G.R. No.
L-45685 65 Phil 56 November 16, 1937 Among other things in the allegation of the petition, it is asserted
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI
BANKING CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
JOSE O. VERA, Judge . of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MARIANO
CU UNJIENG, respondents.
Facts:Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed
for reconsideration and four motions for new trial but all were denied. He then
elevated to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court remanded the appeal
to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for
probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of.
The Judge of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office.
The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request
by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor
countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under
probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that
the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system
of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is
applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only
provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is
unconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal
protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial
boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said
probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to
provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as
in pardon.
Issues:
Whether or not Act No. 4221 constituted an undue delegation of legislative
power
Whether or not the said act denies the equal protection of the laws
Discussions:
An act of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down
any rule or definite standard by which the administrative officer or board may
be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it. The
probation Act does not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose
upon the provincial boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their
discretionary power. What is granted, as mentioned by Justice Cardozo in the
recent case of Schecter, supra, is a “roving commission” which enables the
provincial boards to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 if the Act, the
legislature does not seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the
Probation Act to the provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the
various provincial boards to determine.
The equal protection of laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. The
classification of equal protection, to be reasonable, must be based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to
the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
must apply equally to each member of the class.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34674 October 26, 1931
MAURICIO CRUZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
STANTON YOUNGBERG, Director of the Bureau of Animal
Industry, respondent-appellee.
Jose Yulo for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Reyes for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is a petition brought originally before the Court of First
Instance of Manila for the issuance of a writ of mandatory
injunction against the respondent, Stanton Youngberg, as
Director of the Bureau of Animal Industry, requiring him to issue
a permit for the landing of ten large cattle imported by the
petitioner and for the slaughter thereof. The petitioner attacked
the constitutionality of Act No. 3155, which at present prohibits
the importation of cattle from foreign countries into the
Philippine Islands.
that "Act No. 3155 of the Philippine Legislature was enacted for
the sole purpose of preventing the introduction of cattle diseases
into the Philippine Islands from foreign countries, as shown by
an explanatory note and text of Senate Bill No. 328 as introduced
in the Philippine Legislature, ... ." The Act in question reads as
follows:
SECTION 1. After March thirty-first, nineteen hundred and
twenty-five existing contracts for the importation of cattle into
this country to the contrary notwithstanding, it shall be strictly
prohibited to import, bring or introduce into the Philippine
Islands any cattle from foreign countries: Provided, however,
That at any time after said date, the Governor-General, with the
concurrence of the presiding officers of both Houses, may raise
such prohibition entirely or in part if the conditions of the
country make this advisable or if decease among foreign cattle
has ceased to be a menace to the agriculture and live stock of the
lands.
SEC. 2. All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with this Act are
hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, March 8, 1924.
The respondent demurred to the petition on the ground that it
did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The
demurrer was based on two reasons, namely, (1) that if Act No.
3155 were declared unconstitutional and void, the petitioner
would not be entitled to the relief demanded because Act No.
3052 would automatically become effective and would prohibit
the respondent from giving the permit prayed for; and (2) that Act
No. 3155 was constitutional and, therefore, valid.
The court sustained the demurrer and the complaint was
dismissed by reason of the failure of the petitioner to file another
complaint. From that order of dismissal, the petitioner appealed
to this court.
The appellee contends that even if Act No. 3155 be declared
unconstitutional by the fact alleged by the petitioner in his
complaint, still the petitioner can not be allowed to import cattle
from Australia for the reason that, while Act No. 3155 were
declared unconstitutional, Act No. 3052 would automatically
become effective. Act No. 3052 reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Section seventeen hundred and sixty-two of Act
Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, known as the
Administrative Code, is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 1762. Bringing of animals imported from foreign countries
into the Philippine Islands. — It shall be unlawful for any person
or corporation to import, bring or introduce live cattle into the
Philippine Islands from any foreign country. The Director of
Agriculture may, with the approval of the head of the department
first had, authorize the importation, bringing or introduction of
various classes of thoroughbred cattle from foreign countries for
breeding the same to the native cattle of these Islands, and such
as may be necessary for the improvement of the breed, not to
exceed five hundred head per annum: Provided, however, That
the Director of Agriculture shall in all cases permit the
importation, bringing or introduction of draft cattle and bovine
cattle for the manufacture of serum: Provided, further, That all
live cattle from foreign countries the importation, bringing or
introduction of which into the Islands is authorized by this Act,
shall be submitted to regulations issued by the Director of
Agriculture, with the approval of the head of the department,
prior to authorizing its transfer to other provinces.
"At the time of the approval of this Act, the Governor-General
shall issue regulations and others to provide against a raising of
the price of both fresh and refrigerated meat. The Governor-
General also may, by executive order, suspend, this prohibition
for a fixed period in case local conditions require it."
SEC. 2. This Act shall take effect six months after approval.
Approved, March 14, 1922.
The petitioner does not present any allegations in regard to Act
No. 3052 to show its nullity or unconstitutionality though it
appears clearly that in the absence of Act No. 3155 the former
act would make it impossible for the Director of the Bureau of
Animal Industry to grant the petitioner a permit for the
importation of the cattle without the approval of the head of the
corresponding department.
An unconstitutional statute can have no effect to repeal former
laws or parts of laws by implication, since, being void, it is not
inconsistent with such former laws. (I Lewis Sutherland,
Statutory Construction 2nd ed., p. 458, citing McAllister vs.
Hamlin, 83 Cal., 361; 23 Pac., 357; Orange Country vs. Harris,
97 Cal., 600; 32 Pac., 594; Carr vs. State, 127 Ind., 204; 11
L.R.A., 370, etc.)
This court has several times declared that it will not pass upon
the constitutionality of statutes unless it is necessary to do so
(McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563, 568; Walter E.
Olsen & Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259) but in this
case it is not necessary to pass upon the validity of the statute
attacked by the petitioner because even if it were declared
unconstitutional, the petitioner would not be entitled to relief
inasmuch as Act No. 3052 is not in issue.
But aside from the provisions of Act No. 3052, we are of the
opinion that Act No. 3155 is entirely valid. As shown in paragraph
8 of the amended petition, the Legislature passed Act No. 3155
to protect the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the
introduction of cattle diseases through importation of foreign
cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of
industries affecting the public welfare and the development of the
resources of the country are objects within the scope of the police
power (12 C.J., 927; 6 R.C.L., 203-206 and decisions cited
therein; Reid vs. Colorado, 187 U.S., 137, 147, 152; Yeazel vs.
Alexander, 58 Ill., 254). In this connection it is said in the case of
Punzalan vs. Ferriols and Provincial Board of Batangas (19 Phil.,
214), that the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
did not have the effect of denying to the Government of the
Philippine Islands the right to the exercise of the sovereign police
power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public
interest. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition
shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there
was reasonable necessity therefor and it cannot be said that the
Legislature exceeded its power in passing the Act. That being so,
it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act upon
constitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether
the measures are wise or the best that might have been adopted.
(6 R.C.L., 243 and decisions cited therein.)1awphil.net
In his third assignment of error the petitioner claims that "The
lower court erred in not holding that the power given by Act No.
3155 to the Governor-General to suspend or not, at his
discretion, the prohibition provided in the act constitutes an
unlawful delegation of the legislative powers." We do not think
that such is the case; as Judge Ranney of the Ohio Supreme
Court in Cincinnati, Wilmington and Zanesville Railroad Co. vs.
Commissioners of Clinton County (1 Ohio St., 77, 88) said in
such case:
The true distinction, therefore, is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to
what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to
its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.
The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be
made.
Under his fourth assignment of error the appellant argues that
Act No. 3155 amends section 3 of the Tariff Law, but it will be
noted that Act No. 3155 is not an absolute prohibition of the
importation of cattle and it does not add any provision to section
3 of the Tariff Law. As stated in the brief of the Attorney-General:
"It is a complete statute in itself. It does not make any reference
to the Tariff Law. It does not permit the importation of articles,
whose importation is prohibited by the Tariff Law. It is not a tariff
measure but a quarantine measure, a statute adopted under the
police power of the Philippine Government. It is at most a
`supplement' or an `addition' to the Tariff Law. (See MacLeary vs.
Babcock, 82 N.E., 453, 455; 169 Ind., 228 for distinction between
`supplemental' and `amendatory' and O'Pry vs. U.S., 249 U.S.,
323; 63 Law. ed., 626, for distinction between `addition' and
`amendment.')"
The decision appealed from is affirmed with the costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez,
Villa-Real, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 175220 February 12, 2009
WILLIAM C. DAGAN, CARLOS H. REYES, NARCISO MORALES,
BONIFACIO MANTILLA, CESAR AZURIN, WEITONG LIM, MA.
TERESA TRINIDAD, MA. CARMELITA FLORENTINO, Petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE RACING COMMISSION, MANILA JOCKEY CLUB,
INC., and PHILIPPINE RACING CLUB, INC.,Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The subject of this petition for certiorari is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 95212, affirming in toto the judgment2 of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati in Civil Case No. 04-1228.
The controversy stemmed from the 11 August 2004 directive3 issued by the
Philippine Racing Commission (Philracom) directing the Manila Jockey Club,
Inc. (MJCI) and Philippine Racing Club, Inc. (PRCI) to immediately come up
with their respective Clubs’ House Rule to address Equine Infectious Anemia
(EIA)4 problem and to rid their facilities of horses infected with EIA. Said
directive was issued pursuant to Administrative Order No. 55 dated 28 March
1994 by the Department of Agriculture declaring it unlawful for any person,
firm or corporation to ship, drive, or transport horses from any locality or place
except when accompanied by a certificate issued by the authority of the Director
of the Bureau of Animal Industry (BAI).6
In compliance with the directive, MJCI and PRCI ordered the owners of
racehorses stable in their establishments to submit the horses to blood sampling
and administration of the Coggins Test to determine whether they are afflicted
with the EIA virus. Subsequently, on 17 September 2004, Philracom issued
copies of the guidelines for the monitoring and eradication of EIA. 7
Petitioners and racehorse owners William Dagan (Dagan), Carlos Reyes,
Narciso Morales, Bonifacio Montilla, Cezar Azurin, Weitong Lim, Ma. Teresa
Trinidad and Ma. Carmelita Florentino refused to comply with the directive.
First, they alleged that there had been no prior consultation with horse owners.
Second, they claimed that neither official guidelines nor regulations had been
issued relative to the taking of blood samples. And third, they asserted that no
documented case of EIA had been presented to justify the undertaking. 8
Despite resistance from petitioners, the blood testing proceeded. The horses,
whose owners refused to comply were banned from the races, were removed
from the actual day of race, prohibited from renewing their licenses or evicted
from their stables.
When their complaint went unheeded, the racehorse owners lodged a complaint
before the Office of the President (OP) which in turn issued a directive
instructing Philracom to investigate the matter.
For failure of Philracom to act upon the directive of the OP, petitioners filed a
petition for injunction with application for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO). In an order9 dated 11 November 2004, the trial court
issued a TRO.
Dagan refused to comply with the directives because, according to him, the
same are unfair as there are no implementing rules on the banning of sick horses
from races. Consequently, his horses were evicted from the stables and
transferred to an isolation area. He also admitted that three of his horses had
been found positive for EIA.10
Confronted with two issues, namely: whether there were valid grounds for the
issuance of a writ of injunction and whether respondents had acted with whim
and caprice in the implementation of the contested guideline, the trial court
resolved both queries in the negative.
The trial court found that most racehorse owners, except for Dagan, had already
subjected their racehorses to EIA testing. Their act constituted demonstrated
compliance with the contested guidelines, according to the trial court. Hence,
the acts sought to be enjoined had been rendered moot and academic.
With respect to the subject guidelines, the trial court upheld their validity as an
exercise of police power, thus:
The Petitioner’s submission that the subject guidelines are oppressive and hence
confiscatory of proprietary rights is likewise viewed by this Court to be barren
of factual and legal support. The horseracing industry, needless to state, is
imbued with public interest deserving of utmost concern if not constant
vigilance. The Petitioners do not dispute this. It is because of this basic fact that
respondents are expected to police the concerned individuals and adopt
measures that will promote and protect the interests of all the stakeholders
starting from the moneyed horse-owners, gawking bettors down to the lowly
maintainers of the stables. This is a clear and valid exercise of police power
with the respondents acting for the State. Participation in the business of
horseracing is but a privilege; it is not a right. And no clear acquiescence to this
postulation can there be than the Petitioners' own undertaking to abide by the
rules and conditions issued and imposed by the respondents as specifically
shown by their contracts of lease with MCJI.111avvphi1
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision dated 27 October
2006, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
The appellate court upheld the authority of Philracom to formulate guidelines
since it is vested with exclusive jurisdiction over and control of the horse-racing
industry per Section 8 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 8. The appellate court
further pointed out that P.D. No. 420 also endows Philracom with the power to
prescribe additional rules and regulations not otherwise inconsistent with the
said presidential decree12 and to perform such duties and exercise all powers
incidental or necessary to the accomplishment of its aims and objectives.13 It
similarly concluded that the petition for prohibition should be dismissed on the
ground of mootness in light of evidence indicating that petitioners had already
reconsidered their refusal to have their horses tested and had, in fact,
subsequently requested the administration of the test to the horses.14
Aggrieved by the appellate court’s decision, petitioners filed the instant
certiorari petition15 imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondents in compelling petitioners to subject their racehorses to blood
testing.
In their amended petition,16 petitioners allege that Philracom’s unsigned and
undated implementing guidelines suffer from several infirmities. They maintain
that the assailed guidelines do not comply with due process requirements.
Petitioners insist that racehorses already in the MJCI stables were allowed to be
so quartered because the individual horse owners had already complied with the
Philracom regulation that horses should not bear any disease. There was neither
a directive nor a rule that racehorses already lodged in the stables of the racing
clubs should again be subjected to the collection of blood samples preparatory
to the conduct of the EIA tests,17petitioners note. Thus, it came as a surprise to
horse owners when told about the administration of a new Coggins Tests on old
horses since the matter had not been taken up with them.18 No investigation or
at least a summary proceeding was conducted affording petitioners an
opportunity to be heard.19 Petitioners also aver that the assailed guidelines are
ultra vires in that the sanctions imposed for refusing to submit to medical
examination are summary eviction from the stables or arbitrary banning of
participation in the races, notwithstanding the penalties prescribed in the
contract of lease.20
In its Comment,21 the PRCI emphasizes that it merely obeyed the terms of its
franchise and abided by the rules enacted by Philracom.22 For its part,
Philracom, through the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG), stresses that the
case has become moot and academic since most of petitioners had complied
with the guidelines by subjecting their race horses to EIA testing. The horses
found unafflicted with the disease were eventually allowed to join the
races.23 Philracom also justified its right under the law to regulate horse
racing.24 MJCI adds that Philracom need
not delegate its rule-making power to the former since MJCI’s right to
formulate its internal rules is subsumed under the franchise granted to it by
Congress.25
In their Reply,26 petitioners raise for the first time the issue that Philracom had
unconstitutionally delegated its rule-making power to PRCI and MJCI in
issuing the directive for them to come up with club rules. In response to the
claim that respondents had merely complied with their duties under their
franchises, petitioners counter that the power granted to PRCI and MJCI under
their respective franchises is limited to: (1) the construction, operation and
maintenance of racetracks; (2) the establishment of branches for booking
purposes; and (3) the conduct of horse races.
It appears on record that only Dagan had refused to comply with the orders of
respondents. Therefore, the case subsists as regards Dagan.
Petitioners essentially assail two issuances of Philracom; namely: the Philracom
directive27 and the subsequent guidelines addressed to MJCI and PRCI.
The validity of an administrative issuance, such as the assailed guidelines,
hinges on compliance with the following requisites:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
3. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature;
4. It must be reasonable.28
All the prescribed requisites are met as regards the questioned issuances.
Philracom’s authority is drawn from P.D. No. 420. The delegation made in the
presidential decree is valid. Philracom did not exceed its authority. And the
issuances are fair and reasonable.
The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated, or as expressed in
the Latin maxim: potestas delegate non delegare potest. This rule is based upon
the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes not only a right but a
duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment
acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the
intervening mind of another.29 This rule however admits of recognized
exceptions30 such as the grant of rule-making power to administrative agencies.
They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate
the implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has
become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing
complexity and variety of public functions.31
However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that
the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself,
setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by
the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard—the limits of which are sufficiently
determinate and determinable—to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines
legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the
legislative command is to be effected.32
P.D. No. 420 hurdles the tests of completeness and standards sufficiency.
Philracom was created for the purpose of carrying out the declared policy in
Section 1 which is "to promote and direct the accelerated development and
continued growth of horse racing not only in pursuance of the sports
development program but also in order to insure the full exploitation of the sport
as a source of revenue and employment." Furthermore, Philracom was granted
exclusive jurisdiction and control over every aspect of the conduct of horse
racing, including the framing and scheduling of races, the construction and
safety of race tracks, and the security of racing. P.D. No. 420 is already
complete in itself.
Section 9 of the law fixes the standards and limitations to which Philracom must
conform in the performance of its functions, to wit:
Section 9. Specific Powers. Specifically, the Commission shall have the power:
a. To enforce all laws, decrees and executive orders relating to horse-racing that
are not expressly or implied repealed or modified by this Decree, including all
such existing rules and regulations until otherwise modified or amended by the
Commission;
b. To prescribe additional rules and regulations not otherwise inconsistent with
this Decree;
c. To register race horses, horse owners or associations or federations thereof,
and to regulate the construction of race tracks and to grant permit for the holding
of races;
d. To issue, suspend or revoke permits and licenses and to impose or collect
fees for the issuance of such licenses and permits to persons required to obtain
the same;
e. To review, modify, approve or disapprove the rules and regulations issued by
any person or entity concerning the conduct of horse races held by them;
f. To supervise all such race meeting to assure integrity at all times. It can order
the suspension of any racing event in case of violation of any law, ordinance or
rules and regulations;
g. To prohibit the use of improper devices, drugs, stimulants or other means to
enhance or diminish the speed of horse or materially harm their condition;
h. To approve the annual budget of the omission and such supplemental budgets
as may be necessary;
i. To appoint all personnel, including an Executive Director of the Commission,
as it may be deem necessary in the exercise and performance of its powers and
duties; and
j. To enter into contracts involving obligations chargeable to or against the
funds of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, there is a proper legislative delegation of rule-making power to
Philracom. Clearly too, for its part Philracom has exercised its rule-making
power in a proper and reasonable manner. More specifically, its discretion to
rid the facilities of MJCI and PRCI of horses afflicted with EIA is aimed at
preserving the security and integrity of horse races.
Petitioners also question the supposed delegation by Philracom of its rule-
making powers to MJCI and PRCI.
There is no delegation of power to speak of between Philracom, as the delegator
and MJCI and PRCI as delegates. The Philracom directive is merely instructive
in character. Philracom had instructed PRCI and MJCI to "immediately come
up with Club’s House Rule to address the problem and rid their facilities of
horses infected with EIA." PRCI and MJCI followed-up when they ordered the
racehorse owners to submit blood samples and subject their race horses to blood
testing. Compliance with the Philracom’s directive is part of the mandate of
PRCI and MJCI under Sections 133 of R.A. No. 795334 and Sections 135 and
236 of 8407.37
As correctly proferred by MJCI, its duty is not derived from the delegated
authority of Philracom but arises from the franchise granted to them by
Congress allowing MJCI "to do and carry out all such acts, deeds and things as
may be necessary to give effect to the foregoing."38 As justified by PRCI,
"obeying the terms of the franchise and abiding by whatever rules enacted by
Philracom is its duty."39
More on the second, third and fourth requisites.
As to the second requisite, petitioners raise some infirmities relating to
Philracom’s guidelines. They question the supposed belated issuance of the
guidelines, that is, only after the collection of blood samples for the Coggins
Test was ordered. While it is conceded that the guidelines were issued a month
after Philracom’s directive, this circumstance does not render the directive nor
the guidelines void. The directive’s validity and effectivity are not dependent
on any supplemental guidelines. Philracom has every right to issue directives
to MJCI and PRCI with respect to the conduct of horse racing, with or without
implementing guidelines.
Petitioners also argue that Philracom’s guidelines have no force and effect for
lack of publication and failure to file copies with the University of the
Philippines (UP) Law Center as required by law.
As a rule, the issuance of rules and regulations in the exercise of an
administrative agency of its quasi-legislative power does not require notice
7and hearing.40 In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission,41 this Court had the
occasion to rule that prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of
rules or regulations issued in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers since there
is no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or
ascertained.42
The third requisite for the validity of an administrative issuance is that it must
be within the limits of the powers granted to it. The administrative body may
not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which
created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a statute.43
The assailed guidelines prescribe the procedure for monitoring and eradicating
EIA. These guidelines are in accord with Philracom’s mandate under the law to
regulate the conduct of horse racing in the country.
Anent the fourth requisite, the assailed guidelines do not appear to be
unreasonable or discriminatory. In fact, all horses stabled at the MJCI and
PRCI’s premises underwent the same procedure. The guidelines implemented
were undoubtedly reasonable as they bear a reasonable relation to the purpose
sought to be accomplished, i.e., the complete riddance of horses infected with
EIA.
It also appears from the records that MJCI properly notified the racehorse
owners before the test was conducted.44Those who failed to comply were
repeatedly warned of certain consequences and sanctions.
Furthermore, extant from the records are circumstances which allow
respondents to determine from time to time the eligibility of horses as race
entries. The lease contract executed between petitioner and MJC contains a
proviso reserving the right of the lessor, MJCI in this case, the right to determine
whether a particular horse is a qualified horse. In addition, Philracom’s rules
and regulations on horse racing provide that horses must be free from any
contagious disease or illness in order to be eligible as race entries.
All told, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Philracom in issuing
the contested guidelines and on the part MJCI and PRCI in complying with
Philracom’s directive.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner William
Dagan.
SO ORDERED.
SMART VS. NTC; G.R. No. 151908
PARTIES:
SMART & PILTEL – petitioners,
GLOBE & ISLACOM – petitioners,
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC)
– respondent.
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
FACTS:Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued Memorandum Circular No.
13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on the billing of
telecommunications services. On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a
Memorandum to all cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS) operators which
contained measures to minimize if not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing
of cellular phone units. This was followed by another Memorandum dated
October 6, 2000 addressed to all public telecommunications entities, which
reads:
This is to remind you that the validity of all prepaid cards sold on 07 October
2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use
pursuant to MC 13-6-2000.
In addition, all CMTS operators are reminded that all SIM packs used by
subscribers of prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid
for at least two (2) years from date of first use. Also, the billing unit shall be on
a six (6) seconds pulse effective 07 October 2000. For strict compliance.
On October 20, 2000, petitioners ISLACOM and PILTEL filed against the
NTC, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner Aurelio M.
Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for declaration
of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular)
and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order at the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77.
Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, that the NTC has no jurisdiction to
regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards since such
jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under the
Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive,
confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation
of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the
impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging
the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the
requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance
announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular
be declared null and void ab initio. Globe Telecom and Smart filed a joint
Motion for Leave to Intervene which was granted by the trial court. On October
27, 2000, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the NTC
from implementing Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and the
Memorandum dated October 6, 2000.
In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners' failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. Subsequently, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion to
dismiss. Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in an
Order dated February 1, 2001.
Respondent NTC thus filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals, which was granted and annulled the injunction
issued by the lower court.
Petitioners' motions for reconsideration were denied in a Resolution dated
January 10, 2002 for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition for review filed
by Smart and Piltel.
ISSUES:
WON Respondent court erred in holding respondents failed to exhaust
administrative remedy.
WON NTC has Jurisdiction over the case.
WON the Billing Circular issued by NTC is unconstitutional.
RULE:
1ST ISSSUE – Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making
powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-
legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations
which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting
statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.
The rules and regulations should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law.17 They
must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in
order for such rule or regulation to be valid. The administrative body exercises
its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is
essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in
such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the
executive or administrative duty entrusted to it.
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by
an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies
before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-
legislative power.
Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
apply in this case, the records reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied with
this requirement. Petitioners were able to register their protests to the proposed
billing guidelines. They submitted their respective position papers setting forth
their objections and submitting proposed schemes for the billing circular. After
the same was issued, petitioners wrote successive letters dated July 3, 2000 and
July 5, 2000, asking for the suspension and reconsideration of the so-called
Billing Circular. This was taken by petitioners as a clear denial of the requests
contained in their previous letters, thus prompting them to seek judicial relief.
2ND ISSSUE – In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only
where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
function. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a court
in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction until
after an administrative agency has determined some question or some aspect of
some question arising in the proceeding before the court.
However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same.
The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an
administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts.
3RD ISSSUE – In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum
Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was
pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were
justified in invoking the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the
constitutionality and validity of the said issuances. Hence, the Regional Trial
Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The Court of Appeals erred
in setting aside the orders of the trial court and in dismissing the case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions are
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
PRINCIPLE INVOLVED: Doctrine of Administrative Exhaustion.
[G.R. No. 151908. August 12, 2003]
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (SMART) and PILIPINO
TELEPHONE CORPORATION (PILTEL), petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC), respondent.
[G.R. No. 152063. August 12, 2003]
GLOBE TELECOM, INC. (GLOBE) and ISLA COMMUNICATIONS
CO., INC. (ISLACOM), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (The
Former 6th Division) and the NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Pursuant to its rule-making and regulatory powers, the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) issued on June 16, 2000
Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, promulgating rules and regulations on
the billing of telecommunications services. Among its pertinent provisions are
the following:
(1) The billing statements shall be received by the subscriber of the telephone
service not later than 30 days from the end of each billing cycle. In case the
statement is received beyond this period, the subscriber shall have a specified
grace period within which to pay the bill and the public telecommunications
entity (PTEs) shall not be allowed to disconnect the service within the grace
period.
(2) There shall be no charge for calls that are diverted to a voice mailbox, voice
prompt, recorded message or similar facility excluding the customers own
equipment.
(3) PTEs shall verify the identification and address of each purchaser of prepaid
SIM cards. Prepaid call cards and SIM cards shall be valid for at least 2 years
from the date of first use.Holders of prepaid SIM cards shall be given 45 days
from the date the prepaid SIM card is fully consumed but not beyond 2 years
and 45 days from date of first use to replenish the SIM card, otherwise the SIM
card shall be rendered invalid. The validity of an invalid SIM card, however,
shall be installed upon request of the customer at no additional charge except
the presentation of a valid prepaid call card.
(4) Subscribers shall be updated of the remaining value of their cards before the
start of every call using the cards.
(5) The unit of billing for the cellular mobile telephone service whether
postpaid or prepaid shall be reduced from 1 minute per pulse to 6 seconds per
pulse. The authorized rates per minute shall thus be divided by 10. [1]
The Memorandum Circular provided that it shall take effect 15 days after its
publication in a newspaper of general circulation and three certified true copies
thereof furnished the UP Law Center. It was published in the newspaper, The
Philippine Star, on June 22, 2000.[2] Meanwhile, the provisions of the
Memorandum Circular pertaining to the sale and use of prepaid cards and the
unit of billing for cellular mobile telephone service took effect 90 days from the
effectivity of the Memorandum Circular.
On August 30, 2000, the NTC issued a Memorandum to all cellular mobile
telephone service (CMTS) operators which contained measures to minimize if
not totally eliminate the incidence of stealing of cellular phone units. The
Memorandum directed CMTS operators to:
a. strictly comply with Section B(1) of MC 13-6-2000 requiring the
presentation and verification of the identity and addresses of prepaid SIM card
customers;
b. require all your respective prepaid SIM cards dealers to comply with Section
B(1) of MC 13-6-2000;
c. deny acceptance to your respective networks prepaid and/or postpaid
customers using stolen cellphone units or cellphone units registered to
somebody other than the applicant when properly informed of all information
relative to the stolen cellphone units;
d. share all necessary information of stolen cellphone units to all other CMTS
operators in order to prevent the use of stolen cellphone units; and
e. require all your existing prepaid SIM card customers to register and present
valid identification cards.[3]
This was followed by another Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 addressed
to all public telecommunications entities, which reads:
This is to remind you that the validity of all prepaid cards sold on 07 October
2000 and beyond shall be valid for at least two (2) years from date of first use
pursuant to MC 13-6-2000.
In addition, all CMTS operators are reminded that all SIM packs used by
subscribers of prepaid cards sold on 07 October 2000 and beyond shall be valid
for at least two (2) years from date of first use. Also, the billing unit shall be on
a six (6) seconds pulse effective 07 October 2000.
For strict compliance.[4]
On October 20, 2000, petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pilipino
Telephone Corporation filed against the National Telecommunications
Commission, Commissioner Joseph A. Santiago, Deputy Commissioner
Aurelio M. Umali and Deputy Commissioner Nestor C. Dacanay, an action for
declaration of nullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the
Billing Circular) and the NTC Memorandum dated October 6, 2000, with prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order. The complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-42221 at the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77.[5]
Petitioners Islacom and Piltel alleged, inter alia, that the NTC has no
jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as the prepaid call cards
since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade and Industry under
the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular is oppressive,
confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition against deprivation
of property without due process of law; that the Circular will result in the
impairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging
the validity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the
requirements of identification of prepaid card buyers and call balance
announcement are unreasonable. Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular
be declared null and void ab initio.
Soon thereafter, petitioners Globe Telecom, Inc and Smart Communications,
Inc. filed a joint Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Complaint-in-
Intervention.[6]This was granted by the trial court.
On October 27, 2000, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the NTC from implementing Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000
and the Memorandum dated October 6, 2000.[7]
In the meantime, respondent NTC and its co-defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the case on the ground of petitioners failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
Subsequently, after hearing petitioners application for preliminary injunction as
well as respondents motion to dismiss, the trial court issued on November 20,
2000 an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the defendants motion to dismiss is
hereby denied for lack of merit. The plaintiffs application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction is hereby granted. Accordingly, the defendants
are hereby enjoined from implementing NTC Memorandum Circular 13-6-2000
and the NTC Memorandum, dated October 6, 2000, pending the issuance and
finality of the decision in this case. The plaintiffs and intervenors are, however,
required to file a bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00), Philippine currency.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied in an Order
dated February 1, 2001.[9]
Respondent NTC thus filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 64274. On
October 9, 2001, a decision was rendered, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition is GRANTED, in that, the order of the court a quo denying the
petitioners motion to dismiss as well as the order of the court a quo granting the
private respondents prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction, and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued thereby, are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The private respondents complaint and complaint-in-intervention
below are hereby DISMISSED, without prejudice to the referral of the private
respondents grievances and disputes on the assailed issuances of the NTC with
the said agency.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioners motions for reconsideration were denied in a Resolution dated
January 10, 2002 for lack of merit.[11]
Hence, the instant petition for review filed by Smart and Piltel, which was
docketed as G.R. No. 151908, anchored on the following grounds:
A.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION (NTC) AND NOT THE REGULAR COURTS HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
B.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ALSO GRAVELY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO EXHAUST
AN AVAILABLE ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY.
C.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE BILLING CIRCULAR ISSUED BY THE RESPONDENT NTC
IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND CONTRARY TO LAW AND PUBLIC
POLICY.
D.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO SHOW THEIR CLEAR
POSITIVE RIGHT TO WARRANT THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION.[12]
Likewise, Globe and Islacom filed a petition for review, docketed as G.R. No.
152063, assigning the following errors:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED
BECAUSE THE DOCTRINES OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND
EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES DO NOT APPLY
SINCE THE INSTANT CASE IS FOR LEGAL NULLIFICATION
(BECAUSE OF LEGAL INFIRMITIES AND VIOLATIONS OF LAW) OF A
PURELY ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATION PROMULGATED BY AN
AGENCY IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS RULE MAKING POWERS AND
INVOLVES ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED
BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE ON EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES DOES NOT APPLY WHEN THE QUESTIONS RAISED ARE
PURELY LEGAL QUESTIONS.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED
BECAUSE THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES DOES NOT APPLY WHERE THE ADMINISTRATIVE
ACTION IS COMPLETE AND EFFECTIVE, WHEN THERE IS NO OTHER
REMEDY, AND THE PETITIONER STANDS TO SUFFER GRAVE AND
IRREPARABLE INJURY.
4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED
BECAUSE PETITIONERS IN FACT EXHAUSTED ALL
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THEM.
5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SO GRAVELY ERRED IN
ISSUING ITS QUESTIONED RULINGS IN THIS CASE BECAUSE GLOBE
AND ISLA HAVE A CLEAR RIGHT TO AN INJUNCTION. [13]
The two petitions were consolidated in a Resolution dated February 17, 2003.[14]
On March 24, 2003, the petitions were given due course and the parties were
required to submit their respective memoranda.[15]
We find merit in the petitions.
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and
quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-
making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in
delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers.[16]
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are
the product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal
provisions that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required
that the regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be
not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by
law.[17] They must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the
enabling statute in order for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional
and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations may
be promulgated by an administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields
are subject to regulation by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the
statute it is administering or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or
defeat, the purpose of a statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an
administrative order, the former must prevail.[18]
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an
administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory
power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The
administrative body exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or administrative
nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted
to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the administrative officers or
bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their
official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. [19]
In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by
an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies
before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial
function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-
legislative power. In Association of Philippine Coconut Dessicators v.
Philippine Coconut Authority,[20] it was held:
The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may
seek judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of
respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was
issued by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative
power. However, only judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies
made in the exercise of their quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion
doctrine.
Even assuming arguendo that the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies apply in this case, the records reveal that petitioners sufficiently
complied with this requirement. Even during the drafting and deliberation
stages leading to the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000,
petitioners were able to register their protests to the proposed billing
guidelines. They submitted their respective position papers setting forth their
objections and submitting proposed schemes for the billing circular. [21] After
the same was issued, petitioners wrote successive letters dated July 3,
2000[22] and July 5, 2000,[23] asking for the suspension and reconsideration of
the so-called Billing Circular. These letters were not acted upon until October
6, 2000, when respondent NTC issued the second assailed Memorandum
implementing certain provisions of the Billing Circular. This was taken by
petitioners as a clear denial of the requests contained in their previous letters,
thus prompting them to seek judicial relief.
In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the
administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to
refer the same to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.The courts will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the administrative
tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal,
where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion
requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of
ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the regulatory statute
administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is to guide a
court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction
until after an administrative agency has determined some question or some
aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies
where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play
whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of
an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is suspended pending
referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.[24]
However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-
legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the
same. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an
administrative agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive
agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in
the courts, including the regional trial courts.[25] This is within the scope of
judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts to determine in an
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. [26]Judicial
power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.[27]
In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-
2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-
legislative or rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking
the judicial power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and
validity of the said issuances. In Drilon v. Lim,[28] it was held:
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws
by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, B.P.
129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the
accused in a criminal action has the right to question in his defense the
constitutionality of a law he is charged with violating and of the proceedings
taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover,
Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which
the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.[29]
In their complaint before the Regional Trial Court, petitioners averred that the
Circular contravened Civil Code provisions on sales and violated the
constitutional prohibition against the deprivation of property without due
process of law. These are within the competence of the trial judge. Contrary to
the finding of the Court of Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not
entail highly technical matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will
resolve this issue is a basic familiarity with the workings of the cellular
telephone service, including prepaid SIM and call cards and this is judicially
known to be within the knowledge of a good percentage of our population and
expertise in fundamental principles of civil law and the Constitution.
Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case
No. Q-00-42221. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the
trial court and in dismissing the case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the consolidated petitions
are GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
64274 dated October 9, 2001 and its Resolution dated January 10, 2002 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated November 20, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 77, in Civil Case No. Q-00-42221
is REINSTATED. This case is REMANDED to the court a quo for
continuation of the proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 116422. November 4, 1996]
AVELINA B. CONTE and LETICIA BOISER-PALMA, petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Are the benefits provided for under Social Security System Resolution No. 56
to be considered simply as financial assistance for retiring employees, or does
such scheme constitute a supplementary retirement plan proscribed by Republic
Act No. 4968?
The foregoing question is addressed by this Court in resolving the instant
petition for certiorari which seeks to reverse and set aside Decision No. 94-
126[1]dated March 15, 1994 of respondent Commission on Audit, which denied
petitioners request for reconsideration of its adverse ruling disapproving claims
for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56.
The Facts
Petitioners Avelina B. Conte and Leticia Boiser-Palma were former employees
of the Social Security System (SSS) who retired from government service
on May 9, 1990 and September 13, 1992, respectively. They availed of
compulsory retirement benefits under Republic Act No. 660. [2]
In addition to retirement benefits provided under R.A. 660, petitioners also
claimed SSS financial assistance benefits granted under SSS Resolution No. 56,
series of 1971.
A brief historical backgrounder is in order. SSS Resolution No. 56,[3] approved
on January 21, 1971, provides financial incentive and inducement to SSS
employees qualified to retire to avail of retirement benefits under RA 660 as
amended, rather than the retirement benefits under RA 1616 as amended, by
giving them financial assistance equivalent in amount to the difference between
what a retiree would have received under RA 1616, less what he was entitled to
under RA 660. The said SSS Resolution No. 56 states:
RESOLUTION NO. 56
WHEREAS, the retirement benefits of SSS employees are provided for under
Republic Acts 660 and 1616 as amended;
WHEREAS, SSS employees who are qualified for compulsory retirement at
age 65 or for optional retirement at a lower age are entitled to either the life
annuity under R.A. 660, as amended, or the gratuity under R.A. 1616, as
amended;
WHEREAS, a retirement benefit to be effective must be a periodic income as
close as possible to the monthly income that would have been due to the retiree
during the remaining years of his life were he still employed;
WHEREAS, the life annuity under R.A. 660, as amended, being closer to the
monthly income that was lost on account of old age than the gratuity under R.A.
1616, as amended, would best serve the interest of the retiree;
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the Social Security Commission to promote and
to protect the interest of all SSS employees, with a view to providing for their
well-being during both their working and retirement years;
WHEREAS, the availment of life annuities built up by premiums paid on behalf
of SSS employees during their working years would mean more savings to the
SSS;
WHEREAS, it is a duty of the Social Security Commission to effect savings in
every possible way for economical and efficient operations;
WHEREAS, it is the right of every SSS employee to choose freely and
voluntarily the benefit he is entitled to solely for his own benefit and for the
benefit of his family;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, That all the SSS employees who
are simultaneously qualified for compulsory retirement at age 65 or for optional
retirement at a lower age be encouraged to avail for themselves the life annuity
under R.A. 660, as amended;
RESOLVED, FURTHER, That SSS employees who availed themselves of the
said life annuity, in appreciation and recognition of their long and faithful
service, be granted financial assistance equivalent to the gratuity plus return of
contributions under R.A. 1616, as amended, less the five year guaranteed
annuity under R.A. 660, as amended;
RESOLVED, FINALLY, That the Administrator be authorized to act on all
applications for retirement submitted by SSS employees and subject to
availability of funds, pay the corresponding benefits in addition to the money
value of all accumulated leaves. (underscoring supplied)
Long after the promulgation of SSS Resolution No. 56, respondent Commission
on Audit (COA) issued a ruling, captioned as 3rd Indorsement dated July 10,
1989,[4]disallowing in audit all such claims for financial assistance under SSS
Resolution No. 56, for the reason that: --
x x x the scheme of financial assistance authorized by the SSS is similar to those
separate retirement plan or incentive/separation pay plans adopted by other
government corporate agencies which results in the increase of benefits beyond
what is allowed under existing retirement laws. In this regard, attention x x x is
invited to the view expressed by the Secretary of Budget and Management dated
February 17, 1988 to the COA General Counsel against the proliferation of
retirement plans which, in COA Decision No. 591 dated August 31, 1988, was
concurred in by this Commission. x x x.
Accordingly, all such claims for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No.
56 dated January 21, 1971 should be disallowed in audit. (underscoring
supplied)
Despite the aforequoted ruling of respondent COA, then SSS Administrator
Jose L. Cuisia, Jr. nevertheless wrote[5] on February 12, 1990 then Executive
Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., seeking presidential authority for SSS to
continue implementing its Resolution No. 56 dated January 21, 1971 granting
financial assistance to its qualified retiring employees.
However, in a letter-reply dated May 28, 1990,[6] then Executive Secretary
Macaraig advised Administrator Cuisia that the Office of the President is not
inclined to favorably act on the herein request, let alone overrule the
disallowance by COA of such claims, because, aside from the fact that
decisions, order or actions of the COA in the exercise of its audit functions are
appealable to the Supreme Court[7] pursuant to Sec. 50 of PD 1445, the benefits
under said Res. 56, though referred to as financial assistance, constituted
additional retirement benefits, and the scheme partook of the nature of a
supplementary pension/retirement plan proscribed by law.
The law referred to above is RA 4968 (The Teves Retirement Law), which took
effect June 17, 1967 and amended CA 186 (otherwise known as the
Government Service Insurance Act, or the GSIS Charter), making Sec. 28 (b)
of the latter act read as follows:
(b) Hereafter, no insurance or retirement plan for officers or employees shall be
created by employer. All supplementary retirement or pension plans heretofore
in force in any government office, agency or instrumentality or corporation
owned or controlled by the government, are hereby declared inoperative or
abolished; Provided, That the rights of those who are already eligible to retire
thereunder shall not be affected. (underscoring supplied)
On January 12, 1993, herein petitioners filed with respondent COA their letter-
appeal/protest[8] seeking reconsideration of COAs ruling of July 10,
1989 disallowing claims for financial assistance under Res. 56.
On November 15, 1993, petitioner Conte sought payment from SSS of the
benefits under Res. 56. On December 9, 1993, SSS Administrator Renato C.
Valencia denied[9] the request in consonance with the previous disallowance by
respondent COA, but assured petitioner that should the COA change its
position, the SSS will resume the grant of benefits under said Res. 56.
On March 15, 1994, respondent COA rendered its COA Decision No. 94-126
denying petitioners request for reconsideration.
Thus this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Issues
The issues[10] submitted by petitioners may be simplified and re-stated thus: Did
public respondent abuse its discretion when it disallowed in audit petitioners
claims for benefits under SSS Res. 56?
Petitioners argue that the financial assistance under Res. 56 is not a retirement
plan prohibited by RA 4968, and that Res. 56 provides benefits different from
and aside from what a retiring SSS employee would be entitled to under RA
660. Petitioners contend that it is a social amelioration and economic upliftment
measure undertaken not only for the benefit of the SSS but more so for the
welfare of its qualified retiring employees. As such, it should be interpreted in
a manner that would give the x x x most advantage to the recipient -- the retiring
employees whose dedicated, loyal, lengthy and faithful service to the agency of
government is recognized and amply rewarded -- the rationale for the financial
assistance plan. Petitioners reiterate the argument in their letter dated January
12, 1993 to COA that:
Motivation can be in the form of financial assistance, during their stay in the
service or upon retirement, as in the SSS Financial Assistance Plan. This is so,
because Government has to have some attractive remuneration programs to
encourage well-qualified personnel to pursue a career in the government
service, rather than in the private sector or in foreign countries ...
A more developmental view of the financial institutions grant of certain forms
of financial assistance to its personnel, we believe, would enable government
administrators to see these financial forms of remuneration as contributory to
the national developmental efforts for effective and efficient administration of
the personnel programs in different institutions.[11]
The Courts Ruling
Petitioners contentions are not supported by law. We hold that Res. 56
constitutes a supplementary retirement plan.
A cursory examination of the preambular clauses and provisions of Res. 56
provides a number of clear indications that its financial assistance plan
constitutes a supplemental retirement/pension benefits plan. In particular, the
fifth preambular clause which provides that it is the policy of the Social Security
Commission to promote and to protect the interest of all SSS employees, with
a view to providing for their well-being during both their working and
retirement years, and the wording of the resolution itself which states Resolved,
further, that SSS employees who availed themselves of the said life annuity
(under RA 660), in appreciation and recognition of their long and faithful
service, be granted financial assistance x x x can only be interpreted to mean
that the benefit being granted is none other than a kind of amelioration to enable
the retiring employee to enjoy (or survive) his retirement years and a reward for
his loyalty and service. Moreover, it is plain to see that the grant of said
financial assistance is inextricably linked with and inseparable from the
application for and approval of retirement benefits under RA 660, i.e., that
availment of said financial assistance under Res. 56 may not be done
independently of but only in conjunction with the availment of retirement
benefits under RA 660, and that the former is in augmentation or
supplementation of the latter benefits.
Likewise, then SSS Administrator Cuisias historical overview of the origins and
purpose of Res. 56 is very instructive and sheds much light on the
controversy:[12]
Resolution No. 56, x x x, applies where a retiring SSS employee is qualified to
claim under either RA 660 (pension benefit, that is, 5 year lump sum pension
and after 5 years, life time pension), or RA 1616 (gratuity benefit plus return of
contribution), at his option. The benefits under RA 660 are entirely payable by
GSIS while those under RA 1616 are entirely shouldered by SSS except the
return of contribution by GSIS.
Resolution No. 56 came about upon observation that qualified SSS employees
have invariably opted to retire under RA 1616 instead of RA 660 because the
total benefit under the former is much greater than the 5-year lump sum under
the latter. As a consequence, the SSS usually ended up virtually paying the
entire retirement benefit, instead of GSIS which is the main insurance carrier
for government employees. Hence, the situation has become so expensive for
SSS that a study of the problem became inevitable.
As a result of the study and upon the recommendation of its Actuary, the SSS
Management recommended to the Social Security Commission that retiring
employees who are qualified to claim under either RA 660 or 1616 should be
encouraged to avail for themselves the life annuity under RA 660, as amended,
with the SSS providing a financial assistance equivalent to
the difference between the benefit under RA 1616 (gratuity plus return of
contribution) and the 5-year lump sum pension under RA 660.
The Social Security Commission, as the policy-making body of the SSS
approved the recommendation in line with its mandate to insure
the efficient, honest and economical administration of the provisions and
purposes of this Act. (Section 3 (c) of the Social Security Law).
Necessarily, the situation was reversed with qualified SSS employees opting to
retire under RA No. 660 or RA 1146 instead of RA 1616, resulting in substantial
savings for the SSS despite its having to pay financial assistance.
Until Resolution No. 56 was questioned by COA. (underscoring part of original
text; italics ours)
Although such financial assistance package may have been instituted for noble,
altruistic purposes as well as from self-interest and a desire to cut costs on the
part of the SSS, nevertheless, it is beyond any dispute that such package
effectively constitutes a supplementary retirement plan. The fact that it was
designed to equalize the benefits receivable from RA 1616 with those payable
under RA 660 and make the latter program more attractive, merely confirms the
foregoing finding.
That the Res. 56 package is labelled financial assistance does not change its
essential nature. Retirement benefits are, after all, a form of reward for an
employees loyalty and service to the employer, and are intended to help the
employee enjoy the remaining years of his life, lessening the burden of
worrying about his financial support or upkeep.[13] On the other hand, a pension
partakes of the nature of retained wages of the retiree for a dual purpose: to
entice competent people to enter the government service, and to permit them to
retire from the service with relative security, not only for those who have
retained their vigor, but more so for those who have been incapacitated by
illness or accident.[14]
Is SSS Resolution No. 56 then within the ambit of and thus proscribed by Sec.
28 (b) of CA 186 as amended by RA 4968?
We answer in the affirmative. Said Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no
uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan -- other
than the GSIS -- for government officers and employees, in order to prevent the
undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. It is beyond cavil that Res. 56
contravenes the said provision of law and is therefore invalid, void and of no
effect. To ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to permitting
every other government office or agency to put up its own supplementary
retirement benefit plan under the guise of such financial assistance.
We are not unmindful of the laudable purposes for promulgating Res. 56, and
the positive results it must have had, not only in reducing costs and expenses
on the part of the SSS in connection with the pay-out of retirement benefits and
gratuities, but also in improving the quality of life for scores of retirees. But it
is simply beyond dispute that the SSS had no authority to maintain and
implement such retirement plan, particularly in the face of the statutory
prohibition. The SSS cannot, in the guise of rule-making, legislate or amend
laws or worse, render them nugatory.
It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative
order, the former must prevail.[15] A rule or regulation must conform to and be
consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or
regulation to be valid.[16] The rule-making power of a public administrative
body is a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the
authority given it by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power
beyond the scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with
respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by such a body, as
well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation by it. It may not
make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering or which
created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute.[17] Though well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are liberally
interpreted in favor of the retiree,[18] nevertheless, there is really nothing to
interpret in either RA 4968 or Res. 56, and correspondingly, the absence of any
doubt as to the ultra-vires nature and illegality of the disputed resolution
constrains us to rule against petitioners.
As a necessary consequence of the invalidity of Res. 56, we can hardly impute
abuse of discretion of any sort to respondent Commission for denying
petitioners request for reconsideration of the 3rd Indorsement of July 10,
1989. On the contrary, we hold that public respondent in its assailed Decision
acted with circumspection in denying petitioners claim. It reasoned thus:
After a careful evaluation of the facts herein obtaining, this Commission finds
the instant request to be devoid of merit. It bears stress that the financial
assistance contemplated under SSS Resolution No. 56 is granted to SSS
employees who opt to retire under R.A. No. 660. In fact, by the aggrieved
parties own admission (page 2 of the request for reconsideration dated January
12, 1993), it is a financial assistance granted by the SSS management to its
employees, in addition to the retirement benefits under Republic Act No.
660. (underscoring supplied for emphasis) There is therefore no question, that
the said financial assistance partakes of the nature of a retirement benefit that
has the effect of modifying existing retirement laws particularly R.A. No. 660.
Petitioners also asseverate that the scheme of financial assistance under Res. 56
may be likened to the monetary benefits of government officials and employees
who are paid, over and above their salaries and allowances as provided by
statute, an additional honorarium in varying amounts. We find this comparison
baseless and misplaced. As clarified by the Solicitor General:[19]
Petitioners comparison of SSS Resolution No. 56 with the honoraria given to
government officials and employees of the National Prosecution Service of the
Department of Justice, Office of the Government Corporate Counsel and even
in the Office of the Solicitor General is devoid of any basis. The monetary
benefits or honoraria given to these officials or employees are categorized as
travelling and/or representation expenses which are incurred by them in the
course of handling cases, attending court/administrative hearings, or
performing other field work. These monetary benefits are given upon rendition
of service while the financial benefits under SSS Resolution No. 56 are given
upon retirement from service.
In a last-ditch attempt to convince this Court that their position is tenable,
petitioners invoke equity. They believe that they are deserving of justice and
equity in their quest for financial assistance under SSS Resolution No. 56, not
so much because the SSS is one of the very few stable agencies of government
where no doubt this recognition and reputation is earned x x x but more so due
to the miserable scale of compensation granted to employees in various
agencies to include those obtaining in the SSS.[20]
We must admit we sympathize with petitioners in their financial predicament
as a result of their misplaced decision to avail of retirement benefits under RA
660, with the false expectation that financial assistance under the disputed Res.
56 will also materialize. Nevertheless, this Court has always held that equity,
which has been aptly described as justice outside legality, is applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law or judicial rules of procedure. [21] In
this case, equity cannot be applied to give validity and effect to Res. 56, which
directly contravenes the clear mandate of the provisions of RA 4968.
Likewise, we cannot but be aware that the clear imbalance between the benefits
available under RA 660 and those under RA 1616 has created an unfair situation
for it has shifted the burden of paying such benefits from the GSIS (the main
insurance carrier of government employees) to the SSS. Without the corrective
effects of Res. 56, all retiring SSS employees without exception will be
impelled to avail of benefits under RA 1616. The cumulative effect of such
availments on the financial standing and stability of the SSS is better left to
actuarians. But the solution or remedy for such situation can be provided only
by Congress. Judicial hands cannot, on the pretext of showing concern for the
welfare of government employees, bestow equity contrary to the clear
provisions of law.
Nevertheless, insofar as herein petitioners are concerned, this Court cannot just
sit back and watch as these two erstwhile government employees, who after
spending the best parts of their lives in public service have retired hoping to
enjoy their remaining years, face a financially dismal if not distressed future,
deprived of what should have been due them by way of additional retirement
benefits, on account of a bureaucratic boo-boo improvidently hatched by their
higher-ups. It is clear to our mind that petitioners applied for benefits under RA
660 only because of the incentives offered by Res. 56, and that absent such
incentives, they would have without fail availed of RA 1616 instead. We
likewise have no doubt that petitioners are simply innocent bystanders in this
whole bureaucratic rule-making/financial scheme-making drama, and that
therefore, to the extent possible, petitioners ought not be penalized or made to
suffer as a result of the subsequently determined invalidity of Res. 56, the
promulgation and implementation of which they had nothing to do with.
And here is where equity may properly be invoked: since SSS employees who
are qualified for compulsory retirement at age 65 or for optional retirement at a
lower age are entitled to either the life annuity under R.A. 660, as amended, or
the gratuity under R.A. 1616, as amended,[22] it appears that petitioners, being
qualified to avail of benefits under RA 660, may also readily qualify under RA
1616. It would therefore not be misplaced to enjoin the SSS to render all
possible assistance to petitioners for the prompt processing and approval of their
applications under RA 1616, and in the meantime, unless barred by existing
regulations, to advance to petitioners the difference between the amounts due
under RA 1616, and the amounts they already obtained, if any, under RA 660.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit, there
having been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
Commission. The assailed Decision of public respondent is AFFIRMED, and
SSS Resolution No. 56 is hereby declared ILLEGAL, VOID AND OF NO
EFFECT. The SSS is hereby urged to assist petitioners and facilitate their
applications under RA 1616, and to advance to them, unless barred by existing
regulations, the corresponding amounts representing the difference between the
two benefits programs. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE
BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES, BENJAMIN REYES,
NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellant.
Rustics F. de los Reyes, Jr. for appellees.
AQUINO, J.:têñ.£îhqwâ£
This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro
fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries
Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission.
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes,
Nazario Aquino and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary
investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.
It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1,
1969 resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta.
Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a generator
colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and
electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed
copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole with electric wire
attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of these
devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any
aquatic animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the
populace" (Criminal Case No. 5429).
Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The
prosecution appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order
of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is now before this Court on
appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440.
The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric
current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section
I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy
conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since
the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial
departments cannot consider it unlawful.
As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law
prohibits "the use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing.
Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or
poisonous substance in fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos
nor more than five thousand, and by imprisonment for not less than six months
nor more than five years.
It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro
fishing." Notwithstanding the silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Commissioner of
Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224),
prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The order is quoted
below: ñé+.£ªwph!1
SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL
WATERS ñé+.£ªwph!1
OF THE PHILIPPINES.
Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No.
3512, the following rules and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro
fishing in all waters of the Philippines are promulgated for the information and
guidance of all concerned.ñé+.£ªwph!1
SECTION 1. — Definition. — Words and terms used in this Order 11 construed
as follows:
(a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines' includes all waters
of the Philippine Archipelago, as defined in the t between the United States and
Spain, dated respectively the tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight
and the seventh of November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of this order,
rivers, lakes and other bodies of fresh waters are included.
(b) Electro Fishing. — Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of
electric current. The equipment used are of many electrical devices which may
be battery or generator-operated and from and available source of electric
current.
(c) 'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee.
(d) 'Fish' includes other aquatic products.
SEC. 2. — Prohibition. — It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in
electro fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of
the Philippine waters except for research, educational and scientific purposes
which must be covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources which shall be carried at all times.
SEC. 3. — Penalty. — Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative
Order shall subject the offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos
(P500.00) or imprisonment of not extending six (6) months or both at the
discretion of the Court.
SEC. 4. — Repealing Provisions. — All administrative orders or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Administrative Order are hereby
revoked.
SEC. 5. — Effectivity. — This Administrative Order shall take effect six (60)
days after its publication in the Office Gazette.
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the
recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of Administrative Order No. 84, by
restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63 O.G.
9963).
Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2,
was changed by the amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water
fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes, swamps, dams, irrigation
canals and other bodies of fresh water."
The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that
electro fishing is punishable under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under
section 76 thereof), which provides that any other violation of that law "or of
any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender to
a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six
months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order
No. 84 imposes a fm of not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro
fishing, which amount the 83. It seems that the Department of Fisheries
prescribed their own penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less than the
severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not Identified to the at
penalty imposed in section 83.
Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on
83, then the crime of electro fishing would be within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the inferior court (Sec. 44 [f], Judiciary Law; People vs. Ragasi,
L-28663, September 22,
We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious
that the crime of electro fishing which is punishable with a sum up to P500,
falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the inferior courts and the
Court of First instance (People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70
SCRA 531 and the cases cited therein).
And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna,
a provincial capital, the order of d rendered by that municipal court was directly
appealable to the Court, not to the Court of First Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45
and last par. of section 87 of the Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25992,
June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596).
It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction
over the case. Its order affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal is void
for lack of motion. This appeal shall be treated as a direct appeal from the
municipal court to this Court. (See People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67).
In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and
84-1 were not issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated
above, punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance. This
contention is not well-taken because, as already stated, the Penal provision of
Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a form
of fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11.
The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro
fishing in fresh water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department
Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the
Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and
the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and regulations
consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and
for the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3)
the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing
resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries
Law which provides that "any other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any
rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall subject the offender to a
fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more than six
months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of
place because the penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order No. 84
is not the same as the penalty fixed in section 83.
We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries
Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted
under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing.
As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize
it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro
fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision
to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive
in fishing; (2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of
marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen
to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative
Order No. 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an
offense fails within the category of "other violations" because, as already
shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty
for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section
76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of the law and
regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to
declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of
regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.
(People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).
Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters.
Later, the ban against electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The
amendment created the impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per
se. It could be tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances strengthens the
view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro fishing.
However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable
under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive
revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704, which is a revision and
consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which
was promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro
fishing in fresh water and salt water areas.
That decree provides: ñé+.£ªwph!1
SEC. 33. — Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic
products. — It shall he unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause
to be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine
waters with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the
use of electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of
Section 3 hereof: ...
The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and
3586, Presidential Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all , Acts, Executive
Orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D.
No. 704).
The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro
fishing is a clear recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of the old
Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally
adequate to penalize electro fishing.
Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1 (c) of
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 and which is not provided for the old
Fisheries Law, is now found in section 3(d) of the decree. Note further that the
decree penalty electro fishing by "imprisonment from two (2) to four (4) years",
a punishment which is more severe than the penalty of a time of not excluding
P500 or imprisonment of not more than six months or both fixed in section 3 of
Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84.
An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and
administrative agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources) under the Fisheries
Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by
means of an administrative order.
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the
lawmaking body finds it impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and
provide for the multifarious and complex situations that may be encountered in
enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane
to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards
that the law prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry
vs. Muñ;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs.
Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712).
The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the
enforcement of a particular statute (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125,
citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus Co., Inc. vs.
Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation
of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption
of legislative, powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation
calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing
complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs.
Williams, 70 Phil. 726; People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeñ;a, 68 Phil. 328).
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular
department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be
for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such
regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi
Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress
(Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of
Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel vs. General
Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs.
Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or
proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot
be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace
matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be
sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382,
citing 12 C.J. 845-46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs.
Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78 Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs.
Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
has rule-making powers. Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the
Secretary "shall from time to time issue instructions, orders, and regulations
consistent" with that law, "as may be and proper to carry into effect the
provisions thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural
Resources by on 7 of the Revised Fisheries law, Presidential December No.
704.
Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries "to prepare
and execute upon the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, forms instructions, rules and regulations consistent with the
purpose" of that enactment "and for the development of fisheries."
Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the
Department Head shall have the power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit
do so, all rules, regulates, orders, memorandums, and other instructions, not
contrary to law, to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient
administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his
Department, and for the strict enforcement and proper execution of the laws
relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said Department; but none of said
rules or orders shall prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except as
expressly authorized by law."
Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with
law have the force of law (Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural
Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L- 20051,
May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he exercises the rule-making power by
delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend
the bound demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power; otherwise,
he would be improperly exercising legislative power in his own right and not
as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.
Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or
executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution."
As noted by Justice Fernando, "except for constitutional officials who can trace
their competence to act to the fundamental law itself, a public office must be in
the statute relied upon a grant of power before he can exercise it." "department
zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute." (Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Santiago, L-29236, August 21,
1974, 58 SCRA 493, 496-8).
"Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or
authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature
of a statute, and compliance therewith may be enforced by a penal sanction
provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in general
terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions
intended by the legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law
are oftentimes left to the administrative agency entrusted with its enforcement.
In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the product of a
delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect
of law." The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory
authority granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. (Davis,
Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victories Milling Co., Inc. vs. Social
Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to
implement said law, the basic law prevails because said rule or regulation
cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law (People vs. Lim,
108 Phil. 1091).
This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra, promulgated on July 26, 1960,
called the attention of technical men in the executive departments, who draft
rules and regulations, to the importance and necessity of closely following the
legal provisions which they intend to implement so as to avoid any possible
misunderstanding or confusion.
The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer
of the government in conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such
regulation constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to punishment
in accordance with the provisions of the law (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil.
119, 124).
In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued
can constitute a crime punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by
virtue of the latter (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125, 1132).
It has been held that "to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall
be punished is a power vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be
delegated to any other body or agency" (1 Am. Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas
Co. vs. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527).
In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in
accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was
issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing.
The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos case
involves section 28 of Fish and Game Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources pursuant to the aforementioned
section 4 of the Fisheries Law.
Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the
Fisheries Law and under the said administrative order may fish within three
kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction
is exercised by naval and military reservations authorities of the United States
only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be
granted by the Secretary upon recommendation of the military or naval
authorities concerned. A violation of the proviso may be proceeded against
under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code.
Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First
Instance of Cavite for having caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and
anchor without permission from the Secretary within three kilometers from the
shoreline of Corrigidor Island.
This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to
license from fishing within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and
reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military
authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources upon recommendation of the military and
naval authorities concerned.
As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the
administrative order, the promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is
equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has not been and cannot
be delegated to him, it being expressly reserved" to the lawmaking body. "Such
an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the
Secretary but also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have,
and therefore" the said provision "is null and void and without effect". Hence,
the charge against Santos was dismiss.
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the
right to make ranks and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted,
that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute.
An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State,
206 Ga. 734, 58 Second 2d 534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130).
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and
boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose,
the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of
extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent
a valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an
administrative body to legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322, 105 Pac. 2nd
51).
In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear
that the order is one which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon
the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special care.
(State vs. Miles supra).
The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game
Commission "to adopt, promulgate, amend and/or repeal, and enforce
reasonable rules and regulations governing and/or prohibiting the taking of the
various classes of game.
Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that "it shall be
unlawful to offer, pay or receive any reward, prize or compensation for the
hunting, pursuing, taking, killing or displaying of any game animal, game bird
or game fish or any part thereof."
Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-
down cash prize to the person displaying the largest deer in his store during the
open for hunting such game animals. For that act, he was charged with a
violation of the rule Promulgated by the State Game Commission.
It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. What the
statute penalized was the taking of game. If the lawmaking body desired to
prohibit the display of game, it could have readily said so. It was not lawful for
the administrative board to extend or modify the statute. Hence, the indictment
against Miles was quashed. The Miles case is similar to this case.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack
of appellate jurisdiction and the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal
court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is affirmed. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108524 November 10, 1994
MISAMIS ORIENTAL ASSOCIATION OF COCO TRADERS,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE SECRETARY, COMMISSIONER
OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE (BIR), AND
REVENUE DISTRICT OFFICER, BIR MISAMIS
ORIENTAL, respondents.
Damasing Law Office for petitioner.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to nullify
Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 47-91 and enjoin the
collection by respondent revenue officials of the Value Added Tax
(VAT) on the sale of copra by members of petitioner
organization. 1
Petitioner Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. is a
domestic corporation whose members, individually or
collectively, are engaged in the buying and selling of copra in
Misamis Oriental. The petitioner alleges that prior to the issuance
of Revenue Memorandum Circular 47-91 on June 11, 1991,
which implemented VAT Ruling 190-90, copra was classified as
agricultural food product under $ 103(b) of the National Internal
Revenue Code and, therefore, exempt from VAT at all stages of
production or distribution.
Respondents represent departments of the executive branch of
government charged with the generation of funds and the
assessment, levy and collection of taxes and other imposts.
The pertinent provision of the NIRC states:
Sec. 103. Exempt Transactions. — The following shall be exempt
from the value-added tax:
(a) Sale of nonfood agricultural, marine and forest products in
their original state by the primary producer or the owner of the
land where the same are produced;
(b) Sale or importation in their original state of agricultural and
marine food products, livestock and poultry of a kind generally
used as, or yielding or producing foods for human consumption,
and breeding stock and genetic material therefor;
Under §103(a), as above quoted, the sale of agricultural non-food
products in their original state is exempt from VAT only if the sale
is made by the primary producer or owner of the land from which
the same are produced. The sale made by any other person or
entity, like a trader or dealer, is not exempt from the tax. On the
other hand, under §103(b) the sale of agricultural food products
in their original state is exempt from VAT at all stages of
production or distribution regardless of who the seller is.
The question is whether copra is an agricultural food or non-food
product for purposes of this provision of the NIRC. On June 11,
1991, respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued the
circular in question, classifying copra as an agricultural non-food
product and declaring it "exempt from VAT only if the sale is
made by the primary producer pursuant to Section 103(a) of the
Tax Code, as amended." 2
The reclassification had the effect of denying to the petitioner the
exemption it previously enjoyed when copra was classified as an
agricultural food product under §103(b) of the NIRC. Petitioner
challenges RMC No. 47-91 on various grounds, which will be
presently discussed although not in the order raised in the
petition for prohibition.
First. Petitioner contends that the Bureau of Food and Drug of
the Department of Health and not the BIR is the competent
government agency to determine the proper classification of food
products. Petitioner cites the opinion of Dr. Quintin Kintanar of
the Bureau of Food and Drug to the effect that copra should be
considered "food" because it is produced from coconut which is
food and 80% of coconut products are edible.
On the other hand, the respondents argue that the opinion of the
BIR, as the government agency charged with the implementation
and interpretation of the tax laws, is entitled to great respect.
We agree with respondents. In interpreting §103(a) and (b) of the
NIRC, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue gave it a strict
construction consistent with the rule that tax exemptions must
be strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor
of the state. Indeed, even Dr. Kintanar said that his classification
of copra as food was based on "the broader definition of food
which includes agricultural commodities and other components
used in the manufacture/processing of food." The full text of his
letter reads:
10 April 1991
Mr. VICTOR A. DEOFERIO, JR.
Chairman VAT Review Committee
Bureau of Internal Revenue
Diliman, Quezon City
Dear Mr. Deoferio:
This is to clarify a previous communication made by this Office
about copra in a letter dated 05 December 1990 stating that
copra is not classified as food. The statement was made in the
context of BFAD's regulatory responsibilities which focus mainly
on foods that are processed and packaged, and thereby copra is
not covered.
However, in the broader definition of food which include
agricultural commodities and other components used in the
manufacture/ processing of food, it is our opinion that copra
should be classified as an agricultural food product since copra
is produced from coconut meat which is food and based on
available information, more than 80% of products derived from
copra are edible products.
Very truly yours,
QUINTIN L. KINTANAR, M.D., Ph.D.
Director
Assistant Secretary of Health for Standards and Regulations
Moreover, as the government agency charged with the
enforcement of the law, the opinion of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, in the absence of any showing that it is plainly
wrong, is entitled to great weight. Indeed, the ruling was made by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in the exercise of his
power under § 245 of the NIRC to "make rulings or opinions in
connection with the implementation of the provisions of internal
revenue laws, including rulings on the classification of articles for
sales tax and similar purposes."
Second. Petitioner complains that it was denied due process
because it was not heard before the ruling was made. There is a
distinction in administrative law between legislative rules and
interpretative rules. 3 There would be force in petitioner's
argument if the circular in question were in the nature of a
legislative rule. But it is not. It is a mere interpretative rule.
The reason for this distinction is that a legislative rule is in the
nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a
primary legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same
way that laws must have the benefit of public hearing, it is
generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there
must be hearing. In this connection, the Administrative Code of
1987 provides:
Public Participation. — If not otherwise required by law, an agency
shall, as far as practicable, publish or circulate notices of
proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to
submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless
the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of
general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing
thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be
observed. 4
In addition such rule must be published.5 On the other hand,
interpretative rules are designed to provide guidelines to the law
which the administrative agency is in charge of enforcing.
Accordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to
make three inquiries: (i) whether the rule is within the delegated
authority of the administrative agency; (ii) whether it is
reasonable; and (iii) whether it was issued pursuant to proper
procedure. But the court is not free to substitute its judgment as
to the desirability or wisdom of the rule for the legislative body,
by its delegation of administrative judgment, has committed
those questions to administrative judgments and not to judicial
judgments. In the case of an interpretative rule, the inquiry is not
into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule.
As a matter of power a court, when confronted with an
interpretative rule, is free to (i) give the force of law to the rule;
(ii) go to the opposite extreme and substitute its judgment; or (iii)
give some intermediate degree of authoritative weight to the
interpretative rule. 6
In the case at bar, we find no reason for holding that respondent
Commissioner erred in not considering copra as an "agricultural
food product" within the meaning of § 103(b) of the NIRC. As the
Solicitor General contends, "copra per se is not food, that is, it is
not intended for human consumption. Simply stated, nobody
eats copra for food." That previous Commissioners considered it
so, is not reason for holding that the present interpretation is
wrong. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue is not bound by
the ruling of his predecessors. 7 To the contrary, the overruling
of decisions is inherent in the interpretation of laws.
Third. Petitioner likewise claims that RMC No. 47-91 is
discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because while coconut farmers and copra producers
are exempt, traders and dealers are not, although both sell copra
in its original state. Petitioners add that oil millers do not enjoy
tax credit out of the VAT payment of traders and dealers.
The argument has no merit. There is a material or substantial
difference between coconut farmers and copra producers, on the
one hand, and copra traders and dealers, on the other. The
former produce and sell copra, the latter merely sell copra. The
Constitution does not forbid the differential treatment of persons
so long as there is a reasonable basis for classifying them
differently. 8
It is not true that oil millers are exempt from VAT. Pursuant to §
102 of the NIRC, they are subject to 10% VAT on the sale of
services. Under § 104 of the Tax Code, they are allowed to credit
the input tax on the sale of copra by traders and dealers, but
there is no tax credit if the sale is made directly by the copra
producer as the sale is VAT exempt. In the same manner, copra
traders and dealers are allowed to credit the input tax on the sale
of copra by other traders and dealers, but there is no tax credit if
the sale is made by the producer.
Fourth. It is finally argued that RMC No. 47-91 is
counterproductive because traders and dealers would be forced
to buy copra from coconut farmers who are exempt from the VAT
and that to the extent that prices are reduced the government
would lose revenues as the 10% tax base is correspondingly
diminished.
This is not so. The sale of agricultural non-food products is
exempt from VAT only when made by the primary producer or
owner of the land from which the same is produced, but in the
case of agricultural food products their sale in their original state
is exempt at all stages of production or distribution. At any rate,
the argument that the classification of copra as agricultural non-
food product is counterproductive is a question of wisdom or
policy which should be addressed to respondent officials and to
Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 95832 August 10, 1992
MAYNARD R. PERALTA, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.
Tranquilino F. Meris Law Office for petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner was appointed Trade-Specialist II on 25 September
1989 in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). His
appointment was classified as "Reinstatement/Permanent".
Before said appointment, he was working at the Philippine Cotton
Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation
under the Department of Agriculture.
On 8 December 1989, petitioner received his initial salary,
covering the period from 25 September to 31 October 1989. Since
he had no accumulated leave credits, DTI deducted from his
salary the amount corresponding to his absences during the
covered period, namely, 29 September 1989 and 20 October
1989, inclusive of Saturdays and Sundays. More specifically, the
dates of said absences for which salary deductions were made,
are as follows:
1. 29 September 1989 — Friday
2. 30 September 1989 — Saturday
3. 01 October 1989 — Sunday
4. 20 October 1989 — Friday
5. 21 October 1989 — Saturday
6. 22 October 1989 — Sunday
Petitioner sent a memorandum to Amando T. Alvis (Chief,
General Administrative Service) on 15 December 1989 inquiring
as to the law on salary deductions, if the employee has no leave
credits.
Amando T. Alvis answered petitioner's query in a memorandum
dated 30 January 1990 citing Chapter 5.49 of the Handbook of
Information on the Philippine Civil Service which states that
"when an employee is on leave without pay on a day before or on
a day immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or Holiday,
such Saturday, Sunday, or Holiday shall also be without pay
(CSC, 2nd Ind., February 12, 1965)."
Petitioner then sent a latter dated 20 February 1990 addressed
to Civil Service Commission (CSC) Chairman Patricia A. Sto.
Tomas raising the following question:
Is an employee who was on leave of absence without pay on a day
before or on a day time immediately preceding a Saturday,
Sunday or Holiday, also considered on leave of absence without
pay on such Saturday, Sunday or Holiday?1
Petitioner in his said letter to the CSC Chairman argued that a
reading of the General Leave Law as contained in the Revised
Administrative Code, as well as the old Civil Service Law
(Republic Act No. 2260), the Civil Service Decree (Presidential
Decree No. 807), and the Civil Service Rules and Regulation fails
to disclose a specific provision which supports the CSC rule at
issue. That being the case, the petitioner contented that he
cannot be deprived of his pay or salary corresponding to the
intervening Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays (in the factual
situation posed), and that the withholding (or deduction) of the
same is tantamount to a deprivation of property without due
process of law.
On 25 May 1990, respondent Commission promulgated
Resolution No. 90-497, ruling that the action of the DTI in
deducting from the salary of petitioner, a part thereof
corresponding to six (6) days (September 29, 30, October 1, 20,
21, 22, 1989) is in order. 2 The CSC stated that:
In a 2nd Indorsement dated February 12, 1965 of this
Commission, which embodies the policy on leave of absence
without pay incurred on a Friday and Monday, reads:
Mrs. Rosalinda Gonzales is not entitled to payment of salary
corresponding to January 23 and 24, 1965, Saturday and
Sunday, respectively, it appearing that she was present on
Friday, January 22, 1965 but was on leave without pay beginning
January 25, the succeeding Monday. It is the view of this Office
that an employee who has no more leave credit in his favor is not
entitled to the payment of salary on Saturdays, Sundays or
holidays unless such non-working days occur within the period
of service actually rendered. (Emphasis supplied)
The rationale for the above ruling which applies only to those
employees who are being paid on monthly basis, rests on the
assumption that having been absent on either Monday or Friday,
one who has no leave credits, could not be favorably credited with
intervening days had the same been working days. Hence, the
above policy that for an employee on leave without pay to be
entitled to salary on Saturdays, Sundays or holidays, the same
must occur between the dates where the said employee actually
renders service. To rule otherwise would allow an employee who
is on leave of absent (sic) without pay for a long period of time to
be entitled to payment of his salary corresponding to Saturdays,
Sundays or holidays. It also discourages the employees who have
exhausted their leave credits from absenting themselves on a
Friday or Monday in order to have a prolonged weekend, resulting
in the prejudice of the government and the public in general. 3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and in Resolution No.
90-797, the respondent Commission denied said motion for lack
of merit. The respondent Commission in explaining its action
held:
The Primer on the Civil Service dated February 21, 1978,
embodies the Civil Service Commission rulings to be observed
whenever an employee of the government who has no more leave
credits, is absent on a Friday and/or a Monday is enough basis
for the deduction of his salaries corresponding to the intervening
Saturdays and Sundays. What the Commission perceived to be
without basis is the demand of Peralta for the payment of his
salaries corresponding to Saturdays and Sundays when he was
in fact on leave of absence without pay on a Friday prior to the
said days. A reading of Republic Act No. 2260 (sic) does not show
that a government employee who is on leave of absence without
pay on a day before or immediately preceding Saturdays, Sunday
or legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said days.
Further, a reading of Senate Journal No. 67 dated May 4, 1960
of House Bill No. 41 (Republic Act No. 2625) reveals that while
the law excludes Saturdays, Sundays and holidays in the
computation of leave credits, it does not, however, include a case
where the leave of absence is without pay. Hence, applying the
principle of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, the claim of
Peralta has no merit. Moreover, to take a different posture would
be in effect giving more premium to employees who are frequently
on leave of absence without pay, instead of discouraging them
from incurring further absence without
pay. 4
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner filed the present petition.
What is primarily questioned by the petitioner is the validity of
the respondent Commission's policy mandating salary
deductions corresponding to the intervening Saturdays, Sundays
or Holidays where an employee without leave credits was absent
on the immediately preceding working day.
During the pendency of this petition, the respondent Commission
promulgated Resolution No. 91-540 dated 23 April 1991
amending the questioned policy, considering that employees paid
on a monthly basis are not required to work on Saturdays,
Sunday or Holidays. In said amendatory Resolution, the
respondent Commission resolved "to adopt the policy that when
an employee, regardless of whether he has leave credits or not, is
absent without pay on day immediately preceding or succeeding
Saturday, Sunday or holiday, he shall not be considered absent
on those days." Memorandum Circular No. 16 Series of 1991
dated 26 April 1991, was also issued by CSC Chairman Sto.
Tomas adopting and promulgating the new policy and directing
the Heads of Departments, Bureaus and Agencies in the national
and local governments, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, to oversee the
strict implementation of the circular.
Because of these developments, it would seem at first blush that
this petition has become moot and academic since the very CSC
policy being questioned has already been amended and, in effect,
Resolutions No. 90-497 and 90-797, subject of this petition for
certiorari, have already been set aside and superseded. But the
issue of whether or not the policy that had been adopted and in
force since 1965 is valid or not, remains unresolved. Thus, for
reasons of public interest and public policy, it is the duty of the
Court to make a formal ruling on the validity or invalidity of such
questioned policy.
The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) conferred upon the
Commissioner of Civil Service the following powers and duties:
Sec. 16 (e) with the approval by the President to prescribe,
amend and enforce suitable rules and regulations for carrying
into effect the provisions of this Civil Service Law, and the rules
prescribed pursuant to the provisions of this law shall become
effective thirty days after publication in the Official Gazette;
xxx xxx xxx
(k) To perform other functions that properly belong to a
central personnel agency. 5
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the Commission
promulgated the herein challenged policy. Said policy was
embodied in a 2nd Indorsement dated 12 February 1965 of the
respondent Commission involving the case of a Mrs. Rosalinda
Gonzales. The respondent Commission ruled that an employee
who has no leave credits in his favor is not entitled to the
payment of salary on Saturdays, Sundays or Holidays unless
such non-working days occur within the period of service actually
rendered. The same policy is reiterated in the Handbook of
Information on the Philippine Civil Service. 6 Chapter Five on
leave of absence provides that:
5.51. When intervening Saturday, Sunday or holiday
considered as leave without pay — when an employee is on leave
without pay on a day before or on a day immediately preceding a
Saturday, Sunday or holiday, such Saturday, Sunday or holiday
shall also be without pay. (CSC, 2nd Ind., Feb. 12, 1965).
It is likewise illustrated in the Primer on the Civil Service 7 in the
section referring to Questions and Answers on Leave of Absences,
which states the following:
27. How is leave of an employee who has no more leave
credits computed if:
(1) he is absent on a Friday and the following Monday?
(2) if he is absent on Friday but reports to work the
following Monday?
(3) if he is absent on a Monday but present the preceding
Friday?
- (1) He is considered on leave without pay for 4 days
covering Friday to Monday;
- (2) He is considered on leave without pay for 3 days from
Friday to Sunday;
- (3) He is considered on leave without pay for 3 days from
Saturday to Monday.
When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion
or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-existing
law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best
advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law
means. 8 It has also been held that interpretative regulations
need not be published. 9
In promulgating as early as 12 February 1965 the questioned
policy, the Civil Service Commission interpreted the provisions of
Republic Act No. 2625 (which took effect on 17 June 1960)
amending the Revised Administrative Code, and which stated as
follows:
Sec. 1. Sections two hundred eighty-four and two hundred
eighty-five-A of the Administrative Code, as amended, are further
amended to read as follows:
Sec. 284. After at least six months' continues (sic)
faithful, and satisfactory service, the President or proper head of
department, or the chief of office in the case of municipal
employees may, in his discretion, grant to an employee or laborer,
whether permanent or temporary, of the national government,
the provincial government, the government of a chartered city, of
a municipality, of a municipal district or of government-owned or
controlled corporations other than those mentioned in Section
two hundred sixty-eight, two hundred seventy-one and two
hundred seventy-four hereof, fifteen days vacation leave of
absence with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and
holidays, for each calendar year of service.
Sec. 285-A. In addition to the vacation leave provided in
the two preceding sections each employee or laborer, whether
permanent or temporary, of the national government, the
provincial government, the government of a chartered city, of a
municipality or municipal district in any regularly and specially
organized province, other than those mentioned in Section two
hundred sixty-eight, two hundred seventy-one and two hundred
seventy-four hereof, shall be entitled to fifteen days of sick leave
for each year of service with full pay, exclusive of Saturdays,
Sundays and holidays: Provided, That such sick leave will be
granted by the President, Head of Department or independent
office concerned, or the chief of office in case of municipal
employees, only on account of sickness on the part of the
employee or laborer concerned or of any member of his immediate
family.
The Civil Service Commission in its here questioned Resolution
No. 90-797 construed R.A. 2625 as referring only to government
employees who have earned leave credits against which their
absences may be charged with pay, as its letters speak only of
leaves of absence with full pay. The respondent Commission
ruled that a reading of R.A. 2625 does not show that a
government employee who is on leave of absence without pay on
a day before or immediately preceding a Saturday, Sunday or
legal holiday is entitled to payment of his salary for said days.
Administrative construction, if we may repeat, is not necessarily
binding upon the courts. Action of an administrative agency may
be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an
error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or the
spirit of a legislative enactment. 10
We find this petition to be impressed with merit.
As held in Hidalgo vs. Hidalgo: 11
. . . . where the true intent of the law is clear that calls for the
application of the cardinal rule of statutory construction that
such intent or spirit must prevail over the letter thereof, for
whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute,
since adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice
and contradictions and would defeat the plain and vital purpose
of the statute.
The intention of the legislature in the enactment of R.A. 2625
may be gleaned from, among others, the sponsorship speech of
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino during the second reading of House
Bill No. 41 (which became R.A. 2625). He said:
The law actually provides for sick leave and vacation leave of 15
days each year of service to be with full pay. But under the
present law, in computing these periods of leaves, Saturday,
Sunday and holidays are included in the computation so that if
an employee should become sick and absent himself on a Friday
and then he reports for work on a Tuesday, in the computation
of the leave the Saturday and Sunday will be included, so that he
will be considered as having had a leave of Friday, Saturday,
Sunday and Monday, or four days.
The purpose of the present bill is to exclude from the computation
of the leave those days, Saturdays and Sundays, as well as
holidays, because actually the employee is entitled not to go to
office during those days. And it is unfair and unjust to him that
those days should be counted in the computation of leaves. 12
With this in mind, the construction by the respondent
Commission of R.A. 2625 is not in accordance with the legislative
intent. R.A. 2625 specifically provides that government
employees are entitled to fifteen (15) days vacation leave of
absence with full pay and fifteen (15) days sick leave with full
pay, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays in both cases.
Thus, the law speaks of the granting of a right and the law does
not provide for a distinction between those who have
accumulated leave credits and those who have exhausted their
leave credits in order to enjoy such right. Ubi lex non distinguit
nec nos distinguere debemus. The fact remains that government
employees, whether or not they have accumulated leave credits,
are not required by law to work on Saturdays, Sundays and
Holidays and thus they can not be declared absent on such non-
working days. They cannot be or are not considered absent on
non-working days; they cannot and should not be deprived of
their salary corresponding to said non-working days just because
they were absent without pay on the day immediately prior to, or
after said non-working days. A different rule would constitute a
deprivation of property without due process.
Furthermore, before their amendment by R.A. 2625, Sections
284 and 285-A of the Revised Administrative Code applied to all
government employee without any distinction. It follows that the
effect of the amendment similarly applies to all employees
enumerated in Sections 284 and 285-A, whether or not they have
accumulated leave credits.
As the questioned CSC policy is here declared invalid, we are next
confronted with the question of what effect such invalidity will
have. Will all government employees on a monthly salary basis,
deprived of their salaries corresponding to Saturdays, Sundays
or legal holidays (as herein petitioner was so deprived) since 12
February 1965, be entitled to recover the amounts corresponding
to such non-working days?
The general rule vis-a-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional
act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it
affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal
contemplation as inoperative as though it had never been passed.
13
But, as held in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter State
Bank:14
. . . . It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to
the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
such determination is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects — with respect to particular relations, individual
and corporate; and particular conduct, private and official.
To allow all the affected government employees, similarly situated
as petitioner herein, to claim their deducted salaries resulting
from the past enforcement of the herein invalidated CSC policy,
would cause quite a heavy financial burden on the national and
local governments considering the length of time that such policy
has been effective. Also, administrative and practical
considerations must be taken into account if this ruling will have
a strict restrospective application. The Court, in this connection,
calls upon the respondent Commission and the Congress of the
Philippines, if necessary, to handle this problem with justice and
equity to all affected government employees.
It must be pointed out, however, that after CSC Memorandum
Circular No. 16 Series of 1991 — amending the herein invalidated
policy — was promulgated on 26 April 1991, deductions from
salaries made after said date in contravention of the new CSC
policy must be restored to the government employees concerned.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, CSC Resolutions No.
90-497 and 90-797 are declared NULL and VOID. The
respondent Commission is directed to take the appropriate action
so that petitioner shall be paid the amounts previously but
unlawfully deducted from his monthly salary as above indicated.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
COMMISSIONER OF G.R. No. 159694
INTERNAL REVENUE,
Petitioner, Present:
Panganiban, CJ,
- versus - Chairman,
Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
AZUCENA T. REYES, Callejo, Sr., and
Respondent. Chico-Nazario, JJ
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
AZUCENA T. REYES, G.R. No. 163581
Petitioner,
- versus -
COMMISSIONER OF Promulgated:
INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondent. January 27, 2006
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ.:
U nder the present provisions of the Tax Code and pursuant
to elementary due process, taxpayers must be informed in
writing of the law and the facts upon which a tax assessment is
based; otherwise, the assessment is void. Being invalid, the
assessment cannot in turn be used as a basis for the perfection
of a tax compromise.
The Case
Before us are two consolidated[1] Petitions for Review[2] filed under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the August 8, 2003
Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 71392.
The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision
of the Court of Tax Appeals is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE without prejudice to the action of the National Evaluation
Board on the proposed compromise settlement of the Maria
C. Tancinco estates tax liability.[4]
The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
On July 8, 1993, Maria C. Tancinco (or decedent) died, leaving a
1,292 square-meter residential lot and an old house thereon (or
subject property) located
at 4931 Pasay Road, Dasmarias Village, Makati City.
On the basis of a sworn information-for-reward filed on February
17, 1997 by a certain Raymond Abad (or Abad), Revenue District
Office No. 50 (South Makati) conducted an investigation on the
decedents estate (or estate). Subsequently, it issued a Return
Verification Order. But without the required preliminary findings
being submitted, it issued Letter of Authority No. 132963 for the
regular investigation of the estate tax case.Azucena T. Reyes (or
[Reyes]), one of the decedents heirs, received the Letter of
Authority on March 14, 1997.
On February 12, 1998, the Chief, Assessment Division, Bureau
of Internal Revenue (or BIR), issued a preliminary assessment
notice against the estate in the amount of P14,580,618.67. On
May 10, 1998, the heirs of the decedent (or heirs) received a final
estate tax assessment notice and a demand letter, both dated
April 22, 1998, for the amount of P14,912,205.47, inclusive of
surcharge and interest.
On June 1, 1998, a certain Felix M. Sumbillo (or Sumbillo)
protested the assessment [o]n behalf of the heirs on the ground
that the subject property had already been sold by the decedent
sometime in 1990.
On November 12, 1998, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
(or [CIR]) issued a preliminary collection letter to [Reyes], followed
by a Final Notice Before Seizure dated December 4, 1998.
On January 5, 1999, a Warrant of Distraint and/or Levy was
served upon the estate, followed on February 11, 1999 by Notices
of Levy on Real Property and Tax Lien against it.
On March 2, 1999, [Reyes] protested the notice of levy. However,
on March 11, 1999, the heirs proposed a compromise settlement
of P1,000,000.00.
In a letter to [the CIR] dated January 27, 2000, [Reyes] proposed
to pay 50% of the basic tax due, citing the heirs inability to pay
the tax assessment. On March 20, 2000, [the CIR] rejected
[Reyess] offer, pointing out that since the estate tax is a charge
on the estate and not on the heirs, the latters financial incapacity
is immaterial as, in fact, the gross value of the estate amounting
to P32,420,360.00 is more than sufficient to settle the tax
liability. Thus, [the CIR] demanded payment of the amount
of P18,034,382.13 on or before April 15, 2000[;] otherwise, the
notice of sale of the subject property would be published.
On April 11, 2000, [Reyes] again wrote to [the CIR], this time
proposing to pay 100% of the basic tax due in the amount
of P5,313,891.00. She reiterated the proposal in a letter
dated May 18, 2000.
On February 19, 2001, [Reyes] filed a Motion to Declare
Application for the Settlement of Disputed Assessment as a
Perfected Compromise. In said motion, she alleged that [the CIR]
had not yet signed the compromise[,] because of procedural red
tape requiring the initials of four Deputy Commissioners on
relevant documents before the compromise is signed by the
[CIR]. [Reyes] posited that the absence of the requisite initials
and signature[s] on said documents does not vitiate the perfected
compromise.

Commenting on the motion, [the CIR] countered that[,] without

As the estate failed to pay its tax liability within the April 15,
the approval of the NEB, [Reyess] application for compromise
2000 deadline, the Chief, Collection Enforcement Division, BIR,
with the BIR cannot be considered a perfected or consummated
notified [Reyes] on June 6, 2000 that the subject property would
compromise.
be sold at public auction on August 8, 2000.

On March 9, 2001, the CTA denied [Reyess] motion, prompting

On June 13, 2000, [Reyes] filed a protest with the BIR Appellate
her to file a Motion for Reconsideration Ad Cautelam. In a
Division. Assailing the scheduled auction sale, she asserted that
[R]esolution dated April 10, 2001, the CTA denied the [M]otion for
x x x the assessment, letter of demand[,] and the whole tax
[R]econsideration with the suggestion that[,] for an orderly
proceedings against the estate are void ab initio. She offered to
presentation of her case and to prevent piecemeal resolutions of
file the corresponding estate tax return and pay the correct
different issues, [Reyes] should file a [S]upplemental [P]etition for
amount of tax without surcharge [or] interest.
[R]eview[,] setting forth the new issue of whether there was
already a perfected compromise.

Without acting on [Reyess] protest and offer, [the CIR] instructed

the Collection Enforcement Division to proceed with the August
On May 2, 2001, [Reyes] filed a Supplemental Petition for Review
8, 2000 auction sale. Consequently, on June 28, 2000, [Reyes]
with the CTA, followed on June 4, 2001 by its Amplificatory
filed a [P]etition for [R]eview with the Court of Tax Appeals (or
Arguments (for the Supplemental Petition for Review), raising the
CTA), docketed as CTA Case No. 6124.
following issues:

On July 17, 2000, [Reyes] filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ
1. Whether or not an offer to compromise by the [CIR], with the
of Preliminary Injunction or Status Quo Order, which was
acquiescence by the Secretary of Finance, of a tax liability
granted by the CTA on July 26, 2000. Upon [Reyess] filing of a
pending in court, that was accepted and paid by the taxpayer, is
surety bond in the amount of P27,000,000.00, the CTA issued a
a perfected and consummated compromise.
[R]esolution dated August 16, 2000 ordering [the CIR] to desist
and refrain from proceeding with the auction sale of the subject
property or from issuing a [W]arrant of [D]istraint or
[G]arnishment of [B]ank [A]ccount[,] pending determination of 2. Whether this compromise is covered by the provisions of
the case and/or unless a contrary order is issued. Section 204 of the Tax Code (CTRP) that requires approval by the
BIR [NEB].

[The CIR] filed a [M]otion to [D]ismiss the petition on the grounds

(i) that the CTA no longer has jurisdiction over the case[,] because
the assessment against the estate is already final and executory;
and (ii) that the petition was filed out of time. In a
[R]esolution dated November 23, 2000, the CTA denied [the CIRs]
motion.
Answering the Supplemental Petition, [the CIR] averred that an
application for compromise of a tax liability under RR No. 6-2000
and RMO No. 42-2000 requires the evaluation and approval of
either the NEB or the Regional Evaluation Board (or REB), as the
case may be.

During the pendency of the [P]etition for [R]eview with the CTA,
however, the BIR issued Revenue Regulation (or RR) No. 6-2000
and Revenue Memorandum Order (or RMO) No. 42-2000 offering
certain taxpayers with delinquent accounts and disputed
assessments an opportunity to compromise their tax liability.
On June 14, 2001, [Reyes] filed a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings; the motion was granted on July 11, 2001. After
submission of memoranda, the case was submitted for
[D]ecision.

On June 19, 2002, the CTA rendered a [D]ecision,

On November 25, 2000, [Reyes] filed an application with the BIR
for the compromise settlement (or compromise) of the assessment
against the estate pursuant to Sec. 204(A) of the Tax Code, as
implemented by RR No. 6-2000 and RMO No. 42-2000.
On December 26, 2000, [Reyes] filed an Ex-Parte Motion for
Postponement of the hearing before the CTA scheduled on
January 9, 2001, citing her pending application for compromise
with the BIR. The motion was granted and the hearing was reset
to February 6, 2001.
the decretal portion of which pertinently reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant
[P]etition for [R]eview is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, [Reyes] is
hereby ORDERED to PAY deficiency estate tax in the amount of
Nineteen Million Five Hundred Twenty Four Thousand Nine
Hundred Nine and 78/100 (P19,524,909.78), computed as
follows:
xxxxxxxxx

On January 29, 2001, [Reyes] moved for postponement of the

hearing set on February 6, 2001, this time on the ground that
[Reyes] is likewise ORDERED to PAY 20% delinquency interest
she had already paid the compromise amount of P1,062,778.20
on deficiency estate tax due of P17,934,382.13 from January 11,
but was still awaiting approval of the National Evaluation Board
2001 until full payment thereof pursuant to Section 249(c) of the
(or NEB). The CTA granted the motion and reset the hearing
Tax Code, as amended.
to February 27, 2001.
In arriving at its decision, the CTA ratiocinated that there can
only be a perfected and consummated compromise of the estates
tax liability[,] if the NEB has approved [Reyess]
application for compromise in accordance with RR No. 6-2000,
as implemented by RMO No. 42-2000.
Anent the validity of the assessment notice and letter of demand
against the estate, the CTA stated that at the time the questioned
assessment notice and letter of demand were issued, the heirs
knew very well the law and the facts on which the same were
based. It also observed that the petition was not filed within the
30-day reglementary period provided under Sec. 11 of Rep. Act
No. 1125 and Sec. 228 of the Tax Code.[5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In partly granting the Petition, the CA said that Section 228 of
the Tax Code and RR 12-99 were mandatory and unequivocal in
their requirement.The assessment notice and the demand letter
should have stated the facts and the law on which they were
based; otherwise, they were deemed void.[6] The appellate court
held that while administrative agencies, like the BIR, were not
bound by procedural requirements, they were still required by
law and equity to observe substantive due process. The reason
behind this requirement, said the CA, was to ensure that
taxpayers would be duly apprised of -- and could effectively
protest -- the basis of tax assessments against them.[7] Since the
assessment and the demand were void, the proceedings
emanating from them were likewise void, and any order
emanating from them could never attain finality.
The appellate court added, however, that it was premature to
declare as perfected and consummated the compromise of the
estates tax liability. It explained that, where the basic tax
assessed exceeded P1 million, or where the settlement offer was
less than the prescribed minimum rates, the National Evaluation
Boards (NEB) prior evaluation and approval were
the conditio sine qua non to the perfection and consummation of
any compromise.[8] Besides, the CA pointed out, Section 204(A) of
the Tax Code applied to all compromises, whether government-
initiated or not.[9]Where the law did not distinguish, courts too
should not distinguish.
Hence, this Petition.[10]
The Issues
In GR No. 159694, petitioner raises the following issues for the
Courts consideration:
I.Whether petitioners assessment against the estate is valid.
II.
Whether respondent can validly argue that she, as well as the
other heirs, was not aware of the facts and the law on which the
assessment in question is based, after she had opted to propose
several compromises on the estate tax due, and even prematurely
acting on such proposal by paying 20% of the basic estate tax
due.[11]
The foregoing issues can be simplified as follows: first, whether
the assessment against the estate is valid; and, second, whether
the compromise entered into is also valid.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is unmeritorious.
First Issue:
Validity of the Assessment Against the Estate
The second paragraph of Section 228 of the Tax Code [12] is clear
and mandatory. It provides as follows:
Sec. 228. Protesting of Assessment. --
xxxxxxxxx
The taxpayers shall be informed in writing of the law and the
facts on which the assessment is made: otherwise, the
assessment shall be void.
In the present case, Reyes was not informed in writing of the law
and the facts on which the assessment of estate taxes had been
made. She was merely notified of the findings by the CIR, who
had simply relied upon the provisions of former Section
229[13] prior to its amendment by Republic Act (RA) No. 8424,
otherwise known as the Tax Reform Act of 1997.
First, RA 8424 has already amended the provision of Section 229
on protesting an assessment. The old requirement of
merely notifying the taxpayer of the CIRs findings was changed
in 1998 to informing the taxpayer of not only the law, but also of
the facts on which an assessment would be made; otherwise, the
assessment itself would be invalid.
It was on February 12, 1998, that a preliminary assessment
notice was issued against the estate. On April 22, 1998, the final
estate tax assessment notice, as well as demand letter, was also
issued. During those dates, RA 8424 was already in effect. The
notice required under the old law was no longer sufficient under
the new law.
To be simply informed in writing of the investigation being
conducted and of the recommendation for the assessment of the
estate taxes due is nothing but a perfunctory discharge of the tax
function of correctly assessing a taxpayer. The act cannot be
taken to mean that Reyes already knew the law and the facts on
which the assessment was based. It does not at all conform to
the compulsory requirement under Section 228.Moreover, the
Letter of Authority received by respondent on March 14,
1997 was for the sheer purpose of investigation and was not even
the requisite notice under the law.
The procedure for protesting an assessment under the Tax Code
is found in Chapter III of Title VIII, which deals with
remedies. Being procedural in nature, can its provision then be
applied retroactively? The answer is yes.
The general rule is that statutes are prospective. However,
statutes that are remedial, or that do not create new or take away
vested rights, do not fall under the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statutes.[14] Clearly, Section 228 provides
for the procedure in case an assessment is protested. The
provision does not create new or take away vested rights. In both
instances, it can surely be applied retroactively. Moreover, RA
8424 does not state, either expressly or by necessary implication,
that pending actions are excepted from the operation of Section
228, or that applying it to pending proceedings would impair
vested rights.
Second, the non-retroactive application of Revenue Regulation
(RR) No. 12-99 is of no moment, considering that it merely
implements the law.
A tax regulation is promulgated by the finance secretary to
implement the provisions of the Tax Code.[15] While it is desirable
for the government authority or administrative agency to have
one immediately issued after a law is passed, the absence of the
regulation does not automatically mean that the law itself would
become inoperative.
At the time the pre-assessment notice was issued to Reyes, RA
8424 already stated that the taxpayer must be informed of both
the law and facts on which the assessment was based. Thus, the
CIR should have required the assessment officers of the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR) to follow the clear mandate of the new
law. The old regulation governing the issuance of estate tax
assessment notices ran afoul of the rule that tax regulations --
old as they were -- should be in harmony with, and not supplant
or modify, the law.[16]
It may be argued that the Tax Code provisions are not self-
executory. It would be too wide a stretch of the imagination,
though, to still issue a regulation that would simply require tax
officials to inform the taxpayer, in any manner, of the law and
the facts on which an assessment was based. That requirement
is neither difficult to make nor its desired results hard to achieve.
Moreover, an administrative rule interpretive of a statute, and not
declarative of certain rights and corresponding obligations, is
given retroactive effect as of the date of the effectivity of the
statute.[17] RR 12-99 is one such rule. Being interpretive of the
provisions of the Tax Code, even if it was issued only
on September 6, 1999, this regulation was to retroact to January
1, 1998 -- a date prior to the issuance of the preliminary
assessment notice and demand letter.
Third, neither Section 229 nor RR 12-85 can prevail over Section
228 of the Tax Code.
No doubt, Section 228 has replaced Section 229. The provision
on protesting an assessment has been amended. Furthermore,
in case of discrepancy between the law as amended and its
implementing but old regulation, the former necessarily
prevails.[18] Thus, between Section 228 of the Tax Code and the
pertinent provisions of RR 12-85, the latter cannot stand because
it cannot go beyond the provision of the law. The law must still
be followed, even though the existing tax regulation at that time
provided for a different procedure. The regulation then simply
provided that notice be sent to the respondent in the form
prescribed, and that no consequence would ensue for failure to
comply with that form.
Fourth, petitioner violated the cardinal rule in administrative law
that the taxpayer be accorded due process. Not only was the law
here disregarded, but no valid notice was sent, either. A void
assessment bears no valid fruit.
The law imposes a substantive, not merely a formal,
requirement. To proceed heedlessly with tax collection without
first establishing a valid assessment is evidently violative of the
cardinal principle in administrative investigations: that
taxpayers should be able to present their case and adduce
supporting evidence.[19] In the instant case, respondent has not
been informed of the basis of the estate tax liability. Without
complying with the unequivocal mandate of first informing the
taxpayer of the governments claim, there can be no deprivation
of property, because no effective protest can be made.[20] The
haphazard shot at slapping an assessment, supposedly based on
estate taxations general provisions that are expected to be known
by the taxpayer, is utter chicanery.
Even a cursory review of the preliminary assessment notice, as
well as the demand letter sent, reveals the lack of basis for -- not
to mention the insufficiency of -- the gross figures and details of
the itemized deductions indicated in the notice and the
letter. This Court cannot countenance an assessment based on
estimates that appear to have been arbitrarily or capriciously
arrived at. Although taxes are
the lifeblood of the government, their assessment and collection
should be made in accordance with law as any arbitrariness will
negate the very reason for government itself.[21]
Fifth, the rule against estoppel does not apply. Although the
government cannot be estopped by the negligence or omission of
its agents, the obligatory provision on protesting a tax
assessment cannot be rendered nugatory by a mere act of the
CIR .
Tax laws are civil in nature.[22] Under our Civil Code, acts
executed against the mandatory provisions of law are void, except
when the law itself authorizes the validity of those acts.[23] Failure
to comply with Section 228 does not only render the assessment
void, but also finds no validation in any provision in the Tax
Code. We cannot condone errant or enterprising tax officials, as
they are expected to be vigilant and law-abiding.
Second Issue:
Validity of Compromise
It would be premature for this Court to declare that the
compromise on the estate tax liability has been perfected and
consummated, considering the earlier determination that the
assessment against the estate was void. Nothing has been settled
or finalized. Under Section 204(A) of the Tax Code, where the
basic tax involved exceeds one million pesos or the settlement
offered is less than the prescribed minimum rates, the
compromise shall be subject to the approval of
the NEB composed of the petitioner and four deputy
commissioners.
Finally, as correctly held by the appellate court, this provision
applies to all compromises, whether government-initiated or
not. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. Where
the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 94878-94881 May 15, 1991
NORBERTO A. ROMUALDEZ III, petitioner,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION* and THE PHILIPPINE
COCONUT AUTHORITY, respondents.
Fernando T. Collantes for petitioner.
GANCAYCO, J.:
By this petition the intervention of public respondent Civil
Service Commission (SCS) is sought to compel public respondent
Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA) to reinstate and extend a
permanent appointment to petitioner as Deputy Administrator
for Industrial Research and Market Development.
Petitioner was appointed and served as a Commercial Attache of
the Department of Trade continuously for twelve years from
September, 1975 to August 30, 1987. His civil service eligibilities
are: Patrolman of the City of Manila (1963 CS Exam) and a
Commercial Attache (1973 CS Exam).
On September 1, 1987, he was transferred to the respondent PCA
whereby he was extended an appointment as Deputy
Administrator for Industrial Research and Market
Development.1 The nature of his appointment was
"reinstatement" and his employment status was "temporary," for
the period covering September 1, 1987 to August 30, 1988. His
appointment was renewed for another six months from
September 1, 1988 to February 28, 1989 also on a "temporary"
status and subject to certain conditions to which petitioner
agreed.
When his appointment expired on February 28, 1989, the
Governing Board did not renew the same so he was promptly
informed thereof by the Acting Chairman of the Board of the
PCA, Apolonio V. Bautista.2
On February 6, 1990, petitioner appealed to respondent CSC He
requested reinstatement to his previous position in PCA and in
support of the request, he invoked the provisions of (CSC)
Memorandum Circular No. 29 dated July 19, 1989.3
Respondent CSC denied petitioner's request for reinstatement on
May 2, 1990 by way of its Resolution No. 90-407, holding that
CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29 was not applicable to
petitioner's case because it took effect on July 19, 1989 when
petitioner had long been out of the government service since
February 28, 1989 and that his reappointment was essentially
discretionary on the part of the proper appointing authority.
On May 11, 1990, respondent PCA appointed Mr. Roman Santos
to the contested position.
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of Resolution No. 90-407
but it was denied by respondent CSC in Resolution No. 90-693
dated July 31, 1990.4
Hence, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order,
raising the following issues—
l. Public Respondent Civil Service Commission committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to capricious, whimsical, and
despotic refusal to perform a legal/constitutional duty to enforce
the Civil Service Law and/or constituting non-feasance/mis-
feasance in office in issuing Resolution Nos. 90-407 and 90-693;
2. The legal issue of the applicability of Civil Service Commission
Circular No. 29, Series 1989 on the appointment of petitioner as
PCA Deputy Administrator for Industrial Research and Market
Development;
3. The legal issue as to whether it is mandatory for an appointing
authority to extend permanent appointments to selected
appointees with corresponding civil service eligibilities;
4. Public respondent Civil Service Commission committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and/or non-
feasance/misfeasance of official functions in not exercising its
authority to enforce/implement the Civil Service Law and in not
affording petitioner who belongs to the career service in the
government the protective security of tenure and due process
clause of the Philippine 1987 Constitution as well as the Civil
Service Law under P.D. 807;
5. Public respondent Philippine Coconut Authority unlawfully
and maliciously deliberately failed/refused to strictly comply with
the provision of par. a, Section 25 of P.D. 807 in the matter of
extending permanent appointment to petitioner constituting
likewise grave abuse of discretion on the part of public
respondent Civil Service Commission amounting to gross
ignorance of the law in not correcting/rectifying such malicious
and deliberate non-compliance, in view of the mandatory
directive of Section 8, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on
Personnel Actions and Policies.5
The petition is devoid of merit.
No doubt the appointment extended to petitioner by respondent
PCA as PCA Deputy Administrator for Industrial Research and
Market Development was temporary. Although petitioner was
formerly holding a permanent appointment as a commercial
attache, he sought and accepted this temporary appointment to
respondent PCA.
His temporary appointment was for a definite period and when it
lapsed and was not renewed on February 28, 1987, he complains
that there was a denial of due process. This is not a case of
removal from office. Indeed, when he accepted this temporary
appointment he was thereby effectively divested of security of
tenure.6 A temporary appointment does not give the appointee
any definite tenure of office but makes it dependent upon the
pleasure of the appointing power.7 Thus, the matter of converting
such a temporary appointment to a permanent one is addressed
to the sound discretion of the appointing authority. Respondent
CSC cannot direct the appointing authority to make such an
appointment if it is not so disposed.8
The duty of respondent CSC is to approve or disapprove an
appointment.1âwphi1 Its attestation is limited to the
determination whether the appointee possesses the required
qualifications for the position as the appropriate civil service
eligibility.9
Petitioner invokes CSC Memorandum Circular No, 29, S. 1989,
dated July 19, 1989 which provides—
(a) A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who
meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in
accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards
promulgated in pursuance thereof. (Section 25 (a), P.D. 807).
(b) While the appointing authority is given a wide latitude of
discretion in the selection of personnel for his department or
agency, in the exercise of this discretion he shall be guided by
and subject to the Civil Service Law and Rules.10
As aptly observed by respondent CSC said circular cannot be
given retrospective effect as to apply to the case of petitioner who
was separated from the service on February 28, 1989. And even
if the said circular may apply to petitioner's situation, under said
circular it is recognized that "the appointing authority is given a
wide latitude of discretion in the selection of personnel of his
department or agency." Respondent PCA exercised its discretion
and opted not to extend the appointment of petitioner. It cannot
be compelled to extend petitioner's appointment, much less can
it be directed to extend a permanent appointment to petitioner.
A discretionary duty cannot be compelled by mandamus.11 More
so when as in this case petitioner has not shown a lawful right to
the position. If the legal rights of the petitioner are not well-
defined, clear and certain, the petition must be dismissed.12
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No.133842. January 26, 2000]
FEDERICO S. SANDOVAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and CANUTO SENEN A. ORETA, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
The petition at bar assails the order of the Commission on Elections
, (COMELEC) en banc dated June 2, 1998 nullifying and setting
aside the proclamation of petitioner Federico S. Sandoval as
congressman-elect for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Federico S. Sandoval and private respondent Canuto
Senen Greta, together with Pedro Domingo, Mariano Santiago,
Symaco Benito and Warren Serna, vied for the congressional seat
for the Malabon-Navotas legislative district during the election
held on May 11, 1998.
On election day, after the votes have been cast and counted in
the various precincts in the two municipalities, their respective
board of canvassers convened to canvass the election returns
forwarded by the board of election inspectors.
In Malabon, a reception group and several canvassing
committees were formed to expedite the canvass. The reception
group received, examined and recorded the sealed envelopes
containing the election returns, as well as the ballot boxes coming
from the precincts. The reception group then distributed the
election returns among the canvassing committees. The
committees simultaneously canvassed the election returns
assigned to them in the presence of the lawyers and watchers of
the candidates.
On May 16, 1998, counsels for private respondent made a written
request upon Malabon Election Officer Armando Mallorca to
furnish them with a complete list of the statement of votes so that
they could verify whether all statements of votes have been
tabulated.[1] They likewise requested for a complete list of
precincts in the municipality together with the number of
canvassed votes for petitioner and private respondent as of May
16, 1998. They also sought permission to conduct an audit of the
tabulation reports made by the municipal board of
canvassers.[2] These requests, however, were denied by the
municipal ,board of canvassers on the following grounds: (1) that
any counsel for a candidate has neither personality nor right to
conduct an audit of the tabulation report as the proceedings of
the board are presumed to be regular, and (2) that the granting
of the requests would delay the proceedings of the board to the
prejudice of the will of the people of Malabon.[3] Calrky
On May 17, 1998, the Malabon municipal board of canvassers
concluded its proceedings. The board issued a certificate of
canvass of votes stating that it canvassed 804 out of 805 precincts
in the municipality. The certificate of canvass showed that private
respondent obtained the highest number of votes in Malabon
with 57,760 votes, with petitioner coming in second with 42,892
votes.[4]
On the same day, after obtaining copies of the statements of
votes, Ma. Rosario O. Lapuz, authorized representative of private
respondent wrote then COMELEC Chairman Bernardo
Pardo[5] and informed him that several election returns were not
included in the canvass conducted by the Malabon municipal
board of canvassers. She moved that the certificate of canvass
issued by said board be declared "not final."[6]
On May 19, 1998, Ms. Lapuz again wrote Chairman Pardo. The
letter reiterated the allegations in her letter dated May 17, 1998
and requested that the Malabon municipal board of canvassers
be ordered to canvass the election returns which it allegedly
failed to include in its canvass.[7]
On May 23, 1998, private respondent filed with the COMELEC an
Urgent Petition entitled "In re: Petition to Correct Manifest Error in
Tabulation of Election Returns by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Malabon, NCR. Canuto Tito Oreta vs. Municipal
Board of Canvassers of Malabon." The petition was docketed as
SPC No.98-143. It alleged that while the certificate of canvass
showed that 804 election returns were canvassed and tabulated,
only 790 election returns were actually canvassed. Private
respondent contended that there was a manifest error in the non-
recording or copying of the results in 14 election returns from 14
precincts into the statement of votes. It prayed: (1) that the
municipal, board of canvassers of Malabon be reconvened to
correct said manifest error by entering the results of the elections
in the 14 election returns into the statement of , votes and that the
certificate of canvass be corrected to reflect the complete results
in 804 precincts; and (2) that the canvass of the results for the
congressional election by the district board of canvassers for
Malabon and Navotas be suspended until the alleged manifest
error is corrected.[8] Mesm
Meanwhile, the proceedings of the municipal board of
canvassers of Navotas were disrupted by the riotous exchange of
accusations by the supporters of the opposing mayoralty
candidates. The COMELEC had to move the venue to the
Philippine International Convention Center in Manila to finish the
canvass. On May 27, 1998, Chairman Pardo issued a
memorandum to Atty. Ma. Anne V. G. Lacuesta, Chairman,
District Board of Canvassers for Malabon-Navotas, authorizing her
to immediately reconvene the district board of canvassers,
complete the canvassing of the municipal certificate of canvass
and supporting statement of votes per municipality , and
proclaim the winning candidate for the congressional seat of the
Malabon-Navotas legislative district.[9]
On May 28, 1998, private respondent filed with the COMELEC an
Urgent Manifestation/Motion in connection with SPC No.98-143. It
prayed that the canvass of the, results of the congressional
election by the district board of canvassers be suspended until the
alleged manifest error in SPC No.98-143 is corrected.[10]
At 4:15 in the afternoon on May 28, 1998, the district board of
canvassers convened at the Philippine International Convention
Center. It took up private respondent's petition to correct the
manifest error arising from the non-inclusion of 19 election returns
in the canvass. After examining the statement of votes by precinct
and the certificate of canvass signed and thumbmarked by three
watchers from different parties, the district board of canvassers
found that a total of 804 election returns were canvassed by the
Malabon municipal board of canvassers.[11]
The district board of canvassers then proceeded to canvass the
certificates of canvass from the two municipalities. Counsel for
private respondent requested that the canvassing be suspended
until the Commission has resolved their petition for correction of
manifest error in the certificate of canvass of Malabon. The district
board of canvassers, however, denied the request for the
following reasons:
"1. absence of restraining order from the Commission;
"2. order of the Chairman dated May 27, 1998 directing the district
board to proceed with the canvass and proclamation of winning
candidates for the district of Malabon-Navotas; Scslx
"3. there is no irregularity in the submitted certificate of canvass
from both municipalities and there were no objections raised for
both certificates of canvass of the counsels present;
"4. no report coming from the municipal board of canvassers from
Malabon that there were uncanvassed election return except for
one;
"5. the municipal board of canvassers of Malabon submitted to
the district board of canvassers certificate of canvass which
indicated that the number of canvassed returns for District I is 397
and 407 for District II for a total of 804 out of 805 election returns;
"6. the board has only the ministerial duty to tally the votes as
reflected on the certificate of canvass supplemented by the
statement of votes and has no authority to verify allegations of
irregularities in the preparation thereof; and
"7. there is no pre-proclamation contest for the position of
congressman."[12]
Private respondent's counsel sought reconsideration of the
decision of the district board' of canvassers but it was likewise
denied by the board.
After canvassing the municipal certificates of canvass, the district
board of canvassers proclaimed petitioner the duly elected
congressman of the legislative district of Malabon-Navotas. The
board declared that petitioner obtained a total vote of 82,339
over private respondent's 80,319 votes.[13] Petitioner took his oath
of office on the same day.[14] Slxs c
The following day, on May 29, 1998, private respondent filed with
the COMELEC in connection with SPC No.98-143 an "Urgent
Appeal from the Decision of the Legislative District Board of
Canvassers for Malabon and Navotas with Prayer for the
Nullification of the Proclamation of Federico S. Sandoval as
Congressman." It alleged that there was a verbal order from the
COMELEC Chairman to suspend the canvass and proclamation
of the winning candidate for congressman of the Malabon-
Navotas legislative district; that the district board of canvassers
proceeded with the canvass and proclamation despite the
verbal order; and that the non-inclusion of the 19 election returns
in the canvass would result in an incomplete canvass of the
election returns. It prayed that the decision of the district board of
canvassers be reversed and that the municipal board of
canvassers of Malabon be reconvened to complete its canvass.
It also prayed that the proclamation of petitioner as congressman
be annulled.[15]
On May 30, 1998, private respondent filed with the COMELEC an
Urgent Petition docketed as SPC No.98-206. The petition sought
the annulment of , petitioner's proclamation as congressman. It
alleged that at about 4:00 in the afternoon on May 28, 1998, the
COMELEC Chairman directed the district board of canvassers to
suspend the canvass and proclamation pending the resolution of
the petition for correction of manifest error in the municipal
certificate of canvass of Malabon; that the district board of
canvassers still proceeded with the canvass in spite of the order;
that the proclamation was made despite the non-inclusion of
election returns from 19 precincts in Malabon; and that the non-
inclusion of these election returns will materially affect the result of
the election. Private respondent prayed that the proclamation of
petitioner as congressman be annulled and that the municipal
board of canvassers of Malabon be ordered to reconvene to
include the 19 election returns in the canvass.[16]
On June 2, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued an order setting
aside the proclamation of petitioner. The COMELEC ruled that the
proclamation by the district board of canvassers was void
because: (1) it was made in defiance of the verbal order by the
COMELEC Chairman relayed through Executive Director
Resurrection Z. Borra to suspend the proclamation of the winner in
the congressional election until the Commission has resolved
private respondent's petition for correction of manifest error in the
certificate of canvass; and (2) it was based on an incomplete
canvass. The dispositive portion of the order reads: slx mis
"WHEREFORE, the proclamation made by the District Board of
Canvassers of Malabon and Navotas for the position of
Congressman being void ab initio is no proclamation at all.
Meantime, it is hereby set aside.
"Atty .Ma. Anne Lacuesta is hereby relieved as Chairman, District
Board of Canvassers of Malabon-Navotas, and Atty. Consuelo B.
Diola is named Chairman of said Board. Atty. Diola is directed to
maintain the status quo prior to the Board's unauthorized
proclamation, until further orders.
"Meantime, let these cases be set for hearing en banc on 09 June
1998 at 10:00 in the morning.
"SO ORDERED."[17]
On June 8, 1998, petitioner filed this petition for certiorari seeking
the annulment and reversal of said order. Petitioner contended:
"1. Respondent COMELEC's annulment of petitioner Sandoval's
proclamation as winner in the election for congressman of
Malabon-Navotas, without the benefit of prior hearing, is grossly
indecent and violates his right to due process of law.
"2. Respondent COMELEC's action on respondent Oreta's petitions
violates Republic Act 7166 which bars pre-proclamation cases in
the elections of members of the House of Representative.
"3. Respondent Oreta's remedy for seeking correction of alleged
manifest errors in the certificate of canvass for members of
Congress does not lie with respondent COMELEC but, initially with
the municipal board of canvassers.
"4. At any rate, respondent Oreta's right to raise questions
concerning alleged manifest errors in the Malabon certificate of
canvass is barred by his failure to raise such questions before
petitioner Sandoval's proclamation.
"5. Respondent Oreta's recourse lies with the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal which is not precluded from
passing upon the allegedly uncanvassed election returns in
Malabon."[18]
On June 9, 1998, we required the respondents to comment on the
petition. We also issued a temporary restraining order mandating
the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing and
enforcing the questioned order.[19]
The COMELEC nonetheless conducted a hearing on June 9, 1998
, concerning SPC No.98-143 and SPC No.98-206.
Private respondent filed his comment[20] on June 22, 1998. He
argued:
"1. Respondent COMELEC committed no jurisdictional error in
declaring void ab initio the proclamation of petitioner Sandoval
as Congressman-elect for the Malabon-Navotas legislative
district. Missdaa
a. The premature and hasty proclamation of respondent
Sandoval made by the District Board on the basis of an
incomplete canvass is illegal, hence, null and void.
b. Respondent COMELEC substantially complied with the
requirements of due process in declaring the proclamation of
respondent Sandoval an absolute nullity.
"2. Respondent COMELEC properly took cognizance of
respondent Oreta's petition to correct manifest error in the
certificate of canvass issued by the Malabon board.
a. While technically a pre-proclamation case, correction of
manifest errors for purposes of the congressional elections is within
the power and authority of the COMELEC to order, in the exercise
of its appellate and original jurisdiction over such subject matter.
b. The failure of the Malabon board to tabulate the results of
seventeen ( 17) election returns and to record the votes
supporting the certificate of canvass resulted in a manifest error in
the certificate of canvass which should be summarily corrected
by ordering the Malabon board to reconvene, canvass the 17
election returns, record the votes in the statement of votes and
prepare a new certificate of canvass."
On June 29, 1998, then Solicitor General Silvestre Bello III filed a
Manifestation and Motion in Lieu of Comment.[21] He found the
assailed order of the COMELEC null and void for the following
reasons:
"1. Respondent COMELEC's motu proprio and ex
parte annulment of petitioner's proclamation as winner in the
election for congressman of Malabon-Navotas is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and violated petitioner's right to due process; and
"2. Respondent COMELEC had no jurisdiction over the petitions
filed by respondent Oreta, hence its order dated June 2, 1998
annulling petitioner's proclamation is null and void."
In view of. the Solicitor General's manifestation and motion, we
required the COMELEC to file its own comment.
The COMELEC filed its comment on August 11, 1998. It invoked its
power of direct control and supervision over the board of
canvassers, allowing it to review, revise and reverse the board's
actions. It said that it rendered the questioned order upon finding
that petitioner's proclamation was illegal and therefore void ab
initio. It cited two reasons to support its findings: first, it was made
in disregard of the Chairman's verbal order to suspend the
canvass and proclamation, and second, it was based on an
incomplete canvass.[22] Sda adsc
On August 27, 1998, the new Solicitor General, Ricardo P. Galvez,
filed a Manifestation and Motion withdrawing the Manifestation
and Motion filed ,by former Solicitor General Bello. The Solicitor
General, this time, upheld the validity of the assailed order. In
essence, he argued that the Malabon municipal board of
canvassers failed to include 17 election returns in its canvass; that
such omission constitutes manifest error in the certificate of
canvass which must be corrected by the district board of
canvassers; and that the proclamation of petitioner was void ab
initio because it was based on an incomplete canvass.[23]
Petitioner and private respondent subsequently filed their
respective reply, rejoinder and sur-rejoinder.
Considering the arguments raised by the parties, the issues that
need to be resolved in this case are:
1. whether the COMELEC has the power to take cognizance of
SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206, both alleging the existence
'of manifest error in the certificate of canvass issued by the
Malabon municipal board of canvassers and seeking to
reconvene said board of canvassers to allow it to correct the
alleged error; and
2. whether the COMELEC's order to set aside petitioner's
proclamation was valid.
On the first issue, we uphold the jurisdiction of the COMELEC over
the petitions filed by private respondent. As a general rule,
candidates and registered political parties involved in an election
are allowed to file pre-proclamation cases before the COMELEC.
Pre-proclamation cases refer to any question pertaining to or
affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may
be raised by, any candidate or by any registered political party or
coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the
Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and
236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation of election returns.[24] The COMELEC has
exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies.[25] As
an exception, however, to the general rule, Section 15 of
Republic Act (RA) 7166[26]. prohibits candidates in the presidential,
vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from
filing pre-proclamation cases.[27] It states:
"Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for
President, Vice-President, Senator, and Members of the House of
Representatives.-- For purposes of the elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody
and appreciation of election returns or the certificates of canvass,
as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority
of the appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written
complaint of an interested person to correct manifest errors in the
certificate of canvass or election returns before it." Rtc spped
The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the
winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in
these sensitive posts.[28] The law, nonetheless, provides
an exception to the exception. The second sentence of Section
15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in
the certificate of canvass or election returns even in elections for
president, vice- president and members of the House of
Representatives for the simple reason that the correction of
manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay
the proclamation of the winner in the election. This rule is
consistent with and complements the authority of the COMELEC
under the Constitution to, "enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an, election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall"[29] and its power to "decide,
except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections."[30]
Applying the foregoing rule, we hold that the Commission has
jurisdiction over SPC No. 98- 143 and SPC No.98-206, both filed by
private respondent seeking to correct the alleged manifest error
in the certificate of canvass issued by the Malabon municipal
board of canvassers. These petitions essentially allege that there
exists a manifest error in said certificate of canvass as the board
failed to include several election returns in the canvassing. Private
respondent prays that the board be reconvened to correct said
error. Section 15 of RA 7166 vests the COMELEC with jurisdiction
over cases of this nature. We reiterate the long-standing rule that
jurisdiction is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the petition regardless of whether or not the
petitioner is entitled to the relief sought.[31]
The authority to rule on petitions for correction of manifest error is
vested in the COMELEC en banc. Section 7 of Rule 27 of the 1993
COMELEC Rules of Procedure[32] provides that if the error is
discovered before proclamation, the board of canvassers
may motu proprio, or upon verified petition by any candidate,
political party, organization or coalition of political parties, after
due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed. The
aggrieved party may appeal the decision of the board to the
Commission and said appeal shall be heard and decided by the
Commission en banc. Section 5, however of the same rule states
that a petition for correction of manifest error may be filed directly
with the Commission en banc provided that such errors could not
have been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise
of due diligence and proclamation of , the winning candidate
had already been made. Thus, we held in Ramirez vs.
COMELEC:[33] Korte
"Although in Ong, Jr. v. COMELEC it was said that 'By now it is
settled that election cases which include pre-proclamation
controversies must first be heard and decided by a division of the
Commission' -- and a petition for correction of manifest error in the
Statement of Votes, like SPC 95-198 is a pre-proclamation ;
controversy -- in none of the cases cited to support this proposition
was the issue the correction of a manifest error in the Statement
of Votes under Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP. Blg.
881) or Sec. 15 of R.A. No.7166. On the other hand, Rule 27, Sec. 5
of the 1993 Rules of the COMELEC expressly provides that pre -
proclamation controversies involving, inter alia, manifest errors in
the tabulation or tallying of the results may be filed directly with
the COMELEC en banc x x x."[34]
Petitioner nonetheless contends that SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No.
98-206 must be dismissed because private respondent failed to
raise the issue of manifest error before the appropriate board of
canvassers in accordance with the second sentence of Section
15 of RA 7166.
We disagree.
The issue of manifest error in the certificate of canvass for
Malabon has been raised before the district board of canvassers
before petitioner could be proclaimed and said board has in fact
ruled on the issue.[35] We find this as sufficient compliance with the
law. The facts show that it was impossible for private respondent
to raise the issue before the Malabon municipal board of
canvassers as it still did not have a copy of the statement of votes
and the precinct list at the time of the canvassing in the municipal
level. At that time, private respondent still had no knowledge of
the alleged manifest error. He, however, lost no time in notifying
the COMELEC Chairman and the district board of the alleged
error upon discovery thereof. We find petitioner's argument,
therefore, to be devoid of merit.
We now go to the second issue. Although the COMELEC is clothed
with jurisdiction over the subject matter and issue of SPC No.98-
143 and SPC No. 98-206, we find the exercise of its jurisdiction
tainted with illegality. We hold that its order to set aside the
proclamation of petitioner is invalid for having been rendered
without due process of law. Procedural due process demands
prior notice and hearing. Then after the hearing, it is also
necessary that the tribunal show substantial evidence to support
its ruling.[36] In other words, due process requires that a party be
given an opportunity to adduce his evidence to support his side
of the case and that the evidence should be considered in the
adjudication of the case.[37] The facts show that COMELEC set
aside the proclamation of petitioner , without the benefit of prior
notice and hearing and it rendered the questioned order based
solely on private respondent's allegations. We held in Bince, Jr. vs.
COMELEC:[38] x law
"Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process
of law. Although public office is not property under Section 1 of
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, and one cannot acquire a
vested right to public office, it is, nevertheless, a protected right.
Due process in proceedings before the COMELEC, exercising its
quasi-judicial functions, requires due notice and hearing, among
others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate
cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any
candidate, We had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on Elections,
Reyes vs. Commission on Elections and Gallardo vs. Commission
on Elections that the COMELEC is without power to partially or
totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a
proclamation without notice and hearing."[39]
Citing Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code, private
respondent argues that the COMELEC is authorized to annul an
illegal proclamation even without notice and hearing because
the law states that it may motu proprio order a partial or total
suspension of the proclamation of any candidate-elect or annul
partially or totally any proclamation, if one has been made. We
reject the argument. Section 242 of the Omnibus Election Code
reads:
"Sec. 242. Commission's exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-
proclamation controversies.-- The Commission shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of all pre-proclamation controversies. It
may motu proprio or upon written petition, and after due notice
and hearing, order the partial or total suspension of the
proclamation of any candidate-elect or annul partially or totally
any proclamation, if one has been made, as the evidence shall
warrant in accordance with the succeeding sections."
The phrase "motu proprio" does not refer to the annulment of
proclamation but to the manner of initiating the proceedings to
annul a proclamation made by the board of canvassers. The law
provides two ways by which annulment proceedings may be
initiated. It may be at the own initiative of the COMELEC (motu
proprio) or by written petition. In either case, notice and hearing
is required. This is clear from the language of the law. Scmis
We likewise reject private respondent's assertion that the hearing
held on June 9, 1998 substantially satisfies the due process
requirement. The law requires that the hearing be held beforethe
COMELEC rules on the petition. Here, the public respondent first
issued an order annulling the proclamation of petitioner and then
set the date of the hearing. We explained in Farinasvs.
COMELEC[40] the pernicious effect of such procedure:
"As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General, 'to sanction the
immediate annulment or even the suspension of the effects of a
proclamation before the petition seeking such annulment or
suspension of its effects shall have been heard would open the
floodgates of unsubstantiated petitions after the results are
known, considering the propensity of the losing candidates to put
up all sorts of obstacles in an open display of unwillingness to
accept defeat, or would encourage the filing of baseless petitions
not only to the damage and prejudice of winning candidates but
also to the frustration of the sovereign will of the
electorate.'" (citations omitted)
Public respondent submits that procedural due process need not
be observed in this case because it was merely exercising its
administrative power to review, revise and reverse the actions of
the board of canvassers. It set aside the proclamation made by
the district board of canvassers for the position of congressman
upon finding that it was tainted with illegality.
We cannot accept public respondent's argument.
Taking cognizance of private respondent's petitions for annulment
of petitioner's proclamation, COMELEC was not merely
performing an administrative function. The administrative powers
of the COMELEC include the power to determine the number and
location of polling places, appoint election officials and
inspectors, conduct registration of voters, deputize law
enforcement agencies and government instrumentalities to
ensure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections,
register political parties, organizations or coalitions, accredit
citizens' arms of the Commission, prosecute election offenses, and
recommend to the President the removal of or imposition of any
other disciplinary action upon any officer or employee it has
deputized for violation or disregard of its directive, order or
decision. In addition, the Commission also has direct control and
supervision over all personnel involved in the conduct of
election. However , the resolution of the adverse claims of
private respondent and petitioner as regards the existence of
a manifest error in the questioned certificate of canvass
requires the COMELEC to act as an arbiter. It behooves the
Commission to hear both parties to determine the veracity
of their allegations and to decide whether the alleged error
is a manifest error. Hence, the resolution of this issue calls
for the exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi- judicial
power. It has been said that where a power rests in judgment or
discretion, so that it is of judicial nature or character, but does
not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred
upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-
judicial.[41] The COMELEC therefore, acting as quasi-judicial
tribunal, cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due
process in resolving the petitions filed by private
respondent.Mis sc
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the COMELEC order dated June 2, 1998 in
SPC No. 98-143 and SPC No. 98-206 is ANNULLED. This case is
REMANDED to the COMELEC and the Commission is hereby
ordered to hold a hearing on the issues presented in SPC No. 98-
143 and SPC No. 98-206, and thereafter render a decision based
on the evidence adduced and the applicable laws. The incident of
whether or not petitioner may continue discharging the functions
of the office of congressman pending resolution of the case on its
merit shall be addressed by the COMELEC in the exercise of its
reasonable discretion.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 73123 September 2, 1991
IN RE: PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF INSOLVENCY OF [A]
FILAND MANUFACTURING AND ESTATE DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY; [B] TOP CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES, INC. AND [C]
SPOUSES EMILIO CHING AND INAI TEH; EMILIO CHING, petitioner,
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DIONISIO N. CAPISTRANO, JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASAY CITY, EMILIO CHING AND FILAND
MANUFACTURING AND ESTATE DEVELOPMENT CO.,
INC., respondents.
Lily K. Gruba and Florencio S. Jimenez for Land Bank of the Philippines.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City over a petition for declaration
of insolvency of two (2) private corporations.
The antecedent facts are undisputed:
On September 19, 1980, private respondents Filand Manufacturing and
Estate Development Co., Inc. (hereafter, Filand Manufacturing) and
Emilio Ching obtained from petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines a
loan in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). Private
respondents having failed to pay the loan on its due date, petitioner
instituted before the RTC of Manila a complaint for recovery thereof,
docketed as Civil Case No. 0184-P.
During the pendency of the collection suit on December 29, 1984,
private respondents Filand Manufacturing, Emilio Ching and his spouse
Inai Teh and Top Construction Enterprises, Inc., thru Emilio Ching, filed
before the respondent RTC of Pasay City a petition docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3232P for declaration of insolvency. Cited as ground
therefor was their inability to pay the various debts and liabilities incurred
by them, either jointly or solidarily or guaranteed by one for the other, in
the course of their businesses, such inability being due to business
reserves brought about by the fire on January 2, 1984 which gutted the
old Holiday Plaza Building then owned and operated by Filand
Manufacturing, as well as the economic crisis which gripped the country
following the assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino in
1983.1
Acting on said petition, respondent court on January 29, 1985 issued an
Order of Adjudication declaring private respondents insolvent pursuant
to Section 18 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956). The Sheriff of Pasay
City was "directed to take possession of, and safely keep, until the
appointment of a receiver or assignee, all the deeds, vouchers, books
of account, papers, notes, bonds, bills and securities of (therein)
petitioners, and all the real and personal properties, estates and effects
of the same petitioners, except such as may, by law, be exempt from
execution." Respondent court set "March 25, 1985 at 9:00 A.M. in its
premises ... as the date of the meeting of the creditors of the petitioners
for them to choose an assignee/assignees of the estates of the
petitioners."2
Petitioner bank moved for a reconsideration of the Order of Adjudication
on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) that the court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the petition insofar as petitioning corporations are
concerned; and (2) the petition is defective in form and substance.3 After
an exchange of pleadings between petitioner and private respondents,
respondent court issued on July 19, 1985 an Order upholding its
jurisdiction over the petition and appointing petitioner bank as the
assignee for and in behalf of all the creditors without bond, thus:
WHEREFORE, all motions seeking to have this Court make a
declaration that it has no jurisdiction over the above-entitled proceeding
are hereby DENIED, and the Land Bank of the Philippines is appointed
as the assignee for and in behalf of all the creditors of the petitioners,
without bond, to which assignee the Clerk of Court, thru the Branch
Sheriff, shall deliver any and all real and personal properties, estates
and effects, as well as the pertinent papers and all deeds, vouchers,
books of accounts, papers, notes, bonds, bills and securities taken by
him pursuant to the order of this Court of January 29, 1985.
The assignee is hereby ordered to comply with the time limit provided
for in Sec. 43 of Act 1956, and for this purpose, hereby sets his report
for hearing on October 29, 1985, at 9:00 A.M.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner bank declined the appointment and the City Treasurer of
Pasay City, being the second biggest creditor of private respondents,
was appointed in its stead Petitioner bank then filed a Notice of Appeal
and a Record on Appeal on August 19, 1985, on the basis of which the
respondent court forwarded the records of the case directly to this Court.
By resolution dated September 23, 1985, the Court resolved to
"REQUIRE the Branch Clerk of Court of the (respondent court) to
EXPLAIN why he forwarded to this Court the aforesaid records when the
mode of seeking review by this Court of a lower court's judgment under
R.A. 5440 is by petition for review on certiorari; and the Presiding Judge
of said trial court is also directed to EXPLAIN why he accepted and
approved the forwarding to this Court of the aforesaid records, both
within ten (10) days from notice hereof." Petitioner bank and/or counsel
were also "REQUIRED to EXPLAIN within ten (10) days from notice ...,
since they failed to pay timely the docket and legal research fund fees
and to file timely a petition for review on certiorari under R.A. 5440 why
the judgment sought to be reviewed should not be now deemed final
and executory and the records returned for execution of
judgment".5 Upon submission of the required explanations, the Court on
December 4, 1985 resolved to require the petitioner bank to file a petition
for review on certiorari and to pay the docket and legal research fund
fees, both within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
notice.6 This Order was seasonably complied with.
After the private respondents had submitted their comment on the
petition, petitioner bank filed on March 24, 1986 a "Manifestation with
motion for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction" informing the Court
that on March 3, 1986, the respondent court rendered a decision in
Special Proceedings No. 3232-P, providing in its dispositive portion as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
1. Petitioners Filand Manufacturing & Estate Development Co., Inc., and
Top Construction Enterprises, Inc., are declared by this Court as
insolvent and, pursuant to Sec. 52 of Act 1956, as amended, their
properties and assets shall be distributed to the creditors in the
proceeding with respect to the appointment of the City Treasurer of
Pasay City as receiver of their estates and effects. However, they are
not discharged from their liabilities in accordance with Sec. 52 of Act
1956, as amended.
2. Petitioners spouses Emilio Ching and Inai Teh are likewise declared
insolvent and their application for discharge is hereby approved, and
they are hereby ordered discharged and released from all claims, debts,
liabilities and demands, whether actual or contingent, and whether
personally or as guarantors or in a joint and solidary capacity, with
respect to the obligations set forth in the schedule and inventory of
accounts due and payable, Annex 'A' of the petition, as well as with
respect to the obligations and creditors listed in the manifestation of April
29, 1985, and the supplemental manifestation dated May 22, 1985, in
the above-entitled proceedings.
The other aspect of the above-entitled proceedings as regards the
receiver and all incidents and matters in connection with his functions
and duties are hereby considered as mere interlocutory matters in the
process of winding up this proceeding.
SO ORDERED.7
Acting on said manifestation and motion, the Court on April 14, 1986
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent court from
enforcing its decision of March 3, 1986.8 The temporary restraining order
was however lifted insofar as private respondents spouses Emilio Ching
and Inai Teh were concerned, the latter being natural persons over
whom the jurisdiction of the respondent court is not being questioned. 9
In its petition, given due course by the Court per resolution dated
January 28, 1987, petitioner bank advances the argument that it is the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), rather than the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) which has jurisdiction over the petition for declaration
of insolvency filed by private respondent corporations. This theory is
allegedly anchored on specific provisions of Presidential Decree No.
902-A, as amended, namely: Sections 3, 5(d) and 6(c) and (d), which
petitioner bank construes as having repealed the Insolvency Law (Act
1956), which confers jurisdiction over insolvency proceedings on the
regular courts. Private respondents maintain the opposite view,
contending simply that a petition for declaration of insolvency is not one
of those cases enumerated under Section 5, P.D. No. 902-A, as
amended, over which the SEC has original and exclusive jurisdiction.
In view of the far reaching importance of the issue presented before the
Court, both from a legal and economic standpoint, we resolved to
implead the SEC as a party to this case and to require it to inform the
Court of its practice regarding insolvency proceedings. 10 The SEC thru
the Solicitor General, filed its memorandum on December 13, 1989.
After deliberating on the SEC's memorandum, the Court resolved to set
the case for hearing on May 14, 1990 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. A
senior and knowledgeable officer of the SEC was requested to "appear
and inform the Court of the law and practice actually applied and
followed by the SEC in respect of suspension of payments by, and
voluntary and involuntary insolvencies of Philippine corporations . ..."
Former SEC Chairman Julito Sulit, Jr. was appointed amicus curiae and
was requested to appear at the hearing in that capacity. 11
Before addressing the principal issue in the instant petition, the Court
notes with dismay that the petitioner and the lower court appear to be
still in the dark as to the proper mode of appeal to this Court. Hence, for
their elucidation as well as the others similarly misinformed, we deem it
proper to quote the following resolution dated March 1, 1990 of the
Court en banc in UDK 9748, "Murillo v. Consul":
R.A. No. 5440 changed the mode of appeal from courts of first instance
(now Regional Trial Courts) to the Supreme Court in cases involving only
questions of law, or the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law,
ordinance, etc. or the legality of any tax, impost, assessment or toll, etc.,
or the jurisdiction of any inferior court, from ordinary appeal — i.e., by
notice of appeal, record on appeal and appeal bond, under Rule 41— to
appeal by certiorari, under Rule 45.
xxx xxx xxx
At present then, except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is
life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, there is no way by which
judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to this Court except
by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended. The proposition is clearly stated in the Interim Rules: 'Appeals
to the Supreme Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall
be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
xxx xxx xxx
... To repeat, appeals to this Court cannot now be made by petition for
review or by notice of appeal (and, in certain instances, by record on
appeal), but only by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. As
was stressed by this Court as early as 1980 in Buenbrazo v. Marave,
101 SCRA 848, all the members of the bench and bar are charged with
knowledge, not only that since the enactment of Republic Act No. 6031
in 1969,' 'the review of the decision of the Court of First Instance in a
case exclusively cognizable by the inferior court ... cannot be made in
an ordinary appeal or by record on appeal but also that 'appeal by record
on appeal to the Supreme Court under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court
was abolished by Republic Act No. 5440 which, as already stated, took
effect on September 9, 1968.' Similarly, in Santos, Jr. v. C.A., 152 SCRA
378, this Court declared that 'Republic Act No. 5440 had long
superseded Rule 41 and Section 1, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court on
direct appeals from the court of first instance to the Supreme Court in
civil and criminal cases,' ... and that 'direct appeals to this Court from the
trial court on questions of law had to be through the filing of a petition for
review on certiorari, wherein this Court could either give due course to
the proposed appeal or deny it outright to prevent the clogging of its
docket with unmeritorious and dilatory appeals.
Going now to the issue of jurisdiction raised in this petition and
considering the arguments proferred by the parties' respective counsel,
the view spoused by the amicus curiae as well as the submissions of the
SEC thru the Office of the Solicitor General and its Assistant Executive
Director, we find for private respondents.
Under Act 1956, otherwise known as the Insolvency Law, jurisdiction
over proceedings for suspension of payments, voluntary and involuntary
insolvency is exclusively vested in the regular courts. However, P.D. No.
1758 issued in 1981 added to the exclusive and original jurisdiction of
the SEC defined and delineated in Section 5 of P.D. 902-A,12the
following:
d) Petitions of corporations, partnerships or associations to be declared
in the state of suspension of payments in cases where the corporation,
partnership or association possesses sufficient property to cover all its
debts but foresees the impossibility of meeting them when they
respectively fall due or in cases where the corporation, partnership or
association has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, but is under
the management of a Rehabilitation Receiver or Management
Committee created pursuant to this Decree.
It is petitioner's contention that said additional par. (d) effectively
repealed the Insolvency Law so as to transfer and confer upon the SEC
jurisdiction theretofore enjoyed by the regular courts over proceedings
for suspension of payments and voluntary and involuntary insolvency.
We do not share such interpretation.
The SEC like any other administrative body, is a tribunal of limited
jurisdiction and as such, could wield only such powers as are specifically
granted to it by its enabling statute.13 Its jurisdiction should be
interpreted in strictissimi juris.14
Section 5, par. (d) should be construed as vesting upon the SEC original
and exclusive jurisdiction only over petitions to be declared in a state of
suspension of payments, which may either be: (a) a simple petition for
suspension of payments based on the provisions of the Insolvency Law,
or (b) a similar petition accompanied by a prayer for the
creation/appointment of a management committee and/or rehabilitation
receiver based on the provisions of P.D. No. 902-A. Said provision
cannot be stretched to include petitions for insolvency. The reason is
that under said Section 5, par. (d) above-quoted, the jurisdiction of the
SEC over cases where the corporation, partnership or association has
no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities, (and therefore insolvent) is
qualified by the conjunctive phrase "but is under the management of a
Rehabilitation Receiver or Management Committee created pursuant to
this Decree." This qualification effectively circumscribes the jurisdiction
of the SEC over insolvent corporations, partnerships and associations,
and consequently, over proceedings for the declaration of insolvency. It
demonstrates beyond doubt that jurisdiction over insolvency
proceedings pertains neither in the first instance nor exclusively to the
SEC but only in continuation of or as an incident to the exercise of its
jurisdiction over petitions to be declared in a state of suspension of
payments wherein the petitioning corporation, partnership or association
had previously been placed under a rehabilitation receiver or
management committee by the SEC itself.
Viewed differently, where the petition filed is one for declaration of a
state of suspension of payments due to a recognition of the inability to
pay one's debts and liabilities, and where the petitioning corporation
either: (a) has sufficient property to cover all its debts but foresees the
impossibility of meeting them when they fall due (solvent but illiquid or
(b) has no sufficient property (insolvent) but is under the management
of a rehabilitation receiver or a management committee, the applicable
law is P.D. No. 902-A pursuant to Sec. 5 par. (d) thereof. However, if the
petitioning corporation has no sufficient assets to cover its liabilities and
is not under a rehabilitation receiver or a management committee
created under P.D. No. 902-A and does not seek merely to have the
payments of its debts suspended, but seeks a declaration of insolvency,
as in this case, the applicable law is Act 1956 on voluntary insolvency,
specifically section 14 thereof, which provides:
Sec. 14. — An insolvent debtor, owing debts exceeding in amount the
sum of one thousand pesos, may apply to be discharged from his debts
and liabilities by petition to the Court of First Instance of the province or
city in which he has resided for six month next preceding the filing of
such petition. In his petition, he shall set forth his place of residence, the
period of his residence therein immediately prior to filing said petition,
his inability to pay all his debts in full, his willingness to surrender all his
property, estate, and effects not exempt from execution for the benefit
of his creditors, and an application to be adjudged an insolvent. He shall
annex to his petition a schedule and inventory in the form hereinafter
provided. The filing of such petition shall be an act of insolvency.
Neither could the grant of additional powers to SEC under Section 6(c)
and (d) of P.D. No. 902- A, as amended, be construed as vesting upon
it exclusive and original jurisdiction over insolvency proceedings. The
pertinent provisions read:
SEC. 6. In order to effectively exercise such jurisdiction, the Commission
shall possess the following powers:
xxx xxx xxx
c) To appoint one or more receivers of the property, real and personal,
which is the subject of the action pending before the Commission in
accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in such
other cases whenever necessary to preserve the rights of the parties-
litigants to and/or protect the interest of the investing public and
creditors; Provided, however, that the Commission may, in appropriate
cases, appoint a rehabilitation receiver of corporations, partnerships or
other associations not supervised or regulated by other government
agencies who shall have, in addition to the powers of a regular receiver
under the provisions of the Rules of Court, such functions and powers
as are provided for in the succeeding paragraph (d) hereof; Provided,
further that the Commission may appoint a rehabilitation receiver of
corporations, partnerships or other nations supervised or regulated by
other government agencies, such as banks and insurance companies,
upon request of the government agency concerned; Provided, finally
that upon appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board or body pursuant to this Decree, all actions for claims
against corporations, partnerships or nations under management or
receivership pending before any court, tribunal, board or body shall be
suspended accordingly.
d) To create and appoint a management committee, board, or body upon
petition or motu proprio to undertake the management of corporations,
partnerships or other associations not supervised or regulated by other
government agencies in appropriate cases when there is imminent
danger of dissipation, loss, wastage or destruction of assets or other
properties or paralization of business operations of such corporations or
entities which may be prejudicial to the interest of minority stockholders,
parties-litigants or the general public; Provided, further, that the
Commission may create or appoint a management committee, board or
body to undertake the management of corporations, partnerships or
other associations supervised or regulated by other government
agencies, such as banks and insurance companies, upon request of the
government agency concerned.
The management committee or rehabilitation receiver, board or body
shall have the power to take custody of, and control over, all the existing
assets and property of such entities under management; to evaluate the
existing assets and liabilities, earnings and operations of such
corporations, partnerships or other associations, to determine the best
way to wage and protect the interest of the investors and creditors; to
study, review and evaluate the feasibility of continuing operations and
restructure and rehabilitate such entities if determined to be feasible by
the Commission. It shall report and be responsible to the Commission
until dissolved by order of the Commission: Provided, however, that the
Commission may, on the basis of the findings and recommendation of
the management committee, or rehabilitation receiver, board or body, or
on its own findings, determine that the continuance in business of such
corporation or entity would not be feasible or profitable nor work to the
best interest of the stockholders, parties-litigants, creditors, or the
general public, order the dissolution of such corporation entity and its
remaining assets liquidated accordingly.
The management committee or rehabilitation receiver, board or body
may overrule or revoke the actions of the previous management and
board of directors of the entity or entities under management
notwithstanding any provision of law, articles of incorporation or by-laws
to the contrary.
The management committee, or rehabilitation receiver, board or body
shall not be subject to any action, claim or demand for, or in connection
with any act done or omitted to be done by it in good faith in the exercise
of its functions, or in connection with the exercise of its powers herein
conferred.
As declared by the law itself, these are merely ancillary powers to enable
the SEC to effectively exercise its jurisdiction. These additional ancillary
powers can be exercised only in connection with an action pending
before the SEC and therefore had to be viewed in relation to Section 5
which defines the SEC's original and exclusive jurisdiction. Section 6
does not enlarge or add to the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
SEC as particularly enumerated under Section 5 of said Presidential
Decree, as amended.
A well-recognized rule in statutory construction is that repeals by
implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be
manifest that the legislature so intended.15 When statutes are in pari
material they should be construed together. In construing them the old
statutes relating to the same subject matter should be compared with
the new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both
should be so construed that effect may be given to every provision of
each.16
Construing P.D. 902-A, as amended, in relation to Act 1956, we rule that
insofar as petitions for declaration of insolvency of private corporations
are concerned, it is the regular court that has exclusive and original
jurisdiction thereon. The SEC may entertain such petitions only as an
incident of and in continuation of its already acquired jurisdiction over
petitions to be declared in the state of suspension of payments in the
two (2) cases provided in Section 5 (d) of P.D. 902-A, as amended.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED.
The temporary restraining order issued on April 14, 1986 is LIFTED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 159145. April 29, 2005]
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION
BOARD (DARAB) of the DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM (DAR), REPRESENTED by DAR SECRETARY
ROBERTO M. PAGDANGANAN, petitioner, vs. JOSEFINA S.
LUBRICA, in her capacity as Assignee of the rights and
interest of FEDERICO SUNTAY, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of
the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710
granting herein respondents petition for prohibition and
its Resolution[2] denying herein petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
This Court adopts the appellate courts narration of facts.
On August 4, 2000, Federico Suntay, now deceased, filed a
petition for fixing and payment of just compensation under
Presidential Decree No. 27 against the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), the DAR Regional Director for Region IV and the
Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank).[3] Docketed as DARAB
Case No. V-0405-0001-00, the case was filed before the Office of
the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD) and raffled to
Adjudicator Conchita Mias. Subject of the case was Suntays
landholdings covering a total area of 948.1911 hectares situated
in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro and embraced under Transfer
Certificate of Title T-31. The DAR and Land Bank determined its
value at Four Million Two Hundred Fifty-One Thousand One
Hundred Forty-One Pesos and 68/100 (P4,251,141.68) or Four
Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos and 50/100
(P4,497.50) per hectare, which valuation according to Suntay,
was unconscionably low and tantamount to taking of property
without due process of law.[4]
After summary administrative proceedings, the RARAD rendered
a Decision[5] on January 24, 2001 in favor of Suntay, ordering
Land Bank to pay the former the amount of One Hundred Fifty-
Seven Million Five Hundred Forty-One Thousand Nine Hundred
Fifty-One Pesos & 30/100 (P157,541,951.30) as just
compensation for the taking of a total of 948.1911 hectares of
Suntays properties. Land Bank sought reconsideration of the
RARAD decision for not being supported by clear and convincing
evidence and for its conclusions which are contrary to law.
However, in an Order[6] dated March 14, 2001, the RARAD denied
Land Banks motion. Land Bank received a copy of the order of
denial on March 26, 2001.[7]
On April 20, 2001, Land Bank filed a petition for just
compensation[8] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro against Suntay, DAR, and RARAD. The
petition, docketed as Agrarian Case No. R-1241, prayed that just
compensation for the taking of Suntays landholdings be declared
in the amount of Four Million Two Hundred Fifty One Thousand,
One Hundred Forty-One Pesos (P4,251,141.00). Suntay moved to
dismiss the petition on the grounds of lack of capacity to sue,
lack of cause of action, and res judicata. After Land Bank filed its
comment on Suntays motion to dismiss, the RTC, sitting as a
special agrarian court, dismissed on August 6, 2001 Land Banks
petition for failure to pay the docket fees within the reglementary
period.[9] The special agrarian court also denied Land
Banks Motion for Reconsideration for being pro-
forma.[10] Thereafter, Land Bank appealed the order of dismissal
to the Court of Appeals by filing a Notice of Appeal with the
special agrarian court.[11]
While the petition for just compensation was pending with the
special agrarian court, upon motion of Suntay, the RARAD issued
an Order[12] on May 22, 2001, declaring its January 24,
2001 Decision as final and executory after noting that Land
Banks petition for just compensation with the special agrarian
court was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period in
violation of Section 11, Rule XIII of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure.[13] In its July 10, 2001 Order,[14] the RARAD denied
LBPs motion for reconsideration of the order of finality. On July
18, 2001, the RARAD issued a Writ of Execution,[15] directing the
Regional Sheriff of DARAB-Region IV to implement its January
24, 2001 Decision.
Thus, Land Bank filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order/Preliminary
Injunction[16] before the DARAB on September 12, 2001 against
Suntay and RARAD. The petition, docketed as DSCA No. 0252,
prayed for the nullification of the following issuances of the
RARAD: [1] the January 24, 2001 Decision directing Land Bank
to pay Suntay just compensation in the amount
of P157,541,951.30; [2] the Order dated May 22, 2001 declaring
the finality of the aforesaid Decision; [3] the July 10,
2001 Order denying Land Banks motion for reconsideration; and
[4] the Writ of Execution dated July 18, 2001. On September 12,
2001, the DARAB issued an Order[17] enjoining the RARAD from
momentarily implementing its January 24, 2001 Decision and
directing the parties to attend the hearing for the purpose of
determining the propriety of issuing a preliminary/permanent
injunction.
On September 20, 2001, Josefina Lubrica, the successor-in-
interest of Suntay, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Prohibition,[18] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 66710. The petition,
impleading DARAB and Land Bank as respondents, sought to
enjoin DARAB from further proceeding with DSCA No. 0252,
mainly on the theory that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, which
confers adjudicatory functions upon the DAR, does not grant
DAR jurisdiction over special civil actions for certiorari. On the
same day, the Court of Appeals granted Lubricas prayer for a
temporary restraining order.[19] This notwithstanding, DARAB
issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction[20] on October 3, 2001,
directing RARAD not to implement its January 24,
2001 Decision and the other orders in relation thereto, including
the Writ of Execution.
On October 8, 2001, DARAB filed a Comment[21] in CA-G.R. SP
No. 66710, arguing that the writ of certiorari/injunction was
issued under its power of supervision over its
subordinates/delegates like the PARADs and RARADs to restrain
the execution of a decision which had not yet attained finality. In
an omnibus motion filed on October 10, 2001, Lubrica sought to
nullify the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by DARAB in
DSCA No. 0252 and to cite the DARAB for contempt. [22] Land
Bank also filed its Comment[23] on October 15, 2001, raising the
prematurity of Lubricas petition for prohibition. It contended that
the issue of whether or not DARAB can take cognizance of Land
Banks petition for certiorari may be elevated to the Office of the
DAR Secretary, in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. Land Bank also questioned Lubricas
personality to file the petition for prohibition considering that she
never intervened in the proceedings before the RARAD.
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision[24] on August
22, 2002. The appellate court ruled that petitioner DARAB had
no personality to file a comment on Lubricas petition for
prohibition filed with the Court of Appeals because DARAB was
a mere formal party and could file a comment only when
specifically and expressly directed to do so. The appellate court
also ruled that DARABs exercise of jurisdiction over the petition
for certiorari had no constitutional or statutory basis. It rejected
DARABs contention that the issuance of the writ of certiorari
arose from its power of direct and functional supervision over the
RARAD. In sum, the Court of Appeals declared that DARAB was
without jurisdiction to take cognizance of DSCA No. 0252 and
issued a Writ of Prohibition, perpetually enjoining DARAB from
proceeding with DSCA No. 0252 and ordering its dismissal.
Hence, the instant petition, in which DARAB assigns the
following errors to the Court of Appeals:
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred when it ruled:
1. THAT THE PETITIONER (DARAB), BEING A FORMAL PARTY,
SHOULD NOT HAVE FILED COMMENT TO THE PETITION AND
INSTEAD, IT SHOULD HAVE BEEN CO-RESPONDENT LAND
BANK, THE FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARY OF CARP;
2. THAT PETITIONER HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER DSCA 0252
WHICH IS A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI; AND
3. THAT WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION ISSUED BY
DARAB IN DSCA 0252 WAS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN
ISSUED IN VIOLATION OF THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER IT ISSUED.[25]
This Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the
DARAB does not have jurisdiction over Land Banks petition for
certiorari.
Jurisdiction, or the legal power to hear and determine a cause or
causes of action, must exist as a matter of law.[26] It is settled that
the authority to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus involves the exercise of original jurisdiction
which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by
law.[27] It is never derived by implication. Indeed, while the power
to issue the writ of certiorari is in some instance conferred on all
courts by constitutional or statutory provisions, ordinarily, the
particular courts which have such power are expressly
designated.[28]
Pursuant to Section 17 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 229 and
Section 13 of E.O. No. 129-A, the DARAB was created to act as
the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR. With the passage of R.A. No.
6657, the adjudicatory powers and functions of the DAR were
further delineated when, under Section 50 thereof, it was vested
with the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform
except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Department of Agriculture, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources and the Special Agrarian Courts. The same
provision granted the DAR the power to summon witnesses,
administer oaths, take testimony, require submission of reports,
compel the production of books and documents and answers to
interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum,
and enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized
officers, and the broad power to adopt a uniform rule of
procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination of cases before it.[29] Section 13 of E.O. No. 129-A
also authorized the DAR to delegate its adjudicatory powers and
functions to its regional offices.
To this end, the DARAB adopted its Rules of Procedure, where it
delegated to the RARADs and PARADs the authority to hear,
determine and adjudicate all agrarian cases and disputes, and
incidents in connection therewith, arising within their assigned
territorial jurisdiction.[30] In the absence of a specific statutory
grant of jurisdiction to issue the said extraordinary writ of
certiorari, the DARAB, as a quasi-judicial body with only limited
jurisdiction, cannot exercise jurisdiction over Land Banks
petition for certiorari. Neither the quasi-judicial authority of the
DARAB nor its rule-making power justifies such self-conferment
of authority.
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers
which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the
enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which
an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends
largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or
empowering such agency.[31] The grant of original jurisdiction on
a quasi-judicial agency is not implied. There is no question that
the legislative grant of adjudicatory powers upon the DAR, as in
all other quasi-judicial agencies, bodies and tribunals, is in the
nature of a limited and special jurisdiction, that is, the authority
to hear and determine a class of cases within the DARs
competence and field of expertise. In conferring adjudicatory
powers and functions on the DAR, the legislature could not have
intended to create a regular court of justice out of the DARAB,
equipped with all the vast powers inherent in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. The DARAB is only a quasi-judicial body, whose
limited jurisdiction does not include authority over petitions
for certiorari, in the absence of an express grant in R.A. No. 6657,
E.O. No. 229 and E.O. No. 129-A.
In addition, Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure allows
a party who does not agree with the RARADs preliminary
valuation in land compensation cases fifteen (15) days from
receipt of notice to bring the matter to the proper special agrarian
court, thus:
SECTION 11. Land Valuation and Preliminary Determination and
Payment of Just Compensation. The decision of the Adjudicator
on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment of
just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall
be brought directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as
Special Agrarian Courts within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
the notice thereof. Any party shall be entitled to only one motion
for reconsideration.
In Philippine Veterans Bank vs. Court of Appeals,[32] this Court
affirmed the dismissal of a landowners petition for judicial
determination of just compensation for its failure to file the
petition within the fifteen-day reglementary period provided
under Rule XIII, 11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
In the instant case, Land Bank received a copy of the RARAD
order denying its motion for reconsideration on March 26, 2001.
Land Bank filed the petition for just compensation with the
special agrarian court only on April 20, 2001, which is
doubtlessly beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period. Thus,
the RARAD Decision had already attained finality in accordance
with the afore-quoted rule, notwithstanding Land Banks
recourse to the special agrarian court.
DARAB takes exception to the general rule that jurisdiction over
special civil actions must be expressly conferred by law before a
court or tribunal can take cognizance thereof. It believes that this
principle is applicable only in cases where the officials/entities
contemplated to be subject thereof are not within the
administrative power/competence, or in any manner under the
control or supervision, of the issuing authority.
This Court is not persuaded. The function of a writ of certiorari is
to keep an inferior court within the bounds of its jurisdiction or
to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction.[33] In the instant case, the
RARAD issued the order of finality and the writ of execution upon
the belief that its decision had become final and executory, as
authorized under Section 1, Rule XII of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure. It is worth noting that in its petition, DARAB
maintains that in preventing the RARAD from implementing its
decision, it merely exercised its residual power of supervision, to
insure that the RARAD acted within the bounds of delegated
authority and/or prevent/avoid her from committing grave and
serious disservice to the Program.[34] DARABs action, therefore,
is a rectification of what it perceived as an abuse of the RARADs
jurisdiction. By its own admission, DARAB took upon itself the
power to correct errors of jurisdiction which is ordinarily lodged
with the regular courts by virtue of express constitutional grant
or legislative enactments.
This Court recognizes the supervisory authority of the DARAB
over its delegates, namely, the RARADs and PARADs, but the
same should be exercised within the context of administrative
supervision and/or control. In the event that the RARADs or
PARADs act beyond its adjudicatory functions, nothing prevents
the aggrieved party from availing of the extraordinary remedy of
certiorari, which is ordinarily within the jurisdiction of the
regular courts.
That the statutes allowed the DARAB to adopt its own rules of
procedure does not permit it with unbridled discretion to grant
itself jurisdiction ordinarily conferred only by the Constitution or
by law. Procedure, as distinguished from jurisdiction, is the
means by which the power or authority of a court to hear and
decide a class of cases is put into action. Rules of procedure are
remedial in nature and not substantive. They cover only rules on
pleadings and practice.[35]
While the Court of Appeals held that the DARAB should not have
participated in the proceedings before said court by filing a
comment in CA-G.R. SP No. 66710, this Court considers
satisfactory the explanation of the DARAB that it has a peculiar
interest in the final outcome of this case. As DARAB pointed out,
while it is only an adjunct of, it is at the same time not totally
independent from it. The DARAB is composed of the senior
officials of the DAR, who are guided by the States main policy in
agrarian reform when resolving disputes before the DARAB. The
DARABs interest in the case is not purely legal but also a matter
of governance; thus, it cannot be strictly considered as a nominal
party which must refrain from taking an active part in the
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 78163. December 10, 1990.]
ANGELINA P. SANTIAGO, Petitioner, v. The Honorable DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY and HI-CEMENT CORPORATION,
Respondents.
Justiniano P. Cortez & Associates for Petitioner.
Juan J. Diaz & Nicolas J. Lim for Respondents.
This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with
preliminary injunction, to review and annul the decision of the
respondent Deputy Executive Secretary ** dated September 1,
1986 in O.P. Case No. 3274 (MNR Case No. 6376), entitled "Hi-
Cement Corporation v. Angelina P. Santiago and Philippine
Development and Industrial Corporation" setting aside the
decision of the Ministry of Natural Resources *** (now Department
of Environment and Natural Resources) dated March 26, 1986 and
reinstating the decision of the Bureau of Mines and Geo-Sciences,
**** dated May 17, which cancelled Quarry License No. 37 of
petitioner and ordered her and/or her operator to immediately
vacate and turn over the possession of the mining area to the
respondent Hi-Cement Corporation.
As gathered from the records, the antecedent facts are as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Hi-Cement Corporation (Hi-Cement, for short) is a manufacturer
of cement with plant located at Bo. Matiktik, Norzagaray,
Bulacan. For its operation, Hi-Cement leased and acquired
several placer mining claims from the Bureau of Mines and Geo-
Sciences (BMGS), namely Mining Lease Contract (MLC) Nos. V-78,
85, 90, 150, 261, and 269. MLC V-90 covers mining claim Red Star
VIII, Red Star IX and Hunter I in the name of Red Star Association.
Said mining claims were transferred to Hi-Cement by virtue of a
deed of assignment dated December 13, 1965 duly approved by
the Director of BMGS.
On February 24, 1984, BMGS issued Quarry License (QL) No. 37 in
the name of Angelina P. Santiago, petitioner herein, covering 19.5
hectares which are entirely within the mining claims of respondent
Hi-Cement despite the fact that its lease contract has not been
declared abandoned or cancelled by the BMGS (Rollo, p. 55). On
April 10, 1984, Santiago entered into an Operating Agreement
with the Philippine Development and Industrial Corporation
(PDIC).
Meanwhile, the Director of BMGS, in a letter dated April 3, 1984,
informed Nicolas Katigbak, Senior V-president of Hi-Cement, that
per field verification conducted, Hi-Cement has complied with
the annual work obligation requirements vis-a-vis MLC V-90 and
that the BMGS recognizes the validity of Hi-Cement mining lease
contracts. Nevertheless, the Director recognized as valid the
intervening rights prior to the field verification, although the same
would no longer be subject to renewal (Rollo, p.
89).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On October 20, 1984, Hi-Cement filed a petition with the BMGS,
amended on January 28, 1985, praying for the revocation of QL
No. 37 on the following grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Hi-Cement is the lessee and surface titled owner of the
area covered by QL No. 37 of Santiago (Rollo, p. 27);
2. Hi-Cement’s mining claims covered under MLC V-90 has
never been declared abandoned nor cancelled (Rollo, p. 29);
3. That under Sec. 63, PD 463 and its implementing rules
and regulations, areas covered by valid and existing mining lease
shall not be subject to any quarry permit or license (Ibid., p. 28);
4. That Santiago has misled the BMGS into issuing a quarry
license by misrepresenting the area to be public land (Rollo, p.
30).
In her answer to the above petition, Santiago alleged, among
others, that the failure of Hi-Cement to file Affidavits of Annual
Work Obligations (AAWO) for more than two (2) consecutive
years constituted automatic abandonment of the mining claims
under Sec. 27 of PD 463, as amended (Rollo, p. 36) and that Hi-
Cement’s title over the disputed area is void as it covers mineral
lands (Ibid., p. 53).
On May 17, 1985, the Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the BMGS,
Benjamin Gonzales, issued a decision, the dispositive portion of
which is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, this office, finding the
instant petition of HI-CEMENT Corporation to be well-founded, the
same is hereby granted. Accordingly, Quarry License No. 37 of
Respondent Angelina Santiago is hereby declared cancelled
and she and/or her operator is ordered to immediately vacate
and turn over the possession of the mining area subject of this
case to the petitioner." (Rollo, p. 63).
On July 1, 1985, Santiago filed an appeal with the then Ministry of
Natural Resources, alleging that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The OIC erred in rendering and signing the aforesaid
decision considering that he has no legal authority to do so (Rollo,
p. 66).
2. The OIC erred in not holding that Red Star VIII under
MLC-90 was not automatically abandoned for failure of Hi-
Cement to comply with the filing of the AAWP for more than two
consecutive years (Rollo, p. 72).
3. The OIC erred in stating that Santiago committed
misrepresentation or deception fatal enough to cause the
cancellation of her QL No. 37 (Rollo, p. 81).
On March 26, 1986, the Minister of Natural Resources issued a
decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
decision dated May 17, 1985 of the OIC of the Bureau of Mines
and Geo-Sciences should be, as hereby it is, SET ASIDE. Quarry
License No. 37 of Angelina P. Santiago is hereby ordered
REINSTATED and be entered in the records as Q.P. or quarry permit
subject to renewal upon compliance with the requirements of
law, and the area covered thereby excluded from the coverage
of MLC No. V-90 of HI-CEMENT Corporation.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, P. 102)
From said decision, Hi-Cement filed an appeal with the Office of
the President, dated May 19, 1986, assigning the following errors,
to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The Hon. Minister of Natural Resources erred in declaring
as null and void the Decision of the OIC of the BMGS;chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
2. The Hon. Minister of Natural Resources erred in declaring
as automatically abandoned the Placer Lease Contract of Hi-
Cement Corporation for failure to file proof of annual work
obligation despite lessee having performed the work obligation
required, and despite the fact that no previous hearing was even
conducted in accordance with Section 44 of the Consolidated
Mines Administrative Order, implementing PD 463; and
3. The Hon. Minister of Natural Resources erred in not taking
into consideration the Transfer Certificate of Title of Hi-Cement
Corporation, as well as the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
decisions as proof of the misrepresentation of Santiago. (Rollo, p.
190).
On September 1, 1986, the then Deputy Executive Secretary
rendered a decision, holding thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Ministry of
Natural Resources, dated March 26, 1986 is hereby SET ASIDE, and
this office hereby REINSTATES the decision of the Bureau of Mines
and Geo-Sciences dated May 17, 1985.
SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 106)
On November 8, 1986, Santiago filed a motion for reconsideration
of the aforesaid decision (Rollo, p. 111) but was denied by the
Deputy Executive Secretary not only because it was filed late but
her motion contained mere reiterations of the matters already
considered and found to be without merit (Rollo, p. 117).
Hence, the instant petition.
The issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
1. Whether or not private respondent automatically
abandoned its mining claim on MLC V-90 by reason of its failure
to file affidavit of annual work obligations for two years, as
required by Section 27 of PD 463, as amended.
2. Whether or not QL No. 37 of Santiago is a valid
intervening right that prevails over the mining claim of private
Respondent.
3. Whether or not the decision issued by the OIC of BMGS
dated May 17, 1985 is valid.
The petition is devoid of merit.
I Petitioner contends that Hi-Cement abandoned its mining claim
over MLC V-90 when it failed to file affidavit of annual work
obligations (AAWO) as required by Sec. 27, PD 463, as amended,
which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 27. Annual Work Obligations. — The claim-owner shall
submit proof of compliance with the annual work obligations by
filing an affidavit therefor and the statement of expenditures and
technical report in the prescribed form in support thereof with the
Mines Regional Officer concerned within one hundred twenty
days from the end of the year in which the work obligation is
required: Provided, That failure of the claim-owner to comply
therewith for two (2) consecutive years shall constitute automatic
abandonment of the mining claim: Provided, further, That, if it is
found upon field verification that no such work was actually done
on the mining claim, the claim owner/lessee shall automatically
lose all his right thereto notwithstanding submission of the
aforesaid documents: Provided, finally, That the Director, in cases
of unstable peace and order conditions and/or involvement in
mining conflicts may grant further extensions."cralaw virtua1aw
library
The argument is untenable.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, there is no rule of automatic
abandonment with respect to mining claims for failure to file
AAWO. Under the Consolidated Mines Administrative Order
(CMAO), implementing PD 463, as amended, the rule that has
been consistently applied is that it is the failure to perform the
required assessment work, not the failure to file the AAWO that
gives rise to abandonment. Interpreted within the context of PD
1902, the last amending decree of PD 463, it is intended, among
others, to accelerate the development of our natural resources
and to accelerate mineral productions, abandonment under the
aforequoted Sec. 27 refers to the failure to perform work
obligations which in turn is one of the grounds for the cancellation
of the lease contract (Sec. 43 (a), Consolidated Mines
Administrative Order, implementing PD 463).
The question of whether or not the failure to submit AAWO for
more than two (2) consecutive years constitutes abandonment
as ground for cancellation of a mining lease contract has been
the subject matter of many cases in the Ministry of Natural
Resources (now Department of Environment and Natural
Resources). Public respondent had made the following significant
findings, to quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In a number of cases, the MNR answered the question in the
negative. (Sec. 1, Malayan Integrated industries Corporation v.
Apo Cement Corporation; 2. "In the matter of the denial by the
Director of Mines Temporary Permit Application No. V-2780 of the
Republic Glass Corporation" and 3. "In Re: Denial of Mines
Temporary Permit Application No. V-2340, Bonanza Consolidated
Mines, Inc., Appellant", docketed as MNR Case Nos. 5036, 4386,
4459, respectively). As there explained, it is the continued failure
to perform the annual work obligations, NOT the failure to file
AAWO, that gives rise to abandonment as ground for
cancellation of a mining lease contract; that compliance with
AAWO requirements, not being related to the essence of the acts
to be performed, is a matter of convenience rather than
substance; and that non-submission of AAWO does not preclude
the lessee from proving performance of such working obligation
in some other way." (Rollo, p. 106; Decision, O.P., p. 6)
Moreover, before any mining lease contract is cancelled,
Consolidated Mines Administrative Order, Section 44 thereof,
requires notice and healing. Said BMGS OIC Director
Gonzales:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The provision of Sec. 44 of Consolidated Mines Administrative
Order (CMAO) specifically provides for the necessity of the
cancellation of the Mining Lease Contract before the same can
be considered open to relocation. And in cases of non-
compliance with the filing of AAWO, it has been a long consistent
policy of this office to first require field verification before any
recommendation for cancellation be endorsed to the Ministry of
Natural Resources (MNR). But the field verification reveals that
cancellation is not in order and neither can it be said that the
verification conducted was improperly made." (Rollo, p. 107)
It is significant to note that the then Minister of Natural Resources
Ernesto Maceda reiterated the Ministry’s previous ruling in his
decision dated April 10, 1986, in MNR Case No. 6300, entitled "RE
PLACER LEASE APPLICATION NO. V-3895 OF CONTINENTAL MARBLE
CORPORATION." To quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This office has been consistent on its ruling that it is the continued
failure to undertake the work obligation that causes a mining
claim to lapse. The affidavit (of annual work obligation) is merely
a prima facie proof of performance of said work obligations, and
the omission to submit said affidavit raised only a disputable
presumption that no work had been done and shift upon the
claim owner the burden of proof to show otherwise. The claim-
owner is not precluded from making proof of performance in
some other way. (Malayan Integrated Industries v. Apo Cement
Corporation, Et. Al. MNR Case No. 5036, July 6, 1982, Republic
Glass Corporation, MNR Case 4336 and Sto. Rosario Fertilizer
Corporation, MNR Case No. 4369). These decided cases fall
squarely with the facts of the instant case." (Rollo, p. 195)
The aforesaid decision was penned after the then Minister Ernesto
Maceda overturned the decision of the BMGS in the case of Hi-
Cement v. Angelina Santiago. As can be seen therefore, it has
always been an administrative policy that the requirement to file
AAWO is a matter of convenience rather than substance as it is
not related to the essence of the acts performed. These
administrative policies enacted by administrative bodies to
interpret the law have the force and effect of law and entitled to
great respect (Tayug v. Central Bank, G.R. 46158, Nov. 28, 1986;
Warren Manufacturing Workers Union v. Bureau of Labor Relations,
159 SCRA 387 [1988]). It is the general policy of this Court to sustain
the decision of administrative authorities not only on the basis of
the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed
knowledge ability and even expertise in the laws they are
entrusted to enforce (Cuerdo v. COA, 166 SCRA 657
[1988]).chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Consequently, Hi-Cement has never abandoned its mining claim.
It may not have filed the AAWO but it has actually performed the
annual work obligations as found by the BMGS. Administrative
findings of facts are sufficient if supported by substantial evidence
on record and as a general rule, actions of administrative
agencies need not be disturbed by the judicial department
(Manahan v. People, G.R. 37010, Nov. 7, 1988; Gordon v.
Veridiano, 167 SCRA 51[1938]; Mapa v. Arroyo G.R. 78585, July 5,
1989; Neddle Queen Corporation v. Nicolas, Et. Al. G.R. 60741-45,
Dec. 22, 1989). This court finds no reason to disturb such findings.
II Petitioner insists that her Quarry License No. 37 is a valid
intervening right that prevails over the mining claims of Hi-Cement
as its claims were automatically abandoned without need for any
proceeding or declaration for cancellation.
Given the fact that Hi-Cement Mining Lease Contract has never
been cancelled not its mining claim abandoned, this Court rules
that Santiago can not have any valid intervening right over the
mining claims of the respondent for the following reasons: First, the
license of the respondent covers an area which is closed to
mining location under Sec. 13, PD 463, as amended.
"Sec. 13. Areas Closed to Mining Location. — No prospecting and
exploration shall be allowed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
"C. In lands covered by valid and subsisting mining claims
located, and leases acquired, under previous mining laws and in
accordance with the provisions of this Decree."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Second, Sec. 63 of the Consolidated Mines Administrative Order
categorically states that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . Areas covered by valid and subsisting mining claims and
mining leases shall not be the subject of a quarry permit or
license."cralaw virtua1aw library
Hence, it is only when the mining lease contract has been
cancelled or terminated in the manner provided by law that a
leased mining area may be open to location and lease by other
qualified persons. Since the mining lease contract of Hi-Cement
over the area covered by the quarry license of petitioner is still
valid and existing at the time the license was obtained by the
petitioner, her license is null and void and, therefore, cannot be
considered as a valid intervening right that prevails over the
mining claim of Hi-Cement.
Third, both the BMGS and the public respondent found the
petitioner guilty of misrepresentation. Said the public
respondent:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . Santiago misrepresented in her application for a quarry license
that the area applied for was a public land when, in reality, it is
covered by TCT No. T-62628 in the name of Hi-Cement. In this
regard, the provisions of PD 512 require the locator or prospector
before entering a private land to give prior notification to the
landowner who is thereby entitled to compensation and royalty."
(Rollo, p. 110).
Such finding is binding on this Court. Findings of the administrative
agency on matters falling within its competence will not be
disturbed by the courts, especially with respect to factual findings,
they are accorded respect if not finality, because of the special
knowledge and expertise gained by the tribunals from handling
specific matters falling under their jurisdiction (Mapa v. Arroyo,
G.R. 78585, July 5, 1989; Needle Queen Corp. v. Nicolas, Et Al.,
supra).chanrobles law library
Section 43 of the Consolidated Mines Administrative Order has
provided a ground for cancellation of a Mining Lease Contract,
among others, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1.) Any falsehood in the statements in the application or
support thereof, which may alter, change or affect substantially
the facts set in said statements."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner’s QL No. 37, therefore, cannot be a valid intervening
right over the mining claims of Hi-Cement.
III Petitioner assails the decision rendered by OIC Benjamin A.
Gonzales of the BGMS. She claims that under Special Order No.
86 dated March 19, 1985 which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Except appointments and matters involving policy, the Assistant
director or the Officer-in-charge of his office shall sign on official
papers; . . ." (p. 18, Rollo).
the jurisdiction to exercise quasi-judicial authority to resolve mining
controversies lies solely with the Director of BGMS. Hence, she
alleges that the decision of May 17, 1985 is null and void for want
of authority (Rollo, pp. 228-230).
The argument is untenable.
What is actually excluded in the aforesaid order is the formulation
of new policies of the BGMS. OIC Gonzales did not formulate new
policies. He merely upheld and reiterated the long and consistent
policy of the Bureau in similar disputes previously passed upon not
only by the Director of Mines but also by the Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources based on the applicable law.
Besides, as the public respondent said, "the more important
consideration is that the decision correctly disposes of the
controversy" (Rollo, p. 110).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Hence, the decision issued by the OIC is valid.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit and the decision of the Deputy Executive Secretary,
dated September 1, 1986, is hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against
the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988
LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A.
MESINA, ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG,
ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA, ERNESTOC. BLAS,
JR., ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R.
RIMANDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
COMMISSION, respondent.
Balgos & Perez Law Offices for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Is the Regional Trial Court of the same category as the Professional
Regulation Commission so that it cannot pass upon the validity of the
administrative acts of the latter? Can this Commission lawfully prohibit
the examiness from attending review classes, receiving handout
materials, tips, or the like three (3) days before the date of the
examination? Theses are the issues presented to the court by this
petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulagated on January 13, 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No.
10598, * declaring null and void the other dated Ocober 21, 1986 issued
by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 32 in Civil Case No. 86-
37950 entitled " Lupo L. Lupangco, et al. vs. Professional Regulation
Commission."
The records shows the following undisputed facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its
"Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for
admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy. The
resolution embodied the following pertinent provisions:
No examinee shall attend any review class,
briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or
shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any
tip from any school, college or university, or any
review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,
instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similars institutions during the
three days immediately proceeding every
examination day including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be
subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art.
III of the Rules and Regulations of the
Commission. 1
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take
the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and
November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others
similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XXXII, a complaint for injuction with a prayer with the issuance
of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain
the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare
the same unconstitution.
Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the
ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin
the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the
lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined
the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to
Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional.
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for the nullification of the above
Order of the lower court. Said petiton was granted in the Decision of the
Court of Appeals promulagated on January 13, 1987, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition meritorious the
same is hereby GRANTED and the other dated
October 21, 1986 issued by respondent court is
declared null and void. The respondent court is
further directed to dismiss with prejudice Civil Case
No. 86-37950 for want of jurisdiction over the
subject matter thereof. No cost in this instance.
SO ORDERED. 2
Hence, this petition.
The Court of Appeals, in deciding that the Regional Trial Court of Manila
had no jurisdiction to entertain the case and to enjoin the enforcement
of the Resolution No. 105, stated as its basis its conclusion that the
Professional Regulation Commission and the Regional Trial Court are
co-equal bodies. Thus it held —
That the petitioner Professional Regulatory
Commission is at least a co-equal body with the
Regional Trial Court is beyond question, and co-
equal bodies have no power to control each other
or interfere with each other's acts. 3
To strenghten its position, the Court of Appeals relied heavily
on National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza, 4 which cites
Pineda vs. Lantin 5 and Philippine Pacific Fishing, Inc. vs. Luna, 6 where
this Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the
orders of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the two being co-
equal bodies.
After a close scrutiny of the facts and the record of this case,
We rule in favor of the petitioner.
The cases cited by respondent court are not in point. It is glaringly
apparent that the reason why this Court ruled that the Court of First
Instance could not interfere with the orders of the Securities and
Exchange Commission was that this was so provided for by the law.
In Pineda vs. Lantin, We explained that whenever a party is aggrieved
by or disagree with an order or ruling of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, he cannot seek relief from courts of general jurisdiction
since under the Rules of Court and Commonwealth Act No. 83, as
amended by Republic Act No. 635, creating and setting forth the powers
and functions of the old Securities and Exchange Commission, his
remedy is to go the Supreme Court on a petition for review. Likewise,
in Philippine Pacific Fishing Co., Inc. vs. Luna,it was stressed that if an
order of the Securities and Exchange Commission is erroneous, the
appropriate remedy take is first, within the Commission itself, then, to
the Supreme Court as mandated in Presidential Decree No. 902-A, the
law creating the new Securities and Exchange Commission. Nowhere in
the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no
jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the contrary, the
ruling was specifically limited to the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
The respondent court erred when it place the Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Professional Regulation Commsision in the same
category. As alraedy mentioned, with respect to the Securities and
Exchange Commission, the laws cited explicitly provide with the
procedure that need be taken when one is aggrieved by its order or
ruling. Upon the other hand, there is no law providing for the next course
of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the
Professional Regulation Commission. Unlike Commonwealth Act No. 83
and Presidential Decree No. 902-A, there is no provision in Presidential
Decree No. 223, creating the Professional Regulation Commission, that
orders or resolutions of the Commission are appealable either to the
Court of Appeals or to theSupreme Court. Consequently, Civil Case No.
86-37950, which was filed in order to enjoin the enforcement of a
resolution of the respondent Professional Regulation Commission
alleged to be unconstitutional, should fall within the general jurisdiction
of the Court of First Instance, now the Regional Trial Court. 7
What is clear from Presidential Decree No. 223 is that the Professional
Regulation Commission is attached to the Office of the President for
general direction and coordination. 8 Well settled in our jurisprudence is
the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed
by the Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court). In Medalla
vs. Sayo, 9 this rule was thoroughly propounded on, to wit:
In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review
by certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil
Service Commission and of the residential
Executive Asssistant is concerned, there should be
no question but that the power of judicial review
should be upheld. The following rulings buttress this
conclusion:
 The objection to a judicial
review of a Presidential act
arises from a failure to
recognize the most important
principle in our system of
government, i.e., the
separation of powers into three
co-equal departments, the
executives, the legislative and
the judicial, each supreme
within its own assigned powers
and duties. When a appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
presidential act is challenged
before the courts of justice, it is
not to be implied therefrom that
the Executive is being made
subject and subordinate to the
courts. The legality of his acts
are under judicial review, not
because the Executive is
inferior to the courts, but
because the law is above the
Chief Executive himself, and
the courts seek only to
interpret, apply or implement it
(the law). A judicial review of
the President's decision on a
case of an employee decided
by the Civil Service Board of
Appeals should be viewed in
this light and the bringing of the
case to the Courts should be
governed by the same
principles as govern the
jucucial review of all
administrative acts of all
10
administrative officers.
Republic vs. Presiding Judge, CFI of Lanao del Norte, Br. II, 11 is another
case in point. Here, "the Executive Office"' of the Department of
Education and Culture issued Memorandum Order No. 93 under the
authority of then Secretary of Education Juan Manuel. As in this case, a
complaint for injunction was filed with the Court of First Instance of
Lanao del Norte because, allegedly, the enforcement of the circular
would impair some contracts already entered into by public school
teachers. It was the contention of petitioner therein that "the Court of
First Instance is not empowered to amend, reverse and modify what is
otherwise the clear and explicit provision of the memorandum circular
issued by the Executive Office which has the force and effect of law." In
resolving the issue, We held:
... We definitely state that respondent Court lawfully
acquired jurisdiction in Civil Case No. II-240 (8)
because the plaintiff therein asked the lower court
for relief, in the form of injunction, in defense of a
legal right (freedom to enter into contracts) . . . . .
Hence there is a clear infringement of private
respondent's constitutional right to enter into
agreements not contrary to law, which might run the
risk of being violated by the threatened
implementation of Executive Office Memorandum
Circular No. 93, dated February 5, 1968, which
prohibits, with certain exceptions, cashiers and
disbursing officers from honoring special powers of
attorney executed by the payee employees. The
respondent Court is not only right but duty bound to
take cognizance of cases of this nature wherein a
constitutional and statutory right is allegedly
infringed by the administrative action of a
government office. Courts of first Instance have
original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is not capable of pecuniary
estimation (Sec. 44, Republic Act 296, as
amended). 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
In San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 13 We ruled that a judge of the
Court of First Instance has the authority to decide on the validity of a city
tax ordinance even after its validity had been contested before the
Secretary of Justice and an opinion thereon had been rendered.
In view of the foregoing, We find no cogent reason why Resolution No.
105, issued by the respondent Professional Regulation Commission,
should be exempted from the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court.
Respondent PRC, on the other hand, contends that under Section 9,
paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, it is the Court of Appeals which has
jurisdiction over the case. The said law provides:
SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. — The Intermediate Appellate
Court shall exercise:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-
judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions, except those falling within the
accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of
this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth
paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of
1948.
The contention is devoid of merit.
In order to invoke the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals as provided for in Section 9, paragraph 3 of B.P. Blg. 129, there
has to be a final order or ruling which resulted from proceedings wherein
the administrative body involved exercised its quasi-judicial functions. In
Black's Law Dictionary, quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the
action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies
required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official
action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound
thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of
rights, privileges and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies
to a specific situation . 14This does not cover rules and regulations of
general applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its
purely administrative policies and functions like Resolution No. 105
which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve
the integrity of licensure examinations.
The above rule was adhered to in Filipinas Engineering and Machine
Shop vs. Ferrer. 15 In this case, the issue presented was whether or not
the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction over a case involving an order
of the Commission on Elections awarding a contract to a private party
which originated from an invitation to bid. The said issue came about
because under the laws then in force, final awards, judgments, decisions
or orders of the Commission on Elections fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by way of certiorari. Hence, it has been
consistently held that "it is the Supreme Court, not the Court of First
Instance, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review on certiorari final
decisions, orders, or rulings of the Commission on Elections relative to
the conduct of elections and the enforcement of election laws." 16
As to whether or not the Court of First Instance had jurisdiction in
saidcase, We said:
We are however, far from convinced that an order
of the COMELEC awarding a contract to a private
party, as a result of its choice among various
proposals submitted in response to its invitation to
bid comes within the purview of a "final order" which
is exclusively and directly appealable to this court
on certiorari. What is contemplated by the term
"final orders, rulings and decisions, of the
COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Court as provided by law are those rendered in
actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and
taken cognizance of by the said body in
the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial
powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
We agree with petitioner's contention that the order
of the Commission granting the award to a bidder is
not an order rendered in a legal controversy before
it wherein the parties filed their respective pleadings
and presented evidence after which the questioned
order was issued; and that this order of the
commission was issued pursuant to its authority to
enter into contracts in relation to election
purposes. In short, the COMELEC resolution
awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not
issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but
merely as an incident of its inherent administrative
functions over the conduct of elections, and hence,
the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final
order reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme
Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt
order may be imposed by the COMELEC from said
order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by
certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any
question arising from said order may be well taken
 in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.
(Emphasis supplied.) 17
One other case that should be mentioned in this regard is Salud vs.
Central Bank of the Philippines. 18 Here, petitioner Central Bank, like
respondent in this case, argued that under Section 9, paragraph 3 of
B.P. Blg. 129, orders of the Monetary Board are appealable only to the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Thus:
The Central Bank and its Liquidator also postulate,
for the very first time, that the Monetary Board is
among the "quasi-judicial ... boards" whose
judgments are within the exclusive appellate
jurisdiction of the IAC; hence, it is only said Court,
"to the exclusion of the Regional Trial Courts," that
may review the Monetary Board's resolutions. 19
Anent the posture of the Central Bank, We made the following
pronouncement:
The contention is utterly devoid of merit. The IAC
has no appellate jurisdiction over resolution or
orders of the Monetary Board. No law prescribes
any mode of appeal from the Monetary Board to the
IAC. 20
In view of the foregoing, We hold that the Regional Trial Court has
jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 86-37950 and enjoin the
respondent PRC from enforcing its resolution.
Although We have finally settled the issue of jurisdiction, We find it
imperative to decide once and for all the validity of Resolution No. 105
so as to provide the much awaited relief to those who are and will be
affected by it.
Of course, We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a
commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of
the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to
conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen
that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any
review class, briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out,
review material, or any tip from any school, collge or university, or any
review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or
employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions . ... 21
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught
committing the prohibited acts even without any ill motives will be barred
from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC.
Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to
have a watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days
before the examination period.
It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should
not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and
regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable
and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable
relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then
they must be held to be invalid. 22
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also
infringes on the examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the
reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure
examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps
needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public
accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in
attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy
their freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their
personal growth. As defined in a decision of the United States Supreme
Court:
The term "liberty" means more than mere freedom
from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It
means freedom to go where one may choose and
to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the
equal rights of others, as his judgment may dictate
for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such
callings and vocations as may be most suitable to
develop his capacities, and giv to them their highest
enjoyment. 23
Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the
academic freedom of the schools concerned. Respondent PRC cannot
interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers
believe would best enable their enrolees to meet the standards required
before becoming a full fledged public accountant. Unless the means or
methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or
riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped
from helping out their students. At this juncture, We call attention to Our
pronouncement in Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola
School of Theology, 24 regarding academic freedom to wit:
... It would follow then that the school or college
itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for
itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain
them. It is free from outside coercion or interference
save possibly when the overriding public welfare
calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of
autonomy certainly extending to the choice of
students. This constitutional provision is not to be
construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging
fashion.
G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991
HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department
of Education, Culture & Sports, DR. ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her
capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY,
JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO, AMPARO
GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO
ESBER, respondents.
The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at
bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be formulated as follows:
where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a
party in a case consists of the review and reversal or modification of a
decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or
official exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take
cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated otherwise, where a
particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court
or other government agency or official for purposes of trial and
adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of
the same subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and
adjudication?
The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and
are hence taken as substantially correct for purposes of ruling on the
legal questions posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together with
others involved in related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or
otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.
1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some
800 public school teachers, among them members of the Manila Public
School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned
Teachers (ACT) undertook what they described as "mass concerted
actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the
alleged failure of the public authorities to act upon grievances that had
time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them
they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the
protest rally staged at the DECS premises on September 14, 1990
without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate
the granting of demands had elicited no response from the Secretary of
Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their
classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable
assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the teachers
participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the
Secretary of Education to return to work in 24 hours or face dismissal,
and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate
dismissal proceedings against those who did not comply and to hire their
replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions
continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that
followed. 3
Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the
eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay
High School, Manila, who had agreed to support the non-political
demands of the MPSTA. 4
2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR
complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on
the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to answer the
charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days
"pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced
(unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G, H). An investigation committee
was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D.
807. 5
3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-
082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran,
Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others, named
respondents, 6 the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal
investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the administrative
proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their
application for issuance of an injunctive writ/temporary restraining
order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated
November 8, 1990 of the Investigating Committee, which later also
denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of
November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a
walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings." 7 The
case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño dated
December 17, 1990, rendered after evaluation of the evidence as well
as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents,
decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the
suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. 8
4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariño),
which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I). Later, the
MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify
said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking
teachers" right to due process and peaceable assembly docketed as
G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the
Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9 Both petitions in this
Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named
individuals, and "other teacher-members so numerous similarly
situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too
numerous to be impleaded."
5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted
sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the Commission on
Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful
mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacements as teachers,
allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely
unknown to them. 10
6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "ordered
suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) — were
docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No. 90775." In connection
therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990,
and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance
therein. 11
On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain
whether he (Sec. Cariño) received the subpoena which was served at
his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the Chairman presiding, and
Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded
to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his
clients had been "denied due process and suspended without formal
notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b)
expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of
MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants)
sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13 reciting
these facts and making the following disposition:
To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly
guided in its investigation and resolution of the matter, considering that
these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their
wages, which they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda Lolarga,
school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay
High School, Manila, are hereby enjoined to appear and enlighten the
Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring
with them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated
herein to assist the Commission in this matter. Otherwise, the
Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants'
evidence.
xxx xxx xxx
7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño
sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss the case. His
motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as
grounds therefor, "that the complaint states no cause of action and that
the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14
8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to
dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in
two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:
a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education
Secretary Cariño in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from
the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months
of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and
b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R.
Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any
appeals, if still timely, that the individual petitioners may take to the Civil
Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia
"ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to issue return-
to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants,
preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17
9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent
Commission denied Sec. Cariño's motion to dismiss and required him
and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits within ten
(10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and
resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter
affidavit." 18 It held that the "striking teachers" "were denied due process
of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply
to the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil
and political rights which the Commission was empowered to
investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme
Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are different from those in the case
decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to
this Court's joint Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and
95590, supra).
It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the
Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cariño, has commenced the
present action of certiorari and prohibition.
The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it
does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution in G.R. Nos. 95445
and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and
resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the
merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and
determine, i.e., exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:
1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process,
and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative disciplinary
sanctions on them by their superiors; and
2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the
mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR
complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say,
determine with character of finality and definiteness, the same issues
which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of
Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to the Civil Service
Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that
the teachers affected may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission
on said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human
Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not,
like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has
jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide,
or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human
rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such
power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another
court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take
over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of
adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and
make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations
involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and
cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a
quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and
ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those
factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or
determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such
appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. 21 This function,
to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22
The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying
the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.
The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an
independent office. 23 Upon its constitution, it succeeded and
superseded the Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the
time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and functions are
the following 25
(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms
of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;
(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and
cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of
Court;
(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of
human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos
residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated
or need protection;
(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention
facilities;
(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and
information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;
(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote
human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of
human rights, or their families;
(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with
international treaty obligations on human rights;
(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose
testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;
(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or
agency in the performance of its functions;
(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law;
and
(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided
by law.
As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers
and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment.
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the
power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on
complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such
rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said
rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the
course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may
grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or
whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or
convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of
any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy
as may be required by its findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as
courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not
to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense,
these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore,
inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary
definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire into
systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official
probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation,
of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application
of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow
up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to
search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find
out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal
inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being
in turn describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which
ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an
inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts
concerning a certain matter or matters." 29
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge,
arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The
dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of
the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass
judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30 And "adjudge" means
"to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial
powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ." 31
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of
judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its
strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide,
settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial
determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32
Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the
power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the
merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case
No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so
even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and conducted
by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been
transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to
"resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass
concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are
prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of
carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the
teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite
the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute
infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative
disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of
by them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual
teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said
acts or omissions.
These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction
of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary
powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already
taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33 and it appears
that appeals have been seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to
the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had
occasion to pass upon said issues. 34
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by
the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are
adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the
proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the
respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education
had in truth committed "human rights violations involving civil and
political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined
through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary
Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be
reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme
Court.
The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme
of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions
of the Education Secretary or the Civil Service Commission. It has no
business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making
its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success
to what may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort,
frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the
administrative cases against them which they anticipated would be
adverse to them.
This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.
In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights
would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in
conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary Cariño, it would
have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal
thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by
this Court. The only thing the Commission can do, if it concludes that
Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate
Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil
Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate
jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the respondent Commission on
Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited
"to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-
775) on the merits."
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188056 January 8, 2013
SPOUSES AUGUSTO G. DACUDAO AND OFELIA R.
DACUDAO, Petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAUL M. GONZALES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Petitioners - residents of Bacaca Road, Davao City - were among
the investors whom Celso G. Delos Angeles, Jr. and his
associates in the Legacy Group of Companies (Legacy Group)
allegedly defrauded through the Legacy Group's "buy back
agreement" that earned them check payments that were
dishonored. After their written demands for the return of their
investments went unheeded, they initiated a number of charges
for syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al. in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City on February 6, 2009.
Three of the cases were docketed as NPS Docket No. XI-02-INV.-
09-A-00356, Docket No. XI-02-INV.-09-C-00752, and Docket No.
XI-02-INV.-09-C-00753.1
On March 18, 2009, the Secretary of Justice issued Department
of Justice (DOJ) Order No. 182 (DO No. 182), directing all
Regional State Prosecutors, Provincial Prosecutors, and City
Prosecutors to forward all cases already filed against Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al. to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in
Manila for appropriate action.
DO No. 182 reads:2
All cases against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr., et al. under Legacy
Group of Companies, may be filed with the docket section of the
National Prosecution Service, Department of Justice, Padre
Faura, Manila and shall be forwarded to the Secretariat of the
Special Panel for assignment and distribution to panel members,
per Department Order No. 84 dated February 13, 2009.
However, cases already filed against Celso G. delos Angeles, Jr.
et al. of Legacy group of Companies in your respective offices with
the exemption of the cases filed in Cagayan de Oro City which is
covered by Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, should be
forwarded to the Secretariat of the Special Panel at Room 149,
Department of Justice, Padre Faura, Manila, for proper
disposition.
For information and guidance.
Pursuant to DO No. 182, the complaints of petitioners were
forwarded by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Davao City to
the Secretariat of the Special Panel of the DOJ.3
Aggrieved by such turn of events, petitioners have directly come
to the Court via petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, ascribing to respondent Secretary of Justice grave
abuse of discretion in issuing DO No. 182. They claim that DO
No. 182 violated their right to due process, their right to the equal
protection of the laws, and their right to the speedy disposition
of cases. They insist that DO No. 182 was an obstruction of
justice and a violation of the rule against enactment of laws with
retroactive effect.
Petitioners also challenge as unconstitutional the issuance of
DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009 exempting from the
coverage of DO No. No. 182 all the cases for syndicated estafa
already filed and pending in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cagayan de Oro City. They aver that DOJ Memorandum dated
March 2, 2009 violated their right to equal protection under the
Constitution.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), representing
respondent Secretary of Justice, maintains the validity of DO No.
182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, and prays that
the petition be dismissed for its utter lack of merit.
Issues
The following issues are now to be resolved, to wit:
1. Did petitioners properly bring their petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus directly to the Court?
2. Did respondent Secretary of Justice commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing DO No. 182?
3. Did DO No. 182 and DOJ Memorandum dated March 2, 2009
violate petitioners’ constitutionally guaranteed rights?
Ruling
The petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, being
bereft of substance and merit, is dismissed.
Firstly, petitioners have unduly disregarded the hierarchy of
courts by coming directly to the Court with their petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus without tendering therein
any special, important or compelling reason to justify the direct
filing of the petition.
We emphasize that the concurrence of jurisdiction among the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts
to issue the writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus and injunction did not give petitioners
the unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.4 An undue
disregard of this policy against direct resort to the Court will
cause the dismissal of the recourse. In Bañez, Jr. v.
Concepcion,5 we explained why, to wit:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the
hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be
ignored without serious consequences. The strictness of the
policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with
causes that are also well within the competence of the lower
courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more
fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has
assigned to it. The Court may act on petitions for the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only
when absolutely necessary or when serious and important
reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy. This was why
the Court stressed in Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto:
x x x. The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so
remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to
it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It
cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with
causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the
so-called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where
absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons
exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction should generally be
exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of
Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not
controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an
extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of
Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts
that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this
regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.
(Emphasis supplied)
In People v. Cuaresma, the Court has also amplified the need for
strict adherence to the policy of hierarchy of courts. There, noting
"a growing tendency on the part of litigants and lawyers to have
their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and
sometimes even their appeals, passed upon and adjudicated
directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land," the
Court has cautioned lawyers and litigants against taking a direct
resort to the highest tribunal, viz:
x x x. This Court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari
(as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus
and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
Regional Trial Courts x x x, which may issue the writ, enforceable
in any part of their respective regions. It is also shared by this
Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals
x x x, although prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Bilang
129 on August 14, 1981, the latter's competence to issue the
extraordinary writs was restricted to those "in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction." This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to
be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which
application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy
of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals,
and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate
forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard
for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions
for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level
("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary
to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and
attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the
Court's docket. Indeed, the removal of the restriction on the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in this regard, supra—
resulting from the deletion of the qualifying phrase, "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction" — was evidently intended precisely to
relieve this Court pro tanto of the burden of dealing with
applications for the extraordinary writs which, but for the
expansion of the Appellate Court corresponding jurisdiction,
would have had to be filed with it.1âwphi1
xxxx
The Court therefore closes this decision with the declaration for
the information and evidence of all concerned, that it will not only
continue to enforce the policy, but will require a more strict
observance thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, every litigant must remember that the Court is not
the only judicial forum from which to seek and obtain effective
redress of their grievances. As a rule, the Court is a court of last
resort, not a court of the first instance. Hence, every litigant who
brings the petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus should ever be mindful of the policy
on the hierarchy of courts, the observance of which is explicitly
defined and enjoined in Section 4 of Rule 65, Rules of Court, viz:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. - The petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new
trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the
sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of
the said motion.
The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to
the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board,
officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme
Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not
the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it
involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or an omission of a municipal
or a regional trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with
the Commission on Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.6
Secondly, even assuming arguendo that petitioners’ direct resort
to the Court was permissible, the petition must still be dismissed.
The writ of certiorari is available only when any tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.7"The sole office of the writ of
certiorari," according to Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Company:8
x x x is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes the
commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. In this regard, mere abuse of discretion is not
enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or
quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the
respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious
or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, therefore, the
following requisites must concur, namely: (a) it must be directed
against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions; (b) the tribunal, board, or officer must have
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (c)
there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law.9 The burden of proof lies on
petitioners to demonstrate that the assailed order was issued
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Yet, petitioners have not shown a compliance with the requisites.
To start with, they merely alleged that the Secretary of Justice
had acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction. Also, the
petition did not show that the Secretary of Justice was an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Instead, the
Secretary of Justice would appear to be not exercising any
judicial or quasi-judicial functions because his questioned
issuances were ostensibly intended to ensure his subordinates’
efficiency and economy in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation of all the cases involving the Legacy Group. The
function involved was purely executive or administrative.
The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the
Government does not make it a quasi-judicial office or agency.
Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function
when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding
of probable cause in any case. Indeed, in Bautista v. Court of
Appeals,10 the Supreme Court has held that a preliminary
investigation is not a quasi-judicial proceeding, stating:
x x x the prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. He does not
exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means
of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with
a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or
information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that
determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court,
for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the
accused, not the fiscal.11
There may be some decisions of the Court that have characterized
the public prosecutor’s power to conduct a preliminary
investigation as quasi-judicial in nature. Still, this
characterization is true only to the extent that the public
prosecutor, like a quasi-judicial body, is an officer of the
executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court
of law.
But the limited similarity between the public prosecutor and a
quasi-judicial body quickly endsthere. For sure, a quasi-judicial
body is an organ of government other than a court of law or a
legislative office that affects the rights of private parties through
either adjudication or rule-making; it performs adjudicatory
functions, and its awards and adjudications determine the rights
of the parties coming before it; its decisions have the same effect
as the judgments of a court of law. In contrast, that is not the
effect whenever a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary
investigation to determine probable cause in order to file a
criminal information against a person properly charged with the
offense, or whenever the Secretary of Justice reviews the public
prosecutor’s orders or resolutions.
Petitioners have self-styled their petition to be also for
prohibition. However, we do not see how that can be. They have
not shown in their petition in what manner and at what point the
Secretary of Justice, in handing out the assailed issuances, acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. On the
other hand, we already indicated why the issuances were not
infirmed by any defect of jurisdiction. Hence, the blatant
omissions of the petition transgressed Section 2, Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 2. Petition for prohibition. — When the proceedings of
any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings
in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting
such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true
copy of the judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies
of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto,
and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in
the third paragraph of section 3, Rule 46. (2a) Similarly, the
petition could not be one for mandamus, which is a remedy
available only when "any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court."12 The main objective of
mandamus is to compel the performance of a ministerial duty on
the part of the respondent. Plainly enough, the writ of mandamus
does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to
compel a course of conduct,13 which, it quickly seems to us, was
what petitioners would have the Secretary of Justice do in their
favor. Consequently, their petition has not indicated how and
where the Secretary of Justice’s assailed issuances excluded
them from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
they were unquestionably entitled.
Thirdly, there is no question that DO No. 182 enjoyed a strong
presumption of its validity. In ABAKADA Guro Party List v.
Purisima,14 the Court has extended the presumption of validity
to legislative issuances as well as to rules and regulations issued
by administrative agencies, saying:
Administrative regulations enacted by administrative agencies to
implement and interpret the law which they are entrusted to
enforce have the force of law and are entitled to respect. Such
rules and regulations partake of the nature of a statute and are
just as binding as if they have been written in the statute itself.
As such, they have the force and effect of law and enjoy the
presumption of constitutionality and legality until they are set
aside with finality in an appropriate case by a competent court.15
DO No. 182 was issued pursuant to Department Order No. 84
that the Secretary of Justice had promulgated to govern the
performance of the mandate of the DOJ to "administer the
criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted
processes thereof"16 as expressed in Republic Act No. 10071
(Prosecution Service Act of 2010) and Section 3, Chapter I, Title
III and Section 1, Chapter I, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order
292 (Administrative Code of 1987).
To overcome this strong presumption of validity of the questioned
issuances, it became incumbent upon petitioners to prove their
unconstitutionality and invalidity, either by showing that the
Administrative Code of 1987 did not authorize the Secretary of
Justice to issue DO No. 182, or by demonstrating that DO No.
182 exceeded the bounds of the Administrative Code of 1987 and
other pertinent laws. They did not do so. They must further show
that the performance of the DOJ’s functions under the
Administrative Code of 1987 and other pertinent laws did not call
for the impositions laid down by the assailed issuances. That was
not true here, for DO No 182 did not deprive petitioners in any
degree of their right to seek redress for the alleged wrong done
against them by the Legacy Group. Instead, the issuances were
designed to assist petitioners and others like them expedite the
prosecution, if warranted under the law, of all those responsible
for the wrong through the creation of the special panel of state
prosecutors and prosecution attorneys in order to conduct a
nationwide and comprehensive preliminary investigation and
prosecution of the cases. Thereby, the Secretary of Justice did
not act arbitrarily or oppressively against petitioners.
Fourthly, petitioners attack the exemption from the consolidation
decreed in DO No. 182 of the cases filed or pending in the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City, claiming that the
exemption traversed the constitutional guaranty in their favor of
the equal protection of law.17
The exemption is covered by the assailed DOJ Memorandum
dated March 2, 2009, to wit:
It has come to the attention of the undersigned that cases for
syndicated estafa were filed with your office against officers of the
Legacy Group of Companies. Considering the distance of the
place of complainants therein to Manila, your Office is hereby
exempted from the directive previously issued by the undersigned
requiring prosecution offices to forward the records of all cases
involving Legacy Group of Companies to the Task Force.
Anent the foregoing, you are hereby directed to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases involving the Legacy Group
of Companies filed in your office with dispatch and to file the
corresponding informations if evidence warrants and to
prosecute the same in court.
Petitioners’ attack deserves no consideration. The equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification.18 Hence, the Court
has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right
nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it
bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government
end.19
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed DOJ
Memorandum dated March 2, 2009, the Secretary of Justice took
into account the relative distance between Cagayan de Oro,
where many complainants against the Legacy Group resided, and
Manila, where the preliminary investigations would be conducted
by the special panel. He also took into account that the cases had
already been filed in the City Prosecutor’s Office of Cagayan de
Oro at the time he issued DO No. 182. Given the considerable
number of complainants residing in Cagayan de Oro City, the
Secretary of Justice was fully justified in excluding the cases
commenced in Cagayan de Oro from the ambit of DO No. 182.
The classification taken into consideration by the Secretary of
Justice was really valid. Resultantly, petitioners could not inquire
into the wisdom behind the exemption upon the ground that the
non-application of the exemption to them would cause them
some inconvenience.
Fifthly, petitioners contend that DO No. 182 violated their right
to the speedy disposition of cases guaranteed by the
Constitution. They posit that there would be considerable delay
in the resolution of their cases that would definitely be "a flagrant
transgression of petitioners’ constitutional rights to speedy
disposition of their cases."20
We cannot favor their contention.
In The Ombudsman v. Jurado,21 the Court has clarified that
although the Constitution guarantees the right to the speedy
disposition of cases, such speedy disposition is a flexible concept.
To properly define that concept, the facts and circumstances
surrounding each case must be evaluated and taken into
account. There occurs a violation of the right to a speedy
disposition of a case only when the proceedings are attended by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are sought and secured, or when,
without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.22 It is
cogent to mention that a mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is not determinant of the concept.23
The consolidation of the cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al.
was ordered obviously to obtain expeditious justice for the parties
with the least cost and vexation to them. Inasmuch as the cases
filed involved similar or related questions to be dealt with during
the preliminary investigation, the Secretary of Justice rightly
found the consolidation of the cases to be the most feasible
means of promoting the efficient use of public resources and of
having a comprehensive investigation of the cases.
On the other hand, we do not ignore the possibility that there
would be more cases reaching the DOJ in addition to those
already brought by petitioners and other parties. Yet, any delays
in petitioners’ cases occasioned by such other and subsequent
cases should not warrant the invalidation of DO No. 182. The
Constitution prohibits only the delays that are unreasonable,
arbitrary and oppressive, and tend to render rights nugatory.24 In
fine, we see neither undue delays, nor any violation of the right
of petitioners to the speedy disposition of their cases.
Sixthly, petitioners assert that the assailed issuances should
cover only future cases against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al., not
those already being investigated. They maintain that DO No. 182
was issued in violation of the prohibition against passing laws
with retroactive effect.

Petitioners’ assertion is baseless.

As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However,

exceptions exist, and one such exception concerns a law that is
procedural in nature. The reason is that a remedial statute or a
statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does not
create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in
furtherance of the remedy or the confirmation of already existing
rights.25 A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of its passage. All procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The retroactive
application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel
adversely affected, for, verily, no vested right generally attaches
to or arises from procedural laws.

Finally, petitioners have averred but failed to establish that DO

No. 182 constituted obstruction of justice. This ground of the
petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded.

Nonetheless, it is not amiss to reiterate that the authority of the

Secretary of Justice to assume jurisdiction over matters involving
the investigation of crimes and the prosecution of offenders is
fully sanctioned by law. Towards that end, the Secretary of
Justice exercises control and supervision over all the regional,
provincial, and city prosecutors of the country; has broad
discretion in the discharge of the DOJ’s functions; and
administers the DOJ and its adjunct offices and agencies by
promulgating rules and regulations to carry out their objectives,
policies and functions.

Consequently, unless and until the Secretary of Justice acts

beyond the bounds of his authority, or arbitrarily, or whimsically,
or oppressively, any person or entity who may feel to be thereby
aggrieved or adversely affected should have no right to call for the
invalidation or nullification of the rules and regulations issued
by, as well as other actions taken by the Secretary of Justice.

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the omnibus petition for

certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus for lack of merit.