Civil Procedure Digest (Rule 36, Judgment), Arbues 2018
G.R. No. 141423. November 15, 2000
MELINA P. MACAHILIG v The Heirs of GRACE M. MAGALIT
Facts:
On February 5, 1965, Pepito Magalit, deceased husband of Dr. Grace M.
Magalit (now substituted by her heirs as respondents in view of her recent demise), filed
with BFAR a fishpond application covering a parcel of land. On April 13, 1972,
Bernardo Macahilig, deceased husband of petitioner, filed with the BFAR Fishpond
Application over the same land Magalit had previously applied for. On February 28,
1972, BFAR rejected Macahilig’s application.
On August 22, 1979, the director of BFAR ordered the Committee on
Fishpond Claims and Conflict to hear and determine the rights of Macahilig and Magalit
over the disputed area. The Committee concluded that the former was merely the latters
laborer and caretaker. On June 6, 1980, BFAR Director ordered the dismissal of
Macahilig’s protest and that he shall remain ejected.
Macahilig appealed with IAC. On March 26, 1985, the appellate court
rendered a Decision declaring that Magalit had occupied, cleared and improved the land;
and that Macahilig was his mere caretaker and laborer thus denying the appeal.
Later on, Magalit instituted Civil Case in the RTC Kalibo for the issuance of a
Writ of Execution. On November 29, 1985, Deputy Provincial Sheriff implemented the
Writ issued by Judge Discaya on October 30, 1985. The heirs of Pepito Magalit,
represented by Dr. Magalit, filed on August 6, 1990, a Motion for Correction of the
Implementation of the Decision of the IAC and of the Decision of the Court dated
October 30, 1985. In that Motion, they prayed that the trial court properly implement
said IAC Decision by ordering Spouses Macahilig to turn over to her the possession of
Lot. Dr. Magalit contended that the Writ of Execution was not satisfied, because the
spouses had refused to give up the fishpond in question.
Issues:
1. WON the writ of execution has already been complied with. No.
2. WON the trial court has jurisdiction. Yes.
3. WON there is res judicata. No.
Held:
1. A judgment is a final ruling by a court of competent jurisdiction regarding the
rights of the parties or other matters submitted to it in an action or a proceeding. As
clearly stated in the assailed Decision, the heirs of Dr. Magalit possessed a right superior
to that of petitioners husband, whose application was rejected by BFAR, Presidential
Assistant Lazaro and the IAC. Being the prevailing party, respondents were entitled to
the execution of the Decision in the Fishpond Case.
1
In her Motion for Correction, Dr. Magalit averred that per Officers Return the
Writ of Execution dated November 29, 1985 was not satisfied because the defendant-
spouses opposed the official turnover of the fishpond land in question. This failure to
satisfy the judgment in the Fishpond Case was confirmed by the Commissioners Report
dated May 13, 1993.
On November 4, 1988, Judge Romulo T. Arellano invalidated the mortgage
and the sale of said parcel of land with a declaration that the disputed fishpond had
already been turned over to Dr. Magalit. The Annulment Case, however, was entirely
different from the Fishpond Case. Thus, the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, was not barred from
ordering the surrender of Lot 4417 to satisfy the execution of the judgment in the
Fishpond Case. The Decision in the Annulment Case simply meant that the lots
mortgaged by the petitioner to the Aklan Development Bank, which formed part of the
10-hectare property awarded to Dr. Magalits husband in the Fishpond Case, were
separate and distinct from Lot 4417. Possession of said Lot 4417, which formed part of
the property awarded to Magalit, was not at issue in the Annulment Case. Contrary to
petitioners claim, the Decision therein did not state that this lot was actually turned over
to respondents.
2 It is too late in the day for petitioner to challenge the jurisdiction of the trial
court. She clearly submitted to its authority by her unqualified participation in Civil
Case No. 3517. We cannot allow her to attack its jurisdiction simply because it rendered
a Decision prejudicial to her position. Participation in all stages of a case before a trial
court effectively estops a party from challenging its jurisdiction. One cannot belatedly
reject or repudiate its decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to
secure affirmative relief against ones opponent or after failing to obtain such relief. If,
by deed or conduct, a party has induced another to act in a particular manner, estoppel
effectively bars the former from adopting an inconsistent position, attitude or course of
conduct that thereby causes loss or injury to the latter.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property
under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a
result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of the court is
recognized and made effective. In the latter condition, the property, though at all times
within the potential power of the court, may not be in the actual custody of said court.
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the disputed lot by virtue of the
institution of the Petition for a Writ of Execution filed by the respondents predecessors
in interest. Without taking actual physical control of the property, it had an impliedly
recognized potential jurisdiction or potential custody over the res. This was the
jurisdiction which it exercised when it issued the Writ of Execution directing the
surrender of Lot 4417 to Dr. Magalit.
3. In the phrase judgments or final orders found in Section 49 of Rule 39, has
two accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no longer
 Civil Procedure Digest (Rule 36, Judgment), Arbues 2018
appeal because the period to do so has expired, or because the order has been affirmed
by the highest possible tribunal involved. The second sense connotes that it is an order
that leaves nothing else to be done, as distinguished from one that is interlocutory. The
phrase refers to a final determination as opposed to a judgment or an order that settles
only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action; for example, an
order postponing a trial, denying a motion to dismiss or allowing intervention. Orders
that give rise to res judicata and conclusiveness of judgment apply only to those falling
under the second category.
For res judicata to apply, the following elements must concur: (1) there is a
final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; (3) the judgment is one on the merits; and (4) there is, between the two
cases, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. For example, an order
overruling a motion to dismiss does not give rise to res adjudicata that will bar a
subsequent action, because such order is merely interlocutory and is subject to
amendments until the rendition of the final judgment.
A judgment or an order on the merits is one rendered after a determination of
which party is upheld, as distinguished from an order rendered upon some preliminary
or formal or merely technical point. Dismissal of a case for failure of plaintiff to comply
with a notice of case status signed by an officer-in-charge does not have the effect of an
adjudication on the merits. Strictly speaking, res judicata does not apply to decisions or
orders adjudicating interlocutory motions.
The interlocutory nature of the Order of September 17, 1992 is evident from
the fact that the trial court proceeded to hear and determine the inclusion of Lot 4417 in
the Fishpond Case. Without any objection from petitioner, it commissioned Sheriff de la
Cruz to hear and submit a report on the issue. If it is true, as she claims, that the
September 17, 1992 Order constituted a final judgment, then she should have objected to
any further proceedings.
Petitioner alleges that her failure to object on time to the Commissioners
Report was a plain error, which could be corrected by the CA. This is wrong. Her failure
to object to the Report cannot be dismissed as just a matter of assigning errors on appeal.
Rather, it was a failure to assert her right over the lot in dispute, an inaction that
constituted estoppel. After having performed affirmative acts upon which a person acted
in good faith, the actor cannot thereafter repudiate those acts or renege on their effects,
to the prejudice of the former.
The apparent conflict between the Orders of the trial court cannot be construed
in favor of petitioner, since her Petition does not present sufficient basis for us to reverse
the CA. The rule of thumb in these cases is to uphold the validity of all these orders. To
be sure, petitioners lack of any right to own or possess the disputed lot should be put to
rest, as this issue has been resolved against her several times. It is about time she faces
the consequences of those decisions.
2
G.R. No. 183628, February 09, 2011 DANIEL T. SO v FOOD FEST LAND
For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration and Clarification of Daniel T.
So from the Court's Decision of April 14, 2010 in these consolidated cases which
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision of April 18, 2008 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Food Fest is ORDERED to pay So
liquidated damages in the amount equivalent to 25% of the total sum due and
demandable. Further, So is ORDERED to pay attorney's fees in the amount
equivalent to 25% of the total sum due and demandable. In all other respects,
the decision is AFFIRMED.
Clarification is in order, respecting the second paragraph of the above-quoted
dispositive portion of the Decision which ordered So to pay attorney's fees in the amount
equivalent to 25% of the total sum due and demandable. The relevant portion of this
Court's Decision - basis of the order reads:
This Court notes that the appellate court did not award liquidated damages in
contravention of the contract. As for the appellate court's award of P20,000.00
as attorney's fees, the contractual stipulation should prevail.
The relevant portion of the Lease Contract between So and Food Fest provides:
23.1. Should LESSOR[-So] be compelled to seek judicial relief against
LESSEE the latter shall, in addition to any other claim for damages pay as
liquidated damages to LESSOR[-So] an amount equivalent to twenty-five
percent (25%) of the amount due, and an attorney's fee in the amount
equivalent to 25% of the amount claimed.
The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the dispositive
portion or the fallo and the body of the decision, the fallo controls. This rule rests on the
theory that the fallo is the final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement
ordering nothing. However, where the inevitable conclusion from the body of the
decision is so clear as to show that there was a mistake in the dispositive portion, the
body of the decision will prevail.
Given the above-quoted portion of the Decision vis-a-vis the above quoted Lease
Contract between the parties, it should be Food Fest Land, Inc., as lessee, not So, the
lessor, who should be ORDERED to pay attorney's fees as stipulated in the contract.
WHEREFORE, the dispositive portion of the Court's Decision of April 14, 2010 is
AMENDED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision of April 18, 2008 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
 Civil Procedure Digest (Rule 36, Judgment), Arbues 2018
Food Fest is ORDERED to pay So liquidated damages in the amount
equivalent to 25% of the total sum due and demandable. Further, Food Fest is
ORDERED to pay So attorney's fees in the amount equivalent to 25% of the
total sum due and demandable. In all other respects, the decision is
AFFIRMED.
DIAMOND BUILDERS v COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE
G.R. No. 171820 December 13, 2007
Facts:
The controversy originated from a civil case pending before the RTC
Caloocan filed by Marceliano Borja against Rogelio S. Acidre for the latters breach of
his obligation to construct a residential and commercial building. Rogelio is the sole
proprietor of petitioner Diamond Builders Conglomeration (DBC).
To put an end to the foregoing litigation, the parties entered into a
Compromise Agreement which provided that the contract will no longer be rescinded in
exchange of petitioner’s promise to complete the building within 75 days starting from
the 5th day of the approval of the compromise agreement. In exchange, plaintiff Borja
must pay petitioner Acidre 370k on the 5th day of the approval of the agreement and
another 200k after the building was completed. The 370k shall be posted by petitioner as
surety bond in case of noncompliance and will be applied exclusively as payment for
damages.They also stipulated that breach of any party upon the Compromise Agreement
will give the aggrieved party right an immediate relief.
In compliance with the Compromise Agreement, Rogelio obtained a Surety
Bond from Country Bankers in favor of the spouses Borja. In this regard, Rogelio signed
an Indemnity Agreement consenting to their joint and several liability to Country
Bankers should the surety bond be executed upon. On April 23, 1992, Country Bankers
received a Motion for Execution of the surety bond filed by Borja with the RTC
Caloocan for Rogelios alleged violation of the Compromise Agreement. The
3
On June 10, 1992 Sheriff Pangan arrived at Country Bankers office, and the
latter was thus constrained to pay the amount of the surety bond. In the meantime,
petitioners refused to reimburse Country Bankers alleging that the voluntary payment of
the latter to pay the bond prevented the former from questioning the Writ of Execution.
Issue:
WON the judgment on the Compromise Agreement becomes a judgment
subject to execution of Rule 39 of ROC.
Held: Yes.
A compromise judgment is a decision rendered by a court sanctioning the
agreement between the parties concerning the determination of the controversy at hand.
Essentially, it is a contract, stamped with judicial imprimatur, between two or more
persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust their difficulties by
mutual consent in the manner which they agree on, and which each of them prefers in
the hope of gaining, balanced by the danger of losing. Upon court approval of a
compromise agreement, it transcends its identity as a mere contract binding only upon
the parties thereto, as it becomes a judgment that is subject to execution in accordance
with Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
Ordinarily, a judgment based on compromise is not appealable. It should not
be disturbed except upon a showing of vitiated consent or forgery. The reason for the
rule is that when both parties enter into an agreement to end a pending litigation and
request that a decision be rendered approving said agreement, it is only natural to
presume that such action constitutes an implicit, as undeniable as an express, waiver of
the right to appeal against said decision. Thus, a decision on a compromise agreement is
final and executory, and is conclusive between the parties.
It is beyond cavil that if a party fails or refuses to abide by a compromise
agreement, the other party may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded
and insist upon his original demand. Following this mandatory rule, the RTC Caloocan
granted Borjas motion, and subsequently issued an order to the sheriff to execute the
compromise judgment.
 Civil Procedure Digest (Rule 36, Judgment), Arbues 2018
G.R. No. 131488. August 3, 1998
ESPIRITA N. ACOSTA v COMELEC and RAYMUNDO I. RIVERA
Facts:
By a winning margin of 4 votes, petitioner was proclaimed as the duly elected
Punong Barangay. On May 15, 1997, Rivera filed an election protest with MTC San
Fabian praying for a recount of the votes. The following day, the court a quo summoned
Acosta who, on May 19, 1997, filed a Motion for Time to File Answer. In an order dated
May 21, 1997, the court denied said motion and concluded that the election protest was
sufficient in form and substance. The court also ordered the COMELEC Election
Registrar to bring to court the ballot boxes.
On May 29, 1997, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Pet Cert questioning
the May 21, 1997, order of the MCTC. On December 2, 1997, the COMELEC issued
Resolution dismissing the petition for lack of merit. It also affirmed the assailed order
dated May 21, 1997, as well as the trial court’s decision should be May 30, 1997 which
declared Rivera as the real winner in the elections.
Issue:
WON COMELEC validly affirmed the trial court’s decision.
Held: No.
The COMELEC indeed exceeded the bounds of its authority when it affirmed
the trial court’s decision when said judgment was not the subject of a special civil action
assailing an interlocutory order of the same lower court. The fact that the decision was
eventually elevated to the COMELEC on appeal does not cure the defect since said
appeal was not consolidated with SPR No. 13-97. In fact, it was still undocketed at the
time and the parties had not yet submitted any evidence relating to the election protest.
Due process dictates that before any decision can be validly rendered in a case,
the following safeguards must be met: (a) the court or tribunal must be clothed with
judicial authority to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) it must have jurisdiction
over the person of the party or over the property subject of the controversy; (c) the
parties thereto must have been given an opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf,
and (d) such evidence must be considered by the tribunal in deciding the case. While the
COMELEC cannot be faulted for resolving the issue raised by petitioner in SPR No. 13-
97, namely, the propriety of the lower courts order dated May 21, 1997, it exceeded its
authority and thereby gravely abused its discretion when, in the same resolution, it
affirmed said court’s decision dated May 30, 1997, which was the subject of petitioners
appeal, UNDK No. 5-97.
4
MARIALEN C. CORPUZ v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 162214 November 11, 2004
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman issued a Resolution on July 27, 2000 finding
probable cause against petitioners. On April 10, 2000, the petitioners were charged with
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, involving the so-called tax credit
scam. The accused also filed similar motions for reconsideration and/or motions to
quash/dismiss which the prosecution opposed. On December 12, 2003, the
Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying all the motions respectively filed by the
accused.
The petitioners filed their petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the
the December 12, 2003 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that the graft court
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in
issuing the same. In its Comment on the petition, the Office of the Ombudsman, through
the Office of the Special Prosecutor, avers that the delay in the submission to the
Sandiganbayan of its report on its reinvestigation was caused by the pendency of the
other cases of equal, if not of more importance, not to mention the filing of 22 other
motions for reconsideration and/or reinvestigation by the other accused in the said cases.
Issues:
1. WON certiorari should lie. No.
2. WON judgment may be made orally. No.
Held:
1. For a petition for certiorari to be granted, it must set out and demonstrate,
plainly and distinctly, all the facts essential to establish a right to a writ. The petitioners
must allege in their petition and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is
not speedy or adequate and that (a) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) such tribunal, board or officer
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction; and, (c) there is no appeal or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal
power to determine the case; there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being
clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its authority as determined by
law. There is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to
be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough.
In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is
limited to resolving only errors of jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve
 Civil Procedure Digest (Rule 36, Judgment), Arbues 2018
questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment. Errors of
judgment of the trial court are to be resolved by the appellate court in the appeal or via a
petition for review on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct
errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal. As long as
the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an
appeal or a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in
excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of
certiorari.
2. The verbal Order of Dismissal by Justice Nario of Sandigan is a nullity.
Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, mandates that a
judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by
the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the
facts and the law upon which it is based. The rule applies to a final order dismissing a
criminal case grounded on the violation of the rights of the accused to a speedy trial. A
verbal judgment or order of dismissal is a violation of the provision; hence, such order
is, in contemplation of law, not in esse, therefore, ineffective. Justice Nario failed to
issue a written resolution dismissing the criminal cases for failure of the prosecution to
submit its report on the reinvestigation of the cases within the sixty-day period fixed by
the graft court. Moreover, the verbal order was rejected by majority vote of the members
of the Sandiganbayan Special Division. In fine, there has been no valid and effective
order of dismissal of the cases. The Sandiganbayan cannot then be faulted for issuing the
assailed resolutions.
5
G.R. No. 157752. March 16, 2005 SALLY MIGUEL v JCT Group
Facts:
In April 1993, petitioners filed complaints for illegal dismissal and payment of
backwages and other monetary claims before the NLRC against respondents. On May
26, 1993, JCT filed a motion to dismiss founded on lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action because of the absence of an employer-employee relationship
between them and petitioners. Without resolving the motion to dismiss, Labor Arbiter
rendered a decision dated in favor or petitioners.
Issues:
1. WON NLRC committed gradelej in ruling in the case without determining the
existence of Employer-Employee Relationship. Yes.
2. WON respondents failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the NLRCs
Decision warrants the immediate denial of the latters Petition for Certiorari filed with
the CA. No.
Held:
1. The labor arbiter and the NLRC gravely abused their discretion when they
ruled in favor of herein petitioners without determining the existence of an employer-
employee relationship between them and respondents. The Decisions were silent on why
JCT were held liable. Judges and arbiters should draw up their decisions and resolutions
with due care, and make certain that they truly and accurately reflect their conclusions
and their final dispositions. The same thing goes for the findings of fact made by the
NLRC, as it is a settled rule that such findings are entitled to great respect and even
finality when supported by substantial evidence; otherwise, they shall be struck down
for being whimsical and capricious and arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. It is a
requirement of due process and fair play that the parties to a litigation be informed of
how it was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts
and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was reached
and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible
errors of the court for review by a higher tribunal.
2. The requirement of a motion for reconsideration, as a prerequisite to the filing
of a petition for certiorari, is waived under any of the following conditions: where the
decision is a patent nullity, where the issue raised is one purely of law, or where the
questions raised are exactly the same as those already squarely presented to and passed
upon by the court a quo. Taken together, the circumstances of the present controversy
place the case within the exceptions to the rule requiring a motion for reconsideration.
As the Court has declared above, the NLRC Decision is a patent nullity and would, if
sustained, violate respondents right to due process.
 Civil Procedure Digest (Rule 36, Judgment), Arbues 2018
FGU INSURANCE v RTC MAKATI G.R. No. 161282 February 23, 2011
Facts:
A truck owned by G.P. Sarmiento Trucking Corporation (GPS) loaded with 30
units of refrigerator owned by Concepcion Industries Inc. (CII) figured in a vehicle
collision. FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), the insurer of the damaged refrigerators,
paid CII, the insured, the value of the covered shipment. FGU, in turn, as subrogee of
the insured’s rights and interests, sought reimbursement of the amount it paid from GPS.
The failure of the GPS to heed FGUs claim for reimbursement, led the latter to
file a complaint for damages and breach of contract of carriage with the RTC. During
the hearing of the case, FGU presented evidence establishing its claim against GPS. For
its part, GPS filed a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence, which was
granted by the RTC.
The RTC ruled that FGU failed to adduce evidence that GPS was a common
carrier and that its driver was negligent, thus, GPS could not be made liable for the
damages of the subject cargoes. The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The case was
then elevated to this Court. On August 6, 2002, the Court rendered a decision agreeing
with the lower courts that GPS was not a common carrier but nevertheless held it liable
under the doctrine of culpa contractual.
On September 18, 2002, this Court denied GPS MR with finality. In due
course, an entry of judgment was issued certifying that the August 6, 2002 decision of
this Court became final and executory on October 3, 2002.
FGU filed a motion for execution. GPS filed its Opposition to Motion for
Execution alleging that after the insured’s claim was compensated in full, the insured
transferred the ownership of the subject appliances to FGU. In turn, FGU sold the same
to third parties thereby receiving and appropriating the consideration of the sale.
Thereafter, on January 13, 2003, GPS filed its Comment with Motion to Set Case for
Hearing on the Merits. On July 1, 2003, the RTC issued an order granting GPS motion
to set case for hearing.
Issue:
WON a case that already attained finality be re-opened.
Held: Yes.
Fundamental is the rule that where the judgment of a higher court has become
final and executory and has been returned to the lower court, the only function of the
latter is the ministerial act of carrying out the decision and issuing the writ of execution.
In addition, a final and executory judgment can no longer be amended by adding thereto
a relief not originally included. In short, once a judgment becomes final, the winning
party is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a court's
ministerial duty. The lower court cannot vary the mandate of the superior court or
6
reexamine it for any other purpose other than execution; much less may it review the
same upon any matter decided on appeal or error apparent; nor intermeddle with it
further than to settle so much as has been demanded.
Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability of judgment, a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no
longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by
the Highest Court of the land. Any act which violates this principle must immediately be
struck down.
But like any other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1) the correction of clerical
errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3)
void judgments; and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.
In the case at bench, the Court agrees with the RTC that there is indeed a need
to find out the whereabouts of the subject refrigerators. For this purpose, a hearing is
necessary to determine the issue of whether or not there was an actual turnover of the
subject refrigerators to FGU by the assured CII. If there was an actual turnover, it is very
important to find out whether FGU sold the subject refrigerators to third parties and
profited from such sale. These questions were brought about by the contention of GPS in
its Opposition to Motion for Execution that after the assured, CII, was fully
compensated for its claim on the damaged refrigerators, it delivered the possession of
the subject refrigerators to FGU as shown in the certification of the
Accounting/Administrative Manager of CII. Thereafter, the subject refrigerators were
sold by FGU to third parties and FGU received and appropriated the consideration and
proceeds of the sale. GPS claims that it verified the whereabouts of the subject
refrigerators from the CII because it wanted to repair and sell them to compensate FGU.
If, indeed, there was an actual delivery of the refrigerators and FGU profited
from the sale after the delivery, there would be an unjust enrichment if the realized profit
would not be deducted from the judgment amount. The Court is not precluded from
rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of
immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.
 Civil Procedure Digest (Rule 36, Judgment), Arbues 2018
A.M. No. 1237-CAR August 21, 1980
FELICIDAD CASTRO v JUDGE ARTURO MALAZO
Facts:
On July 11, 1972, Romeo Tibay filed a complaint against Felicidad Castro,
(the complainant herein). Alleging that he was a tenant or agricultural lessee of the said
landholding, Tibay prayed that Castro be restrained from dispossessing him of his
tenancy. On August 14, 1972, the spouses Felicidad Torio-Castro and Bonifacio Castro
instituted CAR Case (Castro Case) against Romeo Tibay alleging that they were the
lessees of Francisca Quinto, the deceased mother of Enriqueta Salcedo Cruz, and that
Tibay had forcibly entered the premises. On August 25, 1975, the Castros filed their
memoranda in the two cases. Tibay failed to submit his memorandum and the cases
were deemed submitted for decision on September 9, 1975.
On January 29, 1976, complainant herein addressed a letter to this Court
complaining and charging respondent with delay in the Castro case. The said letter was
referred to the respondent Judge Macazo on February 12, 1976, for comment and in the
latter's 2nd Indorsement dated February 26, 1976, he submits "the information that
Castro Case had been decided on September 15, 1975, but the decision was not
immediately released because I wanted the same be released simultaneously with the
decision, promulgated today, in the other case. SC ordered Macalzo to be investigated
by the CA and found the claims of Macalzo to be true.
Issue:
Should Judge Macalzo be exonerated.
Held: No.
While the records support the claim of respondent that he signed the decision
on September 15, 1975 and that consequently, the charge of ante-dating the questioned
decision in Castro case is devoid of merit, nevertheless, by respondent's own admission
he deliberately, deferred the promulgation of the same. Respondent did not file the
decision with the Clerk of Court, which filing is the essential act that constitutes
rendition of the decision and gives it validity and binding effect, for otherwise, the Judge
can readily change, alter, revise, or modify his decision while the same is under his
personal control and custody. The rule is well established that the filing of the derision,
judgment or order with the Clerk of Court, not the date of the writing of the decision or
judgment, nor the signing thereof or even the promulgation thereof, that constitutes
rendition thereof.
Since there is no dispute that the Castro case was declared submitted for
decision together with the Tibay case on September 9, 1975, and the decisions in both
cases were rendered only on February 26, 1976, a clear violation of Section 151,
Republic Act No. 3844, The Agricultural Land Reform Code, has been committed by
respondent Judge.
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ATTY. ARNOLD B. LUGARES v JUDGE LIZABETH GUTIERREZ-TORRES
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1719 November 23, 2010
Facts:
This is a consolidation of 3 administrative charges against Judge Torres.
1st charge: Administrative Matter No. MTJ-08-1719 was commenced by a
complaint dated September 13, 2006 filed by Atty. Lugares charging Judge Torres with
Gross Inefficiency, Undue Delay in the Administration of Justice relative to Civil Case
No. 19887. The civil case was an ejectment suit filed by Lugares against spouses
Bautista. Lugares claimed that Sps Bautista failed to file their answer within the
reglamentary period thus Judge Torres deemed the case submitted for decision after the
Sps MR having been denied on April 2005. However, on August 2006, Judge Torres
issued an order admitting the answer of Sps contrary to the April 2005 decision. Judge
Torres was ordered to comment on the issue but failed despite several extensions.
2nd charge: Administrative Matter No. MTJ-08-1722 was initiated through a
Complaint-Affidavit, dated August 28, 2007, filed by Jose Sembrano charging Judge
Torres with having committed a Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct relative to
Civil Case No. 19063. This civil case was deemed submitted for decision on May 2004.
On August 2004, no judgment was rendered prompting Sembrano to file a motion to
resolve the case. 4 more motions was filed by Sembrano with the last being file on
January 2007. Respondent Judge also failed to comment on the matter.
3rd charge: Administrative Matter No. MTJ-08-1723 was lodged by one
Marcelino Langcap in a letter-complaint dated March 26, 2007 charging Judge Torres
with Delay in the Disposition of Civil Case Nos. 17765 and 18425. Langcap maintained
that judgment on both cases was due as early as March 2004. When Langcap inquired to
the status of the cases, he was assured by Judge Torres that the decision was already
being finalized and would soon be released. Until the filing of his letter-complaint,
Langcap had yet to receive the decision. Di na naman nag comment si Torres.
On July 28, 2008, the OCA issued its Report finding that Judge Torres should
be held guilty of willful disobedience and defiance of authority for ignoring its
directives to file comment on the subject cases as well as of undue delay in the
disposition of cases and other matters. The OCA recommended that the 3 administrative
complaints be re-docketed as regular administrative matters against Judge Torres and
that she be suspended from service without pay for a period of 6 months effective from
receipt of the decision of this Court.
Issue:
WON Judge Torres should be penalized as recommended.
Held: No.
 Civil Procedure Digest (Rule 36, Judgment), Arbues 2018
As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within which certain acts
must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to
the prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial
business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as mandatory.
Section 15 (1) and (2), Article VIII of the Constitution requires courts to
decide cases submitted for decision generally within 3 months from the date of their
submission. With respect to cases falling under the Rules on Summary Procedure, first
level courts are only allowed 30 days following the receipt of the last affidavit and
position paper, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to render
judgment. The Court has consistently impressed upon the magistrates the need to
dispose of the courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods, for
it cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied.
Basic is the rule that after the failure of the defendant to answer the complaint,
the court shall render judgment as may be established by the facts alleged in the
complaint. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes a judge to render a
decision on his own initiative or upon motion of the plaintiff. Judge Torres starkly
deviated from the required procedure when she admitted defendants answer at that stage
of the proceedings even when she had previously denied admission of said pleading.
The Court finds no logic in her sudden change of heart. Instead, respondent judge should
have given due course to Atty. Lugares motion for early resolution and manifestation,
and should not have entertained the defendants comment and counter-manifestation
considering that the case was summary in nature, and a period of more than 1 year had
lapsed after the case was submitted for decision.
Judge Torres demonstrated her propensity for inattentiveness and indifference
when she failed to comply with the basic rule of deciding the aforementioned cases
within the prescribed thirty-day period.
The magnitude of her transgressions in the present consolidated cases - gross
inefficiency, gross ignorance of the law, dereliction of duty, violation of the Code of
Judicial Conduct, and insubordination, taken collectively, cast a heavy shadow on her
moral, intellectual and attitudinal competence. She has shown herself unworthy of the
judicial robe and place of honor reserved for guardians of justice. Thus, the Court is
constrained to impose upon her the severest of administrative penalties dismissal from
the service, to assure the peoples faith in the judiciary and the speedy administration of
justice.
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G.R. No. L-30158 January 17, 1974
LORENZO G. VALENTIN v HONORABLE ANDRES SANTA MARIA
Doctrine: (Madaldal masyado yung ponente ang hirap niya intindihin.)
In the case of People v. Soria, promulgated in 1968, the court ruled that a
judge who had qualified and assumed office in one district could not thereafter validly
issue an order of dismissal in a criminal case formerly heard by him while holding such
office in another. However, as of January 31, 1973, when this Court, in People v.
Donesa, declined in a decision unanimously arrived at to give retroactive effect to Soria,
thus sustaining an order of dismissal of the then Judge Donesa handed down after he had
ceased to be such in Abra, having taken over his new post in the Tagaytay CFI. As a
consequence, Soria is bereft of any authoritive force. It is overruled.
Facts:
Petitioner Lorenzo G. Valentin was the defendant in a civil case of the CFI
Bulacan with private respondent Yolanda Matias as plaintiff. A decision was rendered
on December 20, 1963 in favor of the private respondent as plaintiff declaring null and
void TCT No. T-32568 in the name of the defendant, now petitioner. As noted, it was a
decision of Judge Samuel F. Reyes. CA affirmed it in on May 13, 1968. MR with the
CA denied on July 19, 1968. Subsequently, on October 26, 1968, upon discovering that
when Judge Samuel F. Reyes promulgated the decision dated December 20, 1963, he
had already assumed office as District Judge for the Province of Rizal, and in view of
the ruling in People v Soria, petitioner filed in the CFI of Bulacan with respondent Judge
Santa Maria a "Motion to Disregard Judgment of December 20, 1963 and to Render
Judgment Anew.” There was on October 29, 1968, a pleading of private respondent in
opposition. Respondent Judge, on December 12, 1968, denied said motion. After a
denial of a MR, petitioner came to this Court.
Issue:
WON a judge who previously heard a case may validly render a decision on it
despite being reassigned to a different court branch.
Held: Yes.
Soria ruling should be overruled. According to Justice Teehankee:
"Administration of justice will be best served if the judge who heard the evidence
(although he may have been permanently transferred to another province or station)
renders the decision rather than to leave a mountain of evidence and transcripts for the
perusal and appreciation of a new judge totally unfamiliar with the case and who did not
have the opportunity of hearing the witnesses and observing their deportment for
purposes of gauging their credibility and appraising their testimony."
 Civil Procedure Digest (Rule 36, Judgment), Arbues 2018
More than the successor, the judge who heard the witnesses testify, who
presumably had pored over the documentary evidence, certainly is in a much better
position to appraise the facts and thereafter to apply the statute or codal provision
involved. A litigant's expectation as to his suit being adjudged with care and
thoroughness has greater chances then of being satisfied under such circumstances. This
is so even on the assumption that the one who succeeds him on the bench is much more
skillful and penetrating in his scrutiny of the proof and much more proficient in the
jurist's art. Independently then of the social consideration involved, the notion of law as
a reflection of reason and given expression under conditions that assure an impartial and
thorough adjudicative process is more likely to be served when the one who hears the
case renders the decision himself.
In order to avoid an overlapping between the previous judge and the newly
appointed judge, Justice Teehankee said that: "The only qualification that I would add -
of purposes of avoiding any unnecessary conflict in case another judge has already been
appointed to his former court and the same is no longer vacant or unoccupied (although
in the case at bar, it appears that respondent judge's former court remained vacant) - is
that in line with the statutory proviso therein governing cases 'heard only in part,' as well
as with the first paragraph of the cited section providing for detail of judges, the
interested parties should obtain from this Court the corresponding authorization for the
permanently transferred judge who heard in toto the case and the evidence to render the
decision thereon, in the same manner as temporarily transferred or assigned judges on
detail."
G.R. No. 95751-52. December 2, 1999 PEOPLE v JAIME TUMARU
Facts:
Appeal interposed by Jaime Tumaru and Alex Maun from the Decision of
RTC Kalinga-Apayao, finding them guilty of murder in and for the killing of Atty.
Eduardo Madrid (Criminal Case 15-88 ) and Santiago Umoso (Criminal Case 16-88),
and sentencing them accordingly.
The prosecution presented Lorenzo Miguel as witness. Miguel testified that
On May 24, 1987, he together with his brother and two others were pasturing their
carabaos in Papagan, Flora, Kalinga-Apayao. They later brought the carabaos to the
river for a bath.
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While his companions were still at the river and he was alone pasturing the
carabaos, a man sitting on the branch of a tree whistled and signaled him to go away by
waving his left hand forward and backward. He did not accede and simply ignored such
signal because he thought the man was his brother. He did not know the man. It was
only during the trial that he came to know him to be Alex Maun. Meanwhile, 2 persons
riding on a motorcycle arrived. The driver was Municipal Councilor Santiago Umoso
while the other on board was OIC Mayor Eduardo Madrid. Thereafter, he heard a gun
rapport coming from the long gun of the man sitting on the branch of the tree. Medico
legal showed that Madrid was beheaded and Umuso was shot several times.
Under crossexamination on May 29, 1989, Lorenzo testified that he was living
with Mrs. Zenaida Madrid, widow of Atty. Madrid, in Tondo, Manila, since December
17, 1988. She was supporting him and even promised to send him to school. The police
investigated him four times, once in Quezon City, in Tuguegarao, in Laoag City and at
the office of JAGO on June 8, July 1,6 and 30, 1987, respectively.
Tumaru and Maun executed sworn statements vehemently denying their
participation in the murder. They claimed that the NPAs were responsible for the killing.
Maun claimed that during the police line-up, Captain Espia guided Lorenzo Miguel to
point at him as the culprit. He did not file a case against Captain Espia for the said
violation of his right. He was the personal security guard of Mayor de San Jose for seven
months.
The trial court convicted the accused. (Hindi sinabi sa facts na nalipat yung
judge na nag hear ng case. Bago makapag pen ng decision, napalitan siya. Ang nag pen
ay yung bagong judge.)
Issue:
WON a decision rendered by a judge, who replaced the judge who heard the
case but was not able to decide the case, is valid.
Held: Yes.
It is not necessary that the judge who heard the case be the same judge to pen
the decision. The judge trying the case may die, resign, be disabled, or transferred to
another court while the case was ripening for decision, and before he could decide it. In
such an eventuality, another judge has to continue and finish the trial. Anyway, the
succeeding judge can examine and evaluate the evidence already presented by the
simple expedient of going over the transcripts of the testimonies of witnesses, in the
same manner as appellate courts review evidence on record.
The fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not himself the one who
prepared, signed and promulgated the decision constitutes no compelling reason to
jettison his findings and conclusions, and does not per se render his decision void.
 Civil Procedure Digest (Rule 36, Judgment), Arbues 2018

CITIBANK v MODESTA R. SABENIANO
G.R. No. 156132 October 16, 2006
Facts:
On 8 August 1985, respondent filed a Complaint against petitioners before the
RTC Makati. Respondent claimed to have substantial deposits and money market
placements with the petitioner, the proceeds of which were supposedly deposited
automatically and directly to respondents accounts with petitioner Citibank. Respondent
alleged that petitioners refused to return her deposits and the proceeds of her money
market placements despite her repeated demands. In its Answer, petitioner alleged that
the deposits of the respondents were applied to the respondent’s loan obligation with the
petitioner which the former failed to pay. In other words, na set-off yung deposit para sa
mga unpaid loans evidenced by promissory notes.
10 years after the filing of the Complaint on 8 August 1985, a Decision was
finally rendered on 24 August 1995 by the fourth Judge who handled the said case,
Judge Manuel D. Victorio. Judge Victorio declared the set-off illegal.
G.R. No. 113006. November 23, 2000 ONG CHIU KWAN v CA
Facts:
On January 31, 1991, Assistant City Prosecutor Bayona of Bacolod filed with
the MTC Bacolod an information charging petitioner with unjust vexation for cutting the
electric wires, water pipes and telephone lines of Crazy Feet, a business establishment
owned and operated by Mildred Ong. He was found guilty.
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, the latter court in a
decision dated December 8, 1992, simplistically adopted the decision of the lower court
in toto, without stating the reasons for doing so. CA dismissed the appeal.
Issue:
WON the RTC as an appellate court can render a decision by simply adopting
the decision of the MTC.
Held: No.

Issues:
WON the decision rendered by Judge Victorio, being the 4th judge to handle
the case is valid. (14 issues dito pota)
Held: Yes.
There exists a disputable presumption that the RTC Decision was rendered by
the judge in the regular performance of his official duties. While the said presumption is
only disputable, it is satisfactory unless contradicted or overcame by other evidence.
Encompassed in this presumption of regularity is the presumption that the RTC judge, in
resolving the case and drafting his Decision, reviewed, evaluated, and weighed all the
evidence on record. That the said RTC judge is not the same judge who heard the case
and received the evidence is of little consequence when the records and transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs) are complete and available for consideration by the former.
The Constitution requires that no decision shall be rendered by any court
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is
based. The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides that The judgment
must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge
and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts proved
or admitted by the accused and the law upon which the judgment is based.
Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain conditions, it
cannot merely refer to the findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the lower court.
The court must make a full findings of fact and conclusions of law of its own.
Consequently, the decision of the regional trial court is a nullity

Although it is true that the judge who heard the witnesses testify is in a better
position to observe the witnesses on the stand and determine by their demeanor whether
they are telling the truth or mouthing falsehood, it does not necessarily follow that a
judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid decision since he can
rely on the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial as basis of his decision.
Petitioner’s contention that the trial judge did not have the opportunity to observe the
conduct and demeanor of the witnesses since he was not the same judge who conducted
the hearing is also untenable. While it is true that the trial judge who conducted the
hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the truth and falsity of the testimonies
of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow that a judge who was not present during
the trial cannot render a valid and just decision since the latter can also rely on the
transcribed stenographic notes taken during the trial as the basis of his decision.

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