ETHICS PART 1 (1-16) 10. ZENAIDA REYES, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and

the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No.
111682. February 6, 1997.*
1. IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
11. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, petitioner. B.M. No. 2540.
appellee, vs. LEONCIO SANTOCILDES, JR. y SIGA-AN,
September 24, 2013.*
accused-appellant. G.R. No. 109149. December 21, 1999.*
2. IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND
12. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL
appellee, vs. ESMENIO DE LA PEÑA y BEDRIO, accused-
C. ARGOSINO, AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner. Bar Matter No.
appellant. G.R. No. 92534. July 9, 1991.*
712. July 13, 1995.*
13. SPOUSES PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN,
3. IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ROBERTO TELAN, and
TELESFORO A. DIAO, vs. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ,
SPOUSES VICENTE and VIRGINIA TELAN, respondents. G.R.
petitioner. A.C. No. 244. March 29, 1963.
No. 95026. October 4,1991.*
4. ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator
14. DOMINGO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. THE
and Chief, Public Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Second Division) and the PEOPLE OF
RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent. A.C. No. 5299. August
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. G.R. No. 103276. April 11,
19, 2003.*
1996.*
5. PATRICK A. CARONAN, complainant, vs. RICHARD A.
15. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MERCY
CARONAN a.k.a. “ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN,”
SANTOS y ENTIENZA, accused-appellant. G.R. No.
respondent. A.C. No. 11316. July 12, 2016.*
117873. December 22, 1997.*
6. JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI,
16. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EFREN
defendant-appellant, ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.
JEREZ, accused-appellant. G.R. No. 114385. January 29,
No. L-18727. August 31, 1964.
1998.*
7. SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA,
Clerk of Court VI, Shari’a District Court, Marawi City,
respondent. A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24,
1997.* (Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 96-1-SDC(P)
8. In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of
Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP Administrative Case No.
MDD-1) AC-1928. August 3, 1978.*
9. In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of
Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO
CUNANAN ET AL., petitioners.

1
 Same; Attorneys; Code of Professional Responsibility; While a reading of
Canon 9, Code of Professional Responsibility appears to merely prohibit
lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the
B.M. No. 2540. September 24, 2013.*
unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS
this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to
MICHAEL A. MEDADO, petitioner.
prevent the unauthorized practice of law.―Knowingly engaging in
unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of the Code
Administrative Law; Mistake of Fact; Mistake of Law; While an honest
of Professional Responsibility, which provides: CANON 9 – A lawyer
mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of
consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of
law. While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers
law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized
presumed to know the law and its consequences.―While an honest
practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision,
mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the
consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of
unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students
law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is
and Bar candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to
presumed to know the law and its consequences. Ignorantia facti
comport themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the
excusat; ignorantia legis neminem excusat.
legal profession.

Practice of Law; Indirect Contempt; Under the Rules of Court, the

unauthorized practice of law by one’s assuming to be an attorney or
officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may constitute
indirect contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment
or both.―Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by
one’s assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as
such without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,
which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. Such a finding,
however, is in the nature of criminal contempt and must be reached
after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings. In this case,
while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect
contempt of court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of
law, we refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect
contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against
him.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Petition to Sign the
Roll of Attorneys.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.266
Datu Omar S. Sinsuat and Gilbert Karl T. Sison for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
SERENO, CJ.:
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by
petitioner Michael A. Medado (Medado).
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the
degree of Bachelor of Laws in 19791 and passed the same year’s bar
examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7.2
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorney’s Oath at the Philippine
International Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful

2
bar examinees.3 He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13
May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly
because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province
for a vacation.6
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files,
Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that
he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had
signed at the entrance of the PICC was probably just an attendance
record.7
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He
stated that he was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that
he was not actively involved in litigation practice. Thus, he operated
“under the mistaken belief [that] since he ha[d] already taken the oath,
the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to
his status as a lawyer”;8 and “the matter of signing in the Roll of
Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently
forgotten.”9
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) seminars, he was required to provide his roll
number in order for his MCLE compliances to be credited.10 Not having
signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was unable to provide his roll
number.
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the
instant Petition, praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys.11
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory
conference on the matter on 21 September 201212 and submitted a
Report and Recommendation to this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The
OBC recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s
gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit. 14 It
explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory
conference, petitioner could offer no valid justification for his
negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.15
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medado’s prayer in the
instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a
penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law.
At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of
Attorneys would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of
disbarment, a penalty that we have reserved for the most serious
ethical transgressions of members of the Bar.
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character
when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to
petitioner’s omission; rather, it was Medado himself who
acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30
years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to file
the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:
Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can
you say? Takot ka kung anong mangyayari sa ‘yo, you don’t
know what’s gonna happen. At the same time, it’s a combination
of apprehension and anxiety of what’s gonna happen. And,
finally it’s the right thing to do. I have to come here … sign the
roll and take the oath as necessary.16
For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for
disqualification from the practice of law,17 which is more than what we
can say of other individuals who were successfully admitted as
members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact demonstrates
that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics
of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses
the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
3

Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal
practitioner, having held various positions at the Laurel Law
Office,18 Petron, Petrophil Corporation, the Philippine National Oil
Company, and the Energy Development Corporation.19
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged
member of the Philippine Bar. While the practice of law is not a right
but a privilege,20 this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this
privilege from individuals who have shown mental fitness and moral
fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from
all liability for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period
spanning more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of
Attorneys.21 He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as
“neither willful nor intentional but based on a mistaken belief and an
honest error of judgment.”22
We disagree.
While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from
the legal consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil
motive,24 a mistake of law cannot be utilized as a lawful justification,
because everyone is presumed to know the law and its
consequences.25 Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem
excusat.
Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first
operated under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he
had signed at the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the
Roll of Attorneys. However, the moment he realized that what he had
signed was merely an attendance record, he could no longer claim an
honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point, Medado
should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the
Philippine Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as
it was the act of signing therein that would have made him so. 26 When,
in spite of this knowledge, he chose to continue practicing law without
taking the necessary steps to complete all the requirements for
admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized practice
of law.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by one’s
assuming to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such
without authority, may constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is
punishable by fine or imprisonment or both.28 Such a finding, however,
is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and must be reached after the
filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this case, while it
appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of
court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we
refrain from making any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no
formal charge pertaining thereto has been filed against him. Knowingly
engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 9 – A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the
unauthorized practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from
assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice
of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because
at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyer’s duty to prevent the unauthorized
practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport
themselves in accordance with the ethical standards of the legal
profession.
4
Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9
have warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law. 31 As
Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from
the practice of law. However, we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty
akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one
(1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his transgression of the
prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it
fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period,
petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of
law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice
of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with
severely by this Court.
petitioner not allowed to practice law, with stern warning against doing
so before signing the Roll of Attorneys.
Notes.―The Court has held that a disbarred lawyer, who continues to
represent himself as a lawyer with the authority to practice law
commits a contumacious act and is liable for indirect contempt.
(Sarmiento vs. Oliva, 599 SCRA 1 [2009])
Sections 3 and 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, specifically outlines the
procedural requisites before the accused may be punished for indirect
contempt. (Esperida vs. Jurado, Jr., 671 SCRA 66 [2012])

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is

hereby GRANTED. Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign
in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) YEAR after receipt of this Resolution.
Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of P32,000 for his
unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner
is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that
doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in
the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar

Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Abad, Perez, Reyes,
Perlas-Bernabe and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion and Villarama, Jr., JJ., On leave.
Peralta, Bersamin and Mendoza, JJ., On official leave.
Petition granted, petitioner allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys one (1)
year after receipt of this resolution. During the one (1) year period,

5

Bar Matter No. 712. July 13, 1995.*
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-
TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, AL
C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
Attorneys; Admission to the Bar; The practice of law is a high personal
privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified .—The practice
of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited
to citizens of good moral character, with special educational
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified. The essentiality of good
moral character in those who would be lawyers is stressed in the
following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we regard
as having persuasive effect.
Same; Same; Requirement of good moral character is of greater
importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of
justice is concerned.—It has also been stressed that the requirement of
good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the
general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned,
than the possession of legal learning.
Same; Same; All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired
into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.—All aspects of
moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those
seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said
to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral character of a
lawyer in proceedings for disbarment.
Same; Same; Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by
those who would seek admission to the bar must be a necessity more
stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the
general public.—The requirement of good moral character to be
satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must of
necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from
members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to
individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a
perception would signal the progressive destruction of our people’s
confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as we know it.
Same; Same; Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings
inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral
duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a
finding that the participant was possessed of good moral character.—Mr.
Argosino’s participation in the deplorable “hazing” activities certainly
fell far short of the required standard of good moral character. The
deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of
severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws
on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-
accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and
well-being of a “neophyte” who had, by seeking admission to the
fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at
the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless
stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical
beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of
that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good
moral character.
Same; Same; Good moral character is a requirement possession of which
must be demonstrated at the time of application for permission to take
6
the bar examinations and more importantly at the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take the attorney’s oath of office .—Now that
the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired,
the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether
applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character
is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated not only at
the time of application for permission to take the bar examinations but
also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to
the bar and to take the attorney’s oath of office.
PETITION to take the Attorney’s Oath.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr.
A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the
crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan
on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of “hazing”
conducted as part of university fraternity initiation rites.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining
with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty
to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This
plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February
1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to
suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an
application for probation with the lower court. The application for
probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by
Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation
was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer’s initial report
to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition
for Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he
disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation
status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this
Court’s En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar
Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer’s oath of
office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow
him to take the attorney’s oath of office and to admit him to the practice
of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his
probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note
that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) months
from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation
dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3)
Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to
be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a
highpersonal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The
essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is
stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and
which we regard as having persuasive effect:
In Re Farmer:3
“x x x x x x x x x
7
This ‘upright character’ prescribed by the statute, as a condition
precedent to the applicant’s right to receive a license to practice law in
North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites,
satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a
character. It is something more than an absence of bad character. It is
the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must
have conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would,
or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in
following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the
unpleasant thing if it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing
if it is wrong. x x x
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is
eminently proper. Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer . He is
sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect,
to every man’s fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is
the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s
property, reputation, his life, his all . An attorney at law is a sworn officer
of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of
justice. x x x
x x x x x x x x x”4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926
(1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:
“It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater
temptations to deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the
multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession.
For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission
to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore becomes
clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners, as an arm of the
court, is required to cause a minute examination to be made of the
moral standard of each candidate for admission to practice. x x x It
needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion
that the highest degree of scrutinymust be exercised as to the moral
character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar.
The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented , for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued
his profession, and has established himself therein, a far more difficult
situation is presented to the court when proceedings are instituted for
disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.”
In Re Keenan:6
“The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen ,
as in the right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar
privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special
fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire
to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate
machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to all and
to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are
allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the
standards are allowed to remain in it.”
Re Rouss:7
“Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair
private and professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to
an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past offense: an
examination into character , like the examination into learning, is merely
a test of fitness.”
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
“Attorneys are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that
they may not only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be
able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to
clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required
to be of good moral character, so that the agents and officers of the
court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due
administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence
that both those who have not such qualifications in the first instance , or
8
who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to
appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.”
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character
is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the
proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of
legal learning:
“x x x (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A.
[N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
‘The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to
the practice of the law unless he covered an upright moral
character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if
anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than
legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after years, but if the
applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the
chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a
disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling—a curse instead of a
benefit to his community—a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a
Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.’”9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in
respect of those seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry
is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral
character of a lawyer in proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay:10
“The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding
for his admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment
proceeding.”
Re Wells:11
“x x x that an applicant’s contention that upon application for admission
to the California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral
character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts which would
be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained;
that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to show
the applicant’s character as respects honesty, integrity, and general
morality, and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not
establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.”
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who
would seek admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent
than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public.
There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into
the legal profession is open to individuals with inadequate moral
qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people’s confidence in their courts of
law and in our legal system as we know it.12
Mr. Argosino’s participation in the deplorable “hazing” activities
certainly fell far short of the required standard of good moral character.
The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction
of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the
unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws
on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-
accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and
well-being of a “neophyte” who had, by seeking admission to the
fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at
the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a useless
stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical
beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of
that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes
impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good
moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has
expired, the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of
9
whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious Note.—Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also
moral character is a requirement possession of which must be essential for remaining in the practice of law. (Leda vs. Tabang, 206
demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take SCRA 395 [1992])
the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of
application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney’s oath of
office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination
and consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying
with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those
seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of
sworn certifications from responsible members of the community who
have a good reputation for truth and who have actually knownMr.
Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment
of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the
Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless
student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at
large. Mr. Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to
show that he is a different person now, that he has become morally fit
for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by
appropriate written manifestation, of the names and addresses of the
father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) days from notice hereof. Let a copy of
this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers and sisters, if
any, of Raul Camaligan.

Narvasa (C.J.), Padilla, Regalado, Davide,

Jr., Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco,
JJ.,concur.
Bellosillo, J., On leave.
Petition to take Attorney’s Oath denied.

10
 A.C. No. 244. March 29, 1963.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF
TELESFORO A. DIAO, vs. SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
Attorneys-at-law; Admission to bar obtained under false pretenses.—
Admission to the Bar obtained under false pretenses must be revoked.
Same; Requisites to become attorney-at-law.—Before the study of law,
an applicant for admission must have completed the prescribed courses
of legal study in the regular manner.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court Disbarment.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953,
Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having
falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he
had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course
referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be
investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao’s
name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the
allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had
not completed, before taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal
education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially,
in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his
A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials he had
submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his
allegation therein of successful completion of the “required pre-legal
education”.
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao,
practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had
left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army,
passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according
to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to
civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as
the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with
respondent’s failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the
equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary
to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao
never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his
application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-
1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from
the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously
certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his
school records.
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the “error” or
“confusion” was obviously of his own making. Had his application
disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would
also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he
began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have
been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the
applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, “That
previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily
completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.) as prescribed by the
Department of Private Education,” (emphasis on “previous”).
11
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to
take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such
admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is
hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study
in the regular manner is equally essential.
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the
name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his
lawyer’s diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Notes.—The pre-law requirement under the old rule had been changed.
Under the new rule (Sec. 6, Rule 138, Re-vised Rules of Court), an
applicant for admission to the bar examination is required to present a
certificate of com-pletion of a four-year high school course, and a course
of study prescribed for a bachelor’s degree in arts or sciences with any of
the following subjects as major or field of con-centration: political
science, logic, english, Spanish, history and economics.

Misrepresentation by a government employee as to his educational

attainments, contained in a sworn application for civil service
examination, is an act of dishonesty and is expressly made a ground for
disciplinary action under the Civil Service Rules (Aquino v. General
Manager of GSIS, L-24859, Jan. 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 415).

12
 A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003.*
ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief, Public Information Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO
T. SIMBILLO, respondent.
G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003.*
ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR
DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant
Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, respondents.
Administrative Law; Attorneys; The practice of law is not a
business; Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits;
Elements distinguishing the legal profession from a business.—It has
been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business. It is
a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making
venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The
duty to public service and to the administration of justice should be the
primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves. The following elements
distinguish the legal profession from a business: (1) A duty of public
service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making much money; (2) A
relation as an “officer of the court” to the administration of justice
involving thorough sincerity, integrity and reliability; (3) A relation to
clients in the highest degree of fiduciary; and (4) A relation to
colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and
unwillingness to resort to current business methods of advertising and
encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.
Same; Same; Solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed for
solicitation to be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the
legal profession.—The solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it were made in a
modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer
and to the bar. Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or names
of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as
well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data,
are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now acceptable.
Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and
informative data is likewise allowable.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court and SPECIAL CIVIL
ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that
appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of the newspaper, Philippine Daily
Inquirer, which reads: “ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-
4333/521-2667.”1
Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information
Office of the Supreme Court, called up the published telephone number
and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs. Simbillo,
who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in
handling annulment cases and can guarantee a court decree within four
to six months, provided the case will not involve separation of property
13
or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges
a fee of P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the
case and the other half after a decision thereon has been rendered.
Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the
Public Information Office revealed that similar advertisements were
published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and
August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.2
On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as
Assistant Court Administrator and Chief of the Public Information
Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T.
Simbillo for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services,
in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.3
In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued
that advertising and solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the
time has come to change our views about the prohibition on advertising
and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the
absolute prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the
ban on lawyer advertising; and that the rationale behind the decades-
old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court
promulgate a ruling that advertisement of legal services offered by a
lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as
it is dignified.4
The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.5 On June 29, 2002, the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-2002-
306,6 finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of law for one (1)
year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt
with more severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on
November 11, 2002.7
In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration,8 which was denied by the IBP in Resolution No. XV-
2002-606 dated October 19, 2002.9
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No.
157053entitled, “Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents.” This
petition was consolidated with A.C. No. 5299per the Court’s Resolution
dated March 4, 2003.
In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to
manifest whether or not they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings.10 Complainant filed his
Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any
additional pleading or evidence and is submitting the case for its early
resolution on the basis of pleadings and records thereof.11 Respondent,
on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.
We agree with the IBP’s Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-
606.
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:
Rule 2.03.—A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
Rule 3.01.—A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:
14
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court,
grounds therefor.—A member of the bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any
deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a
business.12 It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits.13 The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration.14 The duty to public service and to the
administration of justice should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests or what they
owe to themselves.15 The following elements distinguish the legal
profession from a business:
. 1.A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money;
. 2.A relation as an “officer of the court” to the
administration of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity
and reliability;
. 3.A relation to clients in the highest degree of
fiduciary;
. 4.A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on their
practice, or dealing directly with their clients.16
There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of.
He himself admits that he caused the publication of the advertisements.
While he professes repentance and begs for the Court’s indulgence, his
contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal
services again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that
he had no intention to violate the rules. Eight months after filing his
answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001
issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.17 Ten months later, he
caused the same advertisement to be published in the October 5, 2001
issue of Buy & Sell.18 Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and
contemptuous affront on the Court’s authority.
What adds to the gravity of respondent’s acts is that in advertising
himself as a self-styled “Annulment of Marriage Specialist,” he wittingly
or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also
the sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the
contemporary climate of permissiveness in our society. Indeed, in
assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four
to six months from the time of the filing of the case,19 he in fact
encourages people, who might have otherwise been disinclined and
would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.
Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper, it must be
compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it were made in a
modest and decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer
and to the bar.20 Thus, the use of simple signs stating the name or
names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of
practice, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same
brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling cards is now
acceptable.21 Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent
with the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief
biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As explicitly
stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:22
15

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of
the lawyer’s name and the names of his professional associates;
addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools
attended with dates of graduation, degrees and other educational
distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar
associations and committees thereof, in legal and scientific societies
and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the
names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the
names of clients regularly represented.
The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that
purpose; it cannot be a rare supplemental feature of a paper, magazine,
trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other
purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his
briefbiographical and informative data in a daily paper,
magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list, the conduct, management, or
contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public
or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the profession.
Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1)
YEAR effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug (Actg. Chairman), Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Abroad on Official Business.
Respondent suspended from practice of law for one (1) year for violation
of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule
138, Sec. 27 of the Rules of Court, with stern warning against repetition of
similar offense.
Note.—While indeed the practice of law is not a business venture, a
lawyer nevertheless is entitled to be duly compensated for professional
services rendered (J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc.
vs. De Vera, 317 SCRA 339 [1999])

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The

card may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law
firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the
partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the
convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise
have his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a
designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T.
SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the

16
 A.C. No. 11316. July 12, 2016.*
PATRICK A. CARONAN, complainant, vs. RICHARD A.
CARONAN a.k.a. “ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN,” respondent.
Attorneys; Admission to the Bar; Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be
admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law
course.—The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose
real name is “Richard A. Caronan,” be barred from admission to the Bar.
Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for
admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had
pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.: Section
6. Pre-Law.—No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall
be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the
Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had
pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized
university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of
a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein
for a bachelor’s degree in arts or sciences with any of the following
subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic,
english, Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied) In the
case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree. While he
enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA
where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating. Clearly,
respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree.
Same; Same; Respondent’s false assumption of his brother’s name,
identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the
Bar.—The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may
later on complete his college education and earn a law degree under his
real name. However, his false assumption of his brother’s name,
identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the
Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone
who demands it. Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character. In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar
Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for
Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar, Atty.
Froilan R. Melendrez, 431 SCRA 146 (2004), the Court explained the
essence of good moral character: Good moral character is what a
person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the
opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held
by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is not a
subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The
standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such
conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal
law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
Same; Same; Good moral character is essential in those who would be
lawyers.—Respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity,
and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into
controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to
resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral
character is essential in those who would be lawyers. This is imperative
in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation which exists
between him and his client, as well as between him and the court.
Same; Same; Respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by
pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer.—
Respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to
have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also tarnished the
image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which
resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against him. Certainly,
respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal profession
17
where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its
integrity and dignity.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE in the Supreme Court. Assuming
Complainant’s Identity and Falsely Representing that the Complainant
has the Required Educational Qualifications to Take the Bar
Examinations and be Admitted to the Practice of Law.
PER CURIAM:
For the Court’s resolution is the Complaint-Affidavit1 filed by
complainant Patrick A. Caronan (complainant), before the Commission
on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
against respondent “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,” whose real name is
allegedly Richard A. Caronan (respondent), for purportedly assuming
complainant’s identity and falsely representing that the former has the
required educational qualifications to take the Bar Examinations and be
admitted to the practice of law.
The Facts
Complainant and respondent are siblings born to Porferio2 R. Caronan,
Jr. and Norma A. Caronan. Respondent is the older of the two, having
been born on February 7, 1975, while complainant was born on August
5, 1976.3 Both of them completed their secondary education at the
Makati High School where complainant graduated in 1993 4and
respondent in 1991.5 Upon his graduation, complainant enrolled at the
University of Makati where he obtained a degree in Business
Administration in 1997.6 He started working thereafter as a Sales
Associate for Philippine Seven Corporation (PSC), the operator of 7-11
Convenience Stores.7 In 2001, he married Myrna G. Tagpis with whom
he has two (2) daughters.8 Through the years, complainant rose from
the ranks until, in 2009, he was promoted as a Store Manager of the 7-
11 Store in Muntinlupa.9
Meanwhile, upon graduating from high school, respondent enrolled at
the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila (PLM), where he stayed for one
(1) year before transferring to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA)
in 1992.10 In 1993, he was discharged from the PMA and focused on
helping their father in the family’s car rental business. In 1997, he
moved to Nueva Vizcaya with his wife, Rosana, and their three (3)
children.11 Since then, respondent never went back to school to earn a
college degree.12
In 1999, during a visit to his family in Metro Manila, respondent told
complainant that the former had enrolled in a law school in Nueva
Vizcaya.13 Subsequently, in 2004, their mother informed complainant
that respondent passed the Bar Examinations and that he used
complainant’s name and college records from the University of Makati
to enroll at St. Mary’s University’s College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya and take the Bar Examinations.14 Complainant brushed these
aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him.15
In 2006, complainant was able to confirm respondent’s use of his name
and identity when he saw the name “Patrick A. Caronan” on the
Certificate of Admission to the Bar displayed at the latter’s office in
Taguig City.16 Nevertheless, complainant did not confront respondent
about it since he was preoccupied with his job and had a family to
support.17
Sometime in May 2009, however, after his promotion as Store Manager,
complainant was ordered to report to the head office of PSC in
Mandaluyong City where, upon arrival, he was informed that the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) was requesting his presence at
its office in Taft Avenue, Manila, in relation to an investigation involving
respondent who, at that point, was using the name “Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan.”18 Accordingly, on May 18, 2009, complainant appeared
before the Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes Division of the NBI where
18
he was interviewed and asked to identify documents including: (1) his
and respondent’s high school records; (2) his transcript of records from
the University of Makati; (3) Land Transportation Office’s records
showing his and respondent’s driver’s licenses; (4) records from St.
Mary’s University showing that complainant’s transcript of records
from the University of Makati and his Birth Certificate were submitted
to St. Mary’s University’s College of Law; and (5) Alumni Book of St.
Mary’s University showing respondent’s photograph under the name
“Patrick A. Caronan.”19 Complainant later learned that the reason why
he was invited by the NBI was because of respondent’s involvement in
a case for qualified theft and estafa filed by Mr. Joseph G. Agtarap
(Agtarap), who was one of the principal sponsors at respondent’s
wedding.20
Realizing that respondent had been using his name to perpetrate
crimes and commit unlawful activities, complainant took it upon
himself to inform other people that he is the real “Patrick A. Caronan”
and that respondent’s real name is Richard A. Caronan. 21 However,
problems relating to respondent’s use of the name “Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan” continued to hound him. In July 2013, PSC received a letter
from Quasha Ancheta Peña & Nolasco Law Offices requesting that they
be furnished with complainant’s contact details or, in the alternative,
schedule a meeting with him to discuss certain matters concerning
respondent.22 On the other hand, a fellow church member had also told
him that respondent who, using the name “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan,”
almost victimized his (church member’s) relatives.23Complainant also
received a phone call from a certain Mrs. Loyda L. Reyes (Reyes), who
narrated how respondent tricked her into believing that he was
authorized to sell a parcel of land in Taguig City when in fact, he was
not.24 Further, he learned that respondent was arrested for gun-
running activities, illegal possession of explosives, and violation
of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 22.25
Due to the controversies involving respondent’s use of the name
“Patrick A. Caronan,” complainant developed a fear for his own safety
and security.26 He also became the subject of conversations among his
colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from his job at
PSC.27 Hence, complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop
respondent’s alleged use of the former’s name and identity, and illegal
practice of law.28
In his Answer,29 respondent denied all the allegations against him and
invoked res judicata as a defense. He maintained that his identity can
no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD
Case No. 09-2362 where
the IBP-Board of Governors dismissed30 the administrative case31 filed
by Agtarap against him, and which case had already been declared
closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No. 10074.32 Moreover,
according to him, complainant is being used by Reyes and her spouse,
Brigadier General Joselito M. Reyes, to humiliate, disgrace, malign,
discredit, and harass him because he filed several administrative and
criminal complaints against them before the Ombudsman.33
On March 9, 2015, the IBP-CBD conducted the scheduled mandatory
conference where both parties failed to appear.34 Instead, respondent
moved to reset the same on April 20, 2015.35 On such date, however,
both parties again failed to appear, thereby prompting the IBP-CBD to
issue an Order36 directing them to file their respective position papers.
However, neither of the parties submitted any.37
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
On June 15, 2015, IBP Investigating Commissioner Jose Villanueva
Cabrera (Investigating Commissioner) issued his Report and
Recommendation,38 finding respondent guilty of illegally and falsely
19
assuming complainant’s name, identity, and academic records.39 He
observed that respondent failed to controvert all the allegations against
him and did not present any proof to prove his identity. 40 On the other
hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he
is the real “Patrick A. Caronan.”41
Further, he noted that respondent admitted that he and complainant
are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on August 31, 2012 that:
(a) his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma Atillo; and (b)
he is married to Rosana Halili-Caronan.42However, based on the
Marriage Certificate issued by the National Statistics Office (NSO),
“Patrick A. Caronan” is married to a certain “Myrna G. Tagpis,” not to
Rosana Halili-Caronan.43
The Investigating Commissioner also drew attention to the fact that the
photograph taken of respondent when he was arrested as “Richard A.
Caronan” on August 16, 2012 shows the same person as the one in the
photograph in the IBP records of “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan.” 44 These,
according to the Investigating Commissioner, show that respondent
indeed assumed complainant’s identity to study law and take the Bar
Examinations.45 Since respondent falsely assumed the name, identity,
and academic records of complainant and the real “Patrick A. Caronan”
neither obtained the bachelor of laws degree nor took the Bar Exams,
the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the name “Patrick A.
Caronan” with Roll of Attorneys No. 49069 be dropped and stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys.46 He also recommended that respondent and the
name “Richard A. Caronan” be barred from being admitted as a member
of the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution,
the IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions against
respondent.47
On June 30, 2015, the IBP-Board of Governors issued Resolution No.
XXI-2015-607,48 adopting the Investigating Commissioner’s
recommendation.
The Issues Before the Court
The issues in this case are whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that:
(a) the name “Patrick A. Caronan” be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys;
and (b) the name “Richard A. Caronan” be barred from being admitted
to the Bar.
The Court’s Ruling
After a thorough evaluation of the records, the Court finds no cogent
reason to disturb the findings and recommendations of the IBP.
As correctly observed by the IBP, complainant has established by clear
and overwhelming evidence that he is the real “Patrick A. Caronan” and
that respondent, whose real name is Richard A. Caronan, merely
assumed the latter’s name, identity, and academic records to enroll at
the St. Mary’s University’s College of Law, obtain a law degree, and take
the Bar Examinations.
As pointed out by the IBP, respondent admitted that he and
complainant are siblings when he disclosed upon his arrest on August
31, 2012 that his parents are Porferio Ramos Caronan and Norma
Atillo.49 Respondent himself also stated that he is married to Rosana
Halili-Caronan.50 This diverges from the official NSO records showing
that “Patrick A. Caronan” is married to Myrna G. Tagpis, not to Rosana
Halili-Caronan.51 Moreover, the photograph taken of respondent when
he was arrested as “Richard A. Caronan” on August 16, 2012 shows the
same person as the one in the photograph in the IBP records of “Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan.”52 Meanwhile, complainant submitted numerous
documents showing that he is the real “Patrick A. Caronan,” among
which are: (a) his transcript of records from the University of Makati
bearing his photograph;53 (b) a copy of his high school yearbook with
his photograph and the name “Patrick A. Caronan” under it; 54 and (c)
NBI clearances obtained in 2010 and 2013.55
20

To the Court’s mind, the foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent
falsely used complainant’s name, identity, and school records to gain
admission to the Bar. Since complainant — the real “Patrick A. Caronan”
— never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended
that the name “Patrick A. Caronan” be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.
The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name
is “Richard A. Caronan,” be barred from admission to the Bar. Under
Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to
the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and
satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.:
Section 6. Pre-Law.—No applicant for admission to the bar
examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he
has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study
of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized
and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto
the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study
prescribed therein for a bachelor’s degree in arts or sciences with any
of the following subject as major or field of concentration: political
science, logic, english, Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases
supplied)
In the case at hand, respondent never completed his college degree.
While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later and entered
the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without
graduating.56 Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite pre-
law degree.
The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later
on complete his college education and earn a law degree under his real
name. However, his false assumption of his brother’s name, identity,
and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The
practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right
to be granted to everyone who demands it.57 Rather, it is a privilege
limited to citizens of good moral character.58 In In the Matter of the
Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S. Meling in the 2002 Bar
Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine
Shari’a Bar, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez,59 the Court explained the
essence of good moral character:
Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from
good reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the
estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is
known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which
corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and
professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely
enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.60 (Emphasis supplied)
Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral
fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity,
and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into
controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to
resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral
character is essential in those who would be lawyers.61 This is
imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the trust relation
which exists between him and his client, as well as between him and
the court.62
Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by
pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer. He also
tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities,
which resulted in the filing of several criminal cases against him.
Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal
profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold
its integrity and dignity.63
WHEREFORE, respondent Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. “Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan” (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely assuming the name,
21
identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick A. Caronan
(complainant) to obtain a law degree and take the Bar Examinations.
Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or
criminal cases, the Court hereby resolves that:
(1) the name “Patrick A. Caronan” with Roll of Attorneys No.
49069 is ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of
Attorneys;
(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of
law or making any representations as a lawyer;
(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of
the Philippine Bar in the future;
(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to respondent under the name “Atty. Patrick A.
Caronan” and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
Certificates issued in such name
are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED;
(5) and the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered
to CIRCULATEnotices and POST in the bulletin boards of all
courts of the country a photograph of respondent with his real
name, “Richard A. Caronan,” with a warning that he is not a
member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false
assumption of the name and identity of “Patrick A. Caronan.”
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Perez, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen,
Jardeleza and Caguioa, JJ., concur.
Mendoza and Reyes, JJ., On Official Leave.
The name “Patrick A. Caronan” ordered dropped and stricken off the
Roll of Attorneys; Respondent prohibited from engaging in practice of
law or making any representation as lawyer; He is barred from being
admitted as member of Philippine Bar in the future; Identification
Cards issued by Integrated Bar of the Philippines cancelled and/or
revoked; and Office of Court Administrator ordered to circulate notices
and post in bulletin boards of all courts a photograph of respondent
with his real name “Richard A. Caronan,” with warning that he is not a
member of Philippine Bar.
Notes.—All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees,
professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have
voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for
admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards
the courts — there is no exemption from this sworn duty for law
professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the
law school to which they belong. (Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty
Entitled “Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of
Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court,” 644
SCRA 543 [2011])
The possession of good moral character is both a condition precedent
and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to
retain membership in the legal profession. (Ventura vs. Samson, 686
SCRA 430 [2012])
22
 Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants
No. L-18727. August 31, 1964.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-
This is a proceeding in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First
appellant, ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.
Instance of Cebu. The office in contention is that of Administrator of
the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April
Attorneys; "Titulo de Abogado" means membership in the bar.—The term
1961 in favor of the plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the
"titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree
defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.
of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the bar after due admission
thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law.
The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don
Same; Possession of law degree not indispensable to qualify as lawyer.—
Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui, now deceased, "for the care and
Possession of the law degree itself is not ndispensable; completion of
support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and
the prescribed courses may be shown n some other way.
helpless persons." It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No.
3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1926) and
Same; Reinstatement to the roll wipes out disabilities.—Reinstatement to
endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a
the roll of attorneys wipes out the restrictions and disabilities resulting
series of donations, principally the deed of donation executed on 2
from a previous disbarment.
January 1926.
Quo warranto; Limitations; One year after right of plaintiff to hold office
arose.—Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (f formerly Sec, 16 Rule 68, taken
Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders
from Section 215 of Act 190), and action of quo warranto must be filed
jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to "such persons as they
within one (1) year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose.
may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them." Section 2
of the deed of donation provides as follows:
Same; Same: Same; Period not to be counted from date defendant began
to discharge duties of office.—The basis of a quo warranto action being
"Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar,
the plaintiff's own right to office, it is from the time such right arose
nos sustituyan nuestro legitimo sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de
that the one-year limitation must be counted and not from the date the
nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la ciudad de
incumbent defendant began to discharge the duties of said office.
Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho
sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese residiendo entonces en la ciudad de
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitimo Mauricio
Canonoy, J.
Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE
SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o incapacidad de estos dos
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court
administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE
Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.
BARILI pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que
Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofileña for defendant-appellant.

23
descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos
Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo
de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de
estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor impuesto o contribucion. En
igualdad de circunstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad
descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando
absolutamente faltare persona de estas cualificaciones, la
administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al señor
Obispo de Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica,
apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la cabecera de esta
Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu."
Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer
the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon the administration
passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May
1931 and the second, on 1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui,
only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter,
beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations
ensued concerning the position of administrator, to which, in so far as
they are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in
this decision.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers,
being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the nephews of the spouses Don
Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui, On 27 February 1960 the then
incumbent administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio
Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between them and
embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio
Ma. Cui took his oath of office. Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior
notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the
position.
Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the
plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant demanding that the office be
turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having
been complied with, the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case.
Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office,
being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned
by the founders of the Hospicio in their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their
respective qualifications to the position of administrator. Jesus is the
older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be
preferred, pursuant to section 2 of the deed of donation. However,
before the test of age may be applied the deed gives preference to the
one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named,
"que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o
farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al estado mayor
impuesto o contribucion,"
The specific point in dispute is the meaning of the term "titulo de
abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the
University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar,
not having passed the examinations to qualif y him as one. Antonio Ma.
Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar, and although disbarred
by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was
reinstated by resolution promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two
weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio
de Barili.
759
VOL. 11, AUGUST 31, 1964 759
Cui vs. Cui
The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that
the phrase "titulo de abogado/' taken alone, means that of a full-fledged
lawyer, but that "as used in the deed of donation and considering the
function or purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict
interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a law degree or
diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both
by the defendant and by the intervenor.
24
We are of the opinion that whether taken alone or in context the term
"titulo de abogado" means not mere possession of the academic degree
of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission
thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word
"titulo" is defined as "testimonio o instrumento dado para ejercer un
empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Real
Academia Española, 1947 ed., p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as
follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en
juicio, por escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes,
y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o puntos legales que se le
consultan." (Id., p. 5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law
school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not
entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English
equivalent of "abogado" is lawyer or attor ney-at-law. This term has a
fixed and general signification, and has reference to that class of
persons who are by license off icers of the courts, empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend, and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities
and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.
In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is
under the authority of the Supreme Court. According to Rule 138 such
admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's
oath and receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate
being his license to practice the profession. The academic degree of
Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar,
except as evidence
760
760 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cui vs. Cui
of compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the
examinations has "successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in
a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of
Education." For this purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is
not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may be shown
in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the
former Code of Civil Procedure, where persons who had not gone
through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the
Bar examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code
required possession of "the necessary qualifications of learning ability.")
Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not
possess the "titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree
of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.
The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established
the foregoing test advisely, and provided in the deed of donation that if
not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or
a pharmacist, in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who
pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A lawyer, first
of al!, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of
the Hospicio shall "make regulations for the government of said
institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which
invalids and incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to
the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and conditions
promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the
Act; and shall administer properties of considerable value—for all of
which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a
license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled,
as against the defendant, to the office of administrator. But it is argued
that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless
disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which
761
VOL. 11, AUGUST 81, 1964 761
Cui vs. Cui
provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground, among
others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident
sound moral character. Reference is made to the fact that the defendant
was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and
unprofessional conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated
on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of administrator.
25
His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon
proof no less than that required for his admission to the Bar in the first
place.
"Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent
in the sound discretion of the court. The court action will depend,
generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest
in the orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved
by the applicant's participation therein in the capacity of an attorney
and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for
admission to the bar, satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral
character—a fit and proper person to practice law. The court will take
into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the charge for which he was
disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that
has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301, p. 443)
"Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to
reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney has received a pardon
following his conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have
been held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except
that the court may require a greater degree of proof than in an original
admission." (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)
"The decisive questions on an application for
reinstatement are whether applicant is 'of good moral character' in the
sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law
and is a fit and proper person to be entrusted with the privileges of the
office of an attorney, and whether his mental quallifications are such as
to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the
moral attributes are to be regarded as a separate and distinct from his
mental qualifications." (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 816)."
As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one
seeking reinstatement to the office of
762
762 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cui vs. Cui
attorney cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the
deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is disputed in this
case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the
restrictions and disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment
were wiped out.
This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse
of time amounting the prescription or laches. Under Section 16 of Rule
68 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this
kind of action must be filed within one (1) year after the right of
plaintiff to hold the office arose.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question
as long ago as 1932. On January 26 of that year he filed a complaint
in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the
administration of the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the
plaintiff's father, and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors, The case
was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the
defendant there to the complaint and complaint in intervention. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the case was
remanded for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The
plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in the
decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro
Cui continued as administrator, Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser"
and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant
administrator.
Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-
judicial maneuvers. First he informed the Social Welfare Commissioner,
by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he
had "made clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator
of the Hospicio." He followed that up with another letter dated 4
February, announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1
January 1950. Actually, however, he took his oath of office before a
notary public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a re-
763
26
 VOL. 11, AUGUST 31, 1964
Cui vs. Cui
ply of acknowledgment, dated 2 March, from the Social Welfare
Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the position
as stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather
muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner to the Secretary
of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950),
correcting another opinion previously given, in effect ruled that the
plaintiff, not being a lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of
the Hospicio,
Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court
controversy. On 4 March 1950, the Hospicio commenced an action
against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu (Civ. No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen
the Hospicio's deposits therein, The Bank then filed a third-party
complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as
stated above, taken oath as administrator. On 19 October 1950, having
been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice
he moved to dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that he
was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the administration of
the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953.
On 6 February 1954 he was able to take another oath of office as
administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a
second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay,
be it said, upon learning that a case was pending in Court, stated in a
telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned
the court may disregard the oath" thus taken, The motion to dismiss
was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case filed their
notice of appeal from the order of of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed
an ex-parte motion to be excluded as party in the appeal and the trial
Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954.
Appellants thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the
Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided on 28 May 1956,
to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That
763 appeal, however, after it reached this Court was dismissed upon
motion
764
764 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cui vs. Cui
of' the parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee
of the Hospiciox x x should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to
be initiated against the incumbent by whomsoever is not occupying the
office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution
of dismissal was' issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent
administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action in quo warranto was
filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid
mo tion for dismissal.
On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this
Court as member of the Bar, and on the following 27 February Dr.
Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor, pursuant to the
"convenio" between them executed on the same date. The next day
Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.
The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this
Court decided the first case of Cui v. Cui in 1934 (60 Phil. 3769),
remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance
instead of the position of assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro
Cui to continue as administrator and his failure to file an action in quo
warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in
Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was dismissed upon motion of
the parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could
be ventilated in such an action—all these circumstances militate
against the plaintiffs present claim in view of the rule that an action in
quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the
plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that the plaintiff did not file
an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the
latter's illness did not interrupt the running of the statutory period.
And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's
assumption of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's
27
position any better, for the basis of the action is his own right to the
office and it is from the time such right arose that the one-year
limitation must
765
VOL. 11, AUGUST 81, 1964 765
Cui vs. Cui
be counted, not from the date the incumbent began to discharge the
duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs. Yulo, 62
Phil. 161.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is
also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one of the nephews of the
founders of the Hospiciomentioned by them in the deed of donation. He
is further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui,
who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The deed
of donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos
administradores (those appointed in the deed itself) pasara a una sola
persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda
legitimamente de cualquiera de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano
Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado
x x x En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas
edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion."
Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is
older than he and therefore is preferred when the circumstances are
otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the
founders was to confer the administration by line and successively to
the descendants of the nephews named in the deed, in the order they
are named, Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr.
Teodoro Cui, who belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next
administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the
intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the
terms of the deed of donation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment
appealed from is reversed and set aside, and the complaint as well as
the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against
plaintiff-appellee and intervenor-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside; complaint as well as complaint in
intervention dismissed.
766
766 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions
Notes.—Regarding the disputed meaning of "titulo de abogado" and
"admission to the Philippine Bar", it was recently held that the "Treaty
on the Validity of Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Professions
between the Philippine Republic and Spain" merely extended to
diplomas issued or degrees conferred by educational institutions of
Spain the same recognition and treatment that we accord to similar
diplomas or degrees from local institution of learning; and, therefore,
holders of said Spanish diplomas or degrees must take the examination
prescribed by our laws for holders of similar diplomas or degrees from
educational institutions in the Philippines (Philippine Medical
Association v. Board of Medical Examiners, et al, L-25135, Sept. 21,
1968). This reiterates the earlier ruling in In re Garcia, Resolution dated
15 August 1961, 2 SCRA 984.
Practice of Law to fall within the prohibition of Section 32 of Rule 32 of
the Rules of Court has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment
for such services (People v. Villanueva, L-19450, May 27, 1965).
Passing the bar examination is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law, taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the
regular manner is equally essential (Martinez v. Diao, Adm. Case No.
244, March 31, 1963).
28
 A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997.*
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 96-1-SDC(P)

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of

Court VI, Shari’a District Court, Marawi City, respondent.
Civil Service Law; Public Officers; Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards
for Public Officials and Employees [RA 6713] inter alia enunciates the
State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service.—The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter
alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics
and utmost responsibility in the public service. Section 4 of the Code
commands that “(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect
the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.
629
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 629
Alawi vs. Alauya
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
public safety and public interest.” More than once has this Court
emphasized that “the conduct and behavior of every official and
employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from
the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times
be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as
to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary.
Same; Same; As a man of the law, he may not use language which is
abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.—Now,
it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good
customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch
denunciations of acts believed—however sincerely—to be deceitful,

29
fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language, Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of
action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right
with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to
anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he “act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” Righteous
indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari’a Bar
and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more
stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law,
he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee, it is expected
that his accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all
times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by
prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these
salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by
his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
Attorneys; Integrated Bar of the Philippines; The title of “attorney” is
reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study
of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in
good standing, and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction.—As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this
Court has already had occasion to
630
630 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
declare that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged
members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before
Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and
one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice
in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of
“attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations,
have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
ADMINISTRATIVE MATTER in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or
coordinator) of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real
estate and housing company. Ashary M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi
City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.
It appears that through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the
purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units
belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa &
Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to
Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya
addressed a letter to the President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the
termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
“** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of
my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement entered into between
me and your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator,
SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company’s branch office here in Cagayan de
Oro City, on the grounds that my consent
631
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 631
Alawi vs. Alauya
30
was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said
contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated
such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an
Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests.”
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic
language on the “grounds which could evidence the bad faith, deceit,
fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
unscrupulous sales agent **;” and closed with the plea that Villarosa &
Co. “agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even as I inform
you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the
contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said
onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I
was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the
controversial contract.”
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co.
at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City. The envelope containing it,
and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at
the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the
words, “Free Postage-PD 26,” had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin
T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit & Collection Group of the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village,
Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with
Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan in
connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the
rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:
“** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul,
cancel, rescind and voided, the ‘manipulated contract’ entered into
between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by
its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and
fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without any authority and against my will.
Thus, the contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the
attending circumstances, that my consent was
632
632 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of
confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me
and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me.”
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what
he took to be the anomalous actuations of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated
February 21,1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for
the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his
housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on
account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M.
Ordoñez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the
Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his
salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous
manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the
contracts by “the scheming sales agent.”b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme
Court requesting it to stop deductions on Alauya’s UHLP loan “effective
May 1996,” and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. “for the buy-
back of ** (Alauya’s) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments.”c
On learning of Alauya’s letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995,
Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified complaint dated January 25,
1996—to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above
mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, ”Free Postage-PD
26.”1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:
_______________
a Annexes B, B-1, B-3 of Alauya’s Comment dated June 5, 1996.
b Annexes F and G, id.
31
c Annex C-2, id. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court,” but only to the
1 Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo at p. 14; copies of the letter District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced
were also furnished the National Home Mortgage Finance the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a “strong link”
633 between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan’s office. He also averred that the
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 633 complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not
Alawi vs. Alauya only “the Executive Clerk of

_______________
. 1.“Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with
no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad
Corporation. The Finance Management and Budget Office and the
faith;”
Financial Division of the Supreme Court.
. 2.“Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor
2 Resolution dated March 25, 1996.
and established reputation;”
3 Dated April 19, 1996.
. 3.“Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free 634
postage **;” and
634 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
. 4.Usurpation of the title of “attorney,” which only Alawi vs. Alauya
regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
Court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar,” but
also “a scion of a Royal Family **.”4
She deplored Alauya’s references to her as “unscrupulous, swindler,
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less
forger, manipulator, etc.” without “even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic)
aggressive, even obsequious tones,5 Alauya requested the former to
his allegations with the essence of truth,” denouncing his imputations
give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment
as irresponsible, “all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with
thereon.6 He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good
manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,” and asserting that all her
faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi, as sales
dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She
agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently
closed with the plea that Alauya “be dismissed from the service, or be
bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of
appropriately desciplined (sic) **.”
P4,333.10 from his salary.
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996,
Conformably with established usage that notices of resolutions emanate
Alauya contended that it was he who had suffered “undue injury,
from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of
mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial
resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan,
suffering,” considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had
Assistant Division Clerk of Court.2
been deducted from his salary.7 He declared that there was no basis for
Alauya first submitted a “Preliminary Comment”3 in which he
the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely
questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require an explanation
acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking
of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to “a mere Asst. Div.
privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a

32
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that
the words: “Free Postage-PD 26,”were typewritten on the envelope by
some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of
Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before
respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);8 and as
far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the
_______________
4 Rollo at p. 23.
5 Evidently, he had since become aware of the immemorial practice
that NOTICES (or communications informing) of Resolutions adopted by
the Court En Banc or any of its three (3) Divisions are sent to the
parties by and over the signature of the corresponding Clerk of Court or
his Assistant, the Court’s Resolutions being incorporated verbatim in
said notices.
6 Dated April 22, 1996.
7 Rollo at p. 28.
8 Id. at p. 60.
635
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 635
Alawi vs. Alauya
use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were
indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred
inadvertently and because of an honest mistake.9
Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is
“lexically synonymous” with “Counsellors-at-law,” a title to which
Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
“attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken for
“councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting a local
legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a
lawyer.
He pleads for the Court’s compassion, alleging that what he did “is
expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured.”10 He claims he
was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and
friend.11 He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi’s assurance
that she would show the completed document to him later for
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite “numerous letters
and follow-ups” he still does not know where the property—subject of
his supposed agreement with Alawi’s principal, Villarosa & Co.—is
situated;12 He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife,
and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not do so
until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his
contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such
pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance,
lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which
he ever saw.13
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice,
Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit, it
consisting of “fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations,” and
complainant Alawi having come to the
_______________
9 Id. at p. 32.
10 Id. at p. 34.
11 Id. at p. 35, et seq.
12 Id. at p. 35.
13 Id.
636
636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan
being apparent and demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant
Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and
his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996—all of which
he signed as “Atty. Ashary M. Alauya”—in his Comment of June 5, 1996,
33
he does not use the title but refers to himself as “DATU ASHARY M.
ALAUYA.”
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for
evaluation, report and recommendation.14
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he
made “malicious and libelous charges (against Alawi) with no solid
grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith,” resulting in
“undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established
reputation.” In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
. 1)Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in
question “by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty
and abuse of confidence;”
. 2)Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal
and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and
interests;”
. 3)Alawi was an “unscrupulous (and “swindling”) sales
agent” who had fooled him by “deceit, fraud misrepresentation,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;” and
. 4)Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated
the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and
against ** (his) will,” and “concealed the real facts **.”
Alauya’s defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was
merely acting in defense of his rights, and doing only what “is expected
of any man unduly prejudiced
_______________
14 See Resolution of the Court en banc dated August 21, 1996; Rollo at
p. 61 et seq.
637
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 637
Alawi vs. Alauya
and injured,” who had suffered “mental anguish, sleepless nights,
wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,” considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.15
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
public service.16 Section 4 of the Code commands that “(p)ublic
officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and
** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest.”17 More
than once has this Court emphasized that “the conduct and behavior of
every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration
of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct
must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety
and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the
judiciary.”18
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good
customs or public policy, or respect for the rights of others, to couch
denunciations of acts believed—however sincerely—to be deceitful,
fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate, insulting or
virulent language, Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a right of
action against So-
_______________
15 SEE footnote No. 7, supra.
16 Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.
17 R.A. No. 6713. Section 11 of the same law punishes any violation of
the Act with (1) a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months’
salary, or (2) suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or (3) removal,
depending on the gravity of the offense, after due notice and hearing by
34
the appropriate body or agency, and even if no criminal prosecution is
instituted against him.
18 Apaga v. Ponce, 245 SCRA 233, 240, citing Callejo, Jr. v. Garcia,
etc., 206 SCRA 491; Angeles v. Bantug, et al., 209 SCRA 413; Icasiano, Jr.
v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 209 SCRA 377; Medilo, et al. v. Asodisen,
etc., 233 SCRA 68; SEE also Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275.
638
638 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Alawi vs. Alauya
phia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety,
without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a
manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he “act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.”19 Righteous
indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari’a Bar
and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more
stringent tan for most other government workers. As a man of the law,
he may not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous,
menacing, or otherwise improper.20 As a judicial employee, it is
expected that his accord respect for the person and the rights of others
at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by
prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these
salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by
his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already
had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not
full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice
law before Shari’a courts.21 While one who has been admitted to the
Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may
both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or
advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The
title of “attorney” is reserved to those who,
_______________
19 ART. 19, Civil Code.
20 Rules 8.01 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which should apply by analogy to Members of the Shari’a Bar. The Code
also proscribes behavior in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the
legal profession (Rule 7.03).
21 Resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 5, 1993 in Bar Matter
No. 681, entitled “Petition to allow Shari’a lawyers to exercise their
profession at the regular courts;.” SEE Rule 138 (secs. 1, 4), Rules of
Court.
639
VOL. 268, FEBRUARY 24, 1997 639
Alawi vs. Alauya
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, “counsellor” or
“counsellor-at-law,” because in his region, there are pejorative
connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to
local legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His
disincilination to use the title of “counsellor” does not warrant his use
of the title of attorney. Finally, respecting Alauya’s alleged unauthorized
use of the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence
adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashary M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED
for the use of excessively intemperate, insulting or virulent language,
i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of
attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or
misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
35
Respondent Ashari M. Alauya reprimanded.
Notes.—Every employee of the judiciary should be an example of
integrity, honesty and uprightness and sheriffs, in particular, musts
show a high degree of professionalism in the performance of their
duties given the delicate task they’re reposed with. (Bora, Sr. vs.
Angeles, 244 SCRA 706 [1995])
The court has reiterated time and again the rule that the conduct of
every employee of the judiciary must be at all times characterized with
propriety and decorum and above all else,
640
640 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cañiza vs. Court of Appeals
it must be above and beyond suspicion. (Bilag-Rivera vs. Flora, 245
SCRA 603 [1995]).

36
 AC-1928. August 3, 1978.*
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
Bar Integration; Attorneys; Disbarment; Payment of membership dues;
Integration of the Bar, its concept and purpose.—An “Integrated Bar” is a
State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers
themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is
essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as
well as obliged to hear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by
or under the direction of the State, an Integrated Bar is an official
national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They
are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of
the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual
fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence
to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of
which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and,
upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. The integration of the Philippine
Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than
constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration
imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of
individual lawyers.
Same; Same; Same; Police power; Integration of the Bar is a valid exercise
of police power of the State; Practice of law, nature of.—Apropos to the
above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of
the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid
exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice
of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed
with public interest because a
______________
* EN BANC.
555
VOL. 84, AUGUST 3, 1978 555
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon
lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes
part in one of the most important functions of the State—the
administration of justice—as an officer of the court. The practice of law
being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must
submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the
interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice
Roberts explained, the expression “affected with a public interest” is
the equivalent of “subject to the exercise of the police power”.
Same; Same; Same; Courts; Supreme Court authorized to adopt rules of
court to effect integration of the Philippine Bar; Purposes of integration
of the Bar.—When, therefore. Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397
authorizing the Supreme Court to “adopt rules of court to effect the
integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see
fit,” it did so in the exercise of the paramount-police power of the State.
The Act’s avowal is to “raise the standards of the legal profession,
improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively.” Hence, the Congress in
enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar
through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the
President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into
a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4,
1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare
and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public
necessity. The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may
interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations.
Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in
order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S.
37
Gomez, Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, “Salus populi
eat suprema lex.” The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but
liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society will fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70, Phil. 726). It is
an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all
freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
Same; Same; Same; Practice of law and exercise of the legal profession
clothed with public interest and lawyers must be bound by such
regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for
556
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon
the common good; Reasons.—Thus, when the respondent Edillon
entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of
the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are)
subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to
such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for
the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his
liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable
interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with
an interest in his concerns.
Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Constitutionality and validity of
Bar integration sustained by explicit grant of precise power to the
Supreme Court under Art. X of the 1973 Constitution resting the Court
with plenary power in all cases regarding admistion to and supervision of
the practice of law.—But the most compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar Integration in the Philippines is the
explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by
Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines. xxx
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the
enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the
language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme
Court the power “to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law,” it at
once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the
Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission
to and supervision of the practice of law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Membership dues; Effect of Bar integration
upon a lawyer’s freedom of association; Compelling a lawyer to be a
member of the Integrated Bar not violative of the constitutional freedom
to associate but the only compulsion a lawyer is subjected is the payment
of annual dues which is not violation of the Constitution; Compulsion
upon a lawyer if any justified by exercise of police power of the State;
Reasons.—The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court
is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom
to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer
to be a member of the Integrated Bar is no violative of his constitution
freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of
any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member
of the Bar when he passed
557
VOL. 84, AUGUST 3, 1978 557
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon
the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. Bar
Integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is
free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the professional in his fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program—the lawyers.
38
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified
as an exercise of the police power of the State.
Same; Same; Same: Same; Same; Provisions of the Court Rule requiring
payment of membership dues by lawyers not violative of the Constitution;
The 1973 Constitution does not prohibit the Supreme Court from
requiring lawyers to pay reasonable membership fees; Nature of
membership fees.—The second issue posed by the respondent is that
the provision of the Court Rule repairing payment of a membership fee
is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court,
under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the
Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)—which
power the respondent acknowledges—from requiring members of a
privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward
defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they
belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a
regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the
objectives and purposes of integration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Penalties; Enforcement of penalty
provisions for non-payment of membership dues not a deprivation of due
process; Reasons; Practice of law in the courts subject to regulation and
inquiry; Practice of law is not property right but mere privilege.—That
respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty
provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether
the practice of law is property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practise of law is a property right, in
the sense of its being one that en-
558
558 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon
titles the holder of a license to practise a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it is clear that under the police power of
the State, and under necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent’s right to practise law before
the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to imposed the fee as
regulatory measure is recognized, then a penalty designed to enforce
its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is
not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. But we must here emphasize
that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and
as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to
exact compliance with the lawyer’s public responsibilities.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Supreme Court; Jurisdiction; The
Supreme Court has power and jurisdiction to strike the name of a lawyer
from its Roll of Attorneys; Court’s jurisdiction provided for in the 1973
Constitution.—Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of
Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their
regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized
as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities
holding such are legion. The Court’s jurisdiction was greatly reinforced
by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the
power to “promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . . . . . and
the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . . . .”
(Article X, Sec. 5[5]) The power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed
undoubtedly vested in the Court.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule of Court 139-A and ByLaws of the
Integrated Bar providing for payment of membership dues are neither
unconstitutional nor illegal; Respondent lawyer disbarred and his name
striken from the Roll of Attorneys in the Supreme Court for repeated
failure to pay membership dues; Case at bar.—We thus reach the
conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-
Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither
unconstitutional nor illegal. x x x It is the unanimous sense of the Court
39
that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of fees due from him.
Attorneys of the Court. On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP
559 Board of Governors to reply to Edition’s comment: on March 24, 1976,
VOL. 84, AUGUST 3, 1978 559 they submitted a joint reply.
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth
RESOLUTION
submitted for resolution.
560
CASTRO, C.J.:
560 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon
The respondent Martial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent’s pleadings
in the Philippines.
would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for
Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,
short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65
however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A
in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership
(hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule)1—in accordance with which
Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the
the Bar of the Philippines was integrated—and to the provisions of par.
Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
Attorneys for “stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues” to the IBP
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
since the latter’s constitution notwithstanding due notice.
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member’s name from the
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-
submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and
Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order
approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws
applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
of the IBP, which reads:
“SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues.—Subject to the provisions of
“. . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following June
Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six
29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the
months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the
appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the
removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of
removal of the delinquent member’s name from the Roll of Attorneys.
Attorneys.”
Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is
member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.”
stated in these words of the Court Rule:
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on
‘SECTION 1. Organization.—There is hereby organized an official
the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment
national body to be known as the ‘Integrated Bar of the Philippines,’

40
composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.”
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following
words of the Court Rule:
“SEC. 9. Membership dues.—Every member of the Integrated Bar shall
pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with
the approval of the Supreme Court. . . . .”
_____________
1 Adopted in the Supreme Court’s Resolution, promulgated on January
9, 1973, ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines.
561
VOL. 84, AUGUST 3, 1978 561
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon
The core of the respondent’s arguments is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to
strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said
matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an “administrative nature pertaining to an administrative
body.”
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to
constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the
surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law,
define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for
the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a
previous case before the Court, entitled “Administrative Case No. 526,
In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.” The Court exhaustively
considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the
integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9,
1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
“. . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all
the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative
materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive
Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the
Philippine Bar is ‘perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable’. . . .”
562
562 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An “Integrated Bar” is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer
must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member
of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient
reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
41
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending
member.2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by
overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such
an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and
personal convenience of individual lawyers.3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing
the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally
sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a
privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes
substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to
______________
2 114 A.L.R. 101.
3 Memorandum of Authorities on the Constitutionality of Bar
Integration, cited in the Report of the Commission Bar Integration on
the Integration of the Philippine Bar, Nov. 30, 1972; see also Supreme
Court Resolution of January 9, 1973, ordaining the integration of the
Philippine Bar.
563
VOL. 84, AUGUST 3, 1978 563
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon
the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most
important functions of the State—the administration of justice—as an
officer of the court.4 The practice of law being clothed with public
interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control
for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the
U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the
expression “affected with a public interest” is the equivalent of “subject
to the exercise of the police power” (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 63975 authorizing
the Supreme Court to “adopt rules of court to effect the integration of
the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit,” it did so in
the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act’s
avowal is to “raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.” Hence, the Congress in enacting such
Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its
Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the
Philippines in decreeing the constitution
______________
4 In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark. 35, 259 S. W. 2d 114; Petition of
Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902; Petition of Florida State
Bar Association, 134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280; In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676,
266 P. 665; Commonwealth ex rel. Ward vs. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41 98 S.
W. 2d 53; Ayres vs. Hadaway, 303 Mich. 589, 6 N. W. 2d 905; Petition
for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195; Petition for
Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; Clark
vs. Austin, 101 S. W. 2d 977; In Re Integration of Nebraska State Bar
Assn., 133 Neb. 283, 275 N. W. 265, 114 A.L.R. 151; In re Scott, 53 Nev.
24, 292 291; Baker vs. Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E. 2d 90; In re
Integration of State Bar of Oklahoma, 185 Okla. 505, 95 P. 2d 113; State
ex rel Rice vs. Cozad, 70 S. Dak. 193, 16 N. W. 2d 484; Campbell vs.
Third District Committee of Virginia State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S. E. 2d
883; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N. W. 2d 404.
5 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF THE PHILIPPINE
BAR AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR, approved on
September 17, 1971.
564
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon
42
of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181
dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of
public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of
pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with
and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31
Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, “Salus populi est supreme lex.”
The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of
government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made
to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy
(Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the
State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals
from some freedom. But the most compelling argument sustaining the
constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the
explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by
Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines,
which reads:
“Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
“(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration
of the Bar xxx”.
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
“SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the
Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise
the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively.”
565
VOL. 84, AUGUST 3, 1978
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even withoutthe
enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely tothe language
of the provision of the Constitution granting theSupreme Court the
power “to promulgate rules concerningpleading, practice and
procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law,” it at
once becomes indubitable thatthis constitutional declaration vests the
Supreme Court withplenary power in all cases regarding the admission
to andsupervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession,
his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect
the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body
politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be
established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the
extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to
submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he
should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now
concisely deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is
without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom
to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer
to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate.6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group
______________
6 In re Unification of New Hampsire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In re Gibson, 35
565 N. Mex. 550, 4P. 2d 643; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N. W.
43
2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct.
1826; Railways Employes’ Dept. vs. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 100 L. ed.
1112, 76 S. Ct. 714.
566
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon
of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar
when he passed the Bar examinations.7 All that integration actually
does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined
but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already
a member.8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the
subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program—the lawyers.9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a
lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is
justified as an exercise of the police power of the State.10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the
Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine
Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution)—which power the
respondent acknowledges—from requiring members of a privileged
class,
______________
7 Diokno, Jose W., “Bar Integration—A Sword and a Shield for Justice”
(Manor Press, Q.C., 1962) p. 17.
8 Fellers, James, “Integration of the Bar—Aloha!”, Journal of the Am.
Judicature Society, Vol. 47, No. 11 (1964) p. 256.
9 Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs.
Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.
10 Hill vs. State Bar of California, 97 P. 2d 236; Herron vs. State Bar of
California, 24 Cal. 53, 147 P. 2d 543; Carpenter vs. State Bar of
California, 211 Cal. 358, 295 P. 23; In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 11 So. 2d
398; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291; In re Platz, 60 Nev. 24, 108 P.
2d 858; In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; Kelley vs. State Bar of
Oklahoma, 148 Okla. 282, 298 P. 623.
567
VOL. 84, AUGUST 3, 1978 567
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon
such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration.11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty
provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether
the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practise a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of
the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent’s right to practise law before
the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not
void as unreasonable or arbitrary.12
44
______________
11 Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902; In re
Integration of Bar of Hawaii, 432 P. 2d 887; Petition for Integration of
Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; In re Scott, 53 Nev.
24, 292 P. 291; In re Unification of New Hampshire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709;
In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; State Bar of Oklahoma vs.
McGhnee, 148 Okla. 219, 298 P. 580; Kelley vs. State Bar of Oklahoma,
148 Okla. 282, 298 P. 623; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.
W. 2d 404.
12 In re Gibson, 4 P. 2d 643.
The following words of Justice Harlan are apposite: “The objection
would make every Governmental exaction the material of a ‘free speech’
issue. Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry
us to lengths that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious
objector, if his liberties were to thus extended, might refuse to
contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned
by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The right of private
judgment has never yet been exalted above the powers and the
compulsion of the agencies of Government.” (Concurring opinion of
Harlan, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., in Lathrop vs. Donohue, 367
568
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege,13 and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer’s
public responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is
sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and
supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent
judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such
are legion.14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of
the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was
confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar
Integration Act of Kentucky, said: “The power to regulate the conduct
and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or
statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a
court—appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of
justice . . . the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court
is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real
because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment
upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts
are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a
determination to uphold the ideals and traditions of an honorable
profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The
very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be
misused or prostituted. . .”
The Court’s jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973
Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power
_______________
U.S. 820, 6 L.ed. 2 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826, citing Cardozo, J., with Brandeis
and Stone, JJ., concurring, in Hamilton vs. Regents of Univ. of
California, 293 U.S. 245, 79 L.ed. 343, 55 S. Ct. 197.)
13 In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291.
14 Bar Flunkers Case, 50 O.G. 1602; In re Aguas, 1 Phil. 1, and others.
569
VOL. 84, AUGUST 3, 1978 569
In re Atty. Marcial Edillon
to “promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice . . . . . and the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . . . .”
45
(Article X, Sec 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the of the IBP did not withdraw from the courts the authority to investigate
respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed and decide complaints against erring members of the Bar. (In re:
undoubtedly vested in the Court. Brillantes, 76 SCRA 1).
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A An attorney abuses his right of recourse to the Supreme Court where he
and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained files multiple petitions for the same cause in false expectation of getting
of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. a favorable action from one division as against the adverse action of the
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the other division. (Cabagul vs. Court of Appeals, 67 SCRA 299).
Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz
Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero,
JJ., concur.
Respondent disbarred.
Notes.—A contract for attorney’s fees cannot be used as a cloak for an
exorbitant exaction. If after receipt of such amount by the attorney, the
petitioner is still required to deposit a sum for the same purpose,
clearly there would be an exorbitant exaction. The test certainly is one
of fairness, and in that sense the due process clause can be relied upon
to protect an attorney’s client. (A.D. Santos, Inc. vs. C.I.R, 72 SCRA
230; Bachrach vs. Golingco, 39 Phil. 139).
An attorney must establish a clear right to his claim for attorney’s fees
before he may be entitled to a writ of mandatory injunction for deposit
of his alleged fees in court. (Integrated Construction Services, Inc. vs.
Relova, 65 SCRA 638).
Where there is no valid reason to investigate a complaint against a
lawyer, after the complainant filed an affidavit of desistance, the case
will be dismissed. (Santiago vs. Bustamante, 76 SCRA 527).
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court ordaining the organization of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines as well as the By-laws
570
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Orlino vs. Philippine National Bank

46
In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of
Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO CUNANAN ET
AL., petitioners.
1.ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; ADMISSION; RELATION TO COURT AND
PUBLIC.—By its declared objective, Republic Act No. 972 is
contrary to public interest because it qualifies 1,094 law
graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the
practice of the profession, as was exactly found by this Tribunal
in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of
the legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problems evolved by the times become
more difficult.
2.ID.; ID.; A JUDICIAL FUNCTION.—In the judicial system from
which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys-at-law in the practice
of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a
judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its
continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial
power have been demonstrated during more than six centuries,
which certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles."
3.ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS TO REPEAL, ALTER OR
SUPPLEMENT RULES.—The Constitution has not conferred on
Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities governing the
admission to the practice of law. The primary power and
responsibility which the Constitution recognizes, continue to
reside in this court. Congress may repeal, alter and supplement
the rules
535
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
In re: Cunanan, et al.
. promulgated by this court, but the authority and
responsibility over the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys-at-law and their supervision
remain vested in the Supreme Court.
. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; POWER OF CONGRESS AND THAT OF
SUPREME COURT MAY BE HARMONIZED.—Being coordinate
and independent branches the power to promulgate and
enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the
concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may
and should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the
other, giving careful consideration to the responsibility which
the nature of each department requires. These powers have
existed together for centuries without diminution on each part;
the harmonious delimitation being found in that the legislature
may and should examine if the existing rules on the admission
to the Bar respond to the demands which public interest
requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training
and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of repeal,
amendment or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it
may find, and the judicial power, which has the inherent
responsibility for a good and efficient administration of justice
and the supervision of the practice of the legal profession,
should consider these reforms as the minimum standards for
the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with these
reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its
traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and
reinstating attorneys-at-law is realized. They are powers
which, exercised within their proper constitutional limits, are
not repugnant, but rather complementary to each other in
535 attaining the establishment of a Bar that would respond to the
47
 increasing and exacting necessities of the administration of
justice.
. 5.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CLASS LEGISLATION.—
Republic Act No. 972 is a class legislation. There is no actual
nor reasonable basis to classify unsuccessful bar candidates by
years nor to exclude those of other years.
. 6.ID.; TITLE OF LAW MUST EMBRACE ALL ITS
PROVISIONS.—Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not
embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
Constitution enjoins. Being inseparable from the provisions of
article 1, the entire law is void.
. 7.ID.; REPUBLIC ACT No. 972, PART OF SECTION 1
DECLARED TO BE IN FORCE.—There being no unanimity in the
eight Justices who constitute the majority of the court in this
case, that part of article 1 Republic Act No. 972 which refers to
the examinations of 1953 to 1955 shall continue in force.
536
536 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Jose M. Aruego, M. H. de Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo, and
Antonio Enrile Inton for petitioners.
Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag for respondent.
DIOKNO, J.:
In recent years few controversial issues have aroused so much public
interest and concern as Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the
"Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953." Under the Rules of Court governing
admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the
Bar) may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he
must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects,
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject." (Rule 127, sec. 14,
Rules of Court). Nevertheless, considering the varying difficulties of the
different bar examinations held since 1946 and the varying degree of
strictness with which the examination papers were graded, this court
passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an
average of only 72 per cent in 1946, 69 per cent in 1947, 70 per cent in
1948, and 74 per cent in 1949. In 1950 to 1953, the 74 per cent was
raised to 75 per cent.
Believing themselves as f ully qualified to practice law as those
reconsidered and passed by this court, and feeling conscious of having
been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R. A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage
lower than those admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and
secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent
effective since 1946. The President requested the views of this court on
the bill. Complying with that request, seven members of the court
subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and
shortly thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the
veto. Instead, it approved
537
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 537
In re: Cunanan, et al.
Senate Bill No. 371, embodying substantially the provisions of the
vetoed bill. Although the members of this court reiterated their
unfavorable views on the matter, the President allowed the bill to
become a law on June 21, 1953 without his signature. The law, which
incidentally was enacted in an election year, reads in full as follows:
48
 REPUBLIC ACT No. 972
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINATIONS FROM
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY-SIX UP TO AND INCLUDING
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY-FIVE.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section fourteen, Rule
numbered one hundred twenty-seven of the Rules of Court, any bar
candidate who obtained a general average of seventy per cent in any
bar examinations after July fourth, nineteen hundred and forty-six up to
the August nineteen hundred and fifty-one bar examinations; seventy-
one per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-two bar examinations;
seventy-two per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-three bar
examinations; seventy-three per cent in the nineteen hundred and fifty-
four bar examinations; seventy-four per cent in the nineteen hundred
and fifty-five bar examinations without a candidate obtaining a grade
below fifty per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine
Bar: Provided, however, That for the purpose of this Act, any exact one-
half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and included as
part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of seventy-five per cent
in any subject in any bar examination after July fourth, nineteen
hundred and f forty-six shall be deemed to have passed in such subject
or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the
passing general average that said candidate may obtain in any
subsequent examinations that he may take.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Enacted on June 21, 1953, without the Executive approval.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed
petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while others
whose motions for the revision
538
538 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also
others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades
without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to
individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for
reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had invoked
Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to
revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be
pursuant to Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be
applied equally to all concerned whether they have filed petitions or
not. A complete list of the petitioners, properly classified, affected by
this decision, as well as a more detailed account of the history of
Republic Act No. 972, are appended to this decision as Annexes I and II.
And to realize more readily the effects of the law, the following
statistical data are set forth:
(1) The unsuccessful bar candidates who are to be benefited by section
1 of Republic Act No. 972 total 1,168, classified as follows:
1946 (August) .................................................................................. 206 121
1946 (November) ............................................................................. 477 228
1947 ................................................................................................. 749 340
1948 ................................................................................................. 899 409
1949 ................................................................................................. 1,218 532
1950 ................................................................................................. 1,316 893
1951 ................................................................................................. 2,068 879
1952 ................................................................................................. 2,738 1,033
1953 ................................................................................................. 2,555 986
Total ............................................................................. 12,230 5,421 1
49
Of the aforesaid 1,168 candidates, 92 have passed in subsequent
examination, and only 586 have filed either motions for admission to
the bar pursuant to said Republic Act, or mere motions for
reconsideration.
(2) In addition, some other 10 unsuccessful candidates are to be
benefited by section 2 of said Republic Act. These candidates had each
taken from two to five different
539
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 539
In re: Cunanan, et al.
examinations, but f ailed to obtain a passing average in any of them.
Consolidating, however, their highest grades in diff erent subjects in
previous examinations, with their latest marks, they would be sufficient
to reach the passing average as provided for by Republic Act 972.
(3) The total number of candidates to be benefited by this Republic Acts
is therefore 1,094, of which only 604 have filed petitions. Of these 604
petitioners, 33 who failed in 1946 to 1951 had individually presented
motions for reconsideration which were denied, while 125
unsuccessful candidates of 1952, and 56 of 1953, had presented similar
motions, which are still pending because they could be favorably
affected by Republic Act No. 972,—although as has been already stated,
this tribunal finds no sufficient reasons to reconsider their grades.
UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
Having been called upon to enforce a law of far-reaching effects on the
practice of the legal prof ession and the administration of justice, and
because some doubts have been expressed as to its validity, the court
set the hearing of the afore-mentioned petitions f or admission on the
sole question of whether or not Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional.
We have been enlightened in the study of this question by the brilliant
assistance of the members of the bar who have amply argued, orally
and in writing, on the various aspects in which the question may be
gleaned. The valuable studies of Messrs. E. Voltaire Garcia, Vicente J.
Francisco, Vicente Pelaez and Buenaventura Evangelista, in favor of the
validity of the law, and of the U. P. Women Lawyers' Circle, the Solicitor
General, Messrs. Arturo A. Alafriz, Enrique M. Fernando, Vicente Abad
Santos, Carlos A. Barrios, Vicente del Rosario, Juan de Blancaflor,
Mamerto V. Gonzales, and Roman Ozaeta against it, aside from the
memoranda of counsel for petitioners, Messrs. Jose M. Aruego, M. H. de
Joya, Miguel R. Cornejo and Antonio Enrile Inton, and of petitioners
Cabrera, Macasaet and
540
540 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
Galema, themselves, has greatly helped us in this task. The legal
researchers of the court have exhausted almost all Philippine and
American jurisprudence on the matter. The question has been the
object of intense deliberation for a long time by the Tribunal, and finally,
after the voting, the preparation of the majority opinion was assigned
to a new member in order to place it as humanly as possible above all
suspicion of prejudice or partiality.
Republic Act No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit
to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading
materials and inadequate preparation. Quoting a portion of the
Explanatory Note of the proposed bill, its author Honorable Senator
Pablo Angeles David stated:
"The reason for relaxing the standard 75 per cent passing grade is the
tremendous handicap which students during the years immediately
after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency
of reading materials and the inadequacy of the preparation of students
who took up law soon after the liberation."
Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952,
5,236 passed. And i&w it is claimed that in addition 604 candidates be
admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from
"insufficiency of reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."
By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because
it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate
50
preparation for the practice of the profession, as was exactly found by
this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest
demands of legal profession adequate preparation and efficiency,
precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more
difficult. An adequate legal preparation is one of the vital requisites for
the practice of law that should be developed constantly and maintained
firmly. To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property,
life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of those inadequately
prepared individuals to dedicate themselves tof
541
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
In re: Cunanan, et al.
such a delicate mission is to create a serious social danger. Moreover,
the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials
is grossly exaggerated. There were abundant materials. Decisions of
this court alone in mimeographed copies were made available to the
public during those years and private enterprises had also published
them in monthly magazines and annual digests. The Official Gazette has
been published continuously. Books and magazines published abroad
have entered without restriction since 1945. Many law books, some
even with revised and enlarged editions have been printed locally
during those periods. A new set of Philippine Reports began to be
published since 1946, which continued to be supplemented by the
addition of new volumes. Those are facts of public knowledge.
Notwithstanding all these, if the law in question is valid, it has to be
enforced.
The question is not new in its fundamental aspect or from the point of
view of applicable principles, but the resolution of the question would
have been easier had an identical case of similar background been
picked out from the jurisprudence we daily consult. Is there any
precedent in the long Anglo-Saxon legal history, from which has been
directly derived the judicial system established here with its lofty ideals
by the Congress of the United States, and which we have preserved and
attempted to improve, or in our contemporaneous juridical history of
more than half a century? From the citations of those defending the law,
we can not find a case in which the validity of a similar law had been
sustained, while those against its validity cite, among others, the cases
of Day (In re Day, 54 NE 646), of Cannon (State vs. Cannon, 240 NW,
441), the opinion of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1932 (81
ALR 1061), of Guariña (24 Phil., 37), aside from the opinion of the
President which is expressed in his vote of the original bill and which
the proponent of the contested law respects.
542
542 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
541 In re: Cunanan, et al.
This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other
countries had been promulgated, the judiciary immediately declared
them, without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a
precedent to uphold the disputed law.
To be exact, we ought to state here that we have examined carefully the
case that has been cited to us as a favorable precedent of the law—that
of Cooper (22 NY, 81), where the Court of Appeals of New York revoked
the decision of the Supreme Court of that State, denying the petition of
Cooper to be admitted to the practice of law under the provisions of a
statute concerning the school of law of Columbia College promulgated
on April 7, 1860, which was declared by the Court of Appeals to be
consistent with the Constitution of the state of New York.
It appears that the Constitution of New York at that time provided:
"They (i.e., the judges) shall not hold any other office of public trust. All
votes for either of them for any elective office except that of the Court
of Appeals, given by the Legislature or the people, shall be void. They
shall not exercise any power of appointment to public office. Any male
citizen of the age of twenty-one years, of good moral character, and
who possesses the requisite qualifications of learning and ability, shall
be entitled to admission to practice in all the courts of this State." (p.
93).
According to the Court of Appeals, the object of the constitutional
precept is as follows:
51
"Attorneys, solicitors, etc., were public officers; the power of appointing
them had previously rested with the judges, and this was the principal
appointing power which they possessed. The convention was evidently
dissatisfied with the manner in which this power had been exercised,
and with the restrictions which the judges had imposed upon
admission to practice before them. The prohibitory clause in the
section quoted was aimed directly at this power, and the insertion of
the provision respecting the admission of attorneys, in this particular
section of the Constitution, evidently arose from its connection with the
object of this prohibitory clause. There is nothing indicative of
confidence in the courts or of a disposition to preserve any portion of
their power over this subject, unless the
543
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 543
In re: Cunanan, et al.
Supreme Court is right in the inference it draws from the use of the
word 'admission' in the action referred to it is urged that the admission
spoken of must be by the court; that to admit means to grant leave, and
that the power of granting necessarily implies the power of refusing,
and of course the right of determining whether the applicant possesses
the requisite qualifications to entitle him to admission.
"These positions may all be conceded, without affecting the validity of
the act." (p. 93.)
Now, with respect to the law of April 7, 1860, the decision seems to
indicate that it provided that the possession 01 a diploma of the school
of law of Columbia College conferring the degree of Bachelor of Laws
was evidence of the legal qualifications that the constitution required of
applicants for admission to the Bar. The decision does not however
quote the text of the law, which we cannot find in any public or
accessible private library in the country.
In the case of Cooper, supra, to make the law consistent with the
Constitution of New York, the Court of Appeals said of the object of the
law:
"The motive for passing the act in question is apparent. Columbia
College being an institution of established reputation, and having a law
department under the charge of able professors, the students in which
department were not only subjected to a formal examination by the law
committee of the institution, but to a certain definite period of study
before being entitled to a diploma as graduates, the Legislature
evidently, and no doubt justly, considered this examination, together
with the preliminary study required by the act, as fully equivalent as a
test of legal requirements, to the ordinary examination by the court;
and as rendering the latter examination, to which no definite period of
preliminary study was essential, unnecessary and burdensome.
"The act was obviously passed with reference to the learning and
ability of the applicant, and for the mere purpose of substituting the
examination by the law committee of the college for that of the court. It
could have had no other object, and hence no greater scope should be
given to its provisions. We cannot suppose that the Legislature
designed entirely to dispense with the plain and explicit requirements
of the Constitution; and the act contains nothing what-
544
544 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
ever to indicate an intention that the authorities of the college should
inquire as to the age, citizenship, etc., of the students before granting a
diploma. The only rational interpretation of which the act admits is,
that it was intended to make the college diploma competent evidence
as to the legal attainments of the applicant, and nothing else. To this
extent alone it operates as a modification of preexisting statutes, and it
is to be read in connection with these statutes and with the
Constitution itself in order to determine the present condition of the
law on the subject." (p. 89)
* * * * * * *
"The Legislature has not taken from the court its jurisdiction Over the
question of admission, that has simply prescribed what shall be
competent evidence in certain cases upon that question." (p. 93)
52
From the foregoing, the complete inapplicability of the case of Cooper
with that at bar may be clearly seen. Please note only the following
distinctions:
. (1)The law of New York does not require that any
candidate of Columbia College who failed in the bar
examinations be admitted to the practice of law.
. (2)The law of New York according to the very decision
of Cooper, has not taken from the court its jurisdiction over the
question of admission of attorney at law; in effect, it does not
decree the admission of any lawyer.
. (3)The Constitution of New York at that time and that
of the Philippines are entirely different on the matter of
admission to the practice of law.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the
practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably
a judicial function and responsibility. Because of this attribute, its
continuous and zealous possession and exercise by the judicial power
have been demonstrated during more than six centuries, which
certainly "constitutes the most solid of titles." Even considering the
power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter and
supplement the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the
admission to the prac-
545
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 545
In re: Cunanan, et al.
tice of law, to our judgment the proposition that the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law is a
legislative f unction, properly belonging to Congress, is unacceptable.
The function requires (1) previously established rules and principles,
(2) concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals. and (3) decision as to whether these facts are governed by
the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial function of the highest
degree. And it becomes more undisputably judicial, and not legislative,
if previous judicial resolutions on the petitions of these same
individuals are attempted to be revoked or modified.
We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been
derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
A comprehensive and conscientious study of this matter had been
undertaken in the case of State vs. Cannon (1932) 240 NW 441, in
which the validity of a legislative enactment providing that Cannon be
permitted to practice before the courts was discussed. From the text of
this decision we quote the following paragraphs:
"This statute presents an assertion of legislative power without parallel
in the history of the English speaking people so far as we have been
able to ascertain. There has been much uncertainty as to the extent of
the power of the Legislature to prescribe the ultimate qualifications of
attorneys at law, but in England and in every state of the Union the act
of admitting an attorney at law has been expressly committed to the
courts, and the act of admission has always been regarded as a judicial
function. This act purports to constitute Mr. Cannon an attorney at law,
and in this respect it stands alone as an assertion of legislative power.
(p. 444)
"No greater responsibility rests upon this court than that of preserving
in form and substance the exact form of government set up by the
people. (p. 444)
"Under the Constitution all legislative power is vested in a Senate and
Assembly. (Section 1, art. 4.) In so far as the prescribing 6f
qualifications for admission to the bar are legislative in character, the
Legislature is acting within its constitutional authority when it sets up
and prescribes such qualifications. (p. 444)
546
546 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
53
"But when the Legislature has prescribed those qualifications which in
its judgment will serve the purpose of legitimate legislative solicitude,
is the power of the court to impose other and further exactions and
qualifications foreclosed or exhausted? (p. 444)
"Under our Constitution the judicial and legislative departments are
distinct, independent, and coordinate branches of the government.
Neither branch enjoys all the powers of sovereignty, but each is
supreme in that branch of sovereignty which properly belongs to its
department. Neither department should so act as to embarrass the
other in the discharge of its respective functions. That was the scheme
and thought of the people setting upon the form of government under
which we exist. State vs. Hastings, 10 Wis., 525; Attorney General ex
rel. Bashford vs. Barstow, 4 Wis., 567. (p. 445)
"The judicial department of government is responsible for the plane
upon which the administration of justice is maintained. Its
responsibility in this respect is exclusive. By committing a portion of
the powers of sovereignty to the judical department of our state
government, under a scheme which it was supposed rendered it
immune from embarrassment or interference by any other department
of government, the courts cannot escape responsibility for the manner
in which the powers of sovereignty thus committed to the judicial
department are exercised. (p. 445)
"The relation of the bar to the courts is a peculiar and intimate
relationship. The bar is an attach6 of the courts. The quality of justice
dispensed by the courts depends in no small degree upon the integrity
of its bar. An unfaithful bar may easily bring scandal and reproach to
the administration of justice and bring the courts themselves into
disrepute. (p. 445)
"Through all time courts have exercised a direct and severe supervision
over their bars, at least in the English speaking countries." (p. 445)
After explaining the history of the case, the Court ends thus:
"Our conclusion may be epitomized as follows: For more than six
centuries prior to the adoption of our Constitution, the courts of
England, concededly subordinate to Parliament since the Revolution of
1688, had exercised the right of determining who should be admitted to
the practice of law, which, as was said in, Matter of the Sergeants at Law,
6 Bingham's New Cases 235, 'constitutes the most solid of all titles.' If
the courts and the judicial power be regarded as an entity, the power to
determine who should be admitted to practice law is a constituent
element of that entity. It may be difficult to isolate
547
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 547
In re: Cunanan, et al.
that element and say with assurance that it is either a part of the
inherent power of the court, or an essential element of the judicial
power exercised by the court, but that it is a power belonging to the
judicial entity cannot be denied. Our people borrowed from England
this judicial entity and made of not only a sovereign institution, but
made of it a separate independent, and coordinate branch of the
government. They took this institution along with the power
traditionally exercised to determine who should constitute its
attorneys at law. There is no express provision in the Constitution
which indicates an intent that this traditional power of the judicial
department should in any manner be subject to legislative control.
Perhaps the dominant thought of the f framers of our constitution was
to make the three great departments of government separate and
independent of one another. The idea that the Legislature might
embarrass the judicial department by prescribing inadequate
qualifications for attorneys at law is inconsistent with the dominant
purpose of making the judicial independent of the legislative
department, and such a purpose should not be inferred in the absence
of, express constitutional provision. While the Legislature may legislate
with respect to the qualifications of attorneys, its power in that respect
does not rest upon any power possessed by it to deal exclusively with
the subject of the qualifications of attorneys, but is incidental merely to
its general and unquestioned power to protect the public interest.
When it does legislate fixing a standard of qualifications required of
attorneys at law in order that public interests may be protected, such
54
qualifications constitute only a minimum standard and limit the class f
rom which the court must make its selection. Such legislative
qualifications do not constitute the ultimate qualifications beyond
which the court cannot go in fixing additional qualifications deemed
necessary by the course for the proper administration of judicial
functions. There is no legislative power to compel courts to admit to
their bars persons deemed by them unfit to exercise the prerogatives of
an attorney at law." (p. 450)
"Furthermore it is an unlawful attempt to exercise the power of
appointment. It is quite likely true that the Legislature may exercise the
power of appointment when it is in pursuance of a legislative f unctions.
However, the authorities are well-nigh unanimous that the power to
admit attorneys to the practice of law is a judicial function. In all of the
states, except New Jersey (In re Reisch, 83 N. J. Eq. 82, 90 A. 12), so far
as our investigation reveals, attorneys receive their formal license to
practice law by their admission as members of the bar of the court so
admitting. Cor. Jur. 572; Ex parte Secombe, 19 How. 9, 15 L. Ed. 565; Ex
parte Garland, 4 Wall. 838, 18 L. Ed. 366; Randall vs. Brigham, 7 Wall.
52, 19 L. Ed. 285;
548
548 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
Hanson vs. Grattan, 48 Kan, 843,115 P. 646, 34 L.R.A.
519; Danforth vs. Egan, 23 S. D. 43, 119 N. W. 1021,, 130 Am. St. Rep.
1030, 20 Ann. Cas. 413.
"The power of admitting an attorney to practice having been
perpetually exercised by the courts, it having been so generally held
that the act of a court in admitting an attorney to practice is the
judgment for the court, and an attempt as this on the part of the
Legislature to confer such right upon any one being most exceedingly
uncommon, it seems clear that the licensing of an attorney is and
always has been a purely judicial f unction, no matter where the power
to determine the qualifications may reside." (p. 451)
In that same year of 1932, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in
answering a consultation of the Senate of that State, 180 NE 725, said:
"It is indispensable to the administration of justice and to
interpretation of the laws that there be members of the bar of sufficient
ability, adequate learning and sound moral character. This arises from
the need of enlightened assistance to the honest, and restraining
authority over the knavish, litigant. It is highly important, also that the
public be protected f rom incompetent and vicious practitioners, whose
opportunity f or doing mischief is wide. It was said by Cardoz, C. L., in
People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 242 N. Y. 456, 470, 471, 162 N. E. 487,
489, 60 A. L. R. 851: 'Membership in the bar is a privilege burden with
conditions.' One is admitted to the bar 'for something more than private
gain.' He becomes 'an officer of the court, and, like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His cooperation
with the court is due 'whenever justice would be imperiled if
cooperation was withheld." Without such attorneys at law the judicial
department of government would be hampered in the performance of
its duties. That has been the history of attorneys under the common
law, both in this country and in England. Admission to practice as an
attorney at law is almost without exception conceded to be a judicial
function. Petition to that end is filed in courts, as are other proceedings
invoking judicial action. Admission to the bar is accomplish and made
open and notorious by a decision of the court entered upon its records.
The establishment by the Constitution of the judicial department
conferred authority necessary to the exercise of its powers as a
coordinate department of government. It is an inherent power of such a
department of government ultimately to determine the qualifications of
those to be admitted to practice in its courts, for assisting in its work,
and to protect itself in this respect from the unfit, those lacking in
sufficient learning, and those not possessing good moral char-
549
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1984 549
In re: Cunanan, et al.
55
acter. Chief Justice Taney stated succinctly and with finality in Ex parte
Secombe, 19 How. 9, 13, 15 L. Ed. 565, 'It has been well settled, by the
rules and practice of common-law courts, that it rests exclusively with
the court to determine who is qualified to become one of its officers, as
an attorney and counsellor, and for what cause he ought to be
removed.' " (p. 727)
In the case of Day and others who collectively filed a petition to secure
license to practice the legal profession by virtue of a law of state (In re
Day, 54 NE 646), the court said in part:
"In the case of Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall, 333, 18 L. Ed. 366, the court,
holding the test oath for attorneys to be unconstitutional, explained the
nature of the attorney's office as follows: "They are officers of the court,
admitted as such by its order, upon evidence of their possessing
sufficient legal learning and f air private character. It has always been
the general practice in this country to obtain this evidence by an
examination of the parties. In this court the fact of the admission of
such officers in the highest court of. the states to which they,
respectively, belong, for three years preceding their application, is
regarded as sufficient evidence of the possession of the requisite legal
learning, and the statement of counsel moving their admission
sufficient evidence that their private and professional character is f fair.
The order of admission is the judgment of the court that the parties
possess the requisite qualifications as attorneys and counsellors, and
are entitled to appear as such and conduct causes therein. From its
entry the parties become officers of the court, and are responsible to it
for professional misconduct. They hold their office during good
behavior, and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and
declared by the judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has
been afforded. Ex parte Hoyfron, 7 How. (Miss.
127; Fletcher vs. Daingerfield, 20 Cal. 430. Their admission or their
exclusion is not the exercise of a mere ministerial power. It is the
exercise of judicial power, and has been so held in numerous cases. It
was so held by the court of appeals of New York in the matter of the
application of Cooper for admission. Re Cooper 22 N. Y. 81. 'Attorneys
and Counsellors,' said that court, 'are not only officers of the court, but
officers whose duties relate almost exclusively to proceedings of a
judicial nature; and hence their appointment may, with propriety, be
intrusted to the court, and the latter, in performing his duty, may very
justly considered as engaged in the exercise of their appropriate
judicial functions." (pp. 650-653).
550
550 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
We quote from other cases, the following pertinent portions:
"Admission to practice of law is almost without exception conceded
everywhere to be the exercise of a judicial function, and this opinion
need not be burdened with citations in this point. Admission to practice
have also been held to be the exercise of one of the inherent powers of
the court."—Re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 906.
"Admission to the practice of law is the exercise of a judicial function,
and is an inherent power of the court."—A. C. Brydonjack, vs. State Bar
of California, 281 Pac. 1018; See Annotation on Power of Legislature
respecting admission to bar, 65, A. L. R. 1512.
On this matter there is certainly a clear distinction between the
functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government.
"The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial
departments is that it is the province of the legislature to establish rules
that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring
subsequent to the legislative action, while the judiciary determines
rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or
conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and
the distinction is a vital one and not subject to alteration or change
either by legislative action or by judicial decrees.
"The judiciary cannot consent that its province shall be invaded by
either of the other departments of the government."—16 C. J. S.,
Constitutional Law, p. 229.
"If the legislature cannot thus indirectly control the action of the courts
by requiring of them construction of the law according to its own views,
56
it is very plain it cannot do so directly, by settling aside their
judgmentSj compelling them to grant new trials, ordering the discharge
of offenders, or directing what particular steps shall be taken in the
progress of a judicial inquiry."—Cooley's Constitutional Limitations,
192.
In decreeing that bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations
of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70 per cent without falling below
50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law,
the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment—a judgment
revoking those promulgated by this Court during the afore-
551
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 551
In re: Cunanan, et al.
cited year affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this
Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable
reasons, it is no less certain that only this Court, and not the legislative
nor executive department, that may be so. Any attempt on the part of
any of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions,
as is the case with the law in question.
That the Constitution has conferred on Congress the power to repeal,
alter or supplement the rules promulgated by this Tribunal, concerning
the admission to the practice of law, is no valid argument. Section 13,
article VIII of the Constitution provides:
"Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish increase or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."—Constitution
of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.
It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and
this Tribunal equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the
practice of law The primary power and responsibility which the
Constitution recognizescontinue to reside in this Court. Had Congress
found that this Court has not promulgated any rule on the matter, it
would have nothing over which to exercise the power granted to it.
Congress may repeal, alter and supplement the rules promulgated by
this Court, but the authority and responsibility over the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law and their
supervision remain vested in the Supreme Court. The power to repeal,
alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor permit that
Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of
its primary
552
552 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
power on the matter. The Constitution does not say nor mean that
Congress may admit, suspend, disbar or reinstate directly attorneys at
law, or a determinate group of individuals to the practice of law. Its
power is limited to repeal, modify or supplement the existing rules on
the matter, if according to its judgment the need for a better service of
the legal profession requires it,. But this power does not relieve this
Court of its responsibility to admit, suspend, disbar and reinstate
attorneys at law and supervise the practice of the legal profession.
Being coordinate and independent branches, the power to promulgate
and enforce rules for the admission to the practice of law and the
concurrent power to repeal, alter and supplement them may and
should be exercised with the respect that each owes to the other, giving
careful consideration to the responsibility which the nature of each
department requires. These powers have existed together for centuries
without diminution on each part; the harmonious delimitation being
found in that the legislature may and should examine if the existing
rules on the admission to the Bar respond to the demands which public
interest requires of a Bar endowed with high virtues, culture, training
57
and responsibility. The legislature may, by means of repeal, amendment
or supplemental rules, fill up any deficiency that it may find, and the
judicial power, which has the inherent responsibility for a good and
efficient administration of justice and the supervision of the practice of
the legal profession, should consider these reforms as the minimum
standards for the elevation of the profession, and see to it that with
these reforms the lofty objective that is desired in the exercise of its
traditional duty of admitting, suspending, disbarring and reinstating
attorneys at law is realized. They are powers which, exercised within
their proper constitutional limits, are not repugnant, but rather
complementary to each other in attaining the establishment of a Bar
that would respond to the increasing and exacting necessities of the
administration of justice.
553
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
In re: Cunanan, et al.
The case of Guariña (1913) 24 Phil., 37, illustrates our criterion.
Guariña took the examination and failed by a few points to obtain the
general average. A recently enacted law provided that one who had
been appointed to the position of Fiscal may be admitted to the practice
of law without a previous examination. The Government appointed
Guariña and he discharged the duties of Fiscal in a remote province.
This Tribunal refused to give his license without previous examinations.
The court said:
"Relying upon the provisions of section 2 of Act No. 1597, the applicant
in this case seeks admission to the bar, without taking the prescribed
examination, on the ground that he holds the office of provincial fiscal
for the Province of Batanes.
Section 2 of Act No. 1597, enacted February 28, 1907, is as follows:
"SEC. 2. Paragraph one of section thirteen of Act Numbered One
Hundred and ninety, entitled 'An Act providing a Code of Procedure in
Civil Actions and Special Proceedings in the Philippine Islands/ is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"1. Those who have been duly licensed under the laws and orders of the
Islands under the sovereignty of Spain or of the United States and are in
good and regular standing as members of the bar of the Philippine
Islands at the time of the adoption of this code; Provided, That any
person who, prior to the passage of this Act, or at any time thereafter,
shall have held, under the authority of the United States, the position of
justice of the Supreme Court, judge of the Court of First Instance, or
judge or associate judge of the Court of Land Registration, of the
Philippine Islands, or the position of Attorney General, Solicitor General,
Assistant Attorney General, assistant attorney in the office of the
Attorney General, prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, assistant
prosecuting attorney for the City of Manila, city attorney of Manila,
assistant city attorney of Manila, provincial fiscal, attorney for the Moro
Province, or assistant attorney for the Moro Province, may be licensed
553 to practice law in the courts of the Philippine Islands without an
examination, upon motion before the Supreme Court and establishing
such fact to the satisfaction of said court."
"The records of this court disclose that on a former occasion this
appellant took, and failed to pass the prescribed examination. The
report of the examining board, dated March 23, 1907, shows that he
received an average of only 71 per cent in the various branches of legal
learning upon which he was examined, thus falling four points short of
the required percentage of 75. We would be delin-
554
554 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
quent in the performance of our duty to the public and to the bar, if, in
the face of this affirmative indication of the deficiency of the applicant
in the required qualifications of learning in the law at the time when he
presented his former application for admission to the bar, we should
grant him a license to practice law in the courts of these Islands,
without' first satisfying ourselves that despite his failure to pass the
examination on that occassion, he now 'possesses the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability.'
58
"But it is contended that under the provisions of the above-cited statute
the applicant is entitled as of right to be admitted to the bar without
taking the prescribed examination 'upon motion before the Supreme
Court' accompanied by satisfactory proof that he has held and now
holds the office of provincial fiscal of the Province of Batanes. It is urged
that having in mind the object which the legislator apparently sought to
attain in enacting the above-cited amendment to the earlier statute, and
in view of the context generally and especially of the fact that the
amendment was inserted as a proviso in that section of the original Act
which specifically provides for the admission of certain candidates
without examination, the clause may be licensed to practice law in the
courts of the Philippine Islands without any examination.' It is
contended that this mandatory construction is imperatively required in
order to give effect to the apparent intention of the legislator, and to the
candidate's claim de jure to have the power exercised."
And after copying article 9 of Act of July 1, 1902 of the Congress of the
United States, articles 2, 16 and 17 of Act No. 136, and articles 13 to16
of Act 190, the Court continued:
"Manifestly, the jurisdiction thus conferred upon this court by the
commission and confirmed to it by the Act of Congress would be limited
and restricted, and in a case such as that under consideration wholly
destroyed, by giving the word 'may,' as used in the above citation from
Act No. 1597, a mandatory rather than a permissive effect. But any act
of the commission which has the effect of setting at naught in whole or
in part the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, or of any Act of Congress
prescribing, defining or limiting the power conferred upon the
commission is to that extent invalid and void, as transcending its
rightful limits and authority.
Speaking on the application of the law to those who were appointed to
the positions enumerated, and with particular emphasis in the case of
Guariña, the Court held:
555
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
In re: Cunanan, et al.
"In the various cases wherein applications for admission to the bar
under the provisions of this statute have been considered heretofore,
we have accepted the fact that such appointments had been made as
satisfactory evidence of the qualifications of the applicant. But in all of
those cases we had reason to believe that the applicants had been
practicing attorneys prior to the date of their appointment.
"In the case under consideration, however, it affirmatively appears that
the applicant was not ,and never had been practicing attorney in this or
any other jurisdiction prior to the date of his appointment as provincial
fiscal, and it further aMrmatively appears that he was deficient in the
required qualifications at the time when he last applied for admission
to the bar.
"In the light of this affirmative proof of his deficiency on that occasion,
we do not think that his appointment to the office of provincial fiscal is
in itself satisfactory proof of his possession of the necessary
qualifications of learning and ability. We conclude therefore that this
application for license to practice in the courts of the Philippines,
should be denied.
"In view, however, of the fact that when he took the examination he fell
only four points short of the necessary grade to entitle him to a license
to practice; and in view also of the fact that since that time he has held
the responsible office of the governor of the Province of Sorsogon and
presumably gave evidence of such marked ability in the performance of
the duties of that office that the Chief Executive, with the consent and
approval of the Philippine Commission, sought to retain him in the
Government service by appointing him to the office of provincial fiscal,
we think we would be justified under the above-cited provisions of Act
No. 1597 in waiving in his case the ordinary examination prescribed by
general rule, provided he offers satisfactory evidence of his proficiency
in a special examination which will be given him by a committee of the
court upon his application therefor, without prejudice to his right, if he
desires so to do, to present himself at any of the ordinary examinations
555 prescribed by general rule."—(In re Guariña, pp. 48-49.)
59
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the
practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other
authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
The law in questionT like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been
found also to suffer from the fatal defect
556
556 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable.
In the case of Day, a law enacted on February 21, 1899 required of the
Supreme Court, until December 31 of that year, to grant license for the
practice of law to those students who began studying before November
4, 1897, and had studied for two years and presented a diploma issued
by a school of law, or to those who had studied in a law office and
would pass an examination, or to those who had studied for three years
if they commenced their studies after the aforementioned date. The
Supreme Court declared that this law was unconstitutional being,
among others, a class legislation. The Court said:
"This is an application to this court for admission to the bar of this state
by virtue of diplomas from law schools issued to the applicants. The act
of the general assembly passed in 1899, under which the application is
made, is entitled 'An act to amend section 1 of an act entitled "An act to
revise the law in relation to attorneys and counselors,' approved March
28, 1894, in force July 1, 1874.' The amendment, so far as it appears in
the enacting clause, consists in the addition to the section of the
following: 'And every applicant for a license who shall comply with the
rules of the supreme court in regard to admission to the bar in force at
the time such applicant commend the study of law, either in a law office
or a law school or college, shall be granted a license under this act
notwithstanding any subsequent changes in said rules'."—In re Day et
al., 54 N. Y., p. 646.
* * * "After said provision there is a double proviso, one branch of
which is that up to December 31, 1899, this court shall grant a license
of admittance to the bar to the holder of every diploma regularly issued
by any law school regularly organized under the laws of this state,
whose regular course of law studies is two years, and requiring an
attendance by the student of at least 36 weeks in each of such years,
and showing that the student began the study of law prior to November
4, 1897, and accompanied with the usual proofs of good moral
character. The other branch of the proviso is that any student who has
studied law for two years in a law office, or part of such time in a law
office, 'and part in the aforesaid law school,' and whose course of study
began prior to November 4, 1897, shall be admitted upon a satisfactory
examination by the examining board in the branches now required by
the rules
557
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 557
In re: Cunanan, et al.
of this court. If the right to admission exists at all, it is by virtue of the
proviso, which, it is claimed, confers substantial rights and privileges
upon the persons named therein, and establishes rules of legislative
creation for their admission to the bar." (p. 647.)
"Considering the proviso, however, as an enactment, it is clearly a
special legislation, prohibited by the constitution, and invalid as such. If
the legislature had any right to admit attorneys to practice in the courts
and take part in the administration of justice, and could prescribe the
character of evidence which should be received by the court as
conclusive of the requisite learning and ability of persons to practice
law, it could only be done by a general law, and not by granting special
and exclusive privileges to certain persons or classes of persons. Const.
art 4, section 2. The right to practice law is a privilege, and a license for
that purpose makes the holder an officer of the court, and confers upon
him the right to appear for litigants, to argue causes, and to collect fees
therefor, and creates certain exemptions, such as from jury services and
arrest on civil process while attending court. The law conferring such
60
privileges must be general in its operation. No doubt the legislature, in
framing an enactment for that purpose, may classify persons so long as
the law establishing classes in general, and has some reasonable
relation to the end sought. There must be some difference which
furnishes a reasonable basis for different legislation as to the different
classes, and not a purely arbitrary one, having no just relation to the
subject of the legislation. Braceville Coal Co. vs. People, 147 111. 66, 35
N. E. 62; Ritchie vs. People, 155 III. 98, 40 N. E. 454; Railroad
Co. vs. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. 255.
"The length of time a physician has practiced, and the skill acquired by
experience, may furnish a basis for classification
(Williams vs. People 121 111. 48, II N. E. 881); but the place where such
physician has resided and practiced his profession cannot furnish such
basis, and is an arbitrary discrimination, making an enactment based
upon it void (State vs. Pennyeor, 65 N. E. 113, 18 Atl. 878). Here the
legislature undertakes to say what shall serve as a test of fitness for the
profession of the law. and. plainly, any classification must have some
reference to learning, character, or ability to engage in such practice.
The proviso is limited. first, to a class of persons who began the study of
law prior to November 4, 1897. This class is subdivided into two
classes—First, those presenting diplomas issued by any law school of
this state before December 31, 1899; and, second, those who studied
law for the period of two years in a law office, or part of the time in a
558
558 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
law school and part in a law office, who are to be admitted upon
examination in the subjects specified in the present rules of this court,
and as to this latter subdivision there seems to be no limit of time for
making application for admission. As to both classes, the conditions of
the rules are dispensed with, and as between the two different
conditions and limits of time are fixed. No course of study is prescribed
for the law school, but a diploma granted upon the completion of any
sort of course its managers may prescribe is made all-sufficient. Can
there be anything with relation to the qualifications or fitness of
persons to practice law resting upon the mere date of November 4,
1897, which will furnish a basis of classification. Plainly not. Those who
began the study of law November 4th could qualify themselves to
practice in two years as well as those who began on the 3rd. The classes
named in the proviso need spend only two years in study, while those
who commenced the next day must spend three years, although they
would complete two years before the time limit. The one who
commenced on the 3d. If possessed of a diploma, is to be admitted
without examination before December 31, 1899, and without any
prescribed course of study, while as to the other the prescribed course
must be pursued, and the diploma is utterly useless. Such classification
cannot rest upon any natural reason, or bear any just relation to the
subject sought, and none is suggested. The proviso is for the sole
purpose of bestowing privileges upon certain defined persons. (pp.
647-648.)
In the case of Cannon above cited, State vs. Cannon, 240 N. W. 441,
where the legislature attempted by law to reinstate Cannon to the
practice of law, the court also held with regards to its aspect of being a
class legislation:
"But the statute is invalid for another reason. If it be granted that the
legislature has power to prescribe ultimately and definitely the
qualifications upon which courts must admit and license those applying
as attorneys at law, that power can not be exercised in the manner here
attempted. That power must be exercised through general laws which
will apply to all alike and accord equal opportunity to all. Speaking of
the right of the Legislature to exact qualifications of those desiring to
pursue chosen callings, Mr. Justice Field in the case of Dent. vs. West
Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 121, 9 S. Ct. 232, 233, 32 L. Ed. 626, said: 'lt is
undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States to follow any
lawful calling, business or profession he may choose, subject only to
such restrictions as are imposed upon all persons of like age, sex, and
condition. This right may in many respects be considered as a
distinguishing feature
61
559
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
In re: Cunanan, et al.
of our republican institutions. Here all vocations are all open to every
one on like conditions. All may be pursued as sources of livelihood,
some requiring years of study and great learning for their successful
prosecution. The interest, or, as it is sometimes termed, the 'estate'
acquired in thern—that is, the right to continue their prosecution—is
often of great value to the possessors and cannot be arbitrarily taken
from them, any more than their real or personal property can be thus
taken. It is fundamental under our system of government that all
similarly situated and possessing equal qualifications shall enjoy equal
opportunities. Even statutes regulating the practice of medicine,
requiring examinations to establish the possession on the part of the
application of his proper qualifications before he may be licensed to
practice, have been challenged, and courts have seriously considered
whether the exemption from such examinations of those practicing in
the state at the time of the enactment of the law rendered such law
unconstitutional because of infringement upon this general
principle. State vs.Thomas Call, 121 N. C. 643, 28 S. E. 517; see, also, The
State ex rel. Winkler vs. Rosenberg, 101 Wis. 172, 76 N. W.
345; State vs. Whitcom, 122 Wis. 110, 99 N. W. 468.
"This law singles out Mr. Cannon and assumes to confer upon him the
right to practice law and to constitute him an officer of this Court as a
mere matter of legislative grace or favor. It is not material that he had
once established his right to practice law and that one time he
possessed the requisite learning and other qualifications to entitle him
to that right. That fact in no manner affect the power of the Legislature
to select from the great body of the public an individual upon whom it
would confer its favors.
"A statute of the state of Minnesota (Laws 1929, c. 424) commanded
the Supreme Court to admit to the practice of law without examination,
all who had 'serve in the military or naval forces of the United States
during the World War and received an honorable discharge therefrom
and who (were disabled therein or thereby within the purview of the
559 Act of Congress approved June 7th, 1924, known as 'World War
Veteran's Act, 1924 and whose disability is rated at least ten per cent
thereunder at the time of the passage of this Act." This Act was held
unconstitutional on the ground that it clearly violated the quality
clauses of the constitution of that state. In re Application of George W.
Humphrey, 178 Minn. 331, 227 N. W. 179.
A good summary of a classification constitutionally acceptable is
explained in 12 Am. Jur. 151-153 as follows:
"The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a
classification to be valid must rest upon material differences
560
560 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
between the person included in it and those excluded and, furthermore,
must be based upon substantial distinctions. As the rule has sometimes
avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent
and real differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial once.
Therefore, any law that is made applicable to one class of citizens only
must be based on some substantial difference between the situation of
that class and other individuals to which it does not apply and must
rest on some reason on which it can be defended. In other words, there
must be such a difference between the situation and circumstances of
all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all
other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the
discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural reason for the
difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and
privileges. A law is not general because it operates on all within a
clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on
that class only, and not generally on all." (12 Am. Jur. pp. 151-153.)
Pursuant to the law in question, those who, without a grade below 50
per cent in any subject, have obtained a general average of 69.5 per
cent in the bar examinations in 1946 to 1951, 70.5 per cent in 1952,
71.5 per cent in 1953, and those will obtain 72.5 per cent in 1954, and
62
73.5 per cent in 1955, will be permitted to take and subscribe the
corresponding oath of office as members of the Bar, notwithstanding
that the rules require a minimum general average of 75 per cent, which
has been invariably followed since 1950. Is there any motive of the
nature indicated by the above-mentioned authorities, f or this
classification? If there is none, and none has been given, then the
classification is fatally defective.
It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before,
with the general average indicated, were not included because the
Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful ul candidates of those years.
This f act does not justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful
candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955. Neither
is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same
conditions justified. The fact that this Court has no record of
examinations prior to 1946 does
561
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 561
In re: Cunanan, et al.
not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other means his
right to an equal consideration.
To defend the disputed law from being declared unconstitutional on
account of its retroactivity, it is argued that it is curative, and that in
such form it is constitutional. What does Rep. Act 972 intend to cure?
Only from 1946 to 1949 were there cases in which the Tribunal
permitted admission to the bar of candidates who did not obtain the
general average of 75 per cent: in 1946 those who obtained only 72 per
cent; in the 1947 and those who had 69 per cent or more; in 1948, 70
per cent and in 1949, 74 per cent; and in 1950 to 1953, those who
obtained 74 per cent, which was considered by the Court as equivalent
to 75 per cent as prescribed by the Rules, by reason of circumstances
deemed to be sufficiently justifiable. These changes in the passing
averages during those years were all that could be objected to or
criticized. Now, is it desired to undo what had been done—cancel the
license that was issued to those who did not obtain the prescribed 75
per cent? Certainly not. The disputed law clearly does not propose to do
so. Concededly, it approves what has been done by this Tribunal. What
Congress lamented is that the Court did not consider 69.5 per cent
obtained by those candidates who failed in 1946 to 1952 as sufficient to
qualify them to practice law. Hence, it is the lack of will or defect of
judgment of the Court that is being cured, and to complete the cure of
this infirmity, the effectivity of the disputed law is being extended up to
the years 1953, 1954 and 1955, increasing each year the general
average by one per cent, with the order that said candidates be
admitted to the Bar. This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best
proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the rules
promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply
taking its place. This is doing directly what the Tribunal should have
done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In
other words, the power exercised was not to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules, which continue
562
562 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
in force. What was done was to stop or suspend them. And this power is
not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because
it falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to
the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.
Article 2 of the law in question permits partial passing of examinations,
at indefinite intervals. The grave defect of this system is that it does not
take into account that the laws and jurisprudence are not stationary,
and when a candidate finally receives his certificate, it may happen that
the existing laws and jurisprudence are already different, seriously
affecting in this manner his usefulness. The system that the said law
prescribes was used in the first bar examinations of this country, but
was abandoned for this and other disadvantages. In this case, however,
the fatal defect is that the article is not expressed in the title of the Act.
While this law according to its title will have temporary effect only
from 1946 to 1955, the text of article 2 establishes a permanent system
63
for an indefinite time. This is contrary to Section 21(1), article VI of the
Constitution, which vitiates and annuls article 2 completely; and
because it is inseparable from article 1, it is obvious that its nullity
affects the entire law.
Laws are unconstitutional on the f ollowing grounds: first, because they
are not within the legislative powers of Congress to enact, or Congress
has exceeded its powers; second, because they create or establish
arbitrary methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; and
third, because their purposes or effects violate the Constitution or its
basic principles. As has already been seen, the contested law suffers
from these fatal defects.
Summarizing, we are of the opinion and hereby declare that Republic
Act No. 972 is unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any
force nor effect for the following reasons, to wit:
. 1.Because its declared purpose is to admit 810
candidates who failed in the bar examinations of 1946-1952,
and
563
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
In re: Cunanan, et al.
. who, it admits, are certainly inadequately prepared to
practice law, as was exactly found by this Court in the aforesaid
years. It decrees the admission to the Bar of these candidates,
depriving this Tribunal of the opportunity to determine if they
are at present already prepared to become members of the
Bar. It obliges the Tribunal to perform something contrary to
reason and in an arbitrary manner. This is a manifest
encroachment on the constitutional responsibility of the
Supreme Court.
. 2.Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the
resolution of this Court on the petitions of these 810
candidates, without having examined their respective
examination papers, and although it is admitted that this
Tribunal may reconsider said resolution at any time for
justifiable reasons, only this Court and no other may revise and
alter them. In attempting to do it directly Republic Act No. 972
violated the Constitution.
. 3.By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its
legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on
admission to the Bar. Such additional or amendatory rules are,
as they ought to be, intended to regulate acts subsequent to its
promulgation and should tend to improve and elevate the
practice of law, and this Tribunal shall consider these rules as
minimum norms towards that end in the admission,
suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers to the
Bar, inasmuch as a good bar assists immensely in the daily
performance of judicial functions and is essential to a worthy
administration of justice. It is theref ore the primary and
inherent prerogative of the Supreme Court to render the
ultimate decision on who may be admitted and may continue
in the practice of law according to existing rules.
563 . 4.The reason advanced for the pretended classification
of candidates, which the law makes, is contrary to f acts which
are of general knowledge and does not justify the admission to
the Bar of law students inadequately prepared. The pretended
classification is arbitrary. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.
564
564 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
. 5.Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in
the title of the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins,
and being inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the
entire law is void.
64
 . 6.Lacking in eight votes to declare the nullity of that
part of article 1 referring to the examinations of 1953 to 1955,
said part of article 1, insofar as it concerns the examinations in
those years, shall continue in force.
RESOLUTION
Upon mature deliberation by this Court, after hearing and availing of
the magnificent and impassioned discussion of the contested law by
our Chief Justice at the opening and close of the debate among the
members of the Court, and after hearing the judicious observations of
two of our beloved colleagues who since the beginning have announced
their decision not to take part in voting, we, the eight members of the
Court who subscribe to this decision have voted and resolved, and have
decided for the Court, and under the authority of the same:
. 1.That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No.
972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all
of article 2 of said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void
and without force and effect.
. 2.That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that
part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent
to the approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive,
is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with
section 10, article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates
who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive are denied,
and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a
general average of 71.5 per cent or more, without having a grade below
50 per cent in any subjcet, are considered as having passed, whether
they have filed petitions for admission or not. After this decision has
become final, they shall be permitted
565
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 565
In re: Cunanan, et al.
to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of
the Bar on the date or dates that the Chief Justice may set. So ordered.
Bengzon, Montemayor, Jugo, Labrador, Pablo, Padilla, and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
ANNEX I
PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
A resumé of pertinent facts concerning the bar examinations of 1946 to
1953 inclusive follows:
August, 19461
Board of Examiners: Hon. Pedro Tuason, Chairman, Prof. Gerardo Florendo, Atty. Bernard
Atty. Joaquin Ramirez, Atty. Crispin Oben, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty.
Cardenas, and Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, members.
Number of candidates ....................................................................................................
Number of candidates whose grades were raised ..........................................................
73's ...........................................................................................................................
72's ...........................................................................................................................
Number of candidates who passed ...............................................................................
Number of candidates who failed ..................................................................................
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 .....................................................
Percentage of success ....................................... (per cent) .............................................
Percentage of failure ......................................... (per cent) .............................................
Passing grade .................................................. (per cent) ...............................................
November, 1946
Board of Examiners: The same as that of August, 1946, except Hon. Jose Teodoro who was
by Atty. Honesto K. Bausan.
Number of candidates ....................................................................................................
Number of candidates whose grades were raised ...........................................................
(72 per cent and above but below 73 per cent—
65
 Minutes of March 31, 1947) (By resolution of the Court).
Number of candidates who passed ................................................................................. NOTE.—In passing
249 the 2 whose grades were 68.95 per cent and 68.1 per cent
Number of candidates who failed ................................................................................... respectively, the228
Court found out that they were not benefited at all by the bonus of 12
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 ...................................................... points given by the
43Examiner in Civil Law.
August, 1948
________________ Board of Examiners: Hon. Marceliano R. Montemayor, Chairman Hon. Luis P. Torres, Hon.
Felipe Natividad, Hon. Jose Teodoro, Sr., Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr.,
1 Designed as Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners vice Mr. Hon. Jesus G. Barrera, Hon. Rafael Amparo, Atty. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Members.
Justice Roman Ozaeta, resigned. Number of candidates ....................................................................................... 899
566 Number of candidates whose grades were raised .............................................. 64
566 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED 71's .......................................................................................................... 29
In re: Cunanan, et al. 70's ........................................................................................................... 35
Percentage of success ........................................................................ (per cent) 52.20
Number of candidates who passed ..................................................................... 490
Percentage of failure .......................................................................... (per cent) 47.80
Number of candidates who failed ....................................................................... 409
Passing grade ..................................................................................... (per cent) 72of those affected by Rep. Act No. 972 .................................................
Number 11
(By resolution of the Court). Percentage of success ............................................ (per cent) ............................. 62
October, 1947
567
Board of Examiners: Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, Atty. VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 567
Antonio Araneta, Atty. Simon Cruz, Hon. Sixto de la Costa, Atty. Celso B. Jamora, Hon. Emilio In re: Cunanan, et al.
Peña, Atty. Federico Agrava, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Members. Percentage of failure ........................................................................... (per cent) ...... 3
Number of candidates ....................................................................................... 749grade ...................................................................................... (per cent) .......
Passing 7
Number of candidates whose grades were raised .............................................. 43
(By resolution of the Court).
70.55 per cent with 2 subjects below 50 per cent .................................. 1 August, 1949
69 per cent ............................................................................................... 40
Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Fernando Jugo, Hon. Enrique
68 per cent ............................................................................................... Filamor,2Atty. Salvador Araneta, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. Federico Agrava, Hon.
Number of candidates who passed .................................................................... 409H. de Joya, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Emeterio Barcelon, Members.
Mariano
Number of candidates who failed ...................................................................... 340of candidates .................................................................................................
Number 1,21
Number of those affected by Rep. Act No. 972 ................................................ 972of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) .................................................
Number 5
Percentage of success .......................................... (per cent) ............................. 54.59
Number of candidates who passed ............................................................................... 68
Percentage of failure .............................................. (per cent) ............................ 45.41
Number of candidates who failed ................................................................................ 53
Passing grade ........................................................ (per cent) ............................. 69of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 ....................................................
Number 16

66
Percentage of success .......................................................... (per cent) ...................... 568 56.28 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Percentage of failure ............................................................. (per cent) .................... 43.72 In re: Cunanan, et al.
Passing grades ........................................................................ (per cent) .................... Number74
of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 ................................................................ 26
(By resolution of the Court). Percentage of success .............................................................................................(per cent).... 32
August, 1950 Percentage of failure ...............................................................................................(per cent).... 67
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo,1 Chairman, Hon. Guillermo B. Guevara, PassingAtty, grade ..........................................................................................................(per cent).... 75
Enrique Altavas, Atty. Marcial P. Lichauco, Atty. Carlos B. Hilado, Atty. J. Antonio Araneta, August, 1951
Hon. Enrique V. Filamor, Hon. Francisco A. Delgado, Hon. Antonio Horrilleno, Members.Board of Examiners: Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty. En
Number of candidates ....................................................................................................
1,316
Altavas, Hon. Manuel Lim, Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Vicente Albert, Atty. Arturo Alafriz,
Number of candidates whose grades were raised .............................................................. Hon. Enrique
38 V. Filamor, Hon. Alfonso Felix, Members.
(The grade of 74 was raised to 75 per cent by recommendation and authority of the examiner
Number of candidates ......................................................................................................... 2
in Remedial Law, Atty. Francisco Delgado). Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) ......................................................
Number of candidates who passed .................................................................................. 423
Number of candidates who passed ...................................................................................... 1
Number of candidates who failed .................................................................................... 894
Number of candidates who failed ........................................................................................
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 ...........................................................
_______________ Percentage of success .......................................................................................(per cent)....
Percentage of failure .........................................................................................(per cent)....
1 In 1946 and 1947, the members of the Supreme Court were Hon.
Passing grade ....................................................................................................(per cent)....
Manuel V. Moran, Chief Justice, Hon. Ricardo Parás, Hon. Felicisimo
August, 1952
Feria, Hon. Guillermo F. Pablo, Hon. Gregorio Perfecto, Hon. Carlos
Hilado, Hon. Cesar Bengzon, Hon. Manuel C. Briones, Hon. Jose Board of Examiners: Hon. Sabino Padilla, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Hon. Enriqu
Hontiveros, Hon. Sabino Padilla, and Hon. Pedro Tuason, Associate Filamor, Atty. . Francisco Ortigas, Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Emilio P. Virata, Hon. Alfonso Fe
Justices. In 1948, Justices Marcelino R. Montemayor and Alex. Reyes Hon. Felipe Natividad, Atty. Macario Peralta, Sr., Members.
took the place of Justice Hilado, resigned, and Hontiveros, retired. Number of candidates ....................................................................................................... 2,
Justice Roman Ozaeta was returned to the Court and Justice Sabino Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) ....................................................
Padilla was appointed Secretary of Justice. In June, 1949, Justice Padilla Number of candidates who passed .................................................................................... 1,
was returned to the Tribunal, as Justice Briones resigned. In October, Number of candidates who failed ...................................................................................... 1,
1950, Justices Fernando Jugo and Felix Bautista Angelo were appointed Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 .........................................................
to the Court, as Justice Perfecto had died, and Justice Ozaeta had Percentage of success .....................................................................................(per cent)....
resigned. In 1951, Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran resigned and Justice
Percentage of failure .......................................................................................(per cent)....
Ricardo Parás was appointed Chief Justice. In 1953, Justice Felicisimo R.
Passing grade ..................................................................................................(per cent)....
Feria retired.
568 August, 1953

67
Board of Examiners: Hon. Fernando Jugo, Chairman, Hon. Pastor M. Endencia, Atty,MRD- Enrique4. Orlina, Soledad 71 68 66 75 63 75 70 88 69.9
Altavas, Atty. Francisco Ortigas, Jr., Hon. Emilio Peña, Atty. Jose S. de la Cruz, Hon. Alfonso Felix, R. ............
Hon. Felipe Natividad, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, Members. MRD- 5. Vivero, Antonio 75 73 73 65 63 66 65 80 69.95
Number of candidates ......................................................................................................... 2,555
Lu. .........
Number of candidates whose grades were raised (74's) ...................................................... MRD- 6.100 Gatchalian, 72 66 71 75 78 68 65 50 69.65
Number of candidates who passed ..................................................................................... Salud .............
1,570
Number of candidates who failed ....................................................................................... 9861949
Number of those affected by Republic Act No. 972 .......................................................... 7.284
Abaya, Jesus 69 79 75 75 71 89 55 75 70.8
569 A. ...............
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 569 MRD- 8. Advincula, David 76 80 62 86 81 72 60 65 70.5
In re: Cunanan, et al. D. .........
Percentage of success ............................................................................................ (per cent).... 61.04 9. Agraviador, Alfredo 63 85 70 77 80 81 65 80 71.8
L. .....
Percentage of failure ............................................................................................... (per cent).... 38.96
10. Alacar, Pascual 61 63 83 79 71 85 65 80 72.05
Passing grade .......................................................................................................... (per cent).... 75
C. ...........
A list of petitioners for admission to the Bar under Republic Act No. 972,
grouped by the years in which they took the bar examinations, with 11. Amog, Pedro 75 66 76 78 81 74 55 85 72.2
annotations as to who had presented motions for reconsideration M. .............
which were denied (MRD), and who filed mere motions for 12. Apolinario, Miguel 75 84 78 78 70 70 60 75 71.95
reconsidration without invoking said law, which are still pending, S. .......
follows: 13. Aquino, Maximo 82 77 71 77 76 77 60 75 73.15
G. .........
PETITIONERS UNDER THE BAR FLUNKERS' LAW 14. Asinas, Candido 75 83 69 80 81 83 55 85 72.65
D. ..........
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. 15. Baldivino, Jose 75 65 72 82 82 69 60 80 71.95
Ave. B. ............
MRD- 1. Agunod, Filemon 66 71 61 76 80 83 73 75 71.4 16. Balintona, 75 80 64 78 74 67 65 70 70
L. ........... Bernardo .........
MRD- 2. Cunanan 76 72 74 75 70 70 65 72 71.45 17. Banawa, Angel 78 70 70 75 81 83 60 60 72.3
Albino .............. L. ............
3. Mejia, Flaviano 64 64 65 68 83 74 68 80 69.85 18. Bandala, Anacleto 66 80 66 71 93 72 55 70 69.6
V. .............. A. .......
1948 19. Bandon, Alawadin 74 79 69 77 91 73 60 80 73.35

68
 L. ....... 33. Enriquez, Agustin 75 77 70 81 81 77 65 80 73.75
20. Baquero, 76 79 64 77 85 72 65 75 72.5 P. .........
Benjamin .......... 34. Espiritu, Irineo 80 88 69 75 76 77 65 75 73.8
21. Blanco, 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.5 E. .............
Jose .................... 35. Fernandez, Macario 63 82 76 75 81 84 65 75 72.95
22. Buenaluz, 75 71 72 78 67 82 60 75 70.85 J. ......
Victoriano T. ..... 36. Gallardo, Amando 78 79 67 77 76 75 60 65 70.95
23. Canda, Benjamin 75 72 75 82 76 77 65 75 73.55 C. .......
S. .......... 37. Garcia, Freidrich 76 80 66 75 72 70 60 75 69.7
24. Canon, 77 86 67 88 75 69 70 85 73.9 M. .........
Guillermo ............ 38. Garcia, Julian 64 77 68 82 89 77 65 75 72.15
25. Carlos, Estela 75 81 81 79 72 73 65 70 73.8 L. …...........
S. ............. 39. Garcia, Leon 77 86 71 80 60 82 65 75 71.85
26. Cerezo, Gregorio 69 76 76 79 71 80 55 80 70.4 Mo. ............
O. ........ 40. Garcia, Pedro 76 82 73 81 74 83 60 85 73.6
27. Clarin, Manuel 75 82 76 81 73 69 70 75 73.95 V. .............
L. ............. 41. Garcia, Santiago 62 91 79 75 72 75 65 80 71.8
28. Claudio Conrado 76 62 78 77 73 72 60 70 71.4 C. ..........
O. ........ 42. Genoves, 75 83 70 78 87 76 55 80 72.7
29. Condevillamar, 68 65 74 80 85 75 60 75 71.65 Pedro ...............
Antonio V. ... 43. Gonzales, Amado 75 71 71 75 86 75 60 75 72.65
MRD- 30. Cornejo, Crisanto 72 75 69 82 83 79 65 80 73.4 P. ........
R. ........ 44. Guia, Odon R. 77 76 66 81 74 76 60 75 70.9
570 de ............
570 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED 45. Fernandez, 62 68 71 80 74 90 65 75 70.85
In re: Cunanan, et al. Simeon ..........
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. 46. Jakosalem, 82 83 73 82 61 87 65 70 73.6
Ave. Filoteo ...........
31. Corona, Olvido 68 76 73 81 81 72 60 75 71.15 47. Jesus, Felipe D. 75 83 67 79 78 85 60 75 72.45
D ........... de ...........
32. Dizon, Marcial 76 86 69 83 75 74 65 80 73.1 48. Jocom, Jacobo 77 77 74 77 74 64 55 85 70.65
C. ............ M. ...........

69
49. Juares, 77 84 56 76 73 82 60 85 70 65. Manad, Andres 77 75 68 82 69 72 65 75 71.15
Nicolas ................. B. ….......
50. Kalalang, 65 75 74 80 70 70 65 85 70.3 1949
Remigio ........... 66. Orosco, Casimiro 72 84 69 81 70 82 65 75 71.9
51. Layumas, Vicente 67 84 65 75 89 66 60 80 70.3 P. ........
L. ........ 67. Padua, Manuel 76 76 68 80 79 79 50 75 70.1
52. Leyson, Amancio 69 83 75 76 81 75 65 75 73.15 C. ............
F. ........ 68. Palang, Basilio 71 75 82 71 55 87 55 75 69.6
53. Libanan, 71 83 61 77 80 81 65 85 71.75 S. .............
Marcelino .......... 69. Palma, 62 75 69 93 80 79 55 80 69.5
54. Lim, Jose 77 77 72 76 72 64 65 70 71.15 Cuadrato ..............
E. .................... 70. Pañganiban, Jose 67 83 61 81 91 74 60 75 70.6
55. Lim, Jose 70 75 62 83 80 71 65 80 70.4 V. .........
F. .................... 71. Pareja, 66 71 75 81 67 74 60 70 68.75
56. Linao, Mariano 66 84 76 78 80 75 60 75 71.75 Felipe ..................
M. .…...... 72. Patalinjug jug, 73 77 78 73 78 71 55 75 71.25
57. Lopez, Angelo 67 81 75 72 79 81 55 80 71 Eriberto ......
P. ............. 73. Paulin, Jose 66 69 71 77 83 82 65 75 72.1
58. Lopez, Eliezar 77 75 60 75 77 85 60 75 70.7 C. ..................
M. ............ 74. Pido, Serafin 72 78 63 80 71 85 70 80 72.05
59. Lopez, Nicanor 72 71 70 78 77 84 60 75 71.55 C. ................
S. ........... 75. Pimentel, Luis 77 75 76 81 76 68 55 80 71.6
60. Manoleto, Proceso 72 70 65 78 81 90 60 80 71.95 P. ...............
D. ...... 76. Plantilla, Rodrigo 72 78 68 89 79 81 65 85 73.55
61. Mancao, Alfredo 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95 C. ..........
P. ......... 77. Regalario, Benito 72 80 64 80 75 81 55 80 69.55
62. Manera, Mariano 75 78 75 75 68 79 60 65 71 B. ..........
A. ......... 78. Robis, Casto 62 77 74 73 68 80 70 80 70.9
63. Mercado, Arsenio 67 64 71 83 76 76 65 80 70.95 P. ................
N. ....... 79. Rodil, Francisco 68 69 70 81 76 75 65 75 70.75
64. Miranda, Benjamin 76 81 67 82 74 77 65 80 72.55 C. ..........
G. ....... 80. Rodriguez, Mariano 80 75 69 80 72 80 65 80 73.35

70
 I. ...... 94. Viado, Jose ..….............. 67 70 74 75 75 90 55 80 70.7
81. Romero, Crispulo 78 75 66 77 76 83 65 75 72.85 95. Villacarlos, Delfin 73 87 71 82 69 70 75 85 73.85
P. ........ A. .......
571 96. Villamil, Leonor 73 81 76 86 86 73 55 85 73.6
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 571 S. ..........
In re: Cunanan, et al. 97. Zabala, Amando 76 70 67 75 76 76 60 75 70.6
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. A. ........
Ave. 1950
82. Saez, Porfirio 75 75 72 81 69 77 60 75 71 MRD- 98. Cruz, Filomeno de 70 71 78 81 76 72 64 96 73.4
D. .............. la .......
83. Saliguma, Crisogono 79 79 74 78 69 65 65 70 71.8 99. Española, Pablo 71 78 55 76 85 69 65 93 70.2
D. .... S. ..........
84. Samano, Fortunato 75 84 72 77 70 82 60 75 71.9 100. Foronda, Clarencio 60 78 68 79 84 88 62 93 71.9
A. ..... J. ......
85. Santos, Faustina 71 68 68 76 75 85 55 75 69.5 101. Hechanova, 59 76 75 75 69 68 75 96 71.3
C. ......... Vicente …....
86. Santos, Josefina 68 69 76 71 77 82 65 75 MRD-
72.3 102. Peñalosa, Osias 80 78 61 76 61 77 66 85 70.2
R. .......... R. ..........
87. Seludo Ananias 75 80 69 79 77 82 65 75 73.25 103. Sarmiento, Floro 65 86 63 82 89 72 60 72 70.15
G. .......... A. ........
88. Semilia Rafael 68 85 55 83 89 79 65 80 MRD- 104. Torre, Catalino
71.25 75 85 68 78 69 67 65 69 70.25
I. .............. P. ...........
89. Telan 77 79 70 75 70 75 60 75 70.85 105. Ungson, Fernando 61 87 75 70 57 85 83 82 72.8
Gaudencio ............. S. ......
90. Tesorero, Leocadio 75 71 63 75 82 62 65 63 69.65 1951
T. .... 106. Abasolo, 77 70 64 65 76 70 76 64 71.7
91. Torre, Valentin S. de 85 81 71 76 69 65 55 70 70.4 Romulo ............
la ... 107. Adeva, Daniel 75 59 74 65 69 51 78 67 70.4
92. Torres, Ariston 78 71 72 81 61 84 55 85 70.4 G. ............
L. ........... 108. Aguilar, Vicente 73 63 68 75 70 69 75 75 71.25
93. Veyra, Zosimo C. 70 75 71 79 65 80 65 80 70.65 Z. ..........
de ...... 109. Amodia, Juan 75 76 66 75 76 60 77 76 72.35

71
 T. …......... MRD- 126. Calimlim, Jose 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 69.65
MRD- 110. Añosa, Pablo S. ............. 76 78 63 75 74 61 75 79 71.6 B. ............
111. Antiola, Anastacio 68 76 75 70 71 70 81 66 73.05 127. Calimlim, Pedro 66 82 69 60 69 52 83 75 70
R. ..... B. .........
112. Aquino, S. Rey 70 71 71 60 74 62 76 77 71.1 128. Camello, Sotero 70 77 63 65 75 66 84 64 71.55
A. …....... H. ........
113. Atienza, Manuel 71 78 68 80 86 51 82 75 73.85 129. Campos, Juan A. ........... 71 88 70 75 64 69 71 62 70.15
G. .......... 130. Castillo, Antonio 78 78 70 60 79 67 69 76 72.65
114. Avanceña, 71 71 65 75 70 72 78 80 71.8 del ........
Alfonso .......... MRD- 131. Castillo, Dominador 75 61 72 75 74 71 67 66 71.1
MRD- 115. Balacuit, Camilo 75 73 75 70 72 65 75 76 73.25 Ad. ...
N. ......... 572
116. Barinaga, Jeremias 68 69 73 70 74 60 80 79 572
71.2 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
L. ….. In re: Cunanan, et al.
MRD- 117. Barrientos, Ambrosio 76 60 67 55 74 63 77 62 70.25 Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
D. .. Ave
MRD- 118. Benitez, Tomas 67 75 75 60 73 72 75 78 72.2
MRD- 132. Castro, Jesus 72 86 72 75 65 75 76 71 72.85
P. …........ B. ...................
119. Biason, Sixto 73 82 67 65 66 72 77 68 71.25 133. Casuga, Bienvenido 75 72 72 70 69 61 75 60 70.95
F. …........... B. .........
MRD- 120. Briñas, Isagani, 71 69 74 70 76 52 79 72 71.95 134. Cabangbang, Santiago 77 67 61 80 73 59 83 76 72.2
A. ........... B. .....
121. Buela, Arcadio 72 77 61 70 71 58 79 71 69.75 135. Cruz, Federico 69 74 75 75 68 65 76 70 71.65
P. ............ S. ................
122. Cabilao, Leonardo 73 50 75 75 75 60 71 79 71.25 136. Dacanay, Eufemio 70 73 62 75 72 69 85 71 72.05
S. ...... P. ...........
123. Cabrera, Ireneo 75 66 70 65 72 81 70 79 72.4 137. Deysolong, 66 62 72 75 70 62 83 62 70.85
M. …..... Felisberto ..........
124. Cacacho, Emilio MRD- 138. Dimaano, Jr., Jose 78 79 63 75 73 75 81 59 73.5
V. …..... N. ..........
125. Calilung, Soledad 64 73 73 80 73 57 75 59 6.65 139. Espinosa, Domingo 78 63 58 70 70 67 87 63 71.6
C. ....... L. .........

72
MRD- 140. Farol, Evencia 80 78 66 75 81 72 62 73 72.25156. Lavilles, Cesar 61 89 75 55 73 63 75 78 70.55
C. ................ L. .................
141. Felix, Conrado 71 71 75 65 70 58 75 69 70.75157. Llenos, Francisco 64 70 65 60 72 65 92 75 71.75
S. ............... U. ............
142. Fernan, Pablo 67 88 66 85 73 68 78 75 72.35158. Leon, Marcelo D. 63 73 60 85 75 75 90 70 72.75
L. ................ de ...........
143. Gandioco, Salvador 64 58 66 65 76 70 89 75 72.1 159. Llanto, 72 68 60 65 76 67 84 68 71.35
G. ...... Priscilla ....................
144. Gastardo, Crispin 70 69 68 75 78 66 86 72 73.9 160. Machachor, 68 59 78 70 67 57 75 75 70.15
B. .......... Oscar ..............
145. Genson, Angelo 75 57 73 65 67 54 78 56 MRD-
69.55161. Magsino, 77 66 70 70 76 71 75 61 72.75
B. ............... Encarnacion .........
146. Guiani, Guinaid 68 60 75 65 74 67 75 77 MRD-
71.5 162. Maligaya, Demetrio 70 61 75 65 75 50 91 51 72.3
M. ............... M. .......
147. Guina, Graciano 66 69 67 60 78 52 83 61 69.6 163. Manio, 67 67 69 80 71 67 75 75 70.65
P. ............... Gregorio .................
MRD- 148. Homeres, Praxedes 74 74 75 75 71 69 75 71 73.35164. Puzon, Eduardo 72 82 60 60 69 70 68 72 68.05
P. .......... S. ..............
149. Ibarra, Venancio 60 75 74 70 74 70 80 75 MRD-
71.9 165. Marcial, Meynardo 66 75 74 70 75 67 81 75 73.15
M. ............. R. .........
150. Imperial, Monico 72 78 75 75 72 56 82 77 73.7 166. Martin, Benjamin 68 72 63 75 69 63 84 62 70.1
L. .......... S. ............
MRD- 151. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano 71 70 63 85 71 60 85 53 MRD-
70.85167. Monterroyo, Catalina 70 80 75 80 76 66 82 51 73.95
M. ........ S. .....
152. Inandan, Fortunato 77 77 67 53 73 75 79 57 MRD-
72.5 168. Montero, Leodegario 73 67 66 80 81 65 81 75 73.75
C. ........... C. ....
153. Jimenez, Florencio 75 70 70 75 72 61 75 78 72.05169. Monzon, Candido 70 72 74 75 67 70 77 69 72.05
C. ........ T. .........
154. Kintanar. Woodrow 70 83 72 65 76 73 75 69 72.95170. Natividad, Alberto 73 79 68 65 73 69 75 79 72.2
M. ........ M. .......
155. Languido, Cesar 63 71 63 85 70 61 85 79 MRD-
70.55171. Navallo, Capistrano 70 72 68 85 81 66 71 74 72.1
V. .............. C. ......

73
 172. Nisce, Camilo Z. ............... 66 66 75 65 79 68 85 62 73.5 192. Suico. Samuel ................. 73 79 72 75 71 59 84 65 73.3
173. Ocampo, Antonio F. 75 81 76 65 74 67 75 69 73.75193. Suson, Teodorico ........... 74 68 66 80 66 59 79 67 70.35
de .... 194. Tado, Florentino 64 76 67 65 76 72 76 53 69.7
174. Olaviar, Jose O. ............... 72 70 69 55 66 70 77 75 70.5 P. ........
MRD- 175. Perez, Cesario Z. ............. 75 76 66 80 72 63 82 69 7.95 195. Tapayan. Domingo 69 72 69 70 76 73 82 79 73.75
176. Pogado, Causin O. .......... 70 66 65 70 75 64 75 70 69.95 A. ......
177. Ramos-Balmori, 75 73 62 65 78 59 75 66 MRD-
70.2 196. Tiausas, Miguel 67 60 71 75 79 67 84 60 72.7
Manuela V. ...........
178. Recinto, Ireneo I. ............ 73 76 68 75 74 68 80 53 72.3 197. Torres, Carlos P. ............. 68 71 71 70 70 63 82 71 71.6
MRD- 179. Redor, Francisco K. ....... 62 77 73 75 69 64 76 69 70 198. Tria, Hipolito ................... 69 72 75 60 69 54 78 66 70.05
MRD- 180. Regis, Deogracias A. ...... 76 74 68 65 65 65 88 75 73.35199. Velasco, Avelino 65 72 75 75 71 67 78 76 72.1
181. Rigor, Estelita C. ............ 67 78 61 80 71 77 79 65 70.9 A .........
MRD- 182. Rimorin-Gordo, 70 72 62 60 88 66 67 79 70.15200. Villa. Francisco C. .......... 65 80 73 75 68 79 65 75 70.2
Estela .. 201. Villagonzalo, Job R. ........ 78 67 74 65 72 51 69 71 70.25
183. Rosario, Prisco del ........ 70 64 70 70 72 73 85 57 72.65202. Villarama, Jr., 75 74 75 55 75 66 67 75 71.45
184. Rosario, Vicente D. del . 75 91 65 75 68 68 79 62 72.2 Pedro .......
573 1952
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 573 203. Abacon, Pablo ................. 75 72 78 81 78 72 64 55 72.7
In re: Cunanan, et al. MHP- 204. Abad, Agapito ................. 73 76 73 85 75 63 62 75 70.95
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. MllP-
Gen. 205. Abella, Ludovico 70 81 76 81 70 66 77 58 72.7
Ave. B. .........
185. Saavedra, Felipe ............. 73 80 63 75 76 73 68 62 MRP-
70.35206. Abellera, Geronimo 75 79 79 87 76 51 63 70 71.7
186. Salazar. Alfredo N. ......... 66 72 73 75 67 68 77 69 70.85 F. .....
187. Salem, Romulo 77 81 72 65 73 60 76 75 MRP-
73 207. Abenojar, Agapito 71 72 78 84 70 75 69 70 72.9
R. ............ N. ......
188. Foz, Julita A. ................... 75 72 75 75 65 70 76 64 72.5 208. Alandy, Doroteo 64 83 93 91 68 59 60 60 71.2
R. .........
189. Santa Ana, Candido 77 69 65 75 81 75 70 75 73
T. .... 209. Alano, Fabian T. ............. 70 83 61 83 72 87 72 70 71.9
190. Santos, Aquilino .............. 72 66 69 65 63 70 81 71 MRP-
71.7 210. Alcantara, Pablo V. ........ 71 79 80 81 73 70 72 62 73.65
191. Santos, Valeriano 76 72 75 75 68 62 76 79 73.1 211. Arcangel, Agustin 75 85 71 73 76 65 68 65 71.85
V. ....... Ag. .....
212. Acosta, Dionisio N. ........ 75 81 78 87 56 65 77 70 72.8

74
 MUP- 213. Abinguna, Agapito 66 85 80 84 75 58 76 75 574
73.65 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
C. ..... In re: Cunanan, et al.
214. Adove. Nehemias C. ...... 76 86 78 77 66 78 69 62 73.55 Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
215. Adrias, Inocencio C. ...... 75 83 61 88 76 67 79 75 73.4 Ave.
216. Aglugub, Andres R. ....... 75 83 73 88 72 62 72 62 72.65236. Bautista, Atilano 70 82 84 85 58 61 71 62 71.25
217. Andrada, Mariano L. ..... 76 85 66 87 63 77 75 77 73. C. ..........
MKP- 218. Almeda, Serafin V. ......... 72 72 75 81 61 67 73 65 70.75237. Bautista, Celso J. ............. 71 68 63 87 80 67 80 70 72.75
219. Almonte-Peralta, 73 71 72 91 75 67 65 53 70.7 238. Belderon, Jose ................. 76 81 76 92 70 66 67 62 72.65
Felicidad ... MRP- 239. Belo, Victor B. ................ 76 77 64 73 75 71 76 76 72.85
MRP- 220. Amodia, Juan T. ............... 75 79 68 85 62 64 75 78 MRP-
71.4 240. Bejec, Conceso D. .......... 79 80 73 82 63 77 75 50 73.15
MRP- 221. Antonio, Felino 71 76 81 83 79 52 72 70 MRP-
73.3 241. Beltran, Gervasio 72 75 81 73 75 57 75 80 73.95
A. ............ M. .......
MRP- 222. Antonio, Jose S. ............... 75 92 90 68 65 64 68 60 MRP-
73.75242. Benaojan, Robustiano 74 84 77 84 75 63 68 62 72.85
223. Añonuevo, Ramos 71 87 78 81 64 63 74 76 72.7 O. ..
B. ....... MRP- 243. Beriña, Roger C. .............. 70 80 79 79 68 72 64 78 71.85
224. Aquino, S. Rey A. ........... 67 77 57 78 69 70 69 80 MRP-
67.7 244. Bihis, Marcelo M. ............ 75 86 65 92 64 64 84 75 73.45
225. Arteche, Filomeno 78 83 50 89 76 77 70 70 MRP-
70.8 245. Binaoro, Vicente 73 69 78 83 73 59 70 82 72.75
D. ...... M. ........
MRP- 226. Arribas, Isaac M. ............ 75 78 70 81 73 70 67 78 MRP-
72.2 246. Bobila, Rosalio B. ........... 76 86 76 83 68 59 71 78 73.05
MRP- 227. Azucena, Ceferino 72 67 78 89 72 67 77 65 73.95247. Buenafe, Avelina R. ........ 78 80 75 75 70 55 72 80 72.75
D. ...... 248. Bueno, Anastacio F. ....... 73 78 71 78 71 67 71 60 71.15
228. Atienza, Ricardo ............. 72 87 70 79 66 55 75 75 70.85249. Borres, Maximino L. ...... 67 85 62 91 72 63 76 80 70.9
229. Balacuit, Camilo N. ........ 75 78 89 75 70 54 66 75 MRP-
7.3 250. Cabegin, Cesar V. ......... 72 71 76 75 74 70 71 60 72.2
MRP- 230. Baclig, Cayetano S. ........ 77 84 83 80 69 70 61 65 MRP-
73 251. Cabello, Melecio F. ......... 72 78 78 89 58 70 67 51 70.5
231. Balcita. Oscar C. ............ 75 77 79 90 64 60 67 50 MRP-
70.65252. Cabrera, Irineo M. .......... 79 88 53 91 71 85 75 76 73.3
232. Barilea, Dominador 71 67 82 77 64 61 65 80 70.5 253. Cabreros, Paulino 71 79 83 84 60 62 71 50 70.85
Z. .... N. ......
MRP- 233. Banta, Jose Y. ............... 75 80 77 81 75 63 71 75 73.95254. Calayag, Florentino 69 79 66 88 69 75 68 76 70.6
MRP- 234. Barrientos, Ambrosio 76 70 67 80 67 65 70 81 70.7 R. ......
D. ... MRP- 255. Calzada, Cesar de 76 72 80 67 62 71 66 62 70.85
235. Batucan, Jose M. ............. 66 76 78 88 62 76 67 78 71.2 la ........
574

75
 256. Canabal, Isabel ................ 70 82 81 77 78 51 75 75 MRP-
73.7 276. Cobangbang, Orlando 69 81 74 82 76 61 78 80 78.85
MRP- 257. Cabugao, Pablo N. .......... 70 87 69 80 58 64 78 75 71.8 B. ...
258. Calañgi, Mateo C. ........... 73 93 71 87 70 66 69 62 71.8 277. Cortez, Armando 78 60 88 86 60 66 69 64 73.1
259. Canda, Benjamin 72 71 77 90 62 75 66 82 71.95 R. ..........
S. ......... 278. Crisostomo, Jesus 76 87 74 76 62 55 76 66 71.45
260. Cantoria, Eulogio ............ 71 80 71 89 70 55 72 75 71 L. .........
261. Capacio, Jr., Conrado ..... 67 78 71 90 65 75 72 60 MRP-
70.65279. Cornejo, Crisanto 68 87 78 86 79 50 80 60 73.7
262. Capitulo, Alejandro 75 70 53 87 78 63 76 91 71.2 R. .........
P. ...... MRP- 280. Cruz, 75 81 79 85 72 57 68 75 72.95
MRP- 263. Calupitan, Jr., 75 93 81 76 64 75 68 56 73.15 Raymundo ..............
Alfredo ....... MRP- 281. Cunanan, Jose C. ............. 78 92 63 83 76 72 68 65 72.4
MRP- 264. Caluya; Arsenio 75 86 70 87 77 52 77 82 73.9 282. Cunanan, Salvador 70 82 64 92 67 75 73 76 71.45
V. ........... F. .......
MRP- 265. Campanilla, Mariano 80 75 78 77 73 71 63 76 73.65283. Cimafranca, Agustin 71 76 76 80 70 71 75 71 73.35
B. ..... B. ......
MRP- 266. Campos, Juan A. .............. 66 85 83 84 67 61 80 57 78.25284. Crisol, Getulio 70 91 78 85 68 55 71 50 70.8
267. Cardoso, Angelita 78 71 73 76 79 56 69 60 71.8 R. ...............
G. ........ MRP- 285. Dusi, Felicisimo 76 82 69 82 66 62 80 71 72.82
268. Cartagena, Herminio 71 72 65 89 64 73 80 70 71.65 R. .............
R. ..... MRP- 286. Datu, Alfredo 70 75 72 86 80 55 68 79 71.5
MRP- 269. Castro, Daniel T. .............. 65 75 77 76 85 60 75 69 78.15 J. .................
270. Cauntay, Gaudencio 70 78 72 73 77 69 64 80 71.2 287. Dacuma, Luis B. ............... 71 67 87 83 71 50 65 70 71.25
V. ..... MRP- 288. Degamo, Pedro 73 80 82 74 80 67 67 57 73.65
271. Castro, Pedro L. 70 68 69 87 76 75 72 70 78.35 R. ............
de .......... 575
272. Cerio, Juan A. .................. 75 82 75 86 60 54 76 75 71.75 VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 575
273. Colorado, Alfonso 68 75 80 74 77 66 67 80 72.6 In re: Cunanan, et al.
R. ....... Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
274. Chavez, Doroteo 73 65 79 84 73 69 66 84 78.1 Ave.
M. ........ 289. Delgado, Vicente 70 84 82 84 77 52 73 50 72.65
275. Chavez, Honorato 77 76 79 86 74 53 71 75 78.65 N. .........
A. ....... MRP- 290. Diolazo, Ernesto 75 83 86 73 54 54 75 75 72.25

76
 A. .......... B. ................
291. Dionisio, Jr., 73 84 64 89 71 78 75 66 72.8
MRP- 307. Fajardo, Balbino 77 69 82 83 65 60 75 75 73.9
Guillermo ..... P. ..........
MRP- 292. Dichoso Alberto 71 71 71 81 69 75 80 70 73.65 308. Fajardo, Genaro 70 79 77 79 79 50 73 75 72.5
M. ......... P. ..........
MRP- 293. Dipasupil, Claudio 70 76 82 73 79 70 72 56 73.9 309. Evangelista, Felicidad 75 75 72 87 63 63 77 70 72.15
R. ....... P. ....
MRP- 294. Delgado, 75 84 63 67 64 60 70 72 68.35 310. Familara, Raymundo 68 75 87 83 64 65 68 65 71.8.5
Abner ............... Z. .....
MRP- 295. Domingo, Dominador 70 69 81 82 68 63 71 75 72.2 311. Fariñas, 70 78 89 66 65 75 70 50 72.75
T. ... Dionisio ...............
296. Ducusin, Agapito 70 78 53 88 75 77 62 76 68.05 312. Favila, Hilario 71 84 74 70 75 67 73 59 72.2
B. ......... B. ...............
MRP- 297. Duque, Antonio 75 77 78 86 76 72 64 75 73.9
MRP- 313. Feliciano, Alberto 71 69 70 85 69 81 72 70 72.25
S. ........... I. ..........
298. Duque, 75 80 73 83 66 67 65 66 70.65
MRP- 314. Fernando, Lope 73 77 86 79 70 76 64 50 73
Castulo ................ F. ...........
299. Ebbah, Percival 70 80 85 76 66 63 76 75 73.95
MRP- 315. Flores, Dionisio 78 72 77 83 67 60 68 73 72.05
B. ........... S. ............
300. Edisa, 65 77 75 89 75 62 75 65 72
MRP- 316. Fortich, Benjamin 70 82 70 70 78 65 64 75 70.35
Sulpicio ................. B. .........
301. Edradan, Rosa 70 75 84 84 71 59 69 86 73.4
MRP- 317. Fuente, Jose S. de 76 88 72 74 60 71 79 79 73.55
C. ............ la .........
MRP- 302. Enage, Jacinto 66 70 88 93 72 67 65 75 73.2 318. Fohmantes, Nazario 72 79 71 77 68 61 76 60 70.9
N. ............ S. ......
MRP- 303. Encarnacion, Alfonso 75 86 73 81 63 77 69 75 72.65
MRP- 319. Fuggan, Lorenzo 76 81 74 69 71 71 73 60 72.85
B. .... B. ...........
304. Encarnacion, 65 78 58 68 66 64 75 78 67.1 320. Gabuya, Jesus 70 83 82 83 70 63 75 65 73.75
Cesar ........... S. ...............
305. Estoista, Agustin 78 76 74 86 58 67 70 76 71.7 321. Galang, Victor 69 83 84 76 70 57 71 60 71.95
A. ........... N. ..............
MRP- 306. Fabros, Jose 66 75 80 82 80 71 67 70 73.05 322. Gaerlan, Manuel 73 87 77 90 67 61 72 75 73.15

77
 L. ........... 339. Grageda, Jose M. 70 85 72 67 70 60 73 73 70.75
323. Galem, Nestor 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05 A. ........
R. ............. 340. Guzman, Juan 75 86 69 84 64 79 75 76 73.6
324. Gallardo, Jose Pe 75 88 75 75 63 70 70 65 71.85 de ..............
B. ........ MRP- 341. Guzman, Mateo 76 79 79 73 72 69 68 80 73.9
MRP- 325. Gallos, Cirilo 70 78 84 91 80 51 65 70 72.85 de ...........
B. ............... 576
326. Galindo, Eulalio 70 89 87 65 78 71 62 62 576
73.4 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
D. ........... In re: Cunanan, et al.
327. Galman, Patrocinio 72 72 80 85 71 56 70 53 71.15 Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
G. ...... Ave.
328. Gamalinda, Carlos 76 79 81 86 67 63 69 55 72.55 342. Guzman, Salvador 71 61 74 72 61 66 78 75 70.75
S. ....... B. .......
329. Gamboa, Antonio 71 67 70 72 76 60 75 68 70.95 343. Guzman, Salvador T. 75 84 64 81 74 61 78 58 71.75
G. ....... de .....
330. Gannod, Jose 69 80 75 81 68 62 73 68 71.25 344. Habelito, Geronimo 71 76 71 87 73 60 67 55 69.65
A. .............. E. ........
MRP- 331. Garcia, Matias 67 78 74 90 79 59 76 65 72.8 345. Hedriana. Naterno 75 68 84 76 66 58 76 60 72.9
N. ............ G. .........
MRP- 332. Ganete, 75 87 77 82 74 57 68 81 73.3 346. Hernandez, Quintin 67 75 72 81 72 72 66 76 70.6
Carmelo ............. B. .......
333. Gilbang, Gaudioso 75 67 80 82 67 57 64 70 7.5 1952
R. ....... 347. Homeres, Agustin 73 84 65 86 70 77 63 76 70.7
334. Gofredo, Claro 68 78 72 86 78 52 70 76 70.9 R. .........
C. ........... 348. Ines, Leonilo 65 88 71 88 77 73 61 70 70.55
335. Gomez Jose S. ................ 71 76 71 81 76 63 69 62 70.85 F. .................
MRP- 336. Gosiaoco, Lorenzo 68 93 85 78 64 69 70 54 72.35 349. Jamer, Alipio 68 75 83 89 80 61 65 50 72
V. ...... S. ...............
MRP- 337. Gonzales, Rafael 77 75 71 89 55 70 70 60 70.05
MRP- 350. Ibasco, Jr., Emiliano 75 65 68 85 76 70 83 54 73.8
C. .......... M. ....
MRP- 338. Gracia, Eulalia L. 66 68 90 84 77 59 69 65 73.3
MRP- 351. Jardinico, Jr., 73 86 72 78 82 67 67 64 72.8
de .......... Emilio ..........

78
MRP- 352. Jaen, Justiniano 76 75 78 84 71 66 70 77 73.85
MRP- 369. Malapit, Justiniano 74 83 74 89 58 60 72 76 71.1
F. ............ S. ......
353. Jaring, Antonio 72 77 79 70 72 57 71 50 70.75 370. Maloles, Iluminado 70 87 73 76 77 50 76 76 72.3
S. ............. M. ....
MRP- 354. Javier, Aquilino 75 84 79 78 77 61 66 66 73.05 371. Maniquis, Daniel 75 80 73 91 69 71 65 70 72.1
M. ........... R. .......
355. Jomuad, 75 75 72 88 78 58 76 43 72.4 372. Maraña, 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.9
Francisco ........... Arsenio ...........
MRP- 356. Jose, Nestor 78 61 64 73 68 76 64 80 69.7 373. Marasigan, 75 71 83 75 69 62 69 70 7.75
L. ................ Napoleon . ....
357. La O, Jose M. ................ 75 71 75 72 70 67 81 59 73.5
MRP- 374. Marco, Jaime P. ............ 75 67 74 76 64 75 75 57 71.9
358. Leon, Brigido C. 67 75 78 92 78 51 72 80 72.55
MRP- 375. Martir, Osmundo 70 86 76 78 72 71 75 53 72.95
de ......... P. ......
359. Leones, Constante 68 81 79 84 73 60 77 60 73
MRP- 376. Masancay, Amando 73 87 75 77 72 50 78 80 73.2
B. ...... E. ....
360. Liboro, Horacio 72 69 80 87 73 62 70 61 72.4
MRP- 377. Mati-ong, Ignacio 62 87 72 79 73 76 69 77 71.3
T. .......... T. .......
361. Llanera, Cesar 77 81 80 78 64 59 75 63 73 378. Mara, Guillermo 70 78 78 89 75 67 66 65 7.35
L. ............ L. ..........
362. Lomontod, Jose 75 76 69 70 73 76 74 75 73.2
MRP- 379. Mercado, Felipe 73 77 82 82 78 52 69 85 73.9
P. .......... A. ........
363. Luna, 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 75 68.4
MRP- 380. Miculob, Eugenio 70 82 73 86 77 52 79 65 72.8
Lucito .................... P. ........
MRP- 364. Luz, Lauro L. .................. 76 90 78 88 64 58 75 77 73.95 381. Mison, Rafael M. 79 78 73 75 71 68 69 53 71.95
MRP- 365. Macasaet, Tomas 73 81 72 83 66 75 72 70 72.5 Jr., ......
S. ....... MRP- 382. Monponbanua, 79 79 68 88 64 78 69 83 73.1
366. Magbiray, Godofredo 80 67 84 76 70 62 65 68 73.05 Antonio D.
V. . MRP- 383. Montero, Leodegario 72 89 69 89 70 68 70 75 72.15
367. Majarais, Rodolfo 70 62 64 82 88 75 71 79 7.85 C. ..
P. ...... 384. Morada, Servillano 75 76 67 71 65 66 75 76 70.9
MRP- 368. Makabenta, 75 90 77 83 59 71 72 78 73.3 S. ......
Eduardo ..... 385. Mocorro, 78 84 78 84 60 73 68 70 73

79
 Generoso ......... MRP- 399. Olaviar, Jose O. .............. 70 62 85 81 74 50 68 79 71.8
MRP- 386. Mosquera, Estanislao 75 78 75 85 72 55 77 66 73.15
MRP- 400. Olandesca, Per O. .......... 70 91 76 87 72 66 70 79 73.45
L. ... 401. Orden, Apolonio 72 65 84 86 66 50 72 68 71.45
387. Motus, Rodentor 80 78 70 94 72 75 70 57 73.75 J. ..........
P. ......... 402. Ortiz, Melencio 71 75 78 81 66 67 70 78 72.1
388. Macario, Pedro 70 67 74 86 78 63 72 66 72.15 T. ...........
R. ........... MRP- 403. Pablo, Fedelino 72 64 76 86 72 61 76 75 72.95
MRP- 389. Nadela, Geredion 72 64 64 81 73 50 75 75 69.15 S. ...........
T. ........ 404. Pacifico, Vicente 76 79 69 80 76 52 72 80 71.95
MRP- 390. Nazareno, Romeo 67 70 71 76 76 79 75 57 72.05 V. .........
P. ....... MRP- 405. Paderna, Perfecto 75 69 72 75 78 58 75 70 72.6
391. Nieto, Benedicto 69 79 77 77 72 62 76 76 72.9 D. ........
S. ......... 406. Padlan, Crispin 71 66 76 79 68 67 74 66 71.65
MRP- 392. Noguera, 71 86 81 80 73 56 72 70 73.15 M. ...........
Raymundo ....... 407. Padilla, Jose C. ............... 70 65 67 82 78 75 78 75 73.3
577 408. Padilla, Jr., Estanislao 71 88 78 86 59 75 78 50 72.95
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 577 E. ..
In re: Cunanan, et al. MRP- 409. Palma, 67 81 80 82 71 75 69 75 73.25
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. Bartolome ............
Ave.
MRP- 410. Papa, Angel A. ................ 75 72 85 85 77 59 63 71 73.45
MRP- 393. Nodado, Domiciano 70 70 69 73 57 37 64 72 63.6
MRP- 411. Parayno, Mario 71 88 74 89 69 66 76 73 73.65
R. .... V. ..........
394. Nono, Pacifico 67 77 78 67 75 59 71 76 71.35 412. Pariña, Santos 70 87 85 77 64 67 63 76 71.85
G. ............ L. .............
MRP- 395. Nuval, Manuel 78 72 67 90 72 68 78 67 73.65
MRP- 413. Pasion, 63 80 68 81 82 79 76 58 72.55
R. ............. Anastacio .............
396. Ocampo, 75 90 77 72 69 55 65 67 60.7 414. Pastrana, Rizal 69 76 71 76 68 63 77 83 71.65
Augusto ............ R. .............
397. Oliveros, Amado 72 75 68 72 84 50 75 79 71.9
MRP- 415. Paulin, Jose O. ................ 70 66 80 87 75 50 65 80 70.9
A. .......... MRP- 416. Pelaez, Jr., Vicente 79 87 73 83 69 71 68 65 73.2
398. Opiña, Jr., 76 77 74 67 73 66 68 70 71.85 C. ......
Pedro ............. 417. Peña, Jesus ...................... 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 66 70.4

80
 418. Perez, Toribio 71 64 81 92 69 58 67 70 71.25 436. Reyes, Abdon L. ............. 72 64 81 78 76 73 69 53 72.85
R. ............. 437. Reyes, Domingo 72 87 78 83 72 75 62 70 72.7
419. Pestaño, 77 81 74 87 59 68 76 75 73.2 B. ..........
Melquiades ........ 438. Reyes, Francisco 75 85 84 68 75 71 68 50 73.9
MRP- 420. Pido, Serafin C. .............. 77 81 72 82 69 71 60 75 71.15 M. ........
421. Pinlac, 67 76 74 86 65 79 65 72 70.55 439. Reyes, Lozano 80 57 78 79 78 65 64 79 73.35
Filemon ................ M. ............
422. Poblete, Celso 72 79 82 76 66 64 74 50 72.15
MRP- 440. Reyes, Oscar R. .............. 75 75 82 82 76 64 68 60 73.65
B. ............. 441. Rigonan, Cesar 71 85 65 86 75 70 76 70 72.7
MRP- 423. Piza Luz ......................... 68 70 75 87 74 67 64 75 70.8 V. ............
424. Puzon, Eduardo 72 80 81 69 72 53 67 70 71.05 442. Rivera, 71 56 70 90 71 65 75 71 71.2
S. ........... Honorio ................
425. Quetulio, Josefina 75 90 60 93 64 78 76 83 72.9
MRP- 443. Rivero, Buenaventura 72 88 72 94 68 73 66 80 72.6
D. ........ A. ..
MRP- 426. Quípanes, Melchor 69 88 79 82 65 62 71 66 71.55
MRP- 444. Robles, 75 77 75 77 82 64 69 70 73.7
V. ...... Enrique ...............
MRP- 427. Quietson, Bayani 73 75 76 77 70 81 71 53 578
72.85
R. ......... 578 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
428. Racho, Macario 68 75 81 82 78 53 66 54 70.55 In re: Cunanan, et al.
D. .......... Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
429. Ramirez, Sabas 71 80 73 87 62 62 75 80 71.65 Ave.
P. ............ 445. Rodriguez, 76 75 76 63 69 77 65 78 72.25
MRP- 430. Raffiñan, Jose 80 83 79 79 62 72 68 65 73.25 Orestes Arellano
A. ............. 446. Roldan, Jose 67 80 79 83 73 71 75 70 73.9
MRP- 431. Ramos, Patricio 75 87 76 75 72 72 61 75 72.25 V. ................
S. ........... 447. Rosario, Adelaida 80 75 65 70 68 72 80 70 73.15
MRP- 432. Ramos-Balmori, 78 84 76 90 48 75 80 65 73.45 R. del ...
Manuela 448. Rosario, Restituto 75 75 79 90 68 65 66 63 72.1
MRP- 433. Raro, Celso ..................... 75 81 76 67 75 77 55 77 71.4 F. del ....
MRP- 434. Rayos Victor S. ............... 75 86 79 91 71 67 67 70 73.9
MRP- 449. Sabelino, Conrado 71 81 69 75 77 71 75 70 72.96
435. Revilla, Mariano 75 78 81 90 70 54 69 81 73.35 S. .......
S. ........... 450. San Juan, 77 86 72 89 69 76 65 72 71.6

81
 Damaso ............ L. ...............
451. Sañiel, Felix 72 93 76 80 67 75 66 62 72.1 467. Tabaque, 69 68 77 79 74 68 72 60 71.85
L. ................. Benjamin R. .......
452. Samaniego, Jesus 75 80 76 72 60 67 68 70 70.6 MRP- 468. Tan Kiang, 81 79 72 80 62 75 73 80 73.96
B. ......... Clarita .............
MRP- 453. Sandoval, 75 83 70 83 77 67 77 60 73.96MRP- 469. Tando, Amado 71 82 78 83 71 61 71 60 72
Emmanuel M. .... T. ............
MRP- 454. Sanidad, 71 75 81 90 62 64 76 68 72.95 470. Tasico, Severo 71 69 75 89 70 75 67 63 71.65
Emmanuel Q. ....... E. .............
455. Santiago, Jr., 75 76 84 93 63 65 69 70 71.8 471. Tiburcio, Ismael 73 82 72 93 76 57 68 54 71.16
Cristobal ...... P. ...........
456. Santillan, Juanito 76 89 83 83 63 58 65 52 71.26MRP- 472. Tiongson, 70 70 76 84 77 75 75 60 73.46
Ll. .......... Federico T. ......
MRP- 457. Santos, Rodolfo 75 75 78 82 73 76 66 70 73.7 MRP- 473. Tolentino, Jesus 75 89 63 84 85 73 73 50 73.4
C. ........... C. ...........
MRP- 458. Santos, Ruperto 67 54 69 76 63 64 71 60 66.75 474. Torrijas, Alfredo 77 66 67 83 68 75 71 63 71.3
M. .......... A. ..........
MRP- 459. Santos, Aquilino 72 71 73 79 73 79 71 85 73.8 MRP- 475. Tobias, Artemio 69 58 74 81 71 55 65 57 67.55
C. .......... M. ..........
MRP- 460. Santos, Rufino 75 81 79 85 74 72 66 54 73.3 MRP- 476. Trillana, Jr., 76 86 76 86 70 68 75 50 73.8
A. ............. Apolonio .......
461. Suanding, 75 67 67 92 79 59 76 76 73.1 MRP- 177. Trinidad, Manuel 66 91 83 75 63 66 67 65 70.8
Bantas .............. O. .........
RTRP- 462. Sulit. Feliz 76 79 76 78 72 75 68 67 73.5 478. Trinidad, Pedro 66 78 78 85 78 51 64 75 70.8
M. ................... O. ...........
463. Songco, Felicisimo 70 68 82 84 60 69 76 65 73.36MRP- 479. Udarbe, Flavio 80 82 77 82 67 66 68 75 72.6
G. ....... J. .............
464. Soriano, Aniceto 64 79 77 80 80 53 70 65 70.7 480. Umali, Osmundo 68 75 81 80 71 69 68 60 71.7
S. .......... C. .........
465. Suarez, Pablo 73 85 70 87 76 70 64 70 71.9 481. Umayam, Juanito 77 75 87 85 56 56 66 60 71
D. .............. C. ........
MRP- 466. Sybico. Jesus 79 70 70 72 75 75 72 60 73.06MRP- 482. Usita, Gelacio 73 72 75 74 73 76 71 70 73.55

82
 U. ............. VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 579
483. Valin, Francisco 72 81 80 84 62 78 71 75 73.7 In re: Cunanan, et al.
M. ......... Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
484. Varela, 67 75 81 86 72 57 81 70 73.85 Ave.
Dominador M. ..... MRP- 498. Ygay, 73 80 83 84 62 69 72 77 72.65
485. Vega, Macairog L. 78 62 79 87 70 70 71 65 73.8 Venancio
de ...... M.
MRP- 486. Velasco, 71 80 74 85 60 66 76 76 71.85 499. Yulo, Jr., 73 82 78 75 60 81 75 76 73.95
Emmanuel D. ..... Teodoro
487. Velez, Maria 73 70 89 80 56 50 72 67 71.05 500. Zamora. 70 65 76 79 62 77 69 82 71.3
E. ................ Alberto
MRP- 488. Venal, Artemio 78 91 58 67 76 55 75 73 73.65 501. Rigonan, 70 79 69 89 76 62 71 64 71.2
V. ............ Felipe C.
489. Venus, Conrado 69 81 74 85 62 66 72 77 77.05
A list of those who petitioned for the consolidation of their grades in
B. .......... subjects passed in previous examinations, showing the years in which
MRP- 490. Verzosa, Federico 75 79 72 88 76 68 74 59 they took the examinations together with their grades and averages,
73.7
B. ....... and those who had filed motions for reconsideration which were
MRP- 491. Villafuerte, 5 83 70 76 64 64 75 65 denied, indicated by the initials MRD, follows:
71.2
Eduardo V. .....
MRP- 492. Villanueva, Cecilio 75 85 79 88 66 77 67 70 73.96 PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
C. .......
493. Villar, Custodio 73 69 70 88 76 66 69 50 70.75 Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
R. ........... Ave.
MRP- 494. Villaseñor, 80 85 67 77 62 75 76 73 1. Amao, Sulpicio M.
73.16
Leonidas F. ..... 1946 .................................... 68 67 76 76 73 73 49 50 66.6
495. Viterbo, Jose 80 77 65 93 70 65 65 65 70.65 1950 .................................... 59 80 67 77 62 80 71 57 67.4
H. ............... 2. Baldo, Olegario Ga.
406. Yaranon, 70 77 76 85 72 50 75 75 71.85 1951 .................................... 65 76 58 55 59 63 75 72 64.9
Pedro ................ 1952 ........................…........ 65 68 75 84 72 59 73 57 69.7
MRP- 497. Yasay, Mariano 75 75 72 76 63 77 70 60 71.1 1953 .................................... 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7
R. ........... 3. Blanco, Jose B.
579 MRD-1949 ................... 75 75 70 75 77 76 60 90 72.1

83
 1951 .................................... 64 71 68 65 68 70 75 71 66.95 Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen
4. Condeno, Mateo Ave
1950 …................................ 71 80 62 75 75 81 55 12. Rementizo,
92 69.3 Filemon S.
1951 .....................…........... 70 60 61 65 77 64 67 1949 ....................................
81 67.85 65 75 72 75 60 75 55 85 66.6
5. Ducusin. AsraDito B. 1951 .................................... 68 57 48 60 91 66 55 75 64.0
MRD-1949............................ 69 70 76 73 76 71 55 1952 ....................................
60 68.65 68 53 68 67 58 56 75 64 65.7
1950 .................................... 60 71 55 67 67 75 66 13. Rivera,
89 68.1 Eulogio J.
6. Garcia, Manuel N. 1952 .................................... 67 80 51 69 69 77 73 53 66.3
MRD-1949 ............................ 60 70 82 79 70 69 60 1953 ....................................
80 69.25 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
1950 .................................... 57 65 51 69 54 85 56 14. Rodulfa,
84 60.3 Juan T.
7. Luna, Lucito A. 1951 ..….............................. 67 60 70 65 68 56 75 66 67.7
1946 .................................... 63 63 69 76 75 76 57 1952 ....................................
69 66.55 70 71 67 78 67 75 71 70 70.1
1952 .................................... 70 75 69 83 59 53 74 15. Sanchez,
75 68.4 Juan J.
8. Maraña, Arsenio S. 1948 .................................... 39 69 82 75 76 72 55 50 63.5
1949 .................................... 72 68 68 75 75 72 60 76 MRD-1949
69.35 ............................... 67 56 69 75 72 77 60 75 68
1952 .................................... 65 79 60 72 73 51 75 86 67.91951 .................................... 70 59 55 60 68 57 78 67 65.8
9. Montano, Manuel M. 16. Santos, Constantino
1951 .................................... 61 60 58 60 70 63 75 64 1952 ....................................
64.8 62 76 54 82 72 77 66 65 66.6
1932 .................................... 70 77 65 79 66 52 70 50 1953 ....................................
66.4 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
1953 .................................... 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 17. Santos,
78 70.65 Salvador H.
10. Peña, Jesus S. 1951 .................................... 60 64 55 70 68 52 70 75 62.8
1950 .................................... 25 75 45 75 45 52 46 71 1952 …................................
46.2 75 64 70 81 76 55 61 75 69.1
1951 .................................... 74 61 62 65 69 65 75 57 1953 ....................................
68.2 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
1952 .................................... 75 75 75 62 75 70 60 18. Sevilla,
66 70.4 Macario C.
11. Placido, Sr., Isidro MRD-1948................................ 50 64 76 66 66 69 60 52 63.1
1950 .................................... 68 78 70 75 69 70 58 69 MRD-1949
67.75 ............................... 47 66 78 64 71 86 65 85 68
1951 .................................... 65 62 75 60 73 57 75 1950 ....................................
71 66.8 35 65 40 75 63 57 27 49 45
MRD-1951 ............................... 68 59 72 55 69 65 75 75 69.3
580 1953 .................................... 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.0
580 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED Finally, with regards to the examinations of 1953, while some
In re: Cunanan, et al. candidates—85 in all—presented motions for reconsideration of their

84
grades, others invoked the provisions of Republic Act No. 972. A list of O. .........
those candidates separating those who filed mere motions for 11. Buhay, Eduardo 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35
reconsideration (56) from those who invoked the aforesaid Republic L. ............
Act, is as follows: 12. Burgos, Dominador 72 80 89 61 66 37 69 68 70.05
C. ......
1953 PETITIONERS FOR RECONSIDERATION 13. Cariño, Eldo J. ….............. 79 81 60 75 74 74 76 74 73
14. Casar, 67 73 84 79 77 61 71 74 73.35
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen.
Dimapuro ..............
Ave.
15. Castañeda, 70 73 80 71 75 70 73 78 73.95
1. Acenas, Calixto 73 70 68 62 82 51 67 77 73.45 Gregorio .........
R. ..............
16. Estrellado, Benjamin 67 79 64 73 82 62 71 74 70.2
2. Alcantara, Pedro 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8 R. .....
N. ............
17. Fabunan, Edilberto 70 72 68 69 77 60 76 74 71.1
3. Alejandro, 67 72 71 75 80 76 75 77 73.4 C. .......
Exequiel .............
18. Feril, Domingo 75 71 84 65 70 60 65 70 71.6
4. Andres, Gregorio 70 73 86 58 79 50 71 78 72.7
B. .............
M. ...........
19. Fernandez, Alejandro 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8
5. Arnaiz, Antonio 66 80 76 58 79 68 77 81 73.4
G. ...
E. ...............
20. Gapus, Rosita S. 76 80 86 77 64 74 66 69 73.9
6. Asis, Floriano U. 66 78 75 81 77 55 73 69 71.25 (Miss) ....
de .............
21. Garcia, Rafael 70 86 70 75 73 63 73 75 71.65
7. Bacaiso, Celestino 71 65 76 68 76 50 75 70 70.95 B. ..............
M. ..........
22. Gracia, Miguel L. 73 68 75 69 80 51 72 71 71
581
de .........
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 581
23. Gungon, Armando 68 76 76 84 77 57 77 83 73.6
In re: Cunanan, et al.
G. .......
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. 24. Gutierrez, Antonio 68 77 66 70 72 59 71 74 69.1
Ave. S. ........
8. Bala, Florencio 64 82 47 70 82 58 75 82 679. 25. Ilejay, Abraham 77 70 76 77 81 62 70 68 73.7
F. ............. I. .............
9. Baldo, Olegario 57 74 68 68 76 52 71 76 66.7 26. Leon, Benjamin La. 66 66 75 70 77 55 71 82 70.35
A. ............ de .....
10. Barrios, Benjamin 65 71 76 75 80 62 83 73 73.95

85
27. Lugtu, Felipe 62 70 78 65 78 56 69 81 69.9 43. Peralta, Rodolfo 70 70 52 81 68 63 59 69 63.7
L. ................ P. ...........
28. Lukman, Abdul- 76 64 67 69 73 59 73 75 70.45 44. Pigar, Leopoldo 76 75 78 61 72 72 71 79 73.75
Harnid ..... R. ...........
29. Maloles, Jr., Benjamin 77 76 68 68 71 51 75 78 70.85 45. Publico, Paciano 68 69 76 76 70 59 74 67 70.6
G. .. L. ...........
30. Maloles, Julius 77 71 60 71 79 62 68 72 69.76 46. Radaza, 75 78 76 61 77 50 71 86 72.2
G. ............. Leovigildo ...........
31. Mandi, Santiago 65 76 70 61 79 68 75 72 71.1 47. Ramos, Bernardo 64 62 75 93 81 52 66 80 70.1
P. ........... M. .......
82. Margete, Rufino 70 76 66 75 85 73 71 75 72.75 48. Rabaino Andres 68 72 75 73 78 55 69 76 70.65
C. …....... D. ...........
33. Melocoton, Nestorio 70 81 73 78 83 52 72 75 72.35 49. Ravanera, Oscar 70 77 80 71 82 62 69 78 73.6
B. .... N. ..........
34. Molina, Manuel 75 78 70 61 75 63 66 85 70.95 50. Renovilla, Jose 65 75 80 68 79 52 62 78 69.5
C. ............ M. ............
35. Muñoz, Mariano 75 80 86 67 74 57 68 76 73.75 51. Sabaot, Solomon 69 73 80 69 82 69 69 79 73.85
A. …...... B. ..........
86. Navarro, 80 75 65 75 83 55 73 79 73 52. Sumaway, Ricardo 66 76 69 76 74 56 72 68 69.1
Buenaventura M. S. ........
37. Nodado, Domiciano 60 67 67 50 70 50 56 75 61.7 53. Torrefiel, Sofronio 70 77 74 75 73 50 68 72 69.55
R. ..... Q. ........
38. Papas, Sisenando 65 62 71 61 70 56 66 67 66 54. Vera, Federico V. 60 61 47 77 69 50 67 77 60.9
B. ......... de ........
89. Pagulayan-Sy, 63 75 71 62 83 67 70 72 70.4 55. Viray, Venancio 65 67 67 52 73 64 71 65 67.15
Fernando ... Bustos .....
40. Padula, Benjamin 70 77 54 62 74 78 75 68 69.05 56. Ylaya, Angela P. 63 70 56 75 68 54 70 77 64.5
C. ......... (Miss) ....
41. Pasno, Enrique 78 72 66 54 71 58 72 78 69.85
M. ............ PETITIONERS UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 972
42. Peña, 70 95 81 78 67 66 67 73 72.55
Jr., Narciso ............. 1. Ala Narciso ...................... 70 71 73 59 73 74 81 77 73.5

86
 2. Alcantara, Pedro N. …...... 67 70 75 85 87 54 71 80 72.8 16. Jacobo, Rafael 76 76 75 74 76 50 72 76 72.3
582 F. ..............
582 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED 17. Macalindong. 67 77 79 79 74 72 68 77 72.75
In re: Cunanan, et al. Reinerio L. ..
Civ. Land Merc. Int. Pol. Crim. Rem. Leg. Gen. 18. Mangubat. Antonio 70 70 78 61 80 74 62 70 71.45
Ave. M. ......
3. Arellano, Antonio 74 66 73 60 78 63 78 72 72.9 19. Montano. Manuel 78 64 66 68 81 50 71 78 70.65
L. …...... M. ........
4. Buhay, Eduardo 73 76 71 91 76 61 74 78 73.35 20. Plomantes, 73 67 74 58 68 70 76 71 71.6
L. ............ Marcos ...........
5. Calautit, Celestino 71 78 84 75 75 61 68 72 78.2 21. Ramos, Eugenio 70 80 76 67 72 69 72 79 72.6
R. ......... R. ...........
6. Casuncad, Sulvio 61 73 82 69 81 68 71 84 73.05 22. Reyes. Juan 71 73 77 76 81 59 72 74 73.2
P. .......... R. ..................
7. Enriquez, Pelagio y 84 69 76 75 82 50 58 79 72.05 23. Reyes, Santiago 65 78 83 60 76 75 70 70 72.9
Concepcion R. ............
8. Estonina, 80 74 64 89 81 66 68 82 72.4 24. Rivera, Eulogio 65 67 78 74 75 62 69 80 70.9
Severino ............ J. ..............
9. Fernandez, 65 75 87 80 81 63 61 80 72.8 25. Santos, 73 71 70 65 78 64 65 78 70.4
Alejandr Q. .... Constantino P. ......
10. Fernandez, Luis 70 75 77 75 78 67 72 73 73.35 26. Santos. Salvador 70 71 79 65 72 54 66 80 70
N. ............ H. ..........
11. Figueroa, Alfredo 70 75 87 78 75 50 68 68 72.3 27. Sevilla, Macario 70 73 74 70 81 56 69 71 71.05
A. ......... C. ...........
12. Formilleza. 65 75 89 68 83 51 70 75 73.25 28. Villavicencio. Jose 78 75 70 67 69 77 64 77 73.2
Pedro .............. A. ........
13. Garcia, Manuel 69 68 83 83 73 62 62 70 71 29. Viray, Ruperto 76 73 76 73 80 58 68 83 73.25
M. ............ G. .............
14. Grospe, Vicente 68 65 78 66 79 61 69 82 71.6 These are the unsuccessful candidates totaling 604 directly affected by
E. ............ this resolution. Adding 490 candidates who have not presented any
15. Galema, Nestor R. 72 79 86 78 60 61 75 70 73.05 petition, they reach a total of 1,094.
(1952) .
The Enactment of Republic Act No. 972

87
As will be observed from Annex I, this Court reduced to 72 per cent the
passing general average in the bar examination of August and
November of 1946; 69 per cent in 1947; 70 per cent in 1948; 74 per
cent in 1949; maintaining the prescribed 75 per cent since 1950, but
raising to 75 per cent those who obtained 74 per cent since 1950. This
caused the introduction in 1951, in the Senate of the Philippines of Bill
No. 12 which was intended to amend Sections 5, 9, 12, 14 and 16 of
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, concerning the admission of attorneys-
at-law to the practice of the profession. The amendments embrace
many interesting matters, but those referring to sections 14 and
583
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 583
In re: Cunanan, et al.
16 immediately concern us. The proposed amendment is as follows:
"SEC. 14. Passing average.—In order that a candidate may be deemed to
have passed the examinations successfully, he must have obtained a
general average of 70 per cent without falling below 50 per cent in any
subject. In determining the average, the foregoing subjects shall be
given the following relative weights: Civil Law, 20 per cent; Land
Registration and Mortgages, 5 per cent; Mercantile Law, 15 per cent;
Criminal Law, 10 per cent; Political Law, 10 per cent; International Law,
5 per cent; Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, 5 per cent; Social Legislation, 5 per cent; Taxation, 5 per cent.
Unsuccessful candidates shall not be required to take another
examination in any subject in which they have obtained a rating of 70
per cent or higher and such rating shall be taken into account in
determining their general average in any subsequent
examinations: Provided, however, That if the candidate fails to get a
general average of 70 per cent in his third examination. he shall lose the
benefit of having already passed some subjects and shall be required to
the examination in all the subjects.
"SEC. 16. Admission and oath of successful applicants.—-Any applicant
who has obtained a general average of 70 per cent in all subjects
without falling below 50 per cent in any examination held after the 4th
day of July, 1946, or who has been otherwise found to be entitled to
admission to the bar, shall be allowed to take and subscribe before the
Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office. (Arts. 4 and 5, 8, No.
12).
With the bill was an Explanatory Note, the portion pertinent to the
matter before us being:
"It seems to be unfair that unsuccessful candidates at bar examinations
should be compelled to repeat even those subjects which they have
previously passed. This is not the case in any other government
examination. The Rules of Court have therefore been amended in this
measure to give a candidate due credit for any subject which he has
previously passed with a rating of 75 per cent or higher."
Senate Bill No. 12 having been approved by Congress on May 3, 1951,
the President requested the comments of this Tribunal before acting on
the same. The comment was signed by seven Justices while three chose
to refrain from making any and one took no part. With regards to the
matter that interests us, the Court said:
584
684 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
"The next amendment is of section 14 of Rule 127. One part of this
amendment provides that if a bar candidate obtains 70 per cent or
higher in any subject, although failing to pass the examination, he need
not be examined in said subject in his next examination. This is a sort of
passing the Bar Examination on the installment plan, one or two or
three subjects at a time. The trouble with this proposed system is that
although it makes it easier and more convenient for the candidate
because he may in an examination prepare himself on only one or two
subjects so as to insure passing them, by the ;time that he has passed
the last required subject, which may be several years away from the
time that he reviewed and passed the first subjects, he shall have
forgotten the principles and theories contained in those subjects- and
remembers only those of the one or two subjects that he had last
reviewed and passed. This is highly possible because there is nothing in
88
the law which requires a candidate to continue taking the Bar
examinations every year in succession. The only condition imposed is
that a candidate, on this plan, must pass the examination in no more
than three installments; but there is no limitation as to the time or
number of years intervening between each examination taken. This
would defeat the object and the requirements of the law and the Court
in admitting persons to the practice of law. When a person is so
admitted, it is to be presumed and presupposed that he possesses the
knowledge and proficiency in the law and the knowledge of all law
subjects required in bar examinations, so as presently to be able to
practice the legal profession and adequately render the legal service
required by prospective clients. But this would not hold true of the
candidates who may have obtained a passing grade on any five subjects
eight years ago, another three subjects one year later, and the last two
subjects the present year. We believe that the present system of
requiring a candidate to obtain a passing general average with no grade
in any subject below 50 per cent is more desirable and satisfactory. It
requires one to be all around, and prepared in all required legal
subjects at the time of admission to the practice of law.
* * * * * * *
"We now come to the last amendment, that of section 16 of Rule 127.
This amendment provides that any applicant who has obtained a
general average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50
per cent in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July,
1946, shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of
office. In other words, Bar candidates who obtained not less than 70
per cent in any examination since the year 1946 without failing below
50 per cent in any subject, despite their
585
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
In re: Cunanan, et al.
non-admission to the Bar by the Supreme Court because they failed to
obtain a passing general average in any of those years, will be admitted
to the Bar. This provision is not only prospective but retroactive in its
effects.
"We have already stated in our comment on the next preceding
amendment that we are not exactly in favor of reducing the passing
general average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent to govern even in the
future. As to the validity of making such reduction retroactive, we have
serious legal doubts. We should not lose sight of the fact that after
every bar examinations, the Supreme Court passes the corresponding
resolution not only admitting to the Bar those who have obtained a
passing general average grade, but also rejecting and denying the
petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The present
amendment would have the effect of repudiating, reversing and
revoking the Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the
petitions of those who may have obtained an average of 70 per cent or
more but less than the general passing average fixed for that year. It is
clear that this question involves legal implications, and this phase of the
amendment if finally enacted into law might have to go thru a legal test.
As one member of the Court remarked during the discussion, when a
court renders a decision or promulgate a resolution or order on the
basis of and in accordance with a certain law or rule then in force, the
subsequent amendment or even repeal of said law or rule may not
affect the final decision, order, or resolution already promulgated, in
the sense of revoking or rendering it void and of no effect.
"Another aspect of this question to be considered is the fact that
members of the bar are officers of the courts, including the Supreme
Court. When a Bar candidate is admitted to the Bar, the Supreme Court
impliedly regards him as a person fit, competent and qualified to be its
officer. Conversely, when it refused and denied admission to the Bar to
a candidate who in any year since 1946 may have obtained a general
585 average of 70 per cent but less than that required for that year in order
to pass, the Supreme Court equally and impliedly considered and
declared that he was not prepared, ready, competent and qualified to
be its officer. The present amendment giving retroactivity to the
reduction of the passing general average runs counter to all these acts
89
and resolutions of the Supreme Court and practically and in effect says
that a candidate not accepted, and even rejected by the Court to be its
officer becau'Se he was "unprepared, undeserving and unqualified,
nevertheless and in spite of all, must be admitted and allowed by this
Court to serve as its officer. We repeat, that this is another important
aspect of the question to be carefully and seriously considered."
586
586 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
The President vetoed the bill on June 16, 1951, stating the following:
"I am fully in accord with the avowed objection of the bill, namely, to
elevate the standard of the legal profession and maintain it on a high
level. This is not achieved, however, by admitting to practice precisely a
special class who have failed in the bar examination, Moreover, the bill
contains provisions to which I find serious fundamental objections.
"Section 5 provides that any applicant who has obtained a general
average of 70 per cent in all subjects without failing below 50 per cent
in any subject in any examination held after the 4th day of July, 1946,
shall be allowed to take and subscribed the corresponding oath of office.
This provision constitutes class legislation, benefiting as it does
specifically one group of persons, namely, the unsuccessful candidates
in the 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950 bar examinations.
"The same provision undertakes to revoke or set aside final resolutions
of the Supreme Court made in accordance with the law then in force. It
should be noted that after every bar examination the Supreme Court
passes the corresponding resolution not only admitting to the Bar those
who have obtained a passing general average but also rejecting and
denying the petitions for reconsideration of those who have failed. The
provision under consideration would have the effect of revoking the
Supreme Court's resolution denying and rejecting the petitions of those
who may have failed to obtain the passing average fixed for that year.
Said provision also sets a bad precedent in that the Government would
be morally obliged to grant a similar privilege to those who have failed
in the examinations for admission to other" prof essions such as
medicine, engineering, architecture and certified public accountancy."
Consequently, the bill was returned to the Congress of the Philippines,
but it was not repassed by 2/3 vote of each House as prescribed by
section 20, article VI of the Constitution. Instead Bill No. 371 was
presented in the Senate. It reads as follows:
AN ACT TO FIX THE PASSING MARKS FOR BAR EXAMINA
TIONS FROM 1946 UP TO AND INCLUDING 1953
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 14, Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general average of
70 per cent in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946
587
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 537
In re: Cunanan, et al.
up to the August 1951 bar examinations; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar
examinations; 72 per cent in the 1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in
the 1954 bar examinations; 74 per cent in 1955 bar examinations
without a candidate obtaining a grade below 50 per cent in any subject,
shall be allowed to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office
as member of the Philippine Bar: Provided, however, That 75 per cent
passing general average shall be restored in all succeeding
examinations; and Provided, finally, That for the purpose of this Act, any
exact one-half or more of a fraction, shall be considered as one and
included as part of the next whole number.
SEC. 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in any
subject in any bar examination after July 4, 1946 shall be deemed to
have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall
be included in computing the passing general average that said
candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.
90
SEC. 3. This bill shall take effect upon its approval.
With the following explanatory note:
"This is a revised Bar bill to meet the objections of the President and to
afford another opportunity to those who feel themselves discriminated
by the Supreme Court from 1946 to 1951 when those who would
otherwise have passed the bar examination but were arbitrarily not so
considered by altering its previous decisions of the passing mark. The
Supreme Court has been altering the passing mark from 69 in 1947 to
74 in 1951. In order to cure the apparent arbitrary fixing of passing
grades and to give satisfaction to all parti6s concerned, it is proposed in
this bill a gradual increase in the general averages for passing the bar
examinations as follows; For 1946 to 1951 bar examinations, 70 per
cent; for 1952 bar examination, 71 per cent; for 1953 bar examination,
72 per cent; for 1954 bar examination, 73 percent; and for 1955 bar
examination, 74 per cent. Thus in 1956 the passing mark will be
restored with the condition that the candidate shall not obtain in any
subject a grade of below 50 per cent. The reason for relaxing the
standard 75 per cent passing grade, is the tremendous handicap which
students during the years immediately after the Japanese occupation
has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the
inadequacy of the preparation of students who took up law soon after
the liberation. It is believed that by 1956 the preparation of our
students as well as the available reading materials will be under normal
conditions, if not improved from those years preceding the last world
war.
In this bill we eliminated altogether the idea of having our Supreme
Court assumed the supervision as well as the administration
588
588 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
of the study of law which was objected to by the President in the Bar
Bill of 1951.
"The President in vetoing the Bar Bill last year stated among his
objections that the bill would admit to the practice of law 'a special
class who failed in the bar examination'. He considered the bill a class
legislation. This contention, however, is not, in good conscience, correct
because Congress is merely supplementing what the Supreme Court
have already established as precedent by making as low as 69 per cent
the passing mark of those who took the Bar examination in 1947. These
bar candidates for whom this bill should be enacted, considered
themselves as having passed the bar examination on the strength of the
established precedent of our Supreme Court and were fully aware of
the insurmountable difficulties and handicaps which they were
unavoidably placed. We believe that such precedent cannot or could
not have been altered, constitutionally, by the Supreme Court, without
giving due consideration to the rights already accrued or vested in the
bar candidates who took the examination when the precedent was not
yet altered, or in effect, was still enforced and without being
inconsistent with the principles of their previous resolutions.
"If this bill would be enacted, it shall be considered as a simple curative
act or corrective statute which Congress has the power to enact. The
requirement of a 'valid classification' as against class legislation, is very
expressed in the following American Jurisprudence:
" 'A valid classification must include all who naturally belong to the
class, all who possess a common disability, attribute, or classification,
and there must be a "natural" and substantial differentiation between
those included in the class and those it leaves untouched. When a class
is accepted by the Court as "natural" it cannot be again split and then
have the diservered factions of the original unit designated with
different rules established for each.' " (Fountain Park Co. vs. Rensier,
199 Ind. 95, N. E. 465 (1926).
"Another case penned by Justice Cardozo: "Time with its tides brings
new conditions which must be cared for by new laws. Sometimes the
new conditions affect the members of a class. If so, the correcting
statute must apply to all alike. Sometimes the condition affect only a
few. If so, the correcting statute may be as narrow as the mischief. The
constitution does not prohibit special laws inflexibly and always. It
permits them when there are special evils with which the general laws
91
are incompetent to cope. The special public purpose will sustain the
special form. * * * The problem in the last analysis is one of legislative
policy, with a wide margin of discretion conceded to the lawmakers.
Only in the case of plain abuse will there be revision by the court. (In
Williams vs. Mayor
589
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 589
In re: Cunanan, et al.
and City Council of Baltimore, 286 U. S. 36, 77 L. Ed. 1015, 53 Sup. Ct.
431). (1932)
"This bill has all the earmarks of a corrective statute which always
retroacts to the extent of the care or correction only as in this case from
1946 when the Supreme Court first deviated from the rule of 75 per
cent in the, Rules of Court.
"For the foregoing purposes the approval of this bill is earnestly
recommended.
(Sgd.) "PABLO ANGELES DAVID
"Senator"
Without much debate, the revised bill was passed by Congress as above
transcribed. The President again asked the comments of this Court,
which endorsed the following:
Respectfully returned to the Honorable, the Acting Executive Secretary,
Manila, with the information that, with respect to Senate Bill No. 371,
the members of the Court are taking the same views they expressed on
Senate Bill No. 12 passed by Congress in May, 1951, contained in the
first indorsement of the undersigned dated June 5, 1951, to the
Assistant Executive Secretary.
(Sgd.) RICARDO PARÁS
The President allowed the period within which the bill should be signed
to pass without vetoing it, by virtue of which it became a law on June 21,
1953 (Sec. 20, Art. VI, Constitution) numbered 972 (many times
erroneously cited as No. 974).
It may be mentioned in passing that 1953 was an election year, and that
both the President and the author of the Bill were candidates for re-
election, together, however, they lost in the polls.
LABRADOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
The right to admit members to the Bar is, and has always been, the
exclusive privilege of this Court, because lawyers are members of the
Court and only this Court should be allowed to determine admission
thereto in the interest of the principle of the separation of powers. The
power to admit is judicial in the sense that discretion
590
590 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
is used in its exercise. This power should be distinguished from the
power to promulgate rules which regulate admission. It is only this
power (to promulgate amendments to the rules) that is given in the
Constitution to the Congress, not the exercise of the discretion to admit
or not to admit. Thus the rules on the holding of examInation, the
qualifications of applicants, the passing grades, etc. are within the scope
of the legislative power. But the power to determine when a candidate
has made or has not made the required grade is judicial, and lies
completely with this Court.
I hold that the act under consideration is an exercise of the judicial
function, and lies beyond the scope of the congressional prerogative of
amending the rules. To say that candidates who obtain a general
average of 72 per cent in 1953, 73 per cent in 1954, and 74 per cent in
1955 should be considered as having passed the examination, is to
mean exercise of the privilege and discretion judged in this Court. It is a
mandate to the tribunal to pass candidates for different years with
grades lower than the passing mark. No reasoning is necessary to show
that it is an arrogation of the Court's judicial authority and discretion. It
92
is furthermore objectionable as discriminatory. Why should those
taking the examinations in 1953, 1954 and 1955 be allowed to have the
privilege of a lower passing grade, while those taking earlier or later
are not?
I vote that the act in toto be declared unconstitutional, because it is not
embraced within the rule-making power of Congress, because it is an
undue interference with the power of this Court to admit members
thereof, and because it is discriminatory.
PARÁS, C. J., dissenting:
Under section 14 of Rule of Court No. 127, in order that a bar candidate
"may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must
have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without
falling
591
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954 591
In re: Cunanan, et al.
below 50 per cent in any subject." This passing mark has always been
adhered to, with certain exception presently to be specified.
With reference to the bar examinations given in August, 1946, the
original list of successful candidates included only those who obtained
a general average of 75 per cent or more. Upon motion for
reconsideration, however, 12. candidates with general averages
ranging from 72 to 73 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution
of December 18, 1946. In the examinations of November, 1946 the list
first released containing. the names of successful candidates covered
only those who obtained a general average of 75 per cent or more; but,
upon motion for reconsideration, 19 candidates with a general average
of 72 per cent were raised to 75 per cent by resolution of March 31,
1947. This would indicate that in the original list of successful
candidates those having a general average of 73 per cent or more but
below 75 per cent were included. After the original list of 1947
successful bar candidates had been released, and on motion for
reconsideration, all candidates with a general average of 69 per cent
were allowed to pass by resolution of July 15, 1948. With respect to the
bar examinations held in August, 1948, in addition to the original list of
successful bar candidates, all those who obtained a general average of
70 per cent or more, irrespective of the grades in any one subject and
irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration, were
allowed to pass by resolution of April 28, 1949. Thus, for the year 1947
the Court in eff ect made 69 per cent as the passing average, and for the
year 1948, 70 per cent; and this amounted, without being noticed
perhaps, to an amendment of section 14 of Rule 127.
Numerous flunkers in the bar examinations held subsequent to 1948,
whose general averages mostly ranged from 69 to 73 per cent, filed
motions for reconsideration.
592
592 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
invoking the precedents set by this Court in 1947 and 1948, but said
motions were uniformly denied.
In the year 1951, the Congress, after public hearings where law deans
and professors, practising attorneys, presidents of bar associations, and
law graduates appeared and argued lengthily pro or con, approved a bill
providing, among others, for the reduction of the passing general
average from 75 per cent to 70 per cent, retroactive to any bar
examination held after July 4, 1946. This bill was vetoed by the
President mainly in view of an unfavorable comment of Justices Padilla,
Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes, Bautista and Jugo. In 1953, the Congress
passed another bill similar to the previous bill vetoed by the President,
with the important difference that in the later bill the provisions in the
first bill regarding (1) the supervision and regulation by the Supreme
Court of the study of law, (2) the inclusion of Social Legislation and
Taxation as new bar subjects, (3) the publication of names of the bar
examiners before the holding of the examinations, and (4) the equal
division among the examiners of all the admission fees paid by bar
applicants, were eliminated. This second bill was allowed to become a
93
law, Republic Act No. 972, by the President by merely not signing it
within the required period; and in doing so the President gave due
respect to the will of the Congress which, speaking for the people, chose
to repass the bill first vetoed by him.
Under Republic Act No. 972, any bar candidates who obtained a general
average of 70 per cent in any examinations after July 4, 1946 up to
August 1951; 71 per cent in the 1952 bar examinations; 72 per cent in
1953 bar examinations; 73 per cent in the 1954 bar examinations; and
74 per cent in the 1955 bar examinations, without obtaining a grade
below 50 per cent in any subject, shall be allowed to pass. Said Act also
provides that any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75 per cent in
any subject in any examination after July 4, 1946,
593
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
In re: Cunanan, et al.
shall be deemed to have passed in such subject or subjects and such
grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing in any
subsequent examinations.
Numerous candidates who had taken the bar examinations previous to
the approval of Republic Act No. 972 and failed to obtain the necessary
passing average, filed with this Court mass or separate petitions,
praying that they be admitted to the practice of law under and by virtue
of said Act, upon the allegation that they have obtained the general
averages prescribed therein. In virtue of the resolution of July 6, 1953,
this Court held on July 11, 1953 a hearing on said petitions, and
members of the bar, especially authorized representatives of bar
associations, were invited to argue or submit memoranda as amici
curiæ, the reason alleged f or said hearing being that some doubt had
"been expressed on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 972 in so
far as it affects past bar examinations and the matter" involved "a new
question of public interest."
All discussions in support of the proposition that the power to regulate
the admission to the practice of law is inherently judicial, are
immaterial, because the subject is now governed by the Constitution
which in Article VII, section 13, provides as follows:
"The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive right. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes and are declared Rules of
Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."
Under this constitutional provision, while the Supreme Court has the
593 power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law, the Congress has the
594
594 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
power to repeal, alter or supplement said rules. Little intelligence is
necessary to see that the power of the Supreme Court and the Congress
to regulate the admission to the practice of law is concurrent.
The opponents of Republic Act No. 972 argue that this Act, in so far as it
covers bar examinations held prior to its approval, is unconstitutional,
because it sets aside the final resolutions of the Supreme Court refusing
to admit to the practice of law the various petitioners, thereby resulting
in a legislative encroachment upon the judicial power. In my opinion
this view is erroneous. In the first place, resolutions on the rejection of
bar candidates do not have the finality of decisions in justiciable cases
where the Rules of Court expressly fix certain periods after which they
become executory and unalterable. Resolutions on bar matters,
specially on motions for reconsiderations filed by flunkers in any given
year, are subject to revision by this Court at any time, regardless of the
period within which the motions were filed, and this has been the
practice heretofore. The obvious reason is that bar examinations and
94
admission to the practice of law may be deemed as a judicial function
only because said matters happen to be entrusted, under the
Constitution and our Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. There is no
judicial function involved, in the strict and constitutional sense of the
word, because bar examinations and the admission to the practice of
law, unlike justiciable cases, do not affect opposing litigants. It is no
more than the function of other examining boards. In the second place,
retroactive laws are not prohibited by the Constitution, except only
when they would be ex post facto,would impair obligations and
contracts or vested rights or would deny due process and equal
protection of the law. Republic Act No. 972 certainly is not an ex post
factoenactment, does not impair any obligation and contract or vested
rights, and denies to no one the right to due process and equal
protection of the law. On the other hand, it is a mere
595
VOL. 94, MARCH 18, 1954
In re: Cunanan, et al.
curative statute intended to correct certain obvious inequalities arising
from the adoption by this Court of different passing general averages in
certain years.
Neither can it be said that bar candidates prior to July 4, 1946, are
being discriminated against, because we no longer have any record of
those who might have failed before the war, apart from the
circumstance that 75 per cent had always been the passing mark during
said period. It may also be that there are no pre-war bar candidates
similarly situated as those benefited by Republic Act No. 972. At any
rate, in the matter of classification, the reasonableness must be
determined by the legislative body. It is proper to recall that the
Congress held public hearings, and we can f airly suppose that the
classification adopted in the Act reflects good legislative judgment
derived from the facts and circumstances then brought out.
As regards the alleged interference in or encroachment upon the
judgment of this Court by the Legislative Department, it is sufficient to
state that, if there is any interference erence at all, it is one expressly
sanctioned by the Constitution. Besides, interference in judicial
adjudication prohibited by the Constitution is essentially aimed at
protecting rights of litigants that have already been vested or acquired
in virtue of decisions of courts, not merely for the empty purpose of
creating appearances of separation and equality among the three
branches of the Government. Republic Act No. 972 has not produced a
case involving two parties and decided by the Court in favor of one and
against the other. Needless to say, the statute will not affect the
previous resolutions passing bar candidates who had obtained the
general average prescribed by section 14 of Rule 127. A law would be
objectionable and unconstitutional if, for instance, it would provide that
those who have been admitted to the bar after July 4, 1946, whose
general average is below 80 per cent, will not be allowed to practice
law, because said statute would then destroy a right already acquired
under previous resolutions of this Court,
595 596
596 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
In re: Cunanan, et al.
namely, the bar admission of those whose general averages were from
75 to 79 per cent.
Without fear of contradiction, I think the Supreme Court, in the exercise
of its rule-making power conferred by the Constitution, may pass a
resolution amending section 14 of Rule 127 by reducing the passing
average to 70 per cent, effective several years before the date of the
resolution. Indeed, when this Court on July 15, 1948 allowed to pass all
candidates who obtained a general average of 69 per cent or more and
on April 28, 1949 those who obtained a general average of 70 per cent
or more, irrespective of whether they filed petitions for reconsideration,
it in effect amended section 14 of Rule 127 retroactively, because
during the examinations held in August 1947 and August 1948, said
section (fixing the general average at 75 per cent) was supposed to be
in force. It stands to reason, if we are to admit that the Supreme Court
and the Congress have concurrent power to regulate the admission to
95
the practice of law, that the latter may validly pass a retroactive rule Candidates who in 1953 obtained 71.5 per cent, without falling below 50
fixing the passing general average. per cent on any subject, are considered passed.
Republic Act No. 972 cannot be assailed on the ground that it is
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, since this Court had already
adopted as passing averages 69 per cent for the 1947 bar examinations
and 70 per cent for the 1948 examinations. Anyway, we should not
inquire into the wisdom of the law, since this is a matter that is
addressed to the judgment of the legislators. This Court in many
instances had doubted the propriety of legislative enactments, and yet
it has consistently refrained from nullifying them solely on that ground.
To say that the admission of the bar candidates benefited under
Republic Act 972 is against public interest, is to assume that the matter
of whether said Act is beneficial or harmful to the general public was
not considered by the Congress. As already stated, the Congress held
public hearings, and we are bound to assume that the
597
VOL. 94, MARCH 20, 1954 597
Vea vs. Acoba, et al.
legislators, loyal, as do the members of this Court, to their oath of office,
had taken all the circumstances into account before passing the Act. On
the question of public interest I may observe that the Congress,
representing the people who elected them, should be more qualified to
make an appraisal. I am inclined to accept Republic Act No. 972 as an
expression of the will of the people through their duly elected
representatives.
I would, however, not go to the extent of admitting that the Congress, in
the exercise of its concurrent power to repeal, alter, or supplement the
Rules of Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, may act in
an arbitrary or capricious manner, in the same way that this Court may
not do so. We are thus left in the situation, incidental to a democracy,
where we can and should only hope that the right men are put in the
right places in our Government.
Wherefore, I hold that Republic Act No. 972 is constitutional and should
therefore be given effect in its entirety.

96

G.R. No. 111682. February 6, 1997.*
ZENAIDA REYES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Speedy Disposition of Cases; Motions for Postponement; The
postponement of the trial of a case to allow the presentation of evidence
of a party is a matter which lies in the discretion of the trial court, but it is
a discretion which must be exercised wisely, considering the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in each case and with a view of doing
substantial justice.—The issue in this case is whether the trial court
properly held petitioner to have waived the right to present evidence
because of her failure to proceed despite several postponements
granted to her. To be sure, the postponement of the trial of a case to
allow the presentation of evidence of a party is a matter which lies in
the discretion of the trial court, but it is a discretion which must be
exercised wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in
each case and with a view to doing substantial justice.
Same; Same; Attorneys; Right to Counsel; Right to be Heard; The gross
negligence of counsel should not be allowed to prejudice an accused’s
constitutional right to be heard—the judicial conscience certainly cannot
rest easy on a conviction based solely on the evidence of the prosecution
just because the presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by
technicality.—It was Atty. Tenorio’s absences, then, rather than
petitioner’s, which appear to be the cause for the defense’s failure to
present its evidence. Atty. Tenorio’s negligence did not consist in error
of procedure or even a lapse in strategy but something as basic as
failing to appear in court despite clear warning that such failure would
amount to waiver of her client’s right to present evidence in her
defense. Keeping in mind that this case involves personal liberty, the
negligence of counsel was certainly so gross that it should not be
allowed to prejudice petitioner’s constitutional right to be heard. The
judicial conscience certainly cannot rest easy on a conviction based
solely on the evidence of the prosecution just because the presentation
of the defense evidence had been barred by technicality. Rigid
application of rules must yield to the duty of courts to render justice
where justice is due—to secure to
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
544
544 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals
every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a
crime with which he or she might be charged.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Indeed, to deny the accused the
opportunity to present her evidence on the merest chance that she might
be innocent would be to disregard the wisdom that it is better to acquit
ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent person.—
Reconsideration of the resolution in this case is compelled by these
precedents. Indeed, to deny petitioner the opportunity to present her
evidence on the merest chance that she might be innocent would be to
disregard the wisdom that it is better to acquit ten guilty individuals
than to convict one innocent person. The Court is as aware as anyone of
the need for the speedy disposition of cases. At the same time, however,
it has ever been mindful of its responsibility as the highest tribunal of
justice to see to it that the paramount interests of justice are not
sacrificed for the sake of speed and efficiency.
Attorneys; Right to Counsel; Pleadings and Practice; Even lawyers who
are parties in a case need the guiding hand of counsel—skill in drafting
pleadings is vastly different from skill needed in the courtroom.—In
denying petitioner’s plea for a chance to present her evidence, the
Court of Appeals observed that petitioner has more than a layman’s
acquaintance with the law, having been able to prepare and file her
own motion for new trial and appellant’s brief, to be given the benefit of
the doubt. But even lawyers, who are parties in a case, need the guiding
97
hand of counsel. Skill in drafting pleadings (which is practically the only
“lawyerly” thing petitioner did) is vastly different from skill needed in
the courtroom. Preparing pleadings can be done at leisure with the
luxury of consultation, either of books or of people. Trial work,
however, demands more. It requires the ability to think fast on one’s
feet and the psychologist’s feel for the witness’ mood and motive.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION of a decision of the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Fortun & Narvasa for petitioner.
Go, Cojuangco, Mendoza & Ligon for private respondent.
545
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution, dated November
29, 1995, of the Court, denying the petition for review of the decision,
dated May 28, 1993, and the resolution, dated August 30, 1993, of the
Court of Appeals1 in CAG.R. CR No. 08410, affirming the conviction of
petitioner Zenaida P. Reyes of falsification of public document.
Petitioner’s motion is based on her contention that because of her
counsel’s unexplained absences at the trial she was prevented from
presenting evidence in her defense and therefore denied the due
process of law.
The facts are as follows:
In an information filed on April 7, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan and later assigned to Branch 22 thereof as Criminal Case No.
9252-M, petitioner Zenaida Reyes was accused of falsifying a deed of
sale of four (4) parcels of land “by feigning and signing the name of
Pablo Floro, who could not affix his signature anymore due to age
infirmity, on the said document as seller and causing it to appear that
said Pablo Floro [had] participated in the execution of the said
document when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew, said
deed of sale was not executed and signed by the said Pablo Floro, nor
did he ever appear before any notary public for the purpose of
acknowledging the deed above mentioned."2
Upon being arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits
then followed. After the prosecution had rested its case, the
presentation of the defense evidence was scheduled on February 6,
1989, which, however, was reset “for the
________________
545
1 (Tenth Division) per Justice Regina G. Ordoñez-Benitez, and
concurred in by Justices Arturo B. Buena and Eduardo G. Montenegro.
2 Vol. I of Records, p. 1.
546
546 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals
last time” to March 10, 1989 due to petitioner’s illness.3 The hearing on
March 10, 1989 was, however, cancelled also because of the absence of
both the private prosecution and defense counsel, Atty. Analuz Cristal-
Tenorio, The new schedule was April 12, 1989.4 However, Atty.
Tenorio was again absent on April 12,1989. Petitioner was also absent,
but her husband appeared and submitted to the court a medical
certificate that she was sick. The hearing on that date was therefore
postponed to May 17, 1989 "[f]or the last time."5
On May 11, 1989, Atty. Tenorio moved for the postponement of the
hearing from May 17, 1989 to June 5, 1989, allegedly because she had
to leave for Malaybalay, Bukidnon to assist in the prosecution of her
brother-in-law’s killers. The trial court, while noting that the bearing on
May 17, 1989 was “intransferrable in character,” nonetheless granted
Atty. Tenorio’s motion and postponed the hearing to June 5, 1989 over
98
the objection of the private prosecution. Petitioner was warned that if
she did not present her evidence on that date, she would be considered
to have waived her right to do so.6 But the hearing on June 5, 1989 had
to be rescheduled again because petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Tenorio, was
absent.7
On July 10, 1989, the new date of hearing, both petitioner and Atty.
Tenorio were absent, so that on motion of private prosecutor, the court
declared petitioner to have waived the right to present her
evidence.8 Four days later (on July 14, 1989), petitioner gave a medical
certificate9 stating that she was suffering from hypertension and
rheumatism which required bed rest for at least 5–7 days. The court
merely noted the medical certificate but maintained its previous order,
on the ground that “the same is not a motion and [as] counsel
________________
3 RTC Order of February 6,1989, d., p. 276.
4 RTC Order of March 10,1989, id., p. 281.
5 RTC Order of April 12, 1989, id., p. 286.
6 RTC Order of May 17, 1989, Id., p. 293.
7 RTC Order of June 5, 1989, Id., p. 297.
8 RTC Order of July 10, 1989, id., p. 300.
9 Ibid., p. 301.
547
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals
was also not in Court during the last hearing, the Order of the Court
dated July 10, 1989 to the effect that the presentation of defense
evidence is considered waived, stands."10
Petitioner by herself moved for reconsideration, alleging that she failed
to appear in court on July 10, 1989 because she was indisposed and had
been unable to contact Atty. Tenorio. She asked for permission to
present her evidence. Her motion, however, was denied by the court in
its order of August 29, 198911 in which it also scheduled the
promulgation of judgment on September 29,1989.
On September 29, 1989, the court rendered its decision12 finding
petitioner guilty of falsification and sentencing her to 4 months
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00.
Petitioner through a new counsel, Atty. Ronolfo S. Pasamba, filed a
notice of appeal.13 On May 9, 1990, petitioner by herself filed a motion
in the Court of Appeals for extension of 30 days to file her brief as
appellant.14 About the same time Atty. Pasamba also filed a motion for
an extension of 45 days for the same purpose, but later asked to be
relieved as petitioner’s counsel on the ground that despite his request,
petitioner did not give him the records of the case and confer with him
but instead acted as her own counsel by filing her own motion for time
to file brief.
The Court of Appeals granted Atty. Pasamba’s motion and required
petitioner to submit the name and address of her new counsel within
ten (10) days from notice. Petitioner instead filed a motion for new trial
in lieu of appellant’s brief, claiming that because of the negligence of
her counsel, she had been deprived of her right to present evidence on
her behalf in the trial court.
________________
547 10 RTC Order of July 17, 1989, id., p. 303.
11 Id., p. 314.
12 Id., pp. 326–334.
13 Id., p. 338.
14 CA Rollo, p. 14.
548
548 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals
After the Solicitor General filed his comment, the Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated January 15, 1992 denied petitioner’s motion for new
99
trial and gave her 30 days within which to file her appellant’s
brief.15 The appellate court held:
All that appellant is invoking as ground for new trial is the policy of
liberality in the application of the rules and the alleged negligence of
her counsel.
Appellant, who has, in fact, prepared the motion herself, without the
assistance of counsel, is probably a member of the Bar. If she is not, she
must have gone through law school as her handiwork is written in
forensic style and is even better than the pleadings of some licensed
advocates who are handling appealed cases or original special civil
actions before this Court.
Under the Rules the grounds for new trial are
. (a)That errors of law or irregularities have been
committed during the trial prejudicial to the substantial rights
of the accused; and
. (b)That new and material evidence has been
discovered which the .accused could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, and which
if introduced and admitted, would probably change the
judgment (Rule 121, Section 2)
There is not even a wee bit of a hint about the second ground.
So, in effect, what the accused would want of Us is to bend over
backwards and in a gesture of liberality consider as an error of law or
as an irregularity the trial court’s conclusion that she was deemed to
have waived her right to present evidence in her defense. In connection
with this course of action she already filed before the trial court a
motion for reconsideration; this was denied, whereupon the trial court
proceeded to rendition of the judgment appealed from by the accused
to this court.
We have meticulously gone over the entire record, and We find that
accused-appellant was not at all deprived of her day in court or denied
due process. She was afforded ample opportunity to present evidence
in her defense.
________________
15 (Special Eleventh Division) per Justice Fortunato A. Vailoces and
concurred in by Justices Nathanael P. de Pano, Jr. and Luis A. Victor, CA
Rollo, pp. 69–71.
549
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997 549
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals
Regardless of the nature of the offense charged, a criminal case, even if
it involves only a light offense, the penalty for which might be mere
censure, is a serious matter that deserves equally serious attention by
the one accused. The appellant, it seems never gave to this case while it
was still at the lower court the serious attention that it deserves. For
good reason—repeated absences of the accused and her counsel—the
trial court was eventually constrained to consider the accused to have
waived the presentation of evidence in her defense. As pointed out by
the Solicitor General, it is settled in our jurisprudence that dilatory
moves by the accused that tend to defeat the expeditious termination of
a criminal case is tantamount to trifling with the administration of
justice that certainly can not and should not be condoned. (PP vs.
Angco, 103 Phil. 33; PP vs. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957)
Petitioner filed a “very urgent motion” for 90 days from February 22,
1992 to secure services of counsel to file her appellant’s brief. The
Court of Appeals gave petitioner 15 days from February 22, 1992, the
last day of the extension previously granted her. The Court of Appeals
stated that it had given petitioner notice to file brief as early as March
27, 1990, but “petitioner has been trifling with our judicial processes
long enough.”
On March 6, 1992, without the assistance of counsel accused-appellant
filed an appellant’s brief. Thereafter the’ Solicitor General filed the
appellee’s brief to which petitioner filed a reply brief. On May 28, 1993,
100
the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, affirming the trial court’s
ruling On August 30, 1993 it denied reconsideration.
Petitioner filed this case for review on certiorari, claiming
that conviction by the trial court Was void because she was denied due
process, since she was denied the opportunity to present evidence in
her behalf. The Solicitor General filed his comment to which petitioner
filed a reply. On November 29, 1995 this Court denied the petition for
lack of merit. Hence this motion for reconsideration.
After due consideration of the motion and its supplement and the
separate comments thereto by the respondents as well as petitioner’s
replies and private respondent’s consoli-
550
550 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals
dated rejoinder, the Court now resolves to grant petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
First. The issue in this case is whether the trial court properly held
petitioner to have waived the right to present evidence because of her
failure to proceed despite several post-ponements granted to her. To be
sure, the postponement of the trial of a case to allow the presentation of
evidence of a party is a matter which lies in the discretion of the trial
court, but it is a discretion which must be exercised wisely, considering
the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case and with a view to
doing substantial justice.16 In the case at bar, hearings were scheduled
for the presentation of petitioner’s evidence on six different dates, to
wit: (1) February 6, 1989; (2) March 10, 1989; (3) April 12, 1989; (4)
May 17, 1989; (5) June 5, 1989; and (6) July 10, 1989. Petitioner was
absent thrice, i.e., on February 6, 1989, April 12, 1989, and July 10,
1989. On the first date, petitioner could not come because she was sick
and her counsel so informed the court. She was absent also on June 5,
1989 and July 10, 1989 because of illness (hypertension and
rheumatism). Thus, while petitioner’s absences were explained, those
of her counsel were not. Atty. Tenorio simply disappeared without a
trace, despite warning to counsel that her failure to present evidence
for her client on June 5, 1989 would be considered a waiver of the
latter’s right to present her evidence. But counsel failed to heed the
warning. Petitioner had to soldier on and, by herself, had to plead with
the court for a chance to present her evidence. Contrary to what the
appellate court thought in affirming petitioner’s conviction, this was
not the case of a woman who treated the criminal proceedings against
her with cavalier disdain. Indeed, we do not think that petitioner’s
absences were so many, capricious, or egregious as to indubitably
indicate an attempt to stall the proceedings of the criminal case
_______________
16 Piedad v. Batuyong, 55 SCRA 763 (1974); People v. Martinez, 105
Phil. 200 (1959); United States v. Ramirez, 39 Phil. 738 (1919).
551
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997 551
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals
as was the case in People v. Angco17 and People v. Dichoso.18 Petitioner
might have tried to delay the filing of her appellant’s brief, but her
effort can be attributed to an understandable desire to be allowed to
present her evidence. Hence, the filing of a motion for new trial. Even in
her present petition before this Court petitioner’s prayer is not that she
be exonerated but only that she be given the chance to prove her
innocence by being allowed to present her evidence.
Respondent People and the counsel for the private respondent oppose
petitioner’s motion. They point out that, unlike the cases19 which
petitioner cites in support of her motion, petitioner herself was
negligent. They contend that she could not have been unaware of the
absences of her lawyer but despite that she did nothing to protect her
interests. Private respondent argues that “if granted a second chance to
present her side, nothing will stop the petitioner from once again
engaging the services of her erstwhile absentee counsel. Anyway, after
another 10 years of litigation, she can easily sound her reliable refrain:
1 was denied due process! I was ready to
101
_______________
17 103 Phil. 33 (1953).
18 96 SCRA 957 (1980).
19 The cases are: (1) Aceyork Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA
371 (1995) where the Court set aside the dismissal of petitioner’s
appeal for failure to file the appellant’s brief on time, it appearing that
petitioner’s former counsel had abandoned him and could not be
contacted despite earnest efforts; (2) Legarda v. Court of Appeals, 195
SCRA 418 (1991) where the Court found petitioner’s counsel’s
negligence in allowing petitioner to be declared in default and the
ensuing judgment against her to lapse in finality resulting in the loss Of
her property worth millions so “gross and inexcusable” as to warrant
reinstating her title to the property, (3) “Escudero v. Dulay, 158 SCRA
69 (1988) where the Court set aside the decision of the trial court
against the petitioner, the same being due to their trial counsel’s
blunder in procedure and gross ignorance of existing jurisprudence;
and (4) People’s Homesite and Housing Corp. v. Tiongco, 12 SCRA
471 (1964) where the Court held that a petition for relief although filed
outside the reglementary period of 60 days was nonetheless
seasonably filed because the delay was attributed to the negligence of
petitioner’s counsel.
552
552 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals
present my evidence, but my lawyer was absent for five consecutive
times'.. . ."
Private respondent’s contention is exaggerated. Of course there is a
limit to petitioner’s credibility should she repeat what had happened
here just for delay, not to mention that she would be taking a big risk of
losing her defense. As for the private respondent’s argument that
petitioner should have gotten another lawyer, only with the benefit of
hindsight does this course appear to be the only tenable one to take.
Petitioner might have thought that her counsel would be more sedulous
in her behalf. Or perhaps petitioner tried to get another counsel, but
failed and, left with no choice, stuck it out with Atty. Tenorio and simply
hoped for the best rather than be left without a counsel. In any case, the
fact that on May 17, 1989 and June 5, 1989 petitioner was present even
when counsel was absent tends to negate an intention to delay the
criminal proceedings.
It was Atty. Tenorio’s absences, then, rather than petitioner’s, which
appear to be the cause for the defense’s failure to present its evidence.
Atty. Tenorio’s negligence did not consist in error of procedure or even
a lapse in strategy but something as basic as failing to appear in court
despite clear warning that such failure would amount to waiver of her
client’s right to present evidence in her defense.
Keeping in mind that this case involves personal liberty, the negligence
of counsel was certainly so gross that it should not be allowed to
prejudice petitioner’s constitutional right to be heard. The judicial
conscience certainly cannot rest easy on a conviction based solely on
the evidence of the prosecution just because the presentation of the
defense evidence had been barred by technicality. Rigid application of
rules must yield to the duty of courts to render justice where justice is
due—to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his
innocence of a crime with which he or she might be charged.20
________________
20 People v. Jose, 70 SCRA 257 (1976).
553
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997 553
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals
Only last year, this Court set aside its decision after finding that the
right of the accused to due process had been violated. In De Guzman v.
Sandiganbayan,21 this Court set aside its decision affirming petitioner’s
conviction by the Sandiganbayan and its resolution denying
reconsideration, after being shown that petitioner’s conviction had
102
been brought about by his counsel’s gross ignorance of law and
procedure. The Court held:
Petitioner’s present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to
pesos and centavos. No less than his liberty is at stake here. And he is
just about to lose it simply because his former lawyers pursued a
carelessly contrived procedural strategy of insisting on what has
already become an imprudent remedy, which thus forbade petitioner
from offering his evidence all the while available for presentation
before the Sandiganbayan. Under the circumstances, higher interests of
justice and equity demand that petitioner be not penalized for the
costly importunirigs of his previous lawyers based on the same
principles why this Court had, on many occasions where it granted new
trial, excused parties from the negligence or mistakes of counsel. To
cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone rather than
rectify a serious injustice to petitioners whose only fault was to repose
his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous lawyers. . . .
The Court remanded the case of the Sandiganbayan for reception and
appreciation of petitioner’s evidence.
In another case, People v. Del Mundo,22 in which the accused was
convicted of rape in six cases and sentenced to reclusion perpetua on
five of them and to death on the sixth, this Court ordered a new trial
after it was shown that complainant had executed prior to accused’s
conviction an affida-vit of desistance, while an NBI medico-legal report
given after such conviction found that complainant’s “physical virginity
preserved.” The report belied the contrary finding of the city health
officer on which the trial court relied in convicting the accused.
Although the NBI report did not constitute newly-
_______________
21 G.R. No. 103276, April 11,1996.
22 G.R. Nos. 119964–69, September 20,1996.
554
554 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals
discovered evidence, a new trial was nonetheless ordered “on the
broader ground of substantial justice [as] the rule for granting a motion
for new trial, among others, should be liberally construed to assist the
parties in obtaining a just and speedy determination of their rights. . ..
Court litigations are primarily for the search for truth, and a liberal
interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the fullest
opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth.”
Reconsideration of the resolution in this case is compelled by these
precedents. Indeed, to deny petitioner the opportunity to present her
evidence on the merest chance that she might be innocent would be to
disregard the wisdom that it is better to acquit ten guilty individuals
than to convict one innocent person. The Court is as aware as anyone of
the need for the speedy disposition of cases. At the same time, however,
it has ever been mindful of its responsibility as the highest tribunal of
justice to see to it that the paramount interests of justice are not
sacrificed for the sake of speed and efficiency. As Justice Teehankee
wrote:23
The Court has consistently maintained that although a speedy
determination of an action implies a speedy trial, speed is not the chief
objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate consideration for the
administration of justice, a genuine respect for the rights of all parties
and the requirements of procedural due process and an adherence to
the Court’s standing admonition that the discretion granted judges in
the granting or denial of motions for postponement and the setting
aside of denial orders previously issued “should always be predicated
on the consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts
or of the parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be
served thereby” are more important than a race to end the trial.
Second. In denying petitioner’s plea for a chance to present her
evidence, the Court of Appeals observed that petitioner has more than a
layman’s acquaintance with the law, having been able to prepare and
file her own motion for new trial and
103
_______________
23 Amberti v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 240, 249–250 (1979).
555
VOL. 267, FEBRUARY 6, 1997
Reyes us. Court of Appeals
appellant’s brief, to be given the benefit of the doubt. But even lawyers,
who are parties in a case, need the guiding hand of counsel. Skill in
drafting pleadings (which is practically the only “lawyerly” thing
petitioner did) is vastly different from skill needed in the courtroom.
Preparing pleadings can be done at leisure with the luxury of
consultation, either of books or of people. Trial work, however,
demands more. It requires the ability to think fast on one’s feet and the
psychologist’s feel for the witness’ mood and motive. As then Chief
Justice Moran said for the Court in People v. Holgado:24
Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence.
It is entirely probable that, forced to be her own lawyer, petitioner
nonetheless felt some inadequacy and experienced some moments of
doubt whether she could go through the ordeal of presenting her
evidence by her lonesome, and that could be the reason why she
hesitated from doing so when she found herself without the assistance
of counsel and not because petitioner tried to delay the proceedings
and obstruct the course of justice.
In sum, it is better to allow petitioner another chance to present her
evidence than to let her conviction stand based solely on the evidence
of the prosecution. In accordance with Rule 121, &6,25 the evidence of
the prosecution shall be under-
________________
24 85 Phil. 752, 756 (1959).
25 Rule 121, §6: Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration.—The
effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration are the following:
(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or
irregularities committed during the trial, all the proceedings and
555 evidence not affected by the commission of such errors and irregularities
shall stand, but those affected thereby shall be set aside and taken anew.
The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the introduction of
additional evidence.
....
556
556 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Reyes vs. Court of Appeals
stood preserved, subject to the right of the prosecution to supplement
it and/or to rebut the evidence which petitioner may present.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
November 29, 1995 is GRANTED and the decision dated May 28, 1993
of the Court of Appeals and that of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan,
Branch 22 dated September 29, 1989 in Criminal Case No. 9252-M are
SET ASIDE and this case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan for a new trial for the purpose of allowing petitioner to present
evidence in her defense with directive to the court thereafter to decide
the case with all deliberate speed.
SO ORDERED,
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Motion granted, judgments set aside. Case remanded to trial court.
Notes.—Shortcuts in judicial processes are to be avoided where they
impede rather than promote a judicious dispensation of
justice. (Paredes vs. Manalo, 244 SCRA 64[1995])
An accused is denied his right to counsel where he could not
understand and communicate with the counsel he was provided with
concerning his defense. (People vs. Cuizon, 256 SCRA 325 [1996])
104
 G.R. No. 109149. December 21, 1999.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. LEONCIO
SANTOCILDES, JR. y SIGA-AN, accused-appellant.
Criminal Law; Right to Counsel; The right of the accused to be heard by
himself and his counsel goes much deeper than the question of ability or
skill—it lies at the heart of our adversarial system of justice.—The Office
of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, maintains that
notwithstanding the fact that appellant’s counsel during trial was not a
member of the bar, appellant was afforded due process since he has
been given an opportunity to be heard and the records reveal that said
person “presented the evidence for the defense with the ability of a
seasoned lawyer and in general handled the case of appellant in a
professional and skillful manner.” However, the right of the accused to
be heard by himself and his counsel, in our view, goes much deeper
than the question of ability or skill. It lies at the heart of our adversarial
system of justice. Where the interplay of basic rights of the individual
may collide with the awesome forces of the state, we need a
professional learned in the law as well as ethically committed to defend
the accused by all means fair and reasonable.
Same; Same; The presence and participation of counsel in criminal
proceedings should never be taken lightly.—The presence and
participation of counsel in criminal proceedings should never be taken
lightly. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in
the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. The right of
an accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the
adversarial system where the accused is pitted against the awesome
prosecutory machinery of the State. Such a right proceeds from the
fundamental principle of due process which basically means that a
person must be heard before being condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a person’s basic rights; it is not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
311
VOL. 321, DECEMBER 21, 1999 311
People vs. Santocildes, Jr.
Same; Same; The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no less
than Article III, Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution.—The
right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no less than Article III,
Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution. This constitutional
mandate is reflected in Section 1 of Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which declares the right of the accused at the trial
to be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of judgment.
Legal Ethics; Attorneys; The right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise—it is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications
duly ascertained and certified.—In turn, Section 5 of Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution vests the power to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law to the Supreme Court. Section 1 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court explicitly states who are entitled to practice
law in the Philippines, and Section 2 thereof clearly provides for the
requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. Jurisprudence
has also held that “the right to practice law is not a natural or
constitutional right but is in the nature of a privilege or franchise. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications
duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its
possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise
of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust.”
Same; Same; Contempt; A person who undertakes the unauthorized
practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court for assuming to be
an attorney and acting as such without authority.—Indeed, so strict is
the regulation of the practice of law that in Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a Bar
105
candidate who has already successfully hurdled the Bar examinations
but has not yet taken his oath and signed the roll of attorneys, and who
was caught in the unauthorized practice of law was held in contempt of
court. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person who
undertakes the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect
contempt of court for assuming to be an attorney and acting as such
without authority.
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Br. 33.
312
312 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Santocildes, Jr.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Igmedio S. Prado, Jr. for accused-appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Where an accused was not duly represented by a member of the
Philippine Bar during trial, the judgment should be set aside and the
case remanded to the trial court for a new trial. A person who
misrepresents himself as a lawyer shall be held liable for indirect
contempt of court.
Subject of the present appeal is the decision dated October 29, 1992, of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, convicting accused-
appellant of the crime of rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the offended party the
amount of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of
rape1 of a girl less than nine (9) years old, committed on December 28,
1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis, San Joaquin, Iloilo.
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued
and the prosecution presented as its witnesses the victim, her mother,
her six (6) year-old playmate, and the medico-legal officer who
examined the victim.
For the defense, appellant presented one German Toriales and himself.
Appellant denied committing the rape and claimed that he merely tried
to stop the two girls, the victim and her playmate, from quarreling.
________________
1 Information, Rollo, p. 6.
313
VOL. 321, DECEMBER 21, 1999 313
People vs. Santocildes, Jr.
On October 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision2 finding
appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:
“WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua together its accessory penalty. The accused is
ordered to pay the amount of P50,000.00 to the complainant and
another amount for costs, without subsidiary penalty in case of failure
to pay the civil liability and the cost.
If qualified under Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
6127, as amended, and he has agreed in writing to abide by the same
rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, he shall be credited with the
full duration of his preventive imprisonment; otherwise, he shall only
be credited with 4/5 of the same.
SO ORDERED.”
Hence, appellant duly filed a Notice of Appeal.3 In his brief,4 appellant
made the following assignment of errors:
. I.THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED IS
106
 GUILTY OF RAPE INSPITE OF CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF
THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT AND HER WITNESSES ON
MATERIAL POINTS.
. II.THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS DEPRIVED
THOUGH NO FAULT OF HIS OWN TO BE DEFENDED BY A
PERSON AUTHORIZED TO PRACTICE LAW AMOUNTING TO
DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.”
Considering the importance of the constitutional right to counsel, we
shall now first resolve the issue of proper representation by a member
of the bar raised by appellant.
Appellant contends that he was represented during trial by a person
named Gualberto C. Ompong, who for all intents and
________________
2 Rollo, pp. 12-23.
3 Id. at 24.
4 Id. at 47.
314
314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Santocildes, Jr.
purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the direct
examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal,
however, appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio
S. Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a
member of the bar. Further verification with the Office of the Bar
Confidant confirmed this fact.5 Appellant therefore argues that his
deprivation of the right to counsel should necessarily result in his
acquittal of the crime charged.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, maintains that
notwithstanding the fact that appellant’s counsel during trial was not a
member of the bar, appellant was afforded due process since he has
been given an opportunity to be heard and the records reveal that said
person “presented the evidence for the defense with the ability of a
seasoned lawyer and in general handled the case of appellant in a
professional and skillful manner.” However, the right of the accused to
be heard by himself and his counsel, in our view, goes much deeper
than the question of ability or skill. It lies at the heart of our adversarial
system of justice. Where the interplay of basic rights of the individual
may collide with the awesome forces of the state, we need a
professional learned in the law as well as ethically committed to defend
the accused by all means fair and reasonable.
On the matter of proper representation by a member of the bar, we had
occasion to resolve a similar issue in the case of Delgado v. Court of
Appeals.6 In Delgado, petitioner and two others were convicted by the
trial court of the crime of estafa thru falsification of public and/or
official documents. One accused did not appeal. Petitioner Delgado and
her remaining co-accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed petitioner’s conviction but acquitted her co-accused. After
entry of judgment, petitioner discovered that her lawyer was not a
member of the bar and moved to set aside the entry of judgment. The
Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s motion,
________________
5 Certification of the Bar Car Confidant, Rollo, p. 59.
6 145 SCRA 357 (1986).
315
VOL. 321, DECEMBER 21, 1999 315
People vs. Santocildes, Jr.
hence, she filed a petition for certiorari with this Court. The Court set
aside the assailed judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for
a new trial, explaining that—
“This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by a
member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the
Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is
great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be
107
inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the
court proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.”7
Indeed, the right to counsel is of such primordial importance that even
if an accused was represented by three successive counsels from the
Public Attorney’s Office, the Court has ordered the remand of a rape
case when it found that accused was given mere perfunctory
representation by aforesaid counsels such that appellant was not
properly and effectively accorded the right to counsel. In the recent en
banc case of People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999, the Court,
speaking through Justice Vitug, admonished three (3) PAO lawyers for
failing to genuinely protect the interests of the accused and for having
fallen much too short of their responsibility as officers of the court and
as members of the Bar. Verily, we can do no less where the accused was
not even duly represented by a certified member of the Philippine Bar,
no matter how zealous his representation might have been.
The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings
should never be taken lightly.8 Even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules
of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he
is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his
innocence.9 The right of an accused to counsel is guaranteed to
minimize the imbal-
________________
7 Id. at 360.
8 People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999, p. 14, 306 SCRA
135; Flores v. Ruiz, 90 SCRA 428(1979).
9 Id., citing People v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752 (1950).
316
316 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Santocildes, Jr.
ance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against the
awesome prosecutory machinery of the State.10 Such a right proceeds
from the fundamental principle of due process which basically means
that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process
requirement is a part of a person’s basic rights; it is not a mere
formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.11
The right to counsel of an accused is enshrined in no less than Article III,
Sections 12 and 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution. This constitutional
mandate is reflected in Section 1 of Rule 115 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which declares the right of the accused at the trial
to be present in person and by counsel at every stage of the
proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of judgment. In
turn, Section 5 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution vests the power
to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law to
the Supreme Court. Section 1 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court explicitly
states who are entitled to practice law in the Philippines, and Section 2
thereof clearly provides for the requirements for all applicants for
admission to the bar. Jurisprudence has also held that “the right to
practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature
of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to persons of good moral
character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing
and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly
personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust.”12 Indeed, so
strict is the regulation of the practice of law that in Beltran, Jr. v.
Abad,13 a Bar candidate who has already successfully hurdled the Bar
examinations but has not yet taken his oath and signed the
________________
10 People v. Serzo, Jr., 274 SCRA 553, 562 (1997).
11 People v. Bermas, G.R. No. 120420, April 21, 1999, p. 15, 306 SCRA
135.
12 In the Matter of the Petition for Authority To Continue use of the Firm
Name “Ozaeta, Romulo, etc.,”92 SCRA 1, 10 (1979).
13 121 SCRA 217, 220 (1983).
108
317 is the accused in a criminal prosecution. (Amion vs. Chiongson, 301
VOL. 321, DECEMBER 21, 1999 317 SCRA 614 [1999])
People vs. Santocildes, Jr. A counsel de oficio is expected to do his utmost. A mere pro-forma
roll of attorneys, and who was caught in the unauthorized practice of appointment of de oficio counsel who fails to genuinely protect the
law was held in contempt of court. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the interests of the accused merits disapprobation. The exacting demands
Rules of Court, a person who undertakes the unauthorized practice of expected of a lawyer should be no less than stringent when one is a
law is liable for indirect contempt of court for assuming to be an counsel de oficio. He must take the case not as a burden but as an
attorney and acting as such without authority. opportunity to assist in the proper dispensation of justice. No lawyer is
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is SET ASIDE, and the case is to be excused from this responsibility except only for the most
hereby REMANDED to the trial court for new trial. With respect to the compelling and cogent reasons. (People vs. Bermas, 306 SCRA
unauthorized practice of law by the person named Gualberto C. 135 [1999])
Ompong in connection with this case, the local Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines of Iloilo City is DIRECTED to conduct a
prompt and thorough investigation regarding this matter and to report
its recommendations to the Court within ninety (90) days from notice
of this order. Let all concerned parties, including the Office of the Bar
Confidant, be each furnished a copy of this Decision for their
appropriate action.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment set aside, case remanded to the trial court for new trial.
Notes.—Doubts on the part of a lawyer as to the ultimate innocence of
a client accused of a serious felony do not, in themselves, constitute
bases for claiming miscarriage of justice or failure of due process or
assailing the professional work done by the lawyer. (People vs.
Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36 [1992])
An examination of related provisions in the Constitution concerning the
right to counsel, will show that the “preference in the choice of counsel”
pertains more aptly and specifically to a person under custodial
investigation rather than one who
318
318 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Santocildes, Jr.

109
 G.R. No. 92534. July 9, 1991.* comes from him. In instigation, the law officers conceive the
commission of the crime and suggest it to the accused, who adopts the
idea and carries it into execution (Araneta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ESMENIO DE
L-46638, 9 July 1986, 142 SCRA 534). Entrapment is sanctioned by the
LA PEÑA y BEDRIO, accused-appellant.
Revised Penal Code. Instigation is tabooed.
Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs; Evidence; Credibility of uncorroborated
Criminal Procedure; Rights of accused; Right to counsel; Evidence
testimony of witness.—The Court a quo can not be faulted for giving
obtained in violation of rights of person under custodial investigation.—x
credence to the testimony of Sgt. Allaga. Although uncorroborated, it is
x x. Appellant’s signature on the receipt of the property seized (Exh. C-
positive and credible and is sufficient to support conviction. He has
1), a procedural step after arrest, is not a factor in his conviction. That
convincingly established the details of the crime. He was present when
signature is inadmissible in evidence against him. It was obtained in
information was received at Narcom headquarters about Appellant’s
violation of Appellant’s right as a person under custodial investigation
illegal activities. He was the principal actor, the designated poseur-
for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to
buyer, in the “buy-bust” operation. It was he who arrested Appellant
show that he was then assisted by counsel.
after determining that the parcel delivered to him contained marijuana.
He witnessed the issuance of a receipt for the seized marijuana, which
APPEAL from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Br.
Appellant had signed. He was also with Lt. Salde when the marijuana
23. Gustilo, J.
was delivered to the PC crime laboratory for examination. More, absent
is any showing that Sgt. Allaga was motivated by any improper motive
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
other than to perform his mandated duty. He is also presumed to have
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
regularly performed his
Raymundo Magat for accused -appellant.
________________
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
* SECOND DIVISION.
Condemned to a life in prison1 for peddling marijuana,2 Esmenio de la
29
Peña reiterates his plea of innocence before this Court.
VOL. 199, JULY 9, 1991 29
Records show that Appellant was arrested on 24 March 1988 for selling
People vs. De la Peña
marijuana in a “buy-bust operation” conducted by
official duty in the absence of any opposite evidence.
Same; Same; “Entrapment” and “Instigation”, distinguished.—The Trial _________________
Court aptly characterized the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s
apprehension as “entrapment” and not “instigation.” x x x. The
1 By the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXIII, Iloilo City, Judge Tito G.
prosecution version, being more credible, the operation was, in fact, an
Gustilo, presiding.
entrapment not an instigation, the underlying difference being in the
2 Art. II, Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended by Pres. Decree No. 1675,
origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, means rea originates from
Sec. 1.
the mind of the criminal. The idea and resolve to commit the crime

110
30
30 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De la Peña
the officers of the Narcotics Command of Region VI, Iloilo City. On 7
April 1988, Appellant executed a counter-affidavit before a CLAO
Attorney, vehemently denying culpability (Exh. D). After preliminary
investigation, the Third Assistant City Prosecutor recommended
dismissal of the case on the ground that appel-lant was instigated to
commit the crime by the Narcom officers (Exh. Y). This
recommendation, however, was reversed by the City Prosecutor, who
ordered another prosecutor to file the necessary Information (Exh. I). A
petition for review of said reversal was denied by the Department of
Justice, which ruled that there was sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause against Appellant and that the question of instigation or
entrapment is for the Court, and not for the Investigating Fiscal, to
determine (Exh. E).
The corresponding Information having been filed, upon ar-raignment,
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty.
Through its witnesses, the principal one being Sgt. Allaga, a team
member, the prosecution wrapped up its evidence thus: On 24 March
1988, at about 2:00 o’clock P.M., Lt. Eleuterio Salde of the Narcotics
Command, Region VI, Iloilo City, received a telephone call from a
concerned citizen informing him that a certain “Esmie” later identified
as Appellant Esmenio de la Peña, was selling marijuana at Punta
Baluarte, Molo, Iloilo City. Immediately, he organized and led a team
composed of six (6) persons to conduct a “buy-bust operation” (tsn., 17
April 1989, pp. 4-5).
Arriving at the directed place at about 5:00 o’clock that same day, Sgt.
Francisco Allaga, the designated poseur-buyer and principal
prosecution witness, proceeded to a sari-sari store (ibid., p. 6) and
inquired, from a child therein, about one “Esmie” (ibid., p. 7). The child
pointed to the Appellant who was seated under a waiting shade about
ten (10) meters away (ibid.). Sgt. Allaga then approached and asked
Appellant if he (the latter) could “score” (lingo for marijuana users).
Reacting, Appellant asked “how much do you want” to which Sgt. Allaga
replied “worth P30.00” (ibid., p. 8). Asked to wait (ibid.), Sgt. Allaga
then gave the amount to Appellant, who left and returned after five (5)
minutes with a parcel wrapped in a “Camel” cigarette pack (ibid., pp.
17-18). Appellant handed the parcel to Sgt. Allaga, who opened it, and
upon seeing that it contained mari-
31
VOL. 199, JULY 9, 1991 31
People vs. De la Peña
juana, arrested Appellant (ibid., pp. 10-11).
At the Narcom headquarters, Lt. Salde placed identifying marks on the
package which he kept in a padlocked steel cabinet for safekeeping
(ibid., p. 14. Lt. Salde also issued a receipt for the property seized (Exh.
C) consisting of fifteen (15) sticks of marijuana wrapped in a “Camel”
cigarette pack (Exh. C-1), which was witnessed by Sgt. Allaga (Exh. C-2),
and signed by Appellant (Exh. C-3). Tests conducted at the PC crime
laboratory yielded positive results for marijuana (Exh. B).
On 29 May 1989, after the prosecution had rested its case, Appellant,
with leave of Court, filed a “Demurrer to Evidence” on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence to produce conviction (Orig. Record, p. 53).
Ruling that the arguments advanced did not appear indubitable, the
Trial Court denied dismissal and ordered the reception of evidence for
the accused (ibid., p. 68).
Denying any and all culpability, Appellant’s narration is that on the date
and time in question, as he was washing clothes at his aunt’s house (tsn.,
21 August 1989, p. 2), a man, whom he later came to know as Sgt.
Francisco Allaga, arrived and inquired from him where marijuana could
be bought (ibid., p. 3). Appellant replied that he did not know. When Sgt.
Allaga insisted, saying that he needed it as medication for a patient
(ibid.). Appellant again disowned any knowledge. At that moment, one
Aris Magarse and a certain Angeles Octavio passed by and Appellant
informed them that the man needed marijuana but that he did not
know where the item could be bought (ibid., p. 4). Aris volunteered to
look for marijuana (ibid.). She was given money by Sgt. Allaga (ibid.).
111
Ten minutes later, Aris returned and handed the marijuana to
Appellant which he, in turn, gave to Sgt. Allaga (ibid., p. 5). No sooner
had the Sgt. taken hold of it when the latter identified himself as a
Narcom agent and apprehended him (ibid.).
Angeles Octavio, a neighbor and close friend of Appellant, corroborated
the latter’s testimony.
After assessing the evidence before it, the Trial Court rejected
Appellant’s version for being replete with inconsistencies and
improbabilities, gave more credence to the testimony of the
prosecution’s main witness, Sgt. Allaga, and adjudged Appellant “to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; to pay a fine of P20,000,00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insol-
32
32 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De la Peña
vency, and to pay the costs.”
Unable to accept the verdict, Appellant contends that the Trial Court
erred (1) in giving credence to the prosecution evidence rather than to
his corroborated testimony; (2) in not finding that the circumstances
leading to his apprehension constitute instigation rather than a valid
entrapment; and, overall, in not acquitting him in the face of the weak
prosecution evidence.
After a review of the oral and documentary evidence, we rule as follows:
The Court a quo can not be faulted for giving credence to the testimony
of Sgt. Allaga. Although uncorroborated, it is positive and credible and
is sufficient to support conviction. He has convincingly established the
details of the crime. He was present when information was received at
Narcom headquarters about Appellant’s illegal activities. He was the
principal actor, the designated poseur-buyer, in the “buy-bust”
operation. It was he who arrested Appellant after determining that the
parcel delivered to him contained marijuana. He witnessed the issuance
of a receipt for the seized marijuana, which Appellant had signed. He
was also with Lt. Salde when the marijuana was delivered to the PC
crime laboratory for examination. More, absent is any showing that Sgt.
Allaga was motivated by any improper motive other than to perform
his mandated duty. He is also presumed to have regularly performed
his official duty in the absence of any opposite evidence.
Contrary to Appellant’s contention, the marijuana identified by Sgt.
Allaga during trial was the same item seized from Appellant. Said
witness was present when Lt. Salde made identifying marks on the
parcel in question and when it was handed to the police custodian for
safekeeping. Proper safeguards were taken to protect the identity of the
exhibit. After appropriate labelling, it was kept in a padlocked steel
cabinet until it was taken to the laboratory for examination four (4)
days later.
Appellant’s story pointing to another individual, one Aris Magarse, as
the supplier of the prohibited drug, is far from credible
notwithstanding its corroboration by defense witness Angeles Octavio.
For, as found by the Trial Court, Appellant had involved himself in
inconsistencies. In his Counter-Affidavit, the authenticity of which he
had acknowledged, he stated
33
VOL. 199, JULY 9, 1991 33
People vs. De la Peña
that when he was approached by a man, who turned out later to be a
Narcom poseur buyer, he was watching his friends playing mahjong
(Exh. D). His testimony in Court, however, was that he was washing
clothes in the house of his aunt when so approached. Contradicting
both statements is the testimony of defense witness, Angeles Octavio,
that he was with Aris Magarse when they passed by Appellant in a
“footpath” conversing with Sgt. Allaga. Besides, if Aris were, indeed, the
marijuana supplier she would surely have been arrested also.
Further, in his Counter-Affidavit, Appellant stated that “I left him and
some few minutes later I returned with fifteen (15) sticks of marijuana
cigarettes for him.” In open Court, however, he was attributing sole
fault to Aris Magarse in an effort to shift culpability from him.
These inconsistencies cast a heavy pall of doubt on Appellant’s version
of the incident. Of significance, too, is the fact that instant rapport was
112
established between Appellant and Sgt. Allaga when the latter asked for factor in his conviction. That signature is inadmissible in evidence
a “score,” a term apparently used by addicts and pushers. If Appellant, against him. It was obtained in violation of Appellant’s right as a person
in fact, had not been engaged in such nefarious activity, the term would under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there
have been alien to him, but it was not. being nothing in the records to show that he was then assisted by
The Trial Court aptly characterized the circumstances surrounding counsel. (People v. Bagano, G.R. No. 77777, 5 February 1990, 181 SCRA
Appellant’s apprehension as “entrapment” and not “instigation.” Firstly, 747). Appellant’s guilt has been adequately established by other
Appellant’s story that he had consistently denied to Sgt. Allaga having evidence of record.
marijuana but that because of the latter’s insistence, he was induced to WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED, except that
look for and produce marijuana, can not be given credence, his the penalty should be life imprisonment (Pres. Decree No. 1675, Section
testimony having been found to be unworthy of belief, as already 4) and not “reclusion perpetua” as imposed by the Trial Court. Costs
expounded. The prosecution version, being more credible, the against accused-appellant, Esmenio de la Peña.
operation was, in fact, an entrapment not an instigation, the underlying SO ORDERED.
difference being in the origin of the criminal intent. In Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
entrapment, means rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The Judgment affirmed.
idea and resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, Note.—No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the
the law officers conceive the commission of the crime and suggest it to presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on
the accused, who adopts the idea and carries it into execution (Araneta his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-46638, 9 July 1986, 142 SCRA 534). detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. (People vs. Galit, 135 SCRA
Entrapment is sanctioned by the Revised Penal Code. Instigation is 465.)
tabooed.
In this case, Sgt. Allaga’s inquiry addressed to Appellant was far from a
suggestion. It was a query to which Appellant imme-
34
34 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. De la Peña
diately responded by asking how much was needed, requesting the Sgt.
to wait, and returning after a few minutes with the “good” in hand.
Appellant needed no prodding, no inducement, and much less,
instigation. His reaction was natural to one who was already engaged in
the illicit trade of marijuana and all that Narcom did was to catch him in
the act.
Under the circumstances, Appellant does not deserve acquittal.
It needs stressing, however, that Appellant’s signature on the receipt of
the property seized (Exh. C-1), a procedural step after arrest, is not a

113
 G.R. No. 95026. October 4,1991.* absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an
ongoing litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of
the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping his client company. No
SPOUSES PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position
APPEALS, ROBERTO TELAN, and SPOUSES VICENTE and VIRGINIA
that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that
TELAN, respondents.
thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal. This is the
Civil Law; Appeal; Constitutional Law; Due Process; Petitioners had not
reason why under ordinary circumstances, a lawyer can not simply
been accorded due process of law because they lost their right to appeal
refuse anyone the counsel that only the exercise of his office can impart.
when they were deprived of the right to counsel.—We rule for the
petitioners. We hold that they had not been accorded due process of
PETITION for review of the resolution of the Court of Appeals Fule, J.
law because they lost their right to appeal when they were deprived of
the right to counsel. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
xxx xxx xxx No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
Peter Donnely A. Barot for petitioners.
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
Monsanto Law Office for private respondents.
protection of the laws. The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as
forcefully as in criminal cases, specially so when as a consequence, life,
SARMIENTO, J.:
liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to property; The preeminent right to due
process of law applies not only to life and liberty but also to This is a petition for review of the Resolution dated December 28,1989
of the Court of Appeals1 which considered the appeal of the herein
_______________ petitioners, spouses Pedro and Angelina Telan (hereinafter PEDRO and
ANGELINA), ABANDONED and DISMISSED, for their failure to file an
appeal brief within the reglementary period, pursuant to Section I(f),
* SECOND DIVISION.
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
535
The only issue involved in this petition for review on certiorari is:
VOL. 202, OCTOBER 4, 1991 535
Telan vs. Court of Appeals
_______________
property.—There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be
different from that in civil cases. The preeminent right to due process of
1 Telan v. Telan, CA-G.R. CV No. 20786, December 28, 1989, Hector C.
law applies not only to life and liberty but also to property. There can
Fule, ponente; Lorna S. Lombos-De la Fuente, Chairman and Regina G.
be no fair hearing unless a party, who is in danger of losing his house in
Ordoñez-Benitez, concurring.
which he and his family live and in which he has established a modest
536
means of livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and
536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
counsel.
Telan vs. Court of Appeals
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to counsel; The right to counsel is
absolute and may be invoked at all times.—The right to counsel is

114
Whether or not the representation of the petitioner by a fake lawyer
amounts to a deprivation of his right to counsel and hence a lack of due
process.
The circumstances under which the case arose are as follow:
The petitioner PEDRO is a retired government employee and high
school graduate who settled in 1973 on a property abutting the
national highway in Guibang, Gamu, Isabela.2
In 1977, when the government needed the land, PEDRO was compelled
to transfer his residence to the other side of the national highway on a
lot owned by Luciano Sia where he rented 750 square meters for
P50.00 a month.3
Because the lot was en route to the shrine of Our Lady of Guibang
which was frequented by pilgrims, PEDRO set up business enterprises
such as a vulcanizing shop and an eatery. Shortly thereafter, his cousins,
the herein private respondents Roberto Telan and Spouses Vicente and
Virginia Telan (hereinafter ROBERTO, VICENTE, and VIRGINIA),
followed suit by setting up their own eatery within the same lot.4
On March 27, 1984, PEDRO and his spouse ANGELINA received a Notice
to Vacate from the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). This
was followed by a letter from VIRGINIA herself, reiterating the said
demand. Apparently VICENTE and VIRGINIA had executed a Deed of
Sale with Assumption of Mortgage with Sia over the said lot shared by
PEDRO and ANGELINA.5
Soon, DBP as the mortgagee of Sia's lot, foreclosed the mortgage.
On June 7, 1984, the DBP and the Spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA
TELAN filed a suit at the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela to evict
PEDRO TELAN's family from the lot. The case was dismissed.
Meanwhile, on September 22,1986, ROBERTO TELAN was able to
secure a Certificate of Title in his name over the con-
_______________
2 Rollo, 9.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
537
VOL. 202, OCTOBER 4, 1991 537
Telan vs. Court of Appeals
tested lot.6
With the new Transfer Certificate of Title, ROBERTO and the spouses
VICENTE and VIRGINIA filed a complaint denominated as Accion
Publiciana against the petitioners, Spouses PEDRO and ANGELINA.7
At this point, PEDRO and ANGELINA hired the services of Atty. Antonio
Paguiran to defend them in the suit.8
On October 27, 1988, the lower court awarded the possession of the
property in question to ROBERTO and Spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA
TELAN.
PEDRO and ANGELINA informed Atty. Paguiran that they wanted to
appeal the case, but since Atty. Paguiran was disposed not to do so,
PEDRO and ANGELINA asked another person to sign for them.9
In the course of their eatery business, petitioner ANGELINA TELAN
became acquainted with Ernesto Palma who represented himself to be
a "lawyer." Having no counsel to assist them in their appeal, Angelina
asked "Atty. Palma" to handle their case. He consented and the
petitioners paid his "lawyer's fees."10
In the meantime, on August 5, 1988, PEDRO TELAN broke his hip while
he was getting off from a passenger jeepney. On September 5, 1988,
unable to withstand the pain, he went to the Philippine General
Hospital for treatment where he was diagnosed to have a "fractured,
closed, complete, femoral neck garden type IV (R) femur."11 On the
spot, the doctors recommended an operation.
Another operation followed on September 22, 1988. All the while, from
September 5, 1988 up to October 2,1988, PEDRO was confined a the
PGH. He had to go back to PGH several times for check-up even after he
was released from the hospital.12
_______________
115
6 Rollo, 10.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Rollo, 10.
11 Rollo, 30.
12 Ibid.
538
538 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Telan vs. Court of Appeals
It was only by January 1990 that PEDRO managed to walk again
although still with much difficulty.
Meanwhile, on December 28, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution which considered the appeal interposed by petitioners as
abandoned and dismissed "for failure x x x to file an appeal brief within
the reglementary period, pursuant to Section l(f), Rule 50 of the Rules
of Court."13
The petitioners were not aware of the dismissal of their appeal. They
only came to know about it on May 1990 when somebody in the Isabela
Provincial Capitol at Ilagan informed PEDRO TELAN about the Court of
Appeals' Resolution.14
PEDRO TELAN immediately verified the facts. "Atty. Palma" could no
longer be found. PEDRO engaged the services of the new counsel, Peter
Donnely A. Barot, who filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion
to Admit Attached Appellants' Brief. Atty. Barot assisted PEDRO in
verifying the existence of "Atty. Palma" in the Roll of Attorneys with the
Bar Confidant's Office. This was followed by the filing of Criminal Case
No. 389-90 for Estafa against "Atty. Palma."15 By now PEDRO had
realized that "Atty. Palma" was a fake.
The Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated August 27, 1990 ruled as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be recalled that the instant appeal was dismissed only on
December 28,1989 (p. 13, rollo). Prior thereto, appellant's counsel
received on July 25, 1989 this Court's letter-notice dated July 14,1989
requiring him to file the appellants' brief within forty-five (45) days
from receipt thereof. Per report dated October 18, 1989 of the brief,
none has yet been filed as of said date and hence, this Court issued a
Resolution dated October 20, 1989 for appellants to show cause, within
ten (10) days, why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file
the appellants' brief within the reglementary period. Hence from July
25, 1989 when appellants' counsel received this Court's letter-notice to
file brief until the JRD's report on December
_______________
13 CA-G.R. CV No. 20786, Ordoñez-Benitez, concurred by Lombos-Dela
Fuente and Mendoza, JJ.
14 Rollo, 12.
15 Id., 82-84.
539
VOL. 202, OCTOBER 4, 1991 539
Telan vs. Court of Appeals
15, 1989 that no appellants' brief has been filed, a period of about four
(4) months and twenty-three (23) days have elapsed, thus giving
appellants enough to time to file their brief. Unfortunately, no
appellants' brief was ever filed during said period. Let it be stressed
that the rules prescribing the time within which certain acts must be
done or certain proceedings taken are absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delay and the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business. (FJR Garment Industries v. CA, 130 SCRA 216, 218).16
On January 24, 1990, the Resolution dated December 28, 1989 became
final and was entered on May 24,1990 in the Book of Entries of
Judgment.
On September 12,1990, the presiding judge of the lower court issue the
Writ of Demolition for the enforcement of the decision.17
The Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court was filed on
October 18,1990 by the spouses PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN with an
116
Urgent Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary
Injunction.18
On October 24, 1990, after deliberating on the petition for review on
certiorari, the Court without giving due course required the
respondents to COMMENT within ten (10) days from notice thereof. At
the same time, as prayed for, effective "immediately" and "continuing
until further orders from this Court", a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER was issued enjoining the respondents from enforcing the Order
dated September 12,1990 issued in Civil Case No. 279.
In due time, after the filing of the necessary pleadings, the petition was
given due course and the parties were ordered to submit
simultaneously their respective memoranda. The petitioners filed their
memorandum while the private respondents manifested to adopt their
Comments dated November 5, 1990. However, after the filing of the
petitioners' memorandum, the private respondents filed on June
10,1991, a pleading they
_______________
16 Rollo, 20.
17 Roberto Telan, et al., v. Pedro Telan, et al., Civil Case No. 279,
Regional Trial Court (Branch 16, Iligan), September 12, 1990, Hon.
Teodoro L. Hernando, Presiding Judge.
18 Rollo, 6.
540
540 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Telan vs. Court of Appeals
denominated as Addendum. Apparently, changing their minds, on July
23, 1991, the private respondents filed their memorandum.
We rule for the petitioners. We hold that they had not been accorded
due process of law because they lost their right to appeal when they
were deprived of the right to counsel.
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws.
The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal
cases,19specially so when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is
subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a
member of the bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave
denial of due process. Thus, even if the judgment had become final and
executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the
opportunity to be heard by himself and
_______________
19 CONST., art. III, states:
"Sec. 12(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent
and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel."
"Sec. 14(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy trial, to meet the witnesses
face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance
of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However,
after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable."
541
VOL. 202, OCTOBER 4, 1991 541
Telan vs. Court of Appeals
connsel.20
117
There is no reason why the rule in criminal cases has to be different
from that in civil cases. The preeminent right to due process of law
applies not only to life and liberty but also to property. There can be no
fair hearing unless a party, who 18 in danger of losing his house in
which he and his family live and in which he has established a modest
means of livelihood, is given the right to be heard by himself and
counsel.
Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure.
To demand as much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle
intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into an
intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his
property rights not because he has no right to the property but because
he does not know how to establish such right.
The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times, More
so, in the case of an on-going litigation, it is a right that must be
exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer faithfully keeping
his client company.
No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the
position that the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that
thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.
This is the reason why under ordinary circumstances, a lawyer can not
simply refuse anyone the counsel that only the exercise of his office can
impart.21
Curiously, the counsel of the private respondents, ROBERTO TELAN
and spouses VICENTE and VIRGINIA, would still
_______________
20 People v. Holgado, 85 Phil. 752, 756-757 (1950) Flores v. Ruiz, No. L-
35707, May 31, 1979, 90 SCRA 432-433; and Delgado v. Court of
Appeals, Nov. 10, 1986, 145 SCRA 360.
21 THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 14 states:
xxx xxx xxx
"Rule 14.01—A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on
account of the latter's sex, race, creed or status of life, or because of his
own opinion regarding the guilt of said person.
xxx xxx xxx
542
542 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Telan vs. Court of Appeals
insist that the petitioners, spouses PEDRO and ANGELINA TELAN, had
lost their right to appeal because of the negligence of their counsel,
referring to "Atty. Palma."
A client is generally bound by the action of his counsel in the
management of a litigation even by the attorney's mistake or
negligence in procedural technique.22 But how can there be negligence
by the counsel in the case at bar when the "lawyer", "Atty. Palma,"
turned out to be fake? The Affidavit of the petitioner PEDRO TELAN, the
sworn Petition, the Certifications of the Bar Confidant's Office and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the submitted records of Criminal
Case No. 389-90 more than sufficiently establish the existence of an
Ernesto Palma who misrepresented himself as a lawyer.23
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the proceedings in CA-G.R. CV
No. 20786 are hereby REINSTATED and the respondent Court of
Appeals is ordered to give DUE COURSE to the appeal and to decide the
same on the merits.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
Note.—The petitioners cannot claim that they are being deprived of
their property without due process of law they had all the opportunity
to raise the question they are now raising, before the decision becomes
final and executory. (Heirs of Remegio Tan vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 163 SCRA 752.)
118
 G.R. No. 103276. April 11, 1996.* penalized for the costly importunings of his lawyers.—Clearly, when
“transcendental matters” like life, liberty or State security are involved,
suspension of the rules is likely to be welcomed more generously.
DOMINGO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs. THE SANDIGANBAYAN
Petitioner’s present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to
(Second Division) and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
pesos and centavos. No less than his liberty is at stake here. And he is
respondents.
just about to lose it simply because his former lawyers pursued a
Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Supreme Court; Rules of Court; The
carelessly contrived procedural strategy of insisting on what has
power of the Supreme Court to suspend its own rules or to except a
already become an imprudent remedy, as aforediscussed, which thus
particular case from its operations whenever the purposes of justice
forbade petitioner from offering his evidence all the while available for
require it, cannot be questioned.—After carefully considering anew
presentation before the Sandiganbayan. Under the circumstances,
petitioner’s plight and keeping in mind that substantial rights must
higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner be not
ultimately reign supreme over technicalities, this Court is swayed to
penalized for the costly importunings of his previous lawyers based on
reconsider. The power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to
the same principles why this Court had, on many occasions where it
except a particular case from its operations whenever the purposes of
granted new trial, excused parties from the negligence or mistakes of
justice require it, cannot be questioned. In not a few instances, this
counsel. To cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone
Court ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds not mentioned
rather than rectify a serious injustice to petitioners whose only fault
in the statute, viz: retraction of witness, negligence or incompetency of
was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous
counsel, improvident plea of guilty, disqualification of an attorney de
lawyers. Consequently, the receipts and other documents constituting
oficio to represent the accused in trial court, and where a judgment was
his evidence which he failed to present in the Sandiganbayan are
rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both the prosecution
entitled to be appreciated, however, by that forum and not this Court,
and the defense. Similarly, in a considerable host of cases has this
for the general rule is that we are not triers of facts.
prerogative been invoked to relax even procedural rules of the most
Same; Same; Same; Same; The power of the Supreme Court to suspend or
mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the period to
even disregard the rules of procedure can be so pervasive and
appeal.
encompassing so as to alter even that which the Court itself has already
declared to be final.—Let us not forget that the rules of procedure
_______________
should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
* EN BANC.
technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial
172
justice, must always be avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this
172 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
liberality. This power to suspend or even disregard the rules can be so
De Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan pervasive and encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court
Same; Same; Same; Same; Clearly, when ”transcendental matters” like life, itself has already declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in
liberty or State security are involved, suspension of the rules is likely to be this case. And this is not without additional basis. For in ”Ronquillo v.
welcomed more generously, and under the circumstances of the instant Marasigan,” the Court held that: “The fact that the decision x x x has
case, higher interests of justice and equity demand that an accused be not

119
become final, does not preclude a modification or an alteration thereof
because even with the finality of
173
VOL. 256, APRIL 11, 1996 173
De Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan
judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or unjust, as in the
instant case, it may be modified or altered to harmonize the same with
justice and the facts.” (Emphasis supplied)
Same; Same; Same; Same; Courts in rendering real justice have always
been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by the norm that
when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against substantive
rights, and not the other way around.—The Rules of Court was
conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines in the dispensation
of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it, for
otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules,
shorn of judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering
real justice have always been, as they in fact ought to be,
conscientiously guided by the norm that when on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the
other way around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate
language of Justice Makalintal, ”should give way to the realities of the
situation.” And the grim reality petitioner will surely face, if we do not
compassionately bend backwards and flex technicalities in this instance,
is the disgrace and misery of incarceration for a crime which he might
not have committed after all. More so, considering that petitioner’s
record as public servant remained unscathed until his prosecution.
Indeed, “while guilt shall not escape, innocence should not suffer.”
OMNIBUS MOTION for leave to vacate first motion for reconsideration
and to set aside conviction.
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.
Zambrano, Gruba & Associates for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FRANCISCO, J.:
The Court in its June 16, 1994 En Banc Resolution1 denied with finality
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the Court’s April 12, 1994
Decision2 affirming his conviction by
________________
1 Rollo, p. 221.
2 Rollo, pp. 197-203.
174
174 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan
the Sandiganbayan3 of violation of Section 3(e) of the “Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act”4 for his alleged failure to account for
P200,000.00 received for certain official training programs of the
Department of Agriculture. Entry of judgment was ordered to be made
in due course.5 Six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum, to nine (9)
years and one (1) day as maximum in jail await petitioner.
As the Sandiganbayan and the Court saw it then, petitioner’s guilt was
duly established by 1) lone prosecution witness Josephine
Angeles’6 testimony that no such training programs were held at the
designated places,7 and 2) petitioner’s failure to present a single
receipt to support due disbursement of the P200,000.00, resulting from
his former lawyers’ insistence in filing a demurrer to evidence despite
prior leave for that purpose having been denied by the Sandiganbayan.
To avert his looming imprisonment and with full awareness that he has
nothing in our Rules of Court to rely on, petitioner takes a novel
recourse by filing the instant “Omnibus Motion For Leave to Vacate
First Motion For Reconsideration In The Light Of The Present
Developments And To Consider Evidence Presented Herein And To Set
Aside Conviction.”8 This was filed on petitioner’s behalf by a new
120
counsel, as shown by the “Entry of Appearance and Motion For Leave
To Submit Attached Omnibus Motion” filed on June 27, 19949 after
petitioner’s former lawyers withdrew their appearance.10
In this Omnibus Motion, petitioner, for the first time, seeks to be
relieved from what he considers as the serious and costly
_______________
3 Decision dated November 19, 1991, Annex “A,” Rollo, pp. 30-43.
4 R.A. 3019.
5 June 16, 1994 En Banc Resolution, p. 221, Rollo.
6 Training Officer and Chief of Bureau of Plant Industry from 1985 to
1986.
7 Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur and Baguio City.
8 Rollo, pp. 227-243.
9 Rollo, p. 225.
10 Rollo, p. 222.
175
VOL. 256, APRIL 11, 1996 175
De Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan
mistake of his former lawyers11 in demurring to the prosecution
evidence after court leave was denied, the effect of which deprived him
of presenting before the Sandiganbayan the pieces of documentary
evidence that would have completely belied the accusation against him.
Annexed to the Omnibus Motion are photocopies of the list of expenses
and receipts12 in support of the liquidation voucher (Exhibit “E”)
showing due disbursement of the P200,000.00 received for training
programs actually conducted—the original records of which are all
along kept in the Records Section of the Bureau of Plant Industry as per
letter of the Bureau Director Emiliano P. Gianzon13 and which are
readily available. Petitioner now appeals to the Court’s sense of justice
and equity that these documents be summoned and appreciated by the
Court itself or by the Sandiganbayan after remanding the case thereto,
if only to give him the final chance to prove his innocence.
When required by the Court to comment on the “Omnibus
Motion,”14 the Solicitor General, representing respondents, was
granted no less than eight (8) extensions to do so,15 the last one with
warning that no further extension will be given. None was filed. Instead,
the Solicitor General filed a ninth (9th) motion for extension which was
denied considering the warning contained in the eighth (8th)
extension.16 The tenth (10th) motion for extension was merely noted
by the Court.17 Thereafter, the Court in a Resolution dated August 15,
1995 required the Solicitor General’s Office to 1) SHOW CAUSE why it
should not be disciplinarily dealt with for its repeated failure to file
comment and 2) file its comment, both within
_______________
11 Attys. V.E. del Rosario and Eduardo R. Robles.
12 Annexes “B” to “GG,” pp. 245-276, Rollo.
13 Annex “A,” p. 244, Rollo.
14 En Banc Resolution dated July 5, 1994, p. 279, Rollo.
15 Resolutions of August 25, 1994, September 13, 1994, October 18,
1994, November 22, 1994, December 6, 1994, January 10, 1995,
January 24, 1995 and March 7, 1995.
16 Resolution of April 4, 1995.
17 Resolution of May 23, 1995.
176
176 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan
ten (10) days from notice. In compliance therewith, the Solicitor
General’s Office filed its Comment and Explanation. The Court accepted
such Explanation, noted the Comment filed and required petitioner to
file a Reply thereto within ten (10) days from notice in a Resolution
dated October 10, 1995. A Reply was thus filed by petitioner in due
time.
The Solicitor General’s Office advances the following arguments in its
Comment:
121
 . 1.Petitioner’s “Omnibus Motion” is violative of the
Court’s adopted policy on second motions for reconsideration
as expressed in a Resolution dated April 7, 1988 stating that:
“Where the Court has resolved to deny a motion for reconsideration
and decrees the denial to be final, no motion for leave to file second
motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.”
. 2.Petitioner is bound by the mistake of his former
lawyers, assuming that the latter indeed committed one.
. 3.Even granting the petitioner is not bound by his
former lawyer’s mistake, the documentary evidence petitioner
now attempts to present would nonetheless not cast at all a
reasonable doubt on his guilt for violation of Section 3 of R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, to warrant a reversal of his conviction
by the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner’s Reply, on the other hand, contains the following counter-
arguments:
. 1.The “Omnibus Motion” is not violative of the
prohibition on second motions for reconsideration since such
motion does not seek leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration but for leave to vacate the first Motion For
Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1994 and in its stead to admit
the “Omnibus Motion” containing the petitioner’s documentary
evidence and arguments. Thus, petitioner’s Motion to vacate
the first motion for reconsideration is but necessary to his
defense that he should be excused from the mistake of his
former lawyers.
. 2.Adherence to the general rule that the client is
bound by his counsel’s mistake is to deprive petitioner of his
liberty through a technicality.
177
VOL. 256, APRIL 11, 1996 177
De Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan
. 3.The pieces of evidence petitioner is now presenting
for appreciation either by this Court or the Sandiganbayan will,
contrary to the OSG’s claim, disprove his guilt of the charge
levelled against him.
After carefully considering anew petitioner’s plight and keeping in
mind that substantial rights must ultimately reign supreme over
technicalities, this Court is swayed to reconsider.
The power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operations whenever the purposes of justice
require it, cannot be questioned.18 In not a few instances, this Court
ordered a new trial in criminal cases on grounds not mentioned in the
statute, viz: retraction of witness,19 negligence or incompetency of
counsel,20 improvient plea of guilty,21 disqualification of an attorney
de oficio to represent the accused in trial court,22 and where a
judgment was rendered on a stipulation of facts entered into by both
the prosecution and the defense.23 Similarly, in a considerable host of
cases has this prerogative been invoked to relax even procedural rules
of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, such as the
period to appeal. Take for instance the relatively recent case of ”PNB, et
al. v. CA, et al.” 24 where the Court once again extended this liberality of
allowing an appeal filed beyond the reglementary 15-day period. It
should be noted that Mr. Justice Melo, while dissenting
therein,25 nonetheless made this crucial observation:
_______________
18 Ronquillo v. Marasigan, 5 SCRA 304; Piczon v. Court of Appeals, 190
SCRA 31.
19 People v. Oscar Castelo, et al., 111 Phil. 54.
122
20 U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74.
21 People v. Solacito, L-29209, August 25, 1969, 27 SCRA 1037; People
v. Mengote, et al., L-30343, July 25, 1975; People v. Vicente del
Rosario, L-33270, November 28, 1975.
22 U.S. v. Laranja, 21 Phil. 500.
23 U.S. v. Pobre, 11 Phil. 51.
24 G.R. No. 108870, July 14, 1995, granting therein petitioner’s Motion
For Reconsideration.
25 Joined by Justices Puno and Kapunan.
178
178 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan
“The majority opinion, with due respect would suspend the rule—
actually the law—for what it says are ‘petitioners’ detailed
demonstration of the merits of the appeal’ without, however, delving on
such so-called ‘merits.’ The simple merits of one’s case, lost through
neglect, to my mind should not automatically call for the suspension of
applicable rules, laws, or jurisprudence. At the very least, before this
may be done, transcendental matters, surely, life, liberty, or the security of
the State, should be at risk, but obviously, not simple matters which can
be reduced to pesos and centavos.” (Italics supplied)
Clearly, when “transcendental matters” like life, liberty or State security
are involved, suspension of the rules is likely to be welcomed more
generously.
Petitioner’s present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to
pesos and centavos. No less than his liberty is at stake here. And he is
just about to lose it simply because his former lawyers pursued a
carelessly contrived procedural strategy of insisting on what has
already become an imprudent remedy, as aforediscussed, which thus
forbade petitioner from offering his evidence all the while available for
presentation before the Sandiganbayan. Under the circumstances,
higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner be not
penalized for the costly importunings of his previous lawyers based on
the same principles why this Court had, on many occasions where it
granted new trial, excused parties from the negligence or mistakes of
counsel.26 To cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone
rather than rectify a serious injustice to petitioners whose only fault
was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous
lawyers. Consequently, the receipts and other documents constituting
his evidence which he failed to present in the Sandiganbayan are
entitled to be appreciated, however, by that forum and not this Court,
for the general rule is that we are not triers of facts. Without prejudging
the result of such appreciation, petitioner’s documentary
evidences prima facie appear strong when reckoned with the lone
prosecution
_______________
26 U.S. v. Gimenez, ibid.
179
VOL. 256, APRIL 11, 1996 179
De Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan
witness Angeles’ testimony, indicating that official training programs
were indeed actually conducted and that the P200,000.00 cash advance
he received were spent entirely for those programs. In this connection,
the Court in ”US v. Dungca,”27 had occasion to state that:
“x x x, the rigor of the rule might in an exceptional case be relaxed, this
would be done only under very exceptional circumstances, and in cases
where a review of the whole record taken together with the evidence
improvidently omitted would clearly justify the conclusion that the
omission had resulted in the conviction of one innocent of the crime
charged.” (Italics supplied)
Let us not forget that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere
tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and
rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
avoided. Even the Rules of Court envision this liberality.28 This power
to suspend or even disregard the rules can be so pervasive and
123
encompassing so as to alter even that which this Court itself has
already declared to be final, as we are now compelled to do in this case.
And this is not without additional basis. For in ”Ronquillo v.
Marasigan,”29 the Court held that:
“The fact that the decision x x x has become final, does not preclude a
modification or an alteration thereof because even with the finality of
judgment, when its execution becomes impossible or unjust, as in the
instant case, it may be modified or altered to harmonize the same with
justice and the facts.” (Emphasis supplied)
The Rules of Court was conceived and promulgated to set forth
guidelines in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the
hand that dispenses it, for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or
robots of technical rules, shorn of
_______________
27 27 Phil. 274.
28 Aznar III v. Bernad, 161 SCRA 276; Piczon v. Court of Appeals, 190
SCRA 31.
29 5 SCRA 304.
180
180 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
De Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan
judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering real justice
have always been, as they in fact ought to be, conscientiously guided by
the norm that when on the balance, technicalities take a backseat
against substantive rights, and not the other way around. Truly then,
technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal, ”should
give way to the realities of the situation.”30 And the grim reality
petitioner will surely face, if we do not compassionately bend
backwards and flex technicalities in this instance, is the disgrace and
misery of incarceration for a crime which he might not have committed
after all. More so, considering that petitioner’s record as public servant
remained unscathed until his prosecution. Indeed, “while guilt shall not
escape, innocence should not suffer.”31
In resumé, this is a situation where a rigid application of rules of
procedure must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice to render
justice where justice is due—to secure to every individual all possible
legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged. To
borrow Justice Padilla’s words in ”People v. CA, et al.,” 32(where
substantial justice was upheld anew in allowing therein accused’s
appeal despite the withdrawal of his notice of appeal and his
subsequent escape from confinement) that ”if only to truly make the
courts really genuine instruments in the administration of justice,” the
Court believes it imperative, in order to assure against any possible
miscarriage of justice resulting from petitioner’s failure to present his
crucial evidence through no fault of his, that this case be remanded to
the Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner’s
evidence.
_______________
30 Urbayan v. Caltex, 5 SCRA 1016; Economic Insurance Co. v. Uy
Realty, 34 SCRA 749.
31 Suarez v. Platon, 69 Phil. 556 (quoting Justice Sutherland of the U.S.
Supreme Court, 69 U.S. Law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309).
32 G.R. No. 104709, March 7, 1995.
181
VOL. 256, APRIL 11, 1996 181
De Guzman vs. Sandiganbayan
WHEREFORE, petitioner’s “Omnibus Motion” is GRANTED and the
Court’s April 12, 1994 Decision and June 16, 1994 Resolution are
hereby RECONSIDERED. Accordingly, let this case be REMANDED to the
Sandiganbayan for reception and appreciation of petitioner’s evidence.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
124
 Narvasa (C.J.), Padilla, Regalado, Davide, G.R. No. 117873. December 22, 1997.*
Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Hermosisima,
Jr. and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MERCY
Vitug, J., I reiterate my dissent from the decision now being
SANTOS y ENTIENZA, accused-appellant.
reconsidered; accordingly, I vote for acquittal even now.
Criminal Law; Constitutional Law; Custodial Investigations; Extrajudicial
Torres, Jr., J., Took no part in the deliberations.
Confessions; A confession is not admissible in evidence unless the
Omnibus motion granted. Decision and resolution granted, case
prosecution satisfactorily shows that it was obtained within the limits
remanded to Sandiganbayan.
imposed by the 1987 Constitution.—A confession is not admissible in
Notes.—Liberality in procedural rules to be applied in proper cases
evidence unless the prosecution satisfactorily shows that it was
only. (Iliasco, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 228 SCRA 413 [1993])
obtained within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution. Section
Before procedural rules can be relaxed to give way to substantive
12, Article III thereof, provides: “(1) Any person under investigation for
justice, it is implicit that such liberality be applied in a proper case and
the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
that there be a prima facieshowing of a meritorious defense. (Mendoza
right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
vs. Civil Service Commission, 233 SCRA 657 [1994])
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s
except in writing and in the
substantive rights since, like all rules, they are required to be followed
except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they be relaxed.
_______________
(Gesmundo vs. JRB Realty Corporation, 234 SCRA 153 [1994])

* THIRD DIVISION.
444
444 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Santos
presence of counsel. x x x x x x x x x (3) Any confession or admission
obtained in violation of this or section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible
in evidence against him.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; If the extrajudicial confession satisfies the
constitutional standards, it is subsequently tested for voluntariness.—If
the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it is
subsequently tested for voluntariness, i.e., if it was given freely—
without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and
credibility, i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of
mankind.

125
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of a person under custodial
investigation to be informed of his rights entails an effective
communication that results in an understanding thereof—any effort
falling short of this standard is a denial of his right.—These questions
and the corresponding responses thereto are insufficient proof of
compliance with the constitutional requirements. They are terse and
perfunctory statements which do not evince a clear and sufficient effort
to inform and explain to appellant her constitutional rights, much less
satisfy the constitutional prerequisites. The right of a person under
custodial investigation to be informed of his rights entails an effective
communication that results in an understanding thereof. Any effort
falling short of this standard is a denial of this right.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Right to Counsel; The trial court errs in
admitting an extrajudicial confession without any showing that the
assisting counsel was indeed the “competent and independent counsel of
the accused’s own choosing.”—Thus, the trial court erred in admitting
appellant’s extrajudicial confession without showing that Atty. Gordon
Uy was indeed the “competent and independent counsel of appellant’s
own choosing.” The Court notes appellant’s insistent and persistent
disavowals of knowing said Atty. Uy, much less of retaining him as her
counsel of choice. The prosecution, for unexplained reasons, failed to
present Uy as a witness to show his role in the taking of the alleged
confession.
Same; Same; Same; Same; No presumption of constitutionality may be
accorded any extrajudicial confession until the prosecution convincingly
establishes the regularity of its taking and its compliance with the
Constitution.—No presumption of constitutionality
445
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997
People vs. Santos
may be accorded any extrajudicial confession until the prosecution
convincingly establishes the regularity of its taking and its compliance
with the Constitution. This is the price the prosecution has to pay
before it can be allowed to use such formidable evidence against the
accused. Therefore, the trial court had no basis for ruling that “Atty. Uy
rendered independent and competent assistance to her as her counsel
of choice during the investigation.” The extrajudicial confession must
be struck down as inadmissible in evidence for failure of the
prosecution to establish observance of appellant’s constitutional rights
during custodial investigation. Specifically, the prosecution failed to
show that appellant was, at that time, assisted by competent and
independent counsel preferably of her own choice.
Same; Evidence; Uncorroborated denial is a negative assertion that is
inferior to positive declarations.—These arguments do not persuade us.
They are mere denials which become sterile in comparison with the
firm and clear declarations of Bautista, who identified appellant as the
person who left Charmaine with her and who fetched the child days
after. The trial court correctly held that appellant’s uncorroborated
denial was a negative assertion that was inferior to the positive
declarations of the prosecution witnesses. Besides, there appears to be
no ill motive for Bautista and the victim to accuse appellant of such a
grave crime, if the same were not true. Thus, the trial court properly
lent credence to their testimony. All in all, this Court has not been given
sufficient reason to deviate from the time-honored rule that the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best
left to the discretion of the trial judge.
Same; Kidnapping; Elements of kidnapping under Article 267, par. 4 of
the Revised Penal Code.—The prosecution has established the elements
of kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code,
namely: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or
detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his or her
liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) the
445 person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public officer.
Same; Same; Same; The fact that the victim initially agreed to go with the
accused does not remove the element of deprivation of liberty where the
victim went with the former on false inducement, without which the
victim would not have done so.—The fact that the
446
126
446 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Santos
victim initially agreed to go with appellant does not remove the
element of deprivation of liberty because the victim went with her on
false inducement, without which the victim would not have done so.
Besides, the minor was distraught because her mother was late in
fetching her from school, and she did not know the way to her house. It
must have been a comfort to her that a grown-up who could bring her
home asked about her situation.
Same; Same; Same; Under Art. 267, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, it is
not the duration of deprivation of liberty which is important, but the fact
that the victim, a minor, was locked up.—The victim was actually
“locked up” inside what she referred to as the “big house.” Although her
detention there lasted only one night, the trial court held that the victim
was actually deprived of her liberty for five days, including the four-day
period when she was already in the custody of Bautista. It must be
stressed that appellant was charged and convicted under Article 267,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Under this provision, it is not
the duration of deprivation of liberty which is important, but the fact
that the victim, a minor, was locked up. Furthermore, it bears emphasis
that appellant did not merely take Charmaine to the “big house” against
her will; she in fact detained Charmaine and deprived her of her liberty.
Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Lockup” is included in the
broader term “detention,” which refers not only to the placing of a person
in an enclosure which he cannot leave, but also to any other deprivation
of liberty.—The Spanish version of Article 267 of the Revised Penal
Code uses the terms “lockup” (encerrar) rather than “kidnap”
(secuestrar or raptar). “Lockup” is included in the broader term
“detention,” which refers not only to the placing of a person in an
enclosure which he cannot leave, but also to any other deprivation of
liberty. To repeat, the prosecution clearly established “lockup” in this
case.
Same; Same; Damages; The grant of moral damages requires factual
basis.—The trial court awarded one hundred thousand pesos as moral
damages in favor of the victim and her parents. This is contrary to the
Court’s consistent holding that the agent of moral damages requires
factual basis. The records are bereft of any evidence that the victim and
her parents ever claimed moral damages, or that they were entitled to
such an award.
447
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997 447
People vs. Santos
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 96.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Even though the extrajudicial confession is excluded for having been
extracted in violation of the Constitution, the Court holds that appellant
may nonetheless be convicted on the basis of the remaining evidence
clearly showing her liability for kidnapping. The Court also reiterates
these rules: (1) the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies is best left to the discretion of the trial court; and (2) bare
denials cannot overturn the positive and straightforward testimonies of
witnesses who are not shown to have any ill motive in testifying against
the accused.
The Case
The foregoing summarizes the Court’s ruling on this appeal from the
Decision,1 dated October 3, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 96, in Criminal Case No. Q-93-42733, convicting Appellant
Mercy Santos y Entienza of kidnapping.
127
In the Information dated March 25, 1993 filed by Assistant Quezon City
Prosecutor Medardo H. Palomaria, appellant was charged as follows:2
“That on or about the 8th day of March, 1993, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating with
four (4) other persons whose true names, identities, whereabouts
_______________
1 Penned by Lucas P. Bersamin; rollo, pp. 11-23.
2 Rollo, p. 3.
448
448 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Santos
and other personal circumstance have not yet been ascertained and
mutually helping one another, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously kidnap one CHARMAINE MAMARIL, a female, a minor, 7
years of age, represented herein by her mother, RAQUEL MAMARIL,
from her school at Kaligayahan Elementary School located at Rivera
Compound, Barangay Kaligayahan, Novaliches, Quezon City, and
brought her to a house at No. 8 G. Araneta Avenue, Sto. Domingo,
Quezon City, on March 13, 1993, thereby illegally detaining her for five
(5) days, to her damage and prejudice.”
With the assistance of Atty. Noel Ocampo of the Public Attorney’s Office,
she pleaded “not guilty” to the charge during the arraignment.3 A pre-
trial conference was conducted on June 2, 1993, but no stipulation or
agreement was arrived at.4 After trial, the court a quo rendered the
assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:5
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
MERCY SANTOS yENTIENZA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION and
sentencing her to suffer reclusión perpetua; to indemnify the victim
CHARMAINE MAMARIL, her parents, and members of her family,
represented by her mother, RAQUEL MAMARIL, in the sum of Pesos:
One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00); and to pay the costs of suit.”
Hence, this appeal.6
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The trial court narrated the facts of this case as presented by the
prosecution:7
_______________
3 Records, p. 34.
4 Ibid., p. 38.
5 Rollo, p. 23.
6 Notice of appeal was filed on October 11, 1994. The case was deemed
submitted for resolution after the Court’s receipt of the brief for the
appellee on January 10, 1996.
7 Rollo, pp. 2-4.
449
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997 449
People vs. Santos
“Charmaine Mamaril, a kindergarten pupil, was brought to school, the
Kaligayahan Elementary School, in Novaliches, Quezon City by her
mother, Raquel Mamaril, at noontime on March 8, 1993. Raquel left
Charmaine in her classroom with her classmates but stayed awhile,
going home only after 12:30 p.m. She would be going back for
Charmaine, according to her daily routine, at 2:00 p.m. When she
returned to fetch Charmaine before 2:30 p.m., Charmaine’s teachers Ms.
Grace Lucena, met and asked her if the child had already reached home;
Raquel replied that Charmaine did not know the way home. She then
looked for her child in school until someone informed her that a woman
had earlier fetched her daughter. She immediately reported the matter
to the police authorities stationed in Novaliches at around 3:00 p.m.
and then to the National Bureau of Investigations the next day; she also
approached radio and television stations for help. She and her family
128
conducted their own search from then until her daughter was finally
found on March 13, 1993.
Raquel recounted how her child was recovered. According to her, a
police sergeant came to her house on March 13, 1993 and asked for her;
he told her to contact Kawagad Aida Bautista of Sto. Domingo. When
contacted, Baustista informed her that a child named Charmaine was
with her; Raquel immediately went to Bautista with some identification
papers of Charmaine, and the child was turned over to her after
showing the birth certificate. This occurred on a Saturday.
Although Charmaine’s kidnapper was not immediately caught, the
matter did not end with the return of Charmaine to her family’s bosom.
Two days later, on Monday, Bautista telephoned Raquel to tell her that
the woman, a certain Mercy Santos, had returned to her place to claim
Charmaine. Raquel wasted no time notifying NBI Agent Roel Jovenir,
who, in turn and with other NBI agents, accompanied by Raquel and
her husband, proceeded to Bautista’s place and arrested Santos.
Following the arrest of Santos, the kidnapping was investigated at the
NBI office, where Raquel gave her written statement.
Bautista recalled that she was at the store on No. 719 Quezon Avenue,
Quezon City on March 9, 1993 when, at around 2:00 p.m., a woman
approached and asked if she could leave her child with her; that she
told the woman to just leave the child ‘at the bench’ of the store; that
the woman then left the child there; that when it was already 7:00 p.m.
and the woman had not yet returned, she became
450
450 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Santos
worried for the child and reported the matter to the Barangay
Chairman who also reported it to Eagle Base, the base of the Barangay
officials; that on March 12, 1993, she read from a newspaper about a
child who was kidnapped in Novaliches; that she immediately called up
the Novaliches police sub-station to know more about the kidnapping;
that when the child’s mother later phoned her on March 13, 1993, she
required the caller to bring the birth certificate of the child for
identification, that later that day, the child was returned to her parents
in the presence of Barangay Chairman Jose Valdez, the reporter of
Pinoy and a barangay tanod; that on March 15, 1993, the woman who
had left the child returned for her; that she called up the child’s parents
to tell them about this; and that soon, three NBI agents, including one
named Roel, came with the parents of the child and, after talking to the
woman, arrested her.
The victim, Charmaine, aged 7 years, declared that Mercy Santos took
her; that she was seated and crying in school when Mercy waved for
her to draw near; that after she approached, Mercy promised to give
her a ‘surprise’ if she went with her to a big house where there were
many children; that she went with Mercy and was brought to a big
house with many children; that she and Mercy slept there; that Mercy
later brought her to the store owned by Ate Tina;and that Ate Tina later
brought her to a house where she saw her ‘daddy.’
Roel Jovenir was assigned as special investigator of the Anti-Fraud and
Action Division of the NBI from April 18, 1992 to June 1, 1993, whose
duties included the conduct of surveillance, making arrests, and
investigating and filing cases involving violations of laws, like the
Revised Penal Code. He testified that on March 9, 1993, Raquel Mamaril
filed her written complaint at the NBI offices against an unidentified
woman for allegedly kidnapping her daughter on March 8, 1993; that
although Raquel’s statement was taken only on March 15, 1993, the NBI
were already conducting their investigation and surveillance of the
kidnapping incident in the vicinity of Kaligayahan Elementary School
since the filing of the complaint; that on March 13, 1993, Raquel called
to tell him about the child being under the custody of Bautista; that he
and the child’s parents rushed to Bautista’s place and rescued the child;
that on March 15, 1993, Raquel again called up to inform him that the
suspected kidnapper had gone back to Bautista’s place to fetch the child;
that in the company of other NBI operatives, namely, Agents Arnel Azul,
SPO1 Rodrigo Mapoy, and Emeterio Armada, he proceeded to the
Bautista house and waited for the suspect to return;
451
129
 VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997
People vs. Santos
that they arrested the suspect upon her return and brought her to the
NBI; that the suspect was Mercy Santos; that Santos was investigated in
the presence of counsel, Atty. Gordon Uy, after she was informed of her
rights under the Constitution; that she executed and signed a statement,
on the occasion of which she admitted the kidnapping; that during the
investigation by question and answer, Atty. Uy would raise objections
by cautioning Santos against answering, in which case the objection
and the question objected to were not anymore typed in the statement;
and that photographs were taken of Charmaine and the accused during
the confrontation.”
Version of the Defense
Appearing as the lone witness for the defense, appellant denied the
prosecution’s allegations and insisted that her extrajudicial confession
was extracted in violation of her constitutional rights. The trial court
related her version of the facts, as follows:8
“The accused testified in her own behalf on November 24, 1993. She
stated that she was arrested by NBI Agent Jovenir on March 15, 1993 at
Araneta Avenue, Talayan Village, Quezon City, at the residence of Aida
Bautista; that she was at Bautista’s house because her friend named
Elsa had asked her to fetch Charmaine at that place; that she did not
know the surname of Elsa, but Elsa lived on Tops Street, Talayan; that
she had come with Elsa from Novaliches; that Elsa had left Charmaine
at Bautista’s place and later requested her to fetch the child; that Elsa
was a nightclub dancer whom she had known for two years; that she
was not the woman whom Bautista said had left Charmaine at the store;
that she was not able to confer with any Atty. Uy and she might have
merely signed the affidavit; that she did not know Atty. Uy; and that she
signed Exhibit C only because she was threatened by NBI Agent Rodrigo
Mapoy and was maltreated.”
451 Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court convicted appellant of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. It observed that appellant’s identifica-
_______________
8 Id., pp. 4-5.
452
452 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Santos
tion by the victim and by Witness Bautista was positive and
unassailable. Their testimonies were straightforward and unhesitating,
especially in their identification of the appellant as the kidnapper. The
evidence on appellant’s direct and personal participation in the crime
was “absolutely credible, trustworthy and sincere.”
The trial court rejected appellant’s explanation that she was merely
fetching the victim upon her friend’s request. It was incredible that her
friend would refuse to testify on her behalf, if this allegation were true,
considering the gravity of the charge leveled against her.
Besides, the trial court considered her extrajudicial confession more
than sufficient evidence of her guilt. Such confession was declared as
competent evidence against her, despite her denials of having given it
and her claims of duress and intimidation. Its voluntariness was
sufficiently proven, as it was given after she was apprised of her
constitutional rights with the assistance of her counsel of choice, a
certain Atty. Gordon Uy. Her subsequent retraction during the trial was
rejected as a flimsy machination to extricate herself from criminal
liability.
The Issues
The appellant assigns the following errors against the trial court:9
“I
130
The trial court gravely erred in giving full weight and credence to the
incredible, unworthy and unreliable testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses and in disregarding the theory of the defense.
II
The trial court gravely erred in not giving credence to the defense of
denial raised by the accused Mercy Santos.
_______________
9 Rollo, pp. 37-38.
453
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997
People vs. Santos
III
The trial court gravely erred in admitting in evidence the extrajudicial
confession of the accused despite the fact that it was elicited in
violation of the exclusionary rule on evidence.
IV
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant
despite failure of the prosecution to prove his (sic) guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.”
For clarity and convenience, the Court will tackle the issues in the
following order: (1) admissibility of the extrajudicial confession, (2)
credibility of witnesses and appellant’s denial, and (3) sufficiency of
evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court rejects the appeal. Although the extrajudicial confession is
inadmissible in evidence, there are, apart from said confession, other
credible and competent pieces of evidence to establish her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
First Issue: Extrajudicial Confession Inadmissible
A confession is not admissible in evidence unless the prosecution
satisfactorily shows that it was obtained within the limits imposed by
the 1987 Constitution. Section 12, Article III thereof, provides:
“(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
453 If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the
presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.”
454
454 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Santos
If the extrajudicial confession satisfies these constitutional standards, it
is subsequently tested for voluntariness,10 i.e., if it was given freely—
without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or false promises; and
credibility,11 i.e., if it was consistent with the normal experience of
mankind.
A confession that meets all the foregoing requisites constitutes
evidence of a high order because no person of normal mind will
knowingly and deliberately confess to be the perpetrator of a crime
unless prompted by truth and conscience.12 Otherwise, it is
disregarded in accordance with the cold objectivity of the exclusionary
rule. Consequently, the burden of evidence to show that it was obtained
through undue pressure, threat or intimidation shifts to the accused.13
131
As proof of alleged compliance with the constitutional standards, the
extrajudicial confession contains the following statements:
“01. TANONG : Bb. MERCY SANTOS Y ENTIENZA, ikaw ay
iimbesigahan namin sa pagkakasangkot mo sa kasong ‘kidnapping’,
bago kami magpatuloy sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay nais naming ipaalam
sa iyo ang iyong mga kara- patan sa ilalim ng ating Saligang Batas.
Ikaw ay may karapatang manahimik at di magpahayag ng anumang
salaysay kung nais mo, naiintindihan mo ba ito?
SAGOT: Opo sir.
02. T: Ikaw ay mayroon ding karapatan na kumuha at tulungan ng isang
abogado na pili mo upang umasiste sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito. Kung
hindi mo naman kayang bumayad ng serbisyo ng isang abogado ay
ikaw ay bibigyan namin ng isa na siyang tutulong sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat
na ito ng walang bayad, naiintindihan mo ba ito?
S: Opo sir.
_______________
10 People vs. Fabro, G.R. No. 95089, August 11, 1997, p. 14.
11 People vs. Pascual, 80 SCRA 1, 16, October 28, 1977.
12 U.S. vs. De los Santos, 24 Phil. 329, 358, February 5, 1913.
13 People vs. Saligan, 101 SCRA 264, 277, November 21, 1980.
455
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997 455
People vs. Santos
03. T: Ngayon, ikaw ba ay mayroong abogado na sarili mong pili para
tumulong sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito?
S: Opo sir, Nandito ang aking abogado si ATTY. GORDON UY na siyang
tutulong sa akin sa pagsisiyasat na ito.”14
These questions and the corresponding responses thereto are
insufficient proof of compliance with the constitutional requirements.
They are terse and perfunctory statements which do not evince a clear
and sufficient effort to inform and explain to appellant her
constitutional rights, much less satisfy the constitutional prerequisites.
The right of a person under custodial investigation to be informed of
his rights entails an effective communication that results in an
understanding thereof. Any effort falling short of this standard is a
denial of this right.15
Furthermore, in People vs. Deniega,16 the Court disbelieved the
typewritten statements in the extrajudicial confessions to the effect
that the accused was properly apprised of his constitutional rights, in
view of the glaring inconsistencies in said documents and the token
participation therein by the lawyers assigned to the accused. The Court
declared:17
“The desired role of counsel in the process of custodial investigation is
rendered meaningless if the lawyer merely gives perfunctory advice as
opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the person
undergoing questioning. If the advice given is so cursory as to be
useless, voluntariness is impaired. If the lawyer’s role is reduced to
being that of a mere witness to the signing of a pre-prepared document
albeit indicating therein compliance with the accused’s constitutional
rights, the constitutional standard guaranteed by Article III, Section
12(1) is not met. The process above-described fulfills the prophylactic
purpose of the constitutional provision by avoiding ‘the pernicious
practice of extorting false or coerced admis-
_______________
14 Records, pp. 76-77.
15 People vs. Binamira, G.R. No. 110397, August 14, 1997, pp. 14-15, per
Panganiban, J.
16 251 SCRA 626, 632-641, December 29, 1995, per Kapunan, J.
17 Ibid., pp. 638-639.
456
456 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Santos
132
sions or confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation for the commission of the offense’ and ensuring that the
accused’s waiver if his right to self incrimination during the
investigation is an informed one in all aspects.”
Thus, the trial court erred in admitting appellant’s extra-judicial
confession without showing that Atty. Gordon Uy was indeed the
“competent and independent counsel of appellant’s own choosing.” The
Court notes appellant’s insistent and persistent disavowals of knowing
said Atty. Uy, much less of retaining him as her counsel of choice. The
prosecution, for unexplained reasons, failed to present Uy as a witness
to show his role in the taking of the alleged confession.
In view of such default, the Court disagrees with this holding of the trial
court:
“The circumstances of the investigation, to begin with determine the
compliance with the ‘right to counsel’ provision. Where, as in the instant
case, the accused is shown to have accepted the representation and
assistance of the counsel during the investigation, he may not easily
subsequently retract acceptance and disavow counsel during the trial
on the flimsy excuse that counsel was not an acquaintance. x x x x
xxx xxx xxx
The accused need not expressly assent to the representation and
assistance of her counsel. Her acquiescence sufficed. x x x x
The accused should further be instructed that her failure to object to
the representation and assistance of Atty. Uy as her counsel has
precluded her from complaining. She could have easily objected at any
time but apparently did not. For her to assert now that she could not
have done so or that she was not enabled to do so is not credible, it
being shown satisfactorily in the records that she was far from
prevented during the investigation from doing so. x x x.”18(Emphases
found in the original.)
No presumption of constitutionality may be accorded any extrajudicial
confession until the prosecution convincingly
_______________
18 Decision, pp. 8-10, rollo, pp. 18-20.
457
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997 457
People vs. Santos
establishes the regularity of its taking and its compliance with the
Constitution. This is the price the prosecution has to pay before it can
be allowed to use such formidable evidence against the accused.
Therefore, the trial court had no basis for ruling that “Atty. Uy rendered
independent and competent assistance to her as her counsel of choice
during the investigation.” The extrajudicial confession must be struck
down as inadmissible in evidence for failure of the prosecution to
establish observance of appellant’s constitutional rights during
custodial investigation. Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that
appellant was, at that time, assisted by competent and independent
counsel preferably of her own choice.
Second Issue: Credibility of Witnesses vs. Denial
The Court is not persuaded by appellant’s posturing that Witness
Bautista’s testimony is unworthy of credence for being “of doubtful
veracity.” The defense insists that Bautista and appellant met for the
first time at the former’s house and harps on the fact that appellant,
who was not even informed of Bautista address, went to said house
only upon the request of appellant’s friend, Elsa. Further, the defense
brands as illogical appellant’s act of leaving her victim at the hands of a
third person, considering that the prosecution depicted her in the
extrajudicial confession as a seasoned kidnapper. Returning to
Bautista’s house to regain custody of the victim, which was practically
surrendering herself to the authorities, would have been the last thing a
seasoned kidnapper would do, appellant contends.
These arguments do not persuade us. They are mere denials which
become sterile in comparison with the firm and clear declarations of
Bautista, who identified appellant as the person who left Charmaine
with her and who fetched the child days after. The trial court correctly
held that appellant’s uncorroborated denial was a negative assertion
133
that was inferior to the positive declarations of the prosecution
witnesses. Besides, there appears to be no ill motive for Bautista and
the
458
458 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Santos
victim to accuse appellant of such a grave crime, if the same were not
true. Thus, the trial court properly lent credence to their
testimony.19 All in all, this Court has not been given sufficient reason to
deviate from the time-honored rule that the assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best left to the
discretion of the trial judge.20
Third Issue: Sufficient Evidence for Conviction
The prosecution has established the elements of kidnapping under
Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) the
offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in
any other manner deprives the latter of his or her liberty; (3) the act of
detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female or a public officer.21
The prosecution proved that appellant was not a public officer; that she
took the victim from the Kaligayahan Elementary School in Novaliches
without the knowledge and consent, and against the wishes, of her
parents; and that the victim was a minor, having been only seven years
old at the time.
The element of deprivation of liberty and the identity of her abductor
are clearly established in the victim’s testimony:22
_______________
19 People vs. Layno, 264 SCRA 558, 573, November 21, 1996; People vs.
Paule, 261 SCRA 649, 663, September 11, 1996; and People vs.
Laurente, 255 SCRA 543, 563-564, March 29, 1996.
20 People vs. Nell, G.R. No. 109660, July 1, 1997, pp. 10-11; People vs.
Dansal, G.R. No. 105002, July 17, 1997, pp. 10-11; People vs. Sumbillo,
supra, p. 14; People vs. Marollano, G.R. No. 105004, July 24, 1997, pp.
15-16; People vs. Ombrog, G.R. No. 104666, February 12, 1997, pp. 11-
12; and People vs. Cogonon, G.R. No. 94548, October 4, 1996, pp. 13-14.
21 Art. 267, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Villanueva, 253 SCRA 155,
159-160, February 1, 1996; People vs. Puno, 219 SCRA 85, 93-94,
February 17, 1993; People vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676, 728, December 6,
1995; and People vs. Cua, 232 SCRA 507, 516, May 25, 1994.
22 TSN, July 7, 1993, pp. 3-6.
459
VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997 459
People vs. Santos
“Q On March 8, 1993, can you recall if you went to school?
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you remember if there is anything that happened to you on that day?
A Yes, sir.
Q What was that which happened to you?
A She took me, sir.
Q When you said she took me, whom are you referring to?
A Mercy Santos, sir.
Q If Mercy Santos is in court, can you point her out?
A Yes, sir. (Witness pointing to a person seated on the second bench)
xxx xxx xxx
Pros. Bringas:
Now, Charmaine you stated awhile ago that Mercy Santos took you, how
was she able to get you, when Mercy Santos took you, how did she do it?
A I was left in a store to a certain Mrs. . .
xxx xxx xxx
Q From what place did Mercy get you?
A At the school sir.
Q How was she able to get you? I am withdrawing the question. Do you

134
 know Mercy previous to that day? “The crime committed is of the most serious nature, involving a
A Yes, sir. defenseless minor of seven years of age whom the accused enticed with
Q How did you know her? her promise of a gift. The accused thereby deprived the child of her
personal liberty and endangered her life. In addition, the child was
A When I met her at a big house I cried and a man whipped me with a piece
forcibly taken away from the midst of her family, causing to them,
of rope.
particularly her parents, much pain, anxiety, anger, and wounded
Q Before Mercy took you from your school, where was she?
feelings, in them. That the minor was subsequently saved from the
A This Mercy was standing while I was seated and crying.
clutches of the accused and of her cohorts did not diminish a bit the
Q Did Mercy call you? criminal and civil responsibility of the accused, for, even if the
A Yes, sir. deliverance of the victim was due to the overconfidence of the accused,
Q Why did she call you? her degree of criminality still evinced her high malevolence and abject
A She waved me over to go to her. disregard of the rights and safety of the child. x x x.”
Q Did you go to her? The victim was actually “locked up” inside what she referred to as the
A Yes, sir she told me there is a surprise for me. “big house.” Although her detention there lasted only one night, the
trial court held that the victim was actually deprived of her liberty for
Q Do you know the reason why there was a surprise for you?
five days, including the
460
460 SPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
_______________
People vs. Santos
A Yes, sir. 23 Rollo, p. 12.
Q What was the reason? 461
A She told me that she will bring me to a big house were [sic] there were VOL. 283, DECEMBER 22, 1997 461
many children. People vs. Santos
xxx xxx xxx four-day period when she was already in the custody of Bautista. It
Q After you went there, where else did you go, if any? must be stressed that appellant was charged and convicted under
A When I was brought to the big house, Mercy and I are and then I slept then Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Under this
after sleeping, I was brought to the store.” [sic] provision, it is not the duration of deprivation of liberty which is
The fact that the victim initially agreed to go with appellant does not important, but the fact that the victim, a minor, was locked up.
remove the element of deprivation of liberty because the victim went Furthermore, it bears emphasis that appellant did not merely take
with her on false inducement, without which the victim would not have Charmaine to the “big house” against her will; she in fact detained
done so. Besides, the minor was distraught because her mother was Charmaine and deprived her of her liberty. The Spanish version24 of
late in fetching her from school, and she did not know the way to her Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code uses the terms “lockup”
house. It must have been a comfort to her that a grown-up who could (encerrar) rather than “kidnap” (secuestrar or raptar). “Lockup” is
bring her home asked about her situation. As the trial court said:23 included in the broader term “detention,” which refers not only to the

135
placing of a person in an enclosure which he cannot leave, but also to
any other deprivation of liberty.25 To repeat, the prosecution clearly
established “lockup” in this case.

Damages
The trial court awarded one hundred thousand pesos as moral damages
in favor of the victim and her parents. This is contrary to the Court’s
consistent holding that the grant of moral damages requires factual
basis.26 The records are bereft of any evidence that the victim and her
parents ever claimed moral damages, or that they were entitled to such
an award.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED but the award
of moral damages is DELETED for want of evidence.

_______________

24 As the Revised Penal Code was originally approved and enacted in

Spanish, the Spanish text is controlling.
25 Aquino, The Revised Penal Code, 1988 ed., Vol. III, pp. 1-2, citing
Groizard and Cuello Calon.
26 Kierulf vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 99301, March 13, 1997, pp. 23-
24; People vs. Serzo, G.R. No. 118435, June 20, 1997, p. 22; People vs.
Zamora, G.R. No. 101829, August 21, 1997, p. 18; People vs. Sol,G.R. No.
118504, May 7, 1997, pp. 18-19.
462
462 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Philippine Deposit Insurance Corp. vs. Court of Appeals
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Romero, Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Assailed decision affirmed but award of moral damages deleted.
Note.—Award of damages set aside where no evidence was submitted
in the trial court in support of or against the claim for damages. (Padilla
vs. Rizal Surety & Insurance Co., 1 SCRA 245 [1961])

136
 G.R. No. 114385. January 29, 1998.* prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the
constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a
confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EFREN JEREZ,
burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. The
accused-appellant.
burden is on the accused to destroy this presumption. A confession is
Constitutional Law; Custodial Investigations; Extrajudicial
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a
Confessions; Fundamental requirements for a confession to be
result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or leniency.
admissible.—It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that for a confession to
Same; Same; Same; The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred
be admissible, it “must satisfy all four fundamental requirements: (1)
from its language such that if upon its face the confession exhibits no sign
the confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made
of suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it
with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the
being replete with details, which could possibly be supplied only by the
confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in writing.”
accused, reflecting spontaneity and coherence which psychologically
Appellant argued that the first and second requirements were not
cannot be associated with a mind to which violence and torture have
complied with. The records of the case, however, reveal otherwise.
been applied, it may be considered voluntary.—Although appellant
Same; Same; Same; Right to Counsel; A lawyer provided by the
thereafter claimed that the confession he gave was made under duress,
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised
there is, however, no evidence on record to support the same. In People
any objection against the former’s appointment during the course of the
v. Villanueva, this Court declared that “voluntariness of a confession
investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
may be inferred from its language such that if upon its face the
statement before the swearing officer.—While the initial choice of the
confession exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast
lawyer in cases where a person under custodial investigation cannot
doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details, which could
afford the services of a lawyer or (where the preferred lawyer
possibly be supplied only by the accused, reflecting spontaneity and
coherence which psychologically cannot be associated with a mind to
_______________
which violence and torture have been applied, it may be considered
voluntary.” A scrutiny of the sworn statement discloses in detail
* THIRD DIVISION.
relevant facts surrounding the commission of the offense charged
394
which the accused himself could only have known.
394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Criminal Law; Alibi; Where an accused’s alibi is established only by
People vs. Jerez himself, his relatives and friends, his denial of culpability should be
is unavailable as in the case at bar) is naturally lodged in the police accorded the strictest scrutiny—they are necessarily suspect and cannot
investigators, the accused has the final choice as he may reject the prevail over the testimonies of the more credible witnesses for the
counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by prosecution.—It is settled in this jurisdiction that “for alibi to
the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never 395
raised any objection against the former’s appointment during the VOL. 285, JANUARY 29, 1998 395
course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the People vs. Jerez
veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. Thus, “once the

137
prosper, it is not enough that the accused prove that he was somewhere
else when the crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he
could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or in its
immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.” Appellant testified
that on the day in question, he was engaged in a drinking spree with his
friends at the house of Felix Rellolosa at Talobatib, Labo, Camarines
Norte and he went home at 4:00 o’clock p.m. staying thereat for the rest
of the night. Unfortunately, this version of the appellant was
contradicted by prosecution witnesses, Julian Ochoa and Gil Villafranca,
who positively identified him in court as the person scouting for
carabao buyers in the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte at around
9:00 o’clock a.m. on May 23, 1990. Needless to say, where an accused’s
alibi is established only by himself, his relatives and friends, his denial
of culpability should be accorded the strictest scrutiny. They are
necessarily suspect and cannot prevail over the testimonies of the more
credible witnesses for the prosecution.
Same; Homicide; Damages; Life Expectancy Formula; The formula
consistently used by the Supreme Court in determining life expectancy is
(2/3 x [80 - age of the victim at the time of death]).—The computation,
however, of the damages awarded by the trial court for loss of earning
capacity fixing the same at P100,000.00 for each victim is erroneous.
“The formula consistently used by the Supreme Court in determining
life expectancy is (2/3 x [80 - age of the victim at the time of death]).”
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines
Norte, Branch 38.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Josefino A. Subia and Public Attorney’s Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
Appellant Efren Jerez, along with Joselito Quijan, Zaldy Victa and Efren
Bola (at large), were charged with the crime of robbery with double
homicide in Criminal Case No. 6755
396
396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Jerez
before the Regional Trial Court1 of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 38,
under an information2 dated October 15, which reads as follows:
“That on or about 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of May 23, 1990 within
the Basit Compound at barangay Sta. Rosa, municipality of Jose
Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named (accused) armed
with revolvers and bladed weapons conspiring, confederating together
and mutually helping with one another, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of violence
take from REYNALDO OCHOA and JOSELITO BALBASTRO the following
personal properties, to wit: cash money amounting to P45,000.00, two
(2) gold plated Seiko 5 wristwatch(es), one (1) golden Horseshoe type
ring and one (1) gold plated Ray-ban with the total value of P52,000.00,
Philippine Currency, belonging to said Reynaldo Ochoa and Joselito
Balbastro; that on the occasion of said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling the said accused to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid
articles, the herein accused in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with deliberate intent to
kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of
their superior number and strength, assault, attack and stab said
Reynaldo Ochoa and Joselito Balbastro, thereby inflicting upon them
multiple mortal wounds on the different parts of their bodies, and as a
result thereof, the said Reynaldo Ochoa and Joselito Balbastro died
instantly, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victims.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty.
A concise narration of the factual circumstances that led to appellant’s
conviction follows:
138
On May 23, 1990, while waiting for passengers near Josie’s Restaurant
in the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte, tricycle driver Gil
Villafranca was approached by a person, later identified as appellant,
informing him that he was
_______________
1 Penned by Judge Sancho Dames II.
2 Rollo, p. 15.
397
VOL. 285, JANUARY 29, 1998
People vs. Jerez
looking for a carabao buyer.3 Subsequently, Villafranca accompanied
the latter to the house of one Reynaldo Ochoa. When apprised of the
purpose of the visit, Julian, the son of Reynaldo, sought his father near
Kathleen Pawnshop and advised him about the four carabaos allegedly
for sale at Barangay Teddy, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.4
Appellant, together with Reynaldo and another carabao buyer, Joselito
Balbastro, boarded a motorcycle and proceeded to Barangay Teddy to
check the condition of the carabaos. It was the last time, however, that
the two were seen alive. When the latter failed to return the following
day, a search, led by Julian, was conducted. In the course of their
inquiry, it was learned that the motorcycle owned by Reynaldo was in
the custody of the barangay captain of Teddy, Jose Panganiban who told
them that it was recovered from the Basit Compound. Forthwith, they
proceeded to the said compound and found Reynaldo and Joselito
lifeless, having sustained several mortally-inflicted stab wounds in
different parts of their bodies. The victims were divested of their
watches, rayban glasses, and a sum of money amounting to P37,000.00.
Police Major Roberto Rosales of the Camarines Norte Integrated
National Police testified that upon appellant’s arrest, the latter was
apprised of his constitutional rights. On June 25, 1990, in the presence
of Atty. Augusto Schneider, an investigation conducted by the police
ensued and statements therein were reduced to writing, signed and
sworn to before Jose Panganiban Municipal Mayor Arnie Arenal, who
likewise inquired whether or not appellant understood the
consequences of his confession.5
Appellant, on the other hand, proffered alibi as his defense and that the
extrajudicial confession was allegedly obtained through the use of
physical violence, coercion and intimidation.
_______________
3 TSN, December 20, 1990, p. 3.
397 4 TSN, December 20, 1990, p. 23.
5 TSN, July 10, 1991, p. 27.
398
398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Jerez
He contended that on the day the incident in question occurred, he was
with his common law wife, Mercedes Sarical, at the house of a certain
Felix Rellolosa from 9:00 o’clock a.m. to 4:00 o’clock p.m. drinking
liquor with some friends.6 He further tried to buttress his alibi by
declaring that no one saw him as a participant in the slaying nor was
any property of the victims recovered from him.
In a decision dated April 19, 1993, the trial court convicted appellant,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered and finding accused EFREN JEREZ
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with double
homicide, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify and/or reimburse the heirs of the
following:
To the Heirs of Reynaldo Ochoa
1. P 50,000.00 damage for death
2. 100,000.00 loss of earning capacity (estimated income x
life span)
3. 25,000.00 articles/money lost (P20,000.00, watch, oth
139
 ers) were not complied with. The records of the case, however, reveal
4. 50,000.00 burial and other expenses otherwise.
P225,000.00 It must be borne in mind that when appellant executed the extrajudicial
confession, it was done in the presence of his counsel, Atty. Schneider,
To the Heirs of Joselito Balbastro
and sworn to before Mayor Arenal. If indeed his confession were
1. P 50,000.00 damage for death
obtained as a result of coercion and intimidation by policemen at the
2. 100,000.00 loss of earning capacity (estimated income
police station, he could have informed the Mayor of the maltreatment
x life span) he suffered. Having failed to convince the authorities, the extrajudicial
3. 27,000.00 articles/money lost (P17,000.00, watch, confession voluntarily made by Jerez is admissible in evidence. “The
Ray-Ban) presumption, therefore, of spontaneity and voluntariness stands unless
4. 50,000.00 burial and other expenses the defense proves otherwise.”9
P227,000.00 Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it denied his right to
But for insufficiency of evidence, Joselito Quijan and Zaldy Victa are have an independent counsel of his own choice. The records show that
hereby acquitted. at the time the extrajudicial confession was executed, appellant
SO ORDERED.”7 disclosed to the police officers that his counsel of choice was Atty.
Freddie Venida but that the latter would not be available as he is due to
_______________ depart for Manila on the same day. Subsequently, Major Rosales
suggested that Atty. Schneider, supposedly the only lawyer available in
6 TSN, February 10, 1992, p. 78. Jose Panganiban, appear as the counsel of appellant during inves-
7 Rollo, pp. 63-64.
399 _______________
VOL. 285, JANUARY 29, 1998 399
8 People v. Calvo and Longcop, G.R. No. 91694, March 14, 1997.
People vs. Jerez
9 People v. Pamon, 217 SCRA 501 (1993).
Appellant assails the lower court for giving weight and credence to the
400
extrajudicial statement, stating that at the time of the taking thereof, he
400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
was assisted by an ineffectual counsel who could not safeguard his
constitutional rights and interests. People vs. Jerez
We affirm appellant’s conviction. tigation and the latter answered in the affirmative, as shown from the
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that for a confession to be excerpts of his extrajudicial confession, thus:
admissible, it “must satisfy all four fundamental requirements: (1) the “PASUBALI: Ginoong Jerez, ikaw ay kukunan namin ng malayang
confession must be voluntary; (2) the confession must be made with salaysay tungkol sa isang usapin na aming sinisiyasat. Subalit, bago ang
the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) the lahat, nais naming malaman mo na ikaw ay may mga karapatan susog
confession must be express; and (4) the confession must be in sa ating Saligang Batas. Ito ay ang mga sumusunod:
writing.”8Appellant argued that the first and second requirements

140
Una: Ikaw ay may karapatang tumangging magbigay ng salaysay o kaya
ay magbigay ng salaysay, sapagkat ang anumang sasabihin mo sa
pagtatanong na ito ay maaaring gamitin laban sa iyo sa harap ng
hukuman. Nauunawaan mo ito?
Sagot: Opo.
Ikalawa: Ikaw ay may karapatang ding kumuha ng isang manananggol
na sarili mong pili upang siyang maging gabay mo sa pagtatanong na ito.
Nauunawaan mo ito?
Sagot: Opo. Nais mo bang maging gabay mong manananggol ang
ating kaharap na manananggol na si Atty. Augusto B. Schneider?
Sagot: Opo.
Pangatlo: Nais din naming malaman mo at ng lahat na ikaw ay hindi
namin pinangangakuan, sinasaktan o tinatakot upang magbigay ng
iyong sariling salaysay, kundi, ito ay pawang katotohanang kusang loob
mong sasabihin at isasalaysay. Nauunawaan mo ito?
Sagot: Opo.
Tanong: Kung nauunawaan mong lahat itong mga pasubaling ito, ikaw
ba ay nakahanda ng magbigay ng iyong sariling malayang salaysay?
Sagot: Opo.”10
While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases where a person under
custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer or (where
the preferred lawyer is unavailable as in the case at bar) is naturally
lodged in the police investigators, the accused has the final choice as he
may reject the counsel
_______________
10 Exhibit “C,” Folder of Exhibits, pp. 7-10.
401
VOL. 285, JANUARY 29, 1998
People vs. Jerez
chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised
any objection against the former’s appointment during the course of
the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity
of his statement before the swearing officer.11Thus, “once the
prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the
constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a
confession is presumed to be voluntary and the declarant bears the
burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and untrue. The
burden is on the accused to destroy this presumption. A confession is
admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a
result of violence, intimidation, threat or promise of reward or
leniency.12
Although appellant thereafter claimed that the confession he gave was
made under duress, there is, however, no evidence on record to
support the same. In People v. Villanueva, this Court declared that
“voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such
that if upon its face the confession exhibits no sign of suspicious
circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its integrity, it being replete
with details, which could possibly be supplied only by the accused,
reflecting spontaneity and coherence which psychologically cannot be
associated with a mind to which violence and torture have been applied,
it may be considered voluntary.”13 A scrutiny of the sworn statement
discloses in detail relevant facts surrounding the commission of the
offense charged which the accused himself could only have known.
The Court, therefore, finds that appellant’s constitutional right to
counsel was not breached when he agreed to be represented by Atty.
Schneider.
Appellant likewise argued that the trial court should have admitted his
defense of alibi “considering that he was not
_______________
401
11 People v. Suarez, 267 SCRA 119 (1997).
12 Ibid.
13 266 SCRA 356 (1997), citing U.S. v. De los Santos, 24 Phil. 329.
402
141
402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 16 People v. Diaz, G.R. No. 110829, April 18, 1997.
People vs. Jerez 17 Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA
properly identified and physical evidence like properties, money, 230 (1996); People v. Cordero, 263 SCRA 122(1996).
fingerprints were not discovered by the arresting officers.”14 403
This contention is simply unavailing in the case at bar. It is settled in VOL. 285, JANUARY 29, 1998 403
this jurisdiction that “for alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the People vs. Jerez
accused prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was Thus, the award for loss of earning capacity for each victim shall be as
committed. He must demonstrate that he could not have been follows:
physically present at the place of the crime or in its immediate vicinity Joselito Balbastro
at the time of its commission.”15 Appellant testified that on the day in P36,000.00 —gross annual income (P3,000.00 x 12 mos.)
question, he was engaged in a drinking spree with his friends at the Multiply: 30 —life expectancy (2/3 x 45 [80 - 35 {age at
house of Felix Rellolosa at Talobatib, Labo, Camarines Norte and he
time of death}])
went home at 4:00 o’clock p.m. staying thereat for the rest of the night.
P1,080,000.00 —total loss of earning capacity
Unfortunately, this version of the appellant was contradicted by
Reynaldo Ochoa
prosecution witnesses, Julian Ochoa and Gil Villafranca, who positively
identified him in court as the person scouting for carabao buyers in the P36,000.00 —gross annual income (P3,000.00 x 12 mos.)
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte at around 9:00 o’clock a.m. on Multiply: 21 —life expectancy (2/3 x 31 [80 - 49 {age at
May 23, 1990. Needless to say, where an accused’s alibi is established time of death}])
only by himself, his relatives and friends, his denial of culpability P756,000.00 —total loss of earning capacity
should be accorded the strictest scrutiny. They are necessarily suspect WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is DISMISSED and the
and cannot prevail over the testimonies of the more credible witnesses decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant EFREN JEREZ
for the prosecution.16 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby
The Court is, therefore, convinced that appellant’s culpability of the AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant shall indemnify
offense charged was proved beyond reasonable doubt. Joselito Balbastro and Reynaldo Ochoa in the amount of P1,080,000.00
The computation, however, of the damages awarded by the trial court and P756,000.00, respectively, for losses of their respective earning
for loss of earning capacity fixing the same at P100,000.00 for each capacity. Costs against appellant.
victim is erroneous. “The formula consistently used by the Supreme SO ORDERED.
Court in determining life expectancy is (2/3 x [80 - age of the victim at Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
the time of death]).”17 Appeal dismissed; Appealed decision affirmed with modification.
Notes.—In laying down the principles of government and fundamental
_______________ liberties of the people, the Constitution did not govern the relationships
between individuals. (People vs. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565 [1995])
14 Rollo, p. 179. 404
15 People v. Sumaoy, 263 SCRA 460 (1996). 404 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

142
 People vs. De Guiang
The purpose of providing counsel to a person under custodial
investigtion is to curb the uncivilized practice of extracting confession
by coercion. (People vs. Paule, 261 SCRA 649 [1996])
The Court can only give credence to those supported by receipt and
which appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the
death, wake or burial of the victim. (People vs. Cordero, 263 SCRA
122 [1996])

143