POLITICAL PARTIES IN NIGERIA’S SECOND,

THIRD AND FOURTH REPUBLICS

Obi, Emeka Anthony Ph.D***

Introduction

When the Nigerian military struck in January 1966, ostensibly to correct the errors of the
First Republic, nobody would have thought that such an intervention would last for an unbroken
thirteen years of dictatorial rule, and also witness four different military Heads of State. Thus,
when Murtala Mohammed announced a transition programme that would climax with the
enthronement of democratic rule in 1979, Nigerians were simply elated.

One thing we must emphasize is that irrespective of how good or wonderful any
government or administration is, so long as it does not allow for mass participation, people
normally have some reservations about such government or administration. There is nothing as
dehumanizing as leading somebody without his consent or mandate so freely given without
compulsion and irrespective of his views and in spite of his personal choices. This is why despite
the pitfalls of democracy, there is yet no other system of government known to man today
which is considered better than democracy. The appeal of democracy is so alluring that:

Today, democracy is a highly cherished value. Even societies that are clearly different in
their politics claim it. For a long time, it was part of the propaganda arsenal of both the East and
West in their ideological struggle for world supremacy. It is particularly appealing to the
oppressed peoples of the world whose yearning for freedom, equality and justice are daily
being frustrated. In fact, its propaganda value is so high that practically every regime, even the
most brutal, oppressive and unjust, wishes to justify its actions on democratic grounds. Probably
for the first time in history, democracy is claimed as the proper ideal description of all systems
of political and social organization advocated by influential politicians. Those who admit not to
practice it are defensive about their admission. They must adduce various reasons to explain the
alleged peculiarities of their societies, which necessitate the deviation from this valued political
order (Nnoli, 2011, p.1).

Based on the above therefore, it becomes understandable why Nigerians were elated at
the prospect of transiting to democracy from thirteen years of military rule. This is more so,
when it is realized that:

The military is nothing other than a highly specialized apparatus of violence whose
salience begins when sociability has become impossible and when civilized values no
longer apply, when we must take to the killing fields. This is why military rule is
inherently and inevitably de-civilizing (Ake 1996.)

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 There is therefore no doubt that any group which has witnessed military rule with its de-
civilizing values, would long for democracy, which has become the most popular system of
government. As Nnoli (2011) has argued extensively that:

This popularity of democracy is understandable. To all intents and purpose, democracy

is among the highest achievements of mankind in social and political relations. It is a
product of the sweat, toil, creativity, blood and sacrifice of millions of people across
space and time in the human struggles for a better life. Therefore to negate democracy
is to negate this struggle, toil, and sacrifice, and the contribution of this struggle to
human progress. Equally, a negation of the struggle is a negation of this further
advancement of these historical struggles to greater social and political progress (p.2).

EMERGENCE OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The transition programme of the Gen. Murtala's regime was announced by him in his
independence day speech on Oct 1st 1975. It was a five stage programme starting from October
1975 and ending on October 1st, 1979, when an elected President is expected to be sworn in.
The five point programme as announced by the Head of State is as follows;

The first stage dealt with creation of states and their settlement and consolidation,
and drafting of the constitution, for which 50 "wise men" were appointed.

The second stage comprised:

a reorganisation of local governments;

b. election into Local Governments on individual merit, without political

parties; Constituent Assembly to consider and accept or adopt the draft

c. constitution. This was to terminate in October 1978.

The third stage was made up of:

a. Lifting ban on political parties;

b. Formation of political parties.

The fourth and fifth stages dealt with;

a. Registration of voters, and delimitation of constituencies;

b. Election into State House of Assembly,

c. Election into Federal House of Assembly.

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 The military government was supposed to handover to an elected President on the 1st
of October 1979. Despite the fact that Gen. Murtala Mohammed was assassinated on the 13th
of February 1976, the transition programme was still implemented as planned by the Gen.
Obasanjo administration.

The ban on political activities was lifted on September 21 1978, surprising barely twenty
four hours after the lifting of this ban, the birth of two political parties were announced. These
were the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) and Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP). The other parties that
followed immediately were the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), the Peoples Redemption Party
(PRP) and the Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP). Apart from these parties, about fifty three
other motley political associations sought for registration, but the electoral body, the Federal
Electoral Commission (FEDECO), registered the above mentioned parties. Yagub (2002) has
argued that despite the fact that the military government tried to remove the tribal basis of
political parties by insisting that parties must have offices in two-thirds of the then nineteen
states before they were registered, the registered parties apart from the GNPP, were to a certain
extent reincarnation of the First Republic parties. This is not very difficult to see. The NPN was
largely a reincarnation of the Northern Peoples Congress (NPC), with the addition of few
politicians from the South. The UPN was clearly an off-shoot of the Action Group (AG), while the
NPP, was a resurrected National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC). As for the PRP, there was
no doubt that it was a rebirth of the Northern Elements Progresive Union (NEPU). It is
important to add at this point for the avoidance of doubt that these reincarnated parties were
not the exact replicas of the First Republic parties as a few things had changed, but the
dominant elements, orientation and affiliations showed their clear roots in the moribund
parties of the First Republic. Let us now take a brief look at the individual parties.

THE NATIONAL PARTY OF NIGERIA (NPN)

The formation of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), was linked to series of meetings
held by Northern politicians of the defunct NPC preparatory to the return to democratic rule.
The Constituent Assembly which took off in late 1977 provided a platform for these Northern
politicians to interact with their Southern counterparts leading to the formation of the party.
The presence of some prominent Southern politicians of the First Republic in the party gave it a
semblance of a national party though it drew its main support from the core Northern Hausa-
fulani. These Southern politicians included people like Chief K.O. Mbadiwe, and Chief Remi Fani-
Kayode, among others. The aims and objectives of the party are:

a. To maintain and protect the unity and sovereignty, of Nigeria as one indivisible political
entity.

b. To promote unity, solidarity harmonious co-exitence amongst all Nigerians irrespective

of religious, tribal and other differences.

c. To uphold federalism as a form of government for Nigeria.

d. To ensure the practice and maintenance of democracy, the rule of law and social justice
in the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

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e. To promote mutual respect for and understanding of the religious, cultures, traditions
and the heritage of all the various communities of Nigeria.

f. To preserve, promote and safeguard Nigerian cultural heritage.

g. To eradicate illiteracy throughout Nigeria and promote learning, science and culture.

h. To achieve and consolidate real political and economic independence and self-respect of
Nigeria.

I. To build and sustain a strong, modern economy under the control of Nigerians.

j. To promote the principle of equal opportunity and treatment for every citizen of
Nigeria.

k. To co-operate with progressive African and other Nationalist movements and

organizations working for the eradication of colonialism, imperialism, neocolonialism
and racism for African Unity.

l. To co-operate with all members of the OAU and UNO and any regional groupings that
shall be in the best interest of Nigeria and help to find just and peaceful settlements of
international problems.

m. To undertake other activities which in the opinion of the party are conducive to the
attainment of the aims and objectives of the party.

Party's Aims

a. Social justice and social welfare

b. Equality of opportunity for all the citizens.

c. Personal liberty and fundamental rights and freedom of the citizens.

d. Supremacy of the will of the people democratically expressed.

e. Self-respect and sel f-reliance.

f. Unity of Nigeria.

In the 1979 elections, the party's candidate Alhaji Shehu Shagari was declared the
winner. Out of a total of 95 Senate seats, the party won 36 and 95 out of the 449 House of
Representative seats. Though Chief Obafemi Awolowo who came second in that election
challenged the declaration of Alhaji Shehu Shargari as duly elected on the grounds that he did
not win up to 25 percent of the votes in at least 2/3 of the the nineteen states as stipulated by
the law, and therefore since no clear winner emerged, there should be a run-off election
between Shagari and himself.

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 The UPN leader, first filed his petition before the Special Presidential Election Tribunal. In
his petition, he joined the President elect; Alhaji Shehu Shagari, Alhaji Ahmadu Kurfi, FEDECO's
Chief Electoral Officer and Mr. F.L.O. Menkiti, Returning Officer for the presidential election.
Chief Awolowo argued that Alhaji Shehu Shagari was not duly elected by a majority of votes for
the reason that he had not satisfied Sections 34A sub section (1)© (11) of the Electoral Decree
1977 and Section 7 of the Electoral (Amendment) Decree 1978 (Ojiako 1981).

On the 11th September 1979, the Tribunal rejected Chief Awolowo's petition against the
declaration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari as the President elect. Not yet satisfied, Chief Awolowo
appealed the tribunal's verdict at the Supreme Court. However on the 26th of September 1979,
the Supreme Court upheld the verdict of the Tribunal that Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the NPN was
duly elected in accordance with the Electoral Decree. On the 1st of October 1979, Alhaji Shehu
Shagari was sworn in as the first Executive President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, bringing
to a just end thirteen years of military rule under four different Heads of State.

After four years in the saddle, the NPN led federal government proved incapable of
surmounting Nigeria's developmental challenges. The government was seen as corrupt, inept,
wasteful and grossly incompetent. In the next election conducted in 1983, the NPN massively
rigged the elections to the extent that they increased the number of states under their control
from seven to twelve. In the Senate, it increased from thirty six to sixty one, while in the Federal
House of Representatives, it jumped from ninety five to three hundred and seven. It was
shocking that at the time the masses were complaining about bad governance and economic
hardship, occasioned by NPN's misrule, the party was “winning” landslide victories all over the
country. Nigerian's were therefore elated when the military intervened and terminated the life
of the Second Republic, thus bringing to an end four years of the party's misrule.

UNITY PARTY OF NIGERIA (UPN)

The birth of the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) was announced on the 22nd of September
1978, barely 24 hours after the ban on party politics was lifted. Chief Obafemi Awolowo
announced the birth of the party. It should be recalled that the Chief was the Founder and
Leader of the Action Group (AG) in the defunct First Republic. It was therefore not surprising
that the party was naturally an off-shoot of the AG, as the members of the UPN were also
mostly the core members of the AG. The party also drew its main support from the South-West
region of Nigeria, the same zone where the AG drew its main support from.

The Four Cardinal Programmes of the Party were;

a. Free education at all levels for all, with effect from October 1, 1979.

b. Integrated rural development which is aimed at boosting food production and feeding
60 million hungry citizens of this country.

c. The provision of free health facilities for all citizens of Nigeria, and

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d. Full employment (Ojiako 1981, p. 254).

In espousing the socialist bent of the party, Chief Awolowo had argued that:

No one nation ever attains a worthwhile goal designed for the benefit of the entire
people in one fell swoop without courting irreparable or prolonged disaster for the
people concerned. Indeed any attempt to attain the goal of socialism in one frantic leap
is bound to generate wide spread alarm, social upheaval and distress and attendant
violence (Cited in Ojiako 1981) P.255.

The main difference between the UPN and other political parties of the Second
Republic:

Was not the leader but the ideals of a social democracy it was founded. The UPN
inherited its ideology from the old Action Group and saw itself as a party for everyone. It
was the only party to promise free education and called itself a welfarist party
(http://en.wikpedia.org/wiki/unity-party-of-nigeria)

Further more the:

UPN as well as the Peoples Redemption Party (PRP) presented the most coherent plan
of action during the electioneering campaign of 1979. The party jettisoned building a
coalition of comfort in a polarized political environment but based partnerships on the
cooperation of like minded advocates of democratic socialism
(https:/en.wikipedia/wiki/unity-party-of-nigeria).

In the 1979 elections, the UPN’s flagbearer, Chief Obafemi Awolowo came second
behind Alhaji Shehu Shagari of the NPN. He challenged Shagari's declaration as been duly
elected on the ground that he did not score the minimum 25% of votes in 2/3 of the nineteen
states of Nigeria, as stipulated by the Electoral Decree. He lost at the Presidential Electionl
Tribunal and also at the Supreme Court. Overall, the party won all the states in the Southwest
and the defunct Bendel state,28 Senate seats and 111 House of Representatives seats in the
1979 elections making it the second strongest party in Nigeria. In the 1983 elections, when the
NPN rigging machine was unleashed on Nigeria, the UPN lost some states and Assembly
elections it controlled to the NPN .

In the Presidential election it still came second behind the NPN. In the National
Assembly elections, it won only 16 out of the previous 28 seats in the Senate and 51 out of its
previous 111 seats in the House of Representatives elections. As expected it rejected the
outcome of the polls and the people of the Southwest the party's strong zone showed their
displeasure about the NPN's landslide victory through electoral violence.

Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP)

The birth of the Nigeria Peoples Party (NPP) was announced on the 22nd of September 1978,
the same day that the ban on political activities was lifted. The three main groups that formed
the party were the National Union Council, Club 19 and the Council for National Unity and

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Progress. Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim, a wealthy businessman announced the birth of the party in a
written statement, in which we said that “we of the Nigeria Peoples Party offer our services to
this country in the firm belief that our programme will fulfill the hopes and aspirations of our
people” (cited in Ojiako, 1981 p. 255).

The Aims and Objectives of the Party were;

a. To promote and sustain the unity of Nigeria and uphold her territorial integrity.

b. To work for the integration and equality of the peoples of Nigeria without regard to
ethnic affiliation, religion or sex.

c. To work for equal opportunity for all Nigerians to participate in every aspect of national
life and to promote political, social and economic equality of all sections of Nigeria.

d. To work for full employment of Nigeria's manpower and natural resources with a view to
building a self-reliant economy.

e. To promote the just and equitable distribution of the fruits of economic development
among persons and states of Nigeria.

f. To work towards free and high quality education at all levels.

g. To work for a secular state which upholds democracy, the rule of law and freedom of
worship.

Soon after it was formed, the party faced a crisis which led to the exist of Alhaji Waziri
Ibrahim from the party. Alhaji Waziri Ibrahim wanted to be both the party Chairman and
Presidential candidate of the party at same time. Of course this was not possible with the
caliber of politicians in the party and later with Dr. Azikiwe’s entry into the party. When it
became obvious that he wouldn’t have his way, Alhaji Ibrahim left and formed the Great Nigeria
Peoples Party (GNPP) where he realised his ambition of being both the party Chairman and
Presidential candidate. Chief Adeniran Ogunsanya emerged the Chairman of the NPP, while Dr.
Azikiwe was the presidential candidate, both for the 1979 and 1983 general elections.

In the 1979 general elections, the party won three gubernatorial elections in Anambra,
Imo and Plateau states. It later entered into an alliance with the ruling National Party of Nigeria
(NPN) at the centre in order to enable the NPN consolidate its hold on the National Assembly
where it did not win majority of the seats. The alliance later collapsed in 1981 and attempts to
get the NPP members in the federal cabinet to resign led to sharp divisions as some refused to
resign but instead decamped to the NPN. In the 1983 general elections, the fortunes of the
party nose-dived seriously following the onslaught of the NPN rigging machine. The NPP and
other parties of the Second Republic, went into oblivion following the coup that terminated that
Republic and subsequently ban on political activities.

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GREAT NIGERIA PEOPLES PARTY (GNPP)

Incidentally, the founder of the Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP) Alhaji Ibrahim Waziri
was the same person that announced the birth of the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP) on the 22nd
of September 1978. It was believed that Waziri's financial backing helped in the formation of
the NPP. Waziri therefore thought that since he provided personal funds in the formation of
NPP, the new party should reciprocate through unflinching allegiance to his control. However,
with the presence of Zik and his ex-NCNC Igbo followers, Waziri’s ambitions were dashed
(Abubakar 2005, p.257). Waziri was disappointed, because he found out that his wealth alone
could not guarantee him all that he wanted from the NPP. It was not surprising; since there was
no way he could have dwarfed Zik with his towering credentials and nationalist antecedents.
Thus, “when Waziri was told by his partners that he would not monopolize the two posts of
Party Chairman and presidential candidate, he withdrew to form the GNPP” (Ababakar 2005, p.
255).

The history of the formation of the GNPP, therefore clearly showed that Waziri was only
interested in a forum through which he would realize his ambition to contest for the presidency
of Nigeria. A wealthy businessman, Alhaji, Waziri's entry into the presidential race in the Second
Republic, according to Abubakar (2005) signified the attempt by the commercial capitalist
fraction of the national bourgeois to entrench itself in power. Being the dominant financier of
the party, made Waziri intolerant of any form of dissenting views which in any case he perceived
as indiscipline. With time his tyrannical disposition made his core supporters to abandon him
for other parties.

Though Waziri's campaign slogan was “politics without bitterness”, the GNPP lacked a
coherent party philosophy or ideology that distinguished it from the other parties. However,
because the party could not muster a national appeal, its major supporters were the Kanuri's,
( Waziri's ethnic group). In the 1979 elections, it won two states; Borno and Gongola, eight
Senatorial seats and forty three Federal House of Representative seats. Waziri's dictatorial
tendencies already alluded to, led to a speedy disintegration of the party to the extent that by
the 1983 elections, it no longer had much electoral value. The tragedy of the GNPP was
summed up by Abubakar (2005) thus:

Waziri's alliance, squabbles and break-up with Azikiwe's NPP epitomized the internal
factional disputes over power, wealth and patronage that characterize a patrimonial political
economy. Although, Waziri, a wealthy businessman from Borno, campaigned on the slogan of
“politics without bitterness”, his total rejection of the grand NPP alliance on the grounds that he
was not given the posts of Party Chairman and Presidential candidate revealed the purely
personal ambitions that underlined the emergence of GNPP… as the Chairman and Presidential
candidate of his party, Waziri confused the complex arena of Nigerian politics with business. For
him, the gains of power and profit were too important to be lost by bitter rivalries, enmity and
unnecessary debates. As the dominant financier of the party, Waziri did not tolerate any
opposition. In fact, even honest suggestions and proposals by members of the party were
perceived as indiscipline towards the “executive president”. Although the party won two states-

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Gongola and Borno- Waziri's supporters eventually disserted him and opted for either the NPP,
UPN or even NPN (p. 257).

THE PEOPLES REDEMPTION PARTY (PRP)

The formation of the People's Redemption Party (PRP) is traceable to the squabble
within the National Movement. This struggle between the mostly Marxist intellectuals, the
remnants of the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) and some former members of
the Northern People's Congress (NPC) in the National Movement led to a sharp division. This
leftists, broke away on the allegation that they were being sidelined and then went ahead to
announce the birth of the PRP on the 27th of September, 1979. The PRP was clearly the only
party in Nigeria’s Second Republic that had a clear cut ideological bent. The party was led by
Malam Aminu Kano, the leader of the defunct Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU).

According to Falola and Ihonvebere, (1985 cited in Abubakar, 2005) the PRP, as a political
movement that aimed at redeeming the peasantry as well as the urban poor classes,
emphasised specific pragmatic policies targeted at specific institutions or practices which it
regarded as oppressive. In the 1979 general elections the party won two states, Kano and
Kaduna. Along with other parties, it was banned by the military following the coup that
terminated the Second Republic.

The journey to Nigeria's aborted Third Republic started in 1996 with the establishment
of the Political Bureau. The Bureau was inaugurated by President Ibrahim Babangida on 13
January 1986. The Bureau was mandated to: “Produce the blueprint of a new political model (or
models)-to place options before the administration (and) to work out a realistic implementation
programme for the agreed model” (Babangida 1986, cited in Olagunju, Jinadu and Oyovbaire
1993, p.110)

The 17 member Political Bureau which Babangida believed was composed “of men and
woman of ideas and experience” was headed by Dr. S.J. Cookey a historian and bureaucrat. The
core assignment of the Bureau was detailed by Olagunju, Jinadu and Oyovbaire (1993).
According to them:

The twin task assigned to the Political Bureau was to produce the blueprint of a new
political model (or models) ... to place options before this Administration [and] to workout a
realistic implementation programme for the agreed model. In pursuit of this task, the Political
Bureau was enjoined to carry out [its] assignment by canvassing the views and opinions
across the Federation...[and] to make adequate administrative arrangements including the
creation of zonal centres in order to enable it reach as many people as possible (p.111).

In summary, the following terms of reference, arising from the substantive

content of the address of President Babangida to the Political Bureau and his 1986 budget
speech, were put forward to assist the Bureau in its assignment. In other words, the Political
Bureau was expected, among other things, to:

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(a) Review Nigeria's political history and identify the basic problems which have led to our
failure in the past and suggest ways of resolving and coping with these problems;

(b) Identify a basic philosophy of government which will determine goals and serve as a
guide to the activities of government;

(c) Collect relevant information and data for the Government as well as identify other
political problems that may arise from the debate;

(d) Gather, collate and evaluate the contributions of Nigerians to the search for a viable
political future and provide guidelines for the attainment of the consensus objectives;
and

(e) Deliberate on other political problems as may be referred to it from time to time
(Olagunju, Jinadu and Oyovbaire 1993, p.11).

The Bureau worked for more than one year and submitted its report to the Armed
Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) on 27 March 1987. The report was referred to a special nine man
panel under the Chairmanship of Major-General Paul Omu, the Commandant of the Command
and Staff College Jaji, who was also a member of the AFRC. The Bureau recommended a 1990
hand over date for the Babangida military Junta, but curiously the Omu Panel decided on the
minority report which recommended a 1992 hand over date. According to Onuoha & Fadakinte
(2002) “the interest in the recommendation lay in the fact that the minority report provided
General Babangida “a fate accomplice” to accept 1992 as his year of handing over political
power to an elected body of Nigerians” (p.4).

The White Paper of the Omu Panel, arising from the Political Bureau Report formed the
main thrust of the Babangida transition programme which was promulgated as Decree No 19 of
1987.According to Olagunu, Jinadu and Oyobaire (1993) the Omu Panel:

Came to the reasoned conclusion that the 1992 date was a more realistic option. It
would allow for the appropriate lessons to be learnt. It would also create more time for
the requisite adjustments to be put in place. In addition, the 1992 date would enable
the necessary structural institutional and cultural reforms take root before the
disengagement of the Babangida Administration (pp,169-170).

What they however forget to add was that the two year extension would also enable
Babangida to continue in office while thinking out more ingenious ways for further prolongation
of his tenure or even self perpetuation, the so called “hidden agenda”.

The military government lifted the ban on party politics which has been in force since
the overthrow of the Shehu Shagari led Second Republic. This meant that people were now free
to form political associations which they would present to the National Electoral Commission
(NEC) for registration. The NEC brought out guidelines which parties must meet to qualify for
registration. The conditions stipulated by NEC were to say the least extremely stringent. Yagub
(2002) avers that:

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 Between the period May 3 and July 19, 1989, ( a working period of 56 days), the political
associations were expected to meet these conditions through the formation,
development and establishment of their branches in at least two-thirds of all parts
(Federal, State and Local Government Areas) of the country. (The three tiers of
government had at that time, a total of 457 constituted governmental structures!). To
put it rather mildly, it would have been difficult within the stipulated period for political
associations to set up viable party structures.

Commenting on the same near impossible conditions for party registration, Obikeze, Obi
and Iwuoha (2016), lamented that:

To determine the two parties, INEC imposed very expensive and almost impossible
conditions. The parties were expected to establish well equipped offices with at least
three paid staff in all the local government areas in the country then. They were to
supply 25 membership lists of their parties comprising the names, photographs, and
personal details of at least 200 members from each local government in the country
(totaling at least 87,000 individual membership files per party) to NEC with a registration
fee of N50,000. All these must be done within three months (p.210).

Despite these near impossible demands, Nigeria politicians been incurable optimists
decided to try their best. At the end of the exercise, thirteen political associations out of the lot
that decided to try, applied to NEC for registration with lorry loads of the required documents.
Shockingly, the President, Gen. Ibrahim Babangida in a nationwide broadcast, announced that
none of the thirteen political associations qualified for registration.

According to President Babangida none of the political associations could be registered

because:

One is reincarnation of a make-shift alliance during the Second Republic containing

people who betrayed the parties that elected them into office. The reincarnation
reflected political opportunism, old lines of cleavage and primordial loyalties. Another is
almost a pure-bred re-emergence of a Second Republic party, with same ideas and
loyalties as the political association mentioned earlier. A third political association is a
proxy organization founded and funded by influential people who are disqualified from
political activities during the transition period. A fourth party appeared to be an
association of wealthy individuals who use their money to determine who joins them
and who does not; and who gets what, when, how and how much. Fellow countrymen
and women, this administration is committed to creating a new socio-political order for
the Third Republic; we shall ensure that such political parties, as will be registered, are
not mere offshoots of those of the First and Second Republics, and, while we have no
intention of succeeding ourselves, we shall not hand the Third Republic to "money bags"
either. (cited in Obikeze and Obi 2003,p. 111).

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 In all these, what Yagub (2002) found most perplexing was the contradiction in one
respect between what the NEC found problematic with the political associations and what the
AFRC said. NEC said “All the associations have poor financial base while President Babangida
said “a fourth political party appeared to be an association of wealthily individuals who use
their money to determine who joins them and who does not”. It was difficult for one to know
which was which and what the exact situation could have been.

With the benefit of hindsight, based on later manifestations, it does appear that
Babangida and his co-travelers had already determined what they had wanted and only used
the bogey of party formation as an alibi to justify it. Remember that the Political Bureau has
already recommended a two-party system, which made Babangida to instruct NEC to
recommend only two parties to be registered. But there was no guarantee that Babangida could
control these two parties. So the best thing to do was to disqualify all those seeking for
registration, and then form two government sponsored parties. Babangida therefore decided to
form two parties with one leaning a little to the left and one a little to the right. The party that
was a little to the left was the Social Democratic Party, (SDP) while the National Republic
Convention (NRC) was a little to the right.

This decision of government to form two parties, broke all known rules of party
formation and therefore drew a lot of unsavoury comments from concerned and informed
commentators. According to General Obasanjo:

Those who call the two government created parties, parastatals are even being
generous. Parastatals at least have effective and accountable chief executives, who can
enforce order and discipline. The same cannot be said of the government created
parties. And yet they are the vehicle through which it is hoped that a stable democracy
will be nurtured (cited in Obikeze, Obi and Iwuoha 2016, p. 211).

Prof. Claude Ake in his own remarks on the transition programme in general and
formation of the two parties in particular, believes that by the action of the military:

It cultivated a politics dissociated from issues, ideology and social forces. It created
political parties abstracted from social realities, parties belonging to everyone in general and no
one in particular and thus constituted an anarchy of ambitions….. after many years of
discrediting politics, aggressing and humiliating politicians, virtually everyone is discouraged
from politics except those who have a neuropathic attachment to power or no other means of
live hood or self esteem (cited in Obikeze, Obi and Iwuoha 2016, p. 211).

Yagub (2002) believes the manner of the introduction of the two parties by the military
Junta violated all of the finest ingredients for the formation and the development of political
parties in the liberal mould. However in defence of the action of the military in this regard,
Olagunju (1989) had argued that the action:

Was informed by the fact that none of the associations possessed or seemed adequately
interested in the vision and objective that informed the transition programme of the
administration… Accordingly to have registered any one of them would have been

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 politically irresponsible of the administration, for it would have called into question its
credibility and sincerity of purpose (p.214).

Another interesting angle to the transition programme was the issue of banning some
categories of people from joining any party or seeking for political office during the transition
period. The Participation in Politics and Elections (prohibition) Decree 1987, otherwise known as
Decree No 25 of 1987, specified in schedules 1 and 2 a category of persons banned or
disqualified from participation in politics, elections or holding any public or political party office
etc. during the transition period. This Decree was later amended by the Participation in Politics
and Elections (prohibition) (Amendment) Decree 1989, otherwise known as Decree No 9 of
1989. This amended Decree includes as part III of schedule 2 of the original Decree No 25 of
1987 a list of office holders (Chairmen and members) of certain bodies from 31 December, 1983
to the end of the transition period who were disqualified from participation in politics
(Olagunju, Jinadu and Oyovbaire 1993). The NEC was granted the powers to determine the
eligibility of political aspirants to participate in politics and elections under this Decree. In
apparent justification of this Decree, Olagunu, Jinadu and Oyovbaire (1993) have argued that:

The critical and strategic significance of the ban and disqualification within this
theoretical framework of the transition as a learning process and as a controlled
opening of the political space is that they are fundamentally focused on the succession
problem (p.202).

Based on provisions of these two Decrees, many people were banned from partisan
politics, thereby leaving the door open for fresh or new politicians. This introduced a new
phrase into the Nigerian political lexicon. The issue of “Old breed” and “New breed” politicians.

In what looks like the most comprehensive defence of the setting up of the two
sponsored parties, a core participant in the two sponsored parties, a core participant in the
whole exercise, and the then the Director of the Center for Democratic Studies (CDS), Prof Omo
Omoruyi in a paper titled “Parties and Politics” has argued that:

The innovation of the two party system in 1989 introduced some elements of
discontinuity between the past and 1989 in terms of origin, composition leadership,
selection, funding and the interest they serve. It removed the idea of “founders” and
“joiners” as all were joiners. It removed the idea of owners, as the government financed
the founding of the two parties and provided a level playing field for all those who
wanted to stake a political career from either of the two parties (para. 29)

Going ahead he asked:

What democratic rules were violated by the act of giving the two names? Was it the act
of funding, which removed the “moneybags” from converting other Nigerians into some
second-class citizens? Was it the act of giving all Nigerian majority and minority, North
and South, East and West a level playing field? Was it the act of educating the political
class in the rudiments of running political parties? (para, 30).

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 He said what led to the formation of the two parties was a security document which
President Babangida had which showed that both serving and retired military officers
sponsored most of the six political associations then seeking for registration. The President
therefore needed a new system that would be innovated to take his colleagues by surprise.
Though attempts were made to persuade these political party owners to merge, they refused,
he therefore decided to take his colleagues by surprise on October 7 1986 when through the
famous Abuja declaration, he set up two political parties with names and training programmes
under the then Center for the study of Democratic Institutions. He then argues that:

The public policy consideration has to do with the need to reduce the political salience
of ethnicity, religion and geography. The two party system were devised to cut across
the known ethnic, religious and regional divide in the country. What should be noted
was that the two party system changed the character of the tripod in Nigerian plural
society. Give them two names, give them two symbols from the national crest or coat of
arms (Horse and Eagle) and give Nigerians the opportunity to work together within the
two formations (para 33).

He concludes by arguing that “the abortion of the transition was not because of the two
party system or in the manner of their origin. It was due to forces extraneous to the two party
system or the manner of their origin” (para 35).

As much interesting as the justifications appear, the last argument on the abortion of the
two party system is worth commenting upon. In the first instance, who aborted the transition?
The answer is simple, the initiator of the transition itself. Gen. Babangida aborted it when he
ended up transiting to nowhere. Nigerians had before then, accused him of harbouring a
“hidden agenda”. As Onuoha and Fadakinte (2002) have said “General Babangida had the most
complex, ambitious, expensive and unpredictable transition programme Nigeria ever had. The
manner of unpredictability was such that General Ibrahim Babangida became known as
“Maradona in politics” (p.7). More extensively, they contend that:

Perhaps the weakest aspect of Babangida's transition politics was his inability to know
when to end his “Maradona approach” politics of shifting the post, and Machiavellian
transition politics. His transition politics could not appreciate the fact that the June 12
Presidential Election had gone beyond a matter of maneuver; and a case of serious
political misjudgment. Babangida was thus pressurized into stepping aside because of
his underestimation of Nigeria's reaction to a cancellation of a presidential election after
so many years of military dictatorship and so much detailed but fraudulent, expensive
and complex transition programme (p.8.)

The second aspect was that the entire exercise was crafted to fail. Probably some people
like Prof. Omoruyi who Gen. Babangida co-opted into his transition programme may have
believed that he was truly working to enthrone a just and equitable political order without
knowing that the evil genius had a different agenda. Thus, the bobby traps and land mines he
laid in the process of the transition programme just to ambush it, in order to buy more time for

14
himself in power, elongate his stay in office and probably transmute into a civilian President. In
the end, the dibbler dribbled himself and had to run away leaving the stage for his long time
friend and rogue ally Gen. Sani Abacha to take over and begin another round of rigmarole. What
a circus show.

In what seemed like a volte-face, Olajunju, Jinadu and Oyovbaire (1993), whose book
“Transition to Democracy in Nigeria (1985-1993)” seemed devoted to defending the Babangida
transition suddenly accepted that governments establishment of the two party was not in order,
after defending the action in the same book. They accepted that the idea of a two party system
was part of the Political Bureau report, but insisted that “the idea behind the Bureau
recommendation was that an environment should be deliberately created and fostered for the
two parties to emerge” (p.252). They argued further that:

The point of interest was that contrary to the conception of the Political Bureau, the
administration decreed into existence, the NRC and the SDP. It is common knowledge
that since their inception, the two parties had tremendous difficulty of being fully
organized and rooted among the electorate…. It is highly arguable that if the two-party
system had originated in the manner envisaged by the Political Bureau the problems
associated with its growth and development would, most probably, have been different
and lightened (p.252).

It is against this backdrop that the SDP and NRC operated. The SDP which was supposed
to be a little bit to the left, had in its fold both progressive and conservative elements of the
Nigerian political class. The party was more entrenched in the Southern part of Nigeria than in
the Northern part. In the National Assembly Elections conducted in 1992, the party won 52
seats in the Senate, while the NRC won 37 and 314 Seats in the Federal House of
Representatives, leaving the NRC with 275. No doubt the party had more following than the
NRC. Its Presidential flag bearer, Chief M.K.O. Abiola won the 1993 presidential election which
Gen Babangida annulled in his self-succession plot. The party was disbanded by Gen Abacha
when he sacked the Chief Ernest Shonekan Illegal Interim National Government (ING)
contraption in November 1993.

The NRC on the other hand, was supposed to be a left bit to the right, and was really
dominated by conservative politicians. It was more dominant in the Northern part of Nigeria
than the SDP, though it also controlled some core Southern states. Its refusal to accept the
outcome of the 1993 presidential election and ready acceptance of the annulment played into
the hands of General Babangida. Perhaps if the NRC had accepted defeat in that election which
was adjudged as the best ever then by both local and foreign observers the annulment may
have been reversed and the history of Nigeria may have been much different from what it is
today.

Gen Abacha who sacked the Interim National Government on the pretense that Chief
Shonekan resigned, immediately dismantled all democratic structures of the Babangida era and
introduced his own transition programme. His transition politics produced five political parties.
They were the United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP), the Congress for National Consensus

15
(CNC), the Democratic Party of Nigeria (DPN), the Grassroot Democratic Movement (GDM) and
the National Centre party of Nigeria (NCPN).

Interestingly all these five parties, chose Gen Abacha as their sole candidate for the
presidential elections, and history was almost been made in the issue of self-succession when
the General died suddenly and his transition programe was aborted by General Abdusalami
Abubakar who took over the reigns of government. General Abubakar's transition programme
has remained the shortest and most purposeful transition in Nigeria's history. The General’s
short transition programme started with a constitutional review, the setting up of the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and registration of political .INEC registered
three parties. They are the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the All Peoples Party (APP),and the
Alliance for Democracy (AD)

The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) according to Omoruyi (2001) arose from four
sources. The first were politicians who were denied registration by General Sani Abacha during
his transition programme. These people who were referred to as the G.34 committee due to the
fact that 34 of them wrote a petition to Gen. Abacha against his self-secession plot. Core
members of this group were Chief Solomon Lar and Dr. Alex Ekwueme.

The second group were former members of the NPN that were not opposed to Abacha's
self-succession bid but were also not part of the plot. They were led by Chief Sunday Awoniyi.
The third group were followers of the late General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua under the umbrella of
the Peoples Democratic Movement (PDM). The leaders of this group were Chief Anthony
Anenih and Alhaji Atiku Abubakar. The last group were those that called themselves Social
Democrats with the name Social Progressive Party (SPP).

The All Peoples Party according to Omoruyi (2001), arose from the self-succession outfit
of General Abacha. Many of the founders of the party had served Abacha as Ministers and
Aides. This was why some people referred to the party as Abacha Peoples Party.

On the other hand, the Alliance for Democracy (AD) was mainly a Yoruba party
committed to producing a Yoruba presidential candidate in 1999. Though the party did not meet
the set criteria for registration, the law had to be amended to register it in order not to exclude
the Yoruba who were already angered by the annulment from the transition programme. It
would be recalled that nine parties contested the 1998 local government elections on the
agreement that only political parties that scored up to 10% of the total votes cast would be
registered after the elections.

These three parties contested the Presidential, Gubernatorial, Senate, House of

Representatives and State House of Assembly elections. At the end of the elections, the PDP
came out as the dominant party in Nigeria. Apart from winning the Presidency, it also won 21 of
the 36 states Governorship elections, 63 of the 109 Senate seats, 209 of the 309 House of
Representative seats, 464 Local Government chairmanship seats, 4856 councilorship seats as
well as 527 state House Assembly seats. The PDP remained dominant as it continued to beat

16
other parties in the 2003, 2007, 2011 elections, although there were loud accusations of large
scale rigging against the party. Its dominance was however cut short in the 2015 general
elections when it was defeated by the All Progressive Congress (APC), not just in the Presidential
election, but in other elections to the extent that the APC now have more Senatorial, House of
Representatives, Gubernatorial, and Houses of Assembly seats. The PDP that once touted itself
as the largest party in Africa that would rule Nigeria for an unbroken 6o years is now the main
opposition party in Nigeria.

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Nnoli, O. (2011). The struggle for democracy in Nigeria. Enugu: Pan African Centre for Research
on Peace and Conflict Resolution (PARCEP).

Obikeze, O.S. and Obi, E.A. (2003). Government and politics of Nigeria: The struggle for power
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Obikeze S. O., Obi, E.A. & Iwuoha V. C. (2016). Government and politics of Nigeria: The struggle
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Ojiako, J.O. (1981) Nigeria: Yesterday, today and?. Onitsha: African educational Publishers Ltd.

Olagunju, T. Jinadu, A. & Oyovbaire, S. (1993). Transition to democracy in Nigeria (1985-1993).

Ibadan: Safari Books (Exports) Ltd. and Spectrum Books Ltd.

Olagunju, T. (1992). The party system and the creation of two political parties. In U. Okon (Ed.)
Contemporary Nigeria: Essays in society, politics and economy. Buenos Aires: Artes
grafitials Editoriales Publiciterias EDIPUBLISA

Omoruyi, O. (2001). Parties and politics in Nigeria. Paper presented at the 44th annual meeting
of the African Studies Association, Houston, Texas.

Onuoha, B. & Fadakinte, M.M. (2002). Introduction. In B. Onuoha & M.M. Fadakinte (Eds.).
Transition politics in Nigeria 1970-1999. Lagos: Malthouse Press Ltd.

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Yaqub, N. (2002). Political parties and the transition process. In B.Onuoha & M.M.
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*** Obi, E.A. (2017) Electoral commissions and the integrity question in Nigeria :The first,
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Democracy, party systems and election administration in Nigeria. Onitsha
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