1
JUDICIAL NOTICE
16. “G” Holdings, Inc. vs. National Mines and Allied Workers
Union Local
Facts:
Maricalum Mining (MMC) was incorporated by the DBP
and the PNB on account of their foreclosure of Marinduque
Mining. DBP and PNB transferred it to the National Government
for disposition or privatization because it had become a non-
performing asset. Pursuant to the Purchase and Sale Agreement
between G Holdings (GHI) and Asset Privatization Trust (APT),
AP bought 90% of MMC’s shares and financial claims. These
claims were converted into 3 promissory notes issued by MMC
in favor of GHI totaling 500M and secured by mortgages over
MMC’s properties.
Almost four years thereafter, a labor dispute arose
between MMC and NAMAWU, with the latter eventually filing
with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board a notice of
strike. The Secretary declared that the lay-off was illegal and
that MMC committed unfair labor practice. He then ordered the
reinstatement of the laid-off workers, with payment of full
backwages and benefits, and directed the execution of a new
CBA.
Then Acting Department of Labor and Employment
Secretary, directed the issuance of a partial writ of execution
and ordered the sheriffs to proceed to the premises for the
execution of the same.
The writ was not fully satisfied because MMC’s resident
manager resisted its enforcement. On motion of NAMAWU, then
DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas issued an Alias Writ of
Execution and Break-Open Order (Sto. Tomas Writ). The
respondent acting sheriffs implemented the Sto. Tomas Writ and
levied on the properties of MMC located at its compound in
Negros Occidental.
GHI filed with the RTC a Special Civil Action for Contempt
with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injuction and to Nullify the
Sheriff’s Levy on Properties.
Issue:
Whether or not the Judicial Notice Rule can be applied.
Held:
Yes. Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its
Decision in Maricalum Mining Corporation v. Hon. Arturo D.
Brion and NAMAWU, in which we upheld the right of herein
private respondent, NAMAWU, to its labor claims. Upon the
same principle of judicial notice, we acknowledge our Decision
in Republic of the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset
Privatization Trust v. G Holdings, Inc., in which GHI was
recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares of stocks of
MMC, and thus, entitled to the delivery of the company notes
accompanying the said purchase. These company notes,
consisting of three (3) Promissory Notes, were part of the
documents executed in 1992 in the privatization sale of MMC by
the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to GHI. Each of these notes
uniformly contains stipulations establishing and constituting in
favor of GHI mortgages over MMCs real and personal properties.
The stipulations were subsequently formalized in a separate
document denominated Deed of Real Estate and Chattel
Mortgage on September 5, 1996. Thereafter, the Deed was
registered on February 4, 2000.
We find both decisions critically relevant to the instant
dispute. In fact, they should have guided the courts below in the
disposition of the controversy at their respective levels. To
repeat, these decisions respectively confirm the right of
NAMAWU to its labor claims and affirm the right of GHI to its
financial and mortgage claims over the real and personal
properties of MMC, as will be explained below. The assailed CA
decision apparently failed to consider the impact of these two
decisions on the case at bar. Thus, we find it timely to reiterate
that: courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to
determine whether or not the case pending is a moot one or
whether or not a previous ruling is applicable to the case under
consideration.
In this light, all the more does it become imperative to
take judicial notice of the two cases aforesaid, as they provide
the necessary perspective to determine whether GHI is such a
party with a valid ownership claim over the properties subject of
the writ of execution. In Juaban v. Espina, we held that in some
instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings
in other cases that are closely connected to the matter in

controversy. These cases may be so closely interwoven, or so
clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice. The
two cases that we have taken judicial notice of are of such
character, and our review of the instant case cannot stray from
the findings and conclusions therein.
17. Spouses Latip vs. Chua
Facts:
Rosalie Chua (Rosalie) is the owner of Roferxane Building,
a commercial building, located at No. 158 Quirino Avenue corner
Redemptorist Road, Barangay Baclaran, Paraaque City. Rosalie
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer plus damages against
petitioners, Spouses Omar and Moshiera Latip (Spouses Latip).
Rosalie attached to the complaint a contract of lease over two
cubicles in Roferxane Bldg., signed by Rosalie, as lessor, and by
Spouses Latip, as lessees thereof.
A year after the commencement of the lease and with
Spouses Latip already occupying the leased cubicles, Rosalie,
through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment
of back rentals and should they fail to do so, to vacate the leased
cubicles. When Spouses Latip did not heed Rosalies demand,
she instituted the aforesaid complaint.
In their Answer, Spouses Latip refuted Rosalies claims.
They averred that the lease of the two (2) cubicles had already
been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to
Rosalie of the total amount of P2,570,000.00.
Spouses Latip asseverated that sometime in October 1999,
Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over two (2) cubicles in
Roferxane Bldg. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during
the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalies offer to
purchase lease rights in Roferxane Bldg., which was still under
construction at the time. According to Spouses Latip, the
immediate payment of P2,570,000.00 would be used to finish
construction of the building giving them first priority in the
occupation of the finished cubicles.
Thereafter, in December 1999, as soon as two (2) cubicles
were finished, Spouses Latip occupied them without waiting for
the completion of five (5) other stalls. Spouses Latip averred that
the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their
purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were
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surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalies counsel and
the subsequent filing of a complaint against them.
Issue:
Whether or not the taking of the judicial notice of the CA is
proper.
Held:
No. As previously adverted to the CA, in ruling for Rosalie
and upholding the ejectment of Spouses Latip, took judicial
notice of the alleged practice of prospective lessees in the
Baclaran area to pay goodwill money to the lessor.
On this point, State Prosecutors v. Muro is instructive:
I. The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom
and discretion of the courts. The power to take
judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with
caution; care must be taken that the requisite
notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the
subject should be promptly resolved in the negative.
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have
three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well
and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the
limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to
be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can
be said that judicial notice is limited to facts
evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety.
To say that a court will take judicial notice of a fact is
merely another way of saying that the usual form of
evidence will be dispensed with if knowledge of the
fact can be otherwise acquired. This is because the
court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it
will not be disputed. But judicial notice is not judicial
knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge
is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is

not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a
fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis
of his action. Judicial cognizance is taken only of
those matters which are commonly known.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take
judicial notice, may be matters coming to the
knowledge of men generally in the course of the
ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters
1 which are generally accepted by mankind as true
and are capable of ready and unquestioned
demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally
known, and which may be found in encyclopedias,
dictionaries or other publications, are judicially
noticed, provided they are of such universal notoriety
and so generally understood that they may be
regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of
every person
From the foregoing provisions of law and our holdings
thereon, it is apparent that the matter which the appellate court
took judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety.
To begin with, only the CA took judicial notice of this supposed
practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area.
Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in
favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of common
knowledge or notoriously known.
However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied
by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the
Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalies appeal before the
CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by
Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court What need not be proved.
18. Corinthian Gardens vs. Spouses Tanjangco
Facts:
Respondents-spouses Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco (the
Tanjangcos) own Lots 68 and 69 covered by Transfer Certificates
of Title (TCT) No. 242245 and 282961 respectively, located at
Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, Quezon City, which is
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managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc.
(Corinthian). On the other hand, respondents-spouses Frank
and Teresita Cuaso (the Cuasos) own Lot 65 which is adjacent
to the Tanjangcos lots.
Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a
relocation survey was necessary. As Geodetic Engineer
Democrito De Dios (Engr. De Dios), operating under the
business name D.M. De Dios Realty and Surveying, conducted
all the previous surveys for the subdivision's developer,
Corinthian referred Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before, during
and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian
conducted periodic ocular inspections in order to determine
compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of
Rules and Regulations of Corinthian. Unfortunately, after the
Cuasos constructed their house employing the services of C.B.
Paraz & Construction Co., Inc. (C.B. Paraz) as builder, their
perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos Lot 69 by 87
square meters.
No amicable settlement was reached between the parties.
Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos demolish the
perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused, prompting the
Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit against the Cuasos for
Recovery of Possession with Damages.
Eventually, the Cuasos filed a Third-Party Complaint[8]
against Corinthian, C.B. Paraz and Engr. De Dios. The Cuasos
ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the
proper specifications of their house, and to Engr. De Dios for his
failure to undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby,
exposing them to litigation. The Cuasos also faulted Corinthian
for approving their relocation survey and building plans without
verifying their accuracy and in making representations as to
Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence. The Cuasos alleged
that had Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty,
they would not have been involved in a boundary dispute with
the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian
should also be held answerable for any damages that they might
incur as a result of such construction.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA has legal basis to increase unilaterally
and without proof the amount prayed for in the Complaint.

Held:
Citing Sia v. Court of Appeals [272 SCRA 141, May 5, 1997],
petitioners argue that the MTC may take judicial notice of the
reasonable rental or the general price increase of land in order
to determine the amount of rent that may be awarded to them.
In that case, however, this Court relied on the CA's factual
findings, which were based on the evidence presented before the
trial court. In determining reasonable rent, the RTC therein took
account of the following factors: 1) the realty assessment of the
land, 2) the increase in realty taxes, and 3) the prevailing rate of
rentals in the vicinity. Clearly, the trial court relied, not on mere
judicial notice, but on the evidence presented before it.
Indeed, courts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for
the use and occupation of a disputed property. However,
petitioners herein erred in assuming that courts, in determining
the amount of rent, could simply rely on their own appreciation
of land values without considering any evidence. As we have said
earlier, a court may fix the reasonable amount of rent, but it
must still base its action on the evidence adduced by the parties.
In Herrera v. Bollos [G.R. No. 138258, January 18, 2002], the
trial court awarded rent to the defendants in a forcible entry
case. Reversing the RTC, this Court declared that the reasonable
amount of rent could be determined not by mere judicial notice,
but by supporting evidence:
x x x A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual
matter in controversy. The court may take judicial notice of
matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges
because of their judicial functions. Before taking such judicial
notice, the court must allow the parties to be heard thereon.
Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the
premises in question without supporting evidence.
Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because
evidence is required for a court to determine the proper rental
value. But contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC
and the CA found that indeed rent was due the Tanjangcos
because they were deprived of possession and use of their
property. This uniform factual finding of the RTC and the CA
4
was based on the evidence presented below. Moreover, in
Spouses Catungal v. Hao, we considered the increase in the
award of rentals as reasonable given the particular
circumstances of each case. We noted therein that the
respondent denied the petitioners the benefits, including rightful
possession, of their property for almost a decade.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were
deprived of possession and use of their property for more than
two decades through no fault of their own. Thus, we find no
cogent reason to disturb the monthly rental fixed by the CA.
All told, the CA committed no reversible error.
19. Social Justice Society vs. Atienza
Facts:
Petitioners Social Justice Society, Cabigao and Tumbokon
sought to compel respondent Hon. Atienza, then mayor of the
City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027. This ordinance
reclassified the area described therein from industrial to
commercial, and directed the owners and operators of
businesses disallowed under the reclassification to cease and
desist from operating their businesses within 6 months from the
date of the effectivity. Among the businesses situated in the area
as the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies. In
its March 7, 2007 decision, the Court upheld the validity of the
ordinance.
Chevron, Shell and Petron filed their respective petitions
in the RTC attacking the validity of the ordinance. A writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction was granted.
In 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No.
8119, also known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan
and Zoning Ordinance of 2006. Chevron and Shell filed a
complaint in the RTC asking for the nullification of the
ordinance. Petron filed its own complaint on the same causes of
action. The court issued a TRO in favor of Petron. During the
oral arguments, the parties submitted to this Court’s power to
rule on the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 8027
despite the pendency of the consolidated cases involving the
issues in the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court is required to take judicial notice of

the ordinance.
Held:
No, the Court is not required to take judicial notice of the
ordinance. The March 2007 decision did not take into
consideration the passage of Ordinance No. 8119 which was
approved by respondent in June 2006. The simple reason was
that he Court was never informed about this ordinance.
While courts are required to take judicial notice of the
laws enacted by Congress, the rule with respect to local
ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the
enumeration of matters covered by mandatory judicial notice
under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Although, Section 50 of RA 409 provides that all courts sitting
in the city shall take judicial notice of the ordinances passed by
the [Sangguniang Panglungsod] this cannot be taken to mean
that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila, should
have taken steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own,
relieving the party of any duty to inform the Court about it.
Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take
judicial notice of municipal ordinances, a court is not required
to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it and to
which it does not have access. The party asking the court to take
judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text
of the rules the party desires it to have notice of. Counsel should
take the initiative in requesting that a trial court take judicial
notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to
take judicial notice of local ordinances.
The intent of a statute requiring a court to take judicial
notice of a local ordinance is to remove any discretion a court
might have in determining whether or not to take notice of an
ordinance. Such a statute does not direct the court to act on its
own in obtaining evidence for the record and a party must make
the ordinance available to the court for it to take notice.
JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS
Toshiba Information vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Facts:
Toshiba is a domestic corporation principally engaged in
the business of manufacturing and exporting of electric
machinery, equipment systems, accessories, parts, components,
5
materials and goods of all kinds, including those relating to
office automation and information technology and all types of
computer hardware and software, such as but not limited to
HDD-CD-ROM and personal computer printed circuit board. It
is registered with the Philippine Economic Zone Authority
(PEZA) as an Economic Zone (ECOZONE) export enterprise in
the Laguna Technopark, Inc. It is also registered with Regional
District Office of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) in San
Pedro, Laguna, as a VAT-taxpayer.
In its VAT returns for the first and second quarters of
1997, filed on April 14, 1997 and July 21, 1997, respectively,
Toshiba declared input VAT payments on its domestic
purchases of taxable goods and services in the aggregate sum of
P3,875,139.65, with no zero-rated sales. Toshiba subsequently
submitted to the BIR on July 23, 1997 its amended VAT returns
for the first and second quarters of 1997, reporting the same
amount of input VAT payments but, this time, with zero-rated
sales totaling P7,494,677,000.00.
On March 30, 1999, Toshiba filed with the One-Stop Shop
Inter-Agency Tax Credit and Duty Drawback Center of the
Department of Finance (DOF One-Stop Shop) two separate
applications for tax credit/refund of its unutilized input VAT
payments for the first half of 1997 in the total amount of
P3,685,446.73.
The next day, on March 31, 1999, Toshiba likewise filed
with the CTA a Petition for Review to toll the running of the two-
year prescriptive period under Section 230 of the Tax Code of
1977, as amended.
Upon being advised by the CTA, Toshiba and the CIR filed
a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Issues.
Issue:
Whether or not Toshiba will be granted tax credit.
Held:
Yes. The admission having been made in a stipulation of
facts at pre-trial by the parties, it must be treated as a judicial
admission. Under Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a
judicial admission requires no proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by a showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. The
Court cannot lightly set aside a judicial admission especially

when the opposing party relied upon the same and accordingly
dispensed with further proof of the fact already admitted. An
admission made by a party in the course of the proceedings does
not require proof.
In the instant case, among the facts expressly admitted
by the CIR and Toshiba in their CTA-approved Joint Stipulation
are that Toshiba “is a duly registered value-added tax entity in
accordance with Section 107 of the Tax Code, as amended[,]”
that “is subject to zero percent (0%) value-added tax on its export
sales in accordance with then Section 100(a)(2)(A) of the Tax
Code, as amended.” The CIR was bound by these admissions,
which he could not eventually contradict in his Motion for
Reconsideration of the CTA Decision dated October 16, 2000, by
arguing that Toshiba was actually a VAT-exempt entity and its
export sales were VAT-exempt transactions. Obviously, Toshiba
could not have been subject to VAT and exempt from VAT at the
same time. Similarly, the export sales of Toshiba could not have
been subject to zero percent (0%) VAT and exempt from VAT as
well.
The CIR cannot escape the binding effect of his judicial
admissions.
The Court disagrees with the Court of Appeals when it
ruled in its Decision dated August 29, 2002 that the CIR could
not be bound by his admissions in the Joint Stipulation because
(1) the said admissions were “made through palpable mistake”
which, if countenanced, “would result in falsehood, unfairness
and injustice”; and (2) the State could not be put in estoppel by
the mistakes of its officials or agents. This ruling of the Court
of Appeals is rooted in its conclusion that a “palpable mistake”
had been committed by the CIR in the signing of the Joint
Stipulation. However, this Court finds no evidence of the
commission of a mistake, much more, of a palpable one.
Cuenco vs. Talisay Tourist Sports Complex
Facts:
Cuenco leased from respondents for a period of two (2)
years, from May 8, 1992 to May 8, 1994, the Talisay Tourist
Sports Complex, to be operated as a cockpit. The lease was
extended for another four (4) years, or until May 8, 1998.
Under the Contract of Lease, it was stipulated that
petitioner shall, like a good father of the family, maintain in good
6
condition the furniture, chattels and all other equipment and
shall, at all times, keep the leased premises clean and sanitary.
For this purpose, petitioner would allow the respondents
building supervisor or his authorized representative to make a
regular spot inspection of the leased premises to see to it that
these stipulations are strictly implemented. Any damage caused
to the furniture, chattels, equipment and parts of the leased
premises shall be the responsibility of petitioner to repair and
compensate. Furthermore, petitioner would give a deposit
equivalent to six (6) months rental to answer for whatever
damages may be caused to the premises during the period of the
lease.
Upon expiration of the contract, respondent company
conducted a public bidding for the lease of the property.
Petitioner participated in the bidding. The lease was eventually
awarded to another bidder, Mr. Rex Cuaqui Salud. Thereafter,
petitioner wrote four (4) demand letters to respondents.
As all of his demand letters remained unheeded, on
October 21, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money,
damages and attorneys fees. He maintained that respondents
acted in bad faith in withholding the amount of the deposit
without any justifiable reason.
Issue:
Whether or not a judicial admission during the pre-trial is
conclusive and binding upon a party making the admission.
Held:
Yes. The admission during the pre-trial is binding and
conclusive upon the respondent. They are bound by the
admissions made by their counsel at the pre-trial.
A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the
pleadings, (2) during the trial, by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the
judicial proceeding. The stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a
case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of judicial
admissions require no further proof and may be controverted
only upon a clear showing that the admissions were made
through palpable mistake or that no admissions were made.
Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as
embodied in the pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon

them.
Respondents did not deny the admission made by their
counsel, neither did they claim that the same was made through
palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is
incontrovertible and may be relied upon by the courts. The pre-
trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt therein may
not be brushed aside in the process of decision-making.
Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be
rendered inconsequential and worthless. Furthermore, an act
performed by counsel within the scope of a general or implied
authority is regarded as an act of the client which renders
respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission
or representation is conclusive upon the person making it and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying
thereon.
JOSHUA S. ALFELOR and MARIA KATRINA S. ALFELOR,
- versus - JOSEFINA M. HALASAN and THE COURT OF
APPEALS,
March 31, 2006 G.R. No. 165987
Facts: The children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and
Cecilia Alfelor filed a Complaint for Partition before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City. Among the plaintiffs
were Teresita Sorongon and her two children, Joshua and Maria
Katrina, who claimed to be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor.
Respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention
claiming that she was the surviving spouse of Jose.
Teresita testified before the RTC narrating that while she did not
know Josefina personally, she knew that her husband had been
previously married to her but the two did not live together as
husband and wife.
Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order denying the
motion and dismissed her complaint, ruling that respondent was
not able to prove her claim. Josefina filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, insisting that under Section 4, Rule 129 of the
Revised Rules of Court, an admission need not be proved.
Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 before the CA, alleging that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in declaring
7
that she failed to prove the fact of her marriage to Jose. In its
Decision the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court. It held
that Teresita had already admitted (both verbally and in writing)
that Josefina had been married to the deceased, and under Section
4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission
no longer requires proof. Because of the adverse decision, Joshua
and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition, assailing the
ruling of the appellate court.
Issue
Whether or not the first wife of the decedent should be
allowed to intervene in an action for partition involving the share of
the deceased husband in the estate of his parents.
Ruling
Yes, the first wife is allowed to intervene in the action. The
fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs,
petitioners herein, admitted the existence of the first marriage in
their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC. Likewise, when called
to testify, Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her
late husband had been previously married to another. This
admission constitutes a deliberate, clear and unequivocal
statement; made as it was in the course of judicial proceedings,
such statement qualifies as a judicial admission. A party who
judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial
admissions are a waiver of proof. A judicial admission also removes
an admitted fact from the field of controversy. The allegations,
statements or admissions contained in a pleading are conclusive as
against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently take a position
contrary of or inconsistent with what was pleaded. WHEREFORE,
the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
OBJECT EVIDENCE
DNA Evidence
JESSE U. LUCAS V. JESUS S. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710, [June 6, 2011]
FACTS: Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish
Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA
Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that
he is the son of his mother Elsie who got acquainted with
respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He

also submitteddocuments which include (a) petitioner’s certificate
of live birth; (b) petitioner’s baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s
college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint Louis
University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his
Certificate of Graduation from the same school; (e) Certificate of
Recognition from the University of the Philippines, College of
Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different
newspapers about petitioner, as a musical prodigy.
Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and
Comment manifesting that the petition was adversarial in nature
and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile, Jesse
filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC
found to be sufficient in form and hence set the case for
hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA
testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to
him as Jesse’s father.
Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the
RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse failed to establish
compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action
enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima
facie case, affirmative defences, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the
RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held
that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant
petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet
taken place. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was
denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for certiorari with the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that
Jesse failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional
paternity action had been met and held that DNA testing should
not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima
facie case.
ISSUE: Whether aprima facie showing is necessary before a court
can issue a DNA testing order
HELD: Yes, but it is not yet time to discuss the lack ofa prima
facie case vis-à-vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence
has, as yet, been presented by petitioner.
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RATIO: Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals. The statement in Herrera
v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a
traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been
widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is
confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial,
when the parties have presented their respective evidence. They
are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial
stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish
filiation has been filed. The CA’s observation that petitioner failed
to establish a prima facie case is herefore misplaced. A prima facie
case is built by a party’s evidence and not by mere allegations in
the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides
for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and
integrity of the DNA testing. It states that the appropriate court
may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any
person, who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to
the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A biological sample
exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample: (i) was
not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested;
or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a
scientifically valid technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific
potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper
resolution of the case; and (e) The existence of other factors, if any,
which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy
or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not preclude a DNA
testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any
party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or
proceeding is commenced. This does not mean, however, that a
DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the
hearing, the said conditions are established.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order,
there must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must
first present sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a
reasonable possibility of paternity or “good cause” for the holding
of the test. In these states, a court order for blood testing is
considered a “search,” which, under their Constitutions (as in
ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to

be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or
reasonable possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart
of a finding of probable cause. Courts in various jurisdictions have
differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but
those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a
preliminary showing must be made before a court can
constitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases.
We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court
may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, the moving party
must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As
explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a
party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a
show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case
which warrants issuance of a court order for blood testing The same
condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect
the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the
hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present
prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of
paternity.”
People vs. Umanito GR No. 172607 16 April 2009
Facts: The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused
Rufino Umanito (Umanito) was found by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67 guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals offered the judgment of the trial
court. Umanito appealed the decision of the appellate court to
this court. In its 2007 Resolution, the Court acknowledged
"many incongruent assertions of the prosecution and the
defense." "Among the many incongruent assertions of the
prosecution and the defense, the disharmony on a certain point
stands out. Appellant, on one hand, testified that although he
had courted AAA, they were not sweethearts. Therefore, this
testimony largely discounts the possibility of consensual coitus
between him and AAA. On the other, AAA made contradictory
allegations at the preliminary investigation and on the witness
stand with respect to the nature of her relationship with
appellant. First, she claimed that she met appellant only on the
9
day of the purported rape; later, she stated that they were
actually friends; and still later, she admitted that they were
close".
At the same time, the alleged 1989 rape of the private
complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the
birth of a child, a girl hereinafter identified as "BBB". In view of
that fact, a well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the
Court deemed uncovering of whether or not Umanito is the
father of BBB greatly determinative of the resolution of the
appeal.
This case was remanded to the RTC for reception of DNA
evidence in accordance with the terms of said Resolution, and
in light of the fact that the impending exercise would be the first
application of the procedure, as provided in A.M. No. 06-11-5-
SC, 15 October 2007.
The DNA samples were collected by the forensic chemist of the
National Bureau of Investigation whose qualifications as an
expert was properly established adopting the following
procedure:
a) The subject sources were asked to gargle and to fill out the
reference sample form. Thereafter, the chemists informed them
that buccal swabs will be taken from their mouth and five (5)
droplets of blood will also be taken from the ring finger of their
inactive hand;
b) Pictures of the subject sources were taken by the NBI
Chemist;
c) Buccal swabs were taken from the subject sources three (3)
times;
d) Subject sources were made to sign three (3) pieces of paper to
serve as label of the three buccal swabs placed inside two (2)
separate envelopes that bear their names;
e) Blood samples were taken from the ring finger of the left hand
of the subject sources;
f) Subject sources were made to sign the FTA card of their blood
samples.
The buccal swabs and the FTA cards were placed in a brown
envelope for air drying for at least one hour.
g) Finger prints of the subject sources were taken for additional
identification;

h) The subject sources were made to sign their finger prints.
i) Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court Administrator Reuben
dela Cruz and Prosecutor Maria Nenita A. Oplana, in that order,
were made to sign as witnesses to the reference sample forms
and the finger prints of the subject sources.
j) After one hour of air drying, the Buccal Swabs and the FTA
papers were placed inside a white envelope and sealed with a
tape by the NBI Chemists;
k) The witnesses, Atty. Ramon J. Gomez, Deputy Court
Administrator Reuben dela Cruz, Prosecutor Maria Nenita A.
Opiana including the NBI Chemist, affixed their signatures on
the sealed white envelope;
l) The subjects sources were made to sign and affix their finger
prints on the sealed white envelope;
m) The chemists affixed their signatures on the sealed envelope
and placed it in a separate brown envelope;
n) The subjects sources were made to affix their finger prints on
their identification places and reference forms.
In order to arrive at a DNA profile, the forensic chemists
adopted the following procedure: (1) Sampling which is the
cutting of a portion from the media (swabs and FTA paper); (2)
then subjected the cut portions for extraction to release the
DNA; (3) After the DNA was released into the solution, it was
further processed using the formarine chain reaction to amplify
the DNA samples for analysis of using the Powerplex 16 System,
which allows the analysis of 16 portions of the DNA samples.
The Powerplex 16 System are reagent kits for forensic purposes;
(3) After the target, DNA is multiplied, the amplified products are
analyzed using the genetic analyzer. The Powerplex 16 System
has 16 markers at the same time. It is highly reliable as it has
already been validated for forensic use. It has also another
function which is to determine the gender of the DNA being
examined.
"FINDINGS: Deoxyribonuncleic acid analysis(DNA) using the
Powerplex 16 System conducted on the above-mentioned,
specimens gave the following profiles; There is a COMPLETE
MATCH in all the fifteen (15) loci tested between the alleles of
Rufino Umanito y Millares and [BBB]. (Exhibits "A" and "B").
10
REMARKS: Based on the above findings, there is a 99.9999%
Probability of Paternity that Rufino Umanito y Millares is the
biological Father of [BBB]"
RTC &CA: Guilty of Rape
Issue: Whether or not the accused is the father of his rape
victim. Can the DNA test can be used as evidence against him
for the crime of rape.
Held: The accused filed a motion to withdraw appeal and it was
granted. The SC terminated the case is now closed and
terminated. By filing such motion, Umanito is deemed to have
acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals
finding him guilty of the crime of rape. |||
Section 6. A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC provides that: "If the value of the
Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a
disputable presumption of paternity. Disputable presumptions
are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3, Rules of
Court). The disputable presumption that was established as a
result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome by
other evidence considering that the accused did not object to the
admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A" and "B"
inclusive of sub-markings) nor presented evidence to rebut the
same.
Umanito's defense of alibi, together with his specific assertion
that while he had courted AAA they were not sweethearts, lead
to a general theory on his part that he did not engage in sexual
relations with the complainant. The DNA testing has evinced a
contrary conclusion, and that as testified to by
AAA, Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April
1990, nine months after the day she said she was raped
by Umanito.
Reynaldo De Villa (Habeas Corpus Case) GR No. 158802 17
November 2004
FACTS:
By final judgment dated February 1, 2001, in People of the
Philippines v. Reynaldo de Villa the Supreme Court found
petitioner guilty of the rape of Aileen Mendoza (12 yrs and 10
mos of age), his niece by affinity; sentenced him to suffer the

penalty of reclusión perpetua; and ordered him to pay the
offended party civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit,
and support for Leahlyn Corales Mendoza, the putative child
born of the rape. Petitioner is currently serving his sentence at
the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City.
Three years after the promulgation of our Decision, we are once
more faced with the question of Reynaldo de Villa's guilt or
innocence.
Petitioner-relator in this case, June de Villa, is the son of
Reynaldo. He alleges that during the trial of the case, he was
unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine
once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victim's child,
Leahlyn. Petitioner-relator was only informed during the
pendency of the automatic review of petitioner's case that DNA
testing could resolve the issue of paternity. This information was
apparently furnished by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG)
Anti-Death Penalty Task Force, which took over as counsel for
petitioner.
Thus, petitioner's brief in People v. de Villa sought the conduct
of a blood type test and DNA test in order to determine the
paternity of the child allegedly conceived as a result of the rape.
This relief was implicitly denied in our Decision of February 21,
2001.
On March 16, 2001, Reynaldo de Villa filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the Decision, wherein he once more prayed
that DNA tests be conducted. The Motion was denied with
finality in a Resolution dated November 20, 2001.14 Hence, the
Decision became final and executory on January 16, 2002.
Petitioner-relator was undaunted by these challenges. Having
been informed that DNA tests required a sample that could be
extracted from saliva, petitioner-relator asked Billy Joe de Villa,
a grandson of Reynaldo de Villa and a classmate of Leahlyn
Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a new, sterile cup. Leahlyn
readily agreed and did so. Billy Joe took the sample home and
gave it to the petitioner-relator, who immediately labeled the cup
as "Container A."
11
Petitioner-relator then gathered samples from four
grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa. These samples were placed
in separate containers with distinguishing labels and
temporarily stored in a refrigerator prior to transport to the DNA
Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute
(NSRI).
Petitioner-relator requested the NSRI to conduct DNA testing on
the sample given by Leahlyn Mendoza, those given by the
grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa, and that given by Reynaldo
de Villa himself. The identities of the donors of the samples, save
for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known
to the DNA Analysis Laboratory.
After testing, the DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report
on March 21, 2003, which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could
not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested,
due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic
markers in petitioner's sample and those of any of the other
samples, including Leahlyn's.
ISSUSE: Whether or not the DNA analysis shows that petitioner
is not the father of Leahlyn and thus based on the fact that
Leahlyn was sired as a result of the alleged rape, cannot stand
and must be set aside.
Whether or not a new trial may be granted to consider the
alleged newly discovered DNA evidence.
HELD:
It must be stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendoza's
paternity is not central to the issue of petitioner's guilt or
innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely
different question, separate and distinct from the question of the
father of her child. Recently, in the case of People v. Alberio, we
ruled that the fact or not of the victim's pregnancy and resultant
childbirth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was
raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of
rape. Whether the child which the victim bore was fathered by

the purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of no
moment in determining an individual's guilt.
In the instant case, however, we note that the grant of child
support to Leahlyn Mendoza indicates that our Decision was
based, at least in small measure, on the victim's claim that the
petitioner fathered her child.
The fact of the child's paternity is now in issue, centrally relevant
to the civil award of child support. It is only tangentially related
to the issue of petitioner's guilt. However, if it can be conclusively
determined that the petitioner did not sire Leahlyn Mendoza,
this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt, and allow the
acquittal of the petitioner on this basis.
Be that as it may, it appears that the petitioner relies upon
erroneous legal grounds in resorting to the remedy of a motion
for new trial. A motion for new trial, under the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, is available only for a limited period of time,
and for very limited grounds. Under Section 1, Rule 121, of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a motion for new trial may
be filed at any time before a judgment of conviction becomes
final, that is, within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or
notice. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore, a motion for new
trial is no longer an available remedy.
In the case at bar, petitioner anchors his plea on the basis of
purportedly "newly-discovered evidence", i.e., the DNA test
subsequently conducted, allegedly excluding petitioner from the
child purportedly fathered as a result of the rape.
The decision sought to be reviewed in this petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus has long attained finality,
and entry of judgment was made as far back as January 16,
2002. Moreover, upon an examination of the evidence presented
by the petitioner, we do not find that the DNA evidence falls
within the statutory or jurisprudential definition of "newly-
discovered evidence".
A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may
be granted only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the
12
evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could
not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely
cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the
evidence is of such weight that that, if admitted, it would
probably change the judgment. It is essential that the offering
party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the
evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure
it.
In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly
discovered after the trial, we nonetheless find that it does not
meet the criteria for "newly-discovered evidence" that would
merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have
been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of
reasonable diligence.
Petitioner-relator's claim that he was "unaware" of the existence
of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight
with this Court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA
testing speaks of negligence, either on the part of petitioner, or
on the part of petitioner's counsel. In either instance, however,
this negligence is binding upon petitioner.
Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific
evidence presented by petitioner and his counsel, we are not
convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is
conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is not the father of
Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand,
with Aileen Mendoza's testimony and positive identification as
its bases. The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that
the pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the
crime of rape. Therefore, the DNA evidence has failed to
conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should
be discharged. Although petitioner claims that conviction was
based solely on a finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this
is not the case. Our conviction was based on the clear and
convincing testimonial evidence of the victim, which, given
credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.

*** If sir asks about the Habeas Corpus, say that it is not
applicable on this case. Very broadly, the writ applies "to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by which a person has
been deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person has been withheld from the person entitled thereto.
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore,
is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of
his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal
restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal
process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. Concomitant to
this principle, the writ of habeas corpus cannot be used to
directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court or
tribunal which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not
deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in
the conduct of the proceedings.
Thus, notwithstanding its historic function as the great writ of
liberty, the writ of habeas corpus has very limited availability as
a post-conviction remedy. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of
Appeals,25 we ruled that review of a judgment of conviction is
allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
only in very specific instances, such as when, as a consequence
of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the
court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an
excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as
to such excess.26
In this instance, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to
assail a final judgment of conviction, without, however,
providing a legal ground on which to anchor his petition. In fine,
petitioner alleges neither the deprivation of a constitutional
right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the
sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed upon
him.
In fine, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order
to seek the review of findings of fact long passed upon with
finality. This relief is far outside the scope of habeas corpus
proceedings.
13
People vs. Vallejo GR No. 144656 9 May 2002
FACTS:
At around 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999,
she sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to their
neighbor’s house in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite, so that
Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant, could help Daisy
with her lessons. Aimee’s house, where accused-appellant was
also staying, is about four to five meters away from Daisy’s
house. Ma. Nida saw her daughter go to the house of her tutor.
She was wearing pink short pants and a white sleeveless shirt.
An hour later, Daisy came back with accused-appellant. They
were looking for a book which accused-appellant could copy to
make a drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to her
teacher. After finding the book, Daisy and accused-appellant
went back to the latter’s house. When Ma. Nida woke up at about
5:30 o’clock after an afternoon nap, she noticed that Daisy was
not yet home. She started looking for her daughter and
proceeded to the house of Aimee, Daisy’s tutor. Aimee’s mother
told Ma. Nida that Daisy was not there and that Aimee was not
able to help Daisy with her lessons because Aimee was not
feeling well as she had her menstrual period. Ma. Nida looked
for Daisy in her brother’s and sister’s houses, but she was not
there, either. At about 7:00 o’clock that evening, Ma. Nida went
back to her neighbor’s house, and there saw accused-appellant,
who told her that Daisy had gone to her classmate’s house to
borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went there, she was told that
Daisy had not been there. Ma. Nida went to the dike and was
told that they saw Daisy playing at about 3:30 o’clock in the
afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. Nida that Daisy
was playing in front of her house that afternoon and even
watched television in her house, but that Daisy later left with
accused-appellant.
Ma. Nida and her brother and sister searched for Daisy
the whole evening of July 10, 1999, a Saturday, until the early
morning of the following day, July 11, 1999, a Sunday, but their
search proved fruitless. Then, at about 10:00 o’clock in the
morning of July 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead body
of her daughter was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by

the river after the “compuerta” by a certain Freddie Quinto. The
body was already in the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her
daughter. Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with her
sleeveless shirt tied around her neck.
In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejo’s house to
question the latter as he was one of the last persons with the
victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already told the
police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of
July 10. The police requested for the clothes that Vallejo wore
the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes
were submitted for processing.
The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron
Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At the instance of the local
fiscal, he also took buccal swabs (mouth/cheek swabs) from
Vallejo and a vaginal swab from Daisy’s body for DNA testing.
Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in Vallejo’s clothing
– Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejo’s Blood
Type is O. Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy
contained Vallejo’s DNA profile.
Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement
admitting the crime. But when trial came, Vallejo insisted that
the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened by the
cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the
body and the clothing of Daisy were already soaked in smirchy
waters, hence contaminated.
RTC: Gerrico Vallejo Guilty of Rape with homicide. Senteced to
death and directed to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of 100,000 as civil indemnity and 50,000 as moral
damages.
Automatic Review of the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA samples were admissible as evidence.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr.
Buan are conclusive. The court reiterated that even though DNA
evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the accused
considering that it corroborates all other circumstantial
evidence gathered in this rape-slay case.
14
The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA
evidence in this case and for the first time recognized its
evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus:
DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which
contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each
person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique.
When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene
of the crime or from the victim’s body for the suspect’s DNA. This
is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched
with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.
The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an
association exists between the evidence sample and the
reference sample.The samples collected are subjected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile. The test may yield
three possible results:
1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated
from different sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute
and requires no further analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test,
whether the samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This
might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation,
contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various
parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a
different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the
same source (inclusion).33 In such a case, the samples are
found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the
statistical significance of the Similarity.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence,
therefore, courts should consider, among others things, the
following data: how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper
standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests,
and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
Tijing vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 126901 8 March
2001
FACTS:

Petitioners are husband and wife. They have six children. The
youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr., who was born on April 27, 1989,
at the clinic of midwife and registered nurse Lourdes Vasquez in
Sta. Ana, Manila. Petitioner Bienvenida served as the
laundrywoman of private respondent Angelita Diamante, then a
resident of Tondo, Manila.
According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her
house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida
was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait
until she returned. She also left her four-month old son,
Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let
Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing
laundry.
When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and
Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida forthwith proceeded to
Angelita’s house in Tondo, Manila, but did not find them there.
Angelita’s maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for
a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to
Angelita’s house after three days, only to discover that Angelita
had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her
barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved
by her pleas for assistance.
Although estranged from her husband, Bienvenida could
not imagine how her spouse would react to the disappearance of
their youngest child and this made her problem even more
serious. As fate would have it, Bienvenida and her husband
reconciled and together, this time, they looked for their missing
son in other places. Notwithstanding their serious efforts, they
saw no traces of his whereabouts.
Four years later or in October 1993, Bienvenida read in a
tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, allegedly the common-
law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state
in Hagonoy, Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going to
Hagonoy, Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo,
Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the boy,
who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the
late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She
avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her
demand to do so.
Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas
corpus with the trial court in order to recover their son.
15
To substantiate their petition, petitioners presented two
witnesses namely: Lourdes Vasquez who assisted in the delivery
of Edgardo Tijing Jr.in her clinic in Sta. Ana, Manila. She
supported her testimony with clinical records and Benjamin
Lopez (brother of Tomas Lopez) declared that her brother could
not have possibly fathered John Tomas Lopez because the latter
was sterile due to an accident where the latter bumped his
private part against the edge of a banca causing him
excruciating pain and eventual loss of Child bearing capacity.
RTC: Writ of Habeas Corpus is granted. Alleged birth of John
Thomas Lopes is an impossiblity. Trial Court also held that the
minor and Bienvenida showed strong facial similarity.
CA: Reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1) Wether or not Habeas Corpus is a proper remedy.
2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing Jr. And John Thomas
Lopez are one and the same person and is the son of the
petitioners.
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the RTC.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his
liberty, or by the rightful custody of any person withheld from
the persons entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the
proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a
minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person
of his own free will. It must be stressed out that in habeas corpus
proceeding, the question of identity is relevant and material,
subject to the usual presumption, including those as identity of
the person.
The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence
established by the parents and by the witness who is the brother
of the late common-law husband of Angelita. Furthermore, there
are no clinical records, log book or discharge from the clinic
where John Thomas was allegedly born were presented. Strong
evidence directly proves that Thomas Lopez, Angela's "husband",
was not capable of siring a child. Moreover, his first marriage
produced no offspring even after almost 15 years of living
together with his legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also
bore no offspring.

The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by
irregularities. It was filed by Thomas Lopez, the alleged father.
Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register Law), the attending
physician or midwife in attendance of the birth should cause the
registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or
midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. Certificate
must be filed with the LCR within 30 days after the birth. The
status of Thomas and Angelita on the birth certificate were typed
in as legally married, which is false because Angelita herself had
admitted that she is a "common-law wife."
Trial court also observed several times that when the child and
Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in
their faces. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent
is competent and material evidence to establish parentage.
Lastly, the spouses presented clinical records and testimony of
the midwife who attended Bienvenida's childbirth.
(The part where DNA was mentioned in the decision)
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in
using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute
(UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to
conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis.
The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person
has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from
the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and
child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a
novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge.Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,
courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results
of science when competently obtained in aid of situations
presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though
it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in
future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt
resolution of parentage and identity issues.
People vs. Yatar GR No. 150224 19 May 2004
FACTS:
16
Judilyn Pas-a and her first cousin,Kathylyn Uba (17 years
old), were on the ground floor of their grandmother's house,
Isabel Dawang, in Liwan West, Rizal, Kalinga. They were talking
about the letter sent by their aunt, Luz Yatar, to her husband,
appellant Joel Yatar, through Kathylyns friend, Cecil Casingan.
Kathylyn handed the letter to Joel earlier that morning.
On that same day, Judilyn and Joel, together with Isabel
Dawang, left for their farm in Nagbitayan. Before Judilyn and
her husband departed, Kathylyn told Judilyn that she intended
to go to Tuguegarao, but in the event she would not be able to
leave, she would just stay home and wash her clothes or go to
the house of their aunt, Anita Wania. Kathylyn was left alone in
the house.
Later that day, Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly
Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw Joel at the
back of the house. They went inside the house through the back
door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked Joel
what he was doing there, and he replied that he was getting
lumber to bring to the house of his mother.
At 12:30 p.m., while Judilyn was on her way home from
Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder from the
second floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the
back of the house. She later noticed Joel, who was wearing a
white shirt with collar and black pants, pacing back and forth
at the back of the house. She did not find this unusual as
appellant and his wife used to live in the house of Isabel Dawang.
At 1:30 p.m., Judilyn again saw Joel when he called her near
her house. This time, he was wearing a black shirt without collar
and blue pants. Appellant told her that he would not be getting
the lumber he had stacked, and that Isabel could use it. She
noticed that Joel’s eyes were "reddish and sharp." Appellant
asked her where her husband was as he had something
important to tell him. Judilyns husband then arrived and
appellant immediately left and went towards the back of the
house of Isabel.8
In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived
home and found that the lights in her house were off. She called
out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the
ground floor was open. She noticed that the water container she
asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She
went up the ladder to the second floor of the house to see if

Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a
rope, so she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the
dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.
Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found
out that it was the naked body of her granddaughter, Kathylyn.
She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was
given a flashlight by Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw
Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines
protruding out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had
arrived to offer assistance. A daughter of Isabel, Cion, called the
police.
At 9:00 that evening, SP04 Melchor Faniswa received a
report that a dead woman was found in Isabel Dawangs house.
Together with fellow police officers, Faniswa went to the house
and found the naked body of Kathylyn Uba with multiple stab
wounds.
The people in the vicinity informed the police officers that
appellant was seen going down the ladder of the house of Isabel
Dawang at approximately 12:30 p.m.
The police discovered the victims panties, brassiere, denim
pants, bag and sandals beside her naked cadaver at the scene
of the crime, and they found a dirty white shirt splattered with
blood within 50 meters from the house of Isabel.
When questioned by the police authorities, Joel denied any
knowledge of Kathylyn’s death, however, he was placed under
police custody.
Joel asked the police officers if he could relieve himself.
Police Officer Cesar Abagan accompanied him to the toilet
around seven to ten meters away from the police station. They
suddenly heard someone shout in the Ilocano dialect, that Joel
was running away. Police Officer Orlando Manuel exited through
the gate of the Police Station and saw appellant running away.
Appellant was approximately 70 meters away from the station
when Police Officer Abagan recaptured him. He was charged
with Rape with Homicide. When he was arraigned Joel pleaded
"not guilty."
CA: After trial, appellant was convicted of the crime of Rape with
Homicide and was sentenced to Death. Under the law, cases
having a penalty of Death shall be submitted for automatic
review.
17
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court gravely erred in giving much
weight to the evidence presented by the prosecution
notwithstanding their doubtfulness.
HELD:
This Court will not interfere with the judgment of the trial
court in determining the credibility of witnesses unless there
appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight and
influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which
has been misinterpreted. The weight of the prosecutions
evidence must be appreciated in light of the well-settled rule
which provides that an accused can be convicted even if no
eyewitness is available, as long as sufficient circumstantial
evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond doubt
that the accused committed the crime. Subsequent testing
showed that the Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) of the sperm
specimen from the vagina of the victim was identical the semen
to be that of appellants gene type. DNA print or identification
technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to
link a suspect to a crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused
suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For purposes
of criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of
both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence.
DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a
suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in the same
principle as fingerprints are used. Incidents involving sexual
assault would leave biological evidence such as hair, skin tissue,
semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victims body or
at the crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets,
bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the victims
body during the assault. It must also be noted that appellant in
this case submitted himself for blood sampling which was
conducted in open court on March 30, 2000, in the presence of
counsel. Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted
by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional on the
ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of
an ex-post facto law.
This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is
involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing involves

the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence
obtained under the Rules of Court. Whereas an ex-post facto law
refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a
factual determination of the probative weight of the evidence
presented. Appellants twin defense of denial and alibi cannot be
sustained.
ZALDY NUEZ VS. ELVIRA CRUZ-APAO
A.M. No. CA-05-18-P// Ephemeral Electronic
Communication
FACTS:
Complainant Zaldy Nuez filed an illegal dismissal case against
PAGCOR before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). The CSC
ordered complainant’s reinstatement but a writ of preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order was issued by the
CA in favor of PAGCOR, thus complainant was not reinstated to
his former job pending adjudication of the case. Desiring an
expeditious decision of his case, Nuez sought the assistance of
respondent Cruz-Apao after learning of the latter’s employment
with the CA from her sister.
Nuez communicated to the respondent through telephone
conversation and text messages. A week after their first
telephone conversation, respondent allegedly told complainant
that a favorable and speedy decision of his case was attainable
but the person who was to draft the decision was in return
asking for P1,000,000.00.Complainant said that he did not have
that kind of money since he had been jobless. He sought the
assistance of Imbestigador of GMA Network. The crew of the TV
program accompanied him to Presidential Anti-Organized Crime
Commission where he lodged a complaint against respondent for
extortion. Thereafter, he communicated with respondent again
to verify if the latter was still asking for the money and to set up
a meeting with her. Upon learning that respondent’s offer of a
favorable decision in exchange for P1,000,000.00 was still
standing, the plan for the entrapment operation was formulated
by Imbestigador in cooperation with the PAOCC.
On 24 September 2004, complainant and respondent met for the
first time in person at the Jollibee at UN Avenue. Respondent
18
was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the WPD where she
was tested and found positive for ultra-violet powder that was
previously dusted on the money. She was later detained at the
WPD Headquarters. Respondent called Atty. Gepty, her
immediate superior in the CA with whom she confessed that she
asked for money and was entrapped by police offers.
As evidence, complainant was able to prove by his testimony in
conjunction with the text messages from respondent duly
presented before the Committee that the latter asked for
P1,000,000.00 in exchange for a favorable decision of the
former’s pending case with the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the text messages sent by respondent
Cruz-Apao may be admitted as evidence
HELD: Yes, the text messages by Cruz-Apao may be admitted as
evidence.
Section 1(k) Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence:
“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to
telephone conversations, text messages…and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of
which is not recorded or retained.
Section 2, Rule 11 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence:
Ephemeral electronic communications shall be
proven by the testimony of a person who was (1) a
party to the same or (2) who has personal knowledge
thereof..”
In this case, Nuez was the recipient of the text messages from
respondent and therefore had personal knowledge on the
contents and import of the text messages. Thus, his testimony
with regard to the contents of text messages can prove the
ephemeral electronic communications between him and the
respondent. The testimony of complainant was corroborated by
Siringan, the reporter of Imbestigador who was present when the

parties met in person. She was privy to the parties’ actual
conversation.
The respondent admitted that the cellphone number reflected in
Nuez’s cellphone from which the messages originated was hers.
Moreover, doubt respondent may have had as to the
admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest when she
and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text
messages between her and complainant.
Respondent admitted some of the messages which are not
incriminating but claimed that she did not remember those that
clearly showed she was transacting with
complainant. Respondent’s testimony consisted of bare denials
and self-serving claims.
Text messages which respondent claimed that she did not
remember:
a. Sige bukas nang tanghali sa Times Plaza, Taft Avenue,
corner U.N. Avenue. Magdala ka ng I.D. para makilala kita
o isama mo si Len David.
b. "Di pwede kelan mo gusto fixed price na iyon."
c. Alam mo di ko iyon price and nagbigay noon yung gagawa.
Wala ako doon."
d. "Oo naman ayusin nyo yung hindi halatang pera".
e. “Di na pwede sabi sa akin. Pinakaiusapan ko na nga ulit
iyon."
Atty. Gepty, the recipient of respondent’s confession
immediately after the entrapment, supports the finding that
respondent did voluntarily engage herself in the activity she is
being accused of. Having worked for the government for 24
years, 19 years of which have been in the Court of Appeals, she
should have known that court employees are hell to the strictest
standards of honesty. The Supreme Court held that respondent
should be dismissed from government service.
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD, Respondents.
G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010
Ponente: ABAD, J.
19
FACTS: Complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan
were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province.
Rustan courted Irish and they became “on-and-off” sweethearts
towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that
Rustan had taken a live-in partner (now his wife), whom he had
gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with
Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying that he
did not love the woman he was about to marry. Irish rejected
the proposal and told Rustan to take on his responsibility to the
other woman and their child. Irish changed her cellphone
number but Rustan somehow managed to get hold of it and sent
her text messages. Rustan used two cellphone numbers for
sending his messages. Irish replied to his text messages but it
was to ask him to leave her alone.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received
through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a naked
woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on
the figure sent by Rustan. Irish surmised that he copied the
picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio
in 2003.
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text
messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy for him
to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he
threatened to spread the picture he sent through the internet.
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora
who referred her to the police. Under police supervision, Irish
contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in
sending the picture and his text messages. Irish asked Rustan
to meet her at the Lorentess Resort where he was intercepted
and arrested. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson
P900 cellphone and several SIM cards.
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State
College of Technology, testified as an expert in information
technology and computer graphics. He testified that the picture

in question had two distinct irregularities: the face was not
proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter color. In his
opinion, the picture was fake and the face on it had been copied
from the picture of Irish.
Rustan denied the allegations. He said that he was
helping Irish to identify the prankster sending her malicious
messages. Rustan claims that he got back obscene messages
from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his
cellphone. This explained, he said, why the obscene messages
appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan
claims that it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture to
him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he identified
as Irish.
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she
was sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims that she
received the pictures and hid the memory card that contained
them because she was jealous and angry. But, while the woman
in the pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear
naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in
different exhibits could not be seen. Irish denied that she was
the woman in those four pictures.
RTC: RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of
R.A. 9262. the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible,
given in an honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC observed
that she wept while recounting her experience. The crying of the
victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of her
charges with the verity borne out of human nature and
experience.
CA: CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Rules on Electronic Evidence is
applicable in this case.
RULING: No, it is not applicable in this case. Rustan claims that
the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message
constitutes an electronic document. Thus, it should be
authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided
20
under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence
(A.M. 01-7-01-SC). But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection
to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first
time before this Court. The objection is too late since he should
have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at
the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have
already waived such ground for objection. Besides, the rules he
cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules
on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-
judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings. The
Court denies the petition and affirms the decision of the CA.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON.
RAMON G. CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC of Cebu, Br.
19, BANGPAI SHIPPING COMPANY, and WALLEM SHIPPING,
INCORPORATED, respondents
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J
Facts:
On 20 April 1996, M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry
owned and operated by private respondent Bangpai Shipping,
Co., allegedly bumped and damaged petitioner's(NPC) Power
Barge 209 which was then moored at the Cebu International
Port. Thus, on 26 April 1996, petitioner filed before the Cebu
RTC a complaint for damages against private respondent
Bangpai Shipping Co., for the alleged damages caused on
petitioner's power barges.
Petitioner, after adducing evidence during the trial of the
case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court on 2
February 2004 consisting of Exhibits "A" to "V" together with the
sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, private
respondents Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc.
filed their respective objections to petitioner's formal offer of
evidence.
The record shows that the plaintiff has been given every
opportunity to present the originals of the Xerox or photocopies
of the documents it offered. It never produced the originals.
The plaintiff attempted to justify the admission of the
photocopies by contending that "the photocopies offered are
equivalent to the original of the document" on the basis of

the Electronic Evidence. But as rightly pointed out in defendant
Wallem's Reply to the Comment of Plaintiff, the Xerox copies
do not constitute the electronic evidence defined in Section
1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as follows:
"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the
representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other
models of written expression, described or however represented,
by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or
by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received,
recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced
electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any
printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately
reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For
the purpose of these Rules, the term "electronic document" may
be used interchangeably with "electronic data message".
RTC: The RTC issued the assailed order denying the admission
and excluding from the records petitioner's Exhibits "A-V" and
its submarkings. Exhibits "S" and its sub-markings are also
DENIED admission for lack of proper identification since the
witness who brought these pictures expressly admitted that he
was not present when the photos were taken and had not
knowledge when the same where taken.
MR-denied. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals
maintaining that public respondent Judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in denying the admission of its Exhibits.
CA: Denied the petition for review for certiorari. There is no
gainsaying the fact that the respondent judge acted within the
pale of his discretion when he denied admission of said
documentary evidence. Section 3 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines is very explicit in providing that, when
the subject of inquiry are the contents of documents, no
evidence shall be admissible other than the original documents
themselves, except in certain cases specifically so enumerated
therein, and the petitioner has not shown that the non-
presentation or non-production of its original documentary
pieces of evidence falls under such exceptions.
21
Petition for Review for Certiorari to SC under Rule 45.
Issue: Whether or not the photocopies NPC offered as formal
evidence before the trial court are the functional equivalent of
their original based on its inimitable interpretation of the Rules
on Electronic Evidence. Petitioner maintains that an "electronic
document" can also refer to other modes of written expression
that is produced electronically, such as photocopies, as included
in the section's catch-all proviso: "any print-out or output,
readable by sight or other means".
Held: Denied the petition and Affirmed the Ruling of the CA.
The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic
document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an
electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information
contained therein, similar to any other document which is
presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what
differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based
document is the manner by which the information is processed;
clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is
received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or
produced electronically.
A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies
submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents
therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly
signed the documents, may be recorded or produced
electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a person's
signature affixed manually be considered as information
electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed,
retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that
since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic
process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as
defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an
erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having
thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount
to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may
not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original
as decreed in the law.
The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies
as they violate the best evidence rule and are therefore of no
 22

probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. Moreover, quo denying admissibility of the photocopies offered by
as mandated under Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court: petitioner as documentary evidence.
There can be no evidence of a writing the contents of which
is the subject of inquiry, other than the ORIGINAL writing
itself, except in the following cases:

(a) When the original has been lost, destroyed, or cannot be

produced in court;
(b) When the original is in the possession of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original is a record or other document in the
custody of a public officer;
(d) When the original has been recorded in an existing record
a certified copy of which is made evidence by law;
(e) When the original consists of numerous accounts or
other documents which cannot be examined in court
without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the
whole."

When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or

cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its
execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a
recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror of
secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof:
(a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the
part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by
circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of
documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair
preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of
the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be
shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has
been made for the document in the proper place or
places. However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted
in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed to
establish that such offer was made in accordance with the
exceptions as enumerated under the above quoted rule.
Accordingly, we find no error in the Order of the court a