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Pil - 190205 FT
Pil - 190205 FT
Pil - 190205 FT
DECISION
PUNO J.:
The petition at bar was filed by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. who
asserts his legal standing to file the suit as member of the Senate;
Congresswoman Loretta Ann Rosales, a member of the House of
Representatives and Chairperson of its Committee on Human Rights;
the Philippine Coalition for the Establishment of the International
Criminal Court which is composed of individuals and corporate
entities dedicated to the Philippine ratification of the Rome Statute; the
Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, a juridical entity with the
avowed purpose of promoting the cause of human rights and human
rights victims in the country; the Families of Victims of Involuntary
Disappearances, a juridical entity duly organized and existing pursuant
to Philippine Laws with the avowed purpose of promoting the cause of
families and victims of human rights violations in the country; Bianca
Hacintha Roque and Harrison Jacob Roque, aged two (2) and one (1),
respectively, at the time of filing of the instant petition, and suing under
the doctrine of inter-generational rights enunciated in the case
of Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr.;[9] and a group of fifth year working law
students from the University of the Philippines College of Law who
are suing as taxpayers.
We find that among the petitioners, only Senator Pimentel has the legal
standing to file the instant suit. The other petitioners maintain their
standing as advocates and defenders of human rights, and as citizens
of the country. They have not shown, however, that they have
sustained or will sustain a direct injury from the non-transmittal of the
signed text of the Rome Statute to the Senate. Their contention that
they will be deprived of their remedies for the protection and
enforcement of their rights does not persuade. The Rome Statute is
intended to complement national criminal laws and courts. Sufficient
remedies are available under our national laws to protect our citizens
against human rights violations and petitioners can always seek redress
for any abuse in our domestic courts.
The core issue in this petition for mandamus is whether the Executive
Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs have
a ministerial duty to transmit to the Senate the copy of the Rome
Statute signed by a member of the Philippine Mission to the United
Nations even without the signature of the President.
In filing this petition, the petitioners interpret Section 21, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution to mean that the power to ratify treaties
belongs to the Senate.
We disagree.
xxx
A. Executive Agreements.
B. Treaties.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
*
On official leave.
[1]
Article 1, Rome Statute.
[2]
Article 5, Rome Statute.
[3]
Annex B of Petition, Rollo, p. 101.
[4]
Article 25, Rome Statute.
[5]
Article 18, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reads:
Article 18
Obligation not to defeat the object and purpose of a treaty prior to its
entry into force
A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and
purpose of a treaty when:
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the
treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have
made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry
into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into force is not
unduly delayed.
[6]
Section 3, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[7]
Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 (1987).
[8]
Joya vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 225 SCRA 568
(1993).
[9]
224 SCRA 792 (1993).
[10]
Gonzales vs. Narvasa, 337 SCRA 733 (2000).
[11]
Del Mar vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 346 SCRA
485 (2000).
[12]
Cortes, The Philippine Presidency: A Study of Executive Power (1966), p.
187.
[13]
Cruz, Philippine Political Law (1996 Ed.), p. 223.
[14]
Cortes, supra note 12, p. 189.
[15]
Bayan vs. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 (2000).
[16]
Cruz, International Law (1998 Ed.), pp. 172-174.
[17]
Bayan vs. Zamora, supra note 15.
[18]
Salonga and Yap, Public International Law (5th Edition), p. 138.
[19]
Cruz, International Law, supra note 16, p.174.
[20]
Bayan vs. Zamora, supra note 15.
[21]
Cruz, International Law, supra note 16, p.174.
[22]
Salonga and Yap, supra note 18.
[23]
See Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil. 366 (1910).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
MORAN, C.J.:
Alleging that the United State is not a party in interest in the case
petitioner challenges the personality of attorneys Hussey and Port as
prosecutors. It is of common knowledge that the United State and its
people have been equally if not more greatly aggrieved by the crimes
with which petitioner stands charged before the Military Commission. It
can be considered a privilege for our Republic that a leader nation
should submit the vindication of the honor of its citizens and its
government to a military tribunal of our country.
For all the foregoing the petition is denied with costs de oficio.
Paras, Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor and Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
The charges against petitioner has been filed since June 26, 1948 in the
name of the people of the Philippines as accusers.
The National War Crimes Office shall maintain direct liaison with
the Legal Section General Headquarters, Supreme Commander
for the Allied power and shall exchange with the said Office
information and evidence of war crimes.
The following rules and regulation shall govern the trial off person
accused as war criminals:
II. JURISDICTION
(2) To prepare cases for trial and to conduct the prosecution before
the commission of all cases referred for trial.
(1) Confine each trial strictly to fair and expeditious hearing on the
issues raised by the charges, excluding irrelevant issues or
evidence and preventing any unnecessary delay or interference.
(4) Hold each session at such time and place as it shall determine,
or as may be directed by the convening authority.
(3) To testify in his own behalf and have his counsel present
relevant evidence at the trial in support of his defense, and cross-
examine each adverse witness who personally appears before the
commission.
(d) Evidence.
(1) The commission shall admit such evidence as in its opinion shall
be of assistance in proving or disproving the charge, or such as in
the commission's opinion would have probative value in the mind
of a reasonable man. The commission shall apply the rules of
evidence and pleading set forth herein with the greatest liberality to
achieve expeditious procedure. In particular, and without limiting in
any way the scope of the foregoing general rules, the following
evidence may be admitted:
(4) The official position of the accused shall not absolve him from
responsibility nor be considered in mitigation of punishment.
Further action pursuant to an order of the accused's superior, or of
his Government, shall not constitute a defense, but may be
considered in mitigation of punishment if the commission
determines that justice so requires.
(4) The witnesses and other evidence for the prosecution shall be
heard or presented. At the close of the case for the prosecution,
the commission may, on motion of the defense for a finding of not
guilty, consider and rule whether he evidence before the
commission may defer action on any such motion and permit or
require the prosecution to reopen its case and produce any further
available evidence.
(5) The defense may make an opening statement prior to
presenting its case. The presiding member may, at this any other
time require the defense to state what evidence it proposes to
submit to the commission where upon the commission may rule
upon the admissibility of such evidence.
(6) The witnesses and other evidence for the defense shall be
heard or presented. Thereafter, the prosecution and defense may
introduce such evidence in rebuttal as the commission may rule as
being admissible.
(7) The defense and thereafter the prosecution shall address the
commission.
Done in the City of Manila, this 29th day of July in the year of Our
Lord, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, and of the Independence
of the Philippines, the second.
MANUEL ROXAS
President of the Philippines
By the President:
EMILIO ABELLO
Chief of the Executive Office
EXECUTIVE LEGISLATION
The first question that is trust at our face spearheading a group of other
no less important question, is whether or not the President of the
Philippines may exercise the legislative power expressly vested in
Congress by the Constitution. .
The order provides that person accused as war criminals shall be tried
by military commissions. Whether such a provision is substantive or
adjective, it is clearly legislative in nature. It confers upon military
commissions jurisdiction to try all persons charge with war crimes. The
power to define and allocate jurisdiction for the prosecution of person
accused of any crime is exclusively vested by the Constitution in
Congress. .
Executive Order No. 68., is, therefore, null and void, because, though it
the President of the Philippines usurped power expressly vested by the
Constitution in Congress and in the Supreme Court.
SEC. 2. For the purpose of administering this Act and carrying out
its objective, the President may designate any officer, without
additional compensation, or any department, bureau, office, or
instrumentality of the National Government.
SEC. 3. The President of the Philippines report thereto all the rules
and regulation promulgated by him under the power herein
granted.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval and the rules
and regulations. promulgated hereunder shall be in force and effect
until the Congress of the Philippines shall otherwise provide.
The above Acts cannot validly be invoked, Executive Order No. 68 was
issued on July 29, 1947. Said Acts had elapsed upon the liberation of
the Philippines form the Japanese forces or, at the latest, when the
surrender of Japan was signed in Tokyo on September 2, 1945.
It has never been the purpose of the National Assembly to extend the
delegation beyond the emergency created by the war as to extend it
farther would be violative of the express provision of the Constitution.
We are of the opinion that there is no doubt on this question.; but if there
could still be any the same should be resolved in favor of the
presumption that the National Assembly did not intend to violate the
fundamental law.
For all the foregoing, conformably with our position in the Yamashita and
Homma cases, we vote to declare Executive Order No. 68 null and void
and to grant petition.