POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONDUCT OF ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA

OBI, EMEKA ANTHONY Ph.D***

Introduction

Political parties are one of the most important ingredients of democracy. Since parties
serve as the main vehicles through which candidates are transported to power in democratic
polities, their roles in making for orderly transfer of power from one leader to another is very
vital and therefore make for stable polities. A political party according to Edmund Burke (cited in
Obikeze & Obi 2004), is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavour the
national interest upon some particular principle in which they are all united. It is the conscious
effort on the part of the organized individuals to seek, capture and retain political power that
distinguishes political parties from other organizations. They posit that arising from this
definition therefore, parties have the following characteristics:

1) Political parties have membership.

2) Members share common views, opinions and understanding on societal issues.

3) Members are organised i.e there is deliberate effort to come together for a specific
purpose.

4) The primary purpose is to secure power in order to be in government.

5) While in government to use the power to perform the generally agreed and common
agenda to continue to retain power.

6) All parties must need the mobilisation of as large number of people as possible to
enhance their probability of retaining power.

In summation, Yahaya (2006), posits that parties are the fulcrums upon which modern
democracy is made both possible and effective and it is also conceivable to suggest that political
parties and democracy are Siamese twins; for one to survive the other must be alive and
functioning well. Arising from this analysis therefore, one can almost conclude that without
political parties, democracy would at best remain a pipe dream.

Nigeria, right from the colonial era have seen the existence of numerous political parties.
However, the incursion of the military into politics has adversely affected their growth and
maturity. Fortunately, with a record of eighteen years (18 years) of unbroken democratic rule
(1999-2017), political parties are gradually evolving and may with time mature to the level they
have attained in advanced democracies.

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 Since it is an established fact that democratic governance would be difficult if not
impossible to operate without political parties, it would be quite useful to identify the proper
roles of political parties in a democracy. Okowa (2017) believes that political parties ought to
advance political pluralism, enhance citizen participation in the political process, broaden the
representation of different political opinions and ideologies in the governance process, ensure
the peaceful and democratic transfer of political power at the national, state and local
government levels, enhance the accountability of government and give the necessary legitimacy
to both the government of the day and the political system as a whole. They ordinarily should
provide a platform for interest aggregation and political stability in societies.

In her own analysis, Kubatha (2011),believes political parties play five key roles in a
democracy. These role are:

1. Advancing freedom of association;

2. promoting democratic governance;

3. educating citizens on governance issues;

4. promoting respect of individual choices; and

5. conducting oversight on the ruling government.

Finally, Goel (2015), sees the functions of political parties in a democracy as:

1. Makes the working of parliamentary government possible;

2. formulating public policies;

3. educating public opinion;

4. providing political stability; and

5. helping in the recruitment of leaders.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND ELECTIONS IN NIGERIA

The origin of political parties in Nigeria is usually traced to the colonial era. The vast
literature on this area (Coleman, 1963; Sklar 1963, Post 1963; Dudley 1968 etc.) credit the
Clifford Constitution of 1922 and its elective principle with the impetus for the formation of
political parties in Nigeria. Though before this period, there were some organizations that some
see as political parties like the People's Union of 1908 and the Lagos Auxiliary of the Anti-
Slavery and Aborigines Protective Society, they may not qualify to be addressed as such. The
main reason being that they were not involved in the struggle for capture of state power which
is the major distinguishing feature of political parties. The Nigerian National Democratic Party
(NNDP) led by Herbert Macauley (father of Nigerian nationalism) was founded principally to
contest for the three seats allocated to Lagos in the Legislative Council. Although its activities

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centered on Lagos, it laid claim to being a national party. It was victorious in the elections to the
Legislative Council in 1923, 1928 and 1933

The dominance of the NNDP ended in 1938, when the Nigerian Youth Movement (NYM)
defeated it in the legislative elections. Quite unlike the NNDP that confined its activities to
Lagos, the NYM established branches in different parts of the country. Based on this therefore,
it is right to assert that it was the first national political party in Nigeria. In fact, it had nearly
twenty provincial branches in parts of Nigeria, though predominantly in the South (Coleman,
1958).

In February 1941, the President of the NYM, Dr. Kofo Abayomi resigned his seat in the
Legislative Council because of his appointment into the Governors Executive Council. A fight for
his seat ensued in the Movement between Mr. Ernest Ikoli; an Ijaw, and Samuel Akinsanya; an
Ijebu-Yoruba, both of who were founding members of the Movement. Ikoli eventually won.
Azikiwe who supported Akinsanya was not happy. Eventually, Azikiwe and most other Igbos as
well as Akinsanya and some Ijebus left the Movement. They rationalized their defeat as a
manifestation of ethnic prejudice against Ijebu and Igbo peoples (Nnoli, 1978). The NYM never
recovered from this schism as the Igbos never rejoined the Movement and it was composed
mainly of the Yoruba. This introduced a very dangerous trend in party politics in Nigeria as it
helped to lay the ground for ethnic politics in the country. According to Nnoli (1978):

This fateful Ikoli-Akinsanya political conflict is quite illuminating of the social basis of
politics in Nigeria in general and ethnic politics in particular, the major class interest which
dominate the political struggle and underlie ethnic politics. It shows that although many
interests are involved in political process, it is only certain of them which dictate the direction
and nature of political development. The development of nationalism, nationalist movement
and political parties depends first and foremost on the dynamics of the interest of their leaders
and only peripheral, if at all on those of the followers (p.143).

The development of party politics in Nigeria got a big boost at the Conference of all
Organizations called by students that held on August 26, 1944 at Glover Memorial Hall, Lagos,
where the Nigeria National Council which later changed its name to the National Council of
Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) was born. Herbert Maculay was elected President, while
Azikiwe was elected General Secretary. From its formation in 1944 till 1957, the NCNC was the
leading nationalist organization in Nigeria. Also until 1952, membership of the party was
restricted to organizations.

The Action Group was formed in March 1951 as an off shoot of the pan- Yoruba socio-
cultural organization, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, Chief Obafemi Awolowo was the founder and
leader of the party. It was the aim of the party to capture power in the Western Region as a
result of the McPherson Constitution of 1951. The new party was politically motivated by the
desire of the anti-Azikiwe faction of the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie, and comprador bourgeoisie,
essentially Yoruba speaking to frustrate an NCNC led by Azikiwe from coming to power in the
Western Region. Nnoli (1978), notes that the Action Group became the first party of the
Nigerian petty bourgeoisie and comprador bourgeoisie to be inspired, founded in and nourished

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by ethnic chauvinism and regional parochialism. The party based its appeal for mass support
explicitly and implicitly on ethnic sentiments, sensibilities and interests. Thus, the main theme
in the party's electoral campaign was common opposition to Azikiwe together with the threat of
Igbo domination(Nnoli 1978).

The Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), was formed in October 1951 as purely a regional
political party that was interested in protecting the interest of the Northern region within the
Nigerian nation. Hence, its motto of 'one North, one people, irrespective of religion-tribe or
rank'. According to Nnoli (1978), it was formed for Northerners, by Northerners and for the
pursuit of objectives limited to the North and the Northerners. Its emphasis was on the region
rather than the ethnic group. The ethnic or regional orientation of both the AG and NPC
gradually made the NCNC to take on an ethnic and regional character. Thus, Ibodje and Dode
(2007), argue that in the pursuit of political power, essentially the strategies of these parties
were similar. They were for intensive mobilization of the ethnic homeland of their leaders to
ensure their monolithic support at the times of elections.

The 1954 general elections into the Federal House of Representatives most clearly
showed the dangerous ethnic bent of the parties which was also affecting the nature of
Nigerian politics. In that elections, in the North, the NPC (which only contested in the region)
won 83 of the 93 seats, the AG won 2,while the NCNC won 2. The remaining 6 seats went to
candidates of unknown political affiliations. In the East, the NCNC won 34 seats out of the 42
contested for, the AG won 3, the United Nigeria Party won 4, while an independent candidate
won 1, in the West, which used to be the traditional base of the NCNC before the AG came with
its tribal politics, the AG won 28 out of the total of 42, the NCNC 12 and the Commoners Liberal
Party 1 (Nnadozie, 2007). In the 1959 general elections, the trend continued. In the North, the
NPC won 134 seats, the AG 25, NEPU 8 and independents 7. In the East, the NCNC won 58 seats,
the AG 14 and the NDC 1 seat. In the West, the AG won 33 seats, the NCNC 21 and the
independents 8 seats. In analyzing these figures, Nnoli (1978) explains that of the 33 seats won
by the AG in the West, 30 were in Yoruba constituencies. This showed that the NCNC share of
the Yoruba vote had dropped from 41.9 percent in 1954 to 17.4 percent in 1959. In the East, the
NCNC won all the fifty constituencies in Igbo land, receiving over 90 percent of the votes in
sixteen of the constituencies. In the North, the NPC won 77 percent of the total number of
seats. Indeed the politicization of ethnicity and regionalization of politics mentioned by Nnoli
have come full circle.

The next election was the 1964 general elections. Before this time, so many issues and
crises have come to affect the political landscape, but the ethnic cleavages still remained as
strong as ever and in some instances have become more intense, sharp and dangerous. The
events leading to the elections showed that the elections would be anything but free and fair.
The elections were contested by two major alliances, the Nigeria National Alliance (NNA) made
up of the NPC, the NNDP, the Mid-west Democratic Front, The Dynamic Party, the Niger Delta
Congress, the Republican Party and the Lagos United Front. The other alliance was the United
Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA) made up of the NCNC, the AG, the NEPU and the United
Middle Belt Congress (UMBC).

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 Both alliances embarked on very bitter campaigns that were aimed mainly at smearing
the image of the other without really addressing concrete issues. The level of political violence
was also very high, while various methods were adopted to either prevent or disturb the
campaign by opponents in areas where an alliance member was in power.

In the end, UPGA boycotted the elections. The boycott was total in the East, partly
successful in the West and successful in the Mid-West. In the North voting took place. The
results of the elections were highly contentious and the compromises that were arrived at were
still very shaky as at the time the military struck in January 1966, ending the First Republic,
scrapping the parties and banning party politics in Nigeria.

The planned disengagement of the military from politics in 1979, necessitated once
again the introduction of party politics. However in order to avoid the main problem of ethnic
politics which bedeviled the First Republic, the Obasanjo government insisted that the parties
must have a national outlook.

Yagub (2002) posits that as a result of this electoral provision, the five parties that
emerged in the Second Republic were more national in outlook, scope of activities, recruitment,
membership etc, than the erstwhile parties of the First Republic. He also believes that the
presidential system could have also contributed to the emergence of pan-Nigerian political
parties.

However, despite the pan-Nigerian outlook of the parties, they were all engaged in a
“vituperative and vicious politics that was aimed at primitive accumulation in a social formation
whose productive forces were under developed and super-exploited” (Yagub 2002,p.125). The
registered parties then were the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Unity Party of Nigeria
(UPN), the Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP), the Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP), the Peoples
Redemption Party (PRP) and later in (1983), the Nigeria A dvanced Party (NAP).

The National Party of Nigeria (NPN), which some commentators insist was a
reincarnation of the NPC has been disputed by Abubakar (2005). According to him, the NPNs’
class project within Nigeria politics transcended the NPCs’ feudalist and ethno-regional
tendencies. With its roots in the so-called National Movement, the NPN as a political party in
the Second Republic represented the gradual coalescence of the hitherto ethnic-regional
reactions of the nascent national bourgeoisie in the Nigerian post colonial formation. The
dominant groups within the party, according to Falola and Ihonvbere (1985) were petty-
capitalist contractors, discredited civil servants, technocratic intellectuals with petty-bourgeoisie
ambition, traditional rulers and feudal elements along with retired Army Generals, all bent on
boosting their declining influence by economic power and the feudalization of modern
institutions. The party emerged victorious in the 1979 elections, thereby producing the first
Executive President of Nigeria. As a party committed to capturing and retaining power for
primitive accumulation, it was not surprising that the acquisitive tendencies of the party itself
intensified the intra-class contradictions that culminated in the Buhari regime in 1983. More
explicitly, Falola and Ihonvbere (1985) argue that “The factional struggles within the NPN itself

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over the distribution of wealth and power proved detrimental even to the realization of its class
project in the sense that production was totally neglected”.

The party was still celebrating-over its 'landslide' victory in the 1983 elections that was
then seen as the worst elections in Nigeria's history, when the military struck, arrested its
political office holders and sentenced most of them to various prison terms for offences that
hinged mainly on looting the treasury.

The Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), which no doubt was a reincarnation of the AG has
Chief Obafemi Awolowo as leader. As an offshoot of the AG, it drew the bulk of its support from
the Yoruba people of South West Nigeria.The UPN just like the AG was the best organized and
disciplined party among its peers. However, the tragedy of the party along with its leadership,
arose from the inability of the party to transcend its ethno-regional base of power to become
acceptable as a symbol and expression of unity in Nigerian politics as its name indicated. It
rather concentrated on its traditional turf. Thus, the Yoruba speaking states and Bendel state
was perceived as the 'traditional home-base’ of the Awoists. Any incursion by an opposing party
was conceived as an affront and a threat to UPN's hegemony.

This was exactly the same practice in the First Republic, when the AG felt that the
Western Region was its exclusive preserve and therefore a “no go area” for other parties while it
was courting the minorities in other regions. Despite the party's socialist posture, Abubakar
(2005) insists that the UPN's 'defensive radicalism' through the advocacy of major reforms in the
Nigerian post-colonial formation was essentially a petty bourgeois ideological project masked in
populist discourse and aimed at consolidating bourgeoisie rule and hegemony in the Second
Republic. The party's leader Chief Awolowo challenged Alhaji Shagari's victory in the 1979
elections unsuccessfully. It also contested the 1983 elections and lost out woefully to the
landslide rigging machine of the NPN. In fact its loss of Oyo and Ondo states led to serious
violence that confirmed the status of the western part of Nigeria as the 'melting pot' of Nigerian
politics or the 'wild wild west’.

The Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP), according to Joseph (1987), was a product of two
major forces. First, a coalition of representatives of Nigerian ethnic minorities before and during
the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly; and second, the belated effort by Azikiwe to rally
the stalwarts of NCNC. When the birth of the party was announced, it was Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim
that read a written statement to reporters. However when the intrigues in the party, became
clear to him that he will not be the party's flag bearer, when Azikiwe had the same interest, he
dumped the party and left. His leaving the party with his loyalists made the party a resurrected
NCNC. Like the other parties, it also had lofty programmes, which it claimed it would implement
if voted into power. It was not voted into power at the center, but it won the then two Igbo
states, Anambra and Imo and also Plateau state

The Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) had its roots in the Northern Elements Progressive
Union (NEPU) of the First Republic led by the indefatigable Mallam Aminu Kano. It represented
once again an attempt to introduce ideology into Nigerian politics. Thus, quite unlike other
parties that were held together by the greed and acquisitive tendencies and the compelling

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urge to grab state power for personal aggrandizement, the PRP was motivated by the need to
challenge the patrimonial and feudalistic bent of the Northern oligarchy. Its focus was on the
talakawa (masses). Though the party won two states (Kano and Kaduna), its fortunes nose-
dived seriously before the 1983 elections. This has been attributed to the party's initial false
theoretical and ideological premises concerning class alliance in the Nigerian post-colonial state
and partly from internal petty bourgeoisie factional squabbles fermented by personal
opportunism as well as intrigues fermented by the NPN, which were aimed at neutralizing any
form of radicalism in the Second Republic (Abubakar, 2005,p.256).

The founder of the Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP) Alhaji Ibrahim Waziri, interestingly
was the same person that announced the birth of the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) on the 22nd
of September 1978. It was believed that Waziri's financial backing helped in the formation of
the NPP. Waziri therefore thought that since he provided personal funds in the formation of
NPP, the new party should reciprocate through unflinching allegiance to his control. However,
with the presence of Zik and his ex-NCNC Igbo followers, Waziri’s ambitions were dashed
(Abubakar 2005, p.257). Waziri was disappointed, because he found out that his wealth alone
could not guarantee him all that he wanted from the NPP. It was not surprising; since there was
no way he could have dwarfed Zik with his towering credentials and nationalist antecedents.
Thus, “when Waziri was told by his partners that he would not monopolize the two posts of
Party Chairman and presidential candidate, he withdrew to form the GNPP” (Ababakar 2005, p.
255).

The history of the formation of the GNPP, therefore clearly showed that Waziri was only
interested in a forum through which he would realize his ambition to contest for the presidency
of Nigeria. A wealthy businessman, Alhaji, Waziri's entry into the presidential race in the Second
Republic, according to Abubakar (2005):

signified the attempt by the commercial capitalist fraction of the national bourgeois to
entrench itself in power. Being the dominant financier of the party, made Waziri
intolerant of any form of dissenting views which in any case he perceived as indiscipline.
With time his tyrannical disposition made his core supporters to abandon him for other
parties.

Though Waziri's campaign slogan was “politics without bitterness”, the GNPP lacked a
coherent party philosophy or ideology that distinguished it from the other parties. However,
because the party could not muster a national appeal, its major supporters were the Kanuri's,
( Waziri's ethnic group). In the 1979 elections, it won two states; Borno and Gongola, eight
Senatorial seats and forty three Federal House of Representative seats. Waziri's dictatorial
tendencies already alluded to, led to a speedy disintegration of the party to the extent that by
the 1983 elections, it no longer had much electoral value. The tragedy of the GNPP was
summed up by Abubakar (2005) as cited in Obi (2017) thus:

Waziri's alliance, squabbles and break-up with Azikiwe's NPP epitomized the internal
factional disputes over power, wealth and patronage that characterize a patrimonial
political economy. Although, Waziri, a wealthy businessman from Borno, campaigned on

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 the slogan of “politics without bitterness”, his total rejection of the grand NPP alliance
on the grounds that he was not given the posts of Party Chairman and Presidential
candidate revealed the purely personal ambitions that underlined the emergence of
GNPP… as the Chairman and Presidential candidate of his party, Waziri confused the
complex arena of Nigerian politics with business. For him, the gains of power and profit
were too important to be lost by bitter rivalries, enmity and unnecessary debates. As
the dominant financier of the party, Waziri did not tolerate any opposition. In fact, even
honest suggestions and proposals by members of the party were perceived as
indiscipline towards the “executive president”. Although the party won two states-
Gongola and Borno- Waziri's supporters eventually disserted him and opted for either
the NPP, UPN or even NPN (p. 257).

In the build up to the Third Republic, the Political Bureau set up by the Babangida
government recommended a two party system for the country. Consequent upon this, the
National Electoral Commission (NEC) issued very stringent requirements for the registration of
parties. It required the political associations seeking for registration as parties to among other
things establish offices in a least two-thirds of parts of federal, state and local government areas
of the country. This they were expected to achieve between May 3 and July 19 1989, (a working
period of 56 days) (Yagub, 2002). At the end of the exercise, none of the thirteen political
associations that submitted its application was able to score up to fifty percent according to
NEC. The first among them scored slightly above forty three percent (Yahaya 2006). The Armed
Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) which through Decree 8 of February 1989 had the final authority
on the registration of parties, did not register any. Instead the government decreed two parties
into existence. These were the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and the National Republican
Convention (NRC). According to Babangida, none of the thirteen political associations was
registered because:

One is reincarnation of a make-shift alliance during the Second Republic containing

people who betrayed the parties that elected them into office. The reincarnation
reflected political opportunism, old lines of cleavage and primordial loyalties. Another is
almost a pure-bred re-emergence of a Second Republic party, with same ideas and
loyalties as the political association mentioned earlier. A third political association is a
proxy-organization founded and funded by influential people who are disqualified from
political activities during the transition period. A fourth party appeared to be an
association of wealthy individuals who use their money to determine who joins them
and who does not: and who gets what, when, how and how much. Fellow countrymen
and women, this administration is committed to creating a new socio-political order for
the Third Republic; we shall ensure that such political parties, as will be registered, are
not mere offshoots of those of the First and Second Republics, and, while we have no
intention of succeeding ourselves, we shall not hand the Third Republic to "money bags"
either (Cited in Yagub, 2002,p.126).

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 Both parties contested the June 12 Presidential elections, which the presidential
candidate of the SDP, Chief M.K.O. Abiola, won. Gen Babangida annulled the elections as part of
his self-succession plot and curiously the SDP leadership without the consent of Abiola accepted
the annulment. However the heat generated by the annulment was so much that Babangida
had to run away (in his own words to step aside) and handed over to a strange contraption
known as Interim National Government (ING). The inability of the Ernest Shonekan led Interim
National Government to contain the crisis of the June 12 impasse gave the then Defence
Secretary and Babangida’s bossom friend and confidant, General Sani Abacha the opportunity
to sack the ING and take over as the Head of State.

His own transition programme saw the birth of five political parties. They were the
United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP), the Grassroot Democratic Movement (GDM), Congress
for National Consensus (CNC), Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), and the National Centre Party
of Nigeria (NCPN). By April 1988, all the parties had adopted General Abacha who was still a
serving General in the Nigerian Army and who was not a card carrying member of any of the
parties as their presidential candidate (Yahaya 2006,p.9). Barely two months later on June 8
1998, the General dropped-dead under mysterious circumstances, and his transition or rather
transformation ended abruptly and General Abdulsalami Abubakar who succeeded him,
initiated yet another transition programme.

It is on record that Abubakar's transition programme has remained the shortest in

Nigeria's transition politics. It lasted for ten months. According to Onuoha (2002), those ten
months were the shortest most momentous and eventful, but at the same time one of the most
relaxed of all the military transition programmes in terms of expectation, the content of the
activities, and speed which marked the handover of political power to an elected government.
General Abubakar dissolved Abacha's NECON and replaced it with the Independent National
Electoral Commission (INEC). In establishing INEC, the government tried as much as possible to
make the body appear as autonomous as possible and quite unlike what obtained under the
Babangida and Abacha years when electoral commissions were openly manipulated and their
duties clearly interfered with publicly. One of the early demonstrations of this autonomy was
the fact that it was INEC and the political associations, and not INEC and government which
discussed and agreed on the modalities for the formation and registration of political parties.

The guideline for the registration of political parties in Nigeria as agreed by INEC and the
political parties stipulated that:

To be qualified to contest subsequent elections under the transition, provisionally

registered associations must poll at least 10% of the total number of votes cast in each
of at least 24 states of the federation at the said local government council election.
After the local government election, any political association which satisfied the
requirement (scored 10% of the votes cast in 24 states) shall be granted certificate of
registration as a political party (Yaqub,2002,p.338).

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 Based on the above provisions therefore, political activities kicked off immediately and
at the end of the deadline on September 9 1998, 25 political associations have applied to INEC
for registration. On October 9 1998, the electoral Commission released the names of the 9
political associations which it said met its guidelines to be given provincial registration These
associations which contested the local government elections were;

Peoples Democratic Partly = PDP

All Peoples Party = APP

Alliance for Democracy = AD

Democratic Advance Movement = DAM

National Solidarity Movement = NSM

Movement for Democracy and Justice = MDJ

Peoples Redemption Party = PRP

United Democratic Party = UDP

United Peoples Party = UPP

However, INEC had to change the guidelines so as to accommodate the AD. The
amendment made it possible for the AD to be registered, even though that it did not meet the
criteria set for registration. This was done clearly to accommodate the political interest of the
South West basically due to the fact they were the most injured in the annulment of June 12
elections. In the presidential election of February 1999, the AD and APP formed an alliance and
presented Chief Olu Falae as their joint candidate. The PDP candidate Chief Olusegun Obasanjo
won the presidential election. The PDP also controlled the highest number of seats at all levels.
It also won 21 States, 63 Senate seats, 209 House of Representatives seats,464 Chairmanship
seats, 527 State Houses of Assembly seats and 4856 Councillorship seats. It was indeed
apparent that the party was the dominant political party in Nigeria right from 1999 (Abubakar,
2005,p.253).

The 2003 elections was horrible in all respects. Both local and foreign observers faulted
the conduct of the elections on many grounds. For instance, The Transition Monitoring Group's
(TMG) report of the election, pointed out serious flaws in both the nomination process and
organization of the party primaries. According to them:

First, the process demonstrated vividly the supremacy of political party executives,
power brokers and factions within the parties in determining the flag bearers of the
party in particular elections. The party membership has virtually no direct say in the
choice of flag bearers. Second, the guidelines for the party primaries were originally
designed to provide discriminating support for the incumbents particularly that of the
PDP. This was because of the deliberate choice of the delegate system as against the
congress system which the parties had adopted. By this preferred system, there was no
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 respect for the democratic principle of equal opportunities and a level playing field for
all the aspirants. It adopted the use of special automatic delegates, including Ministers,
Ambassadors, Presidential Aides and other appointees of the President. On the eve of
the primaries, those incumbents manufactured appointment letters for loyalists who
were to serve as delegates. There were also reports of substitutions made on the
authentic delegate lists from local government areas to include trusted and devoted
loyalists of the incumbents.

In terms of the actual conduct of the elections, the group believed that they were
characterized by disruption of polls or absence of elections in some polling centres, vote-buying,
stealing and stuffing of ballot boxes, improper set-up and voting procedures, multiple, ghost and
under-aged voting, violence and harassment, general insecurity, collaboration of INEC officials
to commit electoral fraud, absence of polling officials at polling units and intimidation of
election observers. In his review of the same elections, Omelle (2005) argues that:

To call the 2003/2004 electoral motions 'elections' is to brutalize the English language.
This brutalization of the white man's language is brought about by the brazen assaults
on the basic principle of democratic process-the elections. Virtual democracy, the
substitution of content for form could not have been better calibrated (p.4).

Despite the heavy criticisms of the elections, those that were declared winners were
duly sworn in, leaving the losers to challenge these mainly dubious victories in court. While
some were lucky to retrieve their mandates through the courts, others were not that lucky, as
those who stole electoral mandates served out the constitutionally mandated four year terms.

The stage, mood, and tempo of the 2007 elections was set by President Obasanjo who said
the elections would be a do-or-die affair. In fulfillment of his prophesy, the elections were simply
nothing but brazen day-light robbery and wanton assault on the sensibilities of Nigerians. This is
why till date that elections are still seen as the worst elections ever conducted in Nigeria. In
their preliminary report of the 2007 Presidential, National Assembly, Gubernatorial and State
House of Assembly Elections released on the 23rd April, 2007, the European Union Election
Observer Mission (Eu EOM) observed among others that:

More specifically complaints relating to missing voters registers, ballot box stuffing,
hijacking of ballot boxes and other sensitive materials, thumb printing of ballot papers,
forgery of results, use of violence to force people to vote for a particular political party,
intimidation and harassment of party agents and voters by thugs, police and the armed
forces, (Guardian, 25th April, 07).

The major proof of the horrible conduct of that elections was the acceptance by
President Yar’dua himself who was elected through that election that the process was flawed,
and that the countrys electoral system needed reforms.

The appointment of Professor Attahiru Jega as INEC Chairman in 2010, by President

Goodluck Jonathan brought a ray of hope that may be the President was committed to free and
fair elections. This was as a result of the pedigree of Professor Jega. The INEC went to work

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immediately and put in place all necessary logistics for the elections. The 2011 general elections
finally held from April 9 to April 26. At the end, the incumbent, President Jonathan won the
elections convincingly.

In their final report issued on the 31st of May 2011, the European Union Election
Observation Mission (EUEOM), noted that;

The legal framework, the general performance of the Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC), and of other stakeholders provided for the 2011 general elections
an overall democratic foundation of further democratic development in accordance
with international principles and with international instruments ratified by the Federal
Republic of Nigeria (Alojz Peterle, the Chief Observer of the EUEOM).

He said that though some short comings were noticed and elements identified which
needed to be enhanced, “Hence overall the 2011 elections marked an important improvement
compared to all polls observed previously by the European Union in Nigeria”.There was thus no
doubt that the 2011 elections was far better than the 2007 elections and other ones ever
conducted by INEC.

The political parties that contested the elections accepted the outcome though they
raised issues with certain conducts. The only exception was Gen. Mohammadu Buhari of the
Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), who rejected the results claiming he won the pools but
was rigged out.

According to him, the computer programme installed in the INEC computers were
manipulated to give Dr Goodluck Jonathan an advantage. In a petition signed by both the CPC
National Chairman and Secretary, Prince Tony Momoh and Engr. Buba Galadima,respectively to
the INEC alleged intimidation of voters, multiple voting among other reasons why the entire
South-South and South East geopolitical zones should be cancelled (Vanguard 19/4/2011).

The party went ahead to challenge the result in the courts. The Supreme Court, Nigeria's
apex court ruled on the matter on December 19 2007. In a unanimous judgment led by the then
Chief Justice of Nigeria, Justice Dahiru Musdapher, it affirmed the November 12 ruling of the
Presidential Election Petition Tribunal which dismissed the petition. In the lead judgment which
was read by Justice Olufunlola Oyelola Adekeye, the court dismissed the appeal basically on the
grounds that the CPC could not prove that the alleged acts of non-compliance it claimed
substantially affected the outcome of the election. In conclusion the court ruled that:

Consequently the 3rd and 4th respondents (Jonathan and Sambo) won the April 16
presidential election conducted by the 1st respondent (INEC) and were returned by the
2nd respondent (Professor Attahiru Jega) as the duly elected President and Vice
President respectively. This appeal failed in its entirety and is hereby dismissed. Parties
are to bear their respective costs (vanguard 2011).

12
 In his reaction to the verdict, Gen. Buhari read a prepared speech saying among others
that:

As in 2003 and 2007, the Supreme Court this morning rejected CPC's appeal against the
lower court verdict that the rigged presidential election of 16th April 2011 was properly
conducted. All who witnessed the conduct of the 2011 elections would know that the
decision of the Supreme Court is politically motivated and has proved no better than the
Supreme Courts of 2003 and 2007 (Vanguard 2011).

He went ahead to lampoon the INEC Chairman ,by saying that:

The new Chairman of INEC Professor Jega was touted as competent and a man of
integrity. He has proved neither after asking for-getting-close to N100 billion for the
election including biometric data with all 10 finger prints to conduct a thorough
electoral exercise, he botched it.

The speech further addressed the issue of the post election violence in parts of the
North, which were mainly linked to his speeches before and after the elections, and which he
refused to condemn. According to him:

To nobody’s surprise therefore, simultaneous violence broke out in parts of the country
after the announcement of the “result”. The Lemo Panel has come up with detailed
causes of the riots and given lie to those who wanted to label the riots my handiwork.
The facts are that people were deeply angered and deeply provoked at the wanton
conduct of the elections: the snatching and stuffing of ballot boxes, violence unleashed
on opposition supporters, the use of police and elements of the army to intimidate,
injure and kill opposition supporters and flagrant change of results after collation such
as in Niger, Bauchi and Kaduna states (Vanguard 2011).

It would be recalled that Gen Buhari was credited with a statement that he would make
the country ungovernable if he lost the 2011 presidential election. It is however clear that Gen
Buhari did not make such a statement at all, instead the statement is credited to a PDP politician
Alhaji Lawal Kaita who in the heat of the battle by the North to stop President Jonathan from
contesting the 2011 presidential election, made such a statement. What he actually said was
that Nigeria would be ungovernable if President Jonathan remained President after the 2011
elections

The post electoral violence that took place in the Northern part of the country was
unprecedented. The violence engulfed 12 Northern states. The affected states were Adamawa,
Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Jigawa, kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Niger, Sokoto, Yobe and Zamfara.
According to a report by the Human Rights Watch, the riots began with widespread protests by
supporters of the main opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, a Northern Moslem from
the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC). While about 800 persons were killed and about
65,000 people were displaced. The report noted that; “The April elections were heralded
among the fairest in Nigeria's history, but they also were among the bloodiest”
(https:IIwww.hrw.org/news/2011/05/16/nigeria-post-election-violence-killed-800). The

13
protesters who were Buhari's supporters protested against what they perceived as INEC's
rigging out of their candidate. The protests pitted Muslims against Christians and at the end,
more than 350 churches were burnt or destroyed by the Muslim rioters in 10 Northern states.
The Christians retaliated by also burning down some mosques. Apart from the loss of lives,
properties running into hundreds of millions of naira were destroyed, thousands were wounded
while yet many more were displaced.

While we are not going into the causes of this post-electoral violence, since they have
been addressed by the chapter on electoral violence, there is no doubt that Gen. Buhari's
refusal to caution his supporters or condemn the killings contributed to it's spiral and intensity.
For about three days that it lasted before the security forces brought the situation under
control, Gen Buhari remained taciturn, despite calls on him to condemn the action of his
supporters.

The build-up to the 2015 general elections were completely different from that of 2011.
In the first instance there were serious attempts by Northern politicians both within and outside
the PDP to stop President Jonathan from contesting again in the elections. The argument was
that since he completed the late President Yar'dua's tenure and also served another tenure
from 2011 to 2015, he had served out the constitutionally mandated 2 tenures. Beyond the
constitutional issues, there was the moral argument that President Obasanjo served for eight
years, President Yar'dua served for only two years, while Jonathan has served six years, so that
power should go to the North that has only served for two years, while the South had served for
fourteen years. The attempt to stop Jonathan through the courts failed. Former President
Obasanjo's attempt at subtle blackmail of a single- tenure agreement with Jonathan also failed
to stop him from contesting.

The second interesting part was the formation of the All Progressive Congress, through
an amalgam of the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), a Southwestern dominated party, the All
Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), a far Northern dominated party and Buharis’ Congress for
Progressive Change (CPC) a clearly Northern based party. This coalition was indeed frightening
to the PDP. This was mainly against the backdrop of the defection of five serving PDP Governors,
some Senators and elected representatives of the PDP to the APC.

The third factor of interest was Buhari's emergence as the party's presidential candidate.
Buhari could be said to be a veteran in presidential electoral contests in Nigeria since this would
be his fourth attempt, having contested in 2003 and 2007 under the banner of the ANPP, and
the 2011 elections under the flag of the CPC. The calculation was simple. If Buhari could garner
about 12 million votes in the 2011 elections mainly from the North, the votes from the South
West dominated by the ACN, would put him in a good stead to beat incumbent President
Jonathan leading a badly fractured and divided PDP. The political brinks-manship of Senator
Ahmed Bola Tinubu in this political equation is unparalleled in Nigeria's political history.

Fourth, and arising from the above, is the political alliance between the Southwest and
the North. History of political alliances in Nigeria, has shown that the North and Southwest do
not actually mix politically. While the North is considered mainly conservative, the Southwest

14
prided itself as the progressives of Nigerian politics. This marriage of the conservatives and the
progressives was one that can be described as unparalleled and apparently a marriage of
strange bed fellows. However, it must be noted that at his point what mattered most was how
to break the strangle hold of PDP on Nigeria, the issues of ideology did not matter and could be
sorted out at a future date.

As the elections drew nearer, it was apparent that the APC was ready to snatch power
from the PDP that has been in power for sixteen years without showing that they have the
capacity to solve Nigeria’s developmental problems. The Nigerian people may not mind a
change, to see whether the new captains may be better. The APC cashed in on this and started
chanting the “change” mantra. It sold like wildfire. The campaigns were very bitter and indeed
both parties fought dirty, haste speeches rented the air, decorum was thrown overboard and
the atmosphere became charged. On both sides, accusation of intentions to rig or manipulate
the elections were rife.

Another dangerous angle to the election was the twin issues of religion and ethnicity.
There is no doubt that more than any other time in Nigeria's recent political history, have
religion and ethnicity reared their ugly heads than the 2015 elections. The Presidential election
was between a Northern Muslim and a Southern Christian. Perhaps what made it so was the
perception of Buhari as a religious bigot based on his antecedents and the fact that he
commanded a cult following among the Northern Islamic commoners (the Talakawa).

Well the elections took place amid fears that it may lead to the breakup of Nigeria, but
far from it. Buhari won and Jonathan and the PDP conceded defeat and the tension got diffused
and life got back to normal again. Elections over, the APC is in the saddle now. There is no doubt
that there is a huge difference between the struggle for power and use of power to achieve the
good life for the citizens. After more than two years in the saddle (2017), the APC government
lead by Buhari has left no one in doubt that they lack what it takes to bring about positive
change in the country. Nigerians who cried change in 2015, are now crying to change the
change. They have been clearly short-changed by a cabal of fortune hunters whose only interest
in power is for their selfish interests to forage on our collective patrimony. Nigerians are now
groaning under the hardship imposed on them by a visionless leadership, while the leaders are
busy lining their pockets and preparing for the 2019 elections. One can only imagine what the
campaign slogan would be in 2019 since change has failed and change has refused to come.

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