Missing: Quo Warranto case of Aguinaldo v Aquino

Expropriation cases
1. Landbank v Abecina
2. NPC v Asoque
3. NPC v Poseda
4. Mercado v Landbank
(habol ko maya. Hehe)

G.R. No. 197665

P/S INSP. SAMSON B. BELMONTE, SPO1 FERMO R. GALLARDE, PO3 LLOYD F. SORIA, PO1
HOMER D. GENEROSO, PO1 SERGS DC. MACEREN, PO3 AVELINO L. GRAVADOR, PO2 FIDEL O.
GUEREJERO, and PO1 JEROME T. NOCHEFRANCA, JR., Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN FOR THE MILITARY AND OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICES, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondent.

Facts:
A case was filed by Sara Uy Matiao against petitioners who are members of the Regional Traffic Management
Office-7. Sandra alleged that petitioners flagged down her vehicle because the LTO sticker was not displayed on its
windshield. Consequently, petitioners proceeded to seize and impound the subject vehicle without any warrant or
existing complaint for theft. Petitioner Belmonte told Sandra to just settle the problem for three hundred thousand
pesos.
She received a phone call from petitioner Belmonte threatening to file criminal charges against her for violations of
Anti-Carnapping Act and Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1612. Despite such threat, Sandra filed a civil case against
petitioners for Recovery of Personal Property with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Replevin before the RTC of
Cebu City.

Sandra filed the subject Administrative Complaint for Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority against petitioners.
The Office of the Ombudsman issued the assailed Decision finding petitioners guilty of Grave Misconduct.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the Ombudsman’s decision.

Before the Ombudsman could resolve the said motion, however, petitioners elevated the matter to the Court by filing
the instant Petition for Prohibition.

Issue:

Whether or not the Petition for Prohibition is the appropriate remedy.

Ruling

No. The petition for prohibition filed by petitioners is inappropriate. For a party to be entitled to a writ of
prohibition, he must establish the following requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board
or person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal, corporation, board or person has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

A cursory reading of the records of the case readily reveals the absence of the second and third requisites.

Petitioners, in this case, must prove that public respondent committed not merely reversible error, but grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave.

Petitioners filed the instant action when they clearly had some other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The remedy of a motion for reconsideration was still available to petitioners.
G.R. No. 183173

THE CHAIRMAN and EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE

DEVELOPMENT, and THE PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT,
Petitioners
vs.
EJERCITO LIM DOING BUSINESS AS BONANZA AIR SERVICES, AS REPRESENTED BY
HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, CAPT. ERNESTO LIM, Respondent

Facts:

Petitioners were the public officials tasked with the duty of executing and implementing A.O. No. 00-05
and the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order, while the PCSD was the government agency
responsible for policy direction of the Strategic Environment Plan for Palawan. Respondent was the
operator of transporting live fish from Palawan to fish traders.

PCSD issued an order that the transport of live fish from Palawan would be allowed only through traders
and carriers who had sought and secured accreditation from the PCSD. Air Transportation Office (ATO)
sent to the PCSD its communication to the effect that A TO-authorized carriers were considered common
carriers, and, as such, should be exempt from the PCSD accreditation requirement.

Respondent asserted that he had continued his trade without securing the PCSD-required accreditation.
The PCSD Chairman had nonetheless maintained that the respondent's business was not a common
carrier, and should comply with the requirement for PCSD accreditation.

In disregard of the prohibition, the respondent continued his business operation in Palawan until a
customer showed him the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order issued by the PCSD

According to the respondent, he had not received the Notice of Violation and Show Cause Order. The
respondent filed a petition for prohibition in the CA and the CA promulgated its assailed decision in favor
of the . Hence, this appeal by the petitioners.

Issue:
Whether or not the Petition for Prohibition is the proper remedy.

Ruling:

No. The petition for prohibition should have been originally brought in the proper Regional Trial Court as
a petition for declaratory relief. A petition for prohibition is not the proper remedy to assail an
administrative order issued in the exercise of a quasilegislative function.
EN BANC

G.R. No. 207132, December 06, 2016

ASSOCIATION OF MEDICAL CLINICS FOR OVERSEAS WORKERS, INC., (AMCOW), REPRESENTED

HEREIN BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. ROLANDO VILLOTE, Petitioner, v. GCC APPROVED MEDICAL
CENTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. AND CHRISTIAN CANGCO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 207205

HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH, Petitioner, v. GCC APPROVED MEDICAL CENTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. AND CHRISTIAN E.
CANGCO, Respondents.

Facts:

Facts:

On August 13, 2010, the Implementing Rules and Regulations13 (IRR) of RA No. 8042, as amended by RA No.
10022, took effect.

Pursuant to Section 16 of RA No. 10022, the DOH, through its August 23,2010 letter-order, 14 directed GAMCA to
cease and desist from implementing the referral decking system and to wrap up their operations within three (3) days
from receipt thereof. GAMCA received its copy of the August 23, 2010 letter-order on August 25, 2010.

Issue: Whether the Regional Trial Court legally erred in giving due course to the petition for certiorari and
prohibition against the DOH CDO letters

Ruling: The RTC legally erred when it gave due course to GAMCA's petition for certiorari and prohibition. The
petition for certiorari and prohibition against the DOH Letter was filed before the wrong court. The effect of the
prohibition against the referral decking system is beyond the authority of this Court to consider. The wisdom of this
prohibition has been decided by Congress, through the enactment of RA No. 10022.
G.R. No. 211140

LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN1 B. BARUA-YAP AND
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Respondents.

Facts:

Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Velasco principally
alleges that he is the legal and rightful winner during the May 13, 2013 elections in accordance with final
and executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) because of the COMELEC
resolution that Reyes COC is null and void thus he must be proclaimed to be the winner of the
congressional district of Marinduque

The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory
Decisions and Resolution of this Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of office to
Velasco and entering the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue:

Whether or not a writ of mandamus is correctly filed by the petitioner

Ruling:

Yes. The petition was correctly filed. For a petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the
subject of the petition for mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the
board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the grant
thereof. In this case Velasco is the rightful Representative of the Lone District of the Province of Marinduque;
hence, entitled to a writ of Mandamus.
G.R. Nos. L-51065-72

ARTURO A. MEJORADA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts:

Neptali Franco and Melinda Ocampo former chairpersons of the ERB former members of the ERB, retired
under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 172. Under Section 1 of E.O. No. 172, the Chairman and Members of
ERB were entitled to retirement benefits and privileges equal to those received by the Chairman and
Members of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).

On June 8, 2001, R.A. No. 9136 was passed to reform and restructure the electric power industry and
privatize the National Power Corporation (NPC). It abolished the ERB and created the ERC as an
independent regulatory body. Section 39 of R.A. No. 9136 thereof provides for the retirement benefits of
the Chairman and Members of the ERC. Under the law, The Chairman and the members of the
Commission shall, upon completion of their term or upon becoming eligible for retirement under existing
laws, be entitled to the same retirement benefits and the privileges provided for the Presiding Justice and
Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, respectively.

Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus before the CA wherein they sought to compel the ERC and the
DBM to adjust their monthly pensions. The petitioners argued-that, as retired members of the ERB, they
are entitled to the retirement benefits provided in Section 39 of R.A. No. 9136.

CA decision clearly ruled that the petitioners' retirement benefits should be based on the salaries of the
current COMELEC Chairman and Members, and not on the salaries of the current ERC Chairman
and members

Issue:

Whether or not mandamus is the appropriate remedy

Ruling:

Mandamus does not lie since the petitioners failed to invoke a law specifically enjoining the
performance of the act demanded. The remedy of mandamus, then, is available only to compel the
performance of a ministerial duty.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 185082, November 28, 2016

MANDAUE REALTY & RESOURCES CORPORATION AND MANDAUE CITY REGISTER OF

DEEDS, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Respondents.

Facts:

BSP filed a Complaint for Annulment of Title/Reconveyance/Reinstatement of Title against MARRECO.

MARRECO filed a Motion to Dismiss. RTC issued an order dismissing BSP’s Complaint on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.
BSP timely appealed the aforesaid Order by filing a Notice of Appeal and its Appellant's Brief.
MARRECO, instead of filing an Appellee's Brief: filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal. The CA denied the
Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that the issues raised in the appellant's brief involved mixed
questions of fact and law. MARRECO then filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The CA denied
MARRECO's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus. MARRECO
prays that a writ of mandamus be issued directing the CA to dismiss BSP's appeal and a writ of certiorari
be issued annulling resolutions of the CA. It adds that the CA has no jurisdiction to decide appeals where
only questions of law are involved because such jurisdiction belongs to the Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Petition for mandamus is meritorious
Ruling:
No. Mandamus is a command issuing from a court of law of competent jurisdiction requiring the
performance of a particular duty therein specified which duty results from the official station of the party to
whom the writ is directed or from operation of law. In this case, The CA did not act with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied MARRECO's Motion to Dismiss
Appeal and assumed jurisdiction over BSP's Appeal.
G.R. No. 211140

LORD ALLAN JAY Q. VELASCO, Petitioner,

vs.
HON. SPEAKER FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY GENERAL MARILYN1 B. BARUA-YAP AND
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Respondents.

Facts:

Before this Court is a Petition for Mandamus filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, by
Lord Allan Jay Q. Velasco (Velasco) against Hon. Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. (Speaker Belmonte,
Jr.), Speaker, House of Representatives, Hon. Marilyn B. Barua-Yap (Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap ), Secretary
General, House of Representatives, and Hon. Regina Ongsiako Reyes (Reyes), Representative, Lone
District of the Province of Marinduque .

Velasco principally alleges that he is the legal and rightful winner during the May 13, 2013 elections in
accordance with final and executory resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) because of
the COMELEC resolution that Reyes COC is null and void thus he must be proclaimed to be the winner of
the congressional district of Marinduque

The present Petition for Mandamus seeks the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel respondents
Speaker Belmonte, Jr. and Sec. Gen. Barua-Yap to acknowledge and recognize the final and executory
Decisions and Resolution of this Court and of the COMELEC by administering the oath of office to
Velasco and entering the latter's name in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives.

Issue:

Whether or not quo warranty is the proper remedy

Ruling:

No. The Supreme court ruled that the case is really one for mandamus and not a quo warranto. A petition
for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to the use or exercise of a franchise or
office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his
right to enjoy the privilege. In this case, what is prayed for herein is merely the enforcement of clear legal
duties and not to try disputed title. That the respondents make it appear so will not convert this petition to
one for quo warranto.
G.R. No. 224302

HON. PHILIP A. AGUINALDO, HON. REYNALDO A. ALHAMBRA, HON. DANILO S. CRUZ, HON. BENJAMIN T.
POZON, HON. SALVADOR V. TIMBANG, JR., and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP),
Petitioners
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, HON. MICHAEL FREDERICK L. MUSNGI, HON. MA. GERALDINE FAITH A. ECONG, HON. DANILO
S. SANDOVAL, HON. WILHELMINA B. JORGE-WAGAN, HON. ROSANA FE ROMERO-MAGLAYA, HON.
MERIANTHE PACITA M. ZURAEK, HON. ELMO M. ALAMEDA, and HON. VICTORIA C. FERNANDEZ-
BERNARDO, Respondents
EN BANC

G.R. No. 210588, November 29, 2016

SECRETARY OF FINANCE CESAR B. PURISIMA AND COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE KIM S.

JACINTO--HENARES, Petitioners, v. REPRESENTATIVE CARMELO F. LAZATIN AND ECOZONE PLASTIC
ENTERPRISES CORPORATION, Respondents.

Facts:
Petitioner Secretary of Finance Cesar V. Purisima upon the recommendation of petitioner Commissioner
of Internal Revenue (CIR) Kim S. Jacinto-Henares signed RR 2-2012 R requires the payment of value-
added tax (VAT) and excise tax on the importation of all petroleum and petroleum products coming
directly from abroad and brought into the Philippines, including Freeport and economic zones (FEZs)

Carmelo F. Lazatin, in his capacity as Pampanga First District Representative, filed a petition for
prohibition and injunction6 against the petitioners to annul and set aside RR 2-2012.

Lazatin posits that Republic Act No. (RA) 9400 treats the Clark Special Economic Zone and Clark
Freeport Zone (together hereinafter referred to as Clark FEZ) as a separate customs territory and allows
tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment into the zone. Thus, the imposition
of VAT and excise tax, even on the importation of petroleum products into FEZs (like Clark FEZ), directly
contravenes the law.

RTC initially issued a temporary restraining order to stay the implementation of RR 2-2012. It eventually
issued a writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners questioned the issuance of the writ. They filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) assailing the RTC's order. The CA granted the
petition and denied the respondents' subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether respondents Lazatin and EPEC have legal standing to bring the action of declaratory relief

Ruling:

Respondents have legal standing to file petition for declaratory relief. The party seeking declaratory relief
must have a legal interest in the controversy for the action to prosper. This interest must be material not
merely incidental. It must be an interest that which will be affected by the challenged decree, law or
regulation. It must be a present substantial interest, as opposed to a mere expectancy or a future,
contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest.
Lazatin has legal standing as a legislator. Lazatin filed the petition for declaratory relief before the RTC in
his capacity as a member of Congress. Members of Congress possess the legal standing to question acts
that amount to a usurpation of the legislative power of Congress.

EPEC has legal standing as a Clark FEZ locator. As an enterprise located in the Clark FEZ, its
importations of petroleum and petroleum products will be directly affected by RR 2-2012. Thus, its interest
in the subject matter — a personal and substantial one — gives it legal standing to question the
issuance's validity.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 225141, September 26, 2016

ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Petitioner, v. HON. GREGORIO L. VEGA, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 157, PASIG CITY, AND MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Respondents.

Facts:

Manila Electric Company sought to declare null and void selected issuances by the Department of Energy
and the ERC related to the Retail Competition and Open Access provision of the EPIRA. Meralco's
petition included an ancillary prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the implementation of the DOE/ERC issuances.

The RTC issued an order granting Meralco's prayer and ordering the issuance of a 20-day TRO in its
favor. The ERC then filed the present petition before us assailing the RTC's order.

Issue:

Whether or not RTC properly exercised its jurisdiction over Meralco’s petition for declaratory relief.

Ruling:

Yes. The Supreme court reiterate that the RTC's exercise of jurisdiction over the petition for
declaratory relief is proper as this is a matter that expressly falls under its jurisdiction

Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court furthermore is clear that the RTC has jurisdiction over petitions
for declaratory relief, i.e., over the present petition.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 189571, January 21, 2015

THE HONORABLE MONETARY BOARD AND GAIL U. FULE, DIRECTOR, SUPERVISION AND EXAMINATION
DEPARTMENT II, AND BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK,
Respondent.

Facts:

Respondent established a pension loan product for bona fide veterans or their surviving spouses, as well
as salary loan product for teachers and low-salaried employees pursuant to its mandate under Republic
Act (RA) Nos. 3518 and 7169 to provide financial assistance to veterans and teachers. respondent
devised a program by charging a premium in the form of a higher fee respondent devised a program by
charging a premium in the form of a higher fee. Special Trust Funds were established by respondent
these fees charged against the borrowers were credited to the respective trust funds, which would be
used to fully pay the outstanding obligation of the borrowers in case of death.

Examination was conducted by the Supervision and Examination Department (SED) II of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas. It found that banks shall not directly engage in insurance business as insurer.
Respondent was requested to discontinue the collection of said fees. Respondent complied with the
BSP’s directive and discontinued the collection of fees for CRF. Petitioners issued Monetary Board (MB)
Resolution No. 1139 directing respondent’s Trust and Investment Department to return to the borrowers
all the balances. Respondent requested reconsideration of said MB Resolution. However, the same was
denied. Accordingly, respondent filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with the RTC of Makati City.
Petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss alleging that the petition for declaratory relief cannot prosper. the
RTC dismissed respondent’s petition for declaratory relief

Almost a year later, respondent filed a Motion to admit its Motion for Reconsideration against said order
alleging that it did not receive a copy. The RTC allowed respondent’s motion for reconsideration and
required petitioners to file their answer.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration against said decision, but the same was denied. Hence, the
present petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief is proper.

Ruling:

No. Declaratory relief is to determine any question of construction or validity arising from the instrument,
executive order or regulation, or statute; and for a declaration of his rights and duties thereunder. The
decision of the BSP Monetary Board cannot be a proper subject matter for a petition for declaratory relief
since it was issued by the BSP Monetary Board in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers or functions.

CJH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, vs. BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,

DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS EDWARD O. BALTAZAR[G.R. No. 172457.
December 24, 2008.].

Facts:

BOC demanded 12 of CJH the payment of P71,983,753.00 representing the duties and taxes due on all
the importations made by CJH from 1998 to 2004. For its part, the BIR sent a letter to CJH wherein it
treated CJH as an ordinary corporation subject to the regular corporate income tax as well as to the Value
Added Tax of 1997. CJH questioned the retroactive application by the BOC of the Supreme Court
decision in G.R. No. 119775 (Section 3 of the Proclamation , which granted to the newly created SEZ the
same incentives then already enjoyed by the Subic SEZ, including tax exemptions, was declared
unconstitutional) It claimed that the assessment was null and void because it violated the non-retroactive
principle under the Tariff and Customs Code. held that the decision in G.R. No. 119775 applies
retroactively because the tax exemption granted by Proclamation No. 420 is null and void from the
beginning.

The RTC also ruled that the petition for declaratory relief is not the appropriate remedy. A judgment of the
court cannot be the proper subject of a petition for declaratory relief; the enumeration in Rule 64 is
exclusive. Moreover, the RTC held that Commonwealth Act No. 55 (CA No. 55) which proscribes the use
of declaratory relief in cases where a taxpayer questions his tax liability is still in force and effect.

Issues:
W/N the remedy of declaratory relief proper in this case

Ruling:
No. The proper subject matter of a declaratory relief is a deed, will, contract, or other written instrument,
or the construction or validity of statute or ordinance. A petition for declaratory relief cannot properly have
a court decision as its subject matter. In this case, a judgment of the court cannot be the proper subject of
a petition for declaratory relief; the enumeration in Rule 64 is exclusive.
Also, The Court decisions cannot be the proper subjects of a petition for declaratory relief, decisions of
quasi-judicial agencies cannot be subjects of a petition for declaratory relief for the simple reason that if a
party is not agreeable to a decision either on questions of law or of fact, it may avail of the various
remedies provided by the Rules of Court.
EN BANC

G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN, COMPOSTELA

VALLEY PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, Respondent.

Facts:
Petitioner Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva was a presiding judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Compostela- New Bataas, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province. Petitioner applied for a position as a
judge in a second level court but JBC did not include his name in the list of applicants since he failed to
qualify.
This is because the JBC put priority to incumbent judges who served their position for at least five years
and petitioner here only served as judged for more than a year. The petitioner assailed, inter alia, the
authority of the JBC to add another qualification (5-year-qualitification) because the said qualification was
already prescribed.
The Supreme Court ruled that the internal process of choosing people who would qualify done by the JBC
was valid since under Sect. 8 (5), Art. VIII of the Constitution gave the JBC principal function of
recommending appointees to the judiciary.

A Petition for Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief under Rules 65 and 63 of the
Rules of Court, respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts, on the
ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:
Whether the Petition for Declaratory relief is proper.

Ruling:
No. The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a
person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance.

In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition
specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of
applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that
no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant
judicial positions. The inclusion in the list of candidates, which is one of the incidents of such
appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner cannot claim any right that could have been
affected by the assailed policy.
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.

DIVISION

[ GR No. 191176, Oct 14, 2015 ]

DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR v. RAUL V. GATUZ

FACTS:

Domingo filed an administrative complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman against Gatuz, Barangay
Captain of Barangay Tabang, Plaridel, Bulacan, for Abuse of Authority and Dishonesty. The Ombudsman
found the respondent guilty of Dishonesty and imposed the penalty of three months suspension without
pay. Then, it indorsed its decision to the DILG for immediate implementation. However, after it was
endorsed, the respondent moved for reconsideration, which was later on denied by the Ombudsman.
After its denial, the DILG issued a memorandum addressed to the DILG-RD, directing him to implement
the respondent's suspension.

Eventually, Gatuz filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and Injunction with a Prayer for a Temporary
Restraining Order or a writ of Preliminary Injunction before the RTC. He argued that the filing of a motion
for reconsideration or an appeal automatically stays the execution of the Ombudsman's decisions in
administrative cases pursuant to Samaniego and Lapid v. Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the RTC issued a
TRO prohibiting DILG from implementing the memorandum.

ISSUE:

Whether or not RTC erred in taking cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief and in restraining the
execution of the Ombudsman's decision.

HELD:

YES. RTC erred in taking cognizance of the petition for declaratory relief and in restraining the execution of the
Ombudsman's decision.

Judicial or quasi-judicial orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of declaratory relief is the doctrine of judicial
stability or noninterference. Courts and tribunals with the same or equal authority - even those exercising concurrent
and coordinate jurisdiction are not permitted to interfere with each other's respective cases, much less their orders or
judgments.

Where the decisions of certain administrative bodies are appealable to the Court of Appeals, these adjudicative
bodies are co-equal with the Regional Trial Courts in terms of rank and stature; their actions are logically beyond the
control of the RTC, a co-equal body.16 Notably, the decisions of the Ombudsman in disciplinary cases are
appealable to the CA via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.17 As a co-equal body, the RTC
has no jurisdiction to interfere with or to restrain the execution of the Ombudsman's decisions in disciplinary cases.

Court orders or decisions cannot be the subject matter of declaratory relief.10 They are not included within the
purview of the words "other written instrument."11 The same principle applies to orders, resolutions, or decisions of
quasi-judicial bodies. The fundamental rationale for this is the principle of res judicata.12 Parties are not permitted to
litigate the same issue more than once. Judgment rendered by a court or a quasi-judicial body is conclusive on the
parties subject only to appellate authority. The losing party cannot modify or escape the effects of judgment under the
guise of an action for declaratory relief.

Finally, SC already reconsidered the 2008 Samaniego decision in our resolution dated October 5, 2010.18 SC
unanimously held en banc that the decisions of the Ombudsman in disciplinary cases are immediately executory and
cannot be stayed by the filing of an appeal or the issuance of an injunctive writ.19 This legal question has already
been settled with finality.

G.R. No. 181892, April 19, 2016

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, THE

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, AND MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY, Petitioners, v. HON. JESUS M. MUPAS, IN HIS CAPACITY AS ACTING PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 117, PASAY CITY, AND
PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC., Respondents.

Facts:
On December 21, 2004, the Republic filed a complaint for the expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay. Notably, the property to be expropriated only involves the NAIA-IPT III
structure and did not include the land which the Republic already owns. The RTC issued a writ of
possession in favor of the Republic

The RTC supplemented its December 21, 2004 order. The RTC applied Republic Act No. 8974 instead
of Rule 67 as basis for the effectivity of the writ of possession. The RTC ruled, among others, that the
Land Bank should immediately release to PIATCO the amount to be deducted eventually from the just
compensation.

On September 11, 2006, the RTC reinstated the writ of possession after the Government tendered
PIATCO a check in this amount. The MIAA and the Land Bank entered into an escrow agreement. The
MIAA and the DBP likewise executed an escrow agreement.

The Government stated that the escrow accounts shall be subject to the condition that "[t]he claimant(s)
shall have been held to be entitled to receive the sum claimed from the 'Just Compensation (NAIA
Terminal 3) Fund' in accordance with Philippine law and regulation, by a final, binding and executory
order or award of the expropriation court.

Clearly, the Government does not intend to pay the just compensation due to either PIATCO or Takenaka
and Asahikosan during the pendency of the expropriation case or until the finality of the Court's rulings

Issue:
Whether the CA legally erred in computing just compensation in the expropriation of the NAIA-IPT III
Ruling:
LANDBANK CASE
G.R. No. 206484

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS (DOTC), Petitioner,

vs.
SPOUSES VICENTE ABECINA and MARIA CLEOFE ABECINA, Respondents.

Facts:

Spouses Abecina are the registered owners of five parcels of land in Camarines Norte.

In February 1993, the DOTC awarded Digitel Telecommunications Philippines, Inc a contract for the
management and operation of a Regional Telecommunications Development Project. Later on, the
municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, donated a one thousand two hundred (1,200) square-
meter parcel of land to the DOTC for the implementation of the RDTP in the municipality. However, the
municipality erroneously included portions of the respondents’ property in the donation.
Sometime in the mid-1990s, the spouses Abecina discovered Digitel’s occupation over portions of their
properties. They required Digitel to vacate their properties and pay damages, but the latter refused,
insisting that it was occupying the property of the DOTC pursuant to their FLA.

On September 3, 2003, the respondent spouses filed an accion publiciana complaint against the DOTC
and Digitel for recovery of possession and damages. During the pre-trial conference, the DOTC admitted
that the Abecinas were the rightful owners of the properties and opted to rely instead on state immunity
from suit. The respondent spouses and Digitel executed a Compromise Agreement and entered into a
Contract of Lease. The RTC rendered a partial decision and approved the Compromise Agreement.

The RTC held that as the lawful owners of the properties, the respondent spouses enjoyed the right to
use and to possess them. Rights that were violated by the DOTC’s unauthorized entry construction, and
refusal to vacate. The DOTC elevated the case to the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision but
deleted the award of exemplary damages. The DOTC filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:
Whether or not expropriation proceedings is a waiver for state immunity.

Ruling:
Yes. State’s power of eminent domain shall be exercised through expropriation proceedings in court.
Whenever private property is taken for public use, it becomes the ministerial duty of the concerned office
or agency to initiate expropriation proceedings. By necessary implication, the filing of a complaint for
expropriation is a waiver of State immunity.