Pamintuan v.

Garcia
 The terms “natural,” “industrial” and “civil fruits” are highly technical, and are authoritatively
defined in Civil Code. There should be no question as to the meaning that should be given them
when they occur in a decree entered by the Court.

Pacific Farms, Inc. v. Esguerra

 Carried Lumber Company sold and delivered lumber and construction materials to Insular Farms,
which the latter used in the construction of six buildings at its compound in Bolinao, Pangasinan.
 The procurement price was P15, 000.00 and P4, 710.18 has not been paid by Insular Farms.
Carried Lumber then instituted a civil case. The sheriff then levied upon the six buildings.
 Pacific Farms filed a third party claim, asserting ownership over the levied buildings, which it had
acquired from Insular Farms by virtue of a deed of absolute sale executed about 7 months before
the Carried Lumber filed the civil action.
 Because of an indemnity bond put up by Carried Lumber, the sheriff proceeded with the public
auction, and sold the levied buildings to Carried Lumber.
 Pacific Farms filed a complaint against Carried Lumber, praying to declare as null and void the
levy and judicial sale of the six buildings.
 The lower court ruled that there was no gross negligence or bad faith on the part of the
defendants.
 Held: The Supreme Court applied by analogy the rules of accession under Article 447 because the
petitioner claims that it owns the six buildings constructed out of the lumber and construction
materials furnished by Carried Lumber.
 If the petitioner does own the six buildings, it must bear the obligation to pay for the value of the
materials. Carried Lumber has the right to recover the value of the unpaid lumber and
construction materials.
 Petitioner benefitted from the accession and therefore should shoulder the compensation due to
Carried Lumber as unpaid furnisher of materials.
 Is Pacific Farms an innocent purchaser for value and in good faith? NO. Antonio Araneta is not only
the president of Insular Farms, but also a director and counsel of Pacific Farms.
 Insular Farms and Pacific Farms were housed in adjacent rooms of the same building. It is
therefore reasonable to conclude that the petitioner knew about the unpaid balance of the
purchase price of the lumber and construction materials.
 Pacific Farms was in a better position to protect its interest. It knew that Insular Farms was a
mere lessee of the premises on which the buildings were located. This should have placed the
petitioner on guard and compelled it to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the construction
of the said buildings on the premises.

Community Cagayan, Inc. v. Nanol

 Spouses Arsenio and Angeles Nanol entered into a Contract to Sell with petitioner, whereby the
latter agreed to sell a house and two lots in Camella Homes Subdivision, CDO for P368, 000.00.
 The respondents did not avail of the petitioner’s in-house financing due to its high interest rates.
Instead, they obtained a loan from Capitol Development Bank, a sister company of petitioner,
using the property as collateral. However, the bank collapsed and closed before it could release
the loan.
 The respondents entered into another Contract to Sell with petitioner over the same property for
the same price. They availed the in-house financing, undertaking to pay the loan over four years
(1997-2001)
 In 2000, Arsenio demolished the house and constructed a three-storey house allegedly valued at
P3.5 million, more or less.
  In 2003, petitioner sent the respondents a notarized Notice of Delinquency and Cancellation of
Contract to Sell due to failure to pay the monthly amortizations. Petitioner then filed an unlawful
detainer case, which was later withdrawn and dismissed because the titles were already
registered under the names of the respondents.
 The RTC ordered the respondents to turnover the possession of the house and lot to the
petitioner, subject to the latter’s payment of their total monthly installments and the value of the
new house minus the cost of the original house.
 In its appeal to the Supreme Court, petitioner claims that there is no legal basis for the RTC to
require it to reimburse the respondents because the latter were in bad faith when they renovated
and improved the house, which was not yet their own.
 Issue: W/N petitioner is obliged to reimburse the respondents the value of the new house minus
the cost of the original house?
 Held: YES. The Court applied article 448 (presumption of good faith) because petitioner is deemed
to have waived all factual issues since it appealed the case directly to Supreme Court instead of to
the Court of Appeals.
 As a general rule, article 448 does not apply where there is a contractual relation between the
parties. However, since the parties failed to attach a copy of the Contact to Sell, the Court was
constrained to apply Article 448.
 Article 448 applies when the builder believes that he is the owner of the land or that by some title
he has the right to build thereon. This is not present in the case because of the Contract to Sell,
wherein ownership still remains with the petitioner. Nevertheless, Article 448 was applied even if
the builders do not have a claim of title over the property.
 Article 448 is applicable to the case because good faith is presumed on the part of the respondents,
the petitioner failed to rebut this presumption, and no evidence was presented to show that
petitioner opposed or objected to the improvements introduced by the respondents.
 Petitioner has two options under Article 448. Case remanded.

Heirs of Victorino Sarili v. Lagrosa

 Respondent, who is represented by his attorney-in-fact Lourdes Mojica, filed a complaint against
spouses Sarili and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, alleging that he is the owner of a certain
parcel of land (subject property – 55979) and has been paying real estate taxes therefor since its
acquisition.
 Respondent claims that he is a resident of California, USA, and that during in the Philippines; a
new certificate of title to the subject property (262218) was issued by virtue of a falsified Deed of
Absolute Sale in the name of Victorino Sarili and Isabel Amparo purportedly executed by him and
his wife.
 Spouses Sarili maintained that they purchased the property from Ramon Rodriguez, who
possessed and presented an SPA to sell/dispose of the property.
 Issue: W/N there is a valid conveyance?
 Held: NO. The SPA indicates flaws in its notarial acknowledgment, since the respondent’s
community tax certificate number was not indicated thereon. A higher degree of prudence is
required from one who buys from a person who is not the registered owner, although the land
object of the transaction is registered.
 Spouses failed to show that they conducted an investigation beyond the SPA and into the
circumstances of its execution. Since their claim over the subject property is based on forged
documents, no valid title had been transferred to them.
 The TCT in the name of Victorino and Isabel should be annulled, while the TCT in the name of the
respondent should be reinstated.
  Case is remanded to determine the rights and obligations of the parties with respect to the house
Spouses Sarili had built on the subject property in bad faith in accordance with Articles 449-452,
and the first paragraph of Article 546.

Mirallosa v. Carmel Development, Inc.

 Respondent was the registered owner of a Caloocan property known as the Pangarap Village. The
property has a total land area of 156 hectares, consisting of three parcels of land in the name of
Carmel Farms, Inc.
 In 1973, president Ferdinand Marcos issued PD 293, which invalidated the titles of the respondent
and declared them open for disposition to the members of the MHAI. On this basis, petitioner’s
predecessor-in-interest, Pelagio M. Juan, occupied Lot 32 and subsequently built houses there. On
the other hand, the respondent was constrained to allow the members of the MHAI to occupy the
rest of Pangarap Village.
 In 1988, SC promulgated Tuason v. Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, declaring PD 293 as
unconstitutional and void ab initio in all its parts
 The Register of Deeds then cancelled the Memorandum inscripted on respondent’s title,
eventually restoring its ownership of the entire property. The respondent then made several oral
demands on petitioner to vacate the premises, but to no avail.
 In 1995, petitioner took over Lot 32 by virtue of an Affidavit executed by Juan in his favor.
 The Court of Appeals ruled that the petitioner had no right to the continued possession of the
property and neither could he be considered a builder in good faith who could avail himself of the
benefits under Article 448 because from the moment PD 293 was declared unconstitutional and
the title to the property restored to the respondent, the petitioner could no longer claim good
faith.
 Issue: W/N the petitioner is a builder in good faith?
 Held: NO. Since petitioner only started occupying the property sometime in 1995, or about seven
years after the Tuason case was promulgated, he should have been aware of the binding effect of
the ruling. Therefore, he loses whatever he has built on the property, without right to indemnity,
in accordance with Article 449.

Macasaet v. Macasaet
 Lawful when they were invited by the parents. Unlawful when they were demanded to
vacate.
 Ismael and Teresita Macasaet, petitioners and Vicente and Rosario Macasaet, respondents. The
latter filed an ejectment suit against the former. Vicente and Rosario alleging that they were the
owners of two parcels of lands situated in Lipa City, and that by way of a verbal lease agreement,
Ismael and Teresita occupied the lots and used them as their residence and the site of their
construction business, and despite repeated demands, petitioners failed to pay the agreed rental
of P500.00 per week.
 Ismael and Teresita denied the existence of any verbal lease agreement, and claimed that
respondents had invited them to construct their residence and business on the subject lots in
order that they could all live near one another, and help in resolving family problems.
 Petitioners added that it was policy of the respondents to allot the land they owned as an advance
grant of inheritance in favor of their children.
 Petitioners also assert that the other lot was given as payment for construction materials used in
the renovation of respondents’ house.
 The CA ruled that Article 448 is inapplicable and that under Article 1678, petitioners had the right
to be reimbursed for one-half of the value of the improvements made.
 Issue: W/N Article 1678 or 447 shall apply?
  Held: Article 1678 does not apply because the petitioners’ possession of the two lots was not by
mere tolerance. (In invitation, there is a positive act on the part of the landowner)
 Article 447 is not applicable because it relates to the rules that apply when the owner of the
property uses the materials of another. It does not refer to the instance when a possessor builds
on the property of another.
 Article 448 does not apply when the interest is merely that of a holder, such as a mere tenant,
agent or usufructuary. However, the Court has used Article 448 by recognizing good faith beyond
the limited definition.
 Article 448 applies to the case because the respondents fully consented to the improvements
introduced by the petitioners. Because the children occupied the lots upon their invitation, the
parents certainly knew and approved of the construction of the improvements introduced
thereon. Petitioners may be deemed to have been in good faith when they built the structures on
the lots.
 The petitioners are entitled to indemnity to be paid by respondents under Article 448 and 546.
The respondents have the right to appropriate as their own the building and other improvements
on the subject lots, but only after refunding the expenses of petitioners, or paying the increase in
value acquired by the properties by reason thereof.
 REMANDED to determine matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448 in relation to
Article 546.

Sarmiento v. Agana
 While Ernesto Valentino was still courting Rebecca Lorenzo, the latter’s mother had told him the
couple could build a residential house on a lot in a subdivision in Parañaque (145 sqm)
 Ernesto constructed a residential house at a cost of P8, 000.00 to P10, 000.00. It was probably
assumed that Rebecca’s mother was the owner of the land.
 It turns out that the land had been titled in the name of Mr. and Mrs. Jose C. Santos, Jr., who then
sold the same to petitioner Leonila Sarmiento. Petitioner then asked Ernesto and his wife to
vacate. Three months later, she filed an ejectment suit against them.
 In the MTC, petitioner showed the price of the land to be P15, 000.00; Ernesto then testified that
the then cost of the residential house would be from P30, 000.00 to P40, 000.00.
 The MTC ruled that respondents are builders in good faith, and that the house had a value of P20,
000.00.
 CFI Pasay applied article 448 of the Civil Code. Petitioner was required, within 60 days, to exercise
the option to reimburse (P40, 000.00) or allow them to purchase the land (P25, 000.00)
 Sarmiento did not exercise any of the options. Ernesto was then allowed to deposit the sum of P25,
000.00 with the Court as the purchase price for the land.
 Held: Ernesto and his wife are builders in good faith, because as far as they knew, the land was
owned by Rebecca’s mother who, having stated they could build on the property, could reasonably
be expected to later on give them the land. Article 448 applies.
 The petitioner cannot refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the
owner of the building to remove it from the land where it is erected. She is entitled to such
remotion only when, after having chosen to sell her land, the other party fails to pay for the same.

Ignao v. IAC
 Petitioner Florencio Ignao and his uncles (Juan and Isidro -> private respondents) were co-owners
of a parcel of land in Tabon, Kawit, Cavite (534 sqm.)
 Pursuant to an action for partition filed by the petitioner, the CFI Cavite directed the partition of
the land (133.5 sqm to private respondents, 266.5 to Florencio.) No actual partition was effected.
  Petitioner filed a complaint for recovery of possession of real property, alleging that the two
houses built by private respondents exceeded the 133.5 sqm previously allotted to them by the
trial court.
 An ocular inspection conducted by the lower court found that Juan and Isidro actually encroached
upon a portion of the land belonging to Florencio. Juan occupied 42 sqm, while Isidro occupied 59
sqm.
 In its decision, the trial court considered private respondents as builders in good faith.
 6/8 -> Justo, then sold to Florencio, 1/8 each -> Juan and Isidro. Before the partition case was
promulgated, petitioner sold 134 sqm of his share.
 Petitioner contends that the court erred in applying article 448.
 W/N Article 448 shall apply to a builder in good faith on a property held in common?
 As a general rule, NO because a co-owner is not a third person, and the situation is governed by
the rules of co-ownership.
 BUT, when the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the home of
defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of the land pertaining to the petitioner which was
however made in good faith, then article 448 should apply.

Lopez, Inc. v. Philippine & Eastern Trading Co., Inc

 Respondent, as lessee, was occupying two doors with mezzanine of the Lopez building in Baguio
belonging to the petitioner. Was paying P160.00 monthly rental and the lease was from month to
month.
 During the bombing of Baguio City by the American Air Forces, the Lopez Building including the
two doors were burned and seriously damaged leaving only the concrete walls and framework.
 After the liberation, because the petitioner did not rehabilitate the building, the respondent
thought of rebuilding it.
 Macario Rebodos (VP of defendant company) went to Manila to confer with Atty. Eugenio Lopez
(President of plaintiff company) about the rehabilitation but failed to see him on three occasions.
Rebodos then left a letter for Lopez, which was never answered.
 Respondent proceeded to repair the two doors (P14, 583,45). The improvements were introduced
with the knowledge of the agent for the plaintiff.
 An agreement was then entered into between plaintiff and the respondent, whereby the latter
reoccupied the premises, paying a rental of P300 a month.
 In 1947, respondents failed to pay the monthly rentals (P2, 200.00). They are of the belief that it
had the right to be reimbursed in the sum of the value of the improvements introduced by it.
 Plaintiff brought an action of ejectment. Respondent was ordered to vacate the premises.
 The rule or principle, that a lessee may be considered a possessor in good faith and that
improvements introduced by him on the leased premises are to be regarded as made in good faith,
refers only to a party who occupies or possess property in the belief that he is the owner thereof
and said good faith ends only when he discovers a flaw in his title so as to reasonably advise or
inform him that after all he may not be the legal owner of said property.
 The principle cannot apply to a lessee because he knows that he is not the owner of the leased
property. He cannot deny the ownership or title of his lessor.
 Knowing that his occupation of the premises continues only during the life of the lease contract
and that he must vacate the property upon termination of the lease or upon the violation of its
terms, he introduces improvements on said property at his own risk in the sense that he cannot
recover their value from the lessor.
 The right to improvements are governed by articles 1573 and 487 of the old Civil Code.
Spouses Lacap v. Ong Lee
 Victor Facundo mortgaged two parcels of land and the improvements thereon to Monte de Piedad
Savings Bank. Petitioner spouses then assumed to pay the mortgage obligation to the bank.
 The mortgage was foreclosed due to the petitioner’s failure to pay. After the auction sale, the bank
allowed the petitioner spouses to stay in the premises as lessees. The petitioners introduced
improvements thereon allegedly amounting to P500, 000.00 after relying on the bank’s assurance
that the property would be sold back to them.
 When a representative went to the bank to pay monthly rental, the latter refused to accept
because the property had already been sold to the respondent.
 Petitioner -> cancellation of sale and damages; Respondent -> unlawful detainer.
 CA held that petitioners could not be builders in good faith inasmuch as their payment of rentals
to the banks was an indication that they were lessees.
 Issue: W/N the CA correctly applied article 1678 instead of article 448?
 Held: YES. Article 528 provides that possession in good faith continues to subsist until facts exist
which show that the possessor is already aware that he wrongfully possesses the thing.
Petitioners stopped being possessors in good faith when they started paying monthly rentals to
the Bank after the foreclosure of the property. (448 is not applicable because the spouses asked
permission to build on the property)
 Their supposed belief in good faith of their right of dominion ended when the bank foreclosed and
acquired title over the subject premises. Hence, the applicable provision in article 1678.
 The petitioners are entitled to be paid only ½ of the value of the useful improvements at the time
of the termination of the lease or to have the said improvements removed if the respondent
refuses to reimburse them.

Depra v. Dumlao
 Petitioner Francisco Depra is the owner of a parcel of land in Dumangas, Iloilo (8,870 sqm.)
Respondent Agustin Dumlao owns an adjoining lot (231 sqm.)
 When respondent built his house on his lot, the kitchen thereof had encroached on an area of 34
sqm of the petitioner’s property. The mother of the petitioner sent a demand letter to respondent,
asking the latter to move back from the encroachment, and then filed an unlawful detainer.
 MTC -> Respondent was a builder in good faith; article 448 applies. (Null and void; judgment in
an ejectment case is effective in respect of possession only. Overstepped its bounds when it
imposed upon the parties a situation of forced lease, which like forced co-ownership is not
favored in law.)
 MTC ordered a force lease between the parties (P5.00/month.) Neither party appealed, but
petitioner did not accept payment of rentals. Respondent deposited such rentals with MTC.
 Petitioner then filed a complaint for Quieting of Title against respondent. The RTC issued an Order
decreeing the 34-sqm subject of litigation is part and parcel of the land owned by the petitioner,
and is therefore entitled to the same.
 Issue: W/N the RTC Order is valid?
 Held: It is conceded in the Stipulation of Facts that the respondent is a builder in good faith.
Petitioner has the option to either pay for the encroaching part of the respondent’s kitchen, or to
sell the encroached lot to respondent. He cannot refuse to pay, and to sell the encroached part of
his land.
 It was error for the RTC to rule that petitioner is entitled to possession, without more, of the
disputed portion implying thereby that he is entitled to have the kitchen removed.
 He is entitled to such removal only when, after having chosen to sell the encroached land,
respondent fails to pay for the same. In this case, respondent expressed willingness to pay, but
petitioner refused to sell.
 Judgment of RTC is set aside. Case is REMANDED for further proceedings.
Department of Education v. Casibang
 In 1965, upon the request of then mayor Justo Cesar Caronan, Juan Cepeda allowed the
construction and operation of a school on the western portion of his property (7,532 sqm portion
of Lot 115.) The school is now known as Solana North Central School under the control and
supervision of the petitioner.
 After Cepeda’s death in 1983, respondents continued to tolerate the use and possession of the
property by the school.
 In 2000, respondents entered and occupied a portion of the property. The school officials
demanded them to vacate the property. Respondents refused and asserted Cepeda’s ownership.
 Petitioner then filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry and Damages in the MCTC. GRANTED
(respondents were directed to vacate the premises) and AFFIRMED by the RTC.
 Respondents then demanded petitioner to either: pay rent, purchase the area occupied, or vacate
the premises. Petitioner did not heed the demand.
 Respondents filed an action for Recovery of Possession and/or Sum of Money against petitioner.
They aver that since their late father did not have any immediate need of the land in 1965, he
consented to the building of the temporary structure and allowed the conduct of classes in the
premises. They further claim that they have been deprived of the use and the enjoyment of the
portion of the land occupied by the school. GRANTED. (Petitioner is builder in good faith.)
 Issue: W/N the petitioner owns the land?
 Held: NO. It is undisputed that the subject property is covered by an OCT registered in the name of
Juan Cepeda. A certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible and incontrovertible title to
the property in favor of the person whose name appears therein.
 As registered owners of the lots, the respondents have an imprescriptible right to eject any person
illegally occupying their property.
 Those who occupy the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, are necessarily bound by an implied promise that the occupants will vacate the
property upon demand.
 Petitioner is considered a builder in good faith, despite being a possessor by mere tolerance, since
Cepeda permitted the construction of building and improvements to conduct classes on his
property. Article 448 applies. Two options available to the respondents:
o They may appropriate the improvements, after payment of indemnity representing the
value of the improvements introduced and the necessary and useful expenses defrayed on
the subject lots; or
o They may oblige the petitioner to pay the price of the land.
 The first option is no longer feasible or convenient because it is now being used as school
premises. Hence, respondents are left with the second option. REMANDED to determine the value
of the subject property. Computation of the value of the property should be fixed at the prevailing
market value.
 Tolerated acts – acts of little disturbances, which a person, in the interest of neighborliness or
friendly relations, permits others to do on his property.

Villasi v. Garcia
 In 1990, petitioner Magdalena T. Villasi engaged the services of respondent Fil-Garcia
Construction, Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium building located at Aurora
Boulevard, Quezon City.
 For failure of the petitioner to fully pay the contract price despite several demands, respondent
initiated a suit for collection of sum of money before the RTC of Quezon City.
 Petitioner asserted that she delivered the total amount of P7, 490,325.10 to respondent but the
latter accomplished only 28% of the project.
  The RTC favored the respondent. It upheld the respondent’s claim to the unpaid amount of the
contract price (P3, 565,000.00)
 CA ruled that petitioner made an overpayment and thereby directed respondent to return the
amount that was paid in excess (P1, 244,543.33)
 The petitioner filed a Motion for Execution. The sheriff levied on a building located at Kalayaan
Avenue, Quezon City, and built in the lots registered under two TCTs. While the building was
declared for taxation purposes in the name of the respondent, the lots were registered in the
names of Filomeno and Ermelinda Halili-Garcia.
 Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a Motion to Set Aside Notice of Sale on
Execution, claiming that they are the lawful owners of the property, which was erroneously levied
upon by the sheriff.
 RTC directed the sheriff to hold in abeyance the conduct of the sale on execution. CA affirmed.
 Issue: W/N the CA erred in upholding the decision of the RTC on the basis of the respondents’
affidavit of third-party claim?
 Held: YES. Before the court can exercise its supervisory power to direct the release of the
property mistakenly levied and the restoration thereof to its rightful owner, the claimant must
first unmistakably establish his ownership or right of possession thereon.
 Spouses Garcia failed to prove that they have a bona fide title to the building. Aside from their
statement that as titleholders of the land, the law presumes them to be owners of the
improvements built thereon, they were unable to adduce credible evidence to prove their
ownership of the property.
 The building was declared for taxation purposes in the name of the respondent and not in the
Spouses Garcias’. The respondent is also in actual possession of the building and as the payment of
taxes coupled with actual possession of the land covered by tax declaration strongly supports a
claim of ownership.
 While it is a hornbook doctrine that the accessory follows the principal, such rule is not without
exception. In cases where there is a clear and convincing evidence to prove that the principal and
the accessory are not owned by one and the same person or entity, the presumption shall not be
applied and the actual ownership shall be upheld.

Aquino v. Aguilar
 Spouses Crispin and Teresa Aquino are the owners of a house and lot in Makati City. Since 1981,
spouses Eusebio and Josefina Aguilar have occupied the property. The respondents stayed on the
property with the consent and approval of petitioners, who were then residing in the US.
 While respondents were in possession of the property, the house previously constructed therein
was demolished and a three-storey building built in its place. Respondents occupied half of the
third floor for the next 20 years without payment of rental.
 In 2003, petitioners sent a letter to respondents, informing them that an immediate family
member needed to use the premises and demanding them to surrender the property within 10
days. Respondents failed to heed the demand.
 Petitioners then filed a complaint with the MeTC. Respondents claimed that they had contributed
to the improvement of the property and the construction of the building.
 Respondents alleged that they are co-owners of the building and builders in good faith and
claimed that they had the right to be compensated for the current value of their contribution.
 MeTC and RTC ruled that respondents cannot be considered builders in good faith on account of
their admission that the subject lot belonged to the petitioners. CA declared that respondents
should be reimbursed for the necessary and useful expenses pursuant to articles 1678 and 548.
 Issue: W/N the respondents are entitled to reimbursement?
 Article 1678 does not apply to those who possess property by mere tolerance of the owners,
without a contractual right. Moreover, the absence of good faith on their part prevents them from
invoking the provisions of article 1678.
 Held: NO. The respondents were evidently prohibited by petitioners from building improvements
on the land because the latter had every intention of selling it as it was only bought for investment
purposes. The petitioners have the right to appropriate what has been built on the property
without any obligation to pay indemnity therefor.
 Respondents have no right to a refund of any improvement built therein, pursuant to articles 449
and 450 (relate to article 451.)
 Pursuant to article 452, a builder in bad faith is entitled to reimbursement for necessary
expenses incurred for the preservation of the land, without the right of retention. REMANDED.

Heirs of Emiliano Navarro v. IAC

 Sinfroso Pascual filed an application for foreshore lease covering a tract of foreshore land in
Balanga, Bataan (17 hectares). DENIED.
 His predecessor-in-interest, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of
Fisheries covering 25 hectares of foreshore land also in Balanga, Bataan. Initially denied but
eventually GRANTED but only to the extent of 7 hectares of the property as may be certified by
the Bureau of Forestry as suitable for fishpond purposes.
 On the other hand, Pascual filed an application to register and confirm his title to a parcel of
land (146,611 sqm,) and claimed that this land is an accretion to his property in Barrio Puerto
Rivas. (Property is between Manila Bay and the property he is registering)
o Bounded on the eastern side by the Talisay River, on the western side by the Bulacan
River, and the northern side by the Manila Bay.
 Director of Lands, and Director of Forestry opposed, stating that the property is a portion of
the public domain and therefore belongs to the state. Director of Lands later withdrew his
opposition.
 An order of general default was issued, but was subsequently lifted upon motion of Navarro.
 Navarro also filed an opposition to Pascual’s application, claiming that:
o The land sought to be registered has always been part of the public domain, it being a
part of Manila Bay;
o He was a lessee and in possession of part of the subject property by virtue of a fishpond
permit; and
o He had already converted the area covered by the lease into a fishpond.
 Pascual then filed a complaint for ejectment against Navarro, alleging that the latter had built a
provisional dike on the property. DISMISSED.
 Respondent court ruled that the land is an accretion from the action of the Talisay and Bulacan
rivers, and ordered the issuance of the corresponding decree of registration in the name of
Pascual and the reversion to him of the possession of the portion of the subject property
included in Navarro’s fishpond permit.
 Issue: W/N the subject land is an accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers?
 Held: NO. The title of the petitioners’ own tract of land reveals its northeastern boundary to be
Manila Bay. Therefore, the land used to adjoin, border or front the Manila Bay and not any of
the two rivers. The petitioners’ own land lies between the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers; in front
of their land on the northern side lies now the disputed land.
 If the accretion were to be attributed to the action of either or both of the two rivers, the
alluvium should have been deposited on either or both of the eastern and western boundaries
of their own tract of land, not on the northern portion thereof, which is adjacent to Manila Bay.
 Thus, the third requisite of accretion is lacking. (The land where the accretion takes place is
adjacent to the bank of the river.)
 The petitioners’ own tract of land adjoins the Manila Bay, and therefore is an accretion on a sea
bank. The applicable law is article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
o “Lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of
the sea, form part of the public domain.”

Heirs of Francisco Narvasa v. Imbornal

 Basilia Imbornal had four children: Alejandra (children: Francisco Narvasa, Sr., Pedro Ferrer,)
Balbina (child: Petra Imbornal,) Catalina, and Pablo. The petitioners are heirs and successors-in-
interest of Francisco, Pedro, and Petra, while the respondents are the descendants of Pablo.
 Balibina owned a parcel of land in San Fabian, Pangasinan (4,144 sqm,) which she conveyed to her
three daughters. Catalina’s husband (Ciriaco) applied for and was granted a homestead patent
over a 31,367 sqm riparian land adjacent to the Cayanga River.
 Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portion of the land, while respondents
occupied the southern portion.
 First accretion -> 59,772 sqm adjoined the southern portion of the land. OCT was issued in the
name of Victoriano, husband of Esperanza Narvarte.
 Second accretion -> 32,307 sqm abutted the first accretion on its southern portion. OCT was
issued in the names of all the respondents.
 Petitioners filed an Amended Complaint for reconveyance, partition, and/or damages against
respondents. They allege that Ciriaco urged Balbina and Alejandra to sell the property, and thet
Ciriaco used the proceeds to fund his pending homestead patent application.
 Petitioners also allege that through deceit, fraud, falsehood, and misrepresentation, Victoriano
registered the first and second accretions in the names of the respondents, notwithstanding the
fact that they were not the riparian owners.
 The Court of Appeals held that Victoriano and his heirs do not need to be the owners of the land in
order to acquire them by acquisitive prescription. The respondents have acquired title to the
accretions by prescription considering that they have been in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the first accretion since 1949. They have also become the riparian owners of the
second accretion by virtue of an OCT in their names.
 Issue: W/N Ciriaco and his heirs are the owners of the land?
 Held: YES. Ciriaco and his heirs are the owners of the land. Petitioners failed to prove their
ownership rights, thus their cause of action with respect to the accretions must necessarily fail.
 Petitioners are not the riparian owners of the land to which the first accretion had attached.
Hence, they cannot assert ownership over the first and second accretion.

Republic v. Santos III

 Respondent applied for the registration of Lot 4998-B (1,045 sqm) in the Parañaque RTC. The
property was bounded in the northeast by the property of the respondent Arcadio Santos Jr, in the
southeast by the Parañaque River, in the southwest by an abandoned road, and in the northwest
by the property owned by Arcadio Ivan.
 Ivan amended his application to include Arcadio Jr. as his co-applicant because of the latter’s co-
ownership of the property. He alleged that the property had been formed through accretion.
 Parañaque City opposed the application, stating that it is needed for a flood control program; that
the property was within the legal easement of 20 meters from the riverbank; and that the
property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion.
 The RTC granted the application for land registration. AFFIRMED by the CA.
 Issue: W/N the subject property is an accretion to the adjoining land and therefore makes article
457 of the Civil Code applicable?
  Held: NO. The respondents’ evidence did not establish accretion, but instead the drying up of the
Parañaque River. They did not show that the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through
the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot 4998-B.
 It is highly improbable that the large volume of soil had been deposited in a gradual and
imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span of 20-30 years. The only plausible
explanation was that Lot 4998-B was the dried up bed of the Parañaque River. In accretion, the
water level did not recede and was more or less maintained.
 Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public
dominion of the State. It follows that the riverbeds that dry up continue to belong to the State as
its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried up
riverbeds should belong to some other person.

Galang v. Reyes
 Spouses Conrado and Fe Reyes filed a case for the annulment of OCT in the RTC against spouses
Crispin and Caridad Galang. They allege that they owned two properties: a subdivision project
(Ponderosa Heights Subdivision,) and an adjoining property covered by a TCT (1,201 sqm.)
 The properties were separated by the Marigman Creek, which dried up sometime in 1980 when it
changed its course and passed through Ponderosa. The Galangs, by employing manipulation and
fraud, were able to obtain a certificate of title over the dried up creek bed from the DENR.
 The Galangs denied that the land was part of a creek and countered that their OCT was issued to
them after they had complied with the free patent requirements of the DENR.
 The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC and held that the property was the former bed of Marigman
Creek, which changed its course and passed through the Ponderosa property. Hence, ownership of
the subject property is automatically vested to the respondents.
 Issue: W/N the petitioners own the property?
 Held: YES. Applying article 461, the respondents must prove three key elements by clear and
convincing evidence:
o The old course of the creek;
o The new course of the creek; and
o The change of course of the creek from the old to the new location by natural occurrence.
 The respondents failed to adduce indubitable evidence to prove all the key elements. It is not clear
whether or not the Marigman Creek dried up naturally back in 1980. They also did not submit any
findings or report regarding the nature of change in the course of the creek’s waters. The exact
location of the subject matter of dispute is also uncertain.

Jagualing v. Court of Appeals

 The parties dispute the ownership of a parcel of land in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental (16,452 sqm)
forming part of an island in a non-navigable river, with the following boundaries:
o North, South, and East – Tagoloan River;
o West – a portion belonging to Vicente Neri
 Private respondent Janita Eduave claims that she inherited the land from her father, together with
her co-heirs. She acquired sole ownership of the property by a virtue of a Deed of Extra Judicial
Partition with sale.
 The land had an area of 16,452 sqm, while in the tax declaration the area is only 4,937 sqm.
Private respondent reasoned out that she included the land that was under water. The land was
eroded sometime in November 1964 due to typhoon Ineng.
 In 1966, due to the movement of the river deposits on the land that was not eroded the area
increased to almost half a hectare. The private respondent then started to plant bananas.
Thereafter, the petitioners asked her permission to plant corn and bananas, provided that they
prevent squatters to come to the area.
  The trial court found that the island is a delta forming part of the river bed which the government
may use to reroute, redirect or control the course of the Tagoloan River. As such, it was outside the
commerce of man and part of the public domain.
o The trial court, however, recognized the validity of the petitioners’ possession and gave
them preferential rights to use the property.
 The respondent court, basing its ruling on articles 463 and 465 of the Civil Code, held that the
island was formed by the branching off of the Tagoloan River and subsequent thereto the
accumulation of alluvial deposits. REVERSED (declared private respondents as the lawful and true
owners of the land.)
 Issue: W/N articles 463 and 465 were correctly applied by the respondent court?
 Held: YES. The Supreme Court considered the circumstances tantamount to acts of ownership by
private respondents over the property:
o Payment of land taxes;
o The monuments placed by the land surveyor whose services were engaged by the private
respondent;
o The agreement entered into by private respondents and Tagaloan Aggregates to extract
gravel and sand, which agreement was duly registered with the Register of Deeds; and
o Testimony of two witnesses.
 The respondent court had sufficient basis for finding that the property of the private respondents
actually existed and was identified prior to the branching off or division of the river.
 Petitioners do not dispute that the land is an island that appears in a non-floatable and non-
navigable river; they anchor their claim on adverse possession for about 15 years. Private
respondents insist that the possession by the petitioners is in the concept of caretakers with the
permission of the former
 Between one who has actual possession of an island that forms in a non-navigable and non-
floatable river and the owner of the land along the margin nearest the island, article 465 applies. It
belongs to the owner of the land along the nearer margin.
 Because the island is longer than the property of the private respondents, they are deemed to be
the owners of that portion which corresponds to the length of their property along the margin of
the river.

De Guzman v. Tabangao Realty, Inc.

 In 1980, Serafin and Josefino de Guzman applied for, and were granted, authority to distribute oil
and lubricating products manufactured by Filipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (FSPC.) After
failing to pay for their credit purchases, FSPC filed a complaint for sum of money.
 RTC Manila rendered judgment ordering the two to pay their outstanding obligations to FSPC.
Since they did not appeal, the judgment became final and executory.
 FSPC levied upon a parcel of land located in Trece Martires, Cavite (74,415 sqm) covered by a TCT
in the name of Serafin and Amelia de Guzman. The property was sold at a public auction in favor of
the respondent, which gave the highest bid.
 In 2001, petitioners (children of de Guzman spouses) filed a complaint for quieting of title against
the respondent, alleging that they inherited the property by intestate succession and are the ones
in possession of the property.
 They also allege that the encumberances are apparently valid and subsisting but in fact and in law,
they are void and ineffective or otherwise had been terminated and extinguished or barred by
prescription, estoppel and laches.
o They allege that there was no sheriff’s sale conducted in 1983. Assuming that there was an
execution sale, the same was void for lack of the required notice and publication.
 The respondent argued that the petitioners did not have any existing right or interest over the
property as to entitle them to the relief prayed for in the complaint.
  The RTC ruled that proper steps had been undertaken for the Sheriff’s Sale. Respondent shall be
substituted to and acquires all the rights, title, interest and claim over the subject property.
 Issue: W/N RTC committed an error in dismissing the petitioners’ Complaint for Quieting of Title
on the ground of failure to state a cause of action?
 Held: NO. For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur:
o The plaintiff has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and
o The deed, claim, encumberance, or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
 The petitioners’ failed to allege these two requisites. They alleged that they were the children and
only heirs of the deceased spouses de Guzman and that the subject property was still registered in
the spouses’ names. However, these allegations are insufficient to establish petitioners’ title to the
subject property.
 FIRST REQUISITE: There is no allegation in the Complaint that Serafin and/or Josefino or their
successors-in-interest redeemed the subject property from the respondent within the one-year
redemption period (1989.) Upon expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redeemer
shall be substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to
the property as of the time of the levy.
 Upon the death of the de Guzman spouses in 1997 and 2001, they had no more rights, title,
interest, and claim to the subject property to pass on by succession to the petitioners.
 SECOND REQUISITE: The petitioners’ allegation that no actual execution sale was conducted on
June 30, 1983 or that the execution sale conducted on another date was void for not complying
with notice and publication requirements was purely based on a sentence in the Sheriff’s
Certificate of Sale, which implies that the levy and execution sale of the subject property both took
place on June 30, 1983.
 However, the annotations on the TCT show that it was only the Notice of Levy, which was
executed on June 30, 1983, while the Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale, was executed on February 4,
1988.

Heirs of Datu Dalandag Kuli v. Pia

 In 1940, TCT 1608 covering a parcel of land was issued in the respondent’s name. Although the
Register of Deeds could no longer produce a copy of the alleged Deed of Sale, it issued a
Certification that a Deed of Sale executed by Datu Kuli in favor of the respondent.
 On this basis, Datu Kuli’s OCT was cancelled, and TCT 1608 was issued.
 In 1948, the Register of Deeds administratively reconstituted the TCT, using a duplicate of the
respondent’s title as the source. Another Deed of Conveyance was supposedly executed by the
respondent in favor of Filomena Follosco.
 The respondent’s reconstituted title was cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the name of
Filomena. In 1954, the latter’s TCT was cancelled and another was issued in the name of Jose
Follosco, Sr.
 Claiming that they had always been in possession of the property and that Datu Kuli never sold the
property to any of the respondents, petitioners filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title with the RTC,
praying for the restoration of the OCT and the annulment of all the subsequently issued titles.
 The RTC and CA ruled in respondents’ favor, stating that there was a conveyance from Datu
Dalidig to the respondent.
 Issue: W/N the CA committed an error in upholding the validity of TCT 1608?
 Held: NO. The following requisites must concur, so that an action for quieting of title may prosper:
o The plaintiff has a legal or equitable title or interest in the real property subject of the
action; and
 o The deed, claim, encumberance, or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
 The petitioners failed to establish that they had a valid cause of action because they did not
succeed in proving that the respondent had failed to present a copy of the Deed of Sale with the
Register of Deed or that even if they did, it is invalid.
 Since petitioners failed to prove the invalidity of the TCT, it follows that they cannot now cast
doubt on the validity of the titles derived therefrom.

Mananquil v. Moico
 Lots 18 and 19 in Dagat-Dagatan, Navotas form part of the land previously expropriated by the
NHA and placed under its Tondo Dagat-Dagatan Foreshore Development Project, where
occupants, applicants or beneficiaries may purchase lots on installment basis.
 In 1984, Lot 18 was awarded to spouses Iluminardo and Prescilla Mananquil under a Conditional
Contract to Sell. Its occupant sold Lot 19 to Prescilla in 1980. Prescilla had a child by a previous
marriage in the name of Eulogio Francisco Maypa.
 In 1991, Iluminardo’s supposed heirs (his brothers and sisters and petitioners Dionisio and
Estanislao Mananquil), Laudencia Mananquil-Villamor, and Dianita Mananquil-Rabino, executed
an Extrajudicial Settlement Among Heirs and adjudicated ownership over Lots 18 and 19 in favor
of Dianita. They took possession of Lots 18 and 19 and leased them out to third parties.
 The Mananquil heirs discovered that in 1997, Eulogio and two others, on the ground that they are
the surviving heirs of Iluminardo and Prescilla, had executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
with Waver of Rights and Sale, and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the respondent, Roberto
Moico.
 The respondents began evicting the petitioners’ tenants and demolishing the structures they built
on Lots 18 and 19. The petitioners then instituted a civil case for quieting of title and injunctive
relief.
 The RTC issued a temporary restraining order, thus suspending the eviction and demolition.
 The CA reversed the RTC’s ruling, and noted that Lots 18 and 19 still belong to the NHA, in the
absence of proof that Iluminardo and Prescilla have completed installment payments thereon.
There is no right in respect to these properties that the Mananquils may succeed to. If this is the
case, then no suit for quieting of title could prosper for lack of legal or equitable title to or interest
in Lots 18 and 19.
 Issue: W/N the CA committed an error in construing articles 446 and 447?
 Held: NO. The issue relating to the grant of rights, title or award by the NHA determines whether
the case for quieting of title may be maintained.
 The petitioners failed to show their qualifications or right to succeed Iluminardo in his rights
under the NHS program/project. They did not call to the witness stand competent witnesses from
the NHA who can attest to their rights as successors to or beneficiaries of Lots 18 and 19.
 For this reason, their rights or interest in the property could not be established.

MBTC v. Alejo
 Spouses Raul and Cristina Acampado obtained loans from petitioner in the amounts of P5,
000,000.00 and P2, 000,000.00. As a security for the payment, the spouses executed in favor of
petitioner a Real Estate Mortgage and an Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage over a parcel of land
registered in their names.
 In 1996, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of the TCT was filed by respondent Sy Tan Se
against the spouses. Despite being the registered mortgagee of the real property covered by the
title sought to be annulled, petitioner was not made a party to the case.
 Extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property were initiated after the
spouses’ default in the payment of their loan. During the auction sale, the petitioner submitted the
highest and winning bid.
 Upon presentation to the Register of Deed of the Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership,
petitioner was informed of the existence of the RTC decision of the case filed by Sy Tan Se. The
petitioner then filed with the CA a Petition for Annulment of the RTC Decision.
 The petition was outrightly dismissed for being insufficient in form and substance. The petitioner
should have filed, instead, a petition for relief from judgment or an action for quieting of title.
 Issue: W/N an action for quieting of title is proper?
 Held: NO. An action for quieting of title is filed only when there is a cloud on title to real property
or any interest therein. The subject judgment cannot be considered as a cloud on petitioner’s title
or interest over the real property covered by the TCT, which does not even have a semblance of
being a title.
 The subject judgment cannot be considered a cloud that would warrant the filing of an action for
quieting of title, because to do so would require the court hearing the action to modify or interfere
with the judgment or order of another co-equal court.