CUSTODIO vs.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996

DOCTRINE:
The mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a
right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage
without wrong, does not constitute a cause of action, since damages are
merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or
wrong.

Damnum absque injuria – There is a material distinction between damages

and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the
recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there
can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm
was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.

Article 21 – Article 21 of the New Civil Code provides the basis for the
principle of abuse of rights. For there to be an abuse of rights, the following
requisites must concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful and; (3) There
was damage or injury to the plaintiff.

FACTS:
Private Respondent Mabasa wanted to establish an easement of right of way
going into their property against petitioners who built an adobe wall in their
properties which thereby restricted access to the Mabasa property.
Petitioners claim that they built the wall in order to protect their persons and
their property from their intrusive neighbors. The Trial Court nonetheless
ordered that an easement be created.

Not satisfied, Mabasa went to the Court of Appeals which modified the
decision of the trial court by awarding actual damages (p65,000.00), moral
damages (p30,000.00) and exemplary damages (p10,000.00). Hence this
petition. Damages were based on the fact of loss in the form of unrealized
rentals on the property due to the adobe wall restricting access.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in awarding damages.

HELD:
Yes. The Court of Appeals erred, the award for damages has no legal basis.
The mere fact of loss does not give rise to a right to recover damages. There
must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by defendant and a
damage to the plaintiff resulting therefrom. Damages are merely a part of
the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.

An injury is an illegal invasion of a legal right, any loss, hurt and harm
resulting from the injury is damage. Damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. In this case, the petitioners
merely constructed an adobe wall which was in keeping with and is a valid
exercise of their rights as the owner of their respective properties—i.e. there
was no abuse of right as provided for in Article 21 of the New Civil Code and
where the following requisites must concur: (1) defendant acted in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be
willful and; (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff. None of these
requisites was present in this case.

The loss was therefore not a result of a violation of a legal duty. Instances
where the damage was not a result of an injury is called damnum absque
injuria and the plaintiff is not normally given an award for damages.

In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing
damage, that act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be
damnum et injuria.

People of the Philippines vs. Gambao

Facts:
The accused appellants had kidnapped Lucia Chan and deprived her of her liberty against her will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a
demand for ransom was made as a condition for her release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P400,000.00). The
surveillance team of in Pasay City, however was able to apprehend four suspects in “Chowking” Buendia where the ransom money was agreed to
be delivered. The other remaining suspects where apprehended in a house in Pansol, Calamba Laguna.

During the arraignment, the accused-appellant plead guilty of the crime of Kidnap for Ransom. The trial court imposed on them the penalty of
death. The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court with modifications. It appearing that accused appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON
was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The accused filed an appeal.

Issue:

Whether or not the duties of the Court when an accused pleads guilty had been observed.
Whether or not there were enough evidence to prove accused-appellants guilt
Whether or not the court erred in imposing the penalty of death..

Held:
The duties of the trial court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense are:
(1) to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2) to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability, and
(3) to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires

Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a "searching inquiry," the court has held the following
guidelines: Ascertain from the accused himself

(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;

(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused
has been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of
the judge’s intimidating Robes.

It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules have not been fully complied with. The questions propounded by the trial court judge
failed to ensure that accused appellants fully understood the consequences of their plea. In fact, it is readily apparent from the records43 that
Karim had the mistaken assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the imposable penalty and that both the judge and his counsel failed to
explain to him that such plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea
is the sole basis of judgment. If the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, as it did in this case, the
conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the guilty plea but on evidence proving the commission of the offense
charged. The manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not, loses legal significance where the conviction can be
based on independent evidence proving the commission of the crime by the accused.46

Contrary to accused appellants’ assertions, they were convicted by the trial court, not on the basis of their plea of guilty, but on the strength of the
evidence adduced by the prosecution, which was properly appreciated by the trial court.The prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the
accused-appellants and their degrees of culpability beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs that conspiracy, insofar as they were concerned, was not
convincingly established

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide
to commit it. It has been a long standing opinion of this Court that proof of the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence, as the same may be
inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among
them with respect to the commission of the offense. The testimonies, when taken together, reveal the common purpose of the accused appellants
and how they were all united in its execution from beginning to end. There were testimonies proving that (1) before the incident, two of the
accused appellants kept coming back to the victim’s house; (2) during the kidnapping, accused appellants changed shifts in guarding the victim;
and (3) the accused appellants were those present when the ransom money was recovered and when the rescue operation was conducted.

Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad was established
beyond reasonable doubt based on the proffered evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators..

Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and considering the evidence presented by the prosecution, linking
accused appellants’ participation in the crime, no doubt can be entertained as to their guilt. The CA convicted the accused appellants of
kidnapping for ransom and imposed upon them the supreme penalty of death, applying the provisions of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
Likewise, this Court finds Accused appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals to the crime of kidnapping for ransom. However,
pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,64 we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court and reduce the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility
for parole.

Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of Perpenian. Pursuant to the passing of R.A. No. 9344,65 a determination of
whether she acted with or without discernment is necessary. Considering that Perpenian acted with discernment when she was 17 years old at the
time of the commission of the offense, her minority should be appreciated not as an exempting circumstance, but as a privileged mitigating
circumstance pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.

Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344,66 the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with the law shall still be applied even if he/she is already
eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her Guilt.

Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit from the aforesaid provision, because under Article 40 of R.A. No.
9344,67 the suspension of sentence can be availed of only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty one (21)
years. This leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce judgment. Perpenian is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in
the crime of kidnapping for ransom.

The Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1)
day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.

This Court, however, finds such arrangement no longer necessary in view of the fact that Perpenian’s actual served term has already exceeded the
imposable penalty for her offense. For such reason, she may be immediately released from detention.

GATCHALIAN VS. DELIM

FACTS:
• July 11,1973: Reynalda Gatchalian
boarded Thames" mini bus at Aringay, La
Union bound for Bauang, of the same province. The
bus bumped a cement flower pot on the side of the
road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a
ditch.
• Gatchalian got injured with physical injuries on
the leg, arm and forehead
• Mrs. Adela Delim visited the passenger and later
paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses.
She also gave transportation expense of P12 in
going home from the hospital and they were made to
sign a Joint Affidavit stating that they are no longer
interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against
the said driver and owner of the said Thames.
• Gatchalian filed in the CFI an action extra
contractu to recover compensatory and moral
damages stating that the mishap had left her with a
 conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2 inches on
the forehead, generating mental suffering and an
inferiority complex on her part
• as a result, she had to retire in seclusion
and stay away from her friends
• scar diminished her facial beauty and
deprived her of opportunities for employment
• Delim averred that it was a fortuitous event
• CFI: dismissed because of the Joint Affidavit
• CA: affirmed
ISSUE: W/N Gatchalian is entitled to damages

HELD: YES. CA, CFI REVERSED and SET ASIDE 1) P15,000

actual or compensatory damages to cover the cost of
plastic surgery for the removal of the scar on petitioner's
forehead; 2) P30,000 moral damages; and 3) P1,000
attorney's fees, the aggregate amount to bear interest at
the legal rate of 6% per annum counting from the
promulgation of this decision until full payment thereof

• A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the

first place be couched in clear and unequivocal terms
which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person
to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to
him.
• while reading the same, she experienced
dizziness but that, seeing the other passengers
who had also suffered injuries sign the
document, she too signed without bothering to
read the Joint Affidavit in its entirety.
Considering these circumstances there appears
substantial doubt whether petitioner understood
fully the import of the Joint Affidavit
• To uphold a supposed waiver of any right to
claim damages by an injured passenger, under
circumstances like those exhibited in this case,
would be to dilute and weaken the standard of
extraordinary diligence exacted by the law from
common carriers and hence to render that
standard unenforceable.
• To exempt a common carrier from liability
for death or physical injuries to passengers upon
the ground of force majeure, the carrier must
clearly show not only that the efficient cause of
the casualty was entirely independent of the
human will, but also that it was impossible to
avoid.
• The driver did not stop to check if anything
had gone wrong with the bus after the snapping
sound
• Court of Appeals, however, found that at the
time of the accident, she was no longer
employed in a public school since, being a casual
employee and not a Civil Service eligible, she
had been laid off. Her employment as a
substitute teacher was occasional and episodic,
contingent upon the availability of vacancies for
substitute teachers.
• A person is entitled to the physical integrity
of his or her body; if that integrity is violated or
diminished, actual injury is suffered for which
actual or compensatory damages are due and
assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be
placed as nearly as possible in the condition that
she was before the mishap. A scar, especially
one on the face of the woman, resulting from
the infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of
 bodily integrity, giving raise to a legitimate claim
for restoration to her conditio ante. If the scar is
relatively small and does not grievously disfigure
the victim, the cost of surgery may be expected
to be correspondingly modest.
• In view of the testimony, and the fact that a
considerable amount of time has lapsed since
the mishap in 1973 which may be expected to
increase not only the cost but also very probably
the difficulty of removing the scar, we consider
that the amount of P15,000.00 to cover the cost
of such plastic surgery is not unreasonable
• moral damages may be awarded where
gross negligence on the part of the common
carrier

PNOC vs. CA

FACTS:

• September 21, 1977 early morning: M/V Maria

Efigenia XV, owned by Maria Efigenia Fishing
Corporation on its way to Navotas, Metro
Manila collided with the vessel Petroparcel owned by
the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC)
• Board of Marine Inquiry, Philippine Coast Guard
Commandant Simeon N. Alejandro found Petroparcel
to be at fault
• Maria Efigenia sued the LSC and the Petroparcel
captain, Edgardo Doruelo praying for an award of
P692,680.00 representing the value of the fishing
nets, boat equipment and cargoes of M/V Maria
Efigenia XV with interest at the legal rate plus 25%
 as attorney’s fees and later on amended to add
the lost value of the hull less the P200K insurance
and unrealized profits and lost business
opportunities
• During the pendency of the case, PNOC Shipping
and Transport Corporation sought to be substituted
in place of LSC as it acquired Petroparcel
• Lower Court: against PNOC ordering it to
pay P6,438,048 value of the fishing boat with
interest plus P50K attorney's fees and cost of suit
• CA: affirmed in toto
ISSUE: W/N the damage was adequately proven

HELD: YES. affirming with modification actual damages of

P6,438,048.00 for lack of evidentiary bases therefor. P2M
nominal damages instead.

• in connection with evidence which may appear

to be of doubtful relevancy or incompetency or
admissibility, it is the safest policy to be liberal, not
rejecting them on doubtful or technical grounds, but
admitting them unless plainly irrelevant, immaterial
or incompetent, for the reason that their rejection
places them beyond the consideration of the court.
• If they are thereafter found relevant or
competent, can easily be remedied by
completely discarding or ignoring them
• two kinds of actual or compensatory damages:
• loss of what a person already possesses
(daño emergente)
• failure to receive as a benefit that which
would have pertained to him
• in the case of profit-earning chattels, what has
to be assessed is the value of the chattel to its owner
as a going concern at the time and place of the loss,
and this means, at least in the case of ships, that
regard must be had to existing and pending
engagements
• If the market value of the ship reflects the fact
that it is in any case virtually certain of profitable
employment, then nothing can be added to that
value in respect of charters actually lost, for to do so
would be pro tanto to compensate the plaintiff twice
over.
• if the ship is valued without reference to its
actual future engagements and only in the light of its
profit-earning potentiality, then it may be necessary
to add to the value thus assessed the anticipated
profit on a charter or other engagement which it was
unable to fulfill.
• damages cannot be presumed and courts, in
making an award must point out specific facts that
could afford a basis for measuring whatever
compensatory or actual damages are borne
• proven through sole testimony of general
manager without objection from LSC
• Admissibility of evidence refers to the question
of whether or not the circumstance (or evidence) is
to considered at all. On the other hand, the probative
value of evidence refers to the question of whether
or not it proves an issue
• Hearsay evidence whether objected to or
not has no probative value.
• In the absence of competent proof on the actual
damage suffered, private respondent is `entitled to
nominal damages which, as the law says, is
 adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff,
which has been violated or invaded by defendant,
may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered
• awarded in every obligation arising from
law, contracts, quasi-contracts, acts or
omissions punished by law, and quasi-delicts, or
in every case where property right has been
invaded.
• damages in name only and not in fact
• amount to be awarded as nominal damages
shall be equal or at least commensurate to the
injury sustained by private respondent
considering the concept and purpose of such
damages
• Ordinarily, the receipt of insurance payments
should diminish the total value of the vessel quoted
by private respondent in his complaint considering
that such payment is causally related to the loss for
which it claimed compensation.
• Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to
its increased claim for damages under the amended
complaint should not be considered as having
curtailed the lower court’s jurisdiction since
the unpaid docket fee should be considered as a lien
on the judgment
CANDANO SHIPPING LINES,
INC., petitioner, vs. FLORENTINA
J. SUGATA-ON, respondent.
Posted: March 24, 2017 in Uncategorized
0
CANDANO SHIPPING LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. FLORENTINA J.
SUGATA-ON, respondent.
G.R. No. 163212. March 13, 2007
FACTS:
On March 27, 1996, M/V David Jr., owned by Candano Shipping Lines, sank
together with its cargo in Surigao del Sur. Melquiades Sugata-on employed
by Candano Shipping Lines as third marine engineer in the cargo vessel was
one of those missing.
Florentina Sugata-on (respondent and widow of Melquiades Sugata-on),
went to the office of Candano Shipping in Manila to claim the death benefits
of her husband but it refused to pay. Thus, Florentina filed an action before
the RTC of Manila. She prayed that actual, moral, and exemplary damages
including attorney’s fees, be awarded in her favor in view of the provision of
Art. 1711 NCC.
The RTC decided in favor of Florentina. Candano Shipping filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied.
It then elevated the RTC decision to the CA which affirmed with modification
the judgment of RTC. The award for actual damages was reduced from
P998,400 to P608,400, while the awards for moral and exemplary damages
including attorney’s fees were deleted for lack of sufficient basis for their
allowance.
In arriving at the sum of P608,400, the CA applied the standard prescribed
by Art. 194 of the Labor Code. It likewise denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of Candano Shipping in a resolution issued on April 1, 2004.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
WON the formula for fixing the amount of death compensation in Art. 194 of
the Labor Code applies in determining the compensation claimed by the heir
of the deceased employee against the employer under Art. 1711 of the civil
code

HELD:
Yes. Petition is denied. CA is affirmed.
The remedy availed by Florentina in filing the claim under the New Civil Code
has been validly recognized by the prevailing jurisprudence. Floresca v.
Philex Mining Company declared that the employees may invoke either the
Workmen’s Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to
the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the other and
that the acceptance of the compensation under the remedy chosen will
exclude the other remedy except on the basis of supervening facts or
developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy. This doctrinal
rule is rooted on theory that the basis of compensation under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act is separate and distinct from the award of damages under
the Civil Code.
In this case, Florentina instituted a civil suit for indemnity under the New
Civil Code. The employer shall be liable for the death of personal injury of its
employees in the course of employment as sanctioned by Art. 1711 of the
Civil Code. The liability of the employer for death or personal injury of his
employees arose from the contract of employment entered into between the
employer and his employee which is likely imbued with public interest.
Accordingly, when the employee died or was injured in the occasion of
employment, the obligation of the employer automatically attaches. The
indemnity may partake in the form of actual, moral, nominal, temperate,
liquidated or exemplary damages, as the case may be.
The provisions on damages of the New Civil Code must be transformed into
a more tangible and practical mathematical form, so that the purpose of the
law to indemnify the employee or his heirs for his death or injury occasioned
by his employment under article 1711 may be realized. In regard to this, the
formula for loss of earning capacity enunciated in the case of Villa Rey v.
Court of Appeals, in computing the amount of actual damages to be awarded
to the claimant under article 1711 of the New Civil Code is adopted in this
case.

DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is

DENIED and the Decision dated 23 May 2003 as well as the Resolution dated
1 April 2004, rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 70410, are
hereby PARTIALLY AFFIRMED in so far as it finds petitioner liable to
respondent for damages.
Pursuant to the appropriate provisions of the New Civil Code and the
prevailing jurisprudence on the matter, petitioner Candano Shipping Lines,
Inc., is ORDERED to pay the amount of P748,800.00, as actual damages,
plus 10% of the amount awarded as attorney’s fee plus cost of the suit.

Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals

Posted: March 23, 2017 in case digests, torts, Uncategorized
Tags: case digests, torts, Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals
0
Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals
By: Karen P. Lustica

FACTS:
Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana Zalamea,
purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of respondent
TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight from New York to Los Angeles on
June 6, 1984. The tickets of the spouses were
purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full fare
ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.
While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the spouses Zalamea and their
daughter received a notice of reconfirmation of their reservations for said
flight. On the appointed date, however, the spouses Zalamea and their
daughter checked in at 10:00 am, an hour earlier than the scheduled flight
at 11:00 am but were placed on the wait-list because the number of
passengers who checked in before tem had already taken all the seats
available on the flight.
Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names were eventually
allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including Cesar Zalamea. The two
others, on the other hand, being ranked lower than 22, were not able to fly.
As it were, those holding full-fare ticket were given first priority among the
wait-listed passengers. Mr. Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of
his daughter, was allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter,
who presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. Even in the
next TWA flight to Los Angeles, Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter, could not be
accommodated because it was full booked. Thus, they were constrained to
book in another flight and purchased two tickets from American Airlines.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea filed an action for
damages based on breach of contract of air carriage before the RTC of
Makati which rendered a decision in their favor ordering the TWA to pay the
price of the tickets bought from American Airlines together with moral
damages and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the CA held that moral damages
are recoverable in a damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of
carriage only where there is fraud or bad faith. It further stated that since it
is a matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and accepted
practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically allowed under the
Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil Aeronautics Board, neither fraud nor
bad faith could be imputed on TWA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA erred in accepting the finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations and in holding
that there was no fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA ?

HELD:
The CA was in error. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA when it
did not allow Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter to board their flight for Los
Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets. The US law or regulation allegedly
authorizing overbooking has never been proved.
The evidence shows that petitioners Suthira and Liana were constrained to
take the American Airlines flight to Los Angeles not because they “opted not
to use their TWA tickets on another TWA flight” but because respondent TWA
could not accommodate them either on the next TWA flight which was also
fully booked. 14 The purchase of the American Airlines tickets by petitioners
Suthira and Liana was the consequence of respondent TWA’s unjustifiable
breach of its contracts of carriage with petitioners.
The Court held that in accordance with Article 2201, the TWA should be
responsible for all damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-
performance of the obligation.
In the previously cited case of Alitalia Airways v. Court of Appeals, 15 this
Court explicitly held that a passenger is entitled to be reimbursed for the
cost of the tickets he had to buy for a flight to another airline. Thus, instead
of simply being refunded for the cost of the unused TWA tickets, petitioners
should be awarded the actual cost of their flight from New York to Los
Angeles. On this score, we differ from the trial court’s ruling which ordered
not only the reimbursement of the American Airlines tickets but also the
refund of the unused TWA tickets. To require both prestations would have
enabled petitioners to fly from New York to Los Angeles without any fare
being paid.
1.) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
Written law may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officers having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy
and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has custody. The
certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation, consul-
general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Phil. stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office. Here, TWA relied
solely on the testimony of its customer service agent in her deposition that
the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautic Board allows
overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code
was presented as evidence. Thus, the CA’s finding that overbooking is
specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in
fact.
“That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline when it
did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles in spite of
confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or regulation allegedly
authorizing overbooking has never been proved. Foreign laws do not prove
themselves nor can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other
fact, they must be alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the
legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a
certificate that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a
secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn Lather, its
customer service agent, in her deposition dated January 27, 1986 that the
Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautics Board allows
overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said code
was presented as evidence. Thus, respondent court’s finding that
overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal Regulations
has no basis in fact.”

“Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist, the same is
not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the principle of lex loci
contractus which require that the law of the place where the airline ticket
was issued should be applied by the court where the passengers are
residents and nationals of the forum and the ticket is issued in such State by
the defendant airline. Since the tickets were sold and issued in the
Philippines, the applicable law in this case would be Philippine law