Nelly Lim vs.

CA,
G.R. No. 91114. September 25, 1992

In order that the disqualification by reason of physician-patient privilege be successfully claimed,

the following requisites should concur: (1) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (2) the person
against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or
obstetrics; (3) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his
professional capacity; (4) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; (5)
the information was confidential and if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient.

Facts:
Juan filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with Nelly on the ground that the latter has
been allegedly suffering from a mental illness called schizophrenia "before, during and after the
marriage and until the present." During trial, Juan's counsel announced that he would present as
his next witness Dr. Lydia Acampado, a Doctor of Medicine who specializes in Psychiatry. Said
counsel forthwith orally applied for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum. Nelly's counsel
opposed the motion on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited from the witness is
privileged since the latter had examined Nelly in a professional capacity and had diagnosed her to
be suffering from schizophrenia. Juan's counsel contended, however, that Dr. Acampado would
be presented as an expert witness and would not testify on any information acquired while
attending to Nelly in a professional capacity. The trial court denied the motion and allowed the
witness to testify. Dr. Acampado thus took the witness stand, was qualified as an expert witness
and was asked hypothetical questions related to her field of expertise. She neither revealed the
illness she examined and treated Nelly for nor disclosed the results of her examination and the
medicines she had prescribed.

Issues:
1. Was the information given by the physician in her testimony in open court a privileged
communication?
2. Was there a waiver of the privilege?

Held:
1. No. The physician may be considered to be acting in his professional capacity when he
attends to the patient for curative, preventive, or palliative treatment. Thus, only disclosures
which would have been made to the physician to enable him "safely and efficaciously to treat
his patient" are covered by the privilege. It is to be emphasized that "it is the tenor only of
the communication that is privileged. The mere fact of making a communication, as well as
the date of a consultation and the number of consultations, are therefore not privileged from
disclosure, so long as the subject communicated is not stated." One who claims this privilege
must prove the presence of these aforementioned requisites.

Dr. Acampado was presented and qualified as an expert witness. She did not disclose
anything obtained in the course of her examination, interview and treatment of the
petitioner; moreover, the facts and conditions alleged in the hypothetical problem did not
refer to and had no bearing on whatever information or findings the doctor obtained while
attending to the patient. There is, as well, no showing that Dr. Acampado’s answers to the
questions propounded to her relating to the hypothetical problem were influenced by the
information obtained from the petitioner. Otherwise stated, her expert opinion excluded
 whatever information or knowledge she had about the petitioner which was acquired by
reason of the physician-patient relationship existing between them. As an expert witness,
her testimony before the trial court cannot then be excluded.

2. Yes. While it may be true that counsel for the petitioner opposed the oral request for the
issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to Dr. Acampado and filed a formal motion for the
quashal of the said subpoena a day before the witness was to testify, the petitioner makes
no claim in any of her pleadings that her counsel had objected to any question asked of the
witness on the ground that it elicited an answer that would violate the privilege, despite the
trial court’s advice that said counsel may interpose his objection to the testimony "once it
becomes apparent that the testimony, sought to be elicited is covered by the privileged
communication rule." The particular portions of the stenographic notes of the testimony of
Dr. Acampado quoted in the petitioner’s Petition and Memorandum, and in the private
respondent’s Memorandum, do not at all show that any objections were interposed. Even
granting ex gratia that the testimony of Dr. Acampado could be covered by the privilege, the
failure to seasonably object thereto amounted to a waiver thereof.

Krohn vs. CA
G.R. No. 108854, June 14, 1994

Where the person against whom the privilege is claimed is the patient’s husband who testifies on
a document executed by medical practitioners, his testimony does not have the force and effect of
the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the report. Plainly, this
does not fall within the prohibition.

Facts:
Edgar and Ma. Paz were married and they produced three children. Their relationship later
developed into a stormy one. Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to
ease the marital strain. The effort however proved futile.

Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report. He later filed a petition for
the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz and cited the said report. Ma. Paz denied the report
in her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant."

At the hearing, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the
rule on privileged communication between physician and patient.

Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation expressing her "continuing objection" to any
evidence, oral or documentary, "that would thwart the physician-patient privileged
communication rule." Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of the
confidential psychiatric report as evidence. The trial court issued an Order admitting the report.
Hence, Ma. Paz filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

She argued that since the rules prohibit a physician from testifying on matters which he may have
acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, "WITH MORE REASON should be third
person (like respondent-husband in this particular instance) be PROHIBITED from testifying on
privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report,
findings or evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his
confidential and privileged relation with a patient."

Edgar contends that the prohibition applies only to a physician and is not applicable to the case
at bar where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication is
the husband and not the physician of the petitioner.

Issue:
Is Ma. Paz correct?

Held:
No. Lim v. Court of Appeals clearly lays down the requisites in order that the privilege may be
successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in a civil case; (b) the person against whom the
privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such
person acquired the information while he was attending to the patient in his professional capacity;
(d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity; and, (e) the information
was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation of the patient.

In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to
practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify
on a document executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the
claimed prohibition. Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition
because his testimony cannot have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who
examined the patient and executed the report.

Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the
ground that it was privileged. He invoked the rule on privileged communications but never
questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For, in failing to object to the
testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make such objection and,
consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.

Gonzales v. CA
G.R. No. 117740, October 30, 1998

FACTS:
On 18 April 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa Abad and Cesar de Mesa
Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad. In
their petition, petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of their brother as he had allegedly
died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
Petitioners amended their petition by alleging that the real properties listed as belonging to the
decedent were actually only administered by him and that the true owner was their late mother,
Lucila de Mesa.

The trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the intestate estate of Ricardo
de Mesa Abad. Petitioners executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late mother
Lucila de Mesa in their favor.
On 07 July 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad Empaynado, and Marian
Abad Empaynado filed a motion to set aside proceedings. In their motion, they alleged that
Honoria Empaynado had been the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven (27) years
before his death, or from 1943 to 1971, and that during this period, their union had produced two
(2) children, Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado. They also disclosed the
existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo Abad with another woman,
Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the entire estate to the surviving children to the exclusion of
collateral relatives, they charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the existence of said
children in order to deprive the latter of their rights to the estate of Ricardo Abad.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the three (3) children were entitled to inherit

RULING:
Yes. Evidence presented by private respondents overwhelmingly proved that they are the
acknowledged natural children of Ricardo Abad. They were able to prove that he stated in his
individual income tax returns as his legitimate dependent children, Cecilia, Marian and Rosemarie
Abad. He insured his daughters on a 20-year endowment plan. He opened a trust fund account
for his daughters.

Finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo Abad, petitioners should
have been precluded from inheriting the estate of their brother on the basis of the following Civil
Code provisions:

Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the

illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.

Art. 1003. If there are no illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the

collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles

Petitioners contested the filiation of the children by submitting that the husband of Honoria
Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when Cecilia and Marian Abad were born. It was
undisputed that prior to her relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to
Jose Libunao. But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao died in 1943, petitioners
claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.

The evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died in 1971 was inconclusive.
The evidence presented was an enrolment form wherein there was failure to indicate that Jose
was “deceased”. Such proof did not necessarily prove that said parent was still living during the
time the form was being accomplished. The records of Loyola Memorial Park also showed that a
certain Jose Bautista Libunao was indeed buried there in 1971. Such person was different from
the husband whose full name was Jose Santos Libunao.
UNITED STATES v. NIXON
418 US 683, July 24, 1974

FACTS:
On March 1, 1974, a grand jury of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
returned an indictment charging seven named individuals. with various offenses, including
conspiracy to defraud the United States and to obstruct justice. Although he was not designated
as such in the indictment, the grand jury named the President, among others, as an unindicted
coconspirator. On April 18, 1974, upon motion of the Special Prosecutor, a subpoena duces tecum
was issued pursuant to Rule 17 (c) to the President by the United States District Court and made
returnable on May 2, 1974. The subpoena required the production of certain tapes, memoranda,
papers, transcripts, or other writings relating to certain precisely identified meetings between the
President and others.

On April 30, the President publicly released edited transcripts of 43 conversations; portions of 20
conversations subject to subpoena in the present case were included. On May 1, 1974, the
President's counsel filed a "special appearance" and a motion to quash the subpoena under Rule
17 (c). This motion was accompanied by a formal claim of privilege.

On May 20, 1974, the District Court denied the motion to quash and the motions to expunge and
for protective orders., it further ordered to deliver to the District Court, on or before May 31,
1974, the originals of all subpoenaed items, as well as an index and analysis of those items,
together with tape copies of those portions of the subpoenaed recordings for which transcripts
had been released to the public by the President on April 30. The District Court rejected
jurisdictional challenges based on a contention that the dispute was nonjusticiable because it was
between the Special Prosecutor and the Chief Executive and hence "intra-executive" in character.

The District Court held that the judiciary, not the President, was the final arbiter of a claim of
executive privilege. The court concluded that, under the circumstances of this case, the
presumptive privilege was overcome by the Special Prosecutor's prima facie "demonstration of
need sufficiently compelling to warrant judicial examination in chambers . . . ." On May 24, 1974,
the President filed a timely notice of appeal from the District Court order, and the certified record
from the District Court. On May 31, the petition was granted with an expedited briefing schedule.
On June 6, the President filed, under seal, a cross-petition for writ of certiorari before judgment.
This cross-petition was granted June 15, 1974, and the case was set for argument on July 8, 1974.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subpoena duces tecum is binding upon the President of the United States
based on the principles of executive privilege and separation of powers.

DECISION:
Yes, the subpoena is binding upon the President of the Unites States.
Decision: Affirmed.

I. JURISDICTION
The threshold question presented is whether the May 20, 1974, order of the District Court was an
appealable order and whether this case was properly "in" the Court of Appeals when the petition
for certiorari was filed in this Court. The jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals encompasses only
“final decisions of the district courts”. In applying this principle to an order denying a motion to
quash and requiring the production of evidence pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, it has been
reportedly held that the order is not final and hence not appealable.
This Court has, in an earlier case:
"consistently held that the necessity for expedition in the administration of the criminal law
justifies putting one who seeks to resist the production of desired information to a choice
between compliance with a trial court's order to produce prior to any review of that order, and
resistance to that order with the concomitant possibility of an adjudication of contempt if his
claims are rejected on appeal."

This would mean that a third party who has been issued a subpoena to produce documents would
basically have only 2 options: first, to comply with such order and second, to resist to the order
with the possibility of being held in contempt if the third party’s claims are rejected on appeal. In
the case at bar, the traditional contempt avenue to immediate appeal is peculiarly inappropriate
due to the unique setting of the case. These considerations lead us to conclude that the order of
the District Court was an appealable order.

II. JUSTICIABILITY
In the District Court, the President’s counsel argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to issue the
subpoena because the matter was an inter-branch dispute between a subordinate and superior
officer of the Executive branch. Since the Executive Branch has exclusive authority and absolute
discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case, it is contended that a President's decision is
final in determining what evidence is to be used in a given criminal case. Although his counsel
concedes that the President has delegated certain specific powers to the Special Prosecutor, he
has not "waived nor delegated to the Special Prosecutor the President's duty to claim privilege as
to all materials . . . which fall within the President's inherent authority to refuse to disclose to any
executive officer."

However, the mere assertion of a claim of an "intra-branch dispute," without more, has never
operated to defeat federal jurisdiction; justiciability does not depend on such a surface inquiry.
The issue is the production or nonproduction of specified evidence deemed by the Special
Prosecutor to be relevant and admissible in a pending criminal case. It is sought by one official of
the Executive Branch within the scope of his express authority; it is resisted by the Chief Executive
on the ground of his duty to preserve the confidentiality of the communications of the President.
Whatever the correct answer on the merits, these issues are "of a type which are traditionally
justiciable." In light of the uniqueness of the setting in which the conflict arises, the fact that both
parties are officers of the Executive Branch cannot be viewed as a barrier to justiciability.

III. RULE 17(c)

The subpoena duces tecum is challenged on the ground that the Special Prosecutor failed to
satisfy the requirements of Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 17 (c), which governs. the issuance of subpoenas
duces tecum in federal criminal proceedings. If we sustained this challenge, there would be no
occasion to reach the claim of privilege asserted with respect to the subpoenaed material.

Rule 17 (c) provides:

"A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers,
documents or other objects designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash
or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may direct
that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena be produced before the
court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time when they are to be offered in evidence and
may upon their production permit the books, papers, documents or objects or portions thereof
to be inspected by the parties and their attorneys."

A subpoena for documents may be quashed if their production would be "unreasonable or

oppressive," but not otherwise. This case recognized certain fundamental characteristics of the
subpoena duces tecum in criminal cases: (1) it was not intended to provide a means of discovery
for criminal cases of subpoenaed materials. Under this test, in order to require production prior
to trial, the moving party must show: (1) that the documents are evidentiary and relevant; (2) that
they are not otherwise procurable reasonably in advance of trial by exercise of due diligence; (3)
that the party cannot properly prepare for trial without such production and inspection in advance
of trial and that the failure to obtain such inspection may tend unreasonably to delay the trial;
and (4) that the application is made in good faith and is not intended as a general "fishing
expedition."

Our conclusion is based on the record before us, much of which is under seal. Of course, the
contents of the subpoenaed tapes could not at that stage be described fully by the Special
Prosecutor, but there was a sufficient likelihood that each of the tapes contains conversations
relevant to the offenses charged in the indictment. We also conclude there was a sufficient
preliminary showing that each of the subpoenaed tapes contains evidence admissible with
respect to the offenses charged in the indictment. The most cogent objection to the admissibility
of the taped conversations here at issue is that they are a collection of out-of-court statements
by declarants who will not be subject to cross-examination and that the statements are therefore
inadmissible hearsay. Here, however, most of the tapes apparently contain conversations to
which one or more of the defendants named in the indictment were party. The hearsay rule does
not automatically bar all out-of-court statements by a defendant in a criminal case. Declarations
by one defendant may also be admissible against other defendants upon a sufficient showing, by
independent evidence, of a conspiracy among one or more other defendants and the declarant
and if the declarations at issue were in furtherance of that conspiracy. The same is true of
declarations of coconspirators who are not defendants in the case on trial. Recorded
conversations may also be admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of any
defendant who testifies or any other coconspirator who testifies. Generally, the need for evidence
to impeach witnesses is insufficient to require its production in advance of trial. Here, however,
there are other valid potential evidentiary uses for the same material, and the analysis and
possible transcription of the tapes may take a significant period of time. Accordingly, we cannot
conclude that the District Court erred in authorizing the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum.

[w]e are persuaded that the District Court's denial of the President's motion to quash the
subpoena was consistent with Rule 17 (c). We also conclude that the Special Prosecutor has made
a sufficient showing to justify a subpoena for production before trial. The subpoenaed materials
are not available from any other source, and their examination and processing should not await
trial in the circumstances shown.

IV. THE CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE

A. The first contention is a broad claim that the separation of powers doctrine precludes judicial
review of a President's claim of privilege. The second contention is that if he does not prevail on
the claim of absolute privilege, the court should hold as a matter of constitutional law that the
privilege prevails over the subpoena duces tecum.
Our system of government "requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in
a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch." Powell v.
McCormack, supra, at 549. And in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S., at 211 , the Court stated:
"Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution to another
branch of government, or whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been
committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of
this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution."
We therefore reaffirm that it is the province and duty of this Court "to say what the law is" with
respect to the claim of privilege presented in this case.

B. In support of his claim of absolute privilege, the President's counsel urges two grounds, one of
which is common to all governments and one of which is peculiar to our system of separation of
powers. The first ground is the valid need for protection of communications between high
Government officials and those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold
duties. Whatever the nature of the privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in
the exercise of Art. II powers, the privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each
branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties. Certain powers and privileges flow
from the nature of enumerated powers.
The second ground asserted by the President's counsel in support of the claim of absolute
privilege rests on the doctrine of separation of powers. Here it is argued that the independence
of the Executive Branch within its own sphere, it insulates a President from a judicial subpoena in
an ongoing criminal prosecution, and thereby protects confidential Presidential communications.
Neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level
communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of
immunity from judicial process under all circumstances. When the privilege depends solely on the
broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a
confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to protect military, diplomatic, or
sensitive national security secrets, we find it difficult to accept the argument that even the very
important interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by
production of such material for in camera inspection with all the protection that a district court
will be obliged to provide.
To read the Art. II powers of the President as providing an absolute privilege as against a subpoena
essential to enforcement of criminal statutes on no more than a generalized claim of the public
interest in confidentiality of nonmilitary and nondiplomatic discussions would upset the
constitutional balance of "a workable government" and gravely impair the role of the courts under
Art. III.

C. In this case the President challenges a subpoena served on him as a third party requiring the
production of materials for use in a criminal prosecution; he does so on the claim that he has a
privilege against disclosure of confidential communications. He does not place his claim of
privilege on the ground they are military or diplomatic secrets. The presumptive privilege
[confidentiality of his conversations] must be considered with the historic commitment of the rule
of law, specifically the twofold aim that guilt shall not escape or innocence shall not suffer. The
Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him" and "to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor." Moreover, the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law.

In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of
Presidential communications in performance of the President's responsibilities against the
inroads of such a privilege on the fair administration of criminal justice. The President's broad
interest in confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number
of conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases.
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for
use in a criminal trial is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality. It cannot prevail
over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair administration of criminal justice.

D. We have earlier determined that the District Court did not err in authorizing the issuance of
the subpoena. If a President concludes that compliance with a subpoena would be injurious to
the public interest he may properly, as was done here, invoke a claim of privilege on the return of
the subpoena. Upon receiving a claim of privilege from the Chief Executive, it became the further
duty of the District Court to treat the subpoenaed material as presumptively privileged and to
require the Special Prosecutor to demonstrate that the Presidential material was "essential to the
justice of the [pending criminal] case."

E. Those issues now having been disposed of, the matter of implementation will rest with the
District Court. "[T]he guard, furnished to [the President] to protect him from being harassed by
vexatious and unnecessary subpoenas, is to be looked for in the conduct of a [district] court after
those subpoenas have issued; not in any circumstance which is to precede their being issued."
Statements that meet the test of admissibility and relevance must be isolated; all other material
must be excised. It is elementary that in camera inspection of evidence is always a procedure
calling for scrupulous protection against any release or publication of material not found by the
court, at that stage, probably admissible in evidence and relevant to the issues of the trial for
which it is sought.

It is therefore necessary in the public interest to afford Presidential confidentiality the greatest
protection consistent with the fair administration of justice. The need for confidentiality even as
to idle conversations with associates in which casual reference might be made concerning political
leaders within the country or foreign statesmen is too obvious to call for further treatment.

Banco Filipino vs. Monetary Board

226 Phil. 428, 1986

Subject of this "Petition to Set Aside Order to Produce Documents dated 17 February 1986" is the
Order of Branch 136, Regional Trial Court, Makati, granting the motion of the petitioner herein,
based on Section 1, Rule 27, of the Rules of Court, for the production, inspection, and copying of
certain papers and records which are claimed as needed by the Petitioner Bank for the
preparation of its comments, objections, and exceptions to the Conservator's report dated
January 8, 1985, and Receiver's Report dated March 19, 1985. The documents now asked to be
produced, inspected, and copied are the following:

(1) Copies of tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board (MB) deliberations on the closure of
Banco Filipino (BF) and its meeting on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985;
(2) Copies of the letter and reports of first conser-vator, Mr. Basillo Estanislao, to the MB and to
Central Bank Governor Jose Fernandez;

(3) Papers showing computations of all the interests and penalties charged by the CB against BF;

(4) Schedule of recommended valuation of reserves per Mr. Tiaoqui's report dated March 19,
1985;

(5) Adjustment per Annex "C" of Mr. Tiaoqui's report;

(6) Annexes "A", "B", and "C" of the joint re-port of Mr. Tiaoqui, Mr. Aurellano, and Mrs.
Valen-zuela;

(7) Schedule of devaluation of CB-premises of Paseo de Roxas of same report;

(8) Schedule of BF's realizable assets from P5,159,44 B to P3,909.23 B as of January 25, 1985;

(9) Documents listed in BF's letter to Mrs. Carlota Valenzuela dated October 25, 1985.

In issuing the challenge order, the court below took the view that the Supreme Court's resolution
referring to it the matters relative to the bank's closure does not preclude the petitioner from
availing of this mode of discovery as an additional means of preparing for the hearing. It
considered the documents sought to be produced as not privileged because these constitute or
contain evidence material to the issues into by the Court. These materials are said to comprise of
records of the administrative proceedings conducted by respondent's officials and
representatives from the inception of and preparation of the challenged reports and the
resolution placing petitioner under receivership and thereafter under liquidation as it is the
regularity and impartiality of these administrative proceedings which are being assailed by the
petitioner, the trial court saw no reason why said documents should be thus concealed from it.

Respondents Monetary Board and Central Bank take excep-tion to the said order and pray in their
petition before this Court for the reversal and setting aside of the same. The grounds recited in
support of their petition are the following:

(1) The ratiocination of the trial court is wholly in error because the proceedings before it do not
at all deal with either the administrative proceedings con-ducted by the respondents or the
regularity and impartiality of the CB actions on BF; it does so simply upon the charge that no
"hearing" was given BF prior to those actions of closure and liquidation. However, no such prior
hearing had been called as none is required by the law and by the Supreme Court decisions in
force to this date (Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. vs. Arca, 15 SCRA 66, and Rural Bank of Bato vs. IAC,
G.R. 65642, Oct. 15, 1984).

(2) The tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations are confidential pursuant to
Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act.
"Sec. 13. Withdrawal of persons having a personal interest. - Whenever any member attend-ing
a meeting of the Monetary Board has a material personal interest, directly or indirectly, in the
discussion or resolution of any given matter, said member shall not participate in the discussion
or resolution of the matter and must retire from the meeting during the deliberation thereon.
The subject matter, when resolved, and the fact that a member had a personal interest in it, shall
be made available to the public. The minutes of the meeting shall note the withdrawal of the
member concerned. (As amended by PD No. 1827).

"Sec. 15. Responsibility. - Any member of the Monetary Board or officer or employee of the
Central Bank who willfully violates this Act or who is guilty of gross negligence in the performance
of his duties shall be held liable for any loss or injury suffered by the Bank as result of such violation
or negligence. Similar responsibility shall apply to the disclosure of any information of a
confidential nature about the discussion or resolutions of the Monetary Board, except as required
in Section 13 of this Act, or about the operations of the Bank, and to the use of such information
for personal gain or to the detriment of the Government, the Bank or third parties. (As amended
by Presidential Decree No. 72). (Underlining Supplied).
(3) The Monetary Board deliberations were necessarily held subsequent to the submission
of the CB reports. They did not enter into the making of those reports and can have no materiality
to any question of fact that maybe raised in relation to their contents.

On April 16, 1986, Petitioner Banco Filipino filed its Comment on Respondent's petition to set
aside the order for the production of the documents. In said pleading, the petitioner bank assails
the respondent's petition on the following grounds:

(1) There is no reason why Banco Filipino should not be furnished the documents, particularly
Nos. 3 to 9 of its motion, when these are merely attachments to the Supervision and Examination
Sector, Dept. II (SES) Reports, copies of which were given to it pursuant to a Supreme Court order.

(2) The Supreme Court in its referral of October 8, 1985 to the RTC Makati intended full evidence
taking of the proceeding for judicial review of administrative action filed with the Supreme Court,
the trial court being better equipped for evidence taking.

(3) The respondents cannot claim privilege in refusing to produce the Central Bank records
because it is based only on the generalized interest in confi-dentiality. Petitioner cites as a
precedent the doctrine established in the case of U.S. vs. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713, which states
that "when the ground for asserting privilege as to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a
criminal case is based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail over the
funda-mental demands of due process of law".

(4) The requested documents and records of the Central Bank are material and relevant because
BF is entitled to prove from the CB records (a) that Governor Fernandez closed BF without a MB
resolution and without examiner's reports on the financial position of BF; (b) that a MB resolution
was later made to legalize the BF closure but it had no supporting examiner's report; (c) that the
earlier reports did not satisfy respondent Governor Fernandez and he ordered the examiners and
the conservator, Gilberto Teodoro, to "improve" them; and (d) that the reports were then
fabricated.

Petitioner adds that what respondents fear is disclosure of their proceedings because petitioner
has accused the CB governor of (a) covering 51% of its stockholding, (b) encashing BF securities in
trickles as fuel a run, (c) appointing a conservator when the President ordered the MB to grant
petitioner a P3 Billion credit line, (d) replacing Estanislao with Gilberto Teodoro when the former
wanted to resume normal operations of BF, and (e) changing the conservatorship to receivership
when it appointed Carlota Valenzuela as receiver again without hearing.

On May 13, 1986, Respondent Monetary Board filed their Reply to Petitioner Bank's Comment
dated April 15, 1986. Respondents argue that:

(1) The case of U.S. vs. Nixon and the other decisions cited by petitioner are inapplicable because
-
a) The authorities cited refer only to a claim of privilege based only on the generalized interest
of confidentiality or on an executive privilege that is merely presumptive. On the other hand, the
so-called MB deliberations are privileged communication pursuant to Section 21, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court because statements and opinions expressed in the deliberation of the members of
the MB are specifically vested with confidentiality under Secs. 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act.
The "public interest" requirement for non-disclosure is evident from the fact that the statute
punishes any disclosure of such deliberations.

b) Petitioner has not in the least shown any relevance or need to produce the alleged MB
deliberations. What petitioner intends to prove are not "issue" raised in the pleadings of the main
petition.
(2) Petitioner is interested, not in discovering evidence, but in practicing oppression by the forced
publication of the MB members' confidential statements at board meetings.

(3) The so-called deliberations of the Monetary Board are in truth merely the individual
statements and expressions of opinion of its members. They are not statements or opinions that
can be imputed to the board itself or to the Central Bank. The transcripts of stenographic notes
on the deliberations of the MB are not official records of the CB; they are taken merely to assist
the Secretary of the MB in the preparation of the minutes meetings. And as advertadly also, the
tape recordings are not available as these are used over and over again.

The motion for the production subject documents was filed by petitioner pursuant to Section 1,
Rule 27, of the Rules of Court. It has been held that "a party is ordinarily entitled to the production
of books, documents and papers which are material and relevant to the establishment of his cause
of action or defense" (General Electric Co. vs. Superior Court in and for Alameda County, 45 C 2d
879, cited in Martin, Rules of Court, 3rd edition, Vol. 2, p. 104). "The test to be applied by the trial
judge in determining the relevancy of documents and the sufficiency of their description is one of
reasonableness and practicability" (Line Corp. of the Philippines vs. Moran, 59 Phil. 176, 180). "On
the ground of public policy, the rules providing for production and inspection of books and papers
do not authorize the produc-tion or inspection of privileged matter, that is, books, papers which
because of their confidential and privileged character could not be received in evidence" (27) CJS
224). "In passing on a motion for discovery of documents, the court would be liberal in
determining whether or not documents are relevant to the subject matter of action" (Hercules
Powder Co. vs. Haas Co., U.S. Dist. Ct. Oct. 26, 1944, 9 Fed. Rules Service, 659, cited in Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1979 Ed. Vol. 2, p. 102). Likewise, "any statute declaring in
general terms that official records are confidential should be liberally construed, to have an
implied exception for disclosure when needed in a court of justice" (Wigmore on Evidence, Vol.
VIII, p. 801, citing the case of Marbury vs. Madison, 1 Cr. 137, 143).
In the light of the jurisprudence above-cited, this Court holds that no grave abuse of discretion
was committed by the court below in granting petitioner's motion for the production of the
documents enumer-ated herein. We accept the view taken by the court below that the
documents are not privileged and that these constitute or contain evi-dence material to the issues
being inquired into by the Court.

With respect to Items Nos. 3 to 9, these are the annexes to the Supervision and Examination
Sector, Dept. ll (SES) Reports submitted to the Central Bank and Monetary Board which were
taken into con-sideration by said respondents in closing petitioner bank. A copy of the SES Reports
was furnished to the petitioner. We, therefore, fail to see any proper reason why the annexes
thereto should be withheld. Peti-tioner cannot adequately study and properly analyze the report
without the corresponding annexes. Pertinent and relevant, these could be useful and even
necessary to the preparation by petitioner of its comment, objections and exceptions to the
Conservator's reports and receiver's reports.

Regarding copies of the letter and reports of first Conservator, Mr. Basilio Estanislao, to the
Monetary Board and to Central Bank Governor Fernandez (Item No. 2) these appear relevant as
petitioner has asserted that the above-named Conservator had in fact wanted to resume normal
operations of Banco Filipino but then he was thereafter replaced by Mr. Gilberto Teodoro. The
letter and reports could be favorable or adverse to the case of petitioner but whatever the result
may be, petitioner should be allowed to photocopy the same.

As to the tapes and transcripts of the Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco
Filipino and its meetings on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985, (Item No. 1), respondents contend
that "it is obvious from the requirement (Sections 13 and 15 of the Central Bank Act) that the
subject matter (of the deliberations), when resolved ... shall be made available to the public but
the deliber-ations themselves are not open to disclosure but are to be kept in confidence." This
Court, however, sees it in a different light. The deliberations may be confidential but not
necessarily absolute and privileged. There is no specific provision in the Central Bank Act, even in
Sections 13 and 15 thereof, which prohibits absolutely the courts from conducting an inquiry on
said deliberations when these are relevant or material to a matter subject of a suit pending before
it. The disclosure is here not intended to obtain information for personal gain. There is no
indication that such disclosure would cause detriment to the government, to the bank or to third
parties. Significantly, it is the bank itself here that is interested in obtaining what it considers as
information useful and indispensably needed by it to support its position in the matter being
inquired to by the court below.

On the other hand, respondents cite Section 21, Rule 130, Rules of Court which states:
"Section 21. - Privileged Communica-tions. - The following persons cannot testify as to matters
learned in confidence in the following cases:

xxx xxx xxx xxx

(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or afterwards, as to
communications made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest
would suffer by disclosure."
But this privilege, as this Court notes, is intended not for the protection of public officers but for
the protection of public interest (Vogel vs. Gruaz, 110 U.S. 311 cited in Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, 1980 Ed. Vol. 5, p. 211). Where there is no public interest that would be prejudiced,
this invoked rule will not be applicable.
"The rule that a public officer cannot be examined as to communications made to him in official
confidence does not apply when there is nothing to show that the public interest would suffer by
the disclosure question. xxx", (Agnew vs. Agnew, 52 SD 472, cited in Martin Rules of Court of the
Philippines, Third Edition, Vol. 5, p. 198).
In the case at bar, the respondents have not established that public interest would suffer by the
disclosure of the papers and documents sought by petitioner. Considering that petitioner bank
was already closed as of January 25, 1985, any disclosure of the aforementioned letters, reports,
and transcripts at this time pose no danger or peril to our economy. Neither will it trigger any
bank run nor compromise state secrets. Respondent's reason for their resist-ance to the order of
production are tenuous and specious. If the respondents public official acted rightfully and
prudently in the performance of their duties, there should be nothing at all that would pro-voke
fear of disclosure.

On the contrary, public interests will be best served by the disclosure of the documents. Not only
the banks and its employees but also its numerous depositors and creditors are entitled to be
informed as to whether or not there was a valid and legal justification for the petitioner's bank
closure. It will be well to consider that -
"Public interest means more than a mere curiosity; it means something in which the public, the
community at large, has some pecuniary interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are
affected" (State vs. Crocket, 206, p. 816 cited in Words and Phrases, Vol. 35, p. 229).
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order to produce documents dated February 17, 1986 issued
by the court below in S.C. G.R. No. 70054, is hereby affirmed, except as to the copies of the tapes
relative to the Monetary Board deliberations on the closure of Banco Filipino on January 25, 1985
and its meetings on July 27, 1984, and March 22, 1985 and only if such tapes are actually no longer
available taking into account respondent Monetary Board's manifestations that the tape
recording of the deliberations of that Board are, for purposes of economy, used over and over
again inasmuch as these tapes are not required to be kept or stored. (See Respondent's Reply,
dated May 12, 1986; Rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 1288-1289).

SO ORDERED.

Almonte v. Vasquez
G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

Facts:
This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa
Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the Economic Intelligence and
Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the
year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from enforcing his orders.
Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez is Chief of the EIIB's
Budget and Fiscal Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the
Ombudsman in connection with his investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds
representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed. The letter,
purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen, was
addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished several government offices, including
the Office of the Ombudsman.
May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the EIIB has a syndicate headed by the
Chief of Budget Division who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called "ghost
agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA); that when the agency had salary differential
last Oct '88 all money for the whole plantilla were released and from that alone, Millions were
saved and converted to ghost agents of EIA; Almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big
time smuggler syndicate monthly and brokers every week for them not to be apprehended.]

In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied all the allegations written on
the anonymous letter. Petitioners move to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces tecum
but was denied.

Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the claim of privilege of an agency of the
government on the ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services
Funds and its plantilla . . . will necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements,
targets, strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."

Issue:
Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents relating to personal services and
salary vouchers of EIIB employees on the plea that such documents are classified without violating
their equal protection of laws.

Held:
YES. At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to
state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters and in addition, privilege to
withhold the identity of persons who furnish information of violation of laws. In the case at bar,
there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records
pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of
intelligence reports and information regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy,
such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting."
Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine from
the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence
will expose military matters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a
privilege resting on other considerations.

The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious
persons and that the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal purposes. The
plantilla and other personnel records are relevant to his investigation as the designated
“protectors of the people” of the Constitution.

Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal protection of the laws. Petitioners complain
that "in all forum and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale respondents via their
verified complaints or sworn statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in proceedings
before the Office of the Ombudsman anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the
first place, there can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution
itself. In the second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form
and in a manner," the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of
the people which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had
occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and
prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public
officials who, through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations
held against them. On the other hand complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk
who cannot afford to hire lawyers.

Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum would violate petitioners'
right against self-incrimination. It is enough to state that the documents required to be produced
in this case are public records and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are
government officials in whose possession or custody the documents are. Moreover, if, as
petitioners claim the disbursement by the EII of funds for personal service has already been
cleared by the COA, there is no reason why they should object to the examination of the
documents by respondent Ombudsman.

Senate vs. Ermita

GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by
issuing E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”.
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including
those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department
for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the
issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wiretapping, and the role of military
in the so-called “Gloriagate Scandal”.

Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by
E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and
constitutional?

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege.
The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a
matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by
definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the
necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that
obligation in a particular case.

Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought
in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is
privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

People vs. Invencion

G.R. No. 131636. March 5, 2003

The filial privilege rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not
incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to
testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges.

Facts:
Artemio Invencion was charged before the RTC of Tarlac with thirteen counts of rape committed
against his 16-year-old daughter, Cynthia (his daughter with his first common-law-wife, Gloria
Pagala).

During the trial, the prosecution presented Elven Invencion, the son of Artemio with his second
common-law wife. Elven testified that that sometime before the end of the school year in 1996,
while he was sleeping in one room with his father, Cynthia, and two other younger brothers, he
was awakened by Cynthia’s loud cries. Looking towards her, he saw his father on top of Cynthia,
doing a pumping motion.

After about two minutes, his father put on his short pants. Elven further testified that Artemio
was a very strict and cruel father and a drunkard. He angrily prohibited Cynthia from entertaining
any of her suitors.

The trial court convicted Artemio for one count of rape. Artemio challenges the competency and
credibility of Elven as a witness. He argues that Elven, as his son, should have been disqualified as
a witness against him under pursuant to the rule on filial privilege.

Issue:
Should Elven Invencion be disqualified as a witness pursuant to the rule on filial privilege?

Held:
No. The competency of Elven to testify is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, otherwise known as the rule on “filial privilege.” This rule is not strictly a rule on
disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an
ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other
privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against
his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio.
Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only
“to tell the truth.” Hence, his testimony is entitled to full credence.

Matter of Farber
394 A.2d 330 (N.J. 1978)

Appellants challenged a determination of the Superior Court, Appellate Division (New Jersey), that
they were in contempt of court for failure to disclose information sought by subpoenas duces
tecum by appellee State of New Jersey in a criminal case.

FACTS
Appellants, a reporter and a news organization, were charged with contempt of court for failure
to disclose information sought by subpoenas duces tecum by appellee State of New Jersey in a
criminal case. Appellants contended they had a privilege to remain silent with respect to
confidential information that emanated from the "free speech" and "free press" clauses of the
U.S. Constitutional Amendment I.

DISCUSSION
The court on appeal held that the Supreme Court of the United States rejected a similar claim and
held that no such right existed.
Appellants also argued that a shield law, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21 and 21a applied.
The court found the law constitutional on its face, but held that it violated the U.S. Constitutional
Amendment VI and the N.J. Constitutional art. 1, para. 10, as applied to the facts of the case, by
denying a criminal defendant the right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses.

HELD
The court affirmed that appellants were in contempt of court because the state constitutional
guarantee of a criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses prevailed over the state statute
granting privilege to newspersons regarding their sources of confidential information.

Yambot vs. Tuquero

GR No. 169895, May 31, 2000

DOCTRINE: Like fair commentaries on matters of public interest, fair reports on the same should
thus be included under the protective mantle of privileged communications, and should not be
subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. The concept of
privileged communication is implicit in the constitutionally protected freedom of the press, which
would be threatened when criminal suits are unscrupulously leveled by persons wishing to silence
the media on account of unfounded claims of inaccuracies in news reports

CASE SUMMARY: PDI staff were charged with libel for an article which reported that a sexual
harassment suit was filed against a Judge, even if in fact, there was none. The SC found that the
article lacked the element of libel and thus falls under privileged communication.

FACTS:
The Philippine Daily Inquirer printed an article with the headline: Judge mauled me, says court
employee. This carried the by-line of Volt Contreras, and reported on alleged mauling incident
that took place between RTC Makati Judge Cruz and Robert Mendoza, an admin officer assigned
at the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Judge Cruz filed a complaint for libel with the City Prosec of Makati alleging that the article was
false and malicious for having the following sentence:

“According to Mendoza, Cruz still has a pending case of sexual harassment filed with the Supreme
Court by Fiscal Maria Lourdes Garcia, also of the Makati RTC.”

Judge Mendoza alleged that no suit existed and attached a certification from the Deputy Court
Administrator who attested that only two admin cases were filed against him – the mauling
incident case, and one for gross ignorance of the law, partiality, and rendering an unjust judgment.

Contreras explained that the inclusion of the sentence was based on the fact that Atty. Paredes-
Garcia had filed a Petition for Review with the SC, to assail a contempt order that was filed against
her by Judge Cruz. In connection with this petition, Paredes-Garcia filed a Reply asking the Court
to look into the allegations of Enrina Pascual that Judge Cruz had made sexual advances to her.
She further prayed that her petition be treated as admin case.

The Court granted her petition re: contempt order but did not pass upon her prayer that it be
treated an admin case against Cruz.

City Prosec of Makati rendered a Resolution finding probable cause against Mendoza and 6 PDI
employees (petitioners).

PDI employees filed a Pet. For Review with the Sec. of Justice Tuquero, who rejected the petition
asking that the complaint against them be dismissed for lack of supporting affidavits from 3rd
persons.

PDI staff filed a Pet. For Certiorari before the CA to challenge the SOJ’s resolution. Dismissed. CA
applied the doctrine in Advincula v. CA, that since Information has been filed already with the TC,
the primary determination of probable cause is now with the latter.

ISSUE:
W/N the article falls under privileged communication?

RULING:
Yes. At the outset, it should be made clear that the Court is not abandoning the foregoing ruling
in Advincula. However, Advincula cannot be read to completely disallow the institution of
certiorari proceedings against the Secretary of Justice’s determination of probable cause when
the criminal information has already been filed in court. Under exceptional circumstances, a
petition for certiorari assailing the resolution of the Secretary of Justice (involving an appeal of
the prosecutor’s ruling on probable cause) may be allowed, notwithstanding the filing of an
information with the trial court.

In Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas), this Court held that the acts of a quasi-
judicial officer may be assailed by the aggrieved party via a petition for certiorari and enjoined (a)
when necessary to afford adequate
protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b) when necessary for the orderly
administration of justice;

(c) when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; (d) where the charges are
manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and (e) when there is clearly no prima
facie case against the accused. The Court

also declared that, if the officer conducting a preliminary investigation (in that case, the Office of
the Ombudsman) acts without or in excess of his authority and resolves to file an Information
despite the absence of probable cause, such act may be nullified by a writ of
certiorari

In this case, the SC finds that the need to uphold the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of the
press and crystal-clear absence of a prima facie case against the PDI staff justify the resort to the
extraordinary writ of certiorari.

McCray v. Illinois
386 U.S. 300, March 20, 1967

Brief Fact Summary: Two Chicago police officers made a warrantless drug arrest of the defendant,
McCray, based on probable cause provided by an undercover informant. The officers testified the
informant was credible because of his past information. The Supreme Court of the United States
upheld the arrest.

Synopsis of Rule of Law: When an informant’s testimony goes to probable cause, and not to guilt
or innocence, the government need not disclose the informant’s identity.

Facts:
An undercover informant told Chicago police that the defendant was selling drugs and had drugs
in his possession. The police found the defendant with drugs on him in the area where the
informant said he would be. The officers further testified that during the past two years, the
informant had proved to be reliable regarding other drug dealers. The informant pointed out the
defendant to the officers, then left the scene before the arrest.

Issue:
Must the government identify an undercover informant whose testimony went only to probable
cause, not guilt?

Held. The government need not identify an undercover informant whose testimony goes only to
probable cause.

The majority distinguished the instant case from the earlier Rovario case because in Rovario, the
informant’s role went to the defendant’s guilt. In the instant case, the informant’s role went only
to probable cause. The majority also relied on the fact that several states, including Illinois, had
specific statutes protecting an informant’s identity. The dissenters argued that because Mapp v.
Ohio bound states to requiring warrants absent exigent circumstances, the fact that states had
informant privileges was irrelevant.
Dissent: Previous decisions of the Supreme Court encourage the police to obtain warrants. This
decision goes against that trend. Arrests with warrants are weighed more heavily than those
without because a neutral magistrate controls whether the police have met their probable cause
burden. This decision allows the police themselves to make that decision. Disclosure of informants
is necessary to determine the validity of a probable cause affidavit.

Air Philippines vs. Pennswell

G.R. No. 172835, December 13, 2007

Trade secrets are privileged information and thus may not be the subject of mode of discovery
under Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.

Facts:
Pennswell sold and delivered to Air Philippines Corporation industrial chemicals, solvents, and
special lubricants amounting to P450,000.00. When Air Philippines refused to pay the obligation,
Pensswell filed a collection case before RTC Makati. In its Answer, Air Philippines alleged that: it
refused to pay because it was defrauded in the amount of P600,000.00 by Pennswell for its
previous sale of 4 items; said items were misrepresented by Pennswell as belonging to a new line,
but were in truth and in fact, identical with products it had previously purchased from Pennswell;
and, Pennswell merely altered the names and labels of such goods. During the trial, Air Philippines
filed a motion to compel Pennswell to give a detailed list of the chemical components and the
ingredients used for the products that were sold. Pennswell opposed the motion for production,
contending that the requested information was a trade secret that it could not be forced to
disclose.

Issue:
May Pennswell be compelled to disclose the chemical components and the ingredients used for
its products through a motion for production?

Held:
No. Rule 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
“Sec. 1. Motion for production or inspection order. Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefore, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit
the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things,
not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action
and which are in his possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any designated relevant object or
operation thereon. The order shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection
and taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.”

Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters,
photographs, objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be
privileged. Section 24 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged
communication, to wit: (a) communication between husband and wife; (b) communication
between attorney and client; (c) communication between physician and patient; (d)
communication between priest and penitent; and (e) public officers and public interest. There are,
however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned by Rule 130. Among them are the
following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of published news; (b) voters
may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d) information
contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits.

A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its
owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The definition also
extends to a secret formula or process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using
it in compounding some article of trade having a commercial value. American jurisprudence has
utilized the following factors to determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:

(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer’s business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the
business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and
(6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an
independent source.

The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondents special lubricants are
trade secrets within the contemplation of the law. Respondent was established to engage in the
business of general manufacturing and selling of, and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise
dispose of goods, wares, merchandise, products, including but not limited to industrial chemicals,
solvents, lubricants, acids, alkalies, salts, paints, oils, varnishes, colors, pigments and similar
preparations, among others. It is unmistakable to our minds that the manufacture and production
of respondents products proceed from a formulation of a secret list of ingredients. In the creation
of its lubricants, respondent expended efforts, skills, research, and resources. What it had
achieved by virtue of its investments may not be wrested from respondent on the mere pretext
that it is necessary for petitioners defense against a collection for a sum of money. By and large,
the value of the information to respondent is crystal clear. The ingredients constitute the very
fabric of respondents production and business. No doubt, the information is also valuable to
respondents competitors. To compel its disclosure is to cripple respondents business, and to place
it at an undue disadvantage. If the chemical composition of respondents lubricants are opened to
public scrutiny, it will stand to lose the backbone on which its business is founded. This would
result in nothing less than the probable demise of respondents business. Respondents proprietary
interest over the ingredients which it had developed and expended money and effort on is
incontrovertible.

The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of special lubricants requested by Air
Philippines formed part of the trade secrets of Pennswell. Because of public policy, trade secrets
are privileged and the rules providing for the production and inspection of books and papers do
not authorize their production in a court of law.
KELLER v. COB GROUP MARKETING
GR No. 68097, Jan 16, 1986

“The pieces of documentary evidence (chattel mortgage, settlement of the debt, letters of Adao
and Lorenzo) are sufficient to prove the liability of COB and to justify the foreclosure of the two
mortgages executed by Manahan and Lorenzo. The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a
relevant fact may be given in evidence against him “as an admission of a party”.

Facts:
Keller appointed COB Group Marketing as exclusive distributor of its household products in Panay
and Negros. Keller sold on credit its products to COB. As security, one Asuncion Mahan mortgaged
her land to Keller. Lorenzo also mortgaged his land to Keller for another sales on credit agreement.
After a couple of years, the board of directors of COB found out that COB owed Keller more than
P179,000. They wanted to settle the obligations. Hence, Keller and COB, through their President
Bax, settled the debt, agreeing, among others, that COB would chattel mortgage its trucks to
Keller. So, COB, through their President Bax, executed the chattel mortgage in favor of COB. Also,
the stockholders of COB, Adao and Lorenzo, wrote a letter to Keller proposing to pay the debt and
to substitute the Manahan mortgage on Adao’s lot. COB wanted to foreclose on the mortgages of
Manahan and Lorenzo, but the trial court did not allow it, nullifying the admissions of liability of
Bax and actually stating that it was Keller who owed COB for alleged overpayments.

Issue:
Whether the admissions should be considered?

Ruling:
YES. The pieces of documentary evidence (chattel mortgage, settlement of the debt, letters of
Adao and Lorenzo) are sufficient to prove the liability of COB and to justify the foreclosure of the
two mortgagesexecuted by Manahan and Lorenzo. The act, declaration or omission of a party as
to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him “as an admissionof a party”. With regard
to the admissions of Bax, these are also supported by the documentary evidence, and binding on
COB.

PEOPLE vs PARAGSA
G.R. No. L-44060; July 20, 1978

FACTS:
Benben Paragsa was charged with the rape of a 12 ½ year old girl, Mirasol Magallanes. The
information alleged that victim was alone in her house when the Benben entered, intimidated her
with a hunting knife, forced her to lie in bed and there they had intercourse. The deed was
interrupted when her aunt Lita, knocked on the door of victim’s house. Incidentally, Aunt Lita
testified that she had seen the accused exiting the house when she came knocking. The victim did
not reveal what happened to her until 6 days after the incident.

Accused interposed the “Sweetheart defense”. Defense claims in effect that there was no force
or intimidation involved and that what Aunt Lita saw was not the aftermath of a rape, but was
rather consensual sexual intercourse. Accused also presented witnesses claiming that they were
indeed sweethearts.
The CFI convicted Benben. CA affirmed the conviction.

ISSUE:
The main issue boils down to the question of who is more credible, the defense or the
prosecution? Thus, whether or not the evidence justifies a conviction.

HELD:
NO. A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak,
unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction. The Supreme court noted the absence of
intimidation considering that the act took place in the daytime, in her house where she is
surrounded by her neighbors. The victim could also have revealed the same the very moment she
was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what the accused did to her upon entering the
house immediately after the intercourse took place and not 3 days after.

Furthermore, the prosecution was silent in the matter of the allegation that the victim and
accused were sweethearts. They did not bother to rebut the testimony of the appellant and his
witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had
had two previous sexual communications previously. As to this silence, the Supreme Court
explained:

The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth … is
applicable in criminal cases provided: 1) that he heard and understood the statement; 2) that he
was at liberty to interpose a denial; 3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting
his rights or in which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; 4) that the facts
were within his knowledge; and 5) that the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn from his
silence would be material to the issue. These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the
present case. Hence, the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses
may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.

PEOPLE v. ALEGRE
94 SCRA 109, November 7, 1979

“The silence of an accused (or in this case, the three appellants) under custody, or his failure to
deny statements by another implicating him in a crime, especially when such accused is neither
asked to comment or reply to such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit
confession of his participation in the commission of the crime.”

Facts:
This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo, a 57 year old spinster whose body was found in
her home, which was ransacked. Alegre rented a room in the house of Sajo. One Cudillan was
found with the jewelry of Sajo sometime later. Cudillan executed two extrajudicial statements. In
the first, he admitted that he was involved in the murder of Sajo. In the second, he identified
appellants Alegre, Comayas and Medalla. According to the second statement, Cudillan went near
the cell within the Office of the Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, and identified
Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as the persons he referred to as Jesus Medalla,
"Rami" and "Mario" in his declaration. During the trial, Sgt. Isla of the Pasay police testified that
when Cudillan identified the appellants as the perpetrators, they just stared at him and said
nothing. Cudillan later repudiated his statements, claiming they were done in duress. The
appellants each had their own alibis. However, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of
Sgt. Isla and stated thatthe appellants should have denied the charges when they were identified.

Issues:
Whether Cudillan’s extrajudicial confession binding on the appellants?
Whether the silence of the appellants may be taken against them?

Ruling:
No. On the first issue, the extrajudicial confessions of Cudillan on the basis of which the trial court
was able to reconstruct how Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used
as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla,
under the principle of "res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet" there being no independent
evidence of conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although
deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against his co-¬accused.
It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned.

No. On the second issue, the Court stated that he settled rule is that the silence of an accused in
criminal cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may not be taken as evidence against him,
and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question. It has also been held that while an
accused is under custody, his silence may not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right
to remain silent;; his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise,
his right of silence would be illusory. Hence, the silence of an accused (or in this case, the three
appellants) under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in a crime,
especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications or
accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of his participation in the commission of
the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from his silence or failure to deny the
statement would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self-¬incrimination.

PHILTRUST vs. ANTIGUA BOTICA

56 Phil 562, February 24, 1932

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in the above-entitled
three cases which have been tried together and decided by the court below as one case.

In case G.R. No. 34686, plaintiff-appellant seeks to collect from defendants-appellees, Antigua
Botica Ramirez, Daniel Boquer, and J. J. Dunbar, the amount of P7,531.28 which represents the
balance of an overdraft account of the Antigua Botica Ramirez with the plaintiff as of December
17, 1928. J. J. Dunbar and Daniel Boquer were guarantors for the overdraft.

In case G.R. No. 34687, plaintiff-appellant sees to collect from defendants, Daniel Boque, Antigua
Botica Ramirez, J. J. Dunabar, and Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, the amount of P5,837.07, balance as
of March 24, 1930, of a promissory note for P6,000 executed by the defendants on June 7, 1927,
in favor of the plaintiff, whereby the defendant promised, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff
90 days after its execution.

In case G.R. No. 34688, plaintiff-appellant seeks to collect from defendants J. J. Dunbar, Daniel
Boquer, Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, and Manuela Reyes y Almeida, the sum of P17,702.52, balance
of December 10, 1927, of a promissory note for P30,000 executed by Dunbar Boquer, and
Gutierrez Rupide, P10,000 of which was guaranteed by Manuela Reyes y Almeida with a mortgage
of a parcel of land situated in the City of Manila in favor of the plaintiff.

For some time before the complaints were filed the Antigua Botica Ramirez was under the control
and management of the plaintiff, and a few months after plaintiff's complaints were filed, and
upon plaintiff's petition a receiver of the properties of the defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez was
appointed.

After trial, the court below rendered judgment, dismissing the three complaints, ordering the
cancellation of the mortgage of Manuela Reyes' land, discharging the receiver and ordering him
to turn over the properties of the defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez to plaintiff. From this
judgment the plaintiff appealed to this court and made the following assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in permitting the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide testify, over the
objection and exception of counsel for the plaintiff, that he signed the promissory notes marked
Exhibits J and M in cases Nos. 34687-88, as a mere surety, and for no consideration.

2. The trial court erred in not striking from the record defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide's
testimony that his codefendant Daniel Boquer told him that the plaintiff gave him several
extentions for the payment of the promissory notes marked Exhibits J and M in cases Nos. 34687-
88, and in finding that such extensions were in fact given by plaintiff.

3. The trial court erred in permitting the defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, Daniel Boquer and
J. J. Dunbar and the witness Rosario Boquer testify, over the objection and exception of counsel
for the plaintiff, that the shares which they owned of the stock of the defendant corporation
Antigua Botica Ramirez were assigned by them to plaintiff in payment of their obligations and in
finding that such assignment, as claimed by the defendant, was in fact made.

4. The trial court erred in holding that the plaintiff administered the business of the defendant
corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez, without any intervention on the latter's part, and in not
permitting plaintiff's witness J. M. Araullo testify as to the condition of the corporation in the
month of April, 1929.

5. The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff sold certain furniture and other properties of the
defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez at very reduced prices.

6. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the documents marked defendant's Exhibit CC,
DD and EE, and in not permitting plaintiff's witnesses E.B. Ford and E.B. Velasquez testify on them.

7. The trial court erred in finding that the preponderance of evidence was in favor of the
defendant and against the plaintiff.

8. The trial court erred in rendering judgment in favor of the defendants, and not in favor of the
plaintiff, as prayed for in its complaints.

9. The trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motions for a new trial.
Under the first assignment of error, counsel for the plaintiff contend that the defendant Eduardo
Gutierrez Repide should not have been permitted by the lower court to testify that he signed the
promissory notes marked plaintiff's Exhibits J and M as a mere surety, and for no consideration.

We think that this point is well taken. It is admitted by the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide
that he signed the promissory notes as a surety, and it was immaterial, so far as the plaintiff was
concerned, whether or not the said Gutierrez Repide received anything in payment for the use of
his signature. (Clark vs. Sellner, 42 Phil., 384.)

The second assignment of error has reference to the action of the lower court in not striking from
the record the testimony of the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide that he was told by the
defendant Daniel Boquer that the plaintiff bank gave him (Boquer) several extensions for the
payment of the promissory notes Exhibits J and M, and in finding that plaintiff gave such
extensions.

We have not found anything in the record to justify defendant's contention. The only witness for
the defendants who testified on the alleged extensions given by plaintiff was the defendant
Gutierrez Repide himself, and his testimony consisted only of hearsay evidence and general
statements against the direct and positive evidence introduced by plaintiff that no extension was
ever given for the payment of the promissory notes. But what convinces the court that plaintiff
did not extend the time for the payment of the promissory notes in question, is the fact that the
testimony of the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, was not corroborated by either the
defendant Daniel Boquer, who imparted the information to Gutierrez, Repide, or by the
defendant J. J. Dunbar. The latter, in fact, admitted that no extension was given him for the
payment of the promissory notes. Dunbar testified as follows:

Q. Mr. Dunbar, have you ever obtained an extension for the payment of the indebtedness or
obligations of the Antigua Botica Ramirez to the Philippine Trust Company and Fidelity & Surety
Company covered by some of the documents here presented in evidence? — A. No, sir.

Plaintiff might not have been prompt in proceeding against the principal debtor, but mere delay
is no defense at all for the surety.

We rule that the lower court erred in not striking from the record the testimony of the defendant
Eduardo Gutierrez Repide on the alleged extensions given by plaintiff to the defendant Daniel
Boquer for the payment of the promissory notes marked plaintiff's Exhibits J and M, and in finding
that such extensions were given by plaintiff.

The third assignment of error is directed toward the action of the lower court in permitting the
defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, Daniel Boquer, and J. J. Dunbar, and the witness Rosario
Boquer to testify that the shares which they owned of the stock of the corporation Antigua Botica
Ramirez were assigned by them to plaintiff that such assignment was, in fact, made.

The defendants claim that they assigned to plaintiff the shares which they owned of the stock of
the corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez in payment of their obligations. Plaintiff denies that such
assignment was ever made, and claims that the shares in question were assigned for the purpose
of enabling plaintiff to reorganize the corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez and sell its business at
a fair and reasonable price.
We have carefully examined the evidence, and are of the opinion that plaintiff's contention should
be sustained. The defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Daniel Boquer testified, in direct
examination, that a deed of assignment to plaintiff of the shares in question in payment of the
obligations of the defendants was to be executed, and the record shows that no such document
was ever executed.

It is claimed by the defendants that the assignment of their shares of the stock of the corporation
Antigua Botica Ramirez to the plaintiff bank was made in payment of their obligations. Examining,
however, the notice for the special stockholders' meeting on April 26, 1929, which notice was
prepared by the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide himself, no mention is made therein of any
assignment of the shares in question in payment of the obligations of the defendants to plaintiff.
The notice simply says that the meeting was being called "for the purpose of electing the new
members of the Board of Directors and determining the manner of liquidating with the Philippine
Trust Company and Fidelity & Surety Company of the Philippine Islands the obligations of the
corporation (Antiga Botica Ramirez) pending payment, and at the same time resolve the
indorsement of all the shares of the corporations to the creditor corporations in order that the
latter might reorganize the Antigua Botica Ramirez (antes Zobel), Inc. in the manner most
convenient to their interest." Had such an assignment as claimed by the defendants been made,
it is but natural to except that the defendant Gutierrez Repide would have made some mention
thereof in the notice for the meeting prepared by him.

The fourth and fifth assignments of error relate to the action of the lower court in holding that
plaintiff administered the business of the defendant corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez without
any intervention on the latter's part; in not permitting the witness J. M. Araullo to testify as to the
condition of the corporation in the month of April, 1929; and in finding that plaintiff sold certain
properties of the defendant Antigua Botica Ramirez at very reduced prices.

We think these points are well taken.

The defendants contend that plaintiff should not have sold for P5,000 a credit of P18,539.25 which
the defendant corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez had against the Palma Rosa Manufacturing
Company. The record, however, shows that the debtor, the said Palma Rosa Manufacturing
Company, was insolvent and that before the new board of directors of the corporation Antigua
Botica Ramirez made the sale, the defendants Daniel Boquer and Jose V. Ramirez were asked by
plaintiff to make their comments and recommendations and that no attention was paid to
plaintiff's request. The defendants should not be heard now to complain.

The defendant Daniel Boquer testified, in direct examination, that he delivered to plaintiff's
witness J. M. Araullo all the assets of the defendant coporation Antigua Botica Ramirez. On
rebuttal, Araullo was not permitted to controvert Boquer's testimony.

The defendant Daniel Boquer was the manager of the business of the Antigua Botica Ramirez
before the plaintiff took possession thereof, and the defendants claimed that the business was
properly managed by Boquer. On rebuttal, Araullo was not permitted to testify as to the condition
of the business at the time plaintiff took it over for the purpose of reorganization.
The rulings of the lower court were erroneous. The witness Araullo should have been permitted
to testify, on rebuttal, on the points covered by the defendant Boquer in direct examination.

With reference to the sale of a motorcycle and certain shelves of the corporation Antigua Botica
Ramirez, we have examined the record and found nothing therein to show that they were not
sold for a reasonable price. It appears that the party who once offered P500 for the motorcycle
and later on P150, had no money and claimed that the motorcycle was in bad condition, and there
is total lack of evidence as to the condition in which the shelves were at the time of the sale.

The sixth and seventh assignments of error are concerned with certain evidence offered by the
defendant and admitted by the lower court over the objection of counsel for the plaintiff, and
with certain evidence offered by the plaintiff and rejected by the lower court.

In view of the decision to be rendered by the court, we shall only discuss the assignment of error
in connection with the document marked Exhibit EE offered by plaintiff in evidence and rejected
by the lower court.

Plaintiff's Exhibit EE is a copy of the minutes of a special meeting of the stockholders of the
corporation Antigua Botica Ramirez held on April 26, 1929, wherein a transcript of the
stenographic notes taken at the stockholders' meeting of the same corporation held on April 19,
1929, was incorporated. At the said meeting of April 19, 1929, the defendants Eduardo Gutierrez
Repide, J. J. Dunbar and Daniel Boquer admitted their obligations to the plaintiff bank and such
admissions were inserted, without any objection on the part of the said defendants, in the
minutes of the special stockholders' meeting of April 26, 1929.

Counsel for the defendants objected to the introduction of said Exhibit EE on the ground that it
contained certain statements made by the said defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar,
and Daniel Boquer; that the latter were not given an opportunity to explain their statements
before plaintiff offered the document in evidence; and that this contention is without merit. Had
plaintiff intended to impeach statements made by the defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J.
Dunbar, and Daniel Boquer on another occasion, plaintiff, as claimed by counsel for the
defendant, should have laid a foundation for the introduction in evidence of said Exhibit EE by
calling the attention of the said defendants Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar, and Daniel
Boquer to their former statements, but apparently plaintiff had no such purpose. Plaintiff's
purpose in introducing the said Exhibit EE was probably to show certain admissions against
interest made by the defendants, and said EE might then be admissible without the necessity of
plaintiff's first making the defendant Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, J. J. Dunbar, and Daniel Boquer
explain their statements.

. . . In offering in evidence the testimony given by Mr. Hemady and the Hashims in the earlier case,
the defendant-appellant did not claim that said testimony contained admissions against interest
by the parties to the action of their agents; if such had been the case, the testimony would have
been admissible without the laying of a foundation and without the witness having testified in the
case at bar. . . . (Juan Ysmael & Co. vs. Hashim and Gorayeb, 50 Phil., 132, 138.)

For all the foregoing considerations, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and
judgment is hereby rendered —
In case No. 34686, in favor of the plaintiff Philippine Trust Company and against the defendants
Antigua Botica Ramirez, Daniel Boquer, and J. J. Dunbar, jointly, for the sum of seven thousand
five hundred thirty-one pesos and twenty-eight centavos(P7,531.28), with interest at the rate of
nine per cent (9%) per annum from December 17, 1928, until paid.

In case No. 34687, in favor of the plaintiff Philippine Trust Company and against the defendants
Antigua Botica Ramirez, Daniel Boquer, J. J. Dunbar, and Eduardo Gutierrez Repide, jointly and
severally, for the sum of five thousand eight hundred thirty-seven pesos and seven centavos
(P5,837.07), with interest at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum, from March 24, 1930, until
paid; and additional sum of five hundred eighty-three pesos and seventy centavos (P583.70) for
and as attorney's fee and costs of collection.

In case No. 34688 in favor of the plaintiff Philippine Trust Company and against the defendant J.
J. Dunbar, Daniel Boquer, Eduardo Gutierrez Repide and Manuela Reyes y Almeida, jointly and
severally, for the sum of seventeen thousand seven hundred and two pesos and fifty-two centavos
(P17,702.52), with interest at the rate of ten per cent (10%) per annum from December 10, 1927,
until paid, the liability of the defendant Manuela Reyes y Almeida being limited, however, to the
sum of ten thousand pesos (10,000), which is the amount of the obligation secured by her
mortgage of February 13, 1926.

The defendants J. J. Dunbar, Daniel Boquer, and Eduardo Gutierrez Repide are further sentenced
to pay plaintiff, jointly and severally, the additional sum of one centavo (P1,702.25) for and as
attorneys' fees and costs of collection.

The defendant Manuela Reyes y Almeida is further sentenced to pay plaintiff the additional sum
of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for and as attorney's fees and costs of collection.

The costs will be limited to the attorney's fees and costs of collection as hereinbefore stated. So
ordered.

JOSEPH ESTRADA v. ANIANO DESIERTO

G.R. No. 146710, Mar. 2, 2001

FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.

In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged
that he had personally given Estrada money as payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account
known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused
controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an
impeachment case against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-
tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an
impeachment court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada,
pleaded “not guilty”.

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at
EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools and left-wing organizations. Activists from the
group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar
associations joined in the thousands of protesters. On January 19, The Philippine National Police
and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the
crowd at EDSA Shrine.

At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the beginning of the protests
and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue,
stressing that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.

At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not
run in this election.

On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that
Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took
her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the
Philippines.

At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality
and constitutionality of her proclamation as president”, but saying he would give up his office to
avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a peition
for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the
respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not
until his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the
lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge
the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the
Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not
petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invoke immunity from suits.

HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.”

The Court made a distinction between the Aquino presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The
Court said that while the Aquino government was a government spawned by the direct demand
of the people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution, overthrowing the old government entirely, the
Arroyo government on the other hand was a government exercising under the 1987 constitution,
wherein only the office of the president was affected. In the former, the question of whether the
previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned subjects it to judicial review. The Court held
that the issue is legal and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned, there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is important to follow the succession of
events that struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace. Furthermore, the quoted statements
extracted from the Angara diaries, detailed Estrada’s implied resignation On top of all these, the
press release he issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oath-taking of Arroyo as president
despite his questioning of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the presidential seat for the sake
of peace. The Court held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use of the totality test: prior,
contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance
on the issue.

As to the issue of the petitioner’s contention that he is immune from suits, the Court held that
petitioner is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit. The Court added that, given the
intent of the 1987 Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public office is a public trust,
the petitioner, as a non-sitting President, cannot claim executive immunity for his alleged criminal
acts committed while a sitting President. From the deliberations, the intent of the framers is clear
that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term during
which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his term (time during which the officer may
claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall
succeed one another).

RUFINA PATIS FACTORY vs. ALUSITAIN

G. R. No. 146202. July 14, 2004

DECISION

From the June 23, 2000 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54722 affirming that
of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) awarding retirement benefits in the amount
of P88,595.00 to respondent Juan Alusitain (Alusitain), petitioners Rufina Patis Factory and Jesus
Lucas, Sr. (Lucas) come to this Court on a petition for review on certiorari.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

In March 1948, Alusitain was hired as a laborer at the Rufina Patis Factory owned and operated
by petitioner Lucas. After close to forty three years or on February 19, 1991, Alusitain admittedly
tendered his letter of resignation which is quoted verbatim:

“February 19, 1991

TO: MR. JESUS LUCAS, JR.

ASSISTANT MANAGER
RUFINA PATIS FACTORY

Gentlemen:
I would like to tender my separation letter as a laborer, from your good company effective this 20th of February
1991. May I take this opportunity to extent my heartfelt thanks to you for having given me the chance to
commit myself to work in your factory from which I owe varied experiences that has made a part of me and
be what I am today. Anticipating your outmost consideration on this matter. I remain.

VERY TRULY YOURS,

(Signed) JUAN A. ALUSITAIN
 RECEIVED THE ABOVE SEPARATION LETTER ON THIS DAY, FEBRUARY 20, 1991.

(Signed) BY: JESUS R. LUCAS, JR.

Assistant Manager”

On May 22, 1991, Alusitain executed a duly notarized affidavit of separation from employment
and submitted the same on even date to the Pensions Department of the Social Security System
(SSS). The affidavit reads:

“Republic of the Philippines )SSS

Quezon City )

AFFIDAVIT OF SEPARATION FROM EMPLOYMENT

I, JUAN ASERAS ALUSITAIN of legal age, 63, Filipino and residing at Int. 18 Flores St., Mal. Mla, after having
[been] sworn to in accordance with law hereby depose and state;

1. That I am [a] bonafide member of the Social Security System with SSS Number 03-0107252-0
2. That I was separated from my last employer RUFINA PATIS FACTORY with address at 290 C. Arellano St.,
Malabon, Metro Manila on 2-20-91 and thereafter, I was never again re-employed.
3. That I cannot secure a certification of separation from my last employer because I have not reached the
company applicable age of retirement.
4. That I am executing this affidavit to attest to the truth of the foregoing facts and to support my retirement
paper.
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

(Signed)
Affiant”

On January 7, 1993, Republic Act No. 7641 (R.A. 7641),[4] AN ACT AMENDING ARTICLE 287 OF
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 442, AS AMENDED OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LABOR CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, BY PROVIDING FOR RETIREMENT PAY TO QUALIFIED PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEES
IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY RETIRMENT PLAN IN THE ESTABLISHMENT, took effect[5] providing,
among other things, thusly:

Art. 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established
in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.

xxx

In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees
in the establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not
beyond sixty five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has
served at least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to
retirement pay equivalent to at least one half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a
fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.

Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one half (1/2) month salary shall mean
fifteen (15) days plus one twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not
more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.
xxx

Violation of this provision is hereby declared unlawful and subject to the penal provisions under
Article 288 of this Code.[6]

Sometime in 1995, Alusitain, claiming that he retired from the company on January 31, 1995,
having reached the age of 65[7] and due to poor health, verbally demanded from petitioner Lucas
for the payment of his retirement benefits. By his computation, he claimed that he was entitled
to P86,710.00[8] broken down as follows:

Retirement Benefits = month salary for every year of service

One-half month salary = P1,885.00

Years of Service = 47 years

Retirement Benefits = P86,710.00[9]

Petitioner Lucas, however, refused to pay the retirement benefits of Alusitain, prompting the
latter to make a written demand on September 20, 1995. Lucas, however, remained adamant in
his refusal to give in to Alusitains demands.

Having failed to arrive at an amicable settlement, Alusitain filed on November 17, 1995 a
complaint before the NLRC against petitioners Rufina Patis Factory and Lucas for non-payment of
retirement benefits. The complaint was docketed as NLRC Case No. 00-11-07474-95.

Petitioners maintained that Alusitain had resigned from the company on February 19, 1991 per
his letter of resignation and the Affidavit of Separation dated May 22, 1991.[10]

On the other hand, while respondent admitted having tendered his letter of resignation on
February 19, 1991 and executed the Affidavit of Separation on May 22, 1991,[11] he nevertheless
maintained that he continued working for petitioners until January 1995, the date of actual
retirement, due to illness and old age, and that he merely accomplished the foregoing documents
in compliance with the requirements of the SSS in order to avail of his retirement benefits.[12]

By Decision[13] of February 6, 1997, Executive Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Guanio upheld Alusitains
position in this wise:

After carefully considering the respective submissions of the parties and the evidence they
adduced in support of their opposing claims, this Office rules in favor of the complainant.

To substantiate his allegation that he had continued working for the respondents even after his
supposed resignation on February 19, 1991, the complainant submitted in evidence his sworn
statement and that of his eldest daughter, Gloria Alusitain. In his affidavit, the complainant swore
that: Bagamat ako ay pensionado ng SSS, ako ay patuloy na naglilingkod/nagtratrabaho sa
kompanya ng Rufina Patis Factory hanggang noong buwan ng Enero 1995. By way of
corroboration, his daughter on the other hand, stated under oath that since elementary school
(sic), she was the one who brought food to her father at work in the Rufina Patis Factory; and that
the last time she brought him food at the said factory was in the month of January 1995.

While the foregoing statements may appear to be self-serving, still they have the ring of truth.
From experience, it is quite common that the eldest daughter would be tasked with the duty of
taking lunch to her father at work. Besides, the respondents failed to controvert these sworn
declarations by submitting their counter-affidavits. If it is true that the complainant had in fact
stopped working on February 1991, the respondents could have produced a number of witnesses
who could have attested to this. Hence, their failure to submit even a single affidavit does not
speak well of their credibility in this regard.

Thus, this Office finds that the complainant had executed the letter of resignation and affidavit of
separation from employment in 1991 only for the purpose of securing a pension from the SSS, but
that despite this he remained in the employ of the respondents until his actual retirement on
January 31, 1995, two years after the effectivity of Republic Act 7641 on January 7, 1993. At the
time of his retirement, the complainant was already sixty-five (65) years of age and had served
the respondent company for forty-seven (47) years and therefore, he is legally entitled to the
retirement benefits granted by R.A. 7641 which is one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of
service which as computed will amount to a total of P88,595.00 (P1,885.00 x 47 years).

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the respondents
Rufina Patis Factory and Jesus Lucas, Sr., jointly and severally to pay complainant Juan Alusitain
his retirement benefits in the amount of P88,595.00.

SO ORDERED.[14]

On appeal, the NLRC, by Resolution[15] of May 17, 1999, affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision.

Aggrieved by the NLRC resolution, petitioners brought the case on certiorari[16] to the Court of
Appeals which, by the assailed decision, dismissed it, holding that the NLRC committed no error
much less any grave abuse of discretion[17] as Alusitain was able to sufficiently establish that his
letter of resignation and Affidavit of Separation were executed only for the purpose of securing a
pension from the SSS and that he remained in the employ of petitioners.[18]

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the Court of Appeals by Resolution[19]
of December 6, 2000, petitioners lodged the present petition.[20]

Petitioners argue that the appellate court erred when it did not give weight and probative value
to Alusitains letter of resignation and Affidavit of Separation, choosing instead to give credence
to his self-serving sworn statement and that of his daughter that he remained in the employ of
petitioners until January 31, 1995.

Petitioners assert that the Affidavit of Separation, being a public document, is entitled to full faith
and credit upon its face, and proof is required to assail and controvert the same, citing Cacho v.
Court of Appeals[21] and Arrieta v. Llosa.[22]

Petitioners further assert that the appellate court erred in applying retroactively R.A. 7641 as said
law does not expressly provide for such retroactive application and to do so would defeat the
clear intent of Congress. Furthermore, petitioners insist that the case of Oro Enterprises, Inc. v.
NLRC[23] is inapplicable and submit that what is controlling is the case of J.V. Angeles Construction
Corp. v. NLRC[24] where this Court held that before R.A. 7641 could be given retroactive effect,
the claimant should still be an employee of the employer at the time the said law took effect,.

The petition is impressed with merit.

This Court held in Oro[25] that R.A. 7641 should be given retroactive effect, viz:

R.A. 7641 is undoubtedly a social legislation. The law has been enacted as a labor protection
measure and as a curative statute that absent a retirement plan devised by, an agreement with,
or a voluntary grant from, an employer can respond, in part at least, to the financial well-being of
workers during their twilight years soon following their life of labor. There should be little doubt
about the fact that the law can apply to labor contracts still existing at the time the statute has
taken effect, and that its benefits can be reckoned not only from the date of the laws enactment
but retroactively to the time said employment contracts have started. . .[26] (Underscoring
supplied)

The doctrine enunciated in Oro has been clarified in several cases. In CJC Trading, Inc. v. NLRC,[27]
this Court, speaking through Justice Florentino Feliciano, held that R.A. 7641 may be given
retroactive effect where (1) the claimant for retirement benefits was still the employee of the
employer at the time the statute took effect; and (2) the claimant had complied with the
requirements for eligibility under the statute for such retirement benefits.[28] These twin
requirements for the retroactive application of R.A. 7641 have been reiterated in Philippine Scout
Veterans Security and Investigation Agency v. NLRC,[29] Cabcaban v. NLRC,[30] J.V. Angeles
Construction Corporation v. NLRC,[31] and Manuel L. Quezon University v. NLRC.[32]

It is thus clear that in order for respondent to claim retirement benefits from petitioner Rufina
Patis Factory, he has to prove that he was its employee at the time R.A. 7641 took effect.

As a general rule, the factual findings and conclusions of quasi-judicial agencies such as the NLRC
are, on appeal, accorded great weight and even finality, unless petitioners are able to show that
the NLRC arbitrarily disregarded the evidence before it or misapprehended evidence of such
nature as to compel a contrary conclusion if properly appreciated.[33]

In affirming the decision of the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter, the Court of Appeals disregarded
Alusitains letter of resignation and Affidavit of Separation and gave weight to his and his daughters
sworn statements that he remained in the employ of petitioners until January 31, 1995.

It is a basic rule in evidence, however, that the burden of proof is on the part of the party who
makes the allegations[34] ei incumbit probatio, qui dicit, non qui negat.[35] If he claims a right
granted by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence, relying on the strength of his
own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of his opponent.

In the case at bar, it was incumbent on Alusitain to prove that he retired on January 31, 1995 and
not on February 20, 1991 as indicated on his letter of resignation. As the following discussion will
show, he utterly failed to discharge the onus.
Respondents letter of resignation and May 22, 1991 Affidavit of Separation which he admittedly
voluntarily executed constitute admissions against his own interest.[36] The said documents belie
his claim that he retired on January 31, 1995. Being an admission against interest, the documents
are the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.[37] The rationale
for the rule is based on the presumption that no man would declare anything against himself
unless such declaration was true.[38] Thus, it is fair to presume that the declaration corresponds
with the truth, and it is his fault if it does not.[39]

While these two documents may have facilitated the release of Alusitains retirement benefits
from the SSS, hence, beneficial to him at that time, they may still be considered admissions against
interest since the disserving quality of the admission is judged as of the time it is used or offered
in evidence and not when such admission is made.[40] Thus, it matters not that the admission is
self-serving when it was made, so long as it is against respondents present claim.[41]

No doubt, admissions against interest may be refuted by the declarant.[42] It bears stressing,
however, that Alusitains Affidavit of Separation filed with the SSS is a notarial document,[43]
hence, prima facie evidence[44] of the facts expressed therein.[45]

Since notarial documents have in their favor the presumption of regularity, to contradict the facts
stated therein, there must be evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.[46]

Alusitain explains through his subsequent sworn statement that he only executed these two
documents in order to obtain his retirement benefits from the SSS. His daughter, also by sworn
statement, corroborates his explanation. His position does not persuade.

In order for a declarant to impugn a notarial document which he himself executed, it is not enough
for him to merely execute a subsequent notarial document. What the law requires in order to
contradict the facts stated in a notarial document is clear and convincing evidence. The
subsequent notarial documents executed by respondent and his daughter fall short of this
standard.

The case of Reyes v. Zaballero[47] is instructive. In said case, the creditor executed on December
1, 1944 a notarial document stating that he was releasing a real estate mortgage as the debtor
had already paid his debt. On even date, the creditor subsequently executed an affidavit without
the debtors knowledge stating that he had accepted the payment under protest and obligado por
las circunstancias actuales. This Court held that the creditors statement in his affidavit that he
received the money obligado por las circunstancias actuales is self-serving evidence.[48]

A contrary rule would undermine the confidence of the public in the integrity of notarial
documents. In Dequito v. Llamas,[49] this Court held:

After executing the affidavit voluntarily wherein he made admissions and declarations against his
own interest under the solemnity of an oath, he cannot be allowed to spurn them and undo what
he has done. He cannot, even with great repentance, retrieve the body he forsook and now wishes
to live.[50]
Neither is the sworn statement of Alusitains daughter sufficient to prove that he indeed retired
on January 31, 1995. The February 6, 1997 Decision of Labor Arbiter Guanio relates the material
portion of the sworn statement of Alusitains daughter as follows:

. . . By way of corroboration, his daughter on the other hand, stated under oath that since
elementary school (sic), she was the one who brought food to her father at work in the Rufina
Patis Factory; and that the last time she brought him food at the said factory was in the month of
January 1995.[51] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Alusitains daughter did not state, however, that her father worked for petitioner Rufina Patis
Factory until his alleged retirement on January 31, 1995. All she said was that the last time she
brought him food at the factory was in January 1995. To conclude that Alusitain was still employed
on January 1995 from the mere fact that his daughter brought him food at the Rufina Patis Factory
is non sequitur.

Lastly, while it is evident that Alusitains subsequent sworn statement is in the nature of a
retraction of his May 22, 1991 Affidavit of Separation, such retraction does not necessarily negate
the affidavit. For retractions are generally unreliable and looked upon with considerable disfavor
by the courts as they can easily be fabricated. Thus, before accepting a retraction, it is necessary
to examine the circumstances surrounding it and possible motives for reversing the previous
declaration, as these motives may not necessarily be in consonance with the truth. To
automatically adopt them hook, line and sinker would allow unscrupulous individuals to throw
wide open the doors to fraud.

In the case at bar, Alusitains retraction is highly suspect. Other than his bare and self-serving
allegations and the sworn statement of his daughter which, as reflected above, cannot be relied
upon, he has not shown any scintilla of evidence that he was employed with petitioner Rufina
Patis Factory at the time R.A. 7641 took effect. He did not produce any documentary evidence
such as pay slips, income tax return, his identification card, or any other independent evidence to
substantiate his claim.

While the NLRC and its Labor Arbiters are not bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence
in the adjudication of cases,[52] this should not be construed as a license to disregard
fundamental rules on evidence in proving ones allegations.[53]

In fine, Alusitain having failed to prove that he was an employee of petitioner at the time R.A.
7641 took effect, his claim for retirement benefits thereunder must be disallowed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals June 23, 2000 Decision and
December 6, 2000 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 54722 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
Yujuico vs Republic
537 SCRA 513, 2007

Facts:
 In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration and confirmation of her
title over a parcel of land with an area of 17,343 square meters covered by plan (LRC) Psu-
964 located in the Municipality of Paraaque, Province of Rizal (now Paraaque City), in the
Pasig-Rizal Court of First Instance (CFI),
 The application was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and by Mercedes
Dizon
 Castro won the case
 He sold it to the petitioner of this case
o petitioner subdivided the land to two lots, one for him and the other to petitioner
Carpio
 Annotations at the back of TCT No. 446386 show that Yujuico had, at one time or another,
mortgaged the lot to the Philippine Investments System Organization (PISO) and Citibank
o . Annotations in the title of petitioner Carpio reveal the lot was mortgaged in favor
of Private Development Corporation (PDC), Rizal Commercial Banking
Corporation (RCBC) and then Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB)
and the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to secure various loans.
 Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1085 was enacted. This gave lands in the offshore and
foreshore areas to Public Estates Authority (PEA).
 Some of the land included the land of petitioner.
 Petitioner filed for removal of cloud or quiteting of title.
 . On May 15, 1998 the parties entered into a compromise agreement
 the parties executed a Deed of Exchange of Real Property, pursuant to the compromise
agreement, where the PEA property with an area of 1.4007 hectares would be conveyed to
Jesus Yujuico and petitioner Carpio in exchange for their property with a combined area
of 1.7343 hectares.
 But the President of PEA did not give his approval, hence filed a petition for relief from
the compromise agreement on the basis of mistake and excusable negligence.
 respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, alleged that when the land
registered to Castro was surveyed by Engr. H. Obreto on August 3, 1972 and subsequently
approved by the LRC on April 23, 1973, the land was still a portion of Manila Bay as
evidenced by Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243, Surveys to 1980
 More significantly, respondent Republic argued that, first, since the subject land was still
underwater, it could not be registered in the name of Fermina Castro.Second, the land
registration court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable lands, thus the decision
adjudicating the subject parcel of land to Fermina Castro was void. And third, the titles of
Yujuico and Carpio, being derived from a void title, were likewise void.[9]
 The CA observed that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use
and, therefore, not registrable and their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert
the same into properties of private ownership or confer title upon the registrant.

Issue:
Is a reversion suit proper in this case? (2) Is the present petition estopped by laches? (3) Did the
CA erroneously apply the principle of res judicata

Ruling:
 No. The instant Civil Case No. 01-0222 for annulment and cancellation of Decree No. N-
150912 and its derivative titles was filed on June 8, 2001 with the Paraaque City RTC. It
is clear therefore that the reversion suit was erroneously instituted in the Paraaque RTC
and should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
 This was not done in this case. The Republic misfiled the reversion suit with the Paraaque
RTC. It should have been filed with the CA as required by Rule 47.Evidently, the Paraaque
RTC had no jurisdiction over the instant reversion case.
 Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities when as in this case, the lot
was already alienated to innocent buyers for value and the government did not undertake
any act to contest the title for an unreasonable length of time
 Considering that innocent purchaser for value Yujuico bought the lot in 1974, and more
than 27 years had elapsed before the action for reversion was filed, then said action is now
barred by laches
 . Section 32 of PD 1592 recognized the rights of an innocent purchaser for value over and
above the interests of the government
 There is no allegation that Yujuico was a buyer in bad faith, nor did he acquire the land
fraudulently. He thus had the protection of the Torrens System that every subsequent
purchaser of registered land taking a certificate of title for value and in good faith shall
hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on the certificate
 When respondent government filed the reversion case in 2001, 27 years had already elapsed
from the time the late Jesus Yujuico purchased the land from the original owner Castro.
After the issuance of OCT No. 10215 to Castro, no further action was taken by the
government to question the issuance of the title to Castro until the case of Public Estates
Authority, brought up in the oral argument before this Court on September 6, 2000
 Clearly from the above, Firestone is a precedent case. The Public Estates Authority had
become final and thus the validity of OCT No. 10215 issued to Castro could no longer be
questioned.
 On the other hand, the Namria Hydrographic Map No. 4243 does not reveal what portion
of Manila Bay was Castros lot located in 1974. Moreover, a hydrographic map is not the
best evidence to show the nature and location of the lot subject of a land registration
application
 More so, respondent Government, through its counsel, admits that the land applied by
Fermina Castro in 1973 was solid and dry land, negating the nebulous allegation that said
land is underwater. The only conclusion that can be derived from the admissions of the
Solicitor General and Government Corporate Counsel is that the land subject of the titles
of petitioners is alienable land beyond the reach of the reversion suit of the state
 The waiver by PEA of its right to question petitioners title is fortified by the manifestation
by PEA in the Joint Motion for Judgment based on Compromise Agreement
 The recognition of petitioners legal ownership of the land is further bolstered by the
categorical and unequivocal acknowledgment made by PEA in its September 30, 2003
letter
 In sum, the Court finds that the reversion case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
on the part of the Paraaque RTC. Even if we treat said case as a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the case
nevertheless has to be upheld because it is already barred by laches. Even if laches is
disregarded, still the suit is already precluded by res judicata in view of the peculiar facts
and circumstances obtaining therein.
Republic of the Philippines vs. Kenrick Development Corporation
G.R. No. 149576, August 8, 2006

DOCTRINE: A counsel’s authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not
delegate it to just any person. The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he
has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.

NATURE OF THE CASE: The case is a petition under Rule 45 as an appeal to the ruling of the CA
against the Republic and lifting the trial court’s order of default against Kenrick for failure to file
an answer to the Republic’s complaint.

FACTS:
Kenrick built a concrete fence around some parts of the land behind the Civil Aviation Training
Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) claiming ownership over those lands. Its
encroachment resulted to the dispossession of ATO of some 30,228 square meters of prime land.
Kenrick justified its action by presenting TCTs issued in its name and which allegedly originated
from a TCT registered in the name of Alfonso Concepcion.

When ATO verified the TCTs, the Registrar of Deeds reported that it has no record of them and
that their ascendant title, allegedly in the name of Concepcion, was non-existent in their office.
Thus, the OSG filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title
in behalf of the Republic against Concepcion and Kenrick. Kenrick filed an answer which was
allegedly signed by its counsel Atty. Onofre Garlitos Jr. When Concepcion could not be located
and be served with summons, the trial court ordered the issuance of an alias summons by
publication against him.

While the case was pending, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on Justice and
Human Rights investigated Kenrick’s acquisition of fake titles. During the hearing, Atty. Garlitos
was summoned and testified that he prepared Kenrick’s answer and transmitted an unsigned
draft to Kenrick’s president, Victor Ong. Apparently, the signature appearing above Garlitos’ name
was not his, he did not authorized anyone to sign it in his behalf, and he did not know who finally
signed it.

Republic: It filed an urgent motion to declare Kenrick and Concepcion in default for failure to file
a valid answer because the person who signed it was not the counsel for the respondents. Thus,
the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Under Sec. 3, Rule 7 of the ROC, an unsigned
pleading is a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.

RTC: It granted the Republic’s motion. It ruled Kenrick’s answer “to be a sham and false and
intended to defeat the purpose of the rules.” It also ordered that the answer be stricken from the
records, declared Kenrick in default and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex parte.

Republic: It presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and formally offered its
evidence.

Kenrick: Its motion for reconsideration was denied. So, it elevated the matter to the CA via a
petition for certiorari.
CA: It assailed the RTC’s decision. It granted Kenrick’s petition for certiorari and lifted the trial
court’s order of default against Kenrick Then, it ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with
dispatch. It ruled so because it found Atty. Garlitos’ statements in the legislative hearing to be
unreliable since they were not subjected to cross-examination. It also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos’
acts after the filing of the answer and concluded that he assented to the signing of the answer by
somebody in his stead.

Republic: It moved for reconsideration but was denied, hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Kenrick failed to file a valid answer on the ground that its pleading was unsigned
by its counsel Atty. Garlitos.

HELD:
Yes. Pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 7, a pleading must be “signed by the party or counsel representing
him.” The law is clear, and the counsel’s duty and authority to sign a pleading is personal to him
and may not be delegated to just any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that, to
the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and that
it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature,
who can certify to these matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which is
reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing of
a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is not.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task
which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified persons, something

the law strongly proscribes.

Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was
void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could have
been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos’ subsequent acts.

Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos
consented to the signing of the answer by another “as long as it conformed to his draft.” We give
no value whatsoever to such self-serving statement.

No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the
answer. The trial court correctly ruled that respondent’s answer was invalid and of no legal effect
as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was
rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte.
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true that
its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that could be
set aside.

Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities have
their own valid raison d’etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush them
aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice.

The Court’s pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals is relevant:

Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants
alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances,
allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation
and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that
every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly
and speedy administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive of
reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. In this case,
respondent failed to show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly abiding
by the rules.

As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in violation
of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his possible
misconduct.

EL VARADERO DE MANILA vs. INSULAR LUMBER COMPANY

46 Phil 176, 15 September 1924

Topic: Compromises
Keywords: Lighter Tatlo, exorbitant repair cost

FACTS:
INSULAR LUMBER had a lighter 1 called” Tatlo” which was to be repaired by EL VARADERO de
Manila. The work was performed pursuant to no express agreement, but with the implicit
understanding that the price would be as low as, or lower than, could be, secured from any other
company. When repairs were completed and EL VARADERO gave INSULAR LUMBER the bill, the
latter (INSULAR LUMBER) refused to pay because it was of the opinion that the price was grossly
exorbitant. INSULAR LUMBER, hence, offered a compromise, but they disagreed. Hence, they
went to court. In the CFI, they entered a compromise again. Ultimately, they never settled on an
agreed figure, coz CFI merely adopted INSULAR LUMBER’s proposal (CFI was so impressed with
their testimony). Dissatisfied, EL VARADERO appealed to SC (no appeal to CA was mentioned).

ISSUE:
Whether the compromise must be excluded in arriving at a correct figure of liability? NO.
The general rule is that an offer of compromise is inadmissible. Where, however, the amount
named in the offer to accept a certain sum in settlement appears to have been arrived at as a fair
estimate of value, it is relevant. The rule of exclusion of compromise negotiations does not apply
where there is no denial expressed or implied of liability, and the only questions discussed relate
to the amount to be paid (as in this case). HELD: On the facts, that the reasonable value of the
repairs performed by El Varádero de Manila on the lighter Tatlo owned by INSULAR LUMBER
Company, was P7,700.

FACTS:
INSULAR LUMBER had a lighter 2 called” Tatlo” which was to be repaired by EL VARADERO de
Manila. The work was performed pursuant to no express agreement, but with the implicit
understanding that the price would be as low as, or lower than, could be, secured from any other
company. EL VARADERO completed satisfactorily the repairs on the lighter Tatlo. However,
INSULAR LUMBER was of the opinion that the bill as presented by El Varadero de Manila was
grossly exorbitant. Hence, INSULAR LUMBER proposed a compromise. But, this having failed of
realization, the matter was taken to court. At the CFI, these few salient facts influenced the
judgment of the CFI. The itemized bill presented by EL VARADERO, the amount which it still claims,
totals P12,412.62. At one time during the course of the negotiations, EL VARADERO was willing to
accept P10,241.37. The witnesses for EL VARADERO naturally took the view that the bill was
correct. But the trial judge was of the opinion that it was excessive.

INSULAR LUMBER, on the other hand, says that a reasonable figure for the work would be
P5,310.70. Witnesses were offered to substantiate this contention. Their testimony so impressed
the trial judge that he adopted their statements as his own. During the course of the abortive
negotiations, however, INSULAR LUMBER expressed a willingness to pay EL VARADERO P8,070.12.

CFI-Manila RULING: El Varadero de Manila secured judgment against INSULAR LUMBER Company
in the amount of P5,310.70, with legal interest from the presentation of the complaint, and costs.

Dissatisfied, EL VARADERO appealed to SC and asked to increase the amount of the judgment to
P12,412.62.

ISSUE:
Whether the compromise must be excluded in arriving at a correct figure of liability?

HELD:
Judgment is modified, and in lieu of the judgment rendered in the lower court, another shall issue
in favor of EL VARADERO and against INSULAR LUMBER for the recovery of P7,700, with legal
interest to begin to run from the date when this judgment shall become final and to continue until
payment, without express finding as to costs in either instance. So ordered.

RATIO: SC considered 3 points which assisted them in rendering judgment:

1st point - GR: Compromise is inadmissible. Where, however, the amount named in the offer to
accept a certain sum in settlement appears to have been arrived at as a fair estimate of value, it
is relevant. Here, there was no denial of liability and the only question discussed was the amount
to be paid which EL VARADERO insisted should not be less than P10,241.37, and which INSULAR
LUMBER insisted should not be more than P8,070.12.

2nd point - testimony of one Mariano Yengko, a disinterested witness and is an inspector of
vessels, assessed the fair value of the repairs at P5,134.20, but which, on cross examination, he
raised to between 7K and 8K.

3rd point - the tacit understanding between the parties was that the cost of the repairs should be
approximately the same as what other companies would charge. INSULAR LUMBER admits that El
Varadero de Navotas (another branch of El Varadero) would have done the work for about P8,000.
Basing our findings, therefore, on the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion that the
reasonable value of the repairs performed by El Varadero de Manila on the Tatlo owned by
INSULAR LUMBER Company, was something less than P8,000. We fix the sum definitely at P7,700.

PEOPLE v. MAQUI
GR No. L-8931, March 14, 1914

SUMMARY: Maqui was convicted of theft of a female carabao. In his appeal, his counsel contends
that Maqui's extrajudicial statements to compromise during the pendency of the case should be
excluded on the ground that there was no proof on record that they were made voluntarily. SC
ruled that the record clearly discloses that Maqui offered to compromise voluntarily, hoping that
if accepted, he would escape prosecution.

DOCTRINE: Evidence of offers to compromise are admitted. An offer of compromise, voluntarily

made by the accused, without threat or promise, and the reply thereto, are admissible in evidence
upon his trial for a crime.

FACTS:
Defendant Maqui was convicted in the trial court of theft of a caraballa (female carabao) and her
calf. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 5 years, to pay accessory penalties and to pay his
share for the costs of the proceedings. Hence this appeal. 2. Maqui's counsel contends that the
extrajudicial statements made by Maqui should be excluded on the ground that there is no formal
proof on the record that they were made voluntarily, and are therefore inadmissible as proof
insofar as they can be construed as a confession of guilt.

ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in admitting certain extrajudicial admissions alleged to have been made
by Maqui, including an offer to compromise the case by payment of a sum of money?

RULING:
NO. SC ruled that there was NO suggestion in the trial court's record to indicate that these
extrajudicial statements by Maqui were NOT made voluntarily. 2. As long as the evidence as to
the circumstances under which the said incriminating statements were made to be accepted as
true, it clearly rebuts the possibility that they were made involuntarily or were extorted.

In this case, the record clearly discloses that Maqui's extrajudicial statements were made in the
course of his offer to compromise and that they were voluntarily made by Maqui in the hope that
if accepted, he would escape prosecution.
RULE: Evidence of offers to compromise are admitted. But the accused is allowed to show that
such offers were not made under a guilty conscience, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of
imprisonment or another reason which would justify the accused's claim that the offer to
compromise was not an admission of guilt, but an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which
would ordinarily ensue therefrom.

US v. Hunter: If the accused, under a guilty conscience, repays/satisfies the original owner of the
goods he stole, this is admissible as evidence. But if the accused did this merely to avoid the
convenience of imprisonment and not under a consciousness of guilt, it is not evidence.
Comparing this to our current case: Since Maqui made the extrajudicial statements voluntarily,
then his statements can be admitted.

State v. Bruce: An offer of compromise, voluntarily made by the accused, without threat or
promise, and the reply thereto, are admissible in evidence upon his trial for a crime.

State v. Rodriguez: An offer of compromise of a crime, unaccepted by the prosecutor, may be

proven by the State as an admission of guilt, or as disclosing possession of the property which is
the subject of the burglary and larceny challenged in the indictment.

Justice Carson was kind of racist in this case. Although he applied the "mitigating circumstance"
of "lack of manifest instruction and education" to Maqui, he based it on the fact that even if he's
not a member of "an uncivilized tribe of Igorots", Maqui is still a densely ignorant and untutored
fellow. Justice Carson goes on to say that there should be no presumption arising from racial
affiliation, but I think he contradicted himself in that statement.

Hence, the penalty applicable to Maqui is that of presidio correccional in its medium degree.
(Applying the mitigating circumstance of lack of manifest instruction and education) Penalty is
modified to 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of presidio correccional.

US vs. TORRES
G.R. No. L-10566, August 20, 1915

DECISION
The record in this case has come before us on appeal by both defendants from the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Cebu whereby they were convicted of a violation of Act No. 1761.
Regino Torres was sentenced to imprisonment for three years. Pablo Padilla to one year and one
month, and each to pay one-half of the costs. The three tins of opium, the corpus delicti, were
ordered confiscated.

On examination of the record it appears:

That the testimony of George W. Walker and Juan Samson, secret service agents of the Cebu
Customhouse who arrested the defendants, and the seizure of the corpus delicti (Exhibits A, B,
and C) were held by the trial court to be conclusive evidence against defendants.

That Walker testified that he had received information that on the night of January 20, 1914,
Regino Torres would go to the house of the widow of one Franco to get some opium; that at 7:30
that evening they stationed themselves in Calle de Colon, where the said house stood, and a short
while afterwards saw the two defendants come out of the door of the garage on the premises;
that Samson seized Torres, and as Padilla started to run away Walker went in pursuit of him and
on passing by Samson and Torres saw two tins of opium; that three times he ordered Padilla to
halt, and, as the latter continued to run, after he had thrown one tin over a fence; that, after the
arrest of both defendants, Walker and Samson set out with lights to search for the tins and found
the one thrown by Padilla inside the inclosure, and the other two tins, about a meter from the
place where Samson had been holding Torres.

That the other officer, Samson, gave nearly the same testimony. He added, however, when
questioned by the defense as to whether Walker had said anything to him on his return from his
pursuit of Padilla, that Walker did say that he saw Regino Torres throw away two tins and that he
was looking for them. He was also asked by the defense whether Walker had proposed to the
defendants that they pay a fine in the form of a compromise, to which he replied that he had not,
but that, on the contrary, it was the defendants who made this offer.

That the defendant Regino Torres testified that Padilla told him that there was a large amount of
opium, and they agreed that at 6 o'clock in the evening they would go to the house above
mentioned; that Padilla went to Torres' house at 6 o'clock in the evening and hurried him up,
saying: "Eat in a hurry, for the owner of the opium needs money"; that when they arrived at the
house of Franco's widow, Padilla entered the door of the place where the automobiles were kept,
and five minutes afterwards called witness to enter the garage and there Padilla showed Torres a
tin of opium, at the same time saying that it was first class and cost P60 without haggling; that
witness replied that he would first show it to some trustworthy friends to determine its class; that
Padilla agreed and they both left for this purpose, but that when they had gone about ten brazas
from the door, he was seized by Samson and saw that Padilla had run away and was being pursued
by Walker. The court asked Torres whether he had wished to investigate first and buy afterwards,
to which he replied that he did, and that if he had been convinced of the quality of the opium he
would have bought about 20 or 25 tins. "But have you so much money?" inquired the judge. The
defendant replied: "Yes, sir."

That, upon arraignment, Pablo Padilla pleaded guilty. "The defendant's counsel," says the trial
court in his decision, "requested that his client be permitted to state the circumstances that
surrounded the case and which induced this defendant to commit the crime under prosecution."
The court further says therein: "It is preferable that counsel himself state the circumstances that,
in his opinion, attended the crime and which may be considered as extenuating."

Pantaleon del Rosario, Padilla's counsel, stated that according to the information given by his
client, the latter is a poor man who accompanied the other defendant Regino Torres principally
in order that, in case they were caught by the authorities, Torres might transfer the material
possession of the opium to counsel's client and the latter would assume liability for such
possession and suffer the legal consequences.

That the trial court took that statement into consideration in extenuation of the penalty he
imposed upon Padilla, concluding by saying that this defendant appeared to a be a poor man who,
impelled by poverty, had accompanied Torres for the purpose, as every probability indicated, of
obtaining a relatively small share in the business in which Torres was engaged; while, with respect
to Torres, the court said that he played the most important role, for he confessed to have
sufficient means to purchase opium to the amount of twenty tins at P60 a tin.
From the judgment of conviction Regino Torres bases his appeal on four assignments of error: (1)
In that the trial court concluded that two tins were taken from the appellant's possession; (2) in
holding that the appellant, in his testimony, confessed to having been engaged in the business of
buying and selling opium, and in grounding the judgment of conviction on the said confession; (4)
in accepting, as evidence for the prosecution, the compromise that it is asserted he proposed to
the agent George Walker; and (5), in that the penalty imposed upon the appellant was excessive.

Pablo Padilla bases his appeal only on this last assignment.

Errors 1, 2, and 3 will not lie. Where a person entertains an offer to sell, goes to the house where
the sale is to be affected, making haste because the vendor needs money and because he was
urged to do so by the agent who made him the offer, enters the house, examines the article,
leaves the house with three tins which contained the thing offered for sale and which is a
prohibited article by reason of its being opium, and if the purchaser is not a person authorized to
have it in his possession, it can not be held that the purchaser took the three tins with him to
sample their contents; such a purpose must be proven and unless it is there can be no other
inference than that he carried away with him the thing purchased and that its acquisition was a
consummated fact, for the presumption is that the acts took place in the ordinary course of things
and the general routine of dealings between men, and it cannot be doubted that the person who
had the control over the opium at the moment it was seized, whoever it was that carried it, could
be no other than the owner of the money which the vendor so urgently desired to acquire on that
day in exchange for the opium. Civil possession is the holding of a thing by a person with the
intention of acquiring ownership thereof (Civ. Code, art. 430). It was Torres who had the intention
of having the opium as belonging to him, and as he intended, so he had it, and it was afterwards
taken from him, as being a thing that he could not hold, possess nor lawfully have as his own.
Padilla was not the owner of the money which the person who sold the opium needed. Padilla
was but an agent who made the offer to Torres. Padilla had not intention of holding, possessing
and having as his own the opium which, on the part of another, he had offered to Torres. The
possession or material holding in this case gives way to the civil possession which, according to
Torres' confession, was the reason that took him to the house of Franco's widow, thus putting
into effect the intention to possess which he had a priori entertained as the cause of his presence
in the place of the sale. After all, the seizure of the two tins at a place one meter away from the
spot where Torres was arrested by Samson, and the seizure of one tin in the possession of Padilla,
who had thrown it into an inclosure, are facts held by the trial court to have been proven, and this
finding, which does not violate any law and which we do not find to be erroneous, should not be
changed in this review of the evidence. We confirm the finding and hold that it is in accord with
the merits of the case.

With regard to the fourth cause of action, the facts are as follows: The witness, Walker, testified,
among other things, that Regino Torres endeavored to compromise the case and that he (Walker)
was willing to accept the compromise thought through the payment of P1,500, but subject to the
approval of his superiors. The defense asked that this testimony be stricken out, alleging that, in
accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, the compromise in such cases must be made in
writing. "When made in civil cases, it is proper; but in criminal causes, it is not," the court said,
and accordingly overruled the objection. The defense excepted.
We have already seen above what Samson's testimony was concerning this point and how thereby
he corroborated that given by Walker.

An offer to compromise is not a confession of debt and is not admissible in evidence (Code of Civ.
Proc., sec. 346). In a criminal cause for theft (U.S. vs. Maqui, 27 Phil. Rep., 97) this court said that
the weight both of authority and reason sustains the rule which admits evidence of offers to
compromise, in criminal cases, but permits the accused to show that such offers were not made
under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of imprisonment or for
some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that the offer to compromise was
not in truth an admission of his guilt and an attempt to avoid the legal consequences which would
ordinarily ensue therefrom.

It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right to penalize, that in
the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, in so far as public vengeance
and private interests are concerned, no compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the
penal action, however it may be with respect to the civil liability. But section 25 of Act No. 1761,
under which this cause was prosecuted, expressly authorizes the Collector of Internal Revenue to
compromise a case after action has been begun, "instead of commencing or prosecuting suit
thereon." The words in quotation marks are textual. A compromise necessarily implies two
elements, one of which is the offer and the other the acceptance, in order that the penal action
may be extinguished and there remain only the civil liability to deal with. Of course ordinarily it is
the defendant who makes the offer, — a lawful act sanctioned by law in this class of prosecutions,
— and because it is made, no presumption of guilt must be raised against the maker, as occurs in
other criminal causes for public crimes in which the offer is not lawful because it is a thing
prohibited by law. The offer may have been prompted simply to avoid the annoyance of a
prosecution, as sometimes happens in a civil case where a person involved in the litigation is
perhaps entirely in the right but prefers to lose a sum of money rather than commence and
prosecute an action. This case is, therefore, on all fours with that of section 346 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, above cited. At all events, for the conviction of the defendants it is not necessary
to consider and weigh this evidence; it could only be considered as cumulative, and it was not
taken into account by the trial court.

With regard to the 5th assignment of error which alleges that the penalty was excessive, it must
be remembered that the trial court exercised his discretion in fixing the penalty within the limits
established by law and that, in principle, what is authorized by law cannot be held to be arbitrary.
But the penalty imposed by the trial court in his discretion will not necessarily have to stand for
that reason. If such a principle governed, appeals would be useless. This Supreme Court also
exercises its discretion, and, in a higher degree, by its right of review in criminal causes brought
up on appeal or consultation and of high inspection over the administration of justice, it has the
power to modify within the limits of the penalty provided by law, in order to maintain uniformity
in its application. If judicial decisions vary in the different provinces of the Archipelago, even in
identical or at least analogous cases, it is principally due to the fact that the judges, acquainted
with the extent of crime in their respective jurisdictions, are justified, in order to suppress crime,
in applying the law more strictly and severely in some provinces than in others in accordance with
the greater or lesser propensity to disobey the laws and the peculiar circumstances that prevail in
each locality. But within the same province such variation would not be justifiable, as it would
transgress the law which fits the penalty to the crime. In the Province of Cebu the court sentenced
Lao Lock Hing, for the possession of 70 tins of opium, to five years' imprisonment and a fine of
P10,000, or, in case of insolvency, to subsidiary imprisonment; but this Supreme Court reduced
the penalty to two years' imprisonment and a fine of P3,000 (14 Phil. Rep., 861). In the same
Province of Cebu, Miguel Villano was charged with having bought and sold 190 tins of opium —
although one of the charges was for 100 tins only, valued at P3,000, because the 190 tins were
received on different dates — and was sentenced on the charge for the 100 tins, to one year and
two months' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P2,500, a judgment which was affirmed by this
Supreme Court (18 Phil. Rep., 3592). In another cause, also tried in Cebu against one Loo Chaw
for the sale of 30 tins of opium, the penalty imposed was one year's imprisonment and a fine of
P2,000; this also was affirmed by this Supreme Court (19 Phil. Rep., 3433).

The foregoing sentences are in notable contrast to the case at bar in which Regino Torres is
sentenced to three years' imprisonment for the possession of two tins of opium, valued at scarcely
P120, and Pablo Padilla to one year and one month for the possession of one tin of the same drug,
worth probably P60.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the understanding that the imprisonment to be
imposed upon Regino Torres shall be that of nine months, and that upon Pablo Padilla, six months,
each of them to pay the costs of this instance in equal shares. So ordered.

PEOPLE VS. GODOY

G.R. Nos. 115908-09, December 6, 1995

FACTS:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the RTC in view of the death sentence imposed upon
Danny Godoy, who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape and
kidnapping with serious illegal detention.

Complainant Mia Taha alleged that Godoy, her Physics Teacher and a married man raped her first
on Jan. 21, 1994 in her cousin’s boarding. As Godoy was about to rape her, a knife was pointed at
her neck. As such, she was not able to resist. The next day, Godoy came by their house and asked
the permission of her parents if she can join him in soliciting funds, since Mia was a candidate for
Ms. Palawan National School (PNS). Mia’s parents allowed her to go with Godoy and she was
allegedly brought to the Sunset Garden Motel where she was repeatedly raped again. After three
days, they transferred to Edward’s subdivision where she was kept in a lodging house and was
again raped.

During this time, a police blotter had already been placed for the missing Mia. She was later
released by Godoy after a certain Naem interceded and only after her parents agreed to settle
the case. It was after Mia’s return that her parents accompanied her to a medico-legal which
found lacerations in her vagina concluding that “she just had sexual intercourse.” She and her
mother Helen went to the police and executed sworn statements stating that the accused Godoy
had raped and abducted Mia.

Godoy denied that he raped Mia Taha. He admitted having had sex with her and that they indeed
stayed in Sunset Gardens and in Edward’s Subdivision, but it was because they were lovers and
that Mia had consented to their having sex. To support his claim that they were lovers, he
presented two letters supposedly delivered to him by Mia’s cousin, Lorna, in the provincial jail
while he was detained. There Mia explained that it was her parents who forced her to testify
against him.

The delivery of the letters was denied by Lorna but the defense presented the provincial jail guard
on duty on the supposed dates of the delivery and testified that indeed Lorna had visited Godoy
on said dates. Several witnesses were also presented including two former teachers of Mia who
knew the handwriting on the two said letters as belonging to Mia. Other witnesses were
presented by the defense attesting that they saw the two together in a manner that was
affectionate and cordial, prior to the said “kidnapping” and even during such.

Issues:
Whether or not the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused?
Whether or not in rape cases, the complainant's claim of having been threatened can be taken as
a matter of judicial notice?

Ruling:
The basic rule remains that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense
which the accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any
material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution
has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt and
the accused must be acquitted.
No, the prosecution failed to prove guilt of Godoy. The trial court made no serious effort to
dispassionately or impartially consider the totality of the evidence for the prosecution in spite of
the teaching in various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the offended party must not
be accepted with precipitate credulity. In finding that the crime of rape was committed, the lower
court took into account only that portion of the testimony of complainant regarding the incident
and conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would be reason to believe that she was
indeed raped. But if we are to consider the other portions of her testimony concerning the events
which transpired thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or unwittingly failed
or declined to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily exposed.

The Supreme Court acquitted Danny Godoy.

Three guiding principles in the appellate review of the evidence of the prosecution for the crime
of rape, namely: a) while rape is a most detestable crime, it must be borne in mind that it is an
accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused,
though innocent; b) the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution;
and c) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

Mia claimed that the appellant always carried a knife but it was never explained how she was
threatened with the same in such a manner that she was allegedly always cowed into giving in to
his innumerable sexual demands. In taking judicial notice, the Supreme Court said that it is not
unaware that in rape cases, the claim of the complainant of having been threatened appears to
be a common testimonial expedient and face-saving subterfuge. But it had not been duly
corroborated by other evidence nor proved that the accused indeed always carried a knife.
Likewise, complainant testified that appellant raped her through the use of force and intimidation
(specifically by holding a knife to her neck). However, the element of force was not sufficiently
established. The physical facts adverted to by the lower court as corroborative of the
prosecution's theory on the use of force are undoubtedly the medico-legal findings of Dr. Rogelio
Divinagracia. Upon closer scrutiny, however, we find that said findings neither support nor
confirm the charge that rape was so committed through forcible means by appellant against
complainant on January 21, 1994. (Dr. Divinagracia further testified that he could not say that
there was force applied because there were no scratches or bruises, but only a week-old
laceration).

While the "sweetheart theory" does not often gain favor with this Court, such is not always the
case if the hard fact is that the accused and the supposed victim are, in truth, intimately related
except that, as is usual in most cases, either the relationship is illicit or the victim's parents are
against it. It is not improbable that in some instances, when the relationship is uncovered, the
alleged victim or her parents for that matter would rather take the risk of instituting a criminal
action in the hope that the court would take the cudgels for them than for the woman to admit
to her own acts of indiscretion. And this, as the records reveal, is precisely what happened to
appellant.

Appellant's claim that he and complainant were lovers is fortified by the highly credible
testimonies of several witnesses for the defense. The SC also takes judicial cognizance of the fact
that in rural areas (such as in Palawan) young ladies are strictly required to act with
circumspection and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall remain
untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their character humiliates their entire
families. It could precisely be that complainant’s mother wanted to save face in the community
where everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her daughter’s indiscretion
and escape wagging tongues of their small rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this
rape drama.

PEOPLE vs. DE GUZMAN

G.R. No. 117217, December 2, 1996

D E C I S I O N:
On 1 April 1992, complainant Gilda Ambray filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Bacoor,
Cavite, a complaint charging accused Gener de Guzman y Sico with the crime of rape allegedly
committed at 9:00 p.m. of 31 March 1992 in Meadow Wood, Executive Village, Barangay
Panapaan, Bacoor, Cavite. On even date, Gener de Guzman was arrested and detained at the
Municipal Jail of Bacoor, Cavite, but was released on 14 April 1992 upon the filing and approval of
his bail bond.

Gener de Guzman did not submit any counter-affidavit as required in the subpoena issued by the
MTC on 14 April 1992. Finding a prima facie case against him on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution, the MTC forwarded the record of the case to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
for the filing of the necessary information with the appropriate court.
On 14 July 1992, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bacoor, Cavite, Branch 19, an information charging accused Gener de Guzman with the
crime of rape, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of March 1992 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening at Meadow
Wood Subd., Executive Village, Barangay Panapaan, Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
lewd design, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, have carnal knowledge of one Gilda B. Ambray, against her will and consent, to
the damage and prejudice of said Gilda B. Ambray.

Contrary to law.

The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. B-92-216.

Upon arraignment on 10 August 1992, accused Gener de Guzman entered a plea of not guilty.
Trial on the merits thereafter ensued and the prosecution moved for the cancellation of the bail
bond.

On 9 December 1992, after complainant Gilda Ambray, Police Officer Efren Bautista, and Dr.
Valentin Bernales of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), completed their testimony as
witnesses for the prosecution, the trial court cancelled the bail bond of Gener de Guzman on the
ground that the evidence of his guilt was strong. He was re-arrested, and on 22 January 1993, his
motion for reconsideration[8] of the order cancelling his bail bond was denied by the trial court
for lack of merit as he was charged with a capital offense punishable by reclusion perpetua and
the evidence of his guilt was strong.

Two other witnesses were presented by the prosecution, namely: Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, a
kumadre of the accused, and Aquilino Flores Ambray, the husband of the complainant.

The testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution established the following facts:

Homeward bound on 31 March 1992 from Anson Department Store where she worked as a sales
clerk, complainant Gilda Ambray, the 32-year old wife of Aquilino Flores Ambray and a mother of
two children, was at the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision, Panapaan, Bacoor, Cavite, at about
8:45 p.m. waiting for a tricycle ride toward her residence. She waited for about ten minutes.
When she noticed the accused, then wearing army pants, sitting at the guardhouse, she
approached him and asked him some questions. He answered in a stammering manner. The
complainant recognized the accused very well because it was summertime and the gate of the
subdivision was well-lit.

After Gilda started to walk, the accused mounted his tricycle, followed her and offered her a ride,
to which she agreed. While on board the tricycle, Gilda noticed that the accused took a different
route. She got scared but managed not to show it. The accused would once in a while stop the
tricycle and tell her that it was not in good condition. When they reached Phase II of the same
subdivision near an unfinished house, the accused stopped and told Gilda to push the tricycle.
She alighted from the tricycle and paid him P5.00, which he did not accept. Gilda then walked
away, but after she had taken about ten steps, the accused embraced her from behind, covered
her mouth and held her neck tightly. She tried to shout but the accused threatened her. The
accused then dragged her to a vacant lot ten meters away from the unfinished house. She
attempted to shout again, but he threatened to kill her if she made noise. She fought to free
herself from his hold, but the accused pushed and slapped her. He tried to raise her T-shirt while
holding her neck tightly. He shouted and commanded her to raise her T-shirt, which she obligingly
followed because of fear. He removed her bra and kissed her breast. She shouted “Saklolo!
Tulungan ninyo ako,” but the accused covered her mouth and again held her neck that she could
hardly breathe. He held her hand tightly and positioned himself on top of her. He unzipped her
pants and pulled it down her knees. She struggled to liberate herself, but to no avail. The accused
then tried to insert his penis into her, but failed to do so because she struggled and fought back,
then slapped him while covering her vagina with her hand. When she tried to stand, he pushed
her down and, in the process, was able to completely pull down her pants and underwear. She
pleaded to him to have mercy on her and told him that she had two children. He warned her:
“Huwag kang sisigaw, papatayin kita.” The accused again tried to insert his penis into her, but she
prevented him from doing so. The accused took her hand and let her hold his penis to make it
stiff. As Gilda became too weak to struggle against the accused’s sexual advances, the accused
was able to finally consummate his dastardly desire. He then pulled out his penis and “fingered”
her private organ for a short while. The accused then warned Gilda not to tell anybody, otherwise,
he would kill her and all members of her family. He told her that she was his third victim but the
two did not complain. He then dressed up. Gilda picked up her pants and underwear and
hurriedly ran toward her home, without looking back.

When Gilda arrived home, she told her mother and her husband, Aquilino Flores Ambray, that she
was raped by the accused. Aquilino got angry and wanted to retaliate but was prevailed upon not
to by Gilda’s mother.

At almost midnight of 31 March 1992, Gilda and her mother reported the incident to one Tony
Antonio, the President of the Homeowners’ Association and President of the National Press Club.
Antonio radioed the Bacoor Police Station to send an investigator. PO3 Efren Bautista and Sgt.
Saguisame responded to the alarm immediately. Upon their arrival at the house of Antonio, PO3
Bautista saw Gilda with her mother. Gilda, who was crying, related to PO3 Bautista that she was
raped and described to him her assailant as a tricycle driver, tall, strong, with curly hair and in
army cut.[15] Gilda also gave PO3 Bautista a vivid description of the accused’s tricycle, viz., blue
in color with the name “Dimple” at the back.[16] The policemen left and went to the house of the
accused. PO3 Bautista invited the accused to go with him because the Mayor wanted to talk to
him. The accused, together with P03 Bautista, went to the residence of Antonio. When the
accused entered the house of Antonio, Gilda Ambray cried hysterically while pointing to the
accused as her rapist. The accused was then brought to the municipal jail.

Gilda Ambray was medically examined at the Las Piñas Hospital and issued a medical
certificate.[18] She then proceeded to the NBI for a medico-legal examination. Dr. Valentin
Bernales, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, conducted the examination on Gilda. His findings,
contained in his medico-legal report, were as follows:

I. Physical Injuries:

Abrasion, brownish; lips, upper, left side, mucosal, 2.0 x 1.5 cm.; elbow, right, postero-lateral
aspect, 2.0 x 1.5 cm. and postero-medial aspect, multi-linear, with brown scab formation, 3.0 x
1.0 cm. Contusion, reddish; back, right, scapular area, 7.0 x 5 .0 cm. and left, 15.0 x 8.0 cm.
Contused abrasion, reddish black, scapular area, left, medial aspect, 3.0 x 2.0 cm.

II. Genital Examination:

Pubic hair, fully grown, moderate. Labia majora, gaping. Labia minora, coaptated. Fourchette, lax.
Vestibulae, pinkish, smooth. Hymen, reduced to carunculae myrtiformis. Vaginal orifice, admits a
tube, 3.0 cm. in diameter. Vaginal wall, lax. Rugosities, obliterated.

III. Conclusions:

1. The above physical injuries were noted on the body of the subject at the time of the
examination.

2. Medical evidence indicative of recent sexual intercourse with man on or about the alleged
date of examination.

IV. Remarks:

Laboratory Report S-92-94 shows positive result for the presence of human spermatozoa.

Dr. Bernales opined that the physical injuries sustained by Gilda Ambray resulted from force
applied to her, while the presence of human spermatozoa in Gilda’s genitals indicated recent
sexual intercourse.

On 3 April 1992, “Bebey” and Linda de Guzman, the parents of the accused, asked the help of
Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, the accused’s kumadre, to beg for Gilda’s forgiveness for the
accused’s sake. The following day, Resurreccion accompanied the accused’s parents, wife,
children and sister-in-law to Gilda’s house. Gilda met them, but to their plea for forgiveness, she
told them “that should not be tolerated.”

Gilda further testified that she suffered moral damages, had to resign from her job due to shame,
and had spent P28,500.00 for attorney’s fees.

Gener de Guzman interposed the defense of alibi and presented Alfredo Fernandez and Teotimo
Camagong as his witnesses.

According to Gener de Guzman, on 31 March 1992 at around 9:00 p.m., he was about to go home
and was at the corner of Meadow Wood Subdivision coming from Justineville Subdivision. On his
way home on his tricycle, he saw Gilda Ambray, who flagged him down and boarded his tricycle.
After traveling about half a kilometer, his tricycle malfunctioned. He told her that she better walk
home because her house was already near. He pushed his tricycle home, and on his way, one
Alfredo Fernandez approached him and inquired what was wrong with his tricycle. Alfredo helped
him push the tricycle towards his (accused’s) home, and upon arrival thereat, he told Alfredo not
to leave at once. At around 9:10 p.m., they started to drink liquor until 11:00 p.m., and after their
drinking spree, he cleaned their mess and slept. Then at around 12:50 a.m. of 1 April 1992, PO3
Efren Bautista fetched and apprised him that he was accused of rape by a certain Gilda Ambray.
Thereafter, an investigation was conducted and he was brought to the Bacoor Police Station.
Alfredo L. Fernandez, 37 years old, jobless, and a resident of Justineville Subdivision, corroborated
Gener’s story about the malfunctioning tricycle and the drinking session.

Teotimo Camagong testified that he was present when the accused was investigated at the
residence of Tony Antonio and that the complainant did not pinpoint and identify the accused as
her alleged molester.

In its Decision dated 30 June 1994 and promulgated on 25 July 1994, the trial court found the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as charged, and rendered judgment
as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered herein accused GENER SICO DE GUZMAN is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape punishable by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code. He should suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua and indemnify herein private
complainant Gilda Ambray the following: actual damages representing her lost monthly salary
when she resigned from her office due to shame for being a rape victim, in the sum of P30,000.00,
moral damages in the sum of P30,000.00, exemplary damages of P10,000.00, litigation expenses
of P5,000.00, and attorney’s fee[s] including appearance fees for the private prosecutor in the
sum of P28,500.00.

It gave full gave weight to the testimony of Gilda Ambray because “[w]ithout doubt, the
complainant had endured the rigors of recalling her harrowing ordeal and had vividly, credibly
and candidly portrayed in detail how she was raped by the accused.”

As to whether sexual intercourse was consummated against the will or consent of the offended
party, the trial court said:

No less than NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Valentin Bernales had corroborated the stance of herein
private complainant that she was raped by the accused. The victim had sustained contusions and
abrasions at her body that indicated that she struggled against the sexual advances of the accused.
As a result of the doctor’s examination on the victim, he confirmed the occurrence of a recent
sexual intercourse and presence in her private part of human spermatozoa as denoted in his
Medico Legal Report (Exh. F) and Laboratory Report (Exh. D).

Likewise it ruled that since the accused was drunk, he was more aggressive and sexually capable.
Finally, it considered as evidence of the accused’s guilt the plea of his parents, wife and relatives
for forgiveness and compromise.

The accused seasonably appealed from the trial court’s judgment of conviction, and in urging us
to acquit him, interposes the following assignment of errors in his Appellant’s Brief:

1. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED HAS INDUBITABLY EMPLOYED FORCE AND
INTIMIDATION IN THE RAPE OF THE VICTIM.

2. THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED WAS POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY THE VICTIM.
3. THE COURT ERRED IN STRESSING THAT THE ACCUSED WAS DRUNK AT THE TIME OF THE
COMMISSION OF RAPE.

In the Brief for the Appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with the accused and
prays that we affirm in toto the appealed decision.

The first and second assigned errors may be taken up together. The upshot of the accused’s
stance in these alleged errors is that he was not positively identified and that neither force nor
intimidation was proven. As to the latter he cites these facts: (a) Gilda’s assailant had three acts
of sexual intercourse with her; (b) the physical examination showed that she suffered injuries on
the dorsal portion only, and none was found on her neck; (c) her personal belongings -- bra, pants,
T-shirt and underwear -- were completely intact; and (d) no signs of physical violence were
discernible on both the persons of the accused and Gilda Ambray.

Rape is essentially an offense of secrecy, not generally attempted except in dark or deserted and
secluded places away from prying eyes, and the crime usually commences solely upon the word
of the offended woman herself and conviction invariably turns upon her credibility, as the
People’s single witness of the actual occurrence.

In the review of rape cases, therefore, this Court is guided by the following principles: (1) an
accusation for rape can be made with facility: it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the
person accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of
rape where two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its on merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.

The resolution then of the first two assigned errors and the determination of the guilt of the
accused depend primarily on the credibility of the complainant Gilda Ambray, since only she and
the accused witnessed the incident when it happened. Her testimony alone, if credible, would
render the accused’s conviction inevitable.

A meticulous assessment of Gilda’s testimony demonstrates beyond doubt the truthfulness of her
story, which she narrated in a categorical, straightforward and candid manner. Further
strengthening her credibility in recounting her ordeal at the hands of the accused was her conduct
immediately after the sexual assault. She ran home without looking back, and upon her arrival
she reported the rape to her husband and her mother at once. Immediately thereafter, she
reported it to Tony Antonio, the President of the Homeowners’ Association and President of the
National Press Club, who then sought police assistance. When the policemen arrived at Antonio’s
residence in response to the latter’s call, Gilda narrated the rape to the policemen and gave them
the description of the assailant. When the policemen brought the accused to the residence of
Antonio, Gilda forthwith pointed to the accused as the person who raped her. Gilda voluntarily
submitted herself to a medical examination at the Las Piñas Hospital and then to an examination
of her private parts by Dr. Bernales of the NBI. The following day she submitted herself to an
investigation by the PNP of Bacoor, Cavite, and filed on the same day a complaint for rape against
the accused with the MTC of Bacoor, Cavite.
All the foregoing acts of Gilda were done within twenty-four hours after the commission of the
crime. The quickness and spontaneity of these deeds manifested the natural reactions of a
virtuous woman who had just undergone sexual molestation against herself, and evinced nothing
more than her instant resolve to denounce the beast who criminally abused and ravished her, and
to protect her honor. Moreover, she rejected the plea for forgiveness sought by the accused’s
parents, wife, and children, then suffered the travails of a public trial which necessarily exposed
her to humiliation and embarrassment by unraveling the details of the rape and enduring a cross-
examination which sought to discredit her.

What Gilda endured could only come from one whose obsession was to bring to justice the person
who had abused her and vindicate her honor, even if such vindication would never erase from her
memory that excruciatingly painful chapter in her life which left her psychologically and
emotionally scarred forever. This Court has repeatedly held that no complainant would admit
that she has been raped, make public the offense, allow the examination of her private parts,
undergo the troubles and humiliation of public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying to all its
gory details if she had not in fact been raped.

We likewise agree with the trial court that the accused used force and intimidation upon Gilda.

Another established rule in rape cases is that the force need not be irresistible; all that is necessary
is that the force used by the accused is sufficient to consummate his evil purpose, or that it was
successfully used. It need not be so great or of such character that it could not be repelled.
Intimidation, on the other hand, must be viewed in light of the victim’s perception and judgment
at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule; it is enough that it
produces fear -- fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of the accused,
something would happen to her at that moment, or even thereafter as when she is threatened
with death if she would report the incident.

In this case, the accused embraced Gilda from behind, held her neck tightly, and covered her
mouth. As she struggled to free herself, she sustained her injuries. Dr. Bernales confirmed the
use of force, and according to him, the abrasions and contusions on Gilda’s body were due to
force applied on her. Moreover, the accused also threatened Gilda with death if she would not
yield to his bestial desires. The threat certainly constituted intimidation.

The accused’s contention that it was highly incredible that there was force or intimidation since
the assailant committed three acts of sexual intercourse with Gilda in three hours, deserves scant
consideration. In the first place, Gilda explained in her re-direct examination that the three hours
mentioned in her cross-examination referred to the time which elapsed from the moment she
was at the gate of Meadow Wood Subdivision and until she reported the incident to Tony Antonio.
The principal object of re-direct examination is to prevent injustice to the witness and the party
who has called him by affording an opportunity to the witness to explain the testimony given on
cross-examination, and to explain any apparent contradiction or inconsistency in his statements,
an opportunity which is ordinarily afforded to him during cross-examination. The re-direct
examination serves the purpose of completing the answer of a witness, or of adding a new matter
which has been omitted, or of correcting a possible misinterpretation of testimony. In the second
place, on direct examination, Gilda categorically declared that the accused tried to thrice insert
his penis into her vagina. He failed in the first and second attempts because she struggled, but
succeeded on the third because she was already weak. While it may be true that on cross-
examination she testified that she was raped once, yet on re-direct examination she said that she
was raped three times, no inconsistency at all may be deduced therefrom. There was merely
confusion as to the legal qualifications of the three separate acts, i.e., Gilda’s answers were
conclusions of law. A witness is not permitted to testify as to a conclusion of law, among which,
legal responsibility is one of the most conspicuous. A witness, no matter how skillful, is not to be
asked or permitted to testify as to whether or not a party is responsible to the law. Law in the
sense here used embraces whatever conclusions belonging properly to the court.

What is clear to us is that there were, at least, two acts of attempted rape and one consummated
rape, committed in light of the testimony of Gilda. The information, however, charged the
accused with only one act of rape; hence, consistent with the constitutional right of the accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, he cannot be held liable for
more than what he was charged. There can only be one conviction for rape if the information
charges only one offense, even if the evidence shows three separate acts of sexual intercourse.

Neither are we persuaded by the claim that Gilda was not able to positively identify the accused.
He was familiar to Gilda one or two weeks before the incident because she saw him driving a
tricycle and had, in fact, been once a passenger of his. She saw him clearly at the guardhouse
before the incident because the guardhouse was well-lit; she was his passenger that evening until
he stopped his tricycle near the unfinished house; and she had ample opportunity to see and
recognize him during the assault. Then, Gilda did not hesitate to point to and identify the accused
as her rapist when the latter was brought by the policemen to the house of Tony Antonio.

The accused’s defense of alibi, which is the weakest of all defenses for it is easy to concoct and
fabricate, cannot prevail over his positive identification by Gilda.

Moreover, any scintilla of doubt both as to the identification of the accused and as to his guilt was
dissolved by the overtures of his parents, wife, children and sister-in-law on pleading for
forgiveness from Gilda. The accused did not disown their acts, which were testified to by his
kumadre, Resurreccion Talub Quiocho, and Gilda herself. He chose not to deny their testimony.
Finally, despite the unequivocal pronouncement by the trial court that his guilt was “strongly
established by the acts of his parents, wife and relatives, who had gone to the house of the victim
to ask her forgiveness and to seek a compromise,” the accused dared not assign that finding and
conclusion as an error and his Appellant’s Brief is conspicuously silent thereon. Indubitably then,
the accused was a party to the decision to seek for forgiveness, or had prior knowledge of the
plan to seek for it and consented to pursue it, or confirmed and ratified the act of his parents,
wife, children and sister-in-law. A plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an
attempt to compromise. In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offense (criminal
negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused
may be received in evidence as an implied admission of guilt. No one would ask for forgiveness
unless he had committed some wrong, for to forgive means to absolve, to pardon, to cease to feel
resentment against on account of wrong committed; give up claim to requital from or retribution
upon (an offender). In People vs. Calimquim,[48] we stated:

The fact that appellant’s mother sought forgiveness for her son from Corazon’s father is an
indication of guilt. (See People vs. Olmedillo, L-42660, August 30, 1982, 116 SCRA 193).
The accused may be correct in the third assigned error because no testimony of a witness
established that the accused was in a state of drunkenness when he sexually assaulted Gilda. The
trial court may have formed its conclusion that the accused was drunk from his testimony that he
and Alfredo Fernandez were drinking liquor in his house from 9:00 to 11:00 p.m. of 31 March
1992. In any event, that erroneous conclusion is innocuous.

We do not then hesitate to conclude that the accused, having had carnal knowledge of
complainant Gilda Ambray through the use of force and intimidation, committed the crime of
rape as defined and penalized in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty
being reclusion perpetua.

The damages awarded by the trial court stand modification. No damage for loss of income due
to Gilda’s resignation from her employment should have been awarded, the resignation being
unnecessary. Conformably however with the current jurisprudence, she is entitled to indemnity
of P50,000.00. For her shame, as well as mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, moral shock and social humiliation which rape necessarily brings to the offended
party, she is entitled to recover moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Article 2217 of
the Civil Code. However, since no aggravating circumstance had been proved, exemplary
damages may not be awarded. In Article 2230 of the Civil Code, such damages may be awarded
in criminal cases when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the challenged decision of 30 June 1994 of
Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, in Criminal Case No. B-92-216 is AFFIRMED,
subject to the modification on the civil liabilities, and as so modified, the awards of P30,000.00 as
actual damages for loss of monthly salary and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages are deleted, and
accused-appellant Gener de Guzman y Sico is further ordered to pay the complainant Gilda
Ambray the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity. The awards for moral damages, litigation expenses
and attorney’s fees stand.

Costs against the accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

People v Yparraguirre
268 SCRA 35, 1997

FACTS:
Crispin Yparraguirre was charged with the crime of rape and that the prosecution was able to
establish the following facts:
1. That AAA (name not revealed) was a housemaid of Crispin and his wife (medyo magulo
pagkakasulat kahit maikli, kasi may Mary Ann Yparraguirre later na sabi ng decision was his wife)
and the incident happened when she was cooking porridge for their two children.
2. Crispin went home from work and gave AAA a small envelope containing medicine for her
skin disease because AAA was afflicted with rashes on her thighs and stomach allegedly
contracted from one of her children said envelope contained 15 tablets
3. Crispin told AAA that she should take all the tablets but after doing so, she felt weak and
fell down and was later on dragged by Crispin to their bed and when she resisted a hunting knife
was pointed at her neck. After Crispin had carnal knowledge of her, he punched AAA and thus she
lost her consciousness.
4. AAA woke up and saw blood in her private parts. Crispin threatened her that he would kill
her if AAA reports the incident. AAA eventually left the house and did not say a word about the
incident. She continued serving the Yparraguirres for one month before leaving them to return to
her mother's house in Barrio YYY. Her mother found AAA in a state of shock.
5. She could not eat nor talk, neither could she perform ordinary daily functions such as
dressing herself. She was brought to the Municipal Health Officer for examination. Municipal
Health Officer, Dr. Imelda T. Bendijo, interviewed the girl and found her unresponsive and unable
to talk. She conducted a physical examination and also found that:

"x x x Physical examination externally no abnormal findings;

Pelvic examination -- normal vagina with old laceration found at 2:00 [position]; hymen not intact;
Internal examination -- admits one finger;
Advised for pregnancy test and for consultation by [sic] psychiatrist.

Upon the Municipal Health Officer's advice, AAA was confined at the Davao City Mental Hospital
for observation and treatment. After a week of treatment, AAA began to talk and revealed that
she was raped by Crispin

Accused-appellant pled not guilty to the crime charged. He claimed that on the night of the
alleged rape he was selling fish at the public market. Allegedly, he was at the market at 4:00 in
the morning, and worked straight until 8:00 in the evening. He never left the fish stall until after
8:00 in the evening because of his many customers.

TRIAL COURT: The trial court found accused-appellant guilty and sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua. It also ordered him to indemnify AAA P50,000.00 as moral damages and pay P5,000.00
as attorney's fees, thus:

ISSUE:
1. WON the court erred in holding Crispin guilty of the crime of rape solely on the admission of
AAA?

2. WON the court erred in holding that Mary Ann Yparraguirre went to the mother of AAA to
negotiate compromise even though at that time no criminal complaint was made?

HELD:
1. NO. THE ADMISSION WAS SUFFICIENT. After reviewing the records, we find that the
prosecution evidence, which rests mainly on the testimony of AAA, is credible, reliable and
trustworthy. AAA testified in a straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner and never
wavered even on cross-examination and rebuttal.

The inconsistencies in her testimony are minor which tend to buttress, rather than weaken, the
conclusion that her testimony was not contrived.

The question of whether AAA contracted the skin disease from the children of appellant is not
important. The undisputed fact is that she was afflicted with the disease and that appellant gave
her tablets for treatment of the disease. Appellant's allegation that AAA should have fallen asleep
for hours after ingesting the tablets is speculative.

There is no evidence that the tablets were sleeping tablets. They, however, weakened AAA and
prevented her from making any resistance to appellant's lewd acts. The delay in filing the
complaint does not in any way affect AAA's credibility. She was afraid of appellant's threat to her
life. The complaint was filed three months after AAA told her mother of the incident, and three
months is not too long a period to file a complaint for rape.

AAA was a seventeen-year old barrio lass and a high school dropout. She was also the
breadwinner of the family. It is hard to believe that AAA would fabricate a story of defloration,
open herself to public trial and place her family, who depended on her, in a very humiliating and
compromising situation for no reason at all. AAA suffered psychologically from the incident.
Before the rape, she had been working for the Yparraguirres for two months and the spouses
actually found her to be a good worker. When AAA returned to her family, however, she lost her
speech and could not perform ordinary daily functions that she had to seek psychiatric treatment.
Indeed, AAA's psychological condition could not have been the product of ill-motive and
fabrication.

The positive identification of accused-appellant as the rapist prevails over his defense of alibi. It
was not physically impossible for appellant to have been at the scene of the crime. The public
market was merely a ten-minute walk from their rented room and during work breaks, appellant
would sometimes go home to bring food to his children.

2. NO. There is evidence in trial that AAA revealed the rape incident to her mother and Mary Ann
Yparraguirre offered AAA’s mother 15 K then eventuall 25 k after the refusal of the latter but was
still refused. BBB, AAA’s mother, told Mary Ann about the rape incident which prompted the offer
based from Mary Ann’s testimony.

An offer to compromise does not require that a criminal complaint be first filed before the offer
can be received in evidence against the offeror. What is required is that after committing the
crime, the accused or his representative makes an offer to compromise and such offer is proved.

Hawthorne v. Eckerson Co.

77 F.2d 844, June 3, 1935

Doctrine: Compromises are not in themselves evidence as admissions of liability, and the same rule
applies when they are offered as proof of agency.

Facts:
Hawthorne was driving her own Marquette car and was accompanied by her business (antique
furniture) partner Addie Kellogg who was sitting beside her. As the car was rounding a curve in
the highway leading from Middlebury to Brandon, Vt., it collided with a Chevrolet car belonging
to Eckerson Co., and driven by A. J. Gassett, one of its traveling salesmen. Hawthorne and Kellogg
were both injured and the Marquette car was damaged to the extent of about $125. Hawthorne
filed a case against Eckerson Co.
At the trial, Hawthorne testified that when rounding the curve, she kept well to the inside of the
road and was driving at a speed of only 18 miles/hour. She also showed that Gassett came around
the curve at a speed of 40 miles/hour, did not keep the Chevrolet on his side of the road, but had
come over to her side, and that because of this the collision occurred.

After Hawthorne had put in her case, Eckerson rested without introducing any proof. Thereupon
the court charged the jury to find: (1) whether Hawthorne had proved that Gassett was in the
employ of Eckerson Co. and performing some duty pertaining to his employment at the time of
the collision; and if yes, (2) whether the collision was caused by Eckerson's negligence; (3) in the
event that (1) and (2) were resolved against Eckerson Co., what were Hawthorne's damages? The
jury found in favor of Hawthorne and awarded her $4,664.51. Hence, the present appeal.

ISSUE:
1. WON Gassett was Eckerson Co.’s agent at the time of the collision because he was in the
former’s general employment and was driving its car ( YES )
2. WON the lower court unlawfully permitted Hawthorne to prove a settlement by Eckerson Co.
with Kellogg of her claim for injuries caused by the accident ( YES )

(1) In many jurisdictions it is held that in an action for injuries due to collision by an automobile,
proof that at the time of the accident the car was owned by the defendant establishes a prima
facie case for the plaintiff, and that if the defendant wishes to escape liability, he is required to go
forward with evidence that the driver was not engaged in the defendant's business at the time of
the accident.

There are decisions, including that of Ronan v. J. G. Turnbull Co., that proof of ownership of the
car and of general employment of the driver by the defendant is insufficient to justify an inference
of agency.

The decision in Ronan v. J. G. Turnbull Co. is relied on by Eckerson Co., as showing that the
evidence did not justify a finding that Gassett was acting as its agent when the accident occurred.

In the Ronan case the only evidence (aside from proof of ownership, of employment of the driver,
and of his occasional use of the car, when collecting the defendant's bills) was that the driver was
engaged in his own business at the time when the accident occurred. This decision, however,
seems to have no bearing on the facts of the present case.

In the present case, the proof shows not only that the car belonged to Eckerson Co., and that
Gassett was in its employ as a traveling salesman, but also that he was accustomed to drive the
car when traveling on Eckerson Co.'s business in the sale of its merchandise and that this practice
extended to the general neighborhood where the collision occurred and had existed for a long
period before the accident and had continued thereafter. Such proof, when unexplained, gives
rise to an inevitable inference that Gassett was acting as Eckerson Co.'s agent.

Inasmuch as there was uncontradicted testimony that the car was Eckerson Co.'s, that Gassett
was its traveling salesman and was accustomed to drive the car while on its business, nothing
further was necessary to show prima facie that Gassett was acting for Eckerson Co. There was also
uncontradicted evidence that Gassett, when rounding the curve on the road to Middlebury, did
not keep on his side of the middle of the highway and that Hawthorne kept as far over on her side
as was practicable. Upon such a record there was no question for the jury except that of damages.

(2) Eckerson Co. complains because the court permitted Hawthorne to prove the settlement with
Miss Kellogg, both in order to show that Gassett was its agent and also to show liability.

The Court found that the rulings in this respect were erroneous. Compromises are not in
themselves evidence as admissions of liability, and the same rule applies when they are offered
as proof of agency. It is a quite different matter to allow in evidence independent statements
contained in offers of settlement as admission of liability.

Since there was uncontroverted proof that Gassett was the agent of Eckerson Co., it may be
argued that the error in admitting evidence of the compromise was not prejudicial, for the judge
charged the jury that Hawthorne could only recover compensatory damages for her personal loss
and injuries. But in the course of the testimony as to the settlement, proof was elicited at the
suggestion of the court itself, that Kellogg had received $4,750 in payment of her claim. Such
evidence might have led the jury to allow Hawthorne a recovery equivalent to that of Kellogg.

It is true that the testimony was only admitted on the theory that such a substantial payment as
$4,750 would not have been made merely to buy peace and that the making of it, therefore,
justified the inference that Gassett was the agent of defendant and that the latter was responsible
for his acts. But the evidence was legally inadmissible to prove agency, and it cannot be said that
knowledge by the jury of the amount paid to Kellogg might not have caused them to take her
recovery into account in estimating the Hawthorne's damages.

In Ga. Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Wallace & Co., the court said that the rule against allowing evidence of
compromise is founded upon recognition of the fact that such testimony is inherently harmful,
for the jury will draw conclusions therefrom in spite of anything which may be said by the judge
in instructing them as to the weight to be given such evidence.

That the jury may have been prejudiced by proof of the settlement seems especially likely because
the verdict for Hawthorne was for about the same sum as that paid Kellogg, though the latter's
injuries seem to have been the more serious.

Settlements have always been looked on with favor, and courts have deemed it against public
policy to subject a person who has compromised a claim to the hazard of having a settlement
proved in a subsequent lawsuit by another person asserting a cause of action arising out of the
same transaction.

As proof of the settlement was erroneously received and may have prejudiced the result of the
trial, the judgment cannot stand.
Dispositive Portion: Judgment reversed.
PEOPLE vs. LAMBID
G.R. Nos. 133066-67, October 1, 2003

DECISION
On automatic review is the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, in
Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45672 and CBU-45673 finding Romeo H. Lambid guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of qualified rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
death for each count.

In her two separate Complaints dated November 4, 1997 and November 5, 1997, complainant
Lyzel S. Lambid, accuses Romeo H. Lambid of raping her, as follows:

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45672:

The undersigned complainant, LYZEL S. LAMBID, after having been duly sworn to in accordance
with law, hereby accuses ROMEO H. LAMBID of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 31st day of October, 1997, at about 5:00 A.M., and for sometime subsequent
thereto, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, by means of force and intimidation upon undersigned complainant to wit, by forcibly
placing himself on top of the victim, and at the same time threat her with death if she would
shout, then removed her panty, did then and there have carnal knowledge of the undersigned
against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45673:

The undersigned complainant, LYZEL S. LAMBID, after having been duly sworn to in accordance
with law, hereby accuses ROMEO H. LAMBID of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 1st day of November, 1997, at about 5:00 A.M., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, by means of
force and intimidation upon undersigned complainant to wit, by forcibly placing himself on top of
the victim, and at the same time threat her with death if she would shout, then removed her
panty, did then and there have carnal knowledge of the undersigned against her will.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. The cases were consolidated
and tried jointly.

The prosecution presented three witnesses: Lyzel Lambid, the complainant; Mary Ann Lambid, a
sister of Lyzel; and Dr. Aster Khosravibabadi, the physician who conducted a physical examination
on the complainant.

The facts established by the prosecution are as follows:

On October 31, 1997, 14-year old Lyzel was sleeping in their house located at Inayawan, Cebu City
together with her father, herein appellant, and two sisters. Around 5:00 in the morning, she woke
up and noticed her father lying beside her. Then, her father started removing her panty at the
same time warning her not to tell her mother what he was doing. After her father succeeded in
removing her panty, he went on top of her and started inserting his penis into her vagina. She
initially tried to resist the sexual advances of her father by kicking him and by moving her body
from left to right and vice versa. She stopped resisting when her father stared hard at her and
threatened to kill her (Lyzel). Her father succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina. The
following day, November 1, 1997, she was again roused from her sleep and noticed her father
lying beside her. Repeating what he did the previous day, her father removed her panty.
Thereafter, he successfully inserted his penis into her vagina. Lyzel did nothing out of fear. She did
not tell anybody about these two incidents.

However, her sister, Mary Ann, aged 13, witnessed both incidents. She was awakened around
5:00 in the morning of October 31, 1997 when she heard their father say to her sister Lyzel: Dont
tell this to your mother or else I will kill you. Their father was then lying beside Lyzel. Afterwards,
she saw him stand up and go to urinate. About 5:00 in the morning of the succeeding day,
November 1, 1997, she was sleeping beside her sister Lyzel. She was awakened while their father
was pulling her blanket. Suspicious of their fathers actuation, she kicked him. After kicking him,
she laid near the foot of her sister Lyzel. Their father then covered her with a blanket but she
peeped through the blanket. She saw their father who was only wearing an underwear place
himself on top of Lyzel. Her father covered himself and Lyzel with a blanket, after which Mary Ann
saw their fathers whole body shake and heard him breathing hard. She again heard their father
warn Lyzel not to relate the incident to their mother, otherwise he will kill her (Lyzel).

On November 2, 1997, Mary Ann informed three of their neighbors about the incidents she
witnessed. Their neighbors brought her to the president of their local association for assistance
and on that same day their father was arrested.

Dr. Aster Khosravibabadi conducted a physical examination of Lyzel on November 3, 1997 and
found that Lyzels vagina had new hymenal lacerations with raw edges at 5 oclock position. The
doctor asserted that Lyzel might have sustained the lacerations within six days prior to her
examination. The test for the presence of spermatozoa yielded negative results.

The defense presented appellant as its lone witness. On the witness stand, when asked about the
truth of her daughters’ complaint, appellant simply stated that if he had committed the crimes of
rape against his daughter, he asks for forgiveness because during that time he was drunk. He
asked the court to impose upon him a lesser penalty considering that his children are still under
his care.

The trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Romeo H. Lambid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape, defined and penalized by Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and Republic Act No. 7659 known as the
Death Penalty Law and sentences him to suffer two supreme penalties of Death for the two (2) crimes of rape committed
against her own daughter Lyzel Lambid, with inherent accessory penalties provided by law; to indemnify the victim the
sum of P100,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
Hence, the present automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.

Appellant raises the following Assignment of Errors:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO ALLEGE THE AGE AND RELATIONSHIP
OF THE VICTIM AND THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT.[9]

At the outset, it is noted that since the crimes were committed on October 31, 1997 and
November 1, 1997, the applicable law is R.A. 8353, otherwise known as The Anti-Rape Law of
1997[10] which took effect on October 22, 1997.[11] Under this law, rape has been reclassified
from a private crime or crime against chastity into a crime against persons. Consequently, the
prosecution for the crime of rape was removed from the ambit of Chapter Five, Title Eleven of the
Revised Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which
required that in crimes against chastity, the complaint must be filed by the offended party, or her
parents, godparents or guardian, as the case may be under the law. Thus, effective October 22,
1997, R.A. No. 8353, it is required that prosecution for the crime of rape, as in any other public
crimes, is commenced in court by the filing of an information by the public prosecutor and no
longer by a mere complaint filed by the offended party, parents, godparents or guardian.

In the present cases, the indictments charging appellant with the crimes of rape were each
captioned as a Complaint signed by Lyzel herself; but, there is a Certification on the second page
of each of the complaints by the investigating prosecutor treating the complaint as an
information, to wit:

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45672:

CERTIFICATION

I hereby certify that the foregoing information is filed pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, the accused not having opted to avail of his right to a preliminary investigation and not having
executed a waiver pursuant to Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. I further certify that this information is being filed
with the prior authority of the City Prosecutor.

Cebu City, Philippines, November 4, 1997.

(signed)
JOSE R. PEDROSA
Prosecutor II, Cebu City

In Criminal Case No. CBU-45673:

CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that the foregoing information is filed pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, the accused having opted to avail of his right to a preliminary investigation and having executed
a waiver pursuant to Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code. I further certify that this information is being filed with the prior
authority of the City Prosecutor.

Cebu City, Philippines, November 5, 1997.

(signed)
JOSE R. PEDROSA
Prosecutor II, Cebu City

The apparent defect in the form of indictment, that is by way of a complaint by the offended
party, is merely one of form which does not invalidate the proceedings had in the trial court. The
certification converted the complaints into informations filed by the prosecutor.

Moreover, under Section 8, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure,[14] the governing
law at the time of the filing of the indictments, for his failure to move to quash the same prior to
his arraignment, appellant was deemed to have waived his right to question the complaints filed
by Lyzel on the ground that it is defective in form per Section 3(d), Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court.[15]

Coming to the merits of the case, appellant, in support of the first assigned error, attacks the
credibility of the complainant. He harps upon the fact that although Lyzel was sure of the dates
when appellant raped her, she failed to recall the days of the week upon which these dates fell.
Appellant also points out the apparent inconsistency as to the date Lyzels mother arrived from
Leyte and the date she accompanied Lyzel to report the incident to the police authorities.

We agree with the contention of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the failure of
complainant to correctly pinpoint the day of the week when she was raped and to recall the exact
date of her mothers arrival from Leyte are inconsequential matters. It is a settled rule that
discrepancies in details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime, such as the exact time
of the commission of the crime, are not grounds for acquittal.[16] To be material, discrepancies
in the testimony of the victim should refer to significant facts which are determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.[17] In the present case, the mental lapse on the part of Lyzel in
failing to accurately recall the exact days of the week when she was raped and the date of her
mothers arrival from Leyte does not detract from her credibility. It only indicates that her account
is spontaneous, neither rehearsed nor contrived.[18] What is important is that she was able to
clearly recall how she was raped and testify on this matter in a categorical and straightforward
manner.

Moreover, Lyzels testimony is strongly corroborated by her sister Mary Ann[19] and buttressed
by physical evidence. The physicians findings on her physical examination conducted on
November 3, 1997 indicated the presence of fresh lacerations on her hymen. Laceration of the
hymen, whether fresh or healed, is the best physical evidence of defloration.[20] In the present
case, the doctor estimated that the lacerations could have been sustained by Lyzel within six days
prior to the date of her examination.[21] This estimate is consistent with Lyzels claim that she was
raped on October 31, 1997 and November 1, 1997.
Under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, rape
is committed by a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman through fear, threat or
intimidation.

Appellant would have us to believe that if he had carnal knowledge with her daughter Lyzel, it was
done without force and intimidation, citing her testimony that she did nothing while she was
supposedly being sexually abused by him.

We are not convinced in the light of Lyzels testimony, pertinent portions of which we quote
verbatim, as follows:

Q At about 5:00 oclock in the morning of October 31, 1997 can you recall of any unusual incident
that transpired inside the house where you were residing?

A Yes there was sir.

Q Please tell the Court Lyzel what was the unusual indicent?

A While I was still asleep I was awaken when my father sleep beside me.

Q If your father was laying beside you did he do anything?

A There was sir.

Q What did your father do to you?

A He remove my panty.

Q And after your father remove your panty what did he do?

A He lift out his penis and let it enter into my vagina.

Q And did your father succeeded in inserting his penis into your vagina?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you do when your father was still removing your panty and before he placed himself
on top of you and inserted his penis into your vagina?

A He told me not to reveal to my mother what he did

...

COURT:

Q What did you do when your father was doing all these things that you have told to us?

A Nothing.
FISCAL LABORTE:

Q Why?

A I was entertaining fear considering that he stared his eyes towards me.

Q Aside from staring at you what else if any did your father do to in staring on you?

A He said as follows: Dont tell anybody, if you still somebody I would kill you.

COURT:

Q Did you not move your body away from him so that he would not succeed in doing such thing
to you?

A I moved my body but he kept on holding me.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q On the following day Lyzel November 1, 1997 where did you sleep?

A At our house sir.

Q The same house where you sleep the day before?

A Yes, sir.

COURT:

Q Why did you still sleep in that house after that experienced you had with your father the
preceding night. Why did you not run away from that house.

A Because he will be looking for me, Your Honor.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q And again Lyzel who were your companions if any on November 1, 1997 at your house when
you were sleeping?

A My two younger sister sir.

Q Who else if any?

A My father.

Q At about the same time on November 1, 1997 at about 5:00 oclock in the morning was there
anything unusual that happened inside your house?
A There was.

Q Now. Please tell this Honorable Court what unusual incident happened on that particular date
and time.

A While I was still asleep there was somebody lying beside me I thought it was my sister but when
I was awaken it was my father.

Q And while your father was lying beside you did he do anything?

A Yes.

Q Please tell the Court Lyzel what did your father do to you?

A He removed my panty sir.

Q And after your father removed your panty what did he do next?

A He lift out his penis and inserted into my vagina.

...

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q Did your father succeed in inserting his penis into your vagina?

A Yes.

Q Now what did you do when your father inserted his penis into your vagina?

A Nothing.

Q Why?

A Because I was entertaining fear.

COURT:

Q Why were you afraid of your father?

A Because his eyes were starring at me.

Q Was his bolo was still there?

A Yes, Your Honor.

FISCAL LABORTE:
Q Did you tell somebody Lyzel on what your father did to you on October 31, 1997 as well as on
November 1, 1997?

A No, sir.

Q Why did you not tell anybody about what your father did to you?

A Because I was entertaining fear all the time.[22] (Emphasis supplied)

On cross-examination, Lyzel further testified:

ATTY. GUBALANE:

Q How long did it take by your father in removing your panty on October 31, 1997?

A About one minute sir.

Q Do your remember what were your wearing on October 31, 1997?

A Yes I remember sir.

Q What were you wearing then?

A Short pants sir.

Q When you noticed your father on October 31, 1997 sleep beside you and before he remove
your panty why did you not shour for help?

A Because I was entertaining fear sir.

COURT:

Q Fear of what?

A Entertaining fear to my father, Your Honor.

ATTY. GUBALANE:

Q Is it not true then that Mary Ann is sleeping beside you at your foot?

A Thats correct sir.

Q Did you not kick you father?

A I kicked him sir.

Q How many times did you kick your father?

A Two times.

Q But you did not shout?

A No, sir.

Q Because of fear?

A Thats right sir.

Q Inspite your fear you managed to kick your father two times?

A Thats right sir.

COURT:

Q You kick for two times, did you do this on the first rape or on the second rape?

A The first rape, Your Honor.

Q Why did you not kick him any more in the second time?

A Because he stared his eyes towards me (gisigahan ko sa iyang mata).[23] (Emphasis supplied)

Lyzel very clearly testified that in the first incident, she tried to resist the sexual advances of
appellant by kicking him and by trying to move her body but when appellant threatened to kill
her, she, who was only fourteen years old, was easily cowed into submitting herself to appellants
carnal desire. When appellant raped her the following day, her fear of her father and of the
previous threat that he would kill her still pervaded causing her to do nothing the second time.
Her harrowing experience the day before in the hands of her father coupled with a threat on her
life was sufficient to envelop her with fear and paralyze her into submission even if appellant
merely stared at her when he raped her again the following morning. Lyzels failure to shout or
offer tenacious resistance during the second incident does not demolish her claim that she was
raped. As we have held in People vs. Rodriguez:

The defense argument that the accused has not employed force upon his daughter in order to
have sex with him does not at all persuade. The force or violence necessary in rape is a relative
term that depends not only on the age, size, and strength of the persons involved but also on their
relationship to each other. In a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the formers
parental authority and moral ascendancy over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation
who, expectedly, would just cower in fear and resign to the fathers wicked deeds. It would be
plain fallacy to say that the failure to shout or to offer tenacious resistance makes voluntary the
victims submission to the criminal act of the offender.[24]

and in People vs. Flores, to wit:

Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the perception of the victim at the time of the
commission of the crime, not by any hard and fast rule; it is therefore enough that it produced
fear fear that if she did not yield to the bestial demands of her revisher, some evil could happen
to her at that moment or even thereafter.

The fact that complainant bore no physical evidence of any force used against her person is of no
moment. The absence of any external sign of injury does not necessarily negate the occurrence
of rape, proof of injury not being an essential element of the crime. What is important is that
because of force and intimidation, the victim was made to submit to the will of appellant. As
stated in People vs. Maglente, the test is whether the treat or intimidation produces fear in the
mind of a reasonable person that if one resists or does not yield to the desires of the accused, the
threat would be carried out.[25]

Besides, no less than Lyzels younger sister Mary Ann positively testified that she heard her father
threaten Lyzels life on both occasions. Appellants threat on the life of his 14-year old child and
the fear it instilled in her clearly repudiate his claim that there was no force or intimidation
employed against her in both occasions.

Appellant further questions the credibility of Lyzel in enabling him to rape her in two successive
days. He contends that after Lyzel was raped for the first time on October 31, 1997, her logical
reaction should have been to immediately seek the help of other people; that despite her
opportunity to do so, she did not. We are not persuaded. It is a settled rule that the workings of
the human mind under emotional stress are unpredictable and there is no standard form of
behavior when one is confronted by a shocking incident.[26] Verily, under emotional stress, the
human mind is not expected to follow a predictable path.[27] Indeed, Lyzel must have been
shocked and utterly confused by the fact that her own father, committed such an act of bestiality
against her. More importantly, it is established by competent evidence that appellant threatened
to kill Lyzel if she told anybody about the rape. That alone is sufficient explanation why she did
not make known to other people the first time that she was raped by her father.

Appellant raised no defense whatsoever. He virtually admitted his guilt. A review of the transcript
of stenographic notes taken during his direct and cross examinations shows that he never
disowned the acts imputed against him.[28] Appellant merely claimed that he was drunk and he
asked for forgiveness from Lyzel, if he had really raped her and for compassion from the trial court.
In People vs. Alvero, we held that a plea for forgiveness may be considered as analogous to an
attempt to compromise and an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence
as an implied admission of guilt.[29] Thus, by asking for forgiveness, appellant has admitted his
guilt.

As to the second assigned error, the OSG agrees with appellant. We sustain the arguments of both
appellant and the OSG. The trial court erred in imposing the death penalty.

Articles 266-A and 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, provide:

Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed.- Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above are present.

...

Article 266-B. Penalties. Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.

...

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:

1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law spouse of the parent of the victim;

...

3) When the rape is committed in full view of the spouse, parent, any of the children or other
relatives within the third civil degree of consanguinity; (Emphasis supplied)

...

In both cases, the prosecution has established by competent evidence that Lyzel was fourteen
years old and appellant is her father. In Criminal Case No. CBU-45673, it is likewise established
that appellant raped his daughter Lyzel in full view of his other minor daughter Mary Ann, thus:

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q The following day November 1, 1997 at about the same time 5:00 a.m., can you recall where
were you?

A Yes, I can.

Q Where were you on that particular date and time?

A At our house.

Q Again, can you tell the Court if there was any unusual incident that transpired?
A Yes, sir.

Q What was that unusual incident?

A While I was sleeping beside my sister my father pulled that blanket and then I kicked him. That
is why I transferred lying at the foot sir of my sister.

Q You said that when your father pulled the blanket you kicked him why did you kick you father?

A Because I was suspicious on his actuations sir considering that because I noticed what he said
to my sister by saying dont tell to your mother. If you tell your mother I would kill you.

Q What was that something which your father dont want to let your sister do, if you know?

A When he abused my sister.

Q Now, after you kicked your father and transferred sleeping at the foot of your sister what
happened next?

A While I was lying at that time and when he covered me with a blanket I saw my father rose
placed himself on top of my sister.

Q While your father was already on top of your sister what did you do?

A He made a sexual intercourse with my sister.

COURT:

Q Were you not dreaming?

A No, Your Honor.

Q Are your sure you were wide awake at that time?

A Yes, I am sure.

COURT:

Proceed.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q According to you Mary Ann you covered yourself you covered yourself with a blanket how were
you able to witness, to see what all your father did to your sister when you were inside the
blanket?

A Because I peeped sir.

Q Why did you peep when there was no partition or room inside that house?

A The breathing of my father. As a matter of fact, he kicked me.

Q You said you saw what your father did to your sister because you peeped from where did your
peep?

A I peeped through the blanket.

Q Whose blanket?

A My blanket.

COURT:

Q Are you made to understand you have covered yourself with a blanket and removed a part so
you can peeped?

A That is right Your Honor.

COURT:

Proceed.

FISCAL LABORTE:

Q Now, after your father, according to you, sexually abused your sister Lyzel did your father say
anything to your sister?

A Yes, there was. He threatened my sister.

Q What was this threat?

A He told my sister as follows: dont tell your mother and if you tell your mother I will kill you.

Q And after that what happened?

A He keep on sexually abusing my sister.

Q For how long?

A For quite a time.

Q Did you notice, if your sister, ever resisted to the sexual intercourse done by your father to her?

A My sister moaned.
Q How about you Mary Ann considering that you actually saw your father abusing your sister what
did you do?

A I cried.

Q Did you not try to stop your father from abusing your sister?

A No, sir because he placed a bolo beside him when he sleep.

Q On October 31, 1997 did your father place a bolo beside him when he sleep?

A Yes, sir.

Q How about on November 1, 1997 did he also place the bolo beside him when your father sleep?

A Yes, he place the bolo beside him every night.[30]

However, the complaints/informations in those two cases fail to allege Lyzels minority or
appellants relationship to her. Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
requires that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in the complaint or
information. Existing jurisprudence instructs that the death penalty may be imposed only if the
complaint or information has alleged and the evidence has proven both the minority of the victim
and her relationship to the offender by the quantum of proof required for conviction.[31] In the
present case, not only were the minority of the complainant and her relationship with appellant
not alleged in the two complaints/informations filed against appellant, but, also, the
aggravating/qualifying circumstance that the second rape was committed in full view of
appellants daughter. Consequently, appellant may be convicted only of simple rape; hence, the
trial court erred in imposing death penalty in both cases. The appropriate penalty which could be
imposed on the appellant is reclusion perpetua in each count.

Let us now consider the civil aspect of the criminal cases.

It is a settled rule that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review
and it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct an error as may be found in the appealed
judgment, whether or not it is made the subject of assignment of errors.[32]

While the trial court correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, it failed to
award civil indemnity.

Civil indemnity is distinct from moral damages as it is based on different jural foundations and
assessed by the court in the exercise of its sound discretion.[33] The award of civil indemnity is
mandatory upon the finding of fact of rape.[34] Based on existing jurisprudence, the civil
indemnity for the victim in simple rape shall not be less than P50,000.00.[35]

It is settled that the presence of an aggravating circumstance justifies an award for exemplary
damages under Article 2230[36] of the Civil Code even in the absence of an allegation of the
aggravating circumstance in the Information.[37] The award of exemplary damages should serve
to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies and aberrant sexual behavior from preying upon
and sexually abusing their daughters.[38] Thus, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00
for each count of rape should be awarded to the victim in view of the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of relationship and dwelling.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 18, dated December
22, 1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU-45672 and CBU-45673 finding appellant Romeo H. Lambid
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS to
the effect that in each case, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
ordered to pay complainant Lyzel S. Lambid the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
civil indemnity, Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as exemplary damages in addition to
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) awarded by the trial court as moral damages or
a total of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

RES INTER ALIOS ACTA

Rule 130, Section 28

Section 28. Admission by third party. — The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another, except as hereinafter provided.

PEOPLE VS ALEGRE
94 SCRA 109 (1979)

“As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not
admissible and does not have probative value against his co-¬accused. It is merely hearsay
evidence as far as the other accused are concerned.”

Facts:
The case arose from the death of AdelinaSajoa spinster, 57 years old, whose body was found in
her bathroom inside her house. Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was
ransacked.Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented rooms
on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police headquarters for
investigation in connection with the case, but was later released that same day for lack of any
evidence implicating him in the crime.MelecioCudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte,
in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining
how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the
killing and robbery of AdlinaSajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police
authorities of Tacloban. This was his first extrajudicial admission. Second admission was made in
Pasay wherein he named his companions in the killing; Alegre, Medalla and Comaya.
The prosecution presented SGT. Marianao Isla of the Pasay City Police who testified that when he
was investigating Cudillan, he pointed out Alegre, Medalla and Comaya and said nothing.

Issue:
Whether or not the alleged silence of the accused when allegedly pointed to by Cudillan as his
companions in the commission of the crime, is an admission of guilt.
Ruling:
No, the silence of an accused or his refusal to testify may not be taken in evidence against him,
and that he may refuse to refuse to answer an incriminating question.

While an accused is in custody, his silence may not be taken in evidence again him as he has right
to remain silent, his silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him. Thus,
silence of an accused under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him
a crime; especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to such implications
or accusations; cannot be considered a tacit confession of his participation in a commission of the
crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from silence or failure to deny the statement
would appear incompatible with the right of an accused against self- incrimination.

PEOPLE VS. RAQUEL

G.R. No. 119005, December 2, 1996

“Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel
are inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to
counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel. An extrajudicial
confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused.”

Facts:
The accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel, as well as accused Amado Ponce,
guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, On midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and
AgapitoGambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need, Agapito attended to the person knocking at
the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door,
declared a hold-up and fired their guns at him. George Jovillano responded to Juliet's plea for
help. He reported the incident to the police. The police came and found one of the perpetrators
of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victim's house. He was identified as
Amado Ponce. Even the victim cannot identify if it was the accused who entered their house.
Trial court rendered judgment against the accused.

Issue:
Whether or not the extrajudicial admission made by Ponce against the other accused should be
admissible on court.

Ruling:
The defense submits a lone assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in convicting
accused Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence
positively implicating them as the perpetrators of the crime.

If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter's
extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the same are hearsay as against said accused. That
is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.

The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the
confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a
principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and
are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly
inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither
ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.

Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are
inadmissible and cannot be considered in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel
may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel.

PEOPLE v GAUDIA
G.R. No. 146111. February 23, 2004

Rolando Gaudia was convicted for raping a minor, Remelyn Loyola. Gaudia’s father offered money
to Remelyn’s mother to settle what his son has committed. This offer of compromise was used by
Amalia, the mother of the victim, against the Gaudia to convict him. SC said that the offer of
compromise allegedly made by appellant to Amalia Loyola’s husband is hearsay evidence, and of
no probative value.

FACTS:
• That on or about March 24, 1997 at about 6:30 oclock in the evening, in Davao, Rolando Gaudia,
by means of force and intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with Remelyn Loyola, a minor, against her will to her damage and prejudice.
• Remelyns morhter, Amalia, the primary witness, testified that on 24 March 1997, she left her
two children Remelyn (3 1/2 years old) and Kimberly (1 year old) at their house.
• At the time, her husband was working in Tulunan, South Cotabato. At about 4:00 in the
afternoon, Amalia returned home and could not find Remelyn. She went to fetch water and
proceeded to a neighbor to ask about the whereabouts of Remelyn. Nobody could provide her
any information.
• On her way home, she shouted and called out Remelyns name. At about 6:00 p.m., Amalia heard
Remelyn calling out to her, Ma, I am here, from a grove of ipil-ipil tree. Amalia rushed toward the
place, but was met by Remelyn at the mango trees, some thirty (30) meters from their house.
• She found Remelyn crying, naked, nagbakaang (walking with her legs spread apart) and with
fresh and dried blood on her body. Ipil-ipil leaves clung to her forehead. Blood was oozing from
her private organ. Amalia brought Remelyn home and washed her. Upon closer inspection, she
found a whitish mucuslike substance coming from Remelyns private organ.
• The following day, 2 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the house of a certain Tiya Coring,
a quack doctor, for treatment. Among the people present in the premises were the relatives and
parents of the appellant.The quack doctor found both dried blood and fresh blood oozing in
Remelyns vagina, and told Amalia, Hoy! Amalia, your daughter has been raped.
• At about 10:00 a.m., Tulon Mik, a neighbor, came and informed Amalia that he had seen the
appellant pass by her house and take Remelyn.
• At this point, the parents of appellant told Amalia, Mal, let us talk about this matter, we will just
settle this, we are willing to pay the amount of P15,000.00, for the crime that my son committed.
• Police officers came and brought Amalia, Remelyn and two barangay officials (kagawads) to the
police precinct of Hagonoy for investigation. Amalias statement was taken.
• On 25 March 1997, Amalia brought Remelyn to the Hagonoy Health Center in Davao del Sur. Dr.
Patricio Hernane, the municipal health officer, conducted a genital examination of Remelyn, and
found that there was a physical loss of virginity. The doctor opined that the lacerations could have
been caused by the insertion of a foreign object, such as the penis of a man.
• There where several circumstantial evidence that were presented which led to the conviction
of Rolando Gaudia of the crime of rape and was sentenced to death. The first circumstantial
evidence against the appellant is the testimony of prosecution witness Tulon Mik that at 4:00 p.m.
on 24 March 1997, he saw him carrying Remelyn toward the direction of the ipil-ipil grove, some
130 meters from her house. As a neighbor and relative of Remelyns stepfather, Mik had sufficient
familiarity with the child Remelyn. The possibility that he could have been mistaken in identifying
the victim is nil.
• The second circumstantial evidence against the appellant is Amalias testimony that Remelyn
emerged naked from the same ipilipil grove, with ipil-ipil leaves clinging to her forehead. Remelyn
was crying and walking with her legs spread far apart. Remelyn’s private organ was bleeding and
excreting a white mucus-like substance.
• The third circumstantial evidence against appellant is Remelyn’s statement to her mother that
it was appellant who had brought her to the ipil-ipil grove[34] and forced her to do something
against her will.
• There is no question that Remelyn was violated. After examining Remelyn, Dr. Patricio Hernane,
the Municipal Health Officer of Hagonoy, found her to have a broken hymen, as well as fresh
vaginal lacerations. Hence this review by the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the offer of compromise made by the parents of “Lendoy” / Rolando Gaudia
should be taken against him?
NO – it is merely considered as a hearsay evidence. No probative value. Guilty of only simple rape.
RATIO:
• The Court rejected the appellants arguments and deened his attempt to discredit the
circumstantial evidence against him is futile.
o Appellant contends, first, that Tulon Miks testimony is weak, on the ground that Mik is a relative
of the husband of Amalia. He also questions the credibility of Mik because of his failure to confront
appellant when he saw him carrying Remelyn.
o Neither did Mik inform Amalia about what he saw when Amalia was looking for Remelyn.
Appellant insists that it was Daylen whom he carried and not Remelyn. Second, he stresses the
fact that Remelyn did not make any categorical statement that he sexually molested her.
o Third, he maintains that the accusation of flight against him is false.
o Fourth, he avers that the offer of compromise by his parents as tendered to Amalia Loyola
should not be taken against him, while the offer of compromise he allegedly made to Amalias
husband, as relayed by Amalia in her testimony, should be excluded as evidence for being
hearsay.
o Finally, he submits that inconsistencies in the testimony of Alex Loyola and Cabano should not
be counted against him on the ground that any finding of guilt must rest on the strength of the
prosecution’s evidence.
• Appellants charge that the offers of compromise allegedly made by the parents of the appellant
to Amalia, and by the appellant himself to Amalia’s husband should not have been taken against
him by the trial court, even if sustained, will not exculpate him.
• The offer of compromise allegedly made by appellant to Amalia Loyola’s husband is hearsay
evidence, and of no probative value.
• It was only Amalia who testified as to the alleged offer, and she was not a party to the
conversation which
allegedly transpired at the Hagonoy Municipal Jail.
• A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal knowledge or perception.
• The offer of compromise allegedly made by the appellant’s parents to Amalia may have been
the subject of testimony of Amalia.
• However, following the principle of res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions of
his parents cannot prejudice the appellant, since he was not a party to the said conversation, nor
was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by them to the mother of the
victim.
• They cannot be considered as evidence against appellant but we reiterate that these errors are
not enough to reverse the conviction of the appellant.
• Appellant’s defense hardly impresses. It is interesting to note that appellant and his witnesses
claim that it was at around 5:00 p.m. when appellant carried the child Daylen toward her
grandmother Catalina at the place where she was gathering tuba. Mik testified that it was around
4:00 p.m. when he saw appellant carrying Remelyn toward theipil-ipil grove. Given the 130-meter
distance between the ipil-ipil grove and the houses of appellant and of Amalia Loyola, appellant
could have easily taken Remelyn from her house, raped her at the ipil-ipil grove, and left her there,
all in a matter of a few minutes. Sometime past 4:00 p.m., he could then have returned to his
house, and together with Alex Loyola, proceeded to the COMELEC office to register, and did all
the subsequent acts he claims to have done.

EMMA S. ACENAS v. ANGELA SISON

GR No. L-17011, Aug 30, 1963

DECISION
This is an appeal from the order dated March 7, 1960 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City Branch, holding husband and wife solidarily liable on a note made by the wife.
But although this appeal was brought on behalf of husband and wife, the decision of the trial court
is being questioned only insofar as it holds the husband liable on the note of his wife. The wife's
liability is admitted.

The records show that in September, 1956, Angela Sison executed a promissory note, promising
to pay Emma S. Acenas the sum of P8,160 in 26 installments, the first falling due on November
30, 1956 and the last on November 30, 1960. The note provided that failure to pay two
consecutive installments would make the balance due and demandable.

Mrs. Sison was able to pay up to August 31, 1957 only. Upon her failure to pay the balance of the
note, alleged to be in the sum of P8,391.60, she was sued. Her husband, Teofilo Sison, was joined
as a defendant pursuant to Article 113 of the Civil Code.

In their answer, Mr. Sison denied liability on the ground that he had not signed the promissory
note.

The case was set for hearing on March 7, 1960. What happened on that day is set forth in the
following decision of the Court of First Instance, dated March 7, 1960:

"When this case was called for hearing today, counsel for the defendants moved for the
postponement of the hearing hereof in view of the absence of his clients and that he needs time
within which to confer with them for the purpose of amicably settling this case. To this motion for
postponement, however, counsel for the plaintiffs objected on the ground that the defendants
have been given sufficient time within which to settle this case but failed to do so. On the other
hand, when the court indicated to the defendant's counsel that there seems to be no defense on
the part of the defendants in this case, and that it would be for the best interest of the latter if
the case is terminated by way of judgment on the pleadings or confession of judgment, counsel
for defendants offered no objection and asked that confession of judgment by the defendants
may be entered in this case provided that the corresponding writ of execution thereof should not
be issued until June 30, 1960, to which counsel for the plaintiffs agreed.

"In view thereof, and upon motion of counsel for defendants with the conformity of counsel for
the plaintiffs, the motion for confession of judgment under the terms and conditions set forth
above are hereby granted.

"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, one in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, by
ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiffs the sum of P8,391.60, with
interest at the rate of 1% per month from November 1, 1959 until fully paid for: by ordering the
same defendants, jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiffs the additional sum of P500.00 by way
of attorney's fees; and for the defendants to pay the costs. This decision, however, is subject to
the condition that the corresponding writ of execution should not be issued until June 30, 1960,
as agreed upon by the parties herein." (Italic supplied.)

Their motion for reconsideration and new trial having been denied, defendants appealed directly
to this Court. Appellant Teofilo Sison contends that his lawyer agreed to a judgment on the
pleadings but not to a confession of judgment; that he never authorized his lawyer to confess
judgment for him and that at any rate he was not liable on the note of his wife.

For purposes of this appeal, We take it as a fact, as trial court found, that Atty. Nicanor S. Sison,
counsel for Teofilo and Angela Sison, agreed to a judgment on confession against his clients,
provided no writ of execution was issued until June 30, 1960. But, the records do not show that
Atty. Sison had authority to confess judgment. On the contrary, the decision of March 7, 1960
states that Atty. Sison "moved for the postponement of the hearing hereof in view of the absence
of his clients and that he needs time within which to confer with them for the purpose of amicably
settling this case." This indicates that Atty. Sison lacked authority to confess judgment, otherwise,
there would have been no need for him to confer with his clients. This circumstance should have
put the trial court on an inquiry as to counsel's authority.

In Natividad vs. Natividad, 51 Phil. 613, and Anduiza vs. Quirona, G.R. No. L-5073, May 20, 1953,
We held that the compromise of causes and confession of judgments appear to stand upon the
same footing and that since the compromise may not be affected by counsel without special
authority,[1] so may not an agreement to permit judgment to be entered against his client be
authorized except with the knowledge and at the instance of the client. Such judgment may be
set aside or reopened.

Appellees cite decisions of the courts of Georgia which hold that where a settlement of a suit is
made by an attorney accepting less than the full amount of the claim in cash, the agreement binds
the client if the settlement is carried out by a consent verdict and judgment and the settlement
was made without fraud on the part of the attorney or any instruction of the client to the contrary.
(Coweta Fertilizer Co. vs. Johnson, 26 Ga. App. 528, 106 S.E. 610; Brannan vs. Mobley, 169 Ga.
243, 150, S.E. 76)

As this Court noted in the Natividad case, these cases do not apply here because the Georgia
statute is different from our law. Thus, in the Coweta Fertilizer case, supra, the Court of Appeals
of Georgia held:

"We do not think that section 4956 of the Civil Code of 1910 is applicable to the facts of the
present case. That section provides as follows:

'Without special authority, attorneys cannot receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but
the full amount in cash.'

"In the present case the attorney of the defendant was not endeavoring to collect or enforce his
client's claim, but was resisting a suit or claim against his client and consented to the credit in
favor of his client. * **"

In contrast, Section 21 of Rule 127 expressly requires that attorneys have special authority not
only to receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash but also to
compromise their client's litigation.

Appellees also rely on Holker and others vs. Parker, 7 Cranch 436, 6 Law Ed. 433. But that case
does not support appellees' position, for it was held there that

"Although an attorney at law, merely as such, has strictly speaking no right to make a compromise,
yet a court would be disinclined to disturb one which was not so unreasonable in itself as to be
exclaimed against by all, and to create an impression that the judgment of the attorney has been
imposed on, or not fairly exercised in the case. But where the sacrifice is such as to leave it scarcely
possible that, with a full knowledge of every circumstance, such a compromise could be fairly
made, there can be no hesitation in saying that the compromise, being unauthorized and being
therefore itself void, ought not to bind the injured party. Though it may assume the form of an
award or of a judgment at law, the injured party, if his own conduct has been perfectly blameless,
ought to be relieved against it. * * *"

We hold therefore that it was error for the trial court to accept the confession made by counsel
without ascertaining his authority to do so, at least with respect to Teofilo Sison. With respect to
Angela Sison, however, the judgment will be maintained, there being no claim in this appeal that
the confession of judgment made in her behalf was unauthorized. In fact, her liability is admitted
here.

This brings us to the next point. Does Article 113 of the Civil Code, which requires the joinder of
the husband in actions against the wife, make the husband solidarily liable? Appellees maintain
that it does, since the order is not assailed as far as Mrs. Sison is concerned "otherwise, his (the
husband's) joinder would be an empty formality."

We do not share this review. The law requires the joinder of the husband not because he is
thereby bound with his wife but because he is the administrator of the conjugal partnership which
might be held liable in the action. To make the husband solidarily liable with his wife simply
because his joinder is required would be to subvert the basic rule that the wife cannot bind the
conjugal partnership without the husband's consent. (Art. 172, Civil Code) The only exceptions are
when the husband consents; when the wife spends for the usual daily needs of the family (Art.
115); or when she is given the management of the partnership (Arts. 157, 168, 178 and 196).
There is no allegation in the complaint that Mrs. Sison incurred her obligation to Mrs. Acenas
under any of these exceptions so as to bind the conjugal partnership.

Wherefore, the decision dated March 7, 1960 of the lower court is modified in the sense that
defendant Teofilo Sison is not liable and that defendant Angela Sison alone is liable to the plaintiffs
for the amount adjudged in the decision. No costs.