated 1 June 1989,
granting the Petition for Reconstitution of Title covering Lot No. 39 filed by Crispiniano and Ricardo;
(3) TCT No. T-294295 covering Lot No. 39 issued in the names of Crispiniano and Ricardo; and
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(4) Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of decedent Severo.
The undisputed facts uniformly found by all three lower courts, at the first instance, the MTC, the
RTC, Branch 24, Biñan, Laguna, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, and the Court of Appeals
are:
x x x Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera. Severo x x x died on July 14, 1911. They had a child
named Valentin (Basbas). During Severo’s lifetime, he acquired a parcel of land in Santa Rosa, Laguna
otherwise known as Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate. Lot No. 39 is adjacent to Lot No.
40 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate which lot was acquired, by purchase, by Valentin Basbas.
Sometime in 1995, [herein petitioners Heirs of Valentin Basbas] discovered that [respondents]
Crispiniano and Ricardo Basbas were able to secure for themselves Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-294295 over Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate. Sometime in 1987, [respondents],
through Crispiniano Basbas, filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Title before the Regional Trial Court,
Biñan, Laguna, docketed as LRC Case No. B-758, covering Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached
Estate. Subsequently thereafter, or on June 1, 1989, an Order was issued by the RTC granting the
aforesaid petition. On the basis of said
Order, the title covering Lot No. 39 was ordered reconstituted in the name of the heirs of Severo
Basbas and Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 (N.A.) was
issued. On November 13, 1993, [therein] defendants Crispiniano Basbas y Talampas and
[respondent] Ricardo Basbas y Talampas executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of deceased
Severo Basbas x x x stating among others that the only heirs of Severo Basbas are Felomino Basbas
and Melencio Casubha. On the basis of said Extra-Judicial Settlement x x x, the Registry of Deeds of
Calamba, Laguna cancelled Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 and in lieu thereof Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-294295 was issued in the names of [therein] defendants Crispiniano Basbas
and [respon-
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dent] Ricardo Basbas x x x. [Petitioners] then brought the matter to the Barangay but no settlement
was reached. Hence, this instant action.4
Significantly, the Pre-Trial Order of the MTC, dated 2 September 1998, contained the following
Stipulation of Facts:
STIPULATION OF FACTS
1. [Severo] Basbas is married to Ana Rivera.
2. Both Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas bear the middle name Talampas.
3. [Petitioners] are direct descendants of Valentin Basbas, who is a son of [Severo] Basbas.
4. The property at dispute was originally registered in [Severo’s] name.5
After trial, where both parties presented evidence, the MTC ruled, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of [petitioners] and against defendants
[including herein respondent Ricardo] as follows:
1) declaring TCT No. T-294295 in the name of the defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo]
as NULL and VOID;
2) ordering the defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] to reconvey to [petitioners] Lot
No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, and to surrender possession thereof in favor of the
[petitioners];
3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna to issue a new certificate of title covering said
Lot No. 39 in favor of the heirs of Severo Basbas; and
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4 Records, pp. 519-520.
5 Id., at p. 151.
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4) ordering the defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] and their successors-in-interest to
pay [petitioners] the sum of Php50,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees.6
On appeal to the RTC by Crispiniano and Ricardo docketed as Civil Case No. B-6334, judgment of the
MTC was affirmed in toto.
Insistent on their stance, Crispiniano and Ricardo appealed to the Court of Appeals.
In a subsequent turn of events, the appellate court reversed, applying our ruling in Heirs of
Yaptinchay v. Hon. del Rosario,7 and set aside the uniform rulings of the trial courts:
The court a quo erred in affirming the decision of the MTC, as the MTC had ruled on filiation and
heirship, matters which fall within the jurisdiction of a probate court, which the MTC or RTC of Sta.
Rosa, Laguna were not designated to be. It is also proper that these particular matters be threshed
out in a special proceeding.
In Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, it was ruled that it is decisively clear that the
declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as it involves the
establishment of a status or right.
The case at bar is an action for annulment of title, reconveyance with damages, a civil action, whereas
matters which involve the settlement and distribution of the estate of a deceased person as well as
filiation and heirship partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which requires the application of
specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court. With both parties claiming to be the heirs of Severo
Basbas, it is but proper to thresh out this issue in a special proceeding, since [Crispiniano and
respondent Ricardo] seeks to establish his status as one
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6 Id., at p. 527.
7 363 Phil. 393; 304 SCRA 18 (1999).
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of the heirs entitled to the property in dispute. Before the action for annulment of title, reconveyance
with damages can be resolved, this Court opines that the matter of heirship should be adjudicated
upon first. The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that
such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
xxxx
The MTC and the RTC, both acting in their general jurisdiction, are devoid of authority to render an
adjudication and resolve the issue of annulment of title and reconveyance of the real property in
favor of the respondents. We reiterate that the question of who are the heirs of Severo Basbas should
be adjudged first in a probate court prior to the resolution of the action for annulment of title and
reconveyance.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.8
Hence, this appeal by certiorari of petitioners — Heirs of Valentin, raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING AND SETTING
ASIDE THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 24 OF BIÑAN, LAGUNA AFFIRMING
THAT OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF SANTA ROSA, LAGUNA’S DECISION FINDING FOR THE
PETITIONERS.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULING IN
HEIRS OF GUIDO AND ISABEL YAPTINCHAY VERSUS HON. ROY S. DEL ROSARIO, THAT PRIOR TO
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8 Rollo, pp. 63-66.
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THE RESOLUTION OF THE ACTION FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE AND RECONVEYANCE, THE
DETERMINATION OF WHO THE HEIRS ARE SHOULD FIRST BE ADJUDGED IN A PROBATE COURT.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO RENDER

JUDGMENT BASED ON THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED RELATIVE TO THE ISSUES RAISED AND RULED
UPON BY THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF SANTA ROSA, LAGUNA AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF BIÑAN, LAGUNA.9
In ruling in favor of petitioners, Heirs of Valentin, the trial courts found that petitioners fully
established their filiation with the decedent Severo, the original titleholder of Lot No. 39 and from
whom all parties trace their claim of ownership over the subject property. Oppositely, the trial courts
found wanting, lacking documentary evidence, the different claims of heirship of Crispiniano and
herein respondent Ricardo, through Severo’s purported other son or nephew, Nicolas. The MTC,
affirmed in toto by the RTC, declared, thus:
[Petitioners] have fully established their true filiation with the late Severo Basbas from whom the
subject property came from. Through their own evidence, testimonial and documentary, it was
established that Severo Basbas was married to Ana Rivera. They had one (1) child named Valentin
Basbas x x x. Valentin Basbas had no other brother nor sister. He (Valentin) was married to Irene
Beato. Valentin bore four (4) children, namely: (1) Pedro Basbas; (2) Lucas Basbas; (3) Feliz Basbas,
Sr.; and (4) Remigia Basbas. x x x.
xxxx
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9 Id., at pp. 18-19.
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As shown, [petitioners] are now the great grandchildren of the late Severo Basbas who died in Santa
Rosa, Laguna on July 5, 1911.
The defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] on the other hand claim that they are also the
legal heirs of the late Severo Basbas. Such a claim, however, was not supported by any document. x x
x.
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As correctly pointed out by [petitioners] that assuming, for the sake of argument, that Nicolas Basbas,
predecessor of these defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo], was the son of Severo
Basbas, then Nicolas Basbas must have been an illegitimate child of Severo Basbas, in which case his
filiation should be first established before he can claim to be an heir. But this cannot be done anymore,
simply because an action for recognition should have been made or brought during the lifetime of
the presumed parents x x x. It could not even be applied under the exception of said law x x x, as no
evidence was ever adduced to that effect. The only conclusion, therefore, is that Nicolas Basbas was
neither a legitimate nor an illegitimate son of Severo Basbas, so that defendants [including herein
respondent Ricardo] are not the legal heirs of the late Severo Basbas.
x x x [T]he defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] are not the legal heirs of the late Severo
Basbas. They (defendants) [including herein respondent Ricardo] claimed that they derived their
title and ownership over Lot No. 39 in representation of Felomino Basbas, an alleged son of the late
Severo Basbas; that Severo Basbas gave Lot No. 39 to Nicolas Basbas; and that Lot No. 40 was also
given by Severo Basbas to Valentin Basbas. Such a claim has no basis at all. The [petitioners’]
evidence, specifically the Friar Lands Certificate x x x and the Certification from the DENR x x x show
that Valentin Basbas acquired Lot No. 40 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate by purchase from the
government way back on April 1, 1913, contrary to the allegations of the defendants [including herein
respondent Ricardo] that
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the same was given by Severo Basbas to Valentin Basbas as the latter’s share in the inheritance.10
In marked contrast, the Court of Appeals zeroed in on the claim of Crispiniano and Ricardo that they
are descendants, likewise great grandchildren, of Severo and inherited Lot No. 39 from their father
Felomino Basbas, Severo’s grandson from the latter’s son, Nicolas, who received the subject property
as his share in Severo’s estate. On the whole, the appellate court ruled that the MTC and the RTC,
acting in their general jurisdiction, did not have authority to rule on issues of filiation and heirship of
the parties to the decedent Severo, such matters to be sorted and established in a special proceeding
and falling within the jurisdiction of a probate court.
The pivotal issue in this case turns on the applicability of our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Hon. del
Rosario.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate court’s ruling unqualifiedly applying Heirs of Yaptinchay.
Mistakenly, the Court of Appeals glosses over facts, not controverted by Crispiniano and respondent
Ricardo:
(1) Valentin was a legitimate child of Severo and Ana Rivera; and
(2) Petitioners are themselves legitimate descendants of Valentin.
Not only is the petitioners’ heirship to Severo uncontroverted. The status of Valentin as a compulsory
heir of Severo and of petitioners’ statuses as heirs of Valentin and Severo are stipulated facts agreed
to by Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo:
1. [Severo] Basbas is married to Ana Rivera.
2. Both Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas bear the middle name Talampas.
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10 Records, pp. 520-521 and 524-525.
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3. [Petitioners] are direct descendants of Valentin Basbas, who is a son of [Severo] Basbas.
4. The property at dispute was originally registered in [Severo’s] name.11
11 Id., at p. 151.
On the other hand, Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo miserably fail to establish the status of their
ascendant and purported predecessor-in--interest, Nicolas. In fact, the testimony of respondent
Ricardo tells about the status of Valentin, not about Nicolas’ status, as a compulsory heir of Severo:
Q Now, do you know also [petitioners] in this case the heirs of Valentin Basbas, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you know them Mr. Witness?
A They are my relatives, sir.
Q Will you tell us specifically what is your relationship with [petitioners] in this case, Mr. Witness?
A They are my cousins, I used to call them “Kuya.”
Q How come you became the relatives of [petitioners,] (sic) Mr. Witness?
A My father and the father of [petitioners] are relatives.
Q Specifically, what is the name of the father of [petitioners], Mr. Witness?
A Valentin Basbas.
Q What is the name of your father?
A Felomino Basbas.
Q How is Felomino and Valentin related?

A They are cousins.
Court
How come they became [your] cousins?
A Their family names are both Basbas.
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Q And that is your only basis in saying that they are relatives?
A No.
Q So, what other basis?
A Severo Basbas is the eldest and he bore a child name[d] Nicolas Basbas and Nicolas Basbas bore a
child name[d] Felomino Basbas who [had] two sons named Crispiniano and Ricardo Basbas.
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Q Who was the father of Valentin Basbas then?
A Severo Basbas.
Q You said a while ago that Nicolas Basbas is the son of Severo Basbas and now you are saying that
Valentin Basbas is the son of Severo Basbas, you mean to say that Valentin Basbas and Nicolas Basbas
are brothers?
A Yes, Nicolas is the eldest [older] th[a]n Valentin Basbas.
Q So, it is clear now that Nicolas and Valentin Basbas are brothers?
A That is what I know. That is what my brother told me.12
Mauro Basbas (Mauro), one of the defendants before the trial court, while testifying, also failed to
shed light on the status of Nicolas as an heir of Severo, insisting only that Nicolas is Severo’s son as
told to him by his grandfather, Felomino Basbas. Mauro even categorically answered that the wife of
Severo is Ana Rivera, further establishing the legitimacy of Valentin as the son of Severo and Ana
Rivera:
Q Who is the father of Felomino Basbas?
A Nicolas Basbas.
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12 TSN, 15 June 1999, pp. 5-12.
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Q You mean to tell us that Nicolas is the son of Severo Basbas?
A Yes.
Q Do you happen to know the mother of Felomino Basbas?
A Yes.
Q Would you tell us?
A Catalina Mane.
Q Since you seem to be so well informed about the family of Severo Basbas, can you tell us who was
the wife of Severo Basbas?
A Ana Rivera.
Q How can you say now unless you are implying that Severo Basbas had an illegitimate son, how can
you explain now why the surname… the middle name of your grandfather is [not] Rivera?
Court
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What is the middlename (sic) of Severo Basbas?
A I don’t know.
Court
Who is the son of Severo Basbas?
A Nicolas Basbas.
Q What is the maiden name (sic) of Nicolas Basbas?
A I don’t know.13
In all, Valentin’s long possessed status as a legitimate child and thus, heir of Severo, need no longer
be the subject of a special proceeding for declaration of heirship as envisioned by the Court of
Appeals. There is no need to re-declare his status as an heir of Severo.
And, contraposed to the fact that Valentin’s status as a legitimate child of Severo is already
established, Nicolas’ status
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as a purported heir of Severo can no longer be established, Nicolas’ right thereto expiring upon his
death.
Glaringly, there is no pretension from respondent’s end that Nicolas was born of a valid marriage,
only that he is Severo’s son. Nonetheless, even if respondents were minded to establish the status of
Nicolas, whether he is a legitimate or an illegitimate child of Severo, such can no longer be done.
Article 165, in relation to Articles 173 and 175, of the Family Code and Article 285 of the Civil Code
state:
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate, unless otherwise
provided in this Code.
Chapter 3. Illegitimate Children
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these
cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children. The action must be brought within the same period specified
in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case
the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
CHAPTER 4
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN
SECTION 1. Recognition of Natural Children
Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime
of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
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(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had
been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.
Our ruling in Raymundo v. Vda. de Suarez14 is instructive:
14 593 Phil. 28; 572 SCRA 384 (2008).
Petitioner Valente insists that, following our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario, herein
respondents must first be declared heirs of Marcelo Sr. before they can file an action to annul the
judicial sale of what is, undisputedly, conjugal property of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.
We disagree. Our ruling in Heirs of Yaptinchay is not applicable.
Herein respondents’ status as legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista — and thus, Marcelo
Sr.’s heirs — has been firmly established, and confirmed by this Court in Suarez v. Court of Appeals.
True, this Court is not a trier of facts, but as the final arbiter of disputes, we found and so ruled that
herein respondents are children, and heirs of their deceased father, Marcelo Sr. This having been
settled, it should no longer have been a litigated issue when we ordered a remand to the lower court.
In short, petitioner Valente’s, Violeta’s, Virginia’s, and Maria Concepcion’s representation in the RTC
that our ruling in Suarez required herein respondents to present evidence of their affiliation with the
deceased, Marcelo Sr., is wrong.
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As was set forth in the dispositive portion of Suarez, “Civil Case No. 51203 is reinstated only to
determine that portion which belongs to [herein respondents] and to annul the sale with regard to
said portion.” There is clearly no intimation in our decision for the RTC to have to determine an
already settled issue i.e., herein respondents’ status as heirs of Marcelo Sr.
Moreover, petitioner Valente cannot assail, directly or indirectly, the status of herein respondents as
legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista, and likewise demand that herein respondents first
prove their filiation to Marcelo Sr. The following records bear out Marcelo, Sr.’s and Teofista’s
paternity of herein respondents, and the latter’ s status as legitimate children:
1. The CA decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. Nos. 10646 to 10649 where Teofista, along with herein
respondents, questioned the RTC, Branch 151’s Orders dated October 10, 1984 and October 14, 1986.
Although the CA ruled against Teofista and herein respondents, it explicitly recognized the latter’s
status as legitimate children of Teofista and Marcelo Sr.; and
2. The CA decision in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 20320 which incorrectly ruled that herein respondents were,
as children of Teofista, merely successors-in--interest of the latter to the property and by virtue
thereof, bound by the judgment in Civil Case Nos. 21376 to 21379 consistent with the doctrine of res
judicata. We subsequently reversed this ruling on the wrong application of res judicata in the
conclusive case of Suarez. We retained and affirmed, however, the CA’s factual finding of herein
respondents’ status as heirs of Marcelo Sr. We categorically held therein that “the proprietary
interest of [herein respondents] in the levied and auctioned [properties] is different from and
adverse to that of [Teofista]. [Herein respondents] became co-owners of the property not because of
[Teofista] but through their own right as children of their deceased father[, Marcelo Sr.].” Clearly,
herein respondents’ long possessed status of legitimate children of Marcelo Sr. and Teofista cannot
be indirectly or directly
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attacked by petitioner Valente in an action to annul a judicial sale.
Articles 262, 263, 265 and 266 of the Civil Code, the applicable law at the time of Marcelo’s death,
support the foregoing conclusion, to wit:
Art. 262. The heirs of the husband may impugn the legitimacy of the child only in the following
cases:
(1) If the husband should die before the expiration of the period fixed for bringing his action;
(2) If the husband should die after the filing of the complaint, without having desisted from the
same;
(3) If the child was born after the death of the husband.
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year from
the recording of birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper
case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in the
Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be
counted from the discovery of the fraud.
Art. 265. The filiation of legitimate children is proved by the record of birth appearing in the Civil
Register, or by an authentic document or a final judgment.
Art. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved
by the continuous possession of status of a legitimate child.
In Heirs of Yaptinchay, the complaint for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of certain TCT’s
was dismissed for failure of the petitioners to demonstrate “any proof or even a semblance of it” that
they had been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple, the spouses Yaptinchay. In stark
contrast, the records of this
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case reveal a document, an Extrajudicial Settlement of Marcelo Sr.’s estate, which explicitly
recognizes herein respondents as Marcelo Sr.’s legitimate children and heirs. The same document
settles and partitions the estate of Marcelo Sr. specifying Teofista’s paraphernal properties, and
separates the properties she owns in common with her children, herein respondents. Plainly, there
is no need to re-declare herein respondents as heirs of Marcelo Sr., and prolong this case
interminably.15
Thus, we find no need for a separate proceeding for a declaration of the heirs of Severo in order to
resolve petitioners’ Action for Annulment of Title and Reconveyance of the subject property.
Prescinding from the foregoing, a closer scrutiny of the documents presented in evidence by
Crispiniano and Ricardo before the trial court, betray the fraudulence of their claim.
1. Order of the RTC, Branch 25, Biñan, Laguna in LRC

B-758, a Petition for Reconstitution of Title filed by Cris-piniano and respondent Ricardo:
Petitioner alleges that a certain parcel of residential land, situated in the Municipality of Santa Rosa,
Province of Laguna is registered in the name of the legal heirs of Severo Basbas as evidenced by a
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) of the Register of Deeds of Laguna (Exhibit “E”); that the
aforementioned duplicate copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) was lost during the latter
part of the Japanese Occupation when the petitioner and his family evacuated from their residence
to evade the atrocities being committed by the Japanese soldiers; that after peace and order was
restored, diligent efforts were exerted in trying to find the said certificate of title, but the same proved
futile; and that pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 26, petitioner desires that the original copy of
said title be reconstituted and thereafter have the full technical description of
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15 Id., at pp. 51-54.
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Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate be inscribed therein.
Pursuant to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 26 copies of the petition, notice of hearing, plan and
technical description of Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate were forwarded to the Office of
the Land Registration Commission for appropriate action. On January 18, 1989, this Court received
the Report (Exhibit “C”) of the Acting Administrator of the Land Registration Commission (now
NLTDRA).
xxxx
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.
During the hearing of the petition, Atty. Agapito G. Carait, counsel for the petitioner, presented
Crispiniano Basbas. Together with his testimony, the following documentary evidence were
presented, to wit:
Exhibits “A” – the publication in the Official Gazette;
“B” – Certificate of Posting;
“C” – Report;
“D” – Certification form from the Register of Deeds; and
“E” – Friar Lands Sale Certificate.
CRISPINIANO BASBAS, 70 years old, widower and a resident of Santa Rosa, Laguna, stated that he is
the petitioner in this case; that the parcel of land involved in this case is situated at Aplaya, Santa
Rosa, Laguna and is identified as Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate with an area of 330 sq.
m.; that he was born in that property; that this parcel of land was covered by a title in the name of
the heirs of Severo Basbas; that the title was lost during the Japanese Occupation when his father
Felomino Basbas who was then in possession of the duplicate title, evacuated to the Province of Rizal
particularly in Tanay; that later on his father moved to Sta. Maria, Laguna; that he was with his father
when they evacuated to a place called Laranga; that
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644
while there, he saw the title in the possession of his father in the “maleta” where he kept it; that when
they returned to Santa Rosa, Laguna, he asked his father regarding the Transfer Certificate of Title
and his father told him that the title was lost in the mountains of Rizal; the petitioner verified from
the Office of the Register of Deeds if said title is still intact with their office; that the Register of Deeds
issued a certification (Exhibit “D”) to the effect that Lot 39 of Santa Rosa Detached Estate has no
record on file with the office; that petitioner went to the Bureau of Lands to verify the title and found
out that the said patent was issued in the name of the legal heirs of Severo Basbas (Exhibit “E”); that
the children of the petitioner are now in possession of Lot 39; that the petitioner’s father had paid
the realty taxes and after his death, he (petitioner) continued paying the taxes; that his father exerted
all efforts to recover or find the said title but the same proved futile; and that to his own knowledge,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) covering Lot No. 39 has never been encumbered, sold or given
as security for the performance of any obligation.
xxxx
Thus, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, in his REPORT dated January 18, 1989
recommends:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing information relative to Lot No. 39, Santa Rosa Detached Estate, is
respectfully submitted for consideration in the resolution of the instant petition, and if the Honorable
Court, after notice and hearing, finds justification pursuant to Section 15 Republic Act No. 26 to grant
the same, the owner’s duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. (N.A.) may be used as a source of
the desired reconstitution pursuant to Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 26, Provided, however, that
in case the petition is granted, the reconstituted title should be made subject to such encumbrances
as may be subsisting, and provided, further that no
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certificate of title covering the same parcel of land exists in the Office of the Register of Deeds
concerned.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be in order and meritorious and there being no objection on the
part of the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) as to the technical description of Lot No.
39, the same is hereby GRANTED. The Court hereby orders the Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba
Branch to reconstitute the original copy of TCT No. (N.A.) in the name of the heirs of Severo Basbas
who appear in the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title at the time the original was lost and/or
destroyed as the registered owners, using as basis the technical description of Lot 39, certified by the
Bureau of Lands, and thereafter to annotate on the corresponding title the full technical description
of Lot No. 39 of the Sta. Rosa Detached Estate.
For this purpose, the Clerk of Court is directed to forward to the Registry of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba
Branch, a certified copy of the Report of the Acting Administrator, Land Registration Authority dated
January 18, 1989, the copy of the technical description, which documents shall be used by the
Register of Deeds as bases for reconstitution and inscription.16
16 Records, pp. 293-296.
2. Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Severo executed by Crispiniano and respondent Ricardo:
EXTRA-JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED SEVERO BASBAS
xxxx
That FELOMINO BASBAS is our father and likewise died intestate last October 30, 1976 leaving no
will or debts and the share of MELENCIO CASUBHA was sold and bought by us last 5 December 1977,
xerox copy
_______________
17 Id., at p. 297.
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of such Deed is hereto attached as Annex “A” and made an integral part of this Extra-Judicial
Settlement of Estate of Deceased SEVERO BASBAS;
That there is no pending testate or intestate proceedings against said estate;
That in view thereof the aforenamed CRISPINIANO and RICARDO both surnamed BASBAS do hereby
adjudicate unto themselves the aforedescribed parcel of land subject to the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule
74 of the Rules of Court as follows:
CRISPINIANO BASBAS – undivided share and
RICARDO BASBAS – undivided share;17
Ultimately, we agree with the disquisition of the trial courts in annulling TCT No. 294295 and
ordering the reconveyance of Lot No. 39 to petitioners:
x x x [We proceed to] the next issue as to “whether or not the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Severo Basbas executed by Crispiniano and Ricardo Basbas is valid.” The Court believes
otherwise. Simply because the defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] are not the legal
heirs of the late Severo Basbas. They (defendants) [including herein respondent Ricardo] claimed
that they derived their title and ownership over Lot No. 39 in representation of Felomino Basbas, an
alleged [grand]son of the late Severo Basbas; that Severo Basbas gave Lot No. 39 to Nicolas Basbas;
and that Lot No. 40 was also given by Severo Basbas to Valentin Basbas. Such a claim has no basis at
all. The [petitioners’] evidence, specifically the Friar Lands Certificate x x x and the Certification from
the DENR x x x show that Valentin Basbas acquired Lot No. 40 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate by
purchase from the government way back on April 1, 1913, contrary to the allegations of the
defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] that
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the same was given by Severo Basbas to Valentin Basbas as the latter’s share in the inheritance.
Claiming to be the only heirs of Felomino Basbas (their father), and that Felomino Basbas and
Melencio Casubha are the only heirs of the late Severo Basbas, Crispiniano Basbas and Ricardo Basbas
executed an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased Severo Basbas on November 12, 1993,
whereby they adjudicated to themselves Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate x x x. On the
basis of the said Extra-Judicial Settlement, Crispiniano Basbas filed a Petition For The Reconstitution
of Title No. (N.A.) covering Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate x x x before the Regional
Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, and after hearing, an Order was issued granting the aforesaid petition.
Subsequently thereafter, TCT No. RT-1684 (N.A.) in the names of the Heirs of Severo Basbas was
cancelled and a new title (TCT No. 294295) was issued in the names of Crispiniano Basbas and
Ricardo Basbas, defendants [therein.]
Based on the evidence on hand, defendants [including herein respondent Ricardo] acquired the
property in question through fraud and, therefore, an implied trust was created in favor of
[petitioners] under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code, which provides, thus:
If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered
a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes.
What right or rights, therefore, do they have under these circumstances? Since a constructive trust
was created, [petitioners] have the right to recover the property subject of this action. The fact that
the decision of the RTC, Biñan, Laguna approving/granting the petition for the reconstitution of the
title covering Lot No. 39 and said decision has obtained its finality, is of no moment. It has been held:
“the rule that registration of real property under the Torrens System has the effect of constructive
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notice to the whole world cannot be availed of when the purpose of the action is to compel a trustee
to convey the property registered in his name for the benefit of the cestui que trust. In other words,
the defense of prescription cannot be set up in an action to enforce a trust x x x.
The fact that the subject lot was already registered in the defendants’ [including herein respondent
Ricardo] name and indeed a Tax Declaration was issued in their favor for taxation purposes, and they
have paid the taxes due thereon, are not conclusive evidence of ownership. Hence, it has been held:
When a person obtains a certificate of title to a land belonging to another and he has full knowledge
of the rights of a true owner, he is considered guilty of fraud, and he may be compelled to transfer the
land to the defrauded owner so long as the property has not passed to the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value x x x. Also it has been held “that an original owner of registered land may seek
annulment of the transfer thereof on the ground of fraud and the proper remedy is reconveyance
x x x.18
We add that Valentin’s rights to the succession vested from the moment of death of the decedent
Severo.19 In turn, petitioners’, as Heirs of Valentin, who is an uncontested heir of decedent Severo,
rights to the succession vested from the moment of Valentin’s death. As such, they own Lot No. 39,
undisputedly titled in Severo’s name and forming part of Severo’s estate, and are entitled to the titling
thereof in their names.
19 Civil Code, Article 777.
In this regard, we note that the Court of Appeals did not reverse the trials courts’ factual finding on
Crispiniano’s and Ricardo’s fraudulent titling of Lot No. 39 in their names. The
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evidence presented by Crispiniano and Ricardo highlight the fraudulence of their claim:
1. Title to Lot No. 39 is not in their names, neither is it titled in the name of their predecessors-in-
interest, Nicolas and Felomino Basbas;
2. Crispiniano and Ricardo are not the only heirs of Severo, if they are even heirs to begin with.
One final note. Severo, as well as Valentin, have been long dead. It is well-nigh that title to the subject
property, Lot No. 39 of the Santa Rosa Detached Estate, appear in the names of the petitioners, Heirs
of Valentin, herein declared heirs of Severo, or their successors-in-interest, to finally settle title
thereto and prevent occurrences of fraudulent titling thereof. Hence, petitioners, Heirs of Valentin
and their successors-in-interest, are directed to take the appropriate action for titling of the subject
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
99853 is REVERSED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court and the Municipal Trial Court are
AFFIRMED. Petitioners, Heirs of Valentin Basbas and their successors-in-interest, are likewise
DIRECTED to take the appropriate action for titling of Lot No. 39 of Santa Rosa Detached Estate with
dispatch, and NOTIFY this Court within ten (10) days of such action.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr.,** Leonardo-De Castro*** (Acting Chairperson), Bersamin and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment reversed.
_______________
* * Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1772 dated 28 August 2014.
* ** Per Special Order No. 1771 dated 28 August 2014.

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Notes.—Hereditary succession means succession by intestate succession or by will to the compulsory

heirs under the Civil Code, but does not pertain to testamentary succession to other persons. (Estate
of the Late Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio vs. Dizon, 536 SCRA 565 [2007])
The right of respondent to maintain such a suit is dependent on whether she is entitled to
successional rights as an illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn, may be established through
voluntary or compulsory recognition. (Tayag vs. Tayag-Gallor, 549 SCRA 68 [2008])
——o0o—— Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs. Basbas, 734 SCRA 625, G.R. No. 188773 September 10, 2014
G.R. No. 139587. November 22, 2000.*
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED ISMAEL REYES, THE HEIRS OF OSCAR
R. REYES, petitioners, vs. CESAR R. REYES, respondent.
Estate Proceedings; Probate Courts; Jurisdiction; The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates
to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons,
and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and trustees.—The
jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of the
estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of
administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. The question of ownership is, as a rule, an
extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional,
not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
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542
Heirs of Oscar R. Reyes vs. Reyes
Same; Same; Same; The Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court exercises but limited
jurisdiction.—Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court exercises but
limited jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to
property claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other
parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the
question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby
prejudiced.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Santiago, Cruz & Sarte for petitioners.
Ricafrente, Aguirre, Sanvicente, Cacho Law Firm for respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to annul the decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 467611 which affirmed the Order2 dated January 26, 1994 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, in Special Proceeding No. 89-2519, a petition for
issuance of letters of administration, and the resolution dated July 28, 1999 denying their motion for
reconsideration.3
Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of land situated
in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 4983 and 3598
(39303). The spouses have seven children, namely: Oscar, Araceli, Herminia, Aurora, Emmanuel,
Cesar and Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes.
_______________
1 Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, pon ante, concurred in by Justices Marina L. Buzon, Renato C. Dacudao.
2 Per Judge Lucas P. Bersamin, Records on Appeal, pp. 178-189.
3 Rollo, p. 45.
543
VOL. 345, NOVEMBER 22, 2000
543
On April 18, 1973, Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was notified by the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of his income tax deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel
land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon City. For failure to settle his tax liability, the amount increased
to about P172,724.40 and since no payment was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the
property covered by TCT No. 4983 was levied4 sold and eventually forfeited by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue in favor of the government.5
Sometime in 1976, petitioners’ predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the BIR’s tax amnesty and he was
able to redeem the property covered by TCT No. 49836 upon payment of the reduced tax liability in
the amount of about P18,000.7
On May 18, 1982, the Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City sent a notice to Felisa Revita Reyes
informing her that the Arayat properties will be sold at public auction on August 25, 1982 for her
failure to settle the real estate tax delinquency from 19741981.8
On December 15, 1986, petitioners’ predecessor Oscar Reyes entered into an amnesty compromise
agreement with the City Treasurer and settled the accounts of Felisa R. Reyes.9
On May 10, 1989, private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition for issuance
of letters of administration with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying for his appointment
as administrator of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes which estate included 50% of the Arayat
properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598.10 Oscar Reyes filed his conditional opposition
thereto on the ground that the Arayat properties do not
_______________
4 Record on Appeal, pp. 47-48.
5 Ibid.,p.48.
6 Ibid., p. 49.
7 Ibid., p. 50.
8 Ibid., p. 64.
9 Ibid., p. 53.
10 Ibid., pp. 1-4.

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form part of the estate of the deceased as he (Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and
or purchase.11
The probate court subsequently issued letters of administration in favor of Cesar Reyes where the
latter was ordered to submit a true and complete inventory of properties pertaining to the estate of
the deceased and the special powers of attorney executed by the other heirs who reside in the USA
and that of Aurora Reyes-Dayot conforming to his appointment as administrator.12 Cesar Reyes filed
an inventory of real and personal properties of the deceased which included the Arayat properties
with a total area of 1,009 sq. meters.13 On the other hand, Oscar Reyes filed his objection to the
inventory reiterating that the Arayat properties had been forfeited in favor of the government and
he was the one who subsequently redeemed the same from the BIR using his own funds.14
A hearing on the inventory was scheduled where administrator Cesar Reyes was required to present
evidence to establish that the properties belong to the estate of Ismael Reyes and the oppositor to
adduce evidence in support of his objection to the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory.15
After hearing the parties’ respective arguments, the probate court issued its Order dated January 26,
1994, the dispositive portion of which reads:16
“WHEREFORE, pursuant to the foregoing findings, the Court hereby modifies the inventory
submitted by the administrator and declares to belong to the estate of the late Ismael Reyes the
following properties, to wit:
1. One half (1/2) of the agricultural land located in Montalban, Rizal containing an area of 31,054
square meters, covered by TCT 72730 with an approximate value of P405,270.00;
2. One half (1/2) of two (2) adjoining residential lots located on Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City,
with total area of 1,009 square meters, more or less, covered by TCTs No. 4983 AND 3598 (39303),
with an
_______________
11 Ibid., pp.6-7.
12 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
13 Ibid., pp. 25-26.
14 Ibid., pp. 30-32.
15 Ibid., p.35.
16 Ibid., pp. 188-189.
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approximate value of P3,027,000.00; but this determination is provisional in character and shall be
without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper Court on the
issue of ownership of the properties; and,
3. The building constructed by and leased to Sonny Bernardo and all its rental income from the
inception of the lease, whether such income be in the possession of oppositor, in which case he is
hereby directed to account therefor, or if such income be still unpaid by Bernardo, in which case the
administrator should move to collect the same.
Consistent with the foregoing things, either of the administrator oppositor, or heir Felisa R. Reyes, in
her personal capacity as apparent coowner of the Arayat Street properties, may commence the
necessary proper action for settling the issue of ownership of such properties in the Regional Trial
Court in Quezon City and to inform the Court of the commencement thereof by any of them as soon
as possible.
The administrator is hereby directed to verify and check carefully on whether other properties,
particularly the real properties allegedly situated in Montalban, Rizal; in Marikina, Metro Manila
(near Boys Town); and in Bulacan, otherwise referred to as the Hi-Cement property truly pertained
to the estate; to determine their present condition and the status of their ownership; and to render a
report thereon in writing within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order.
The motion demanding for accounting to be done by oppositor Oscar Reyes is hereby denied for being
unwarranted, except whatever incomes he might have received from Sonny Bernardo, which he is
hereby directed to turn over to the administrator within thirty (30) days from finality of this Order.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Oscar Reyes which was denied in an Order dated May 30,
1994.17 He then filed his appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending,
Oscar died and he was substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners.
On May 6, 1999, the respondent Court issued its assailed decision which affirmed the probate court’s
order. It ruled that the probate court’s order categorically stated that the inclusion of the subject
properties in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes “is provisional in character and
shall be without
_______________
17 Ibid., pp. 195-199.
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prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper court on the issue of
ownership of the properties”; that the provisional character of the inclusion of the contested
properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of intestate court. It
further stated that although the general rule that question of title to property cannot be passed upon
in the probate court admits of exceptions, i.e. if the claimant and all other parties having legal interest
in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court
for adjudication, such has no application in the instant case since petitioner-appellee and oppositor-
appellant are not the only parties with legal interest in the subject property as they are not the only
heirs of the decedent; that it was never shown that all parties interested in the subject property or
all the heirs of the decedent consented to the submission of the question of ownership to the intestate
court.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated July 28,
1999. Hence this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the respondent Court erred (1) in
ruling that the court a quo correctly included one half (1/2) of the Arayat properties covered by TCT
Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303) in the inventory of the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes; and (2) in
upholding that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to determine the issue of ownership.
Petitioners argue that a probate court’s jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the
heirs are and what shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person since the probate
court has the power and competence to determine whether a property should be excluded from the
inventory of the estate or not, thus the Court a quo committed a reversible error when it included the
Arayat properties in the inventory of the estate of Ismael Reyes despite the overwhelming evidence
presented by petitioneroppositor Oscar Reyes proving his claim of ownership. Petitioners contend
that their claim of ownership over the Arayat properties as testified to by their predecessor Oscar
Reyes was based on two (2) grounds, to wit (1) his redemption of the Arayat properties and (2) the
abandonment of the properties by his co-heirs; that his act of redeeming the properties from the BIR
in 1976 and thereafter from
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547
the City Treasurer of Quezon City using his own funds have the effect of vesting ownership to him.
Petitioners claim that private respondent is already barred from claiming the Arayat properties since
he only filed this petition 16 years after the death of Ismael Reyes and after the prices of the real
properties in Cubao have already escalated tremendously.
We find no merit in this argument.
The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of
the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of
administrators, executors, guardians and trustees.18 The question of ownership is as a rule, an
extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality.19 Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional,
not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.20
We find that the respondent Court did not err in affirming the provisional inclusion of the subject
properties to the estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudice to the outcome of any action
to be brought thereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership considering that the subject
properties are still titled under the torrens system in the names of spouses Ismael and Felisa Revita
Reyes which under the law is endowed with incontestability until after it has been set aside in the
manner indicated in the law.21 The declaration of the provisional character of the inclu-
________________
18 Ramos vs. CA, 180 SCRA 635 (1989).
19 Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Jr. vs. CA, 122 SCRA 885 (1983); Baybayan vs. Aquino, 149 SCRA 186
(1987).
20 Pereira vs. CA, 174 SCRA 154 (1989); Bolisay vs. Alcid, 85 SCRA 213 (1978); Lachenal vs. Salas, 71
SCRA 262 (1976); Pio Barreto Realty Development, Inc., vs. CA, 131 SCRA 606 (1984); Junquera vs.
Borromeo, 19 SCRA 656 (1967); Borromeo vs. Canonoy, 19 SCRA 667 (1967); Recto vs. Dela Rosa, 75
SCRA 226 (1977).
21 Bolisay vs. Alcid, 85 SCRA 213 (1978).
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sion of the subject properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the
Probate Court.
Petitioners next claim that as an exception to the rule that the probate court is of limited jurisdiction,
the court has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership when the parties interested are all heirs
of the deceased and they submitted the question of title to the property, without prejudice to third
persons. Petitioners allege that the parties before the probate court were all the heirs of deceased
Ismael Reyes and they were allowed to present evidence proving ownership over the subject
properties, thus private respondent cannot argue that he did not in any way consent to the
submission of the issue of ownership to the probate court as the records of this case is replete with
evidence that he presented evidence in an attempt to prove ownership of the subject properties.
We are not persuaded.
Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court exercises but limited
jurisdiction, thus it has no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property
claimed by a third person adversely to the decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having
legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the
Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced.22
The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule.
It bears stress that the purpose why the probate court allowed the introduction of evidence on
ownership was for the sole purpose of determining whether the subject properties should be
included in the inventory which is within the probate court’s competence. Thus, when private
respondent Cesar Reyes was appointed as administrator of the properties in the court’s Order dated
July 26, 1989, he was ordered to submit a true inventory and appraisal of the real and personal
properties of the estate which may come into his possession or knowledge which private respondent
complied with. However, petitioner Oscar Reyes submitted his objection to the inventory on the
ground
_______________
22 Trinidad vs. CA, 202 SCRA 106 (1991).
549
549
that it included the subject properties which had been forfeited in favor of the government on April
21, 1975 and which he subsequently redeemed on August 19, 1976. The Court resolved the
opposition as follows:
At the hearing today of the pending incidents, it was agreed that the said incidents could not be
resolved without introduction of evidence.
Accordingly, the hearing on the inventory of real and personal properties is hereby set on April 24,
1990 at 10:00 A.M. at which date and time the petitioner/administrator shall be required to present
evidence to establish that the properties stated in the inventory belong to the estate of Ismael Reyes.
The oppositor shall thereafter adduce his evidence in support of his objection to the inclusion of
certain properties of the estates in the inventory.
Notably, the Probate Court stated, from the start of the hearing, that the hearing was for the merits
of accounting and inventory, thus it had jurisdiction to hear the opposition of Oscar Reyes to the
inventory as well as the respective evidence of the parties to determine for purposes of inventory
alone if they should be included therein or excluded therefrom. In fact, the probate court in its Order
stated that “for resolution is the matter of the inventory of the estate, mainly to consider what
properties should be included in the inventory and what should not be included.” There was nothing
on record that both parties submitted the issue of ownership for its final resolution. Thus the
respondent Court did not err in ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue
of ownership conclusively.
In fact, the probate court, aware of its limited jurisdiction declared that its determination of the
ownership was merely provisional and suggested that either the administrator or the widow Felisa
Reyes may commence the proper action in the Regional Trial Court. Moreover, the court admitted
that it was not competent to pass upon the ownership of the subject properties, thus:
“Although the testimony of the oppositor should have greater persuasive value than that of the
petitioner/administrator, mainly because it agrees closely with the recitals of facts found in the
several public documents submitted as evidence in this case and is corroborated to the greatest
extent by the fact that the properties were, indeed, abandoned in his
550
550
possession since 1975 until the present, his alleged ownership of the Arayat Street properties cannot
still be sustained in a manner which would warrant their exclusion from the administrator’s
inventory.
“To begin with, there are portions in the records which show that the oppositor himself was
somehow uncertain about his rights on the properties and the basis therefor. During his cross-
examination (ten, Oct. 4, 1991), he gave the following statements:
xx xx xx
(Atty. Habitan)
Q:
And if we will add the other taxes you have paid, (you) are now claiming to be the owner of the Arayat
property because you have paid all these taxes?
A:
The amounts I have paid and all the expenses I have and if I had not paid all these amounts the
property in question would have been lost, sir.
Q:
So, in effect, you are now claiming ownership over the property, I want a categorical answer, Mr.
Witness?
A:
If I am going to sum up all these expenses, my share in the HiC ement property, my share in the
Bulacan property, the amount of the property in Cubao is small and also all my suff erings because of
the property in Cubao, this cannot be paid in terms of money, sir. (tsn, Oct. 4, 1991, pp. 10-12)
“On re-direct examination (tsn, Sept. 18, 1992), he clarified his statements as follows:
xx xx xx
(Atty. Javellana)
Q:
Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, you were asked by the petitioner’s counsel whether because you
had paid the BIR P17,872.44 you are now claiming to be the owner of the prope rty in Arayat Street
to which you answered no, will you explain your answer?
A:
When I paid almost P18,000.00, it does not mean that I claim the property already; on the contrary, I
have my own reasons to claim it now on other conditions which are the following: number one, there
was a levy by the BIR on the property, it was forfeited due to delinquency of real estate taxes; number
two, for abandonment, when my mother, brothers) and sisters left the property, they told me it is my
problem and I should take care of it. Number three, the disposition, my mother, my brothers and
sisters sold the property of my father, the HiCement and the property in Visayas Street without giving
my
551
551
share. And another thing I have to sell my own property, my own assets so that I can redeem from
the BIR the Arayat property and which I did with my personal funds and number five, nobody helped
me in my problems regarding those properties, I was alone and so I felt that the property in Arayat
is mine.
xx xx xx
(tsn, Sept. 18, 1992, pp. 2-3)

Notwithstanding his clarifying statements on redirect examination, the impression of the Court on
the issue is not entirely favorable to him. Apart from the absence of a specific document of transfer,
the circumstances and factors he gave may not suffice in and by themselves to convey or transfer
title, for, at best, they may only be the basis of such transfer. They may be considered as proof of the
intention to dispose in his favor or as evidence of a set off among the heirs, which seems to be what
he has in mind. There might also be substance in his assertions about the abandonment in his favor,
which, if raised in the proper action, could constitute either prescription or laches. It is hardly needed
to stress, therefore, that more than these are required to predicate the exclusion of the properties
from the inventory.
Another obtrusive reality stands out to invite notice: the BIR levy was only made on the property
covered in TCT 4983 and did not include the property covered in TCT 3598 (39303). This somehow
detracts from the logic of the oppositor’s assertion of ownership of the entire Arayat Street
properties; even if his assertion is valid and true, it can encompass, at most, only the property subject
of the BIR’s levy and declaration of forfeiture (i.e., TCT 4983), not the property covered by TCT 3598
(39303). These pronouncements should not by any means diminish or deprive the oppositor of
whatever rights or properties he believes or considers to be rightfully his. Although the
circumstances and factors he has given to the Court herein may have legal consequences that could
have defeated opposing-claims and rendered oppositor’s claim on the properties unassailable, this
Court’s competence to adjudicate thus in this proceedings is clearly nonexistent. In Baybayan vs.
Aquino (149 SCRA 186), it was held that the question of ownership of a property alleged to be part
of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.
This ruling then, cannot be a final adjudication on the present and existing legal ownership of the
properties. Whatever is declared herein ought not to preclude oppositor from prosecuting an
ordinary action for the purpose of having his claims or rights established over the properties. If he
still cares hereafter to prosecute such claim of ownership adversely to
552
552
the estate and the apparent co-owner, his mother Felisa. As stated in Valera, et al. vs. Judge Inserto,
et al. (149 SCRA 533), this Court, acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction;
accordingly, its determination that property should be included in the inventory or not is within its
probate jurisdiction, but such determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.”
xx xx xx
The aforecited findings clarify that there were several reasons for having the issue of ownership
ventilated elsewhere. Apart from the fact that only one-half of the two lots known as the Arayat
property (i.e., the half that could pertain to the estate) could be settled herein, there was the
realization that the evidence adduced so far (including that bearing on the oppositor’s basis for
excluding from the estate the property) was inadequate or otherwise inconclusive.
A practical way of looking at the problem is that this Court, sitting herein as an intestate court, does
not consider itself competent to rule on the ownership of the entire Arayat property.”
Finally, anent private respondent’s allegation that the instant petition was filed one day late, hence
should be dismissed, we find the same to be devoid of merit. Petitioners received copy of the decision
denying their motion for reconsideration on August 13, 1999, thus they have until August 28, 1999
within which to file petition for review. Petitioners filed their motion for extension on August 27,
1999 praying for 30 days extension from August 28, 1999 or until September 27, 1999 to file their
petition which this Court granted. Petitioners filed their petition on September 27, 1999, which is
within the period given by the Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Petition denied.
Notes.—The authority of the Regional Trial Court, sitting, albeit with limited jurisdiction, as a probate
court over the estate of a deceased individual, is not a trifling thing, but the court’s jurisdic-
553
553
Santos vs. Court of Appeals
tion, once invoked, and made effective, cannot be treated with indifference nor should it be ignored
with impunity by the very parties invoking its authority. (Marcos II vs. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA
47 [1997])
It is hornbook doctrine that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of
ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality, a
pronouncement that applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding. (Sanchez vs. Court of
Appeals, 279 SCRA 647 [1997])
The determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the
gross value of the estate of the decedent. (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 323 SCRA 102 [2000])
——o0o—— Heirs of Oscar R. Reyes vs. Reyes, 345 SCRA 541, G.R. No. 139587 November 22, 2000
G.R. No. 148597. October 24, 2003.*
GRACE F. MUNSAYAC-DE VILLA, LILY F. MUNSAYACSUNGA and ROY MUNSAYAC, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; Judge ANTONIO C. REYES, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio
City, Branch 61; NORA F. MUNSAYAC-VISPERAS (Represented by Her Heirs); and GELACIO F.
MUNSAYAC, JR., respondents.
Actions; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; In a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court—as
distinguished from an ordinary appeal of a criminal case in which the whole case is opened for
review—the appeal is limited to the error assigned by petitioner; No affirmative relief can be given
to one who did not contest the lower court’s decision.—In a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court—as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of a criminal case in which the whole case is opened
for review—the appeal is limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Since respondents did not
contest the Decision of the CA, no affirmative relief can be sought by or given to them. Thus, not all
the issues raised before the appellate court need to be considered by this Court. The sole issue in the
present Petition is the question of inhibition of respondent judge.
Same; Courts; Judges; Inhibition of Judges; Once case has been decided with finality, a petition for
inhibition of the judge is rendered moot and academic.—After the CA terminated Special Proceedings
No. 704-R, we see no more reason why the inhibition of Judge Reyes should still be an issue. The
Petition therefor has already become moot and academic in view of the termination of the main case.
How can he be inhibited from a
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
437
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 24, 2003
437
Munsayac-De Villa vs. Court of Appeals
case that has already been decided with finality? It should be clear that the CA Decision terminating
Special Proceedings No. 704-R found that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by all the
parties was the “final, complete and absolute settlement of their respective shares and claims as heirs
of deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta Munsayac.” As such, any and all incidents
relating to the special proceedings should also be deemed to have been terminated.
Same; Same; Probate Proceedings; Jurisdiction; The determination of whether a property should be
included in the inventory is within the jurisdiction of a probate court.—Needless to say, the lifting of
any freeze order and the return of any property previously deposited with the court should be
effected. The judge had no more discretion to decide whether the amounts and the property
deposited should be released. Likewise, any standing order on any property in relation to the special
proceedings should be lifted. This ruling reiterates the long-standing principle that a tribunal acting
as a probate court exercises limited jurisdiction. However, the determination of whether a property
should be included in the inventory is within its probate jurisdiction. Such determination is only
provisional—not conclusive—in character and subject to the final decision in a separate action that
may be instituted by the parties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A probate court may not decide a question of title of ownership, but it may
do so if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to its assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are not impaired.—In
a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated this settled, corollary principle: generally,
a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, but it may do so if the interested
parties are all heirs; or the question is one of collation or advancement; or the parties consent to its
assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are not impaired. These principles, however,
have no more application in this case, since the main proceedings for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the deceased couple have already been decided and terminated. Indeed, every litigation
must come to an end.
Same; Same; Judgments; It is already an accepted rule of procedure for the Supreme Court to strive
to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of
future litigation.—In view of the above ruling, we deem it necessary to direct Judge Reyes to
immediately lift any freeze order still pending and to order the release of any property deposited in
custodia legis. It is already an accepted rule of procedure for this Court to strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. To
achieve that end and to expedite the case in the interest of substantial justice, a directive to the trial
judge to lift the freeze
438
438
order and release the property deposited with the court becomes indispensable.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Ismael M. Estella for petitioners.
Tenefrancia, Agranzamendez, Liceralde & Associates for private respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Once a case has been decided with finality, a petition for the inhibition of the judge therefrom
becomes moot and academic.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
March 2, 2001 Decision2 and the June 21, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 60914. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby
GRANTED only insofar as nullifying and setting aside the order of arrest contained in Respondent
Judge Antonio C. Reyes’ Orders dated June 22, 2000 and August 28, 2000 in Special Proceedings 704-
R, entitled ‘In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and the Late Vicenta
Munsayac.’
“No pronouncement as to costs.”4
The assailed Resolution denied both petitioners’ Partial Motion for Reconsideration5 and private
respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration.6
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 10-33.
2 Annex “A” of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 34-40. Penned by Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and concurred
in by Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. (Division chairman) and Perlita J. Tria Tirona (member).
3 Annex “B” of the Petition; Rollo, pp. 42-44.
4 CA Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 39.
5 CA Rollo, pp. 298-309.
6 Id., pp. 402-411.
439
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 24, 2003
439
The Facts
The facts of the case were summarized by the CA in this wise:
“A recapitulation of facts shows that the present controversy before [u]s stems from Special
Proceeding Case No. 704-R, entitled ‘In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late Gelacio
Munsayac, Sr. and the Late Vicenta Munsayac’ and pending before Branch 61 of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City. The said special proceeding case was filed on November 17, 1998 by Grace F.
Munsaya-De Villa (‘DE VILLA’), Lily F. Munsayac-Sunga (‘Sunga’) and Roy Peter F. Munsayac
(‘ROY’)—three (3) of the five (5) children of the late Spouses GELACIO and VICENTA MUNSAYAC—
for letters of administration nominating DE VILLA as administratrix of the intestate estate of their
parents. DE VILLA’s nomination was opposed by the two (2) other children of the late Munsayac
Spouse, namely, Gelacio F. Munsayac, Jr. (‘MUNSAYAC, JR.’) and the late Nora F. Munsayac-Visperas
(‘VISPERAS’), who nominated MUNSAYAC, JR. as administrator of the late Munsayac Couple’s
intestate estate.
“MUNSAYAC, JR. was eventually appointed administrator pursuant to respondent Judge’s Order
dated MARCH 22, 2000, replacing Lawyer Ceasar G. Oracion as special administrator of the said
intestate estate, pursuant to the Order dated April 27, 1998.
“Despite the approved 60-day suspension of the proceedings to enable the parties to discuss an
amicable settlement, the protracted exchange of pleadings between the opposing siblings in Special
Proceeding Case No. 704-R was of no help in the immediate settlement of the intestate estate of the
late Munsayac Couple.
“Even the efforts of the petitioners to inhibit respondent Judge further complicated the intestate
proceedings. Thus, there was the Request for Inhibition dated September 28, 1999, which was filed
by DE VILLA and SUNGA. Barely a week after the aforesaid Request for Inhibition was filed and before
respondent Judge could act on it, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
which was received by this Court on October 4, 1999, docketed as CA-G.R. SP NO. 55193 which has
for its petitioners and respondents the same respective parties involved in the present petition
before [u]s, and questions, among others, respondent Judge’s Order in open court dated September
29, 1999 directing/ordering DE VILLA to produce by 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon of the same date
certain bank time deposit certificates/documents; and the order of arrest of DE VILLA by about 4:00
p.m. in the afternoon of the same date, for failure to produce the said bank certificates/documents.
Pending the resolution of CA-G.R. SP NO. 55193, petitioners filed an administrative case dated July
11, 2000 before the Supreme Court, docketed as OCA IPI NO. 00-989-RTJ, which not only prayed for
respondent Judge’s suspension but also his
440
440
permanent removal from office on grounds of grave misconduct and serious inefficiency.
“Acting on the Omnibus Motion dated April 24, 2000 which was filed by the administrator of the
intestate estate, respondent Judge issued the Order dated May 4, 2000, which underscored the order
to surrender, under pain of contempt, (a) the amount of the bank investment discovered in the names
of the late VICENTA, DE VILLA and SUNGA made with the United Coconut Planter’s Bank, Baguio City
(‘UCPB’) under Investment Confirmation No. 0666 worth P13,506,343.33, and which amount was not
disclosed by the petitioners in the estate return tax, (b) as well as the surrender of all the pieces of
jewelry given by the late VICENTA to DE VILLA and SUNGA, subject of the ‘freeze order’ with the
China Banking Corporation.
“The Court a quo substantially reiterated the import of the Order dated May 4, 2000, by issuing the
Order dated May 24, 2000 and, on the account of petitioners’ failure to faithfully comply therewith,
issued the Order dated June 22, 2000, which contained the following decretal portion—
WHEREFORE, for their failure to comply with the Order of this Court dated May 24, 2000, the
petitioners Grace de Villa, Lily Sunga and Peter Roy Munsayac are hereby ordered ARRESTED in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 71, of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, until their compliance to
immediately surrender in custodia legis to this Court for the Special Administrator the amount of
P13,506,343.33 plus the legal interest of 12% per annum compounded annually, from May 1995 until
fully complied with or a total amount of P23,802,788.00 more or less, as of May, 2000.
‘The petitioners Grace de Villa, Lily Sunga and Peter Roy Munsayac are likewise ORDERED to
surrender in custodia legis to this Court for the Special Administrator the amount of P15,298,835.95
and P3,010,822.02 plus the legal interest of 12% per annum compounded annually, from May 1995
until fully complied with or a total amount of P32,267,868.00, more or less, as of May 2000, within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order.
‘SO ORDERED.’
and the Order dated August 28, 2000, the pertinent portion of which reads—
‘The order for the petitioners to surrender the amounts stated in this Court’s order dated June 22,
2000 shall stand and the order for the petitioners’ arrest shall not be lifted until their full and faithful
compliance with the order to place the said money in the legal custody of either the special
administrator or this Court. The motion
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VOL. 414, OCTOBER 24, 2003
441
for reconsideration on the matter of petitioners’ standing order of arrest is therefore DENIED.
‘SO ORDERED.’
were issued by respondent Judge and are now both subject of this present petition x x x.”7
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In nullifying the arrest order issued by Judge Reyes, the CA ruled that he had summarily ordered the
arrest of petitioners without any written charge filed against them or any hearing conducted thereon.
According to the appellate court, “there is nothing in Rule 71 which explicitly allows that the
requirements of filing a written charge and hearing in indirect contempt cases may be dispensed
with.”8 It thus set aside the Order of Arrest issued by respondent judge.
Ruling on the request for inhibition filed by petitioners, the CA, however, held that there was no
convincing proof that the demeanor of the trial judge had put him under suspicion, especially in the
light of their clear display of contumacious behavior toward the court.9 It further held that their
request for inhibition was unacceptable, because they had come to the court with “unclean hands.”10
Hence, this Petition.11
The Issue
In their Memorandum,12 petitioners submit this sole issue for our consideration:
_______________
7 CA Decision, pp. 2-4; Rollo, pp. 35-37. Citations omitted.
8 CA Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 39.

9 CA Resolution dated June 21, 2001, p. 2; Rollo, p. 43.
10 Id., pp. 3 & 44.
11 The case was deemed submitted for decision on July 10, 2002, upon this Court’s receipt of
petitioners’ “Supplemental to Manifestation/Motion for Reconsideration,” which was signed by Atty.
Ismael M. Estella. Earlier or on March 20, 2002, this Court received petitioners’ Memorandum signed
by the same counsel. Private respondents’ Memorandum, signed by Attys. Reynaldo U.
Agranzamendez and Miguel B. Liceralde was filed with this Court on April 15, 2002.
12 Rollo, pp. 107-127.
442
442
“With due respect, the Respondent Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in not ordering the
inhibition of the respondent presiding judge WHO, as shown in all his actuations and orders, [has]
demonstrated vindictiveness, arbitrariness, prejudice and bias against petitioners and partiality in
favor of private respondents thereby denying petitioners’ fundamental right to be entitled to an
impartial tribunal.”13
The Court’s Ruling

The Petition for inhibition has no merit, but the trial judge must lift the freeze order and cause the
return of property or money still in custodia legis.
Sole Issue:
Inhibition
Before delving into the issue of inhibition, we note that the CA Decision nullified and set aside the
Order of Arrest issued by Judge Reyes against petitioners. Consequently, the propriety of the Order
was no longer raised in this Petition. Neither was it raised by respondents.
In a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court—as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of a
criminal case in which the whole case is opened for review—the appeal is limited to the errors
assigned by petitioner.14 Since respondents did not contest the Decision of the CA, no affirmative
relief can be sought by or given to them.15 Thus, not all the issues raised before the appellate court
need to be considered by this Court. The sole issue in the present Petition is the question of inhibition
of respondent judge.
We emphasize at the outset that the main case from which this Petition arose has already been
decided by the CA. The Decision is
_______________
13 Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 12; Rollo, p. 118. Original in uppercase.

14 Manalili v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 632; 280 SCRA 400, October 9, 1997.
15 Rayandayan v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 27; 314 SCRA 255, September 14, 1999; China Banking
Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 329 Phil. 608; 260 SCRA 782, August 22, 1996.
443
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 24, 2003
443
now final and executory.16 Already terminated in that main case was Special Proceedings No. 704-
R, which had given rise to a number of incidents and petitions including the herein matter. In CA-G.R.
SP No. 64025, the CA found that Judge Reyes had gravely abused his discretion when he disallowed
the Extrajudicial Partition17 executed by the heirs of the Munsayac spouses. Thus, the appellate court
disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant special civil action is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the assailed Orders dated March 1, 2001 and March 21, 2001 are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE,
and a new one ENTERED approving the Extrajudicial Partition between the Heirs of the Spouses
Gelacio J. Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta F. Munsayac, and terminating Special Proceedings No. 704-R
pending before respondent Court[.] The parties are hereby ENJOINED to abide by the same.”18
Petitioners, however, argue that since there are still matters pending before the trial judge, such as
the withdrawal/release of money deposited in custodia legis and the lifting of a freeze order on
certain jewelry, his inhibition is still needed.19
We disagree. After the CA terminated Special Proceedings No. 704-R, we see no more reason why the
inhibition of Judge Reyes should still be an issue. The Petition therefor has already become moot and
academic in view of the termination of the main case. How can he be inhibited from a case that has
already been decided with finality?
It should be clear that the CA Decision20 terminating Special Proceedings No. 704-R found that the
Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by all the parties was the “final, complete and absolute
settlement of their respective shares and claims as heirs of
_______________
16 See Entry of Judgment dated June 17, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64025; Annex “A” of petitioners’
“Supplemental to Manifestation/Motion for Reconsideration”; Rollo, p. 160.
17 Records, Vol. III, pp. 834-837.
18 CA Decision dated November 29, 2001, p. 12; Rollo, p. 99.
19 Petitioners’ “Supplemental to Manifestation/Motion for Reconsideration,” p. 2; id., p. 158.

20 Dated November 29, 2001; Records, Vol. III, pp. 883-895; penned by Justice Ramon A. Barcelona
(Division chairman) and concurred in by Justices Bernardo P. Abesamis and Perlita J. Tria Tirona
(members).
444
444
deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta Munsayac.”21 As such, any and all incidents
relating to the special proceedings should also be deemed to have been terminated.
When Judge Reyes issued his Orders commanding the bank manager of the China Bank branch in
Baguio City to freeze the safety deposit box of petitioners22 and to deposit certain amounts in
custodia legis,23 he did so as the presiding judge in the probate court that was hearing Special
Proceedings No. 704-R. Now that the case has finally been terminated, it follows that neither he nor
his court has any more right to hold the properties that were the subject of his Orders in the special
proceedings.
Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order and the return of any property previously deposited
with the court should be effected. The judge had no more discretion to decide whether the amounts
and the property deposited should be released. Likewise, any standing order on any property in
relation to the special proceedings should be lifted. This ruling reiterates the long-standing principle
that a tribunal acting as a probate court exercises limited jurisdiction.24 However, the determination
of whether a property should be included in the inventory is within its probate jurisdiction. Such
determination is only provisional—not conclusive—in character and subject to the final decision in
a separate action that may be instituted by the parties.25
Neither are we unmindful of the rule that questions on an advance made or allegedly made by the
deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court that has jurisdiction over the estate
proceedings; and that the final order of the court thereon
_______________
21 CA Decision dated November 29, 2001, pp. 4-5; id., pp. 886-887.
22 Order dated March 24, 1999, Records, Vol. I, p. 142.
23 Order dated May 4, 2000, Records, Vol. II, pp. 1037-1045; Order dated May 24, 2000, id., pp. 1103-
1104.
24 Heirs of Oscar R. Reyes v. Reyes, 345 SCRA 541, November 22, 2000; Lim v. Court of Appeals, 380
Phil. 60; 323 SCRA 102, January 24, 2000.
25 Heirs of Oscar R. Reyes v. Reyes, supra; Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 155; 279 SCRA 647,
September 29, 1997; Valera v. Inserto, 149 SCRA 533, May 7, 1987.
445
VOL. 414, OCTOBER 24, 2003
445
shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heirs.26
In a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated this settled, corollary principle:
generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, but it may do so if the
interested parties are all heirs; or the question is one of collation or advancement; or the parties
consent to its assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are not impaired.27 These
principles, however, have no more application in this case, since the main proceedings for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased couple have already been decided and terminated.
Indeed, every litigation must come to an end.28
To be sure, this Court is not tasked to look into the ownership of the properties deposited with or
ordered frozen by the lower court during the progress of the special proceedings. Neither can Judge
Reyes do so now. Whether those properties should have been adjudicated by the legal heirs of the
Munsayac spouses is beside the point at this time. The former have already entered into an
Extrajudicial Partition representing the final, complete and absolute settlement of their shares as
heirs of the latter. What is left to be done is simply the lifting of any freeze order and the release of
any property originally deposited by petitioners in custodia legis.
In view of the above ruling, we deem it necessary to direct Judge Reyes to immediately lift any freeze
order still pending and to order the release of any property deposited in custodia legis. It is already
an accepted rule of procedure for this Court to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single
proceeding, leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.29 To achieve that end
and to expedite the case in the interest of substantial justice, a
_______________
26 Natcher v. Court of Appeals, 418 Phil. 669; 366 SCRA 385, October 2, 2001.
27 Ibid.; Coca v. Borwmeo, 81 SCRA 278, January 31, 1978.
28 Province of Camarines Norte v. Province of Quezon, 419 Phil. 372; 367 SCRA 91, October 11, 2001;
Flores v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 992; 259 SCRA 618, July 29, 1996.
29 San Luis v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 598; 365 SCRA 279, September 13, 2001; Ching v. Court of
Appeals, 387 Phil. 28; 331 SCRA 16, April 27, 2000; De los Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 522;
313 SCRA 632, September 3, 1999.
446
446

directive to the trial judge to lift the freeze order and release the property deposited with the court
becomes indispensable.30
WHEREFORE, the prayer for the inhibition of Judge Antonio C. Reyes is hereby DENIED for being
moot and academic. However, he is DIRECTED to immediately lift any order he made on properties
relative to Special Proceedings No. 704-R. He is further ORDERED to cause the return of any amount
or property originally deposited by petitioners in custodia legis. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Petition for prohibition against respondent judge denied, but he is ordered to lift any order relative
to Special Proceedings No. 704-R and to return any amount or property deposited in custodia legis.
Notes.—As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor, administrator, trustee,
guardian or other fiduciary, unless the estate or trust belongs to, or the ward is a member of his
immediate family and only if his service as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or fiduciary will
not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties. (Carual vs. Brusola, 317 SCRA 54
[1999])
A judge is bound never to consider lightly a motion for his inhibition that questions or puts to doubt,
however insignificant, his supposed predilection to a case pending before him. (Cortes vs. Bangalan,
322 SCRA 249 [2000])
——o0o——
_______________
30 De los Reyes v. Court of Appeals, supra; Golangco v. Court of Appeals, 347 Phil. 771; 283 SCRA 493,
December 22, 1997; Heirs of Gabriel-Almoradi v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 15, January 4, 1994.
Munsayac-De Villa vs. Court of Appeals, 414 SCRA 436, G.R. No. 148597 October 24, 2003

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G.R. No. 188773. September 10, 2014.

HEIRS OF VALENTIN BASBAS, ANSELMA B. ENDRINAL, GERTRUDES BASBAS, RUFINA BASBAS,

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs. Basbas

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Pura Ferrer-Calleja and Napoleon C. Banzuela, Jr. for petitioners.

Public Attorney’s Office for respondent.

A claim of status as heir of a decedent must always be substantially supported by evidence as

2 Id., at pp. 78-89.

3 Id., at pp. 129-135.

VOL. 734, SEPTEMBER 10, 2014

Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs. Basbas

The pertinent documents presented in evidence by both parties include:

(1) Certificate of Title No. RT-1684 (N.A.) in the name of Severo;

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs. Basbas

(4) Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of decedent Severo.

VOL. 734, SEPTEMBER 10, 2014

Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs. Basbas

1. [Severo] Basbas is married to Ana Rivera.

4. The property at dispute was originally registered in [Severo’s] name.5

4 Records, pp. 519-520.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs. Basbas

7 363 Phil. 393; 304 SCRA 18 (1999).

VOL. 734, SEPTEMBER 10, 2014

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs. Basbas

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FAILING TO RENDER

9 Id., at pp. 18-19.

VOL. 734, SEPTEMBER 10, 2014

Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs. Basbas

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs. Basbas

1. [Severo] Basbas is married to Ana Rivera.

10 Records, pp. 520-521 and 524-525.

VOL. 734, SEPTEMBER 10, 2014

Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs. Basbas

4. The property at dispute was originally registered in [Severo’s] name.11

Q Why do you know them Mr. Witness?

A They are my relatives, sir.

A They are my cousins, I used to call them “Kuya.”

A My father and the father of [petitioners] are relatives.

Q Specifically, what is the name of the father of [petitioners], Mr. Witness?

Q What is the name of your father?

Q How is Felomino and Valentin related?

How come they became [your] cousins?

A Their family names are both Basbas.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs. Basbas

Q So, what other basis?

Q Who was the father of Valentin Basbas then?

A Yes, Nicolas is the eldest [older] th[a]n Valentin Basbas.

A That is what I know. That is what my brother told me.12

Q Who is the father of Felomino Basbas?

12 TSN, 15 June 1999, pp. 5-12.

VOL. 734, SEPTEMBER 10, 2014

Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs. Basbas

Q Do you happen to know the mother of Felomino Basbas?

Q Would you tell us?

What is the middlename (sic) of Severo Basbas?

Q What is the maiden name (sic) of Nicolas Basbas?

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Heirs of Valentin Basbas vs. Basbas