SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES v. CA, MORADA and HON.
ORTIZ Eventually, they were again put in service by defendant SAUDI. In September 1990,
G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998.
Legal Principle: DOCTRINE OF QUALIFICATION DEFINED — Choice-of-law problems seek to answer two
important questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the
significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system
regulate the situation. Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what
category a certain set of facts or rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine
of qualification." It is the "process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question
specified in a conflicts rule." The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the forum to select the proper
law.
PHILIPPINES IS THE SITUS OF THE TORT. — Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one
involving torts, the "connecting factor" or "point of contract" could be the place or places where the
tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the
Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the places where the alleged tortious conduct took place).
STATE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP RULE APPLIES -In applying said principle to determine
the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account
and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place
where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile,
residence, nationality place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where
the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
FACTS: In 1988 defendant SAUDIA hired plaintiff Morada as a Flight Attendant for its
airlines based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
In 1990, while on a lay-over in Jakarta, plaintiff went to a disco dance with fellow crew
members Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. Because it was
almost morning when they returned to their hotels, they agreed to have breakfast together
at the room of Thamer. When they were in the room, Allah left on some pretext. Shortly
after he did, Thamer attempted to rape plaintiff. Fortunately, a roomboy and several
security personnel heard her cries for help and rescued her. Later, the Indonesian police
came and arrested Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the latter as an accomplice.
When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a few days later, several SAUDIA officials interrogated
her about the Jakarta incident. They then requested her to go back to Jakarta to help
arrange the release of Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad and
base manager Baharini negotiated with the police for the immediate release of the
detained crew members but did not succeed because plaintiff refused to cooperate. She
was afraid that she might be tricked into something she did not want because of her
inability to understand the local dialect. She also declined to sign a blank paper and a
document written in the local dialect.
Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff to return to Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta
flights.
Plaintiff learned that, through the intercession of the Saudi Arabian government, the
Indonesian authorities agreed to deport Thamer and Allah after two weeks of detention.
defendant SAUDIA transferred plaintiff to Manila.
Although she was already working in Manila, petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the
pretense that she would merely testify in an investigation of the charges she made against
the two SAUDIA crew members for the attack on her person while they were in Jakarta.
As it turned out, she was the one made to face trial for very serious charges: (1) adultery; (2)
going to a disco, dancing and listening to the music in violation of Islamic laws; and (3)
socializing with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic tradition. The Court in Saudi
sentenced her to five months imprisonment and to 286 lashes.
Facing conviction, private respondent sought the help of her employer, petitioner SAUDIA.
Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She then asked the Philippine Embassy in
Jeddah to help her while her case is on appeal. Because she was wrongfully convicted, the
Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against her and allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia.
Shortly before her return to Manila, she was terminated from the service by SAUDIA,
without her being informed of the cause.
Morada then filed a Complaint for damages against SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi, its
country manager.
The trial court denied the Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint filed by Saudia.
The CA ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum considering that the Amended
Complaint's basis for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code, and thus, clearly
within the jurisdiction of respondent Court.
SAUDI argues that the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and try Civil Case based on Article
21 of the New Civil Code since the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia inasmuch as this case involves what is known in private international law as a
'conflicts problem'. It alleges that the existence of a foreign element qualifies the instant
case for the application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci
delicti commissi rule.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that since her Amended Complaint is based
on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, then the instant case is properly a matter of domestic
law.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the case involves what is known in private international law as a
'conflicts problem'?
(2) Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to hear and try the civil case?
(3) Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that Philippines Law should govern?
(4) Whether or not the respondent has the burden of pleading and proving the applicable
Saudi law on the matter?
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RULING:
(1) Yes. A conflicts problem presents itself here, and the question of jurisdiction confronts
the court a quo.
A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse laws of two
or more states is said to contain a "foreign element". The presence of a foreign element is
inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely
confined to the geographic limits of their birth or conception.
The forms in which this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may
simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign
domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one State involves properties situated in
another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a complex form.
The foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent Morada is a resident
Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by
virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess,
events did transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly
from Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts"
situation to arise.
(2) Yes. Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives flesh to its
provisions. Violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable
remedies in the municipal forum.
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act
with justice give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.
These provisions on human relations were intended to expand the concept of torts in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide in the statutes (PNB v. CA)
Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in
the Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of the case, it would be forcing respondent
to seek remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer
maintains substantial connections. That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to
her. Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no unnecessary difficulties and
inconvenience have been shown by either of the parties.
By filing her Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial court, private respondent has
voluntary submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. Undeniably, SAUDIA has
effectively submitted to the trial court's jurisdiction by filing motions, an answer, and
praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint on grounds other than lack of
jurisdiction.
(3) Yes. Prescinding that the Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the place
"having the most interest in the problem", the Philippine law on tort liability should have
paramount application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this
case.
Choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions:
(1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant
facts occurred in two or more states; and
(2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.
Before a choice can be made, it is necessary to determine under what category a certain set
of facts or rules fall. This process is known as "characterization", or the "doctrine of
qualification". It is the "process of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of
question specified in a conflicts rule." The purpose of "characterization" is to enable the
forum to select the proper law.
An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or
"point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as
property right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as
the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of
wrongdoing.
These "test factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting factors" could be any of the
following:
(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In particular,
the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved; prcd
(4) the place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has
been made, a marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is
particularly important in contracts and torts:
(5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of
contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement,
the lex loci intentionis;
(7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori —
the law of the forum — is particularly important because, matters of 'procedure' not going to the
substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies whenever the
content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case for
the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law, and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship
and of its master or owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts
of affreightment.
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the "connecting
factor" or "point of contact" could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex
CONFLICT OF LAW: CASE DIGESTS
Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
loci actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case, the Philippines could
be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place).
It is in the Philippines where petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina
residing and working here. According to her, she had honestly believed that petitioner
would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its duties, "act with justice, give
her her due and observe honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed to protect her,
she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is
of no moment. What is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality
of the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of
complainant, had lodged.
In keeping abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, "State of the most significant
relationship" rule should be appropriate to apply. In applying said principle to determine
the State which has the most significant relationship, the following contacts are to be taken
into account and evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the
particular issue:
(a) the place where the injury occurred;
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of
the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
There is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There
is likewise no question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with
petitioner, a resident foreign corporation engaged here in the business of international air
carriage. Thus, the "relationship" between the parties was centered here, although it should
be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law violations.
(4) No. She has no obligation to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she never alleged that Saudi Law
should govern this case. Considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the
applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then the burden was on petitioner to plead and to
establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is.
Petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED.
CHRISTENSEN v. AZNAR
G.R. No. L-16749. January 31, 1963
Legal Principle: Renvoi Doctrine - The conflict of law rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, refers back
the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the
case at bar. The court of domicile cannot and should refer the case back to California, as such action
would leave the issue incapable of determination, because the case will then be tossed back and forth
between the two states.
FACTS: Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he
resided for a period of 9 years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until his death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this country
he had always considered himself a citizen of California. In
In his will, he instituted an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen
(legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in favor of Helen Christensen
Garcia (illegitimate). Adolfo Aznar was the executor of the estate.
Counsel for Helen Garcia claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil Code,
California law should be applied. Under California law, the matter is referred back to the law
of the domicile ultimately making Philippine law applicable. Therefore, the share of Helen
must be increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine
law.
On the other hand, counsel for Maria Christensen contends that inasmuch as it is clear that
under Article 16 of our Civil Code, the national law of the deceased must apply, our courts
must immediately apply the internal law of California on the matter. Under California law,
there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator could dispose of any property
possessed by him in absolute dominion and that finally, illegitimate children not being
entitled to anything and his will remain undisturbed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine law should prevail in administering the estate of
Christensen?
RULING: Yes. The court in deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect
that there are two rules in California on the matter: the internal law which should apply to
Californians domiciled in California; and the conflict rule which should apply to Californians
domiciled outside of California.
The California conflict rule says: “If there is no law to the contrary in the place where
personal property is situated, is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is governed
by the law of his domicile.”
Christensen being domiciled outside California, the law of his domicile, the Philippines,
ought to be followed. Where it is referred back to California, it will form a circular pattern
referring to both country back and forth.
Decision appealed from is reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
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Notes: The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are
to be understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state
or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad
as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be
determined by law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the act in
question occurred
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of
them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question
to the same system of law.
GIBBS v. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
G.R. No. 35694. December 23, 1933
Legal Principle: Article 10(1): Lex Rei Sitae - real property is subject to laws of country where it is situated,
regardless of domicile of parties nor place were marriage was celebrated; The second paragraph of
article 10, Civil Code, applies only when a legal or testamentary succession has taken place in the
Philippine in accordance with the law of the Philippine Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in
regard to the order of succession or the extent of the successional rights; in other words, the second
paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the deceased was vested with a descendible interest
in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine Islands.
FACTS: Allison Gibbs has been continuously, since the year 1902, a citizen of California and
domiciled therein. He and Eva Johnson Gibbs were married in Ohio, in 1906. During said marriage,
the spouses acquired land in the Philippine Islands as conjugal property.
Eva Johnson Gibbs died intestate in California in 1929. At the time of her death she and her
husband were citizens of the State of California and domiciled therein. Allison Gibbs was
appointed administrator of the estate of his said deceased wife. In said intestate proceedings,
Allison filed an ex parte petition in which he alleged "that the parcels of land described belong to
the conjugal partnership, and that in accordance with the law of California, the community
property of spouses who are citizens of California, upon the death of the wife previous to that of
the husband, belongs absolutely to the surviving husband without administration.
The court granted the petition and entered a decree adjudicating Allison D. Gibbs to be the sole
and absolute owner of said lands, applying section 1401 of the Civil Code of California. Gibbs
presented this decree to the register of deeds of Manila and demanded that the latter issue to
him a "transfer certificate of title".
The register of deeds of the City of Manila, declined to accept as binding said decree of court, and
refused to register the transfer of title of the said conjugal property to Allison D. Gibbs, on the
ground that the corresponding inheritance tax had not been paid.
Allison filed in the said court a petition for an order requiring the said register of deeds "to issue
the corresponding titles" to the petitioner without requiring previous payment of any inheritance
tax. The court reaffirmed order of September 22, 1930.
Under review, the SC remanded the case to the court of origin for new trial upon additional
evidence in regard to the pertinent law of California in force at the time of the death of Mrs. Gibbs,
also authorizing the introduction of evidence with reference to the dates of the acquisition of the
property involved in this suit and with reference to the California law in force at the time of such
acquisition.
The appellee contends that the law of California should determine the nature and extend of the
title, citing article 9 of the Civil Code. But that, even if the nature and extent of her title under
said certificates be governed by the law of the Philippine Islands, the laws of California govern the
succession to such title, citing the second paragraph of article 10 of the Civil Code: “Legal and
testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country
in which it may be situated."
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Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
It is argued that the conjugal right of the California wife in community real estate in the Philippine
Islands is a personal right and must be settled by the law governing her personal status, that is,
the law of California.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gibbs is exempt from inheritance tax?
RULING: No. It is the law of the state in which the land is situated we must look for the rules
which govern its descent, alienation, and transfer, and for the effect and construction of wills and
other conveyances. This fundamental principle is stated in the first paragraph of article 10 of our
Civil Code: "Personal property is subject to the laws of the nation of the owner thereof; real
property to the laws of the country in which it is situated”.
In accord with the rule that real property is subject to the lex rei sitæ, the respective rights of
husband and wife in such property, in the absence of an antenuptial contract, are determined by
the law of the place where the property is situated, irrespective of the domicile of the parties or
of the place where the marriage was celebrated.
Under the provisions of the Civil Code and the jurisprudence prevailing here, the wife, upon the
acquisition of any conjugal property, becomes immediately vested with an interest and title equal
to that of her husband, subject to the power of management and disposition which the law vests
in the husband.
Attention has not been called to any law of California that incapacitates a married woman from
acquiring or holding land in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance with the lex rei sitæ. Article 9 of
the Civil Code treats of purely personal relations and status and capacity for juristic acts, the rules
relating to property, both personal and real, being governed by article 10 of the Civil Code.
The trial court found that under the law of California, upon the death of the wife, the entire
community property without administration belongs to the surviving husband; that he is the
absolute owner of all the community property from the moment of the death of his wife, not by
virtue of succession or by virtue of her death, but by virtue of the fact that when the death of the
wife precedes that of the husband he acquires the community property, not as an heir or as the
beneficiary of his deceased wife, but because she never had more than an inchoate interest or
expectancy which is extinguished upon her death. It never belonged to the estate of the deceased
wife.
If he takes nothing by succession from his deceased wife, how can the second paragraph of article 10
be invoked? It seems clear that the second paragraph of article 10 applies only when a legal or
testamentary succession has taken place in the Philippines in accordance with the law of the Philippine
Islands; and the foreign law is consulted only in regard to the order of succession or the extent of the
successional rights; in other words, the second paragraph of article 10 can be invoked only when the
deceased was vested with a descendible interest in property within the jurisdiction of the Philippine
Islands.
Thus, the descendible interest of Eva in the lands was transmitted to her heirs by virtue of inheritance
and this transmission plainly falls within the inheritance and this transmission plainly falls within the
language of section 1536 of Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which levies a tax on
inheritances.
The judgment of the court is reversed with directions to dismiss the petition.
CADALIN, ET AL. v. POEA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 104776. December 5, 1994.
Legal Principle: The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public
policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the
claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
FACTS: Petitioners are overseas contract workers recruited by respondent AIBC for its
accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on various dates from 1975 to 1983.
They were all deployed at various projects undertaken by Brown & Root in several countries
in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Libya, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, as well as
in Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
Having been officially processed as overseas contract workers by the Philippine Government,
all the individual complainants signed standard overseas employment contracts with AIBC
before their departure from the Philippines.
In the State of Bahrain, where some of the individual complainants were deployed, His
Majesty Isa Bin Salman Al Kaifa, Amir of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 in 1976,
otherwise known as the Labour Law for the Private Sector. Article 156 of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 provides: "A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be
actionable after the lapse of one year from the date of the expiry of the contract"
The case arose when their overseas employment contracts were terminated even before
their expiration.
To the POEA Administrator, the prescriptive period was ten years, applying Article 1144 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. It was of the opinion what the respondents violated are
not the rights of the workers as provided by the Labor Code, but the provisions of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 issued in Bahrain, which ipso facto amended the worker's contracts of
employment.
NLRC believed otherwise, fixing the prescriptive period at three years as provided in Article
291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines: “All money claims arising from employer-
employee relations ...shall be filed within three years from the time the cause of action
accrued; otherwise they shall be forever barred”
The Solicitor General expressed his personal view that the prescriptive period was one year
as prescribed by the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 but he deferred to the ruling of NLRC that
Article 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines was the operative law.
AIBC and BRII, insisting that the actions on the claims have prescribed under the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976, argue that there is in force in the Philippines a "borrowing law,"
which is Section 48 of the Code of Civil Procedure and that where such kind of law exists, it
takes precedence over the common-law conflicts rule.
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ISSUE: Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of action based on the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the governing law?
RULING: The applicable law on prescription is the Philippine law. As a general rule, a foreign
procedural law will not be applied in the forum. Procedural matters, such as service of
process, joinder of actions, period and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed by
the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action is based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be
viewed either as procedural or substantive, depending on the characterization given such a
law.
However, the characterization of a statute into a procedural or substantive law becomes
irrelevant when the country of the forum has a "borrowing statute." Said statute has the
practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of substance. A "borrowing
statute" directs the state of the forum to apply the foreign statute of limitations to the
pending claims based on a foreign law. While there are several kinds of "borrowing
statutes," one from provides that an action barred by the laws of the place where it accrued,
will not be enforced in the forum even though the local statute has not run against it. Section
48 of the Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section provides: "If by the laws of the
state or country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the
Philippines Islands."
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be enforced ex proprio
vigore insofar as it ordains the application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public
policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as
regards the claims in question would contravene the public policy on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the 1987 Constitution emphasized that:
"The state shall promote social justice in all phases of national development" (Sec. 10).
"The state affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of
workers and promote their welfare" (Sec. 18).
In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the 1987 Constitution provides:
"Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized
and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all."
VAN DORN v. JUDGE ROMILLO, JR. & UPTON
G.R. No. L-68470. October 8, 1985.
Legal Principle: Applying nationality theory, the divorce decree is binding upon the alien spouse. Our
public policy against divorce does not extend to the alien spouse. The husband is American so his
status must be governed by American law.
FACTS: Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong. They
established their residence in the Philippines and begot two children. Subsequently, they
were divorced in Nevada. Alice re-married in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn.
She returned to the Philippines and started to manage a business. When the American
husband realized that the business is doing well, he followed his wife in the Philippines and
filed an action that he be allowed to administer the same business (post-divorce business).
He contends that he is still the husband because divorce is not recognized in the Philippines
and under Philippine law, there should be joint administration of conjugal properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties abroad is binding in the
Philippines?
RULING: Owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own country’s
court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109 of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is ordered to dismiss the Complaint.
CONFLICT OF LAW: CASE DIGESTS
Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
PILAPIL v. JUDGE IBAY-SOMERA & ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING
G.R. No. 80116. June 30, 1989
Legal Principle: American jurisprudence on laws in pari material provides that after a divorce has been decreed,
the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the
statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for
adultery. The RPC provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who can legally
file the complaint should be the offended spouse. Respondent, being no longer married to petitioner has
no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the posture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.
FACTS: In 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipina and Erich Geiling were married at
Friedenweiler in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated
a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany in January 1983.
Pilapil, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before RTC of Manila in 1983 where it is still pending as a civil case.
In 1986, the local Court of Germany promulgated a divorce decree on the ground of failure
of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner.
standing to commence the adultery case under the posture that he was the offended spouse
at the time he filed suit.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed
by the offended spouse. The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse,
and nobody else. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to
institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity
or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse
no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute
provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution
for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce
subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion.

Thereafter, respondent filed two complaints for adultery alleging that, while still married to We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
respondent, petitioner “had an affair with a certain William Chua as early as 1982 and with jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. In cases of such
yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. The respondent city fiscal approved nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the
a resolution directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against petitioner. time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an
offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the
A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, which time of the filing of the complaint.
motion was denied by the respondent judge.
The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from
Respondent judge denied the motion to quash and also directed the arraignment of both each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.
accused. Petitioner refused to be arraigned and thus charged with direct contempt and
fined. Order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
In 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer
for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
and anchored on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide
the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio, since
the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having
obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal
complaint."

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final
divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint?

RULING: No. The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, is
admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons. Respondent, being no longer married to petitioner has no legal

CONFLICT OF LAW: CASE DIGESTS

Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
PAULA LLORENTE v. CA & ALICIA F. LLORENTE The CA, however, declared Alicia as co-owner of 1/2 of the properties she and the
G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000 deceased Lorenzo may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation,
Legal Principle: Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved; Divorce
and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of ISSUE:
the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons
(1) Whether or not Renvoi Doctrine applies in this case?
(2) Whether or not the foreign divorce is valid?
FACTS: The deceased Lorenzo Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the U.S. Navy from
(3) Whether or not the will is valid?
1927 to 1957 and a naturalized American citizen. In 1937, Lorenzo married petitioner Paula
Llorente. Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States
RULING:
and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Camarines Sur.
(1) No. True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are
not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
When Lorenzo returned to the Philippines to visit his wife in 1945, he discovered that his
proved.
wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and having an adulterous relationship with his
brother, Ceferino Llorente.
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit
the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. Lorenzo returned to the United States
the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent's
and filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County
domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings.
While the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the
same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that "American
The SC of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual allegations
law" follows the 'domiciliary theory' hence, Philippine law applies when determining the
to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce. The divorce decree became
validity of Lorenzo's will.
final.
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16
In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Llorente in Manila. Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of
of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law
the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the
governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the
marriage or cohabitation.
union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can
therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife and produced
three children - Raul, Luz and Beverly.
Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or
In 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all
required by New York State law. The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid
his property to Alicia and their three children. The trial court admitted the will to probate.
since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial court's opinion was a mere
In 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.
paramour. CA also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (½) of
whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article
Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo's estate
144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
in her favor. Alicia also filed in the testate proceeding a petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already
probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal,
The trial court denied Alicia's petition and ruled that the divorce decree granted to the late
especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Lorenzo Llorente was void and inapplicable. It held that the will was intrinsically invalid
since it contained dispositions in favor of Alicia, who in the trial court's opinion was a
(2) Yes. The divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized
mere paramour. Paula was appointed as legal administrator of the estate of the deceased.
in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and

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Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
morality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their REPUBLIC v. ORBECIDO III
national law. G.R. No. 154380. October 5, 2005
Legal Principle: A Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine
Once proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce law and can thus remarry; But before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the
from petitioner, petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him. The effects party pleading it must allege and prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the
foreign law allowing it. Our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. It must also be shown
of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to
that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.
the determination of the trial court.
FACTS: In 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros Villanueva in Ozamis City. Their
(3) Yes. The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children
marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Cipriano's wife left for the United
by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes,
States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife
since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and duties, status,
had been naturalized as an American citizen.
condition and legal capacity."
In 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best
married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live in
proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed
California.
in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In
fact, the will was duly probated.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs
petition, the court granted the same.
may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to
the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional
The Republic, through the OSG, contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is
rights to the decedent's national law.
not applicable because it only applies to a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or
Petition is GRANTED and REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of
for legal separation. OSG further argues that there is no law that governs respondent's
the intrinsic validity of Llorente's will and determination of the parties' successional rights
situation.
allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all
deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists
of Court.
that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to
remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution.

ISSUES:
(1) Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry,
can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
(2) Whether or not the respondent submitted competent evidence concerning the divorce
decree and the naturalization of respondent's wife?

RULING:
(1) Yes. Par. 2 of Article 26 provides: “Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law”.

Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to

CONFLICT OF LAW: CASE DIGESTS

Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino. Thus, PHILSEC INVESTMENT CORP, ET AL. v. CA, DRAGO DAIC, ET AL.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at G.R. No. 103493. June 19, 1997
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them Legal Principle: A party invoking forum non conveniens cannot get a dismissal of the case by filing a
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse motion to dismiss: (1) It is not one of the grounds under Rule 16 (2) The dismissal of the dispute involving
should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of a foreign element requires factual determination of the grounds relied upon. The circumstances that
would show that the Philippine court is an inconvenient forum should be established as a fact.
the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and
injustice.
FACTS: In 1983, respondent Ventura Ducat obtained separate loans from petitioners Ayala
International Finance Limited and Philsec Investment in the sum of US$2.5 million secured
Twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
by shares of stock owned by Ducat with a market value of P14 million.
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and
a foreigner; and
In order to facilitate the payment of the loans, respondent 1488, Inc., through its president,
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
respondent Drago Daic, assumed Ducat's obligation under an Agreement whereby 1488, Inc.
to remarry.
executed a Warranty Deed with Vendor's Lien by which it sold to petitioner Athona Holdings,
N.V. a parcel of land in Texas, U.S.A. for US$2.8 million, while PHILSEC and AYALA extended
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
a loan to ATHONA in the amount of US$2.5 million as initial payment of the purchase price.
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
The balance of US$307,209.02 was to be paid by means of a promissory note executed by
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry. The twin requisites are both present in this case.
ATHONA in favor of 1488, Inc.
Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
Subsequently, upon their receipt of the US$2.5 million from 1488, Inc., PHILSEC and AYALA
(2) No. The records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
released Ducat from his indebtedness and delivered to 1488, Inc. all the shares of stock in
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent's wife. It is settled rule
their possession belonging to Ducat.
that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.
As ATHONA failed to pay the interest on the balance of US$307,209.02, the entire amount
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent must prove his allegation that his wife was
covered by the note became due and demandable.
naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be
recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
Accordingly, respondent 1488, Inc. sued petitioners PHILSEC, AYALA and ATHONA in the
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Such foreign law must also be
United States for payment of the balance of US$307,209.02 and for damages for breach of
proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Furthermore, respondent
contract and for fraud allegedly perpetrated by petitioners in misrepresenting the
must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically
marketability of the shares of stock delivered to 1488, Inc. under the Agreement.
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he
is capacitated to enter into another marriage.
While the Civil Case was pending in the United States, petitioners filed a complaint "For Sum
of Money with Damages and Writ of Preliminary Attachment" against private respondents
Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent's submission of the
in the RTC of Makati.
aforecited evidence in his favor.
Respondent Ducat moved to dismiss Civil Case on the grounds of (1) litis pendentia, vis-a-
Petition by the Republic is GRANTED.
vis Civil Action by 1488, Inc. and Daic in the U.S., (2) forum non conveniens, and (3) the
evidentiary requirements of the controversy may be more suitably tried before the forum
of the litis pendentia in the U.S., under the principle in private international law of forum
non conveniens," even as it noted that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss filed by 1488, Inc. and Daic on the ground of
litis pendentia considering that the "main factual element" of the cause of action in this case
which is the validity of the sale of real property in the United States between defendant
1488 and plaintiff ATHONA is the subject matter of the pending case in the United States
District Court which, under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, is the better forum to

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Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
litigate matters needed to determine the assessment and/or fluctuations of the fair market
value of real estate situated in Houston, Texas.
The CA affirmed the dismissal of the civil case on the ground of litis pendentia and of forum
non conveniens was likewise affirmed by the Court of Appeals on the ground that the case
can be better tried and decided by the U.S. court. The U.S. case and the case at bar arose
from only one main transaction, and involve foreign elements, to wit: 1) the property subject
matter of the sale is situated in Texas, 2) the seller, 1488 Inc. is a non-resident foreign
corporation; 3) although the buyer, Athona Holdings, a foreign corporation which does not
claim to be doing business in the Philippines, is wholly owned by Philsec, a domestic
corporation, Athona Holdings is also owned by BPI-IFL, also a foreign corporation; 4) the
Warranty Deed was executed in Texas, U.S.A.
Private respondents contend that for a foreign judgment to be pleaded as res judicata, a
judgment admitting the foreign decision is not necessary. On the other hand, petitioners
argue that the foreign judgment cannot be given the effect of res judicata without giving
them an opportunity to impeach it on grounds stated in Rule 39, §50 of the Rules of Court,
to wit: "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact."
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not res judicata is applicable?
(2) Whether or not the Principe of Forum Non Conveniens is applicable?
RULING:
(1) It was error for the CA to summarily rule that petitioners' action is barred by the principle
of res judicata. While this court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in
several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for this
purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for enforcement of the foreign judgment.
What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
the court to properly determine its efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect
to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary. Rule 39, §50 provides:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. — The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a
foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the
title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a
right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but
the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners were given the opportunity to challenge
the judgment of the U.S. court as basis for declaring it res judicata or conclusive of the rights
of private respondents. The proceedings in the trial court were summary. Neither the trial
court nor the appellate court was even furnished copies of the pleadings in the U.S. court
or apprised of the evidence presented thereat, to assure a proper determination of
whether the issues then being litigated in the U.S. court were exactly the issues raised in
this case such that the judgment that might be rendered would constitute res judicata.
Petitioners should have the burden of impeaching the foreign judgment and only in the
event they succeed in doing so may they proceed with their action againstrespondents.
(2) No. First, a motion to dismiss is limited to the grounds under Rule 16, §1, which does not
include forum non conveniens. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle
requires a factual determination, hence, it is more properly considered a matter of defense.
Second, while it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming
jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after "vital facts are established, to
determine whether special circumstances" require the court's desistance. The grounds
relied upon should be established as a fact, therefore it cannot be a ground for a MTD, but
it can be raised as a defense. The factual determination should be done after trial on the
merits. Because it’s a matter of defense and therefore best threshed out after trial on the
merits
The trial court abstained from taking jurisdiction solely on the basis of the pleadings filed by
private respondents in connection with the motion to dismiss. It failed to consider that one
of the plaintiffs (PHILSEC) is a domestic corporation and one of the defendants (Ventura
Ducat) is a Filipino, and that it was the extinguishment of the latter's debt which was the
object of the transaction under litigation. The trial court arbitrarily dismissed the case even
after finding that Ducat was not a party in the U.S. case.
Third. It was error for the CA and the trial court to hold that jurisdiction over 1488, Inc. and
Daic could not be obtained because this is an action in personam and summons were served
by extraterritorial service. Rule 14, §17 on extraterritorial service provides that service of
summons on a non-resident defendant may be effected out of the Philippines by leave of
Court where, among others, "the property of the defendant has been attached within the
Philippines." It is not disputed that the properties, real and personal, of the private
respondents had been attached prior to service of summons under the Order of the trial
court dated April 20, 1987.
Decision of the CA is REVERSED and is REMANDED to the RTC for further proceedings in
accordance with this decision.
CONFLICT OF LAW: CASE DIGESTS
Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
RAYTHEON INTERNATIONAL v. ROUZIE, JR.
G.R. No. 162894. February 26, 2008
Legal Principle: Doctrine of forum non conveniens - a court, in Conflict of Law cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties
are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere; But Forum non conveniens cannot be a ground for
a motion to dismiss unless the circumstances that would show that the Philippine court is an
inconvenient forum is established as a fact.; Phases in deciding COL cases: 1) jurisdiction 2) choice of
law 3) recognition and enforcement of judgments. The court can decide if: 1) it is one to which the parties
may conveniently resort; 2) it is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to law and facts; 3) it has
or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision.
FACTS: Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the State of Connecticut, and respondent Stockton Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen,
entered into a contract whereby BMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale of
services in several government projects in the Philippines for an agreed remuneration of 10% of the
gross receipts.
In 1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic of the Philippines on behalf of BMSI
for the dredging of rivers affected by the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.
In 1994, respondent filed before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC a suit against petitioners BMSI and
Rust International, Inc., Rodney Gilbert and Walter Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions,
illegal termination and breach of employment contract.
Labor Arbiter. Espiritu, Jr. rendered judgment ordering BMSI and RUST to pay respondent's money
claims.
The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and dismissed respondent's complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. Respondent elevated the case to the Supreme Court but was dismissed
and the Resolution became final and executory in 1998.
In 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union, instituted an action for damages before the RTC
against Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST, the two corporations impleaded in the
earlier labor case.
Petitioner asserts that the written contract, "Special Sales Representative Agreement”, between
respondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is, that the contract shall be governed
by the laws of the State of Connecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements in the dispute
—the parties and witnesses involved are American corporations and citizens and the evidence to be
presented is located outside the Philippines — that renders our local courts inconvenient forums.
Petitioner theorizes that the foreign elements of the dispute necessitate the immediate application of
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
The trial court ruled that the principle of forum non conveniens was inapplicable because the trial court
could enforce judgment on petitioner, it being a foreign corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines.
CA deferred to the discretion of the trial court when the latter decided not to desist from assuming
jurisdiction on the ground of the inapplicability of the principle of forum non conveniens.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens?
RULING: No. Petitioner's averments of the foreign elements in the instant case are not sufficient to oust
the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and the parties involved. There are three consecutive
phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems, namely:
(1) jurisdiction
(2) choice of law, and
(3) recognition and enforcement of judgments.
Where the Court held that the local judicial machinery was adequate to resolve controversies with a
foreign element, the following requisites had to be proved:
(1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort;
(2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts;
and
(3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have the power to enforce its decision.
On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem where the case is filed in a Philippine
court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res, it may or
can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties
point to a foreign forum. This is an exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case
is filed.
Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the
law and by the material allegations in the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is
entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. The case is an action for
damages arising from an alleged breach of contract. Undoubtedly, the nature of the action and the
amount of damages prayed are within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein plaintiff upon
the filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of defendant was acquired
by its voluntary appearance in court.
That the subject contract included a stipulation that the same shall be governed by the laws of the
State of Connecticut does not suggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal for
that matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdiction and choice of law are two
distinct concepts:
Jurisdiction Choice of law
considers whether it is fair to cause a asks the further question whether the
defendant to travel to this state application of a substantive law which will
determine the merits of the case is fair to
both parties
The choice of law stipulation will become
relevant only when the substantive issues of
the instant case develop, that is, after hearing
on the merits proceeds before the trial court
Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on the principle of forum non conveniens requires
a factual determination; hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. While it is
within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should
do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the
court's desistance.
Petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
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Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
MANILA HOTEL CORP. & MANILA HOTEL INTL. v. NLRC ARBITER DIOSANA and SANTOS
G.R. No. 120077. October 13, 2000
Legal Principle: FORUM NON CONVENIENS; REQUISITES. — Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a
Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that
the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court
is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine
court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. NLRC is not a convenient forum - the proper
defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL are not nationals of the Philippines. Neither are they "doing
business in the Philippines." Likewise, the main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents
of the Philippines.
FACTS: Respondent Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker employed as printer at the
Mazoon Printing Press, Sultanate of Oman. While in Oman, he received a letter from Mr.
Gerald Shmidt, General Manager of Palace Hotel, Beijing, China, offering him the same
position as printer with a higher monthly salary and increased benefits as he was
recommended by his friend Nestor Buenio. Palace Hotel is a member of the Manila Hotel
Group. Santos signified his acceptance in 1988.
In 1989, the Palace Hotel informed respondent Santos by letter signed by Mr. Shmidt that
his employment at the Palace Hotel print shop will be terminated due to business reverses
brought about by the political upheaval in China.
The Palace Hotel terminated the employment of respondent Santos and paid all benefits
due him, including his plane fare back to the Philippines.
Respondent Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against MHC, MHICL, the Palace
Hotel and Mr. Shmidt before the Arbitration Branch of the NLRC. The Palace Hotel and Mr.
Shmidt were not served with summons and neither participated in the proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter. Subsequently, the Labor Arbiter decided against MHC and MHICL.
MHC and MHICL appealed to the NLRC which decided in favor of Santos. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC was the convenient forum to decide the dispute?
RULING: No. NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum. There are three elements that
are required before a Philippine court can proceed taking cognizance of a dispute involving
foreign elements:
1. The local court is the court to which the parties can conveniently resort to
2. It must be in the best position to render an intelligent decision as to the facts or the law
3. It must have the adequate machinery to enforce the ruling.
None of these requisites were present in this case. The only link that the Philippines has
with the case is that respondent Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL
are foreign corporations. The Defendants were neither residents nor doing business in the
Philippines.
The employment contract — Respondent Santos was hired directly by the Palace Hotel, a foreign
employer. There is no way that the Philippine court be the convenient forum and neither is it in the
best position to render an intelligent decision as to the facts or the law because the employment
contract was governed by foreign laws, applying lex loci celebracionis. He was hired without the
intervention of the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the government.
Not Convenient — We fail to see how the NLRC is a convenient forum given that all the incidents of the
case — from the time of recruitment, to employment to dismissal occurred outside the Philippines. The
inconvenience is compounded by the fact that the proper defendants, the Palace Hotel and MHICL
are not nationals of the Philippines. Neither are they "doing business in the Philippines." Likewise, the
main witnesses, Mr. Shmidt and Mr. Henk are non-residents of the Philippines.
No power to determine applicable law. — Neither can an intelligent decision be made as to the law
governing the employment contract as such was perfected in foreign soil. This calls to fore the
application of the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract was
made). The employment contract was not perfected in the Philippines. Respondent Santos signified
his acceptance by writing a letter while he was in the Republic of Oman. This letter was sent to the
Palace Hotel in the People's Republic of China.
No power to determine the facts. — Neither can the NLRC determine the facts surrounding the alleged
illegal dismissal as all acts complained of took place in Beijing. The NLRC was not in a position to
determine whether the Tiannamen Square incident truly adversely affected operations of the Palace
Hotel as to justify respondent Santos' retrenchment.
Principle of effectiveness, no power to execute decision — Even assuming that a proper decision could
be reached by the NLRC, such would not have any binding effect against the employer, the Palace Hotel.
The Palace Hotel is a corporation incorporated under the laws of China and was not even served with
summons. Jurisdiction over its person was not acquired.
Remedy - If Santos were an "overseas contract worker," a Philippine forum, specifically the POEA, not
the NLRC, would protect him. However, he is not an "overseas contract worker," a fact which he admits
with conviction. He was hired directly by the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence
sent to the Sultanate of Oman where he was then employed. He was hired without the intervention of
the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the government.
Further, it is basic that a corporation has a personality separate and distinct from those
composing it as well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. Clear
and convincing evidence is needed to pierce the veil of corporate fiction. The Court found
no evidence to show that MHICL and MHC are one and the same entity. Moreover, when
one "notes" a contract, one is not expressing his agreement or approval, as a party would.
In Sichangco v. Board of Commissioners of Immigration, the Court recognized that the term
"noted" means that the person so noting has merely taken cognizance of the existence of
an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious deliberation or rendering a decision on
the matter. Considering that no employer-employee relationship existed between MHICL,
MHC and respondent Santos, the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over respondent's claim.
SC GRANTS the petition for certiorari and ANNULS the orders and resolutions of the NLRC.
CONFLICT OF LAW: CASE DIGESTS
Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA vs. AMERICAN REALTY CORP & CA
G.R. No. 133876. December 29, 1999
Legal Principle: Even if the foreign law should have been applicable pursuant to our Conflict of Law rules,
such application cannot be had if such application would contravene our own public policy. In this case,
the public policy sought to be protected is the principle proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of
action. Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to
the citizens or residents of the forum.
FACTS: Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing
institution duly licensed to do business in the Philippines, organized and existing under and
by virtue of the laws of the State of California, while respondent American Realty
Corporation (ARC) is a domestic corporation.
Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), on the other hand, is a limited liability
company organized and existing under the laws of England.
BANTSA and BAIL on several occasions granted three major multi-million US Dollar loans to
three corporate borrowers, all of which are existing under and by virtue of the laws of the
Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private respondent.
When the borrowers failed to pay the loan, they requested for the restructuring of their
loan. As additional security for the restructured loans, private respondent ARC as third party
mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages over its parcels of land including
improvements in Bulacan.
Despite the restructuring agreement, the 3 corporate borrowers failed to pay, prompting
petitioner BANTSA to file civil actions for the collection of the principal loan before foreign
courts in England and HongKong. ARC, being a third party mortgagor, was not impleaded as
party-defendant.
During the pendency of the collection suit, petitioner BANTSA filed before the Office of the
Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan an application for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage. The mortgaged real properties were then sold at public with ICCS as the highest
bidder.
This prompted ARC to institute an action for damages, alleging that it was illegal for the Bank
of America to still foreclose the mortgage when it already decided to collect the unpaid loan
by filing a collection suit before the courts in England and Hongkong, invoking the rule
enforced in the Philippines which prohibits the splitting of a single cause of action.
The rule provides that a single cause of action may allow a party to resort to two or more
remedies but because there is only one cause of action, the resort to these remedies should
be on an alternative basis and not cumulative. If the party avails of one remedy arising from
one single cause of action, he is deemed to have abandoned the other remedies.
Applying the principle, ARC argues that since Bank of America already decided to collect the
loan by filing a collection suit before the courts of England and Hongkong, it should not have
foreclosed the mortgaged.
The bank argued that in all the loan contracts between the bank and the borrowers, it is
stipulated that any dispute that may arise out of the transaction should be governed by the
laws of England. Under English law, splitting a single cause of action is not prohibited and
thus the creditor may resort to both remedies: to file an action for collection and, at the
same time, enforce the security.
Additionally, petitioner submits that a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure requires the
concurrence of two requisites: an ordinary civil action for collection should be filed and
subsequently a final judgment be correspondingly rendered therein.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision declaring that the filing in foreign courts by
the bank of collection suits against the principal debtors operated as a waiver of the security
of the mortgages.
The CA affirmed the assailed decision of the lower court.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the Philippine law or English law should apply?
(2) Whether or not the requisites of filing the action for collection and rendition of final
judgment should concur?
RULING:
(1) Philippine law shall apply notwithstanding the evidence presented by petitioner to prove
the English law on the matter.
A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. Thus, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is
the same as our local or domestic or internal law. This is what we refer to as the doctrine of
processual presumption.
Assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved
in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence, said
foreign law would still not find applicability for being contrary to a sound and established
public policy of the forum.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
upon in a foreign country.
CONFLICT OF LAW: CASE DIGESTS
Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action. Section 4, Rule 2 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of
the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
available as a ground for the dismissal of the others."
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
By filing the four civil actions and by eventually foreclosing extrajudicially the mortgages,
petitioner in effect transgressed the rules against splitting a cause of action well-enshrined
in jurisprudence and our statute books.
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.
(2) No. In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed
alternative and not cumulative. An election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other.
Accordingly, petitioner, by the expediency of filing four civil suits before foreign courts,
necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgages constituted over
the properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private respondent ARC.
Incidentally, BANTSA alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the
governing law with regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its
security interest by simply filing civil actions for sums of money.
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
YAO KEE, ET AL. v. AIDA SY-GONZALES, ET AL.
G.R. No. 55960. November 24, 1988
Legal Principle: Doctrine of Processual presumption - When the proper foreign law has not been
properly proved, the court of the forum may presume that said foreign law is the same as its local or
domestic law, which it can now apply; Article 12 of the Civil Code requires that "a custom must be proved
as a fact, according to the rules of evidence"; To establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be
proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign
marriage by convincing evidence.
FACTS: Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died in 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then residing,
leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300K more or
less.
The respondents - Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy – are
his children with common law wife. They filed a petition for the grant of letters of
administration. They do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her
children to him.
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, allegedly the wife of Sy Kiat in China, and her children.
The probate court ruled in favor of the oppositors Yao Kee and appointed Sze Sook Wah,
eldest son, as the administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased.
The CA declared respondents Aida Sy-Gonzales as acknowledged natural children of the
deceased with Asuncion Gillego, and the petitioner Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun
Yen as the acknowledged natural children of the deceased with his Chinese wife Yao Kee
since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China had not been
proven to be valid to the laws of China.
Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and
custom was conclusively proven.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Sy Kiat and Yao Kee was conclusively proven.?
RULING: No. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other
fact. Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be
presumed that it is the same as ours. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the
rules of evidence. A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of
justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact.
Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as is known
here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Kiat was
celebrated, her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
The petitioners relied on the following testimonial and documentary evidence:
CONFLICT OF LAW: CASE DIGESTS
Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
1. Testimony of Yao Kee: Admitting that she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to
agree upon the betrothal of their children. That the practice during the time of her marriage was a written document [is exchanged] just
between the parents of the bride and the parents of the groom, or any elder for that matter. The document is signed only by the parents
of the bridegroom as well as by the parents of the bride. The parties themselves do not sign the document. She doubt if that document
can still be found.
2. Testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he was among the many people who attended the wedding of
his sister with Sy Kiat and that no marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by the parents or elders
of the parties being sufficient.
3. Statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial court to the effect that Sy Kiat was married to Yao Kee
according to Chinese custom; and Sy Kiat's admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he married according to Chinese custom.
4. Sy Kiat's Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3, 1972 where the following entries are found: "Marital
status — Married"; "If married give name of spouse — Yao Kee"; "Address — China"; "Date of marriage — 1931"; and "Place of marriage
— China”.
5. Sy Kiat's Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968 where the following entries are likewise found: "Civil
status — Married"; and, "If married, state name and address of spouse — Yao Kee Chingkang, China".
6. Certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the People's Republic of China to the effect that "according to the
information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were married on January
19, 1931 in Fukien, China.
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat. However, the
same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law or custom.
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to
an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:
SEC. 45.Unwritten law. — The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law of a
foreign country, as are also printed and published books of reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to
be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25, thus:
SEC. 25.Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the
office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul
general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom
of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's
law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there
is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign
law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom,
the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction.
As petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of China,
they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural
children.
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased's acknowledged natural children with
Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years without the benefit of
marriage. They have in their favor their father's acknowledgment, evidenced by a compromise
agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the Court in 1974 wherein Sy
Kiat not only acknowledged them as his children by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for
their support and future inheritance.
Decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
RECTO v. ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN and FRED M. HARDEN
G.R. No. L-6897. November 29, 1956.
Legal Principle: Following the nationality principle in determining the status and dissolution of the
marriage, divorce can be granted to the spouses because they are nationals of country whose laws
allow divorce.
FACTS: Esperanza Harden, an American citizen, engaged the services of Atty. Recto to
appear and act as her counsel in the action which she filed against her husband Fred, an
American citizen, for increasing the amount of support she was receiving and for preserving
her rights in the conjugal partnership between them.
She was planning to file a divorce suit in California. In the contract of professional services,
Mrs. Harden agreed to pay Recto monthly during the pendency of the litigation and until
the termination of the case, twenty-five (25%) per cent of the total increase in allowance or
pension which may be awarded to her by the court over and above the amount of P1,500.00
which she now receives monthly from her husband out of the funds of the conjugal
partnership. She further stipulated that: should the case be terminated or an amicable
settlement be arrived at by the parties before the expiration of two years from the date of
the filing of the complaint, she shall continue to pay the said 25% up to the end of said
period. That the said monthly payments shall be in whatever amount the court will fix as
attorney’s fees.
She also agreed to pay said Recto twenty 20% of the value of the share and participation
which she may receive in the funds and properties of the said conjugal partnership. All
expenses in connection with the litigation are to be for Mrs. Harden’s account.
As agreed, they filed a complaint against Mrs. Harden’s husband for support.
Subsequently, the Philippines was invaded by the Japanese and placed under military
occupation. Then came the liberation, in the course of which the records of the case were
destroyed. Said records were reconstituted at the instance of appellee herein. Thereafter,
the proceedings were resumed, the CFI of Manila ruled in their favor. The other party
appealed.
But during the pendency of the appeal, Mrs. Harden and husband agreed to settle and
"vacate all orders and judgments rendered, and abandon and nullify all her claims to the
conjugal partnership existing between her and Mr. Harden".
Atty. Recto as counsel of Mrs. Harden now demands for the amounts Ms. Harden promised
as his attorney’s fees. He is claiming from the property under receivership that belonged to
Mrs. Harden’s husband, Fred.
As defense, Harden spouses argues that Atty. Recto the contract of services is void its object
was unlawful noting divorce is not allowed in the Philippines. They claim that the contract
is invalid in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code.
CONFLICT OF LAW: CASE DIGESTS
Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether Mrs. Harden cannot bind the conjugal partnership without her husband's
consent?
(2) Whether or not Article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect prohibits
contingent fees?
(3) Whether or not the contract in question has for its purpose to secure a decree of
divorce, allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines?
(4) Whether or not that the terms of said contract are harsh, inequitable and oppressive??
RULING:
(1) The first objection has no foundation in fact, for the contract in dispute does not seek to
bind the conjugal partnership. By virtue of said contract, Mrs. Harden merely
bound herself — or assumed the personal obligation — to pay, by way of contingent fees,
20% of her share in said partnership. The contract neither gives, nor purports to give, to the
appellee any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaid share. The amount
thereof is simply a basis for the computation of said fees.
(2) No. It has already been held that contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines
and are impliedly sanctioned by our Canons (No. 13) of Professional Ethics. There is
absolutely nothing in the records to show that Atty. Recto had, in any manner, taken an
unfair or unreasonable advantage of his client Mrs. Harden.
(3) The third objection is not borne out, either by the language of the contract between
them, or by the intent of the parties. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce, or to
facilitate or promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest
of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a divorce suit she
intended to file in the United States.
What is more, inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Harden are admittedly citizens of the United
States, their status and the dissolution thereof are governed — pursuant to Article 9 of
the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the execution
of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines — by the
laws of the United States, which sanction divorce. In short, the contract of services is not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
4. The last objection is based upon principles of equity, but, pursuant thereto, one who seeks
equity must come with clean hands and the spouses Harden had not done so, for the
circumstances surrounding the case show, to our satisfaction, that their aforementioned
agreements, ostensibly for the settlement of the differences between husband and wife,
were made for the purpose of circumventing or defeating the rights of Recto, under his
above-quoted contract of services with Mrs. Harden. Indeed, having secured a judgment
in her favor, acknowledging her rights to the assets of the conjugal partnership, which
turned out to be worth almost P4,000,000 in addition to litis expensae in the sum of
P175,000, it is inconceivable that Mrs. Harden would have waived such rights, as well as the
benefits of all orders and judgments in her favor, in consideration of the paltry sum of $5,000
allegedly paid to her by Mr. Harden and the additional sum of $20,000 to be paid by him in
installments, at the rate of $500 a month.
In fact, no explanation has been given for this most unusual avowed settlement between
Mr. and Mrs. Harden. One cannot even consider the possibility of a reconciliation between
the spouses, the same being inconsistent with the monetary consideration for said alleged
settlement. What is more, the records show that the relations between said spouses —
which were bad indeed, not only in July, 1941, when Mrs. Harden engaged the services of
the appellee, but, even, before, for Mr. and Mrs. Harden were separated since 1938 — had
worsened considerably thereafter, as evidence by an action for divorce filed by Mr. Harden
in New Jersey, in July 1948, upon the ground of repeated acts of infidelity allegedly
committed by Mrs. Harden in 1940 and 1941.
Harden’s Contention: he has already been paid by his immediate execution pending appeal of the
decision in the civil case wherein he collected the sum of P176,000.00 for all such legal services
Supreme Court: Said decision, however, states clearly that the aforementioned sum of P175,000
represents litis expensae, and the contract between the appellee and Mrs. Harden explicitly declares
that said litis expensae shall be "in addition to" appellee's share of 25% of the increase in the allowance
of Mrs. Harden and his attorney's fees of 20% of her share in the conjugal partnership. The second
assignment of error is, therefore, devoid of merit.
6. Harden’s Contention: The contract of services in question provides that appellee's contingent fees
shall be 20% of the share of Mrs. Harden in the conjugal partnership. Pursuant to law, the share of Mrs.
Harden shall be determined upon the liquidation of said partnership, which has not taken place, as yet.
What is more, it cannot be effected until the dissolution of the marriage relation between Mr. and Mrs.
Harden. Inasmuch as this relation subsists, it follows that the amount of attorney's fees due to appellee
herein should not have been determined in the decision appealed from.
Supreme Court: This line of argument overlooks the fact that said contract of services was made,
principally, in contemplation of a suit for divorce that, according to Mrs. Harden, she intended to file
before a competent court in California, "and of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership between"
her and Mr. Harden. Had she filed said action for divorce and secured a decree of divorce, said conjugal
partnership would have been dissolved and then liquidated, and the share of Mrs. Harden therein would
have been fixed. However, this cannot take place, either now, or in the foreseeable future, owing to the
aforementioned agreements between Mr. and Mrs. Harden, which were made for the evident purpose
of defeating appellee's claim for attorney's fees. In other words, the occurrence, within the time
contemplated by the parties — bearing in mind the nature of, and the circumstances under which they
entered into, said contract of services — of the event upon which the amount of said fees depended,
was rendered impossible by Mrs. Harden.
Hence, whether such event be regarded as a condition or as a period, she may not insist upon its
occurrence, prior to the enforcement of the rights of the herein appellee, for "the condition shall be
deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment" (Art. 1186, Civil Code) and "the
debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period" when he "violates any undertaking, in
consideration of which the creditor agreed to the period." (Art. 1198, Civil Code.)
CONFLICT OF LAW: CASE DIGESTS
Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
PIONEER CONCRETE PHILS, ET AL. v. TODARO
G.R. No. 154830. June 8, 2007
Legal Principle: The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to
dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a ground. While it
is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should
do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require the
court's desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle of forum non
conveniens requires a factual determination, hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense .
FACTS: In 1998, respondent Todaro filed with the RTC of Makati City, a complaint for Sum
of Money and Damages with Preliminary Attachment against five petitioners:
1. Pioneer International Limited (PIL) is a corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of Australia and is principally engaged in the ready-mix concrete and concrete
aggregates business.
2. Pioneer Philippines Holdings, Inc. (PPHI) is the company established by PIL to own and
hold the stocks of its operating company in the Philippines.
3. Pioneer Concrete Philippines, Inc. (PCPI) is the company established by PIL to
undertake its business of ready-mix concrete, concrete aggregates and quarrying
operations in the Philippines.
4. McDonald, the Chief Executive of the Hongkong office of PIL
5. Klepzig, the President and Managing Director of PPHI and PCPI.
Todaro has been the managing director Betonval, a company engaged in pre-mixed concrete
and concrete aggregate production. He resigned in 1996. Two months after, PIL contacted
Todaro and asked him if he was available to join them in connection with their intention to
establish a ready-mix concrete plant and other related operations in the Philippines.
Subsequently, PIL and Todaro came to an agreement wherein the former consented to
engage the services of the latter as a consultant for two to three months, after which, he
would be employed as th manager of PIL's ready-mix concrete operations should the
company decide to invest in the Philippines. Successively, PIL started its operations in the
Philippines. However, it refused to comply with its undertaking to employ Todaro on a
permanent basis.
PPHI, PCPI and Klepzig separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the basis, among
others, of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Petitioners contend that since the majority
of the defendants in the present case are not residents of the Philippines, they are not
subject to compulsory processes of the Philippine court handling the case for purposes of
requiring their attendance during trial. Even assuming that they can be summoned, their
appearance would entail excessive costs.
Petitioners further assert that there is no allegation in the complaint from which one can conclude
that the evidence to be presented during the trial can be better obtained in the Philippines.
Moreover, the events which led to the present controversy occurred outside the Philippines.
Respondent, on the other hand, avers that the question of whether a suit should be entertained
or dismissed on the basis of the principle of forum non conveniens depends largely upon the facts
of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, who is in the best
position to determine whether special circumstances require that the court desist from assuming
jurisdiction over the suit.
RTC denied petitioners' motions to dismiss. The CA denied petitioners' Petition for Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed based on the ground of doctrine of
forum non conveniens?
RULING:
(1) The doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be used as a ground for a motion to
dismiss because Sec. 1, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include said doctrine as a
ground.
While it is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on
this ground, it should do so only after vital facts are established, to determine whether
special circumstances require the court's desistance; and that the propriety of dismissing a
case based on this principle of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination,
hence it is more properly considered a matter of defense. In the present case, the factual
circumstances cited by petitioners which would allegedly justify the application of the
doctrine of forum non conveniens are matters of defense, the merits of which should
properly be threshed out during trial.
The doctrine of forum non conveniens, literally meaning 'the forum is inconvenient', emerged in private
international law to deter the practice of global forum shopping, that is to prevent non-resident
litigants from choosing the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for malicious reasons, such as to
secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or
to select a more friendly venue. Under this doctrine, a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse
impositions on its jurisdiction where it is not the most "convenient" or available forum and the parties
are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
Whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of said doctrine depends largely upon
the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.
Other issues:
(2) The issue is a matter which is not ripe for determination in the present case; rather, this issue must
be taken up during trial, considering that its resolution would necessarily entail an examination of
the veracity of the allegations not only of herein respondent as plaintiff but also of petitioners as
defendants.
(3) In the present case, no employer-employee relationship exists between petitioners and respondent.
In fact, in his complaint, private respondent is not seeking any relief under the Labor Code, but seeks
payment of damages on account of petitioners' alleged breach of their obligation under their
agreement to employ him. It is settled that an action for breach of contractual obligation is intrinsically
a civil dispute. In the alternative, respondent seeks redress on the basis of the provisions of Articles 19
and 21 of the Civil Code. Hence, it is clear that the present action is within the realm of civil law, and
jurisdiction over it belongs to the regular courts.
Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the CA are AFFIRMED.
CONFLICT OF LAW: CASE DIGESTS
Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
NAVIDA, ET AL. v. JUDGE DIZON, JR., SHELL OIL CO., ET AL. Second, the RTC of General Santos City declared that the tort alleged in their complaint is a
G.R. No. 125078. May 30, 2011 tort category that is not recognized in Philippine laws. Averments describe and identify the
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J p: category of specific tort known as product liability tort.
Legal Principle: The fact that the plaintiffs were all Filipinos. The workers, material witness, and the .
doctors were all based in the Philippines. The place where they claimed to have been exposed to the The lower court also opined that the decision of the U.S. District Court dismissing the case
pesticide were located in the Philippines. The alleged cause of action also took place in the Philippines. is not yet final and executory since both the plaintiffs and defendants appealed.
The Philippine court was the convenient forum.
Consequently, since the authority of the agent of the defendants in the Philippines is
conditioned on the final adjudication of the case pending with the U.S. courts, the
FACTS: Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state
acquisition of jurisdiction by the court over the persons of the defendants is also
courts by citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of
conditional.
plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to
dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a chemical used to kill worms, while working on farms in 23
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of
foreign countries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal
defendant companies occurred within Philippine territory. Specifically, the use of and
District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division.
exposure to DBCP that was manufactured, distributed or otherwise put into the stream of
commerce by defendant companies happened in the Philippines. Said fact allegedly
The defendants in the consolidated cases prayed for the dismissal of all the actions under
constitutes reasonable basis for our courts to assume jurisdiction over the case.
the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed to defendant companies constitute a quasi-
In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the Federal District Court conditionally
delict, which falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. DOLE posits that the Philippines is
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. In the event that the highest court of any foreign
the situs of the tortious acts allegedly committed by defendant companies as NAVIDA, et
country finally affirms the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an action commenced by a
al., and ABELLA, et al., point to their alleged exposure to DBCP which occurred in the
plaintiff in these actions in his home country or the country in which he was injured, that
Philippines, as the cause of the sterility and other reproductive system problems that they
plaintiff may return to this court and, upon proper motion, the court will resume jurisdiction
allegedly suffered. Fi
over the action as if the case had never been dismissed for forum non conveniens.
ISSUE: Whether the Philippine court was the convenient forum to decide the dispute?
In accordance with the above Memorandum and Order, a total of 336 plaintiffs from General
Santos City filed a Joint Complaint in the RTC of General Santos City.
RULING: Yes. The allegations in the complaints constitute the cause of action of plaintiff
claimants — a quasi-delict, which under the Civil Code is defined as an act, or omission
NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of the illnesses and injuries to
which causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence.
the reproductive systems which they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides: “Whoever by act or omission causes damage
They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this chemical during the early 1970's
to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
up to the early 1980's when they used the same in the banana plantations where they
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
worked at; and/or when they resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter”
used. NAVIDA, et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or
negligence of each of the defendant companies in that they produced, sold and/or
What determines the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action pleaded as
otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing products. According to
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments therein and the character
NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said products, which the defendant
of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the former's health and
well-being.
In this case, the injuries and illnesses they allegedly suffered resulted from their exposure
to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantations located in the Philippines or
The RTC of General Santos City issued an Order dismissing the complaint. It ruled that the
while they were residing within the agricultural areas also located in the Philippines. The
substance of the cause of action as stated in the complaint against the defendant foreign
factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of action, which
companies cites activity on their part which took place abroad and had occurred outside and
undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of
beyond the territorial domain of the Philippines.
Davao City obviously have reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.

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Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action took place
abroad and had occurred outside and beyond the territorial boundaries of the Philippines,.
Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the act
complained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases.
In personal civil actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow
the action to be commenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs
or defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found,
at the election of the plaintiff.
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove the claims are available only in
the Philippines.
1. Plaintiff claimants are all residents of the Philippines, either in General Santos City or in
Davao City.
2. The specific areas where they were allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within
the territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et
al., initially filed their claims for damages.
3. The testimonial and documentary evidence from important witnesses, such as doctors,
co-workers, family members and other members of the community, would be easier to
gather in the Philippines.
4. Considering the great number of plaintiff claimants involved in this case, it is not far-
fetched to assume that voluminous records are involved in the presentation of evidence to
support the claim of plaintiff claimants.
Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that the alleged cause of action against
the defendant companies for damages occurred in the Philippines, demonstrate that, apart
from the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City having jurisdiction over the
subject matter in the instant civil cases, they are, indeed, the convenient fora for trying these
cases.
This is in consonance with the lex loci delicti commisi theory in determining the situs of a
tort, which states that the law of the place where the alleged wrong was committed will
govern the action.
Court GRANTS the petitions for review on certiorari and REMAND the records of this case
to the respective Regional Trial Courts of origin for further and appropriate proceedings in
line with the ruling that said courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the amended
complaints.
The Court likewise GRANTS the motion filed by Del Monte to withdraw its petition in G.R.
No. 127856. In view of the previous grant of the motion to withdraw the petition in G.R. No.
125598, both G.R. Nos. 127856 and 125598 are considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED.
KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA & NIPPON ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS CO., v. MINORU
KITAMURA
G.R. No. 149177. November 23, 2007.
Legal Principle: Where the only issue in the case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only
inapplicable but also not yet called for; Before determining which law should apply, first there should
exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law
of a foreign country is invoked to provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such
law must be pleaded and proved.
FACTS: Nippon Engineering Consultants, a Japanese consultancy firm providing technical and
management support in the infrastructure projects of foreign governments, entered into an
Independent Contractor Agreement (ICA) with respondent Minoru Kitamura, a Japanese
national permanently residing in the Philippines.
The agreement provides that respondent was to extend professional services to Nippon for a year
starting April 1, 1999. Nippon then assigned respondent to work as the project manager of the
Southern Tagalog Access Road (STAR) Project in the Philippines, following the company's
consultancy contract with the Philippine Government.
When the STAR Project was near completion, the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) engaged the consultancy services of Nippon, this time for the detailed engineering and
construction supervision of the Bongabon-Baler Road Improvement (BBRI) Project. MINORU
KITAMURA was named as the project manager in the contract’s aappendix.
Kazuhiro Hasegawa, Nippon's general manager for its International Division, informed
respondent that the company had no more intention of automatically renewing his ICA. His
services would be engaged by the company only up to the substantial completion of the STAR
Project on March 31, 2000, just in time for the ICA's expiry.
Threatened with impending unemployment, respondent, through his lawyer, requested a
negotiation conference and demanded that he be assigned to the BBRI project.
Nippon insisted that respondent's contract was for a fixed term that had already expired, and
refused to negotiate for the renewal of the ICA.
As he was not able to generate a positive response from the petitioners, respondent consequently
initiated a case for specific performance and damages with the RTC of Lipa City.
Nippon moved to dismiss arguing that the ICA had been perfected in Japan and executed by and
between Japanese nationals. They asserted that the claim for improper pre-termination of
respondent's ICA could only be heard and ventilated in the proper courts of Japan following the
principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex contractus.
In the meantime, the DPWH approved Nippon's request for the replacement of Kitamura by a
certain Y. Kotake as project manager of the BBRI Project.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the premise that matters connected with the
performance of contracts are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance.
CONFLICT OF LAW: CASE DIGESTS
Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.

The CA ruled, among others, that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the
case, because nowhere in the pleadings was the validity of the written agreement put in issue.
The CA thus declared that the trial court was correct in applying instead the principle of lex loci
solutionis.
Asserting that the RTC of Lipa City is an inconvenient forum, petitioners question its jurisdiction
to hear and resolve the civil case for specific performance and damages filed by the respondent.
The ICA subject of the litigation was entered into and perfected in Tokyo, Japan, by Japanese
nationals, and written wholly in the Japanese language. Thus, petitioners posit that local courts
have no substantial relationship to the parties following the state of the most significant
relationship rule in Private International Law.
ISSUE: Whether the subject matter jurisdiction of Philippine courts in civil cases for specific
performance and damages involving contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals
may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus, the "state of the most
significant relationship rule," or forum non conveniens?
RULING: The power to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional
authority to apply forum law. While jurisdiction and the choice of the lex fori will often coincide,
the "minimum contacts" for one do not always provide the necessary "significant contacts" for
the other. The question of whether the law of a state can be applied to a transaction is different
from the question of whether the courts of that state have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.
There are three consecutive phases involved in judicial resolution of conflicts-of-laws problems,
namely:
(1) jurisdiction
(2) choice of law, and
(3) recognition and enforcement of judgments.
In this case, only the first phase is at issue — jurisdiction. Jurisdiction, however, has various
aspects. For a court to validly exercise its power to adjudicate a controversy, it must have
jurisdiction over the plaintiff or the petitioner, over the defendant or the respondent, over the
subject matter, over the issues of the case and, in cases involving property, over the res or the
thing which is the subject of the litigation. In assailing the trial court's jurisdiction herein,
petitioners are actually referring to subject matter jurisdiction.
In the instant case, petitioners, in their motion to dismiss, do not claim that the trial court is not
properly vested by law with jurisdiction to hear the subject controversy for, case for specific
performance and damages is one not capable of pecuniary estimation and is properly cognizable
by the RTC of Lipa City. What they rather raise as grounds to question subject matter jurisdiction
are the principles of lex loci celebrationis and lex
contractus, and the "state of the most significant relationship rule."
The Court finds the invocation of these grounds unsound. DCASIT
Lex loci celebrationis relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony" or the law of the place
where a contract is made.
The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the " law of the place where a contract
is executed or to be performed." It controls the nature, construction, and validity of the contract
and it may pertain to the law voluntarily agreed upon by the parties or the law intended by them
either expressly or implicitly.
Under the "state of the most significant relationship rule," to ascertain what state law to apply
to a dispute, the court should determine which state has the most substantial connection to the
occurrence and the parties. In a case involving a contract, the court should consider where the
contract was made, was negotiated, was to be performed, and the domicile, place of business,
or place of incorporation of the parties. This rule takes into account several contacts and
evaluates them according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue to be
resolved.
Since these three principles in conflict of laws make reference to the law applicable to a dispute,
they are rules proper for the second phase, the choice of law. They determine which state's law
is to be applied in resolving the substantive issues of a conflicts problem.
Necessarily, as the only issue in this case is that of jurisdiction, choice-of-law rules are not only
inapplicable but also not yet called for.
Further, petitioners' premature invocation of choice-of-law rules is exposed by the fact that they
have not yet pointed out any conflict between the laws of Japan and ours. Before determining
which law should apply, first there should exist a conflict of laws situation requiring the
application of the conflict of laws rules. Also, when the law of a foreign country is invoked to
provide the proper rules for the solution of a case, the existence of such law must be pleaded
and proved.
It should be noted that when a conflicts case, one involving a foreign element, is brought before
a court or administrative agency, there are three alternatives open to the latter in disposing of
it:
(1) dismiss the case, either because of lack of jurisdiction or refusal to assume jurisdiction over the case;
(2) assume jurisdiction over the case and apply the internal law of the forum; or
(3) assume jurisdiction over the case and take into account or apply the law of some other State or
States. The court's power to hear cases and controversies is derived from the Constitution and the laws.
While it may choose to recognize laws of foreign nations, the court is not limited by foreign sovereign
law short of treaties or other formal agreements, even in matters regarding rights provided by foreign
sovereigns.
Neither can the other ground raised, forum non conveniens, be used to deprive the trial court of
its jurisdiction herein. FIRST, it is not a proper basis for a motion to dismiss because Section 1,
Rule 16 of the Rules of Court does not include it as a ground .
SECOND, whether a suit should be entertained or dismissed on the basis of the said doctrine
depends largely upon the facts of the particular case and is addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial court. In this case, the RTC decided to assume jurisdiction.
THIRD, the propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires factual determination.
Hence, this conflicts principle is more properly considered a matter of defense .
The RTC is vested by law with the power to entertain and hear the civil case. Petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED
CONFLICT OF LAW: CASE DIGESTS
Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST CO. v. GUERRERO
G.R. No. 136804. February 19, 2003
Legal Principle: Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proven. Certainly, the conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law applies
to Guerrero's claims present a clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial
on the merits. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority o r
tribunal may be proved by (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having
the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept
in the Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof.
FACTS: In 1994, respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. and/or Chemical Bank RTC allegedly for:
(1) illegally withhelding taxes charged against interests on his checking account with the Bank
(2) a returned check worth US$18,000.00 due to signature verification problems; and
(3) unauthorized conversion of his account.
The Bank filed its Answer alleging, inter alia, that by stipulation Guerrero's account is governed
by New York law and this law does not permit any of Guerrero's claims except actual damages.
Subsequently, the Bank filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking the dismissal of
Guerrero's claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary damages as well
as attorney's fees on the same ground alleged in its Answer. The Bank contended that the trial
should be limited to the issue of actual damages
The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. Alyssa Walden's affidavit ("Walden affidavit" for brevity) stated that
Guerrero's New York bank account stipulated that the governing law is New York law and that
this law bars all of Guerrero's claims except actual damages. The Philippine Consular Office in
New York authenticated the Walden affidavit.
The RTC denied the Bank's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and its motion for
reconsideration.
The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition. It ruled that the Walden affidavit
does not serve as proof of the New York law and jurisprudence relied on by the Bank to support
its motion. The Court of Appeals considered the New York law and jurisprudence as public
documents defined in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence. The CA opined that the
following procedure outlined in Section 24, Rule 132 should be followed in proving foreign law.
ISSUE: Whether or not New York Law shall govern the case filed?
RULING: No. Because of the failure to comply on how to prove a foreign law and decisions of
foreign courts, the Walden affidavit did not prove the current state of New York law and
jurisprudence. Thus, the Bank has only alleged, but has not proved, what New York law and
jurisprudence are on the matters at issue. Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public
documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may be proved by:
(1) an official publication thereof or
(2) A copy attested by the officer having the legal custody thereof.
Such official publication or copy must be accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be
issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation
must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof,
as the case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Exception: Section 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court does not exclude the presentation
of other competent evidence to prove the existence of a foreign law. In Willamette Iron and Steel
Works v. Muzzal, SC considered the testimony under oath of an attorney-at-law of San Francisco,
California, who quoted verbatim a section of California Civil Code and who stated that the same
was in force at the time the obligations were contracted, as sufficient evidence to establish the
existence of said law.
The Bank, however, cannot rely on Willamete Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal or Collector of
Internal Revenue v. Fisher to support its cause. These cases involved attorneys testifying in open
court during the trial in the Philippines and quoting the particular foreign laws sought to be
established. On the other hand, the Walden affidavit was taken abroad ex parte and the affiant
never testified in open court. The Walden affidavit cannot be considered as proof of New York
law on damages not only because it is self-serving but also because it does not state the specific
New York law on damages.
The Walden affidavit states conclusions from the affiant's personal interpretation and opinion of
the facts of the case vis a vis the alleged laws and jurisprudence without citing any law in
particular. The citations in the Walden affidavit of various U.S. court decisions do not constitute
proof of the official records or decisions of the U.S. courts. While the Bank attached copies of
some of the U.S. court decisions cited in the Walden affidavit, these copies do not comply with
Section 24 of Rule 132 on proof of official records or decisions of foreign courts.
Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Bank's motion for partial
summary judgment and the Walden affidavit just because he failed to file an opposing affidavit.
Guerrero opposed the motion for partial summary judgment, although he did not present an
opposing affidavit. Guerrero may not have presented an opposing affidavit, as there was no need
for one, because the Walden affidavit did not establish what the Bank intended to prove.
Certainly, Guerrero did not admit, expressly or impliedly, the veracity of the statements in the
Walden affidavit. The Bank still had the burden of proving New York law and jurisprudence even
if Guerrero did not present an opposing affidavit.
There being substantial triable issues between the parties, the courts a quo correctly denied the
Bank's motion for partial summary judgment. There is a need to determine by presentation of
evidence in a regular trial if the Bank is guilty of any wrongdoing and if it is liable for damages
under the applicable laws.
Petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
CONFLICT OF LAW: CASE DIGESTS
Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
CATALAN v. CATALAN-LEE
G.R. No. 183622. February 8, 2012
Legal Principle: Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first
be proven.
FACTS: Orlando Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a
divorce in the US from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage
with petitioner Merope Catalan.
Petitioner Merope filed with RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration
for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando.
It is also imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case was dismissed, the SC
already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce
must still first be proven.
ISSUE: Whether or not the fact of divorce was proven?
RULING: Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the
document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad
is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official
body or tribunal of a foreign country.

While the special proceeding was pending, respondent Louella Catalan-Lee, one of the
children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC. The
two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified
to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando.
In support of her contention, she alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed
against petitioner.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner
contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio
Bristol.
The RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.
The trial court ruled that since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since
that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between
him and petitioner was not valid.
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of
Orlando's divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between
petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the
trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she
has the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate.
Otherwise, letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly
the daughter or next of kin of the deceased.
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to
ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of
Orlando.
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married
to Eusebio Bristol.

But failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage
between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an
interested party in the estate of Orlando.

Petitioner insists that with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys
the presumption of validity.

CONFLICT OF LAW: CASE DIGESTS

Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
EDGAR SAN LUIS v. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS
G.R. No. 133743. February 6, 2007.
Legal Principle: Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may
be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a
copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in
the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
FACTS: The case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo San Luis, who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit in 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Petitioner Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. In 1963,
Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, in 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son,
Tobias. However, in 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree
Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody in 1973.
In 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis before Rev. Fr. William Meyer,
Minister of the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California. He had
no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage
up to his death in 1992.
Thereafter, respondent Felicidad sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets
and the settlement of Felicisimo's estate.
In 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by his first marriage,
filed a motion to dismiss. He claimed, among others, that respondent has no legal
personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter,
at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. Linda also invoked the same
grounds. Trial court denied the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial, respondent submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to
their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime in
1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of
the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had
already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her
by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
Subsequently, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration. It held that,
at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not
in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition
for letters of administration because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo's marriage
to Merry Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino
citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo's legitimate children.
The CA reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court. It found that the marriage
between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii.
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration which were denied by
the Court of Appeals.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether venue was properly laid?
(2) Whether respondent has legal capacity to petition for letters of administration?
RULING:
(1) Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the RTC of the province "in which
he resides at the time of his death.
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. "Resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile.
While petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was
validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa.
(2) Yes. Respondent's legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration
may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article
144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition
as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient
evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage
of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
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With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A.,
she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance
with the said law. However, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they
must be alleged and proved. Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage
of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo's capacity to remarry, but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then
she may be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning.
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage,
the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus
in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to marry.
Petition is DENIED. Case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
FUJIKI v. MARINAY, ET AL.
G.R. No. 196049. June 26, 2013
Legal Principle: the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with
domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court through:
(1) an official publication or
(2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment.
FACTS: Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay in the Philippines in 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner's parents. Thus,
Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara . Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship.
In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
In 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment. He
prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35 (4) and 41
of the Family Code of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of
Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrato r
and Civil Registrar General in the NSO.
The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife, in this case either Maekara or
Marinay, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35 (4) of the Family
Code of the Philippines on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.
In any case, it was also Fujiki's view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (A petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife) applied only to
void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
To apply Section 2 (a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties would be
permitted to sue.
RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage. The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e., lack of
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Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2 (a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The
RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the
decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially
recognized.
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce
decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of
the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked."
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them
to comment on the petition.
Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to
Fujiki. Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay. On the other hand,
Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. She would like to maintain her
silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.
ISSUES:
(1)Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable?
(2)Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy?
(3)Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court?
RULING:
(1) The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where
one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign
judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court
judgment through
(1) an official publication or
(2) Certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office
which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated
by the seal of office.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor,
the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it
will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is
"to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues".
(2) A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and
legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend
the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws. Article 15 of the
Civil Code provides that "laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad."
This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may
require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition
and legal capacity of such citizen.
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to
delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a
Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its merits, i.e., "want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate
a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of
bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the
beginnin g under Article 35 (4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family
Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
48 (b) of the Rules of Court.
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without
prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition
of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal
liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition.
The RTC is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
Decision.
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Louie Blake Sarmiento, M.A.