FORENSIC ENGINEERING Analysis of a gas disaster in Britain by John O'Meara come time before 06:00 on 11 Decem- ber 2005, Tank 912 at the Buncefield bulk fel depot at Hemel Hempstead, northwest of London, began overflow: ing, Petrol gushed from the tank’sroof vents ata rate of at least 550m"/, cascading to the ground and generating vapour and aerosol. With no wind present, petrol vapour spread out from the tank to form a pancake shaped cloud, roughly 200m in radius and 2m deep. By 06:00, about 300t had escaped the tank, forming a vapour cloud containing bout 30 of petrol ‘The remaining petrol collected as a liquid pool within the tank bund ‘One and a half minutes later @ fire alarm was activated and emer- gency fire water pumps started igniting the vapour cloud, A second Tater the cloud erupted in a massive explosion “The blast cansed no fatalities or serious injuries, 23 fuel tanks were engulfed by fire, Neighbouring large commercial buildings were destroyed or severely damaged and houses and property up to 4km away were damaged. The nearby MI motorway was shut down and aviation fuel supplies to Heathrow Airport were severely disrupted AA large smoke plume spread over southeast England and the fire took several days to extinguish, leading to pollution of ground water with contaminated fire water. The in vvestigators estimated the total cost ofthe incident to be £894 million, including a cost to the aviation industry of €250 million ‘The investigation ‘The UK government set up Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) toinvestigetethe circumstances sur- rounding the incident, Investigation work was conducted by the Health and Safety Executive, the UK’sheath and safety regulator. The same inves- tigation also served the purpose of informing any potential prosecution case over breaches ofthe law. ‘The MIIB identified an urgent need to explain the severity ofthe explosion. at a bulk uel depot was ‘not credible: The worst case scenario was considered to be a liquid pool fire, not an explosion. When vapour lauds ignite in unconfined spaces such as the depot, they tend to bur, rather than explode ‘The Buncefield fuel depot before the incident. Tank 912s the centre tank of the three atthe right edge of the depot Roadside vegetation is clearly visible and the nearby MT motorway is seen to the left. Fire fighters attempting to contain the flames. Ittook several days to extinguish the fire. Pros: Hoenn Coteau ‘After the incident -Tank 912 sat bottom centre; the pump house where ignition occurred is at mid left covered in foam. ‘The MIIB invited explosion experts from academia and industry to form an report “Buncefield explosion mechanis ‘was published by the Health and Safety Executivein ane 2009 and makes surprising findings, although some aspectsstill remain ‘unexplained. The investigation is advancing scientific understanding of the complexities of vapour cloud explosion, Most information about the tumstances that led to the over: flow has not been made public. Prosecutions of five companies for breaches of law have commenced and such information may come ‘out as the trials progress. Who or what activated the fire alarm has nat been made public. This isthe first time the role of the fire alarm has been revealed. Instrumentation of the incident field Avast amount of data was available to the advisory group. Although not planned, the field was highly “instrumented” with a variety of devices that “recorded” aspects of the incident, This enabled the development of @ confident ac count of the incident in terms of the timing and sequence of events, the ignition source, the extent of the vapour cloud and the overpres- sures occurring at various locations. ‘These instruments ranged from a humble il filter tothe sophisticated ‘monitoring network of the British Geological Survey. ‘The British Geological Survey ‘operates seismological recording stations across the UK, Several stations recorded both the seismic and acoustic shock waves and the BGS was able to pinpoint the time of the explosion with precision to be 06:01:31, ‘The weight of evidence indicated that emergency fire water pumps provided the ignition source. The ‘pump house was75m from Tank912, well within the vapour cloud. The ‘pump house had clearly suffered an internal explosion. A CCTY camera conaneighbouringbuildingrecorded flameoriginatingin the viinty ofthe ‘pump house. Although not publiclyrevealed, Prevailing wisdom among industry and the advisory group to assess the evidence and _ the timing ofthe activation of he fire alarm regulatorheld hata vapourcloudexplosion explain the explosion mechanism. Their _maybeaccurately known and may align withthe known time ofthe explosion. ‘Thirteen CCTs, all on neighbouring properties, survived the blast and provided a record of events, Images showed the de. velopment of the vapour cloud, increased luminosity from flames, and debris flying through the air. Some recorded image shake as the blast wave reached the camera While image timestamps were not precise, the BGS precision recordings would have enabled correction, ‘Thespreading vapour cloud was captured in clear images. The cold air temperature cof 0°C and the high humidity enhanced the formation ofice crystals within the vapour cloud due to the cooling effect ofevaporating petrol, giving ita white mist appearance. One image shows @ person walking through a knee deep mist. Inves- tigators believe the cloud did not contain petrol in mist form, as petrol mist is unlikely to persist over the time of release and travel the distance matching the size of the cloud. The area finally occupied by the vapour cloud was identified by scorch marksleftby the vapour cloud combustion on vegetation and buildings. Nine witnesses were close tothe vapour cloud when it exploded, and reported on what they sav, heard and felt. All described events occurring over seconds or ‘moments, rather than instantane- ously. None suffered serious injury, including hearing damage, the threshold for which is 35kPa, One witness saw an initial fash coming from the area ofthe pump house. All-witnesses were outside the vapour cloud. Overpressure dam- age within the vapour cloud was severe, suggesting that any person within the cloud at the time of explosion would have likely been seriously injured or killed. Many cars and trucks were parked in neighbouring roads and car parks. Those within the vapour cloud suffered extreme crush damage, indicating overpressures of 200kPa, while those outside suffered ‘minimal Gamage. This showed that theblast overpressures subsided rapidly outside the vapour cloud, Vehicle tyres indicated levels of overpressure by whether or not they were compressed off the wheel rim, Many small objects suffered permanent deformation, suchasancil ter steel drums, 8 water tank and electrical junction boxes. Investigators subjected similar items to compression from controlled high explosive explosions and hydraulic immersion. This allowed for estimation of overpressures at many locations. Many vertical objects showed signs of abrasion, indicating the direction of strong, gas flow. These included tree trunks, posts and bollards. Other tll, stim objects such as trees lamp poles, fence posts and camera ‘mass suffered permanent deflection, indicat ing the net drag impulse they were subject to ‘Objects outside the vapour cloud expe rienced net drag outwards from the point The fire started when a vapour cloud caused by a leaking fuel, tank ignited, engulfing a large area of the fuel depot. The smoke plume spread over southeastern England, Pro: av are A Suro UT of ignition (the pamp house). That is these objects were dragged in a direction point ing away from the vapour cloud. Counter intuitively, objects within the vapour clond experienced net drag towards the pump house (ie in the opposite direction of the ‘explosion propagation). This behaviour has been observed in two other vapour cloud explosions. Several buildings within the vapour cloud suffered severe blast damage. This was termed near and mid field damage. Many properties in the nearby town suf- fered damage to glazing and roofing. This FORENSIC ENGINEERING ‘was termed far field damage. stimatesof the required equivalent TNT ‘charge to cause the damage were made. To account for the near and mid field damage, 7500kg of TNT at the pump house would be required. However, to account for the far field damage, 105,000kg to 250,000kg of TNT at the pump house would be required. Clearly, these two estimates are contradictory. The HSE advises this is a statement of the evidence and is yet to be rationalised. The atmospheric temperature inversion at the time may have played a role in enhancing the transmission of the blast ‘wave to the town. Likely explosion process The advisory group considers that the most likely scenario was “a defiagration outside the emer- gency pump house that changed into a detonation due to flame ac- celeration inthe undergrowth and ‘rees...the detonation extended to a significant part ofthe remaining vapour cloud ‘The role of the vegetation was significant. It is known that a flame front encountering objects ‘ay develop turbulence and flame acceleration, leading to more tur- bulence. This can produce high overpressures or convert into a detonation. The depot itself was largely free of obstructions. How- ever, roads adjacent to the depot were bordered with vegetation ‘The advisory group concluded that branches and twigs presented obstructions to the flame front, leading to flame acceleration and detonation, This was supported by computer modelling ‘The Buncefield incident has ‘become the world’s most intensely investigated vapour cloud expio- sion. The investigation revealed that the event was episodic over about two seconds, rather than instantaneous. It was a complex, dynamic event that is still not fully understood. ‘A second phase of research is intended “to improve the understanding of low wind speed dispersion, lage shallow vapour cloud explosionsand the response of various forms of construction to such explosions’ John O'Meara is a Melbourne-based chemical engineer, currently researching and writing about safety issues inengineeting.