9. CATIPON, JR. V. JAPSON, G.R. NO.

191787, JUNE 22, 2015

FACTS: Petitioner Macario U. Catipon, Jr. was allowed to join the graduation ceremonies despite a
deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science, pursuant to a school policy allowing students with deficiencies
of not more than 12 units to be included in the list of graduates. However, a restriction came after, which
is, that the deficiency must be cured before the student can be considered a graduate. In 1985, petitioner
found employment with the Social Security System (SSS) in Bangued, Abra. Petitioner filed an application
to take the Career Service Professional Examination (CSPE) in October 1993, believing that the CSC still
allowed CSPE applicants to substitute the length of their government service for any academic deficiency
which they may have. However, the abovementioned policy of the CSC had been discontinued since
January. Nevertheless, petitioner took the CSPE tests on October 17, 1993 and obtained a rating of
80.52%. Eventually, petitioner was promoted to Senior Analyst and Officer-in-Charge Branch Head of the
SSS at Bangued, Abra. In October 1995, he finally eliminated his deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science.
On March 10, 2003, respondent Jerome Japson, a former Senior Member Services Representative of SSS
Bangued, filed a letter-complaint with the Civil Service Commission-CAR Regional Director, alleging that
petitioner made deliberate false entries in his CSPE application. Petitioner was charged with Dishonesty,
Falsification of Official documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service by the CSC-CAR. The Regional Director exonerated him on all charges except as to the charge for
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, where he was found guilty and penalized with
suspension of six months and one to one year. Macario appealed to the Civil Service Commission, after
his motion for reconsideration was denied by the Regional Director. Macario filed a Petition for review to
assail the CSC-CAR Regional Director’s ruling, which the Court of Appeals denied. It ruled that instead of
filing a Petition for review directly with the CA, Macario should have interposed an appeal to the Civil
Service Commission pursuant to Sections 5(A)(1), 43 and 49 of the CSC Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases; by filing the petition directly with the CA, Macario violated the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies; the absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to deny or disregard established
rules or norms in the service does not preclude a finding of guilt for conduct prejudicial to the best interest
of the service; and that petitioner did not act with prudence and care, but instead was negligent, in the
filling up of his CSPE application form and in failing to certify beforehand the requirements for the
examination.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macario violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

HELD: The Court denies the Petition. The CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil service.
Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Civil Service Commission shall have the
final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the
civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and
employees. As pointed out by the CA, pursuant to Section 5(A) (1) of MC 19, the Civil Service Commission
Proper, or Commission Proper, shall have jurisdiction over decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices
brought before it on petition for review. And under Section 43, "decisions of heads of departments,
agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty
days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the Commission
Proper within a period of fifteen days from receipt thereof." Thus, we agree with the CA’s conclusion that
in filing his petition for review directly with it from the CSC-CAR Regional Director, petitioner failed to
observe the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As correctly stated by the appellate court,
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies renders petitioner’s CA petition premature and thus
dismissible.
10. CALIBRE TRADERS, INC. v. BAYER PHILIPPINES, INC.

DOCTRINE: Upon determination of the counterclaim as permissive, the party should be ordered to pay
the required docket fees, giving it reasonable time but in no case beyond the reglementary period.

FACTS: Calibre Trading was a distributor/dealer of agricultural chemicals in Pangasinan and Tarlac. It had
a distributorship agreement with Bayerphils effective from June 1989-1991. Bayerphils stopped delivering
stocks to Calibre on July 1989 after the latter failed to settle its unpaid accounts. On Calibre’s part, it
enjoyed discounts and rebates from from Bayerphil but because of a disagreement as to the entitlement
and computations of the discounts, it withheld payment to compel the latter to reconcile its accounts.
Calibre then filed a suit for damages before the RTC of Pasig City. Bayerphil filed an Answer with
Counterclaim and moved that Mario Sebastian and his wife be impleaded as co-defendants, considering
that the Sebastians bound themselves as solidary debtors under the agreement. Calibre opposed the
motion to implead and moved to strike out the counterclaim, reasoning that the spouses are not parties
in its suit against Bayerphil and thus are not the proper parties to the counterclaim. It also stressed that
the issues between the damages suit it filed and Bayerphils’ counterclaim for collection of money are
totally unrelated. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Calibre and that the counterclaim set up by
Bayerphil was only permissive in character so it should be dismissed for failure to pay the required docket
fees. However on appeal to the CA, the court favored Bayerphil’s counterclaim as it was compulsory and
that it arose out of the same dealership agreement from which the claims of Calibre were based.

ISSUE: W/N the lower court correctly dismissed Bayerhils counterclaim for non-payment of the required
docket fees when it ruled the same to be a persmissive counterclaim

HELD: NO. As regards the question of what kind of counterclaim was set up by Bayerphil, the same is a
permissive counterclaim because the suit may proceed independently in a separate action. Although the
rights and obligations of the parties are anchored on the same contract, the causes of action they filed
against each other are distinct and do not involve the same factual issues. Be that as it may, the lower
court was incorrect in dismissing Bayerphils counterclaim for non-payment of docket fees as the latter
never evaded payment on the honest belief that its counterclaim was compulsory. It has always argued
against Calibre’s contention that its counterclaim was permissive ever since the latter opposed Bayerphils
motion before the RTC to implead the Sebastian spouses. Lastly, Bayerphils belief was reinforced by Judge
Claravall’s October 24, 1990 Resolution when she denied Calibres motion to strike out Bayerphils
counterclaim. In accordance with the aforementioned rules on payment of docket fees, the trial court
upon a determination that Bayerphils counterclaim was permissive, should have instead ordered
Bayerphil to pay the required docket fees for the permissive counterclaim, giving it reasonable time but
in no case beyond the reglementary period. Besides, Bayerphil should not suffer from the dismissal of its
case due to the mistake of the trial court. It must be noted that the court had jurisdiction over
counterclaim although it erroneously ordered its automatic dismissal.
11. BUNGCAYAO SR. v. FORT ILOCANDIA, 618 SCRA 181, APRIL 19, 2010

DOCTRINE: A permissive counterclaim is capable of proceeding independently of the main case and for
the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. Any
decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on
appeal before the Supreme Court.

FACTS: In 1992, Bungcayao Sr. and other members applied for a foreshore lease with the CENRO and was
granted a provisional permit. In 2002, Fort Ilocandia Property Holdings and Development Corporation filed
a foreshore application over a 14-hectare area abutting the Fort Ilocandia Property, including the 5-
hectare portion applied for by DSierto members. The foreshore applications became the subject matter
in a conflicts case filed with the DENR. The DENR Regional Exec. Director denied the DSierto members’
foreshore lease applications that the subject area applied for fell either within the titled property or within
the foreshore areas applied for by Fort Ilocandia. The denial was affirmed by the DENR Secretary. Fort
Ilocandia invited the DSierto members to a luncheon meeting and Atty. Marcos, as mediator, offered
financial settlements per claimant in consideration of the improvements introduced, on the condition that
they would vacate the area identified as Fort Ilocandia’s property. Bungcayao Sr. filed an action for
declaration of nullity of contract with the RTC of Laoag City alleging that his son, who attended the
meeting, had no authority to represent him and that the deed was void and not binding upon him. He
alleged that Manuel Jr. manifested that he still had to consult his parents about the offer but upon the
undue pressure exerted by Atty. Marcos, he accepted the payment and signed the Deed of Assignment,
Release, Waiver and Quitclaim. Respondent alleged that petitioner’s sons attended the luncheon meeting
on their own volition and they were able to talk to their parents through a cellular phone before they
accepted respondent’s offer. As a counterclaim, respondent prayed that petitioner be required to return
the amount of P400,000 from respondent, to vacate the portion of the respondents property he was
occupying, and to pay damages because his continued refusal to vacate the property caused tremendous
delay in the planned implementation of Fort Ilocandia’s expansion projects.

ISSUE: W/N Fort Ilocandia’s counterclaim for recovery of possession of the property is compulsory in
nature

HELD: NO. Respondent filed three counterclaims: 1) recovery of P400,000 given to Manuel Jr. (later
rendered moot with the issuance of the court Order confirming agreement of the parties to cancel the
Deed); 2) recovery of possession of the subject property; and 3) damages (waived and renounced.) The
SC ruled that while the second counterclaim was an offshoot of the same basic controversy between the
parties, it is very clear that it will not be barred if not set up in the answer to the complaint. The same is
only a permissive counterclaim that is capable of proceeding independently of the main case. The rule in
permissive counterclaim is that for a court to acquire jurisdiction, the counterclaimant is bound to pay the
prescribed docket fees. Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck
down at any time, even on appeal before the SC. In this case, respondent did not dispute the non-payment
of docket fees. Respondent only insisted that its claims were all compulsory counterclaims. As such, the
judgment by the trial court in relation to the second counterclaim is considered null and void without
prejudice to a separate action which respondent may file against petitioner.
12. REGIONAL AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD VS. CA, G.R. No. 184542, April 23, 2010.

FACTS: Respondents are co-owners of several parcels of land primarily devoted to rice production
consisting of 58.8448 hectares, located at Sta. Barbara, Baliuag, Bulacan. According to respondents,
petitioners are agricultural lessees with the obligation to pay annual lease rentals while the latter aver
that they are farmer-beneficiaries under Presidential Decree 27, who have been granted Certificates of
Land Transfer (CLTs) and (unregistered) emancipation patents (EPs). On March 6, 2002, respondents filed
a complaint for ejectment against petitioners for non-payment of rentals before the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) alleging that petitioners failed to pay and remit the agreed
lease rentals to respondents since 1994, or for a period of eight years. Among the named defendants were
Avelino Santos (Avelino) and Pedro Bernardo (Pedro), who were already deceased at the time of the filing
of the complaint. Thus, when the complaint for ejectment was filed in 2002, the actual tillers on the land
were already the successors-in-interest of Avelino and Pedro, namely Delfin Sacdalan (Delfin) and Roberto
Bernardo (Roberto), respectively.

The Regional Adjudicator ruled in favor of respondents. Aggrieved by the adverse Decision, petitioners
filed two separate notices of appeal. Respondents filed an ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution and a motion to dismiss the appeal on three grounds: first, the two notices did not state the
grounds relied upon for the appeal; second, the March 5, 2003 Notice of Appeal was filed beyond the
reglementary period; third, the March 5, 2003 Notice of Appeal contained the forged signatures of the
deceased defendants Avelino and Pedro. On May 6, 2003, the Regional Adjudicator issued an Order giving
due course to the appeal, except with respect to the decedents Avelino and Pedro, whose signatures were
held to be falsified. Thus, a writ of execution was issued against the non-appealing defendants and the
deceased defendants. The petitioners who were included in the writ of execution, including the heirs of
Avelino and Pedro, argued that the May 6, 2003 Order was hastily executed, without giving them an
opportunity to question its correctness. Thus, the Regional Adjudicator Manalang allowed the appeal of
the heirs of the two decedents and nullified the writ of execution. Respondents consequently filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA arguing that the DARAB no longer had any jurisdiction to reverse the
portion of its Decision, which had already been duly executed and also insisted that both notices of appeal
were infirm for failure to state the grounds for an appeal and for containing forged signatures. The
appellate court found merit in respondents’ petition.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether the Notices of Appeal dated February 28, 2003 and March 3, 2003 are mere scraps of
paper for failure to state the grounds relied upon for an appeal; and
(2) Whether the Notice of Appeal dated March 3, 2003 is null and void for containing two falsified
signatures.

HELD:
The petition is meritorious.

There is nothing sacred about the forms of pleadings or processes, their sole purpose being to facilitate
the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. Hence, pleadings as well as procedural
rules should be construed liberally. This is made more imperative in an agrarian case where the rules
themselves provide for liberal construction.

Going now to the alleged forgery, it is clear from the records that there was never an instant when the
respondents (and the Regional Adjudicator) were deceived or made to believe that Avelino and Pedro
were still alive and participating in the proceedings. Instead of impleading the decedent’s heirs and
current occupants of the landholding, respondents filed their complaint against the decedents, contrary
to the provision of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure where every agrarian case must be initiated and
defended in the name of the real party in interest. The real parties in interest, at the time the complaint
was filed, were no longer the decedents Avelino and Pedro, but rather their respective heirs who are
entitled to succeed to their rights (whether as agricultural lessees or as farmers-beneficiaries) under our
agrarian laws. Since respondents failed to correct their error (they did not amend the erroneous caption
of their complaint to include the real parties-in-interest), they cannot be insulated from the confusion
which it engendered in the proceedings below. Notwithstanding the erroneous caption and the absence
of a formal substitution of parties, jurisdiction was acquired over the heirs of Avelino and Pedro who
voluntarily participated in the proceedings below. This Court has ruled that formal substitution of parties
is not necessary when the heirs themselves voluntarily appeared, participated, and presented evidence
during the proceedings.