FIRST DIVISION Following the only lead given, the investigating team proceeded
directly to MTCC, Davao City.
August 30, 2017
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2223
MS. FLORITA PALMA and MS. FILIPINA
MERCADO, Complainants,
vs.
JUDGE GEORGE E. OMELIO, Regional Trial Court, Br. 14, Davao
City (then of Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br. 4, Davao City),
JUDGE VIRGILIO G. MURCIA, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Br.
2, and Clerk of Court MA. FLORIDA C. OMELIO, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Office of the Clerk of Court, both of the Island
Garden City of Samal,, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On July 8, 2007, a certain Filipina Mercado (Mercado) sent an
1
electronic mail (e-mail) to the pio@supremecourt.gov .ph regarding
an alleged "marriage scam" in Davao City perpetrated by Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) Judges George E. Omelio (Judge Omelio)
2
and Rufino Ferraris (Judge Ferraris). Mercado claimed to have
personal knowledge of the illegal activities of the said judges as she
was once a "fixer".
On March 17, 2008, a certain Fiorita Palma (Palma) also sent an e-
3
mail to the pio@supremecourt.gov.ph complaining about the alleged
dishonorable conduct of respondents Judge Ornelio and his wife,
Clerk of Court Ma. Florida C. Omelio (CoC Omelio ), relative to the
solemnization of the marriage of a certain "Echeverria."
Acting thereon, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) dispatched
an investigating team to Davao City which found as follows:
x x x The investigators asked [Atty. Fe Maloloy-on, Clerk of Court,
4
OCC -MTCC, Davao City] x x x relative to the alleged marriage scam
prevailing in Davao City. She informed the investigators that there
were [sic] no reported incident relative thereto but x x x intimated that
there were some rumors x x x [however] no complainants x x x came
forward to complain about such actions of the judges. When x x x
asked x x x [whether] there was a marriage solemnized x x x [involving
a certain] Echevarria, she stated that there was none[.] x x x Atty.
Maloloy-on however x x x [recalled] an incident wherein a lady called
up her office and asked whether the copy of the marriage contract of
her child was already [ready] for pick up. When asked about the name
of the parties[,] x x x and the [solemnizing] judge, and the date of
solemnizatioil[,J the caller merely stated that one of the parties'
surname [sic] was Echevarria and it was solemnized by Judge George
Omelio on February 29, 2008. x x x Atty. Maloloy-on searched for the
record of such marriage but x x x there was none ever recorded in
MTCC, Davao City. x x x [S]he relayed the information to the phone
caller who x x x got angry and demanded the production of a copy of
the marriage contract. Atty. Maloloy-on calmed the phone caller and
asked her to drop by her office [but t]he phone caller never dropped
by her office and was never heard [of] again.
x x x [A]s there was no marriage solemnized [on] February 29, 2008
wherein one of t11e party bears the surname of Echevarria, [the
investigators proceeded] to MTCC, Island Garden [City] of Samal as
Florita Palma mentioned that Judge Omelio was with his wife when he
solemnized the marriage at the house of the parties in Davao City. The
wife of Judge Omelio, Mrs. Florida Omelio is the Clerk of Court
ofMTCC, OCC, Island Garden City ofSamal.
On June 19, 2008[,] x x x the investigators first proceeded to the Local
Civil Registrar of island City Garden of Samal, to investigate x xx.
Surprisingly, a marriage was solemnized in Island Garden City of
Samal on [February] 28, 2008 by Judge Virgilio G. Murcia x x x. The
parties' names are Julius Regor M. Echevarria and Khristine Marie D.
Duo. x x x [T]he investigators asked the Assistant Local Civil Registrar
[for] a photocopy of the said marriage contract. x x x ‘Die investigators
then proceeded to MTCC, Island Garden City of Samal to interview
Judge Murcia and Mrs. Omelio. However, Mrs. Omelio was not
present and available at that time x x x. Likewise, Judge Murcia was
at MTCC, Davao City to hear inhibited ca-;es thereat.
At MTCC, Davao City, the investigators briefed Judge Murcia of the
purpose of the investigation x x x When asked whether he solemnized
the marriage of Echevania and Duo al Island Garden City of Samal,
he stited that he [could not] really remember the parties considering
the munerous marriages he had solemnized in the past. When [asked]
whether the signature on the marriage contract of Echevarria and Duo
was his, he [admitted] that same was x x x his signature. [When] asked
whether he was persuaded by the Omelios into signing a marriage
certificate without the parties being present[,] x x x he replied that it
was not possible. He claimed that he [was] meticulous in the
examination of the marriages he solemnizes and he makes sure that
the parties are present when he puts his signature on the marriage
contract.
The next day, June 20, 2008 the investigating team x x x
proceeded to the address x x x of Julius Regor Echevarria x x
x.
x x x [The investigators chanced upon [Mr. Julius Echevarria
at his residence]. When asked whether he was married on
February 28, 2009 at his residence, he positively affirmed
such fact. When inquired who solemnized said marriage, he
readily answered that it was Judge George Omelia. [When]
asked how he can positively state that it was Judge Omelio,
he said that he knew Judge Omelio as he was known in the
community, he even gave the investigators a copy of the
pictures of the wedding x x x. [W]hen the investigators x x x
asked if he has [sic] a copy of their marriage contract, Mr.
Echevarria immediately presented the same. The
investigators then pointed out that per copy of the marriage it
was Judge Murcia who solemnized their marriage in Island
Garden City of Samal and not Judge Omelio. Mr. Echevarria
was quite surprised to learn of such fact as it was his first time
to notice the same. Thereafter, the mother of Julius
Echevarria, Mrs. Tita Echevarria, came x x x. The
investigators introduced themselves and stated their purpose.
x x x Tita Echevarria appeared irritated and surprised why
they were being investigated and immediately demanded the
basis of such investigation. The investigators readily showed
her a copy of the letter of Fiorita Palma. After reading the
letter, Tita Echevarria stated that she does not know x x x
Fiorita Palma. Julius Echevarria however noticed some
similarities in the circumstances of his marriage and that of the
one stated in the letter of Florita Palma, except for some minor
[inconsistencies] as to the date of solemnization and the
person accompanying Judge Omelio. He said that the
marriage took place in their house and not anywhere in the
Island Garden City of Samal and it was solemnized on
February 28 and not February 29, 2008 and that Judge
Omelio did not have company when he solemnized the
marriage. He likewise stated that he does not know how much
was given to Judge Omelio as solemnization fee as his
parents were the one [sic] who paid the same. Mrs. Tita
Echevarria however [asserted] that they are not interested in
filing any complaints or x x x willing to state what they know in
an affidavit to be sworn by them. She [begged] the
investigators to just leave them be and suggested that if the
investigators [were] really bent on catching judges doing some
5
anomaly, they should make an entrapment for that purpose.
Based on the foregoing findings, the OCA directed Judge
Omelio, Judge Virgilio G. Murcia (Judge Murcia), and CoC
Omelio, to comment on the e-mails and on the report of the
6
investigating team.
7
In his Comment, Judge Omelio narrated that his neighbors,
Librado G. Echevarria III and Teresita P. Mapayo (the
Echevarrias), went to his office at the MTCC, Branch 4, Davao
City, on February 25, 2008, requesting that he solemnize the
marriage of their son Julius Regor [Julius]; that since they
wanted a beach wedding, he suggested that they see Judge
Murcia whose court has jurisdiction over the Island Garden
City of Samal; that on February 29, 2008, the Echevarrias
invited him and his wife to dinner at their house for those who
were not able to attend their son's wedding on February 28,
2008; and that during said dinner, the Echevarrias requested
him to "reenact the wedding for purposes of picture taking and
8
posterity," to which he acceded.
Moreover, Judge Omelio posited that the e-mail/complaints of
Palma and Mercado should have been disregarded for being
unsigned and not under oath; that the allegations were
unfounded and meant only to harass; and, that he did not
demand any amount from the Echevarrias.
For her part, CoC Omelio found nothing wrong with her
husband, Judge Omelio, acceding to the request of the
Echevarrias to reenact the wedding; that if at all, the
Echevarrias were the parties in interest, and not Palma, hence
the latter had no reason to file the complaint; and that her only
participation was to accompany her husband to the dinner
9
party.
Judge Murcia, on the other hand, insisted that his name was
never mentioned in the complaint; and that he was impleaded
only because his signature appeared in the subject marriage
contract. Judge Murcia claimed that he solemnized the
subject marriage on February 28, 2008 at about 5:30 in the
afternoon in his courtroom; that the contracting parties, as well
as their witnesses, appeared before him; and, that all the
documents in support of said marriage, as well as the
corresponding receipts for the fees, were presented before
10
him.
Since there were factual issues to be clarified, the Court
resolved to redocket the complaint into a regular
administrative matter and to refer the same to the Court of
11
Appeals (CA) for investigation, report and recommendation.
12
Upon referral to the CA, the Investigating Justice directed
respondents to submit, in lieu of their direct testimonies, their
13
affidavits, as well as those of their witnesses.
CoC Omelio adopted her earlier comment filed with the OCA
14
as integral part of her Affidavit. In addition, she averred that
the participation of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) was
only the receipt of payment and its remittance to the Chief
Accountant of the Supreme Court.
15
Judge Omelio submitted his Affidavit where he also adopted
his comment earlier submitted to the OCA as forming part
thereof In addition, he reiterated that the complaints were
mere harassment suits and pure hearsay.
Judge Murcia also adopted his comment filed with the OCA
16
as part of his Affidavit. He maintained that he should not
have been impleaded as respondent herein since his name
was never mentioned by Palma or Mercado. He contended
that the investigation should focus only on the personalities
named in the complaint.
The Investigating Justice then directed the respondents to
attend a preliminary conference and hearing.
Thereafter, the Investigating Justice submitted a
17
Report dated December 15, 2010. As regards Judge
Omelio, the Investigating Justice found him to have trifled with
marriage as a social institution and held him administratively
liable, to wit:
The act of respondent Judge Omelio in conducting what
essentially was a sham wedding is, by all accounts, against
public law and public policy. In so conducting a bogus
wedding before the public, Judge Omelio had trifled with
marriage, an inviolable social institution and the foundation of
the family whose nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by law x x x. As a jurist, Judge Omelio ought to know
that a judge's power to solemnize marriage is to be exercised
in accordance with law. This includes the appearance before
him in his chamber[s] by the contracting parties x x x where
they x x x declare personally that they take each other as
husband and wife x x x. While he has undoubtedly the
authority to solemnize marriages, he had clearly overstepped
the bounds of that authority by administering a fraudulent
wedding ceremony; x x x [H]e should have declined the
importunings of the groom's parents to conduct a
"reenactment" of the wedding x x x.
x x x Worst, Judge Omelio lied when he declared during his
testimony before the undersigned that he had permitted the
other [g]odparents to sign at the back of the marriage
certificate to make it appear that those persons had witnessed
the marriage rites.x x x However, a certified true copy of that
marriage contract x x x [revealed] no such additional
signatures of [g]odparents at the certificate’s back page. His
belated disavowal as to this fact in his Manifestation dated 4
November 2010 [was] x x x an afterthought as he realized his
lies upon seeing the actual marriage contract himself.
xxxx
As to the charge that Judge Omelio had demanded monetary
considerations in exchange for solemnizing the marriage of
the Echevarrias, there [appeared] no sufficient evidence that
such had been the case. Indeed, both complainants had not
substantiated their claims, contained in their e-mail letters,
that respondent Judge and his wife, co-respondent Mrs.
Omelio, had resorted to the unsavory and unlawful activity of
asking money from the parties in order for the judge to conduct
the sham wedding rites. The claims remained as such - just
claims without any supporting evidence to prove them. Thus,
as to this particular aspect of the administrative case,
respondent Judge Omelio, and for that matter, his co-
respondent, his spouse Mrs. Omelio, should not be held liable
in any way, whether administratively or criminally.
However, for his highly irregular solemnization of a sham
marriage, which obviously arose from his misguided
comprehension of the appropriate duties and functions of a
magistrate and the inviolability of marriage as a social
institution, Judge Omelio should be held administratively
18
liable. x x x
As regards Judge Murcia, the Investigating Justice found no
infraction on his part in solemnizing the subject marriage.
Instead, his liability consisted in failing to collect the necessary
solemnization fees, viz.:
There [was] no sufficient evidence to show that respondent
Judge Murcia had solemnized the marriage of the Echevarrias
in a manner violative of the Family Code. Neither was there
proof of any corrupt activity that he committed in the course of
solemnizing the Echevarria wedding. However, it [was]
apparent, based on the judicial report of respondent Mrs.
Omelio x x x that no marriage solemnization fee had been paid
by the [contracting] parties before the MTCC OCC. x x x This
fact [belied] the claim of Judge Murcia that he had carefully
perused the documents of the Echevarrias and only when he
determined that all was proper did he then solemnize the
marriage. Judge Murcia's act of solemnizing the marriage
without the appropriate court documentation as to
solemnization fees [constituted] a violation of Supreme Court
19
Admin. Circular No. 3-2000 x x x.
Similarly, the Investigating Justice found CoC Omelio
administratively liable for failing to collect the solemnization
fees, thus:
The records likewise bear out that Mrs. Omelio had not been
truthfully forthcoming in her claim that her office had duly
collected the marriage solemnization fee of ₱300.00 relative
to the civil wedding of the Echevarrias. Her x x x Exh. "A-1"
indisputably points to this fact. As it was her duty to collect
such fees but did not do so, she should be held
administratively liable as well. Her defense that it was the
Echevarrias who had personally processed the
documentation due to urgency [was], to say the least, passing
the buck to said parties. As her act [constituted] a violation of
both SC Admin. Circular No. 3- 2000 and Circular 127-2007,
she should be meted a fine in the amount of Php5,000.00 as
20
well. x x x
The Court however noted that, in the Report submitted by the
Investigating Justice, it was unclear as to "who between
respondent Judges Murcia and Omelio [actually] solemnized
the marriage of the Echevarrias, where was the marriage
solemnized - in Davao City or in the Island Garden City of
Samal, and when was the marriage solemnized x x
21
x." Noting that these questions could be answered by Julius
and Khristine themselves, their parents and those who signed
22
the Certificate of Marriage, the Court resolved to refer the
matter back to the Investigating Justice for further
23
investigation, report and recommendation.
24
In the Final Report, the Investigating Justice manifested that
efforts to summon the contracting parties, Julius and
Khristine, and the groom’s parents, proved futile since they
were already working in Abu Dhabi, while the bride’s parents,
Danilo J. Duo and Penegilda D. Duo could not be located at
their given address. It was also noted that the "disinterest of
the Echevarrias can be traced as early as from the Report
dated September 10, 2008 by the former Court Administrator,
now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, Jose P. Perez,
who noted that the mother of the groom x x x told the
investigating team x x x that ‘they are not interested in filing
any complaints or are they willing to state what they know in
25
an affidavit to be sworn by them x x x."’ Nevertheless, the
Investigating Justice opined that despite the absence of the
complainants and other witnesses, the issues raised above
could still be resolved based on the documents on hand.
The Investigating Justice noted thus:
The undersigned most respectfully renders the view that
despite the absence of the complainants and witnesses, the
evaluation of the documents x x x which are now part of the
records is sufficient basis to resolve the questions set forth in
the above. The evidentiary weight of the documents is not
diminished by the absence of complainants and witnesses
because these were obtained and authenticated earlier by the
investigating team x x x. These documents include the
Certificate of Marriage and four colored photographs.
Per page 2 of his Comment x x x, respondent Judge Omelio
mentioned his reenactment of the wedding on February 29,
2008 in the Echevarria residence. Per transcript of his
testimony, Judge Omelio confirmed having reenacted (the
role of a judge) in the wedding of the Echevarria couple.
A careful scrutiny of the documents establishes the following
facts:
1. Both respondents Judge Murcia and Judge Omelio
solemnized the marriage of Julius Regor M. Echevarria and
Khristine Marie D. Duo. But it is respondent Judge Murcia
whose name and signature appear in the Certificate of
Marriage while there are only pictures to show that respondent
Judge George E. Omelio also married the couple. x x x
2. Per Certificate of Marriage, respondent Judge Murcia
officiated the marriage in MTCC, Branch 2 Babak District,
Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del Norte on February 28,
2008 at 5:30 P.M.
3. Respondent Judge Omelio re-enacted the marriage of
Regor and Khristine Marie, in the residence of the
Echevarrias, x x x in Monte Maria Village, Catalunan Grande,
Davao City, on February 29, 2008 at around 6:00 o'clock in
the evening. x x x
Based on the above facts, it cannot be ascertained if
respondent Judge Murcia and his Clerk of Court, respondent
Ma. Florida C. Omelio falsified the Certificate of Marriage. x x
x
With regard to respondent Judge Omelio, he could not be held
liable for falsification since he did not have any participation at
 all in the execution of the Certificate of Marriage. His re-
enactment of the marriage did not include the act of
preparation of the Certificate of Marriage. Without that public
document, it is also difficult to render a finding on whether or
not respondent Judge Omelio may be held liable for
performing an illegal marriage ceremony which is punished
26
under Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code.
27
In a Resolution dated December 5, 2012, the Court resolved to refer
the Final Report of the Investigating Justice to the OCA for evaluation,
report and recommendation.
28
In a Memorandum dated January 15, 2014, the OCA found all three
respondents to have violated Administrative Order No. 125-2007 (AO
125-2007), to wit: Judge Omelio for solemnizing the marriage without
signing the Marriage Certificate; Judge Murcia for affixing his signature
in the Marriage Certificate without actually performing the marriage;
and CoC Omelio for failing to collect the solemnization fee. The OCA
also noted that during the pendency of this administrative matter, CoC
Omelio passed away while Judge Omelio was dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of all his retirement benefits, except accrued
leave credits on October 22, 2013 in A.M. Nos. RTJ-11-2259, RTJ-11-
2264, & RTJ-11-2273. Thus, the OCA recommended as follows.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully
recommended for the consideration of the Honorable Court
that:
1. the complaint against respondent Florida C. Omelio, Clerk
of Court, MTCC, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del
Norte, be DISMISSED;
2. respondent Judge George E. Omelio, Branch 14, Regional
Trial Court, Davao City, Davao del Sur be found GUILTY of
gross misconduct and FINED in the amount of ₱40,000.00 to
be deducted from the money value of his accrued leave
credits; and
3. respondent Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, Branch 2, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del
Norte, be likewise found GUILTY of gross misconduct and
29
FINED in the amount of ₱40,000.00.
Our Ruling
We adopt the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
AO 125-2007 dated August 9, 2007 provided for the Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members of the Judiciary and laid
down the rules "to enable the solemnizing authorities of the Judiciary
to secure and safeguard the sanctity of marriage as a social
30
institution." The pertinent portions of AO 125-2007 provide as
follows:
Sec. 3. Venue of marriage ceremony solemnized by Judges.
- As a general rule, a marriage shall be solemnized publicly in
the chambers of the judge or in open court except in the
following instances:
xxxx
b. A marriage where both parties submit a written request to
the solemnizing officer that the marriage be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to
this effect.
Sec. 4. Duties of solemnizing officer before the performance
of marriage ceremony. - Before performing the marriage
ceremony, the solemnizing officer shall:
a. Ensure that the parties appear personally and are the same
contracting parties to the marriage;
b. Personally interview the contracting parties and examine
the documents submitted to ascertain if there is compliance
with the essential and formal requisites of marriage under the
Family Code; and
xxxx
Sec. 6. Duty of solemnizing officer during the solemnization of
the marriage. - The solemnizing officer shall require the
contracting parties to personally declare before him and in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that the
said parties take each other as husband and wife.
Sec. 7. Duties of solemnizing officer after solemnization of the
marriage. - After performing the marriage ceremony, the
solemnizing officer shall:
a. Ensure that the marriage certificate is properly
accomplished and has the complete entries, x x x;
b. See to it that the marriage is properly documented x x x
xxxx
Sec. 9. Recording of marriages solemnized and safekeeping
of documents. - a. The solemnizing officer shall cause to be
kept in the court a record book of all marriages solemnized. x
xx
b. The solemnizing officer shall cause to be filed in the court
the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the original
of the marriage license, x x x when applicable, the affidavit of
the contracting parties regarding the request for change in the
venue for the marriage. All documents pertaining to a
marriage shall be kept in one file x x x.
Sec. 18. Fees for the Solemnization of Marriage. -For the
performance of marriage ceremony and issuance of marriage
certificate and subject to further provisions of AM No. 04-2-
04-SC (16 August 2004) the legal fees in the following
amounts shall be collected:
xxxx
(c) For marriages solemnized by Judges of the Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial
Courts, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Shari’a Circuit
Courts- ‘Three hundred (₱12300.00) pesos.
xxxx
Sec. 19. Payment of legal tees in Philippine legal tender. - All
fees shall be x x x properly officially receipted.
Records show that Judge Murcia and Judge Omelio both violated AO
125- 2007. Although both judges were clothed with authority to
solemnize marriages, in this instance however, they overstepped the
bounds of their authority.
As correctly found by the OCA, Judge Murcia affixed his signature in
the Marriage Contract of Julius and Khristine Without actually
solemnizing their marriage. Judge Murcia's claim that the contracting
31
parties personally appeared before him was belied by the groom
himself, Julius. When confronted by the investigating team from OCA,
Julius denied knowing or appearing before Judge Murcia; moreover,
he asserted that he was not married in the sala of Judge Murcia in the
Island Garden City of Samal, but at their residence in Davao City.
Julius also narrated that it was Judge Omelio, and not Judge Murcia,
who acted as the solemnizing officer. Julius even presented pictures
which were taken during the wedding at their residence showing
Judge Omelio as the solemnizing officer.
What further militates against Judge Murcia's version was the fact that
32
he claimed in his Comment to have examined "all x x x document[s]
in support for a valid marriage under the Family Code and the
33
corresponding receipt of payment for marriage solemnization;" he
also attested that "all the documents were in place and x x x the
34
appropriate fees were paid." However, during the hearing conducted
by the Investigating Justice, Judge Murcia could no longer recall
whether there was a receipt issued by the court to the payment of the
35
solemnization fee. In addition, it was unearthed during the
proceedings that no solemnization fee was received by the court, no
receipt was issued corresponding therefor, and no remittance to the
Judiciary Development Fund pertaining to said solemnization fee was
36
made. In fine, it was established that by signing the Certificate of
Marriage, Judge Murcia made it appear that he solemnized the
marriage of Julius and Khristine without the contracting parties and
their witnesses personally appearing before him and sans payment of
the solemnization fee.
On the other hand, Judge Omelio's contention that he merely re-
enacted the wedding ceremony of Julius and Khristine upon the
request of the groom's parents was similarly debunked by Julius'
admission that it was actually Judge Omelio who solemnized his
marriage with Khristine on February 28, 2008 at their residence in
Davao City. Besides, his defense of reenactment would not justify his
infraction. Interestingly, although Judge Omelio acknowledged said
37
"marriage" as a sham, he insisted that it was not contrary to law as
38
the same was conducted only for picture-taking purposes because
39
they were not able to do so in the sala of Judge Murcia. As a duly-
authorized solemnizing officer, Judge Omelio is expected to know that
marriage should not be trifled with, and its sanctity and inviolability
should never be undermined, especially by such a lame ground as
picture-taking. Worse, although he was supposedly merely doing a re-
enactment, Judge Omelio claimed to have allowed additional
40
witnesses/godparents to affix Murcia. Finally, all the guests were
deceived into believing that Judge Omelio was solemnizing a real
marriage and not just a mere re-enactment.
41
"No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an inviolable
social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
42
by the State." Marriage should not be trivialized, especially by the
solemnizing officers themselves.
Marriage is recognized under the law as an inviolable social institution,
which is the foundation of the family.
[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the community is
deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to
maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and
stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and
duty of each and every member of the community to prevent the
bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and
ultimately lead to its destruction.
Respondent used her authority as a judge to make a mockery of
marriage. As a judicial officer, she is expected to know the law on
solemnization of marriages. ‘A judge is not only bound by oath to apply
the law; he [or she] must also be conscientious and thorough in doing
so. Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature of their office[,]
43
should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.’
"A judge should know, or ought to know, his or her role as a
44
solemnizing officer." Both Judge Murcia and Judge Omelio were
remiss in this regard.
At this juncture, we quote herein the findings of the OCA:
We take note of the fact that Julius Echevarria did not execute an
affidavit or testify during the investigation. However, his statements
before the OCA investigators, as aptly observed by Justice Yap, could
still be given evidentiary weight as these were obtained and
authenticated by the OCA investigators who made the discreet
investigation. The result of the investigation was the subject of the
OCA Memorandum to then Chief Justice Puno which already forms
part of the records.
It was also established that the solemnization fee of ₱300.00 was not
paid as required under Administrative Circular No. 3-2000. The Report
of Collections for the Judiciary Development Fund for the month of
February 2008 submitted by respondent Florida Omelio to the
Supreme Court for the MTCC, Branches 1 and 2 of the Island Garden
City of Samal does not show any payment of the solemnization fee for
the marriage of the Echevarrias. Also, Atty. Fe Maloloy-on, Clerk of
Court, OCC-MTCC, Davao City also informed the OCA investigators
that there are no records of the Echevarria marriage. The records thus
contradict respondent Judge Murcia and respondent Florida Omelio’s Norte, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and FINED in the amount
testimony that the necessary fee was paid. of ₱40,000.00.

It is evident from the foregoing that the action of respondent Judges SO ORDERED.
Omelio and Murcia have undermined the very foundation of marriage
which is the basic social institution in our society whose nature, MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
consequences and incidents are governed by law. xxx Associate Justice

xxxx WE CONCUR:

Unfortunately, respondents Judges Omelio and Murcia trifled with this (On leave)
sacred social institution. While they have the authority to solemnize MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
45
marriages, they clearly overstepped the bounds of that authority. Chief Justice

We agree with the OCA that the following acts of respondents (On official leave)
amounted to gross misconduct constituting violation of the Code of TERESITA J. LEONARDO- FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
46
Judicial Conduct, a serious charge punishable by (a) dismissal from DE CASTRO Associate Justice
the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may Associate Justice
determine, excluding accrued leave credits; and disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations; (b) suspension from NOEL GIMENEZ TIJAM
office without salary or other benefits for more than three (3) but not Associate Justice
exceeding six (6) months; or (c) a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but
not exceeding ₱40,000.00. Notably, during the pendency of this
administrative matter, CoC Omelio passed away; hence the complaint
against her should be dismissed. Likewise, during the pendency of this
administrative matter, Judge Omelio had already been meted the
penalty of dismissal from service. In this regard, we find the
recommended penalty of ₱40,000.00 each for both Judge Omelio and
Judge Murcia commensurate under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the complaint against respondent Clerk of Court

Florida C. Omelio, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Island Garden City
of Samal, Davao del Norte, is DISMISSED. Respondent Judge
George E. Omelio, Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Davao City,
Davao del Sur, is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and FINED in
the amount of ₱40,000.00 to be deducted from the money value of his
accrued leave credits. Respondent Judge Virgilio G. Murcia, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Island Garden City of Samal, Davao del
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:p
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of
Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted
evidence in relation to two specific acts committed by respondent
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, which, he
contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as inefficiency in office
and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the
wedding between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the
knowledge that the groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between
Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his
court's jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds
office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta.
Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. The wedding was solemnized at
the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, which
does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away from the
municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator,
respondent judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal
Mayor of Dapa have been used by someone else, who, as the mayor's
"lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as
a private person. The same person had earlier filed Administrative
Matter No 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack of merit on
September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16,
"Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still
pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks
exculpation from his act of having solemnized the marriage between
Gaspar Tagadan, a married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn
F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar, confirming the fact that Mr.
Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each other for almost seven
1
years. With respect to the second charge, he maintains that in
solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did
not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that:
"Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof
applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the
pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the
2
case.
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of
complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt
upon. The acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto
will suffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove
the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar
Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is
"separated." Despite this declaration, the wedding ceremony was
solemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint
affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed
and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial
3
Judge of Basey, Samar. The affidavit was not issued by the latter
judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged
before him. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar
Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in
September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having
borne five children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dwelling in
Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of
for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she
is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint
affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and
ample reason for him to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do
not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years and the spouse present had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger
of death under the circumstances set forth in the
provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent
marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision.
In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a
summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is
necessary in order to contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory
requirement which has been precisely incorporated into the Family
Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that
the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is
factually or presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent
provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary
proceeding for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death.
Absent this judicial declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda.
Whether wittingly or unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of
respondent judge to have accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the
groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a
bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under Article 35 of the Family
Code, " The following marriage shall be void from the beginning: (4)
Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony
outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the
Family Code, thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in
the chambers the judge or in open court, in the
church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-
general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be,
and not elsewhere, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places
in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where
 both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing
in which case the marriage may be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the
justification for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano
Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As
the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of
the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1)
at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article
29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement
to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario
was at the point of death or in the remote place. Moreover, the written
request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by
4
only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is
the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the
formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing
officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among
others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's
jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision, refers only to the
venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding
provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to
marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the
diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or
a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to
solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the
requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges who are
appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a
marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity
in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not
affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to
5
administrative liability.
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities
of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the
exercise of his misplaced authority, respondent judge again
demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic principles of civil
law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross
ignorance of the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases
brought to our attention are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting
us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack
of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are
at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the
ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in
understanding and applying the law. It is imperative that they be
conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in instant
6
case. It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law
7
intelligently. Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a shaky
foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not
learned in the law. While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which
has greatly prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is
considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage
between Gaspar Tagadan and Ida Peñaranda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its
Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question
resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the other lacked
the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said
recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in
applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C.
Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and
given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts
will be dealt with more severely.

Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 171914 July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z.
LUNA and EUGENIA ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality
rule adopted by Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property
between the parties of the first marriage involving Filipinos submitted
as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the
assets of the husband who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna,
appeals the adverse decision promulgated on November 11,
1
2005, whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification
the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court
2
(RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City. The CA thereby denied her right
in the 25/100 pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium unit,
and in the law books of the husband acquired during the second
marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the
prestigious law firm Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez &
Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he was living with his first wife,
herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (EUGENIA),
whom he initially married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice
of the Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later
solemnized in a church ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel,
Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY. LUNA’s marriage to
EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L.
Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L.
Tabunda, Gregorio Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar
Antonio Luna. After almost two (2) decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA
and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from each other in
February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end,
they entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR
SEPARATION AND PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November
12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live separately and to dissolve and
liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his
marriage with EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of
the First Circumscription of the Court of First Instance of Sto.
Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo, Dominican
Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another
marriage, this time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and
SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines and lived together as husband
and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named:
Luna, Puruganan, Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY.
LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased
from Tandang Sora Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-
Ledesma Condominium Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St.,
Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to
be paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April 15, 1978.
Said condominium unit was to be usedas law office of LUPSICON.
After full payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium
unit was executed on July 15, 1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued
on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing the following
names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO
E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO
R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A. Puruganan (17/100); and
TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x
x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of
Atty. Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty.
Mario E. Ongkiko, for which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on
February 7, 1992 in the following names:
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO
E. ONGKIKO, married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA
CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium
unit was partitioned by the partners but the same was still registered
in common under CCT No. 21716. The parties stipulated that the
interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be 25/100
share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law
firm with Atty. Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office
condominium unit as their office. The said law firm lasted until the
death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit
including the lawbooks, office furniture and equipment found therein
were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY. LUNA’s son of the first
marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of the
condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz
who established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz &
Associates.
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit
as well as the law books, office furniture and equipment became the
subject of the complaint filed by SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY.
JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on September 10,
1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that
the subject properties were acquired during the existence of the
marriage between ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint
efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD became co-owner
of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of
¾ pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties
plus her ½ share in the net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was
bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and testament; and thatthe
heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded SOLEDAD
from her share in the subject properties. The complaint prayed that
SOLEDAD be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject
properties;that the same be partitioned; that an accounting of the
rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the share of SOLEDAD
be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer
the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to
3
pay attorney’s feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.
Ruling of the RTC
On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the
4
aforementioned facts, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit
located at the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to
have been acquired by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole
industry;
(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept
over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds of
Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan Luces Luna
should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to
Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
Zaballero Luna";
 (c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus LIQUIDATED PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-
Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and APPELLANT AND LUNA;
Federal Supreme Court Reports found in the condominium
unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to the plaintiff V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
as soon as appropriate arrangements have been madefor SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION
transport and storage. OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE HOLOGRAPHIC
WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
No pronouncement as to costs.
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE
5
SO ORDERED. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACTTHAT THE NAME OF
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN THE DEED
Decision of the CA OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE
6 CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
Both parties appealed to the CA.

VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT

On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC,
NEITHER ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILYCODE NOR
namely:
ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
ARE APPLICABLE;
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
CONDOMINIUM UNIT WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES LUNA;
THE CAUSE OF ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-
APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY PESCRIPTION AND
II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT LACHES; and
PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY
FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT
EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE INTERVENTION FOR
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY FILING
PORTIONS OF THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, FEE.
7
WHO HAS NO ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE
ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial
PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE
court, to wit:
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;

I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING
CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF
SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL
ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE USE OF
PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND INTERVENOR-
APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;
 II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
PLAINTIFF PROVED BY PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED FOREIGN
LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT,
ASSUMING PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN
LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THEM HAD
PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND
8
ESTOPPEL.
On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified
9
decision, holding and ruling:
EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until
the latter’s death on July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree
obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican Republic did not terminate
his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce between
10
Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001
Decision of the RTC of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby
MODIFIEDas follows:
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at
the SIXTH FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA
CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by Condominium
Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby
adjudged to defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces
Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (first marriage), having
been acquired from the sole funds and sole industry of Juan
Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
(b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner
or under any other concept over the condominium unit, hence
the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 of the
Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil status of
Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES
LUNA married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA
married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and
Eugenia Zaballero-Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared
to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme
Court Reports found in the condominium unit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
11
SO ORDERED.
On March 13, 2006,
12
the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
13
Issues
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on
certiorarithat:
A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement executed
by Luna and Respondent Eugenia was unenforceable; hence,
their conjugal partnership was not dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing
the Dominican Republic court’s approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
Petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof of actual
contribution to the acquisition of purchase of the
subjectcondominium unit; and
 D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
14
Petitioner was not entitled to the subject law books.
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending
parties should be entitled to the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the
condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e., Corpus Juris, Fletcher
on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court
Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain
the law that should determine, firstly, whether the divorce between
Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna (Eugenia) had validly
dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second
marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled
the latter to any rights in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos,
was solemnized in the Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in
force at the time of the solemnization was the Spanish Civil Code,
which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to follow
the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons were binding upon citizens of the Philippines, although living
15
abroad. Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws governed
thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained
Filipinos until the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their
marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10,
1947 until the present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has
not been recognized in the Philippines. The non-recognition of
absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even under the
16
Family Code, even if either or both of the spouses are residing
17
abroad. Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under
our laws have beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the
remedies against such defective marriages have been limited to the
declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment of the
marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of
Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree
18
dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna and Eugenia. Conformably
with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if voluntarily
obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna
and Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12,
1997. This finding conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes
19
marriage as an inviolable social institution, and regards it as a
special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman for
20
the establishment of a conjugal and family life. The non-recognition
of absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect
for the sanctity of the marital union especially among Filipino citizens.
It affirms that the extinguishment of a valid marriage must be grounded
only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground expressly
provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between
Filipinos exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between
them can ever be given legal or judicial recognition and enforcement
in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property
Settlement (Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had
entered into and executed in connection with the divorce proceedings
before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic to dissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable against
Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing
otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any
marriage settlement prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947,
the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains
governed their property relations. This is because the Spanish Civil
Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify
the property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not
entered into any marriage settlement before or at the time of the
marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree
upon absolute or relative community of property, or upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. In the absence of
marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the system of
relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in
this Code, shall govern the property relations between husband and
wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of
gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband
and wife place in a common fund the fruits of their separate property
and the income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon
the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or
benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the
marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of
various causes of termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil
Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did
not per sedissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains.
The approval of the Agreement by a competent court was still required
under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage
settlements, the separation of property between spouses during the
marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of
property, and it shall be decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has
been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil interdiction, or
has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval.
All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the
conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for
judicialapproval or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal
partnership, so that any such creditors may appear atthe hearing to
safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of
the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may
protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles
214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the
effect of partition stated in articles 498 to 501 shall be applicable.
(1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo
in the Dominican Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the
conjugal partnership of gains between the late Atty. Luna and
Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the
approval took place only as an incident ofthe action for divorce
instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for, indeed, the justifications for
their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds raised
21
in the action for divorce. With the divorce not being itself valid and
enforceable under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public
policy and public law, the approval of the Agreement was not also
legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law. Consequently, the
conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in
the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage
between Atty. Luna and Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to
22
Soledad on January 12, 1976 was void for being bigamous, on the
ground that the marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not
been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of Sto.
Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death
of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or
incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or
subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
23 24
proceedings. A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner
being void ab initioby virtue of its being bigamous, the properties
acquired during the bigamous marriage were governed by the rules
on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and
wife, but they are not married, ortheir marriage is void from the
beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both of them through their
work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden
of proof to confirm such fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership,
therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner to offer proof of her
actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere allegation
of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would
warrant no relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court
25
of Appeals:
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which
involved the issue of co-ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties
to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively,
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the
property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners
therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterousunion is
without basis because they failed to substantiate their allegation that
they contributed money in the purchase of the disputed properties.
Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the
controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent
evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who,
as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies
with more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed
to present evidence ex parte.1âwphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically
entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendantsome
measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the allegations in
the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court
isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief.
Indeed, the party alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a
26
mereallegation is not evidence.
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual
contributions in the purchase of the condominium unit in the aggregate
amount of at least ₱306,572.00, consisting in direct contributions of
₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had obtained from
27
Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30; and that
such aggregate contributions of ₱306,572.00 corresponded to almost
the entire share of Atty. Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit
amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s purchase price of
28
₱1,449,056.00. The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were
paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had
29
even sent her a "thank you" note; that she had the financial capacity
to make the contributions and purchases; and that Atty. Luna could
not acquire the properties on his own due to the meagerness of the
income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s
assertions on her actual contributions through the following findings
and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that
her own independent funds were used to buy the law office
condominium and the law books subject matter in contentionin this
case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code
and Article 148 of the Family Code to apply – as to cases where
properties were acquired by a man and a woman living together as
husband and wife but not married, or under a marriage which was void
ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on co-
ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable to many
situations and thus it created a void at first because it applied only if
the parties were not in any way incapacitated or were without
impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to create a co-
ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or
absolute community between the man and his lawful wife). This void
was filled upon adoption of the Family Code. Article 148 provided that:
only the property acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such
contributions and corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to
be equal. However, for this presumption to arise, proof of actual
contribution was required. The same rule and presumption was to
apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the
parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership accrued to the absolute community or conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith was
not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on
forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership
was the exception while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict
rule whereby marriage was an inviolable social institution and divorce
decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by the
Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L-
19671, November 29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium
unit, SOLEDAD failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to
purchase the said property. She failed to establish that the four (4)
checks that she presented were indeed used for the acquisition of the
share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly
explained in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty.
Teresita Cruz Sison was issued on January 27, 1977, which was
thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of Agreement, Exhibit
"7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount
of ₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino. According
to the plaintiff, thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third
check which was for ₱49,236.00 payable to PREMEX was dated May
19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The fourth check,
Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the
foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the payees
were for the acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The
connection was simply not established. x x x"
SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00
is unsubstantiated. Clearly, there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of
co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of the condominium unit and the
trial court correctly found that the same was acquired through the sole
industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium
unit was in the name of Atty. Luna, together with his partners in the
law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not appear as vendee or as
the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of the
Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and
Far East Bank and Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his
partners and plaintiff does not have evidence to show that she paid for
them fully or partially. x x x"
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were
in the name of "JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was
no proof that SOLEDAD was a co-owner of the condominium unit.
Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. It is
well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms
one already existing. The phrase "married to" preceding "Soledad L.
Luna" is merely descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical
that SOLEDAD had no participation in the law firm or in the purchase
of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD failed to prove that she had
anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid for the
law office amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to
presume that it was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office space and
the law books from his earnings from his practice of law rather than
embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for use of the law
30
firm that he headed.
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA
both because they were substantiated by the records and because we
have not been shown any reason to revisit and undo them. Indeed,
the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did not
discharge her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her
31
contributions, not being evidence, did not serve the purpose. In
contrast, given the subsistence of the first marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the
properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should
then be justly concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to
their conjugal partnership of gains as of the time of his death.
Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro indivisoshare of
Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to
the respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
November 11, 2005; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 195432 August 27, 2014
EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking the nullification of the Orders dated 14 January and 8
February 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (R TC), Third
1
Judicial Region, Branch 45, City of San Fernando, Pampanga, in Civil
Case No. 137, which dismissed the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed
therein.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE
The pertinent facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner, are as follows:
3. On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro
Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in a civil wedding
solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. A copy of their
Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex 'A' and
made an integral part hereof.
4. On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in
Japan, and was validly granted under Japaneselaws, a
divorce in respect of his marriage with petitioner. A copy of the
Divorce Certificate duly issued by the Consulate-General of
Japan and duly authenticated by the Department of Foreign
Affairs, Manila, is heretoas Annex ‘B’ and made an integral
part hereof. 5. Said Divorce Certificate was duly registered
with the Office of the Civil Registry of Manila. A copy of the
Certification dated 28 October 2005 is hereto attached as
Annex ‘C’ and made an integral part hereof.
6. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to
remarry and that by such she reverted to her single status,
petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando on 13 September 2005
in a civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga. A copy
of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex ‘D’
and made an integral part hereof.
7. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on
27 December 2005. A copy of the JapaneseFamily Registry
Record of Kobayashi showing the divorce he obtained and his
remarriage with Ryo Miken, duly authenticated by the
Consulate-General of Japan and the Department of Foreign
Affairs, Manila, is hereto attached as Annex ‘E’ and made an
integral part hereof.
8. Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine
passport to indicate her surname withher husband Masatomi
Y. Ando but she was told at the Department of Foreign Affairs
that the same cannot be issued to her until she can prove
bycompetent court decision that her marriage with her said
husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
xxxx
12. Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner’s marriage with
her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando musttherefore be
honored, considered and declared valid, until otherwise
declared by a competent court. Consequently, and until then,
petitioner therefore is and must be declared entitled to the
issuance of a Philippine passport under the name ‘Edelina
Ando y Tungol.’ Hence, this petitioner pursuant to Rule 63 of
2
the Rules of Court.
On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for
Declaratory Relief, which was later raffled off to Branch 46. She
impleaded the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as respondent and
prayed for the following reliefs before the lower court:
WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays of this Honorable
Court that after proper proceedings, judgment be rendered, as follows:
(a) declaring as valid and subsisting the marriage between
petitioner Edelina T. Ando and her husband Masatomi Y.
Ando until otherwise declared by a competent court;
(b) declaring petitioner entitled to the issuance of a Philippine
Passport under the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol"; and
(c) directing the Department ofForeign Affairs to honor
petitioner’s marriage to her husband Masatomi Y. Ando and
to issue a Philippine Passport to petitioner under the name
"Edelina Ando y Tungol".
3
Petitioner prays for such other just and equitable reliefs.
On 15 November 2010, in an Order dismissing the Petition for want of
cause and action, as well as jurisdiction, the RTC held thus:
Records of the case would reveal that prior to petitioner’s marriage to
Masatomi Y. Ando, herein petitioner was married to Yuichiro
Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in Candaba, Pampanga, on
September 16, 2001, and that though a divorce was obtained and
granted in Japan, with respect to the their (sic) marriage, there is no
showing that petitioner herein complied with the requirements set forth
in Art. 13 of the Family Code – that is obtaining a judicial recognition
of the foreign decree of absolute divorce in our country.
It is therefore evident, under the foregoing circumstances, that herein
petitioner does not have any causeof action and/or is entitled to the
reliefs prayed for under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. In the same
vein, though there is other adequate remedy available to the petitioner,
such remedy is however beyond the authority and jurisdiction of this
court to act upon and grant, as it isonly the family court which is vested
4
with such authority and jurisdiction.
On 3 December 2010, petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated 15 November 2010. In anOrder
dated 14 December 2010, the RTC granted the motion in this wise:
WHEREFORE, considering that the allegations and reliefs prayed for
by the petitioner in her petition and the instant Motion for
Reconsideration falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Family Court
of this jurisdiction and for the interest ofsubstantial justice, the Order
of the Court dated November 15, 2010 is hereby reconsidered.
Let the record of this case be therefore referred back to the Office of
the Clerk of Court for proper endorsement to the Family Court of this
5
jurisdiction for appropriateaction and/or disposition. Thereafter, the
case was raffled to Branch 45 of the RTC. On 14 January 2011, the
trial court dismissed the Petition anew on the ground that petitioner
had no cause of action. The Order reads thus:
The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to be
declared as valid is already her second marriage, a bigamous
marriage under Article 35(4) of the Family Codeconsidering that the
first one, though allegedly terminated by virtue of the divorce obtained
by Kobayashi, was never recognized by a Philippine court, hence,
petitioner is considered as still married to Kobayashi. Accordingly, the
second marriage with Ando cannot be honored and considered asvalid
at this time.
Petitioner’s allegation of Sec. 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is
misplaced. The fact that no judicial declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Ando was rendered does not make the same valid
because such declaration under Article 40 ofthe Family Code is
applicable onlyin case of re-marriage. More importantly, the absence
of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is not even a requisite to
make a marriage valid.
6
In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of this case is imperative.
On 1 February 2011,petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated 14 January 2011. The motion was
denied by the RTC in open court on 8 February2011, considering that
neither the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) nor respondent was
furnished with copies of the motion.
On 24 March 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review,
raising the sole issue of whether or not the RTC erred in ruling that
she had no cause of action.
Petitioner argues that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on the
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages, it is solely the wife or the husband who can file a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage.
Thus, as the state is not even allowed to filea direct petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage,with even more
reason can it not collaterally attack the validity of a marriage, as in a
petition for declaratory relief. Further, petitioner alleges that under the
law, a marriage – even one that is void or voidable – shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Petitioner also argues that assuming a court judgment recognizing a
judicial decree of divorce is required under Article 13 of the Family
Code, noncompliance therewith is a mere irregularity in the issuance
of a marriage license. Any irregularity in the formal requisites of
marriage, such as with respect to the marriage license, shall notaffect
the legality of the marriage. Petitioner further claims that all the
requisites for a petition for declaratory relief have been complied with.
With respect to the failure to furnish a copy of the Ex ParteMotion for
Reconsideration to the OSG and the DFA, petitioner avers that at the
time of the filing, the RTC had yet to issue a summons to respondent;
thus, it had yet to acquire jurisdiction over them.
Thereafter, the DFA, through the OSG, filed a Comment on the
Petition. The latter raised the following arguments: (1) the Petition was
improperly verified, as the juratin the Verification thereof only stated
that the affiant had exhibited "her currentand valid proof of identity,"
which proof was not properly indicated, however; (2) prior judicial
recognition by a Philippine court of a divorce decree obtained by the
alien spouse is required before a Filipino spouse can remarry and be
entitled to the legal effects of remarriage; (3) petitioner failed to show
that she had first exhausted all available administrative remedies,
such as appealing to the Secretary of the DFA under Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 8239, or the Philippine Passport Act of 1996, before resorting
to the special civil action of declaratory relief; and (4) petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC was a mere scrap of paper
and did not toll the running of the period to appeal. Hence, the RTC
Order dated 14 January 2011 is now final.
On 29 November 2011, petitioner filed her Reply to the Comment,
addressing the issues raised therein.
THE COURT’S RULING
The Court finds the Petition to be without merit.
First, with respect to her prayer tocompel the DFA to issue her
passport, petitioner incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief
before the RTC. She should have first appealed before the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty was toquestion the
DFA’s refusal to issue a passport to her under her second husband’s
name.
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239,
which was adopted on 25 February 1997, the following are the
additional documentary requirements before a married woman may
obtain a passport under the name of her spouse:
SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or
widowed women shall be made inaccordance with the following
provisions:
a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to
adopt the surname of her husband pursuant to Art. 370 of
Republic Act No. 386, she must present the original or
certifiedtrue copy of her marriage contract, and one photocopy
thereof.
 In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in the
Philippines to a foreigner, shall be required to present a
Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counselling
Seminar conducted by the CFO when applying for a passport
for the first time.
b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must
present a certified true copy of her annotated Marriage
Contract or Certificate of Registration and the Court Order
effecting the annulment.
c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband,
she must present a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree
duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post
which has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is
obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular
mission in the Philippines.
When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified
true copy of the Divorce Decree or a certified true copy of the
Certificate of Divorce from the Shari’ah Court or the OCRG. d) In the
event that marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband, the
applicant must present the original or certified true copy of the Death
Certificate of the husband or the Declaration of Presumptive Death by
a Civil or Shari’ah Court, in which case the applicant may choose to
continue to use her husband’s surname or resume the use of her
maiden surname. From the above provisions, it is clear that for
petitioner to obtain a copy of her passport under her married name, all
she needed to present were the following: (1) the original or certified
true copyof her marriage contract and one photocopy thereof; (2) a
Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if
applicable; and (3) a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly
authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post that has
jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the
concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.
In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued
a Philippine passport under her second husband’s
name.1âwphi1 Should her application for a passport be denied, the
remedies available to her are provided in Section 9 of R.A. 8239, which
reads thus:
Sec. 9. Appeal. — Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the
application of this Act of the implementing rules and regulations issued
by the Secretary shall have the right to appeal to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs from whose decision judicial review may be had to the
Courts in due course.
The IRR further provides in detail:
ARTICLE 10
Appeal
In the event that an application for a passport is denied, or an existing
one cancelled or restricted, the applicant or holder thereof shall have
the right to appeal in writing to the Secretary within fifteen (15) days
from notice of denial, cancellation or restriction.
Clearly, she should have filed anappeal with the Secretary of the DFA
in the event of the denial of her application for a passport, after having
complied with the provisions of R.A. 8239. Petitioner’s argument that
her application "cannot be said to havebeen either denied, cancelled
or restricted by [the DFA ], so as to make her an aggrieved party
7 8
entitled to appeal", as instead she "was merely told" that her
passport cannot be issued, does not persuade. The law provides a
direct recourse for petitioner in the event of the denial of her
application.
Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second
marriage as valid, petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for
the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband.
9
In Garcia v. Recio, we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an
alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely
of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the
governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce
must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of
foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and of the Court's Division.
10
proven and like any other fact.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed Chief Justice
before a trial court actually constitutes a petition for declaratory
11
relief, we are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held by Republic of the Philippines
the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented SUPREME COURT
on record of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and Manila
12
of the validity of the divorce decree under that national law. Hence,
any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon
THIRD DIVISION
her complete submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and
the national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted in the proper
forum. G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child
petitioner's recourse to the proper remedies available. RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
PERALTA, J.:
WE CONCUR:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
1
the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders dated
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the
Associate Justice Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the
criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503,
Associate Justice Associate Justice for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
JOSE C. MENDOZA*
Associate Justice The following facts are culled from the records:

CERTIFICATION Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan

Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on September
2
Pursuant to Section 13 Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less,
3
petition was sixteen (16) years of age. in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately
4
a Divorce Decree issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO
5
time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old. Thereafter, NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial
petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.
6 support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim.
15
CONTRARY TO LAW.
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide
monthly support to their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a
16
Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or Hold Departure Order against respondent. Consequently,
17
7
less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail. Petitioner
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.
8 also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which
18
respondent filed his Opposition. Pending the resolution thereof,
19
respondent was arraigned. Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried
having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent
in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing
9 filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over
thereat. Respondent and his new wife established a business known 20
as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.
10
Pinamungahan, Cebu City. To date, all the parties, including their
son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.
11 On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed
21
Order, dismissing the instant criminal case against respondent on
the ground that the facts charged in the information do not constitute
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter
an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the
demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent
12 dispositive part of which states:
refused to receive the letter.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the accused,
affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against
respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.
for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with
13
petitioner. Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
14
which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit. Thereafter, the for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending released.
the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein
respondent. SO ORDERED.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to
Branch 20 thereof, states that:
22
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto
reiterating respondent’s obligation to support their child under Article
 23
195 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under
R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines
who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the
24
obligor’s nationality."
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order denying
25
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and reiterating its previous
ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those
advanced earlier in the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the
court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a foreign
national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in
regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child.
Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his
alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established
that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis
child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which
mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion
of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the accused herein,
hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
26
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the
following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally
liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support
27
his minor child.
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of
the instant petition despite the fact that the same was directly lodged
with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v.
28
Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, which lays down the
instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal
directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from
filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law
are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners
found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only
questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the
three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by
ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby
judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the
exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under
Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is
taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions
of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on
questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third
mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of
law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented or of the
truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns
the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
29
the given set of circumstances.
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of
law – the response thereto concerns the correct application of law and
jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign
national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine
law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a
novel question of law concerning the liability of a foreign national who
allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special
criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The
inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore,
deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve
as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant
petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time,
effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case,
considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of
justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition
meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner’s
contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A.
No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
30
Petitioner invokes Article 195 of the Family Code, which provides the
parent’s obligation to support his child. Petitioner contends that
notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to
31
Article 26 of the Family Code, respondent is not excused from
complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and
clear basis presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son,
32
are entitled to financial support. Respondent also added that by
reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any
33
financial support.
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on
34
Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from
35
respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil
Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as
Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family
Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By
analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are
governed by their national law with respect to family rights and
36
duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under
family rights and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland
or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to
the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged
to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure
to do so.
37
38
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel, the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves
to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their
personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even
when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).
39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to
support petitioner’s son under Article195 of the Family Code as a
consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does
not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied
40
to a dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the
present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a national of
the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of
41
provision of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the
laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged
to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national
law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the
obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the
issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of
42
Appeals, has already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other property, and those which have for their object public order, public
43
fact, they must be alleged and proved. policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the upon in a foreign country.
Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall
govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a
44
same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of single cause of action.
the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been
properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents
to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
—
45
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, the Court held that a If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of
divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as its legal effects may be action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the merits in any one is
recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the
available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign
matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by
law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the
support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is
most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract
placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the
that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict
aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is 48
46 of Laws.
specifically stated, which was not disputed by respondent.
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national
enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child nor penalize the
law of respondent states that parents have no obligation to support
noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in
their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law
the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be
would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America,
47 denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation, to wit:
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the
no longer liable to support his former wife, in consonance with the
matter were properly pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 49
ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, to wit:
24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in
Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find
applicability. As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that
she should no longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse.
Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound
obligations. It held:
and established public policy of the forum, the said foreign law,
judgment or order shall not be applied.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and
still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with
possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
50
(Emphasis added)
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may
be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly
refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.-
The crime of violence against women and their children is committed
through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to
engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist
from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right
to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her
child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or
effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement
or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of
financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing
the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation
to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal
and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of
51
minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial
support to the child is considered anact of violence against women
and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the
Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality
Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code,
applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and
those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live
and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing
to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the Philippines
as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City.
As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense
charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction
over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but
not admitting, that there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A.
No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been
52
extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime under Section 24
of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a)
to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections
5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of
53
R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is
still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant
case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided
support to petitioner’s child calls for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts
being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to
the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February
19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further
proceedings based on the merits of the case.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 181089 October 22, 2012
MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAÑES, Complainant,
vs.
LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
For our resolution is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to
1 11
annul the Order dated September 24, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No.
4990-SPL which dismissed the lnformation for Bigamy filed against
respondent Lourdes Tajolosa Cipriano. Also assailed is the RTC
2 12
Resolution dated January 2, 2008 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
On April 8, 1976, respondent married Socrates Flores (Socrates) in
3
Lezo, Aklan. On January 24, 1983, during the subsistence of the said
marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano (Silverio) in San
4 13
Pedro, Laguna. In 2001, respondent filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa,
Branch
256, a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the
ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity as defined under Article
36 of the Family Code, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-204.
On July 18, 2003, the RTC of Muntinlupa, Branch 256, rendered an
5 14
Amended Decision declaring the marriage of respondent with
Socrates null and void. Said decision became final and executory on
6
October 13, 2003.
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Cipriano Montañez, Silverio’s
daughter from the first marriage, filed with the Municipal Trial Court of
7
San Pedro, Laguna, a Complaint for Bigamy against respondent,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 41972. Attached to the
8
complaint was an Affidavit (Malayang Sinumpaang Salaysay) dated
9
August 23, 2004, thumb-marked and signed by Silverio, which
alleged, among others, that respondent failed to reveal to Silverio that
she was still married to Socrates. On November 17, 2004, an
10
Information for Bigamy was filed against respondent with the RTC of
San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31. The case was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 4990-SPL. The Information reads:
That on or about January 24, 1983, in the Municipality of San Pedro,
Province of Laguna, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second or subsequent marriage
with one SILVERIO CIPRIANO VINALON while her first marriage with
SOCRATES FLORES has not been judicially dissolved by proper
judicial authorities.
On July 24, 2007 and before her arraignment, respondent, through
counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Information (and Dismissal of the
Criminal Complaint) alleging that her marriage with Socrates had
already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more
marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24,
1983; that the basic element of the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid
marriages, is therefore wanting. She also claimed that since the
second marriage was held in 1983, the crime of bigamy had already
prescribed. The prosecution filed its Comment arguing that the crime
of bigamy had already been consummated when respondent filed her
petition for declaration of nullity; that the law punishes the act of
contracting a second marriage which appears to be valid, while the
first marriage is still subsisting and has not yet been annulled or
declared void by the court.
In its Order dated August 3, 2007, the RTC denied the motion. It
found respondent's argument that with the declaration of nullity of her
first marriage, there was no more first marriage to speak of and thus
the element of two valid marriages in bigamy was absent, to have been
15
laid to rest by our ruling in Mercado v. Tan where we held:
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although
there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In
fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void
only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with
bigamy. For contracting a second marriage while the first is still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already
been consummated by then. x x x
16
As to respondent's claim that the action had already prescribed, the
RTC found that while the second marriage indeed took place in 1983,
or more than the 15-year prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy,
the commission of the crime was only discovered on November 17,
2004, which should be the reckoning period, hence, prescription has
not yet set in.
17
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that the
Mercado ruling was not applicable, since respondent contracted her
first marriage in 1976, i.e., before the Family Code; that the petition for
annulment was granted and became final before the criminal
complaint for bigamy was filed; and, that Article 40 of the Family Code
cannot be given any retroactive effect because this will impair her right
to remarry without need of securing a declaration of nullity of a
completely void prior marriage.
On September 24, 2007, the RTC issued its assailed Order,
18
the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, the Order of August 3, 2007 is reconsidered and set aside.
Let a new one be entered quashing the information. Accordingly, let
the instant case be DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the RTC said that at the time the accused had contracted
a second marriage on January 24, 1983, i.e., before the effectivity of
the Family Code, the existing law did not require a judicial declaration
of absolute nullity as a condition precedent to contracting a
subsequent marriage; that jurisprudence before the Family Code was
ambivalent on the issue of the need of prior judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of the first marriage. The RTC found that both
marriages of respondent took place before the effectivity of the Family
Code, thus, considering the unsettled state of jurisprudence on the
need for a prior declaration of absolute nullity of marriage before
commencing a second marriage and the principle that laws should be
interpreted liberally in favor of the accused, it declared that the
absence of a judicial declaration of nullity should not prejudice the
accused whose second marriage was declared once and for all valid
with the annulment of her first marriage by the RTC of Muntinlupa City
in 2003.
Dissatisfied, a Motion for Reconsideration was filed by the
prosecution, but opposed by respondent. In a Resolution dated
January 2, 2008, the RTC denied the same ruling, among others, that
the judicial declaration of nullity of respondent's marriage is
tantamount to a mere declaration or confirmation that said marriage
never existed at all, and for this reason, her act in contracting a second
marriage cannot be considered criminal.
Aggrieved, petitioner directly filed the present petition with us raising
the following issues:
I. Whether the judicial nullity of a first marriage prior to the enactment
of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy
on the ground of psychological incapacity is a valid defense for a
charge of bigamy for entering into a second marriage prior to the
enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel vs.
Sempio-Diy?
II. Whether the trial court erred in stating that the jurisprudence prior
to the enactment of the Family Code and the pronouncement in Wiegel
vs. Sempio-Diy regarding the necessity of securing a declaration of
nullity of the first marriage before entering a second marriage
ambivalent, such that a person was allowed to enter a subsequent
marriage without the annulment of the first without incurring criminal
19
liability.
Preliminarily, we note that the instant petition assailing the RTC's
dismissal of the Information for bigamy was filed by private
complainant and not by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which
should represent the government in all judicial proceedings filed
20
before us.
Notwithstanding, we will give due course to this petition as we had
21
done in the past. In Antone v. Beronilla, the offended party (private
complainant) questioned before the Court of Appeals (CA) the RTC's
dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her husband, and
the CA dismissed the petition on the ground, among others, that the
petition should have been filed in behalf of the People of the
Philippines by the OSG, being its statutory counsel in all appealed
criminal cases. In a petition filed with us, we said that we had given
due course to a number of actions even when the respective interests
of the government were not properly represented by the OSG and
said:
In Labaro v. Panay, this Court dealt with a similar defect in the
following manner:
It must, however, be stressed that if the public prosecution is
aggrieved by any order ruling of the trial judge in a criminal case, the
OSG, and not the prosecutor, must be the one to question the order
or ruling before us. x x x
Nevertheless, since the challenged order affects the interest of the
State or the plaintiff People of the Philippines, we opted not to dismiss
the petition on this technical ground. Instead, we required the OSG to
comment on the petition, as we had done before in some cases. In
light of its Comment, we rule that the OSG has ratified and adopted as
its own the instant petition for the People of the Philippines. (Emphasis
22
supplied)
Considering that we also required the OSG to file a Comment on the
petition, which it did, praying that the petition be granted in effect, such
Comment had ratified the petition filed with us.
As to the merit of the petition, the issue for resolution is whether or not
the RTC erred in quashing the Information for bigamy filed against
respondent.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code defines and penalizes bigamy
as follow:
Art. 349. Bigamy. – The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed
upon any person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been
legally married; (b) the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or
23
subsequent marriage. It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy
that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first
24
marriage.
In this case, it appears that when respondent contracted a second
marriage with Silverio in 1983, her first marriage with Socrates
celebrated in 1976 was still subsisting as the same had not yet been
annulled or declared void by a competent authority. Thus, all the
elements of bigamy were alleged in the Information. In her Motion to
Quash the Information, she alleged, among others, that:
xxxx

2. The records of this case would bear out that accused's
marriage with said Socrates Flores was declared void ab initio
on 14 April 2003 by Branch 256 of the Regional Trial Court of
Muntinlupa City. The said decision was never appealed, and
became final and executory shortly thereafter.
3. In other words, before the filing of the Information in this
case, her marriage with Mr. Flores had already been declared
void from the beginning.
4. There was therefore no marriage prior to 24 January 1983
to speak of. In other words, there was only one marriage.
5. The basic element of the crime of bigamy, that is, two valid
25
marriages, is therefore wanting.
Clearly, the annulment of respondent's first marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity was declared only in 2003. The question now
is whether the declaration of nullity of respondent's first marriage
justifies the dismissal of the Information for bigamy filed against her.
We rule in the negative.
26
In Mercado v. Tan, we ruled that the subsequent judicial declaration
of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial, because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. And by contracting a second marriage while the first
was still subsisting, the accused committed the acts punishable under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
27
In Abunado v. People, we held that what is required for the charge
of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time
28
the second marriage is contracted. Even if the accused eventually
obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the
point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before
29
the first marriage was annulled.
30
In Tenebro v. CA, we declared that although the judicial declaration
of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
vinculum between the spouses is concerned, it is significant to note
that said marriage is not without legal effects. Among these effects is
that children conceived or born before the judgment of absolute nullity
of the marriage shall be considered legitimate. There is, therefore, a
recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these
legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold
otherwise would render the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory, and allow individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital
contract be flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages, while beguiling
throngs of hapless women with the promise of futurity and
commitment.
31
32
And in Jarillo v. People, applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we
affirmed the accused's conviction for bigamy, ruling that the moment
the accused contracted a second marriage without the previous one
having been judicially declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was
already consummated because at the time of the celebration of the
second marriage, the accused’s first marriage which had not yet been
declared null and void by a court of competent jurisdiction was
deemed valid and subsisting.
Here, at the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first
marriage was still subsisting as it had not yet been legally dissolved.
As ruled in the above-mentioned jurisprudence, the subsequent
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the
fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence
of the first marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the
crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the offense charged
were sufficiently alleged.
33
Respondent claims that Tenebro v. CA is not applicable, since the
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage came after the filing of
the Information, unlike in this case where the declaration was rendered
before the information was filed. We do not agree. What makes a
person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment
of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
34
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
35
bigamy.
Anent respondent's contention in her Comment that since her two
marriages were contracted prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
Article 40 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect
because this will impair her right to remarry without need of securing
a judicial declaration of nullity of a completely void marriage.
We are not persuaded.
36
In Jarillo v. People, where the accused, in her motion for
reconsideration, argued that since her marriages were entered into
before the effectivity of the Family Code, then the applicable law is
37
Section 29 of the Marriage Law (Act 3613), instead of Article 40 of
the Family Code, which requires a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void before a person may contract a subsequent
marriage. We did not find the argument meritorious and said:
As far back as 1995, in Atienza v. Brillantes, Jr., the Court already
made the declaration that Article 40, which is a rule of procedure,
should be applied retroactively because Article 256 of the Family Code
itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as
it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights." The Court
went on to explain, thus:
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants'
rights may not preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative
of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected.
The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach to, nor
arise from, procedural laws.1âwphi1
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, the Court pointed out the danger of not
enforcing the provisions of Article 40 of the Family Code, to wit:
In the case at bar, respondent’s clear intent is to obtain a judicial
declaration nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that
very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot
have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous
bigamist has to do is disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract
a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply
claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent
marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity
of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage license and
thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a
declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first
marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provision
38
on bigamy.
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED.
The Order dated September 24, 2007 and the Resolution dated
January 2, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna,
Branch 31, issued in Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL, are hereby SET
ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 4990-SPL is ordered REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PERSBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-
ROBERTO A. ABAD
DE CASTRO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
 EN BANC
G.R. No. 150758 February 18, 2004
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We are called on to decide the novel issue concerning the effect of the
judicial declaration of the nullity of a second or subsequent marriage,
on the ground of psychological incapacity, on an individual’s criminal
liability for bigamy. We hold that the subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does not
retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the
Philippines’ penal laws are concerned. As such, an individual who
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the
subsequent declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on
the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner in this case, Veronico Tenebro, contracted marriage with
private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The two were
wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu
City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without
interruption until the latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed
Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a
photocopy of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes.
Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal
dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to
1
cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this
one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the
2
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned
of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter
3
was indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter, Villareyes
confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
4
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. The
5
Information, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 013095-L,
reads:
That on the 10th day of April 1990, in the City of Lapu-lapu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
aforenamed accused, having been previously united in lawful
marriage with Hilda Villareyes, and without the said marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a second marriage with LETICIA ANCAJAS,
which second or subsequent marriage of the accused has all the
essential requisites for validity were it not for the subsisting first
marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
6
When arraigned, petitioner entered a plea of "not guilty".
During the trial, petitioner admitted having cohabited with Villareyes
from 1984-1988, with whom he sired two children. However, he denied
that he and Villareyes were validly married to each other, claiming that
7
no marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He
alleged that he signed a marriage contract merely to enable her to get
the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a
8
seaman. He further testified that he requested his brother to verify
from the Civil Register in Manila whether there was any marriage at all
9
between him and Villareyes, but there was no record of said marriage.
On November 10, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City,
Branch 54, rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy under Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one
10
(1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for review on the following assignment of
errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
ERRED, AND THIS ERROR IS CORRECTIBLE IN THIS
APPEAL – WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE
HONORABLE COURT A QUOCONVICTING THE ACCUSED
FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY, DESPITE THE NON-
EXISTENCE OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE AND
INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.
II. THE COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED
FOR (sic) THE CRIME OF BIGAMY DESPITE CLEAR
PROOF THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE ACCUSED
AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN DECLARED
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND WITHOUT LEGAL FORCE
AND EFFECT.
11
After a careful review of the evidence on record, we find no cogent
reason to disturb the assailed judgment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of the
crime of Bigamy are:
(1) that the offender has been legally married;
(2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not
yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
(3) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and
(4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
12
essential requisites for validity.
Petitioner’s assignment of errors presents a two-tiered defense, in
which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Villareyes,
and (2) argues that the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged
indicator that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for
validity, retroacts to the date on which the second marriage was
13
celebrated. Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of
14
the crime of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.
Petitioner’s defense must fail on both counts.
First, the prosecution presented sufficient evidence, both
documentary and oral, to prove the existence of the first marriage
between petitioner and Villareyes. Documentary evidence presented
was in the form of: (1) a copy of a marriage contract between Tenebro
and Villareyes, dated November 10, 1986, which, as seen on the
document, was solemnized at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Julieto
Torres, a Minister of the Gospel, and certified to by the Office of the
15
Civil Registrar of Manila; and (2) a handwritten letter from Villareyes
to Ancajas dated July 12, 1994, informing Ancajas that Villareyes and
16
Tenebro were legally married.
To assail the veracity of the marriage contract, petitioner presented (1)
a certification issued by the National Statistics Office dated October 7,
17
1995; and (2) a certification issued by the City Civil Registry of
18
Manila, dated February 3, 1997. Both these documents attest that
the respective issuing offices have no record of a marriage celebrated
between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B. Villareyes on November
10, 1986.
To our mind, the documents presented by the defense cannot
adequately assail the marriage contract, which in itself would already
have been sufficient to establish the existence of a marriage between
Tenebro and Villareyes.
All three of these documents fall in the category of public documents,
and the Rules of Court provisions relevant to public documents are
applicable to all. Pertinent to the marriage contract, Section 7 of Rule
130 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record. – When the original of a document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by
a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof
(Emphasis ours).
This being the case, the certified copy of the marriage contract, issued
by a public officer in custody thereof, was admissible as the best
evidence of its contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a
marriage was celebrated between petitioner and Villareyes on
November 10, 1986, and it should be accorded the full faith and
credence given to public documents.
Moreover, an examination of the wordings of the certification issued
by the National Statistics Office on October 7, 1995 and that issued by
the City Civil Registry of Manila on February 3, 1997 would plainly
show that neither document attests as a positive fact that there was
no marriage celebrated between Veronico B. Tenebro and Hilda B.
Villareyes on November 10, 1986. Rather, the documents merely
attest that the respective issuing offices have no record of such a
marriage. Documentary evidence as to the absence of a record is
quite different from documentary evidence as to the absence of a
marriage ceremony, or documentary evidence as to the invalidity of
the marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes.
The marriage contract presented by the prosecution serves as positive
evidence as to the existence of the marriage between Tenebro and
Villareyes, which should be given greater credence than documents
testifying merely as to absence of any record of the marriage,
especially considering that there is absolutely no requirement in the
law that a marriage contract needs to be submitted to the civil registrar
as a condition precedent for the validity of a marriage. The mere fact
that no record of a marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage,
19
provided all requisites for its validity are present. There is no
evidence presented by the defense that would indicate that the
marriage between Tenebro and Villareyes lacked any requisite for
validity, apart from the self-serving testimony of the accused himself.
Balanced against this testimony are Villareyes’ letter, Ancajas’
testimony that petitioner informed her of the existence of the valid first
marriage, and petitioner’s own conduct, which would all tend to
indicate that the first marriage had all the requisites for validity.
Finally, although the accused claims that he took steps to verify the
non-existence of the first marriage to Villareyes by requesting his
brother to validate such purported non-existence, it is significant to
note that the certifications issued by the National Statistics Office and
the City Civil Registry of Manila are dated October 7, 1995 and
February 3, 1997, respectively. Both documents, therefore, are dated
after the accused’s marriage to his second wife, private respondent in
this case.
As such, this Court rules that there was sufficient evidence presented
by the prosecution to prove the first and second requisites for the crime
of bigamy.
The second tier of petitioner’s defense hinges on the effects of the
20
subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the second marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Petitioner argues that this subsequent judicial declaration retroacts to
the date of the celebration of the marriage to Ancajas. As such, he
argues that, since his marriage to Ancajas was subsequently declared
21
void ab initio, the crime of bigamy was not committed.
This argument is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner makes much of the judicial declaration of the nullity of the
second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, invoking
Article 36 of the Family Code. What petitioner fails to realize is that a
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the
State’s penal laws are concerned.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes, petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
22
regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since
a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an
argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Pertinently,
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes "any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former
marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered
in the proper proceedings". A plain reading of the law, therefore, would
indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on
April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the valid first marriage, the
crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there
is no cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage
that is null and void purely because it is a second or subsequent
marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the
ground of psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability
for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal laws protecting the
institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of
this special contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s
deliberate disregard of the permanent character of the special bond
between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s
marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. The
requisites for the validity of a marriage are classified by the Family
Code into essential (legal capacity of the contracting parties and their
23
consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing officer) and
formal (authority of the solemnizing officer, marriage license, and
marriage ceremony wherein the parties personally declare their
agreement to marry before the solemnizing officer in the presence of
24
at least two witnesses). Under Article 5 of the Family Code, any male
or female of the age of eighteen years or upwards not under any of
25 26
the impediments mentioned in Articles 37 and 38 may contract
27
marriage.
In this case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of
marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over
eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second
marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr.
of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two
witnesses.
Although the judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the
celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the
spouses is concerned, it is significant to note that said marriage is not
without legal effects. Among these effects is that children conceived
or born before the judgment of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be
28
considered legitimate. There is therefore a recognition written into
the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still
produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences is
incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render
the State’s penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory, and allow
individuals to deliberately ensure that each marital contract be flawed
in some manner, and to thus escape the consequences of contracting
multiple marriages, while beguiling throngs of hapless women with the
promise of futurity and commitment.
As such, we rule that the third and fourth requisites for the crime of
bigamy are present in this case, and affirm the judgment of the Court
of Appeals.
As a final point, we note that based on the evidence on record,
petitioner contracted marriage a third time, while his marriages to
Villareyes and Ancajas were both still subsisting. Although this is
irrelevant in the determination of the accused’s guilt for purposes of
this particular case, the act of the accused displays a deliberate
disregard for the sanctity of marriage, and the State does not look
kindly on such activities. Marriage is a special contract, the key
characteristic of which is its permanence. When an individual
manifests a deliberate pattern of flouting the foundation of the State’s
basic social institution, the State’s criminal laws on bigamy step in.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the
penalty for the crime of bigamy is prision mayor, which has a duration
of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. There being
neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the same shall be
imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, petitioner shall be entitled to a minimum term, to be taken from
the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional which has a
duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the
Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the decision of the trial court which
sentenced petitioner to suffer an indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition for
review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 21636, convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the
crime of Bigamy and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Veronico Tenebro has been charged with bigamy for contracting, while
still being married to Hilda Villareyes, a second marriage with private
complainant Leticia Ancajas. Tenebro argues that since his second
marriage with Ancajas has ultimately been declared void ab initio on
the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity, he should be
acquitted for the crime of bigamy.
The offense of bigamy is committed when one contracts "a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
1
proceedings". Bigamy presupposes a valid prior marriage and a
subsequent marriage, contracted during the subsistence of the prior
union, which would have been binding were it not for its being
bigamous.
Would the absolute nullity of either the first or the second marriage,
prior to its judicial declaration as being void, constitute a valid defense
in a criminal action for bigamy?

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, I believe that, except for a void marriage on account of the
Corona, and Azcuna, JJ., concur. psychological incapacity of a party or both parties to the marriage
Puno, J., join the opinion of J. Vitug. under Article 36 of the Family Code (as so hereinafter explained), the
Vitug, J., see separate opinion. answer must be in the affirmative. Void marriages are inexistent from
Quisumbing, J., join the dissent in view of void nuptia. the very beginning, and no judicial decree is required to establish their
2 3
Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion. nullity. As early as the case of People vs. Aragon this Court has
Austria-Martinez, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio. underscored the fact that the Revised Penal Code itself does not,
Carpio-Morales, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio. unlike the rule then prevailing in Spain, require the judicial declaration
Tinga, J., join the dissent of J. Carpio. of nullity of a prior void marriage before it can be raised by way of a
Callejo, Sr., J., see separate dissent. defense in a criminal case for bigamy. Had the law contemplated
otherwise, said the Court, " an express provision to that effect would
or should have been inserted in the law, (but that in) its absence, (the
courts) are bound by (the) rule of strict interpretation" of penal statutes.
In contrast to a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially
annulled (and, therefore, not a defense in a bigamy charge if the
SEPARATE OPINION>
second marriage were contracted prior to the decree of
4
annulment) the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted
VITUG, J.: marriage, being void ab initio and legally inexistent, can outrightly be
defense in an indictment of bigamy.
It has been held that, by virtue of Article 40 of the Family Code, a
person may be convicted of bigamy although the first marriage is
ultimately adjudged void ab initio if, at the time the second marriage is
contracted, there has as yet no judicial declaration of nullity of the prior
5
marriage. I maintain strong reservations to this ruling. Article 40 of the
Family Code reads:
"Article 40. The absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of the final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
It is only "for purpose of remarriage" that the law has expressed that
the absolute nullity of the previous marriage may be invoked "on the
basis solely of the final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void." It may not be amiss to state that under the regime of the Civil
Code of 1950, the Supreme Court, in Wiegel vs. Judge Sempio-
6
Diy, has held that a subsequent marriage of one of the spouses of a
prior void marriage is itself (the subsequent marriage) void if it were
contracted before a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage. Although this pronouncement has been abandoned in a
7
later decision of the court in Yap vs. Court of Appeals, the Family
Code, however has seen it fit to adopt the Wiegel rule but only for
purpose of remarriage which is just to say that the subsequent
marriage shall itself be considered void. There is no clear indication to
conclude that the Family Code has amended or intended to amend
the Revised penal Code or to abandon the settled and prevailing
jurisprudence on the matter.
8 an action or defense of absolute nullity of marriage falling under Article
A void marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is a class by itself.
The provision has been from Canon law primarily to reconcile the
grounds for nullity of marriage under civil law with those of church
9
laws. The "psychological incapacity to comply" with the essential
marital obligations of the spouses is completely distinct from other
grounds for nullity which are confined to the essential or formal
requisites of a marriage, such as lack of legal capacity or
disqualification of the contracting parties, want of consent, absence of
a marriage license, or the like.
The effects of a marriage attended by psychological incapacity of a
party or the parties thereto may be said to have the earmarks of a
voidable, more than a void, marriage, remaining to be valid until it is
judicially decreed to be a nullity. Thus, Article 54 of the Family Code
considers children conceived or born of such a void marriage before
its judicial declaration of nullity to be legitimate similar to the rule on a
voidable marriage. It is expected, even as I believe it safe to assume,
that the spouses’ rights and obligations, property regime and
successional rights would continue unaffected, as if it were a voidable
marriage, unless and until the marriage is judicially declared void for
basically two reasons: First, psychological incapacity, a newly-added
ground for the nullity of a marriage under the Family Code, breaches
neither the essential nor the formal requisites of a valid
10
marriages; and second, unlike the other grounds for nullity of
marriage (i.e., relationship, minority of the parties, lack of license,
mistake in the identity of the parties) which are capable of relatively
easy demonstration, psychological incapacity, however, being a
11
mental state, may not so readily be as evident. It would have been
logical for the Family Code to consider such a marriage explicitly
voidable rather than void if it were not for apparent attempt to make it
closely coincide with the Canon Law rules and nomenclature.
Indeed, a void marriage due to psychological incapacity appears to
merely differ from a voidable marriage in that, unlike the latter, it is not
convalidated by either cohabitation or prescription. It might be recalled
that prior to republic Act No. 8533, further amending the Family Code,
36, celebrated before the effectivity of the Code, could prescribe in ten
years following the effectivity of the Family Code. The initial provision
of the ten-year period of prescription seems to betray a real
consciousness by the framers that marriages falling under Article 36
are truly meant to be inexistent.
Considerations, both logical and practical, would point to the fact that
a "void" marriage due to psychological incapacity remains, for all
intents and purposes, to be binding and efficacious until judicially
declared otherwise. Without such marriage having first been declared
a nullity (or otherwise dissolved), a subsequent marriage could
constitute bigamy. Thus, a civil case questioning the validity of the first
marriage would not be a prejudicial issue much in the same way that
a civil case assailing a prior "voidable" marriage (being valid until
annulled) would not be a prejudicial question to the prosecution of a
criminal offense for bigamy.

In cases where the second marriage is void on grounds other than the
existence of the first marriage, this Court has declared in a line of
12
cases that no crime of bigamy is committed. The Court has explained
that for a person to be held guilty of bigamy, it must, even as it needs
only, be shown that the subsequent marriage has all the essential
elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsisting first union.
Hence, where it is established that the second marriage has been
13
contracted without the necessary license and thus void, or that the
accused is merely forced to enter into the second (voidable)
14
marriage, no criminal liability for the crime of bigamy can attach. In
both and like instances, however, the lapses refers to the elements
required for contracting a valid marriage. If, then, all the requisites for
the perfection of the contract marriage, freely and voluntarily entered
into, are shown to be extant, the criminal liability for bigamy can
unassailably arise.

Since psychological incapacity, upon the other hand, does not

relate to an infirmity in the elements, either essential or formal, in
contacting a valid marriage, the declaration of nullity subsequent
to the bigamous marriage due to that ground, without more,
would be inconsequential in a criminal charge for bigamy. The
judicial declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity merely nullifies the effects of the marriage
but it does not negate the fact of perfection of the bigamous marriage.
Its subsequent declaration of nullity dissolves the relationship of the
spouses but, being alien to the requisite conditions for the perfection
of the marriage, the judgment of the court is no defense on the part of
the offender who had entered into it.

Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petition.

 FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 139676 March 31, 2006
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
NORMA CUISON-MELGAR, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) is a petition for
1
review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
August 11, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 55538, which affirmed in toto the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City (RTC)
nullifying the marriage of respondents Norma Cuison-Melgar (Norma)
2 3
and Eulogio A. Melgar (Eulogio) pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
On March 27, 1965, Norma and Eulogio were married before the
Catholic Church in Dagupan City. Their union begot five children,
namely, Arneldo, Fermin, Norman, Marion Joy, and Eulogio III. On
August 19, 1996, Norma filed for declaration of nullity of her marriage
on the ground of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity to comply with his
4
essential marital obligations. According to Norma, the manifestations
of Eulogio’s psychological incapacity are his immaturity, habitual
alcoholism, unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional
laziness, and abandonment of his family since December 27, 1985.
Summons, together with a copy of the complaint, was served by
personal service on Eulogio on October 21, 1996 by the
5
sheriff. Eulogio failed to file an answer or to enter his appearance
within the reglementary period.
On November 25, 1996, the RTC ordered the Public Prosecutor to
conduct an investigation on the case to determine whether or not there
6
exists collusion between the contending parties. On December 18,
1996, Public Prosecutor Joven M. Maramba submitted his
Manifestation to the effect that no collusion existed between the
7
contending parties. On December 19, 1996, the RTC set the
8
reception of evidence on January 8, 1997.
On January 8, 1997, upon motion of Norma’s counsel, the RTC
allowed the presentation of evidence before the Clerk of
9
Court. Norma testified that since the birth of their firstborn, Eulogio
has been a habitual alcoholic; when he is drunk he (a) sometimes
sleeps on the streets, (b) every so often, he goes to her office, utters
unwholesome remarks against her and drags her home, (c) he usually
lays a hand on her, (d) he often scolds their children without justifiable
reason; his liquor drinking habit has brought shame and
embarrassment on their family; when she would refuse to give him
money for his compulsive drinking habit, he would beat her up and
threaten her; he has not been employed since he was dismissed from
work and he refuses to look for a job; she has been the one supporting
the family, providing for the education and the basic needs of their
children out of her salary as a government employee; on December
27, 1985, because of unbearable jealousy to her male officemates,
Eulogio went to her office, dragged her home and then beat her up;
her brothers saw this, came to her rescue and then told Eulogio to get
out of the house; and since then, Eulogio has not visited or
communicated with his family such that reconciliation is very
10
unlikely. The Public Prosecutor thereafter conducted a brief cross-
11
examination of Norma.
Twelve days later, or on January 20, 1997, the RTC rendered its
decision nullifying the marriage of Norma and Eulogio. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the instant petition for
being impressed with merit. As such, pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the marriage between Norma L. Cuison-
Melgar and Eulogio A. Melgar, Jr. is declared an ABSOLUTE
NULLITY.
The Local Civil Registrar of Dagupan City is therefore ordered to
cancel the Marriage Contract of the parties bearing Registry No. 180
in the Marriage Registry of said Office after payment of the required
fees.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the following offices: The City
Prosecution Office, Dagupan City, the Solicitor General, and the Local
Civil Registrar of Dagupan City.
SO ORDERED.
12
The RTC reasoned that:
With the testimony of the petitioner, the Court is convinced that
defendant has been incorrigible in his vices such as habitual
alcoholism, subjecting his family to physical maltreatment and many
times caused them to be scandalized, his being indolent by not at least
trying to look for a job so that he could also help his wife in supporting
his family, and also his uncalled for display of his jealousy. These are
clear manifestation of his psychological incapacity to perform his
marital obligation to his wife such as showing respect, understanding
and love to her. Defendant also became indifferent to the needs of his
own children who really longed for a father who is willing to make the
sacrifice in looking for a job so as to support them. Without any
communication to his family since 1985, certaining [sic] reconciliation
and love would be improbable. The attendant circumstances in this
case really point to the fact that defendant was unprepared to comply
with his responsibilities as a good and responsible husband to his wife
13
and a loving father to his children x x x.
Petitioner, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
filed an appeal with the CA, contending that the evidence presented
are not sufficient to declare the marriage void under Article 36 of the
14
Family Code.
On August 11, 1999, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the
15
decision of the RTC. The CA, quoting extensively Norma’s
testimony, ratiocinated:
[I]t has been adequately established that the decree of annulment is
proper not simply because of defendant’s habitual alcoholism but
likewise because of other causes amounting to psychological
incapacity as a result of which defendant has failed to perform his
obligations under Articles 68-72, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code
x x x.
Contrary to the submission of the appellant Republic, the grant of
annulment is not based merely on defendant’s habitual alcoholism but
also because of his inability to cope with his other essential marital
obligations foremost of which is his obligation to live together with his
wife, observe mutual love, respect, fidelity and render mutual help and
support.
For the whole duration of their marriage, that is, the period when they
actually lived together as husband and wide and even thereafter,
defendant has miserably failed to perform his obligations for which
reason the plaintiff should not be made to suffer any longer. The
contention of the Republic that plaintiff never showed that she exerted
effort to seek medical help for her husband is stretching the obligations
of the plaintiff beyond its limits. To our mind, it is equivalent to saying
that plaintiff deserves to be punished for all the inabilities of defendant
to perform his concomitant duties as a husband and a father all of
which inabilities in the first place are in no way attributable to the herein
16
plaintiff.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
17
In its Petition, the OSG poses a sole issue for resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL
INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT IS IN THE NATURE
18
CONTEMPLATED BY ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
The OSG contends that the law does not contemplate mere inability
to perform the essential marital obligations as equivalent to or
evidence of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code; that such inability must be due to causes that are psychological
in nature; that no psychiatrist or psychologist testified during the trial
that a psychological disorder is the cause of Eulogio's inability to look
for a job, his resulting drunkenness, unbearable jealousy and other
disagreeable behavior; and that the decision failed to state the nature,
gravity or seriousness, and incurability of Eulogio’s alleged
psychological incapacity.
19
In her Comment, Norma maintains that her testimony pointing to the
facts and circumstances of Eulogio’s immaturity, habitual alcoholism,
unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, constitutional laziness and
indolence are more than enough proof of Eulogio’s psychological
incapacity to comply with his essential marital obligations, which
justifies the dissolution of their marriage.
20
In its Reply, the OSG submits that Norma’s comments are irrelevant
and not responsive to the arguments in the petition. Nonetheless, the
OSG reiterates that Norma’s evidence fell short of the requirements of
the law since no competent evidence was presented during the trial to
prove that Eulogio’s inability to look for a job, his resulting
drunkenness, jealousy and other disagreeable behavior are
manifestations of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our Constitution to
protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social
21
institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Our family
law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State can
find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
break up of families weakens our social and moral fabric and, hence,
22
their preservation is not the concern alone of the family members.
In this regard, Article 48 of the Family Code mandates:
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent
collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall
be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
(Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 6 of Rule 18 of the 1985 Rules of Court,
23
the rule
then applicable, provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal
separation. - If the defendant in an action for annulment of marriage
or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between
the parties exists, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State
in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.
(Emphasis supplied)
24
In Republic v. Molina, the Court emphasized the role of the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal, and the OSG to appear as counsel for
the State in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification,
which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons
for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the
date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The
Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the
defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
25
(Emphasis
supplied)
In this case, the State did not actively participate in the prosecution of
the case at the trial level. Other than the Public Prosecutor’s
26
Manifestation that no collusion existed between the contending
27
parties and the brief cross-examination which had barely scratched
the surface, no pleading, motion, or position paper was filed by the
Public Prosecutor or the OSG. The State should have been given the
opportunity to present controverting evidence before the judgment
 28
was rendered. Truly, only the active participation of the Public
Prosecutor or the OSG will ensure that the interest of the State is
represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the
29
parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence.
Be that as it may, the totality of evidence presented by Norma is
completely insufficient to sustain a finding that Eulogio is
psychologically incapacitated.
30
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
31
antecedence, and (c) incurability. It should refer to "no less than a
mental, not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage." The
32
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.
33
Subsequently, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v.
34
Molina the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article
36 of the Family Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by
the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability
and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis (Salita v. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness
and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their
"I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to
cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
 procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much
less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
35
courts. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
36
Later, the Court clarified in Marcos v. Marcos that there is no
requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be
personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine
qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Such psychological incapacity, however,
must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during
37
the trial.
In the present case, Norma alone testified in support of her complaint
for declaration of nullity of her marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code. She failed to establish the fact that at the time they were
married, Eulogio was already suffering from a psychological defect
which in fact deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties
of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. In fact, Norma
admitted in her testimony that her marital woes and Eulogio’s
disagreeable behavior started only after the birth of their firstborn and
38
when Eulogio lost his job.
Further, no other evidence was presented to show that Eulogio was
not cognizant of the basic marital obligations as outlined in Articles 68
39 40 41 42
to 72, 220, 221, and 225 of the Family Code. It was not
sufficiently proved that Eulogio was really incapable of fulfilling his
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological nature, and not
merely physical.lawphil.net
The Court cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact of
Eulogio’s immaturity, habitual alcoholism, unbearable jealousy,
maltreatment, constitutional laziness, and abandonment of his family.
These circumstances by themselves cannot be equated with
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.
It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make Eulogio completely unable to discharge the
43
essential obligations of the marital state.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by Norma are grounds for legal
44
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. As the Court ruled
45
in Republic of the Philippines v. Molina, it is not enough to prove that
a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person, it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing
so due to some psychological, not physical, illness. There was no
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates a person from accepting and complying with the
46
obligations essential to marriage.
All told, in order that the allegation of psychological incapacity may not
be considered a mere fabrication, evidence other than Norma’s lone
testimony should have been adduced. While an actual medical,
psychiatric or psychological examination is not a conditio sine qua non
47
to a finding of psychological incapacity, an expert witness would
have strengthened Norma’s claim of Eulogio’s alleged psychological MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
incapacity. Norma’s omission to present one is fatal to her position. Associate Justice
There can be no conclusion of psychological incapacity where there is
absolutely no showing that the "defects" were already present at the CERTIFICATION
48
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
The Court commiserates with Norma’s marital predicament, but as a certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
court, even as the highest one, it can only apply the letter and the spirit consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the law; it cannot reinvent or modify it. Unfortunately, law and of the Court’s Division.
jurisprudence are ranged against Norma’s stance. The Court has no
choice but to apply them accordingly, if it must be true to its mission ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
under the rule of law. The Court’s first and foremost duty is to apply
Chief Justice
the law no matter how harsh it may be.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is GRANTED. The assailed

Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 11, 1999 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 55538, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 43, Dagupan City in Civil Case No. CV-96-01061-D, dated
January 20, 1997, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of
Norma Cuison-Melgar in Civil Case No. CV-96-01061-D
is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES- ROMEO J. CALLEJO,

SANTIAGO SR.
Associate Justice Asscociate Justice
 FIRST DIVISION quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is
capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380
Petitioner, WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the
second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code and
Present: by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him
by his American wife, the petitioner is given the
Davide, Jr., C.J., capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
- versus - (Chairman),
[3]
Quisumbing, IT IS SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as
Azcuna, JJ. follows.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent. Promulgated: On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros
M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines
October 5, 2005 in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a
son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and
x------------ -----------------------------------x Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

DECISION In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
QUISUMBING, J.: discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American
citizen.

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife
party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipino Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently
spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law? live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
make a definite ruling on this apparently novel question, presented authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
as a pure question of law. Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails sought reconsideration but it was denied.
[1]
the Decision dated May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of
[2]
Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution dated
July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN
REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY
[4]
CODE
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it
only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
[5]
annulment or for legal separation. Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The
OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial
[6]
determination.
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly
applicable to his case but insists that when his naturalized
alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to
remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law
[7]
pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry
filed before the trial court actually constituted a petition for
declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR
REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested
under a deed, will, contract or other written
instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or other
governmental regulation may, before breach or
violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial Court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising, and for a declaration
of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be
a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between
persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the
relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is
[8]
ripe for judicial determination.
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a
marriage between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien
citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarried while in the
U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner
representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of
marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration
of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial
determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26
of the Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we
must dwell on how this provision had come about in the first place, and
what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which
took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending
Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
 ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear
to govern the situation presented by the case at hand. It
seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the
marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino
citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an American
citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her
capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American
citizen while residing in the U.S.A.
[9]
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings on
the Family Code, the Catholic Bishops Conference of the
Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates
against those whose spouses are Filipinos
who divorce them abroad. These spouses
who are divorced will not be able to re-marry,
while the spouses of foreigners who validly
divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition
of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses
validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and
can re-marry. We propose that this be
deleted and made into law only after more
widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of
the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the
[10]
1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is
valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of
the celebration of the marriage, the parties were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a
foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita
[11]
v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as
in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married.
The wife became a naturalized American citizen in
1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The
Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is
no longer married under Philippine law and can thus
remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and
applying the rule of reason, we hold that Paragraph 2
of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases
involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and
obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should
likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party
were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of
the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a
statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear
purpose of the legislature, it should be construed
according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far
as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may
therefore be extended to cases not within the literal
meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
[12]
spirit or intent.
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse,
then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an
American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that
has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As
fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating
her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both
present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the divorced
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper
remedy of the Filipino spouse is to file either a petition
for annulment or a petition for legal separation.
Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and
in this particular case, not even feasible, considering
that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the
badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever
the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino
spouse would still remain married to the naturalized
alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent
evidence duly submitted by respondent concerning
the divorce decree and the naturalization of
respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
[13]
allegation is not evidence.
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must
prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as
an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts,
the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
[14]
allowing it. Such foreign law must also be proved
 as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged Associate Justice
[15]
and proved. Furthermore, respondent must also
show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to WE CONCUR:
remarry as specifically required in Article 26.
Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to
declare that he is capacitated to enter into another
marriage. HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Chairman
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O.
No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO ANTONIO T. CARPIO
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, Associate Justice Associate Justice
considering that in the present petition there is no
sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondents bare
allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
had remarried an American, that respondent is now Associate Justice
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only
be made properly upon respondents submission of
the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines
is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and
Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.

Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.
Chief Justice
No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
Manila acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November
[3]
29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent
THIRD DIVISION Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.
[4]
Due to work and
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, G.R. No. 186571 the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
Petitioner,
Present: surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,
BRION, returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court
- versus - BERSAMIN,
*
ABAD, and of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month
[5]
later, on January 8, 2006.
Promulgated:
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The August 11, 2010
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has
Respondents. -- -
found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry
DECISION
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
BRION, J.: Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce
decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision

[1]
of the Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree

petition for review on certiorari

[2]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court,
[6]
(present petition). pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition

of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved (petition) with the RTC.Although summoned, Daisylyn did
not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a
party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
[7]
In its October 30, 2008 decision, the RTC denied Gerberts
petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree
as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino
spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article
[8]
26 of the Family Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry
[9]
under Philippine law. Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative
intent behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido
[10]
III; the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
[11]
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
THE PETITION
[12] [13]
From the RTCs ruling, Gerbert filed the present petition.
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially
for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly
asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends
that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He
claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by
limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse an
interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a
proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case,
as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he
marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines since two marriage
certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry
Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their
[14]
respective Comments, both support Gerberts position.
 Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C.
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
[19]
right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of Constitution, enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending
a foreign divorce decree. Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
THE COURTS RULING Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force
The alien spouse in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
can claim no right there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
under the second except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
paragraph of and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Article 26 of the
Family Code as the Where a marriage between a Filipino
substantive right it citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
establishes is in divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by
favor of the the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
Filipino spouse remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO
and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
227 effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van
Code.
[20] [21]
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. In both cases, the
Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages
[15] [16] rights after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the
void and voidable marriages. In both cases, the basis for
Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand,
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage.
[17]
Our family laws do not recognize absolute To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino
[18]
spouse] has to be considered still married to [the
divorce between Filipino citizens. alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's
 obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino
spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to alien spouse.
[the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of
in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
[22]
served. the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse
to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
[23] than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal
married to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the benefit
[26]
capacity are generally governed by his national law.
of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling
the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien
RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
[24] benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse
remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether
alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related
issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino
The foreign
spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing divorce decree is
the marital bond;
[25]
Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy presumptive
evidence of a right
against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments that clothes the
party with legal
promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second
interest to petition
paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct for its recognition
in this jurisdiction
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor
of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence
of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final
orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction
to render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final
order upon a specific thing, the
judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final
order against a person, the
judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their
successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order
may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.
[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that,
as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
[28]
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country. This means that
the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
[29]
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes
the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
 In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain
a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section
24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section
requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested
by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of
official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal
of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy
of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
[30]
authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
[31]
divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss
the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem
it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce
law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of
action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina
wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at
the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right
by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall
[32]
have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in
[33]
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the
practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between
nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as
discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for
the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides.
Considerations
beyond the
recognition of the
foreign divorce
decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate
based on the mere presentation of the decree.
[34]
We consider the
recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of
the bench and the bar to what had been done.
 Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial shall keep and preserve in their offices the following
books, in which they shall, respectively make the
decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
civil register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
(1) Birth and death register;
decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons
legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities (2) Marriage register, in which shall be
entered not only the marriages
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily solemnized but also divorces and
dissolved marriages.
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate,
[35]
or his being married or not. (3) Legitimation, acknowledgment,
adoption, change of name and
naturalization register.
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign
one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil
not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be
registry:
read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
established for recording the civil status of
persons, in which shall be entered: context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing
the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
(a) births;
(b) deaths; acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages; the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
(e) divorces; certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions; Gerbert.
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name. Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4,
xxxx
 [36]
series of 1982, and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series
[37]
of 1982 both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can
be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of
the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree
does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the
proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil
register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The
Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which
entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional
and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated
in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified
petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the
[38]
corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
[39]
proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be
[40]
published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic
jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we
cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be
construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration
of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of
the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as
[41]
the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of
the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review
on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as
its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the
trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling
 CERTIFICATION
above.Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
SO ORDERED. before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been

reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
Chairperson
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,
vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL
CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE
ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of
1
law. The petition assails the Order dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC
in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed
the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree
of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack
of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The Facts
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married
2
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines on
23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara).
Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were
married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought
Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical
3
abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a
family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay
4
and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011,
Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of
Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki
prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized;
(2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara be
declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code
5
of the Philippines; and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court
judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics
6
Office (NSO).
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued
an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its
7
active civil docket. The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule
on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.
xxxx
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the
province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been
residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case
of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in
"gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its
dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that
"[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a
8
ground for immediate dismissal of the petition." Apparently, the RTC
took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this case either
Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void,
and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of
nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does
not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special
proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
9
fact," and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection
10
of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." In other words,
the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the status and
concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2)
the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment
declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the
ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese
judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
11
Philippines on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by
12
Philippine courts.
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on
13
the ground of psychological incapacity. Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only
the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t
is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having
a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the
prior, pre-existing marriage."
14
Fujiki had material interest and
therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in
the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the
"procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
15 16
3753) in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code. The Civil Register
Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or
annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court
to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or
17
annulled marriage was solemnized." Section 2 of Rule 108 provides
that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of
annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void
18
from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction. The
petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate the judgment
of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the
trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition
based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing
the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack
of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki
19
cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court which held that the
"trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to
the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio dismissing the
20
case." Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have
"immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of
21
absolute nullity of marriage. The trial court reiterated its two grounds
for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under
Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered
22
Fujiki as a "third person" in the proceeding because he "is not the
husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese Family
23
Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x." On the
other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue.
It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a
ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the
24
other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition
based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
25
Occidental. The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding
for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of
Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to
26
nullify marriages x x x." Braza emphasized that the "validity of
marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in
a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a
27
collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that
28
this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition. Moreover, the
verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was
29
not authenticated as required under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the
petition under the same provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment
30
on the petition for review. The public respondents, the Local Civil
Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor
General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a
Manifestation and Motion.
31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the
RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
32
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings. The Solicitor
General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an
injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave
33
v. Republic which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court
explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or
she had only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage
was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already
vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the
bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an
action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance,
the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in
a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and
the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it
causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent
marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and
the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the
34
Constitution.
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the
Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108
35 36
proceeding. In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas, this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
37
right of a party or a particular fact." While Corpuzconcerned a foreign
divorce decree, in the present case the Japanese Family Court
judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially
Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning
the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article
407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in
the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences
38
upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x." The Japanese
Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino
citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108
proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional
infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro
39 40
v. De Castro and Niñal v. Bayadog which declared that "[t]he
41
validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply
42
with the directive for them to comment on the petition. Maekara wrote
that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously
43
married to Fujiki. Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of
44
violence on Marinay. On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had
45
no reason to oppose the petition. She would like to maintain her
silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding
46
between her and Fujiki.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a
petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign
citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not
apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
47
Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic, this Court held that the rule
in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the
48
reason behind the petition is bigamy."
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign
country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact
under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section
49
48(b) of the Rules of Court. Petitioner may prove the Japanese
Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the
judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such
as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
50
authenticated by the seal of office.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition
of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties
should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the
51 52
petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public
53 54 55
prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of
56
the trial court. This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It
will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to
57
limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." The interpretation of
the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares
58
v. Rañada, this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign
court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back
on his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously
59
concluded litigation."
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil
status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect
of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
60
mandatory laws. Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws
relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity
in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign
judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal
jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such
citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void
does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if
it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the
foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment
on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is
under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only
recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to the rules of
evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign
judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of
Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise
limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve
into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on
grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule
on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection
61
of party expectations, as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other
62
states.
63
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, Philippine courts have
recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
64
evidence. Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended
procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial.
While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts
may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino
citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce
65
decree abroad.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact
the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines
has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family
Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation
to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
II.
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact
of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides
that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the
State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are
facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, which
66
the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor
General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
67
right of a party or a particular fact."
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act,
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his
civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the
basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material
interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and
the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the
civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage.
The interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only
68
to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances ) his most intimate
human relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by
69
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property
interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with
70
the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.
71
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
72
Constitution, but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to
relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations
73
between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of
74
the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage. In any case,
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right
by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the union
recognized by law.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of
a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage
on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states
that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
75
be filed solely by the husband or the wife" —it refers to the
husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of
the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning.
Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor
the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting
marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages
void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised
76
Penal Code, which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime.
Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen
77
has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes. If anyone
can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a
78
bigamous marriage, there is more reason to confer personality to sue
on the husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse
does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing
crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect of
protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the
spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the
79
judgment of the suit. Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior
marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
80
spouse." Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to
sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose,
he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment
is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no
more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous marriage in the
civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros
Occidental, this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to
nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction
81
of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the "validity of
marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the
82
marriage. The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for
recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition
of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the
civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A
direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive
and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are
the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
83
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the
84
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
85
spouses, and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
86
collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction
of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic
Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the
87
corresponding civil registry is located." In other words, a Filipino
citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of
changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation
of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment
annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and
procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a
foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action
for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and
decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling
a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign
court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts
to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse
without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
88
Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido, this Court recognized the
legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
89
to the Filipino spouse" under the laws of his or her country. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes
Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine
courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to
trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to
address the anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino,
whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws
allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied
to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the
laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the
Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already
effective in the country where it was rendered. The second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision
90
in Van Dorn v. Romillo which declared that the Filipino spouse
"should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of
91
justice are to be served."
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the
ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry
under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino
spouse cannot remarry.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the
Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is
free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family
Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical
difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground
for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the option to
undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available
to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are
incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decided
under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties,
or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen
who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are
limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign
judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine courts
only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the
rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the
foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the
Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate
proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default,
recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign
judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the
parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes
conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the correction or
cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that
92
establishes a new status, right and fact that needs to be reflected in
the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between
the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public
records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article
93
349 of the Revised Penal Code. The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction
of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of
prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is
absent from the Philippine archipelago."
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees
the need to address the questions on venue and the contents and form
of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January
2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 212656-57, November 23, 2016
MAYOR AMADO CORPUZ, JR., Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
1 2
of Court assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan
(SB) in Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0171 and SB-12-CRM-0172
dated 27 February 2014 and 23 May 2014, respectively, finding
petitioner Mayor Amado. Corpuz, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of two (2) counts of Falsification of Public Document under Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Facts
Petitioner, in his official capacity as the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija, was indicted for two (2) counts of the abovementioned
criminal offense. The accusatory portions of the two (2) separate
Informations filed against him before the SB are as follows:
CRIM. CASE NO. SB-12-CRM-0171
That on 28 October 2009 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [petitioner], a public officer, being
the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, acting in relation to his
office and taking advantage of his official position, did there and then
deliberately, willfully and feloniously, falsify the Certificate of Marriage
of Manny Asuncion and Dina Lumanlan by certifying therein that it was
he who solemnized their marriage when in truth and in fact, he was
not the one who solemnized the same but rather Thelmo O. Corpuz,
Sr., Local Civil Registrar (of) Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, to the damage and
prejudice of the said couple and of public interest.
CRIM. CASE NO. SB-12-CRM-0172
That on 18 December 2009 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named [petitioner], a public officer, being
the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, acting in relation to his
office and taking advantage of his official position, did there and then
deliberately, willfully and feloniously, falsify the Certificate of Marriage
of Alex Pascual and Esperanza Arizabal by certifying therein that it
was he who solemnized their marriage when in truth and in fact, he
was not the one who solemnized the same but rather Thelmo O.
Corpuz, Sr., Local Civil Registrar (of) Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, to the
damage and prejudice of the said couple and of public
3
interest. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As petitioner pleaded not guilty to both charges, trial ensued with the
prosecution presenting five (5) witnesses, and the defense presenting
three (3) witnesses, inclusive of documentary evidence admitted
therein, in order to resolve the jointly proposed issue of "who among
the parties the complainant on the one hand, [and] the married couples
and the sponsors who attest to the fact that it was the accused who
solemnized the said marriage is telling the truth?"
At the trial, the prosecution presented complainant Arsenio Flores, a
retired government employee who testified that being one of the
wedding sponsors of Alex Pascual and Esperanza Arizabal, he
attended and witnessed the actual ceremony of their wedding which
was solemnized by Thelmo Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Registrar, and
not petitioner, at the Municipal Registrar's Office where it was held;
that with the knowledge that said Municipal Registrar was not
authorized to solemnize marriage, he did not sign as a witness their
marriage certificate, and thereafter searched for documents, including
pictures and invitation cards, in order to establish such illegal acts; that
based on the documents he gathered, it was made to appear that
petitioner was the one who solemnized said marriages because of his
signature appearing on the corresponding marriage certificates; and
that he could not explain why the subject marriage certificate was
already signed by petitioner when in fact he was not around during the
 4 8
ceremony, and was immediately given to them on the same day. His
testimony was corroborated by Honorato M. Tolentino, the brother-in-
law of Alex Pascual, who testified that he rendered his services for
free as a photographer during said wedding, and witnessed the actual
ceremony, with the observation that it was Thelmo Corpuz, Sr. who
5
solemnized the same. chanrobleslaw
As to the marriage ceremony of Manny Asuncion and Dina Lumanlan,
Jorge N. Lazaro, a freelance photographer and pilot, testified that the
latter and her mother engaged his services as a photographer, and
even requested his live-in partner, Tessie Atayde, to stand as one of
the principal sponsors; that while taking photos for the event, he
naturally witnessed the actual ceremony which was held at the Senior
Citizen Building (now called Multi-Purpose Building); and that it was
Thelmo Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Registrar of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija,
6
who actually solemnized said marriage. chanrobleslaw
Lastly, the prosecution presented as rebuttal witness, Thelmo O.
Corpuz, Sr., who testified that complainant Arsenio Flores filed a case
for usurpation of official functions against him before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) in connection with the marriages of the couples,
which he allegedly solemnized; that he changed his plea of NOT
GUILTY to that of GUILTY, in order to have a peace of mind and to
reveal the truth that it was actually him who solemnized said
marriages; that it was actually him who was standing in front of both
couples as shown by the pictures presented as evidence; that after
pleading guilty, he immediately filed a Petition for Probation before the
same court; that he did not execute any affidavit of desistance to that
effect; and that his son Thelmo Corpuz III was already separated from
the government service, and that in the recent local elections, the latter
7
sided with the political rival of petitioner. The above narration was
corroborated and attested to by witness Felicisima D. Almonte, Clerk
of Court of the MTC, with the stipulation of the parties on the
authenticity and due execution of its 15 July 2013 Decision. On cross-
examination, she affirmed that as part of the records of the case, that
there was a counter�-affidavit attached therewith by Thelmo O.
Corpuz, Sr., but without an affidavit of recantation against his previous
counter-affidavit denying such accusations against him; and that
during the last local election, both Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., and his son,
Thelmo Corpuz, Jr., persuaded her to vote for petitioner's
opponent. chanrobleslaw
In his defense, petitioner himself testified. He insisted that he actually
solemnized at his office the marriage of spouses Pascual and that of
spouses Asuncion; that spouses Asuncion executed a joint affidavit of
cohabitation based on Article 34 of the Family Code making them
exempted from securing a marriage license as appearing in their
marriage contract; that complainant Arsenio Flores was not present at
the mayor's office when the wedding of spouses Pascual took place;
that in the subject weddings, all signatures appearing on the marriage
certificates were actually signed in his presence; that as a mayor for
eighteen ( 18) years, he knew that the power to solemnize marriage
cannot be delegated; and that he is aware that a case for usurpation
of official function was filed against Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., but has no
knowledge about his change of plea. The above testimonies were
further bolstered by no other than the parties themselves of said
marriage ceremonies. Both Alex Y. Pascual and Manny M. Asuncion
appeared and testified that petitioner was indeed the one who
solemnized their respective marriage; that their respective marriage is
valid and legal; that both ceremonies were held at the mayor's office;
and that, as reflected in the pictures shown by the prosecution, they
appeared before Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. only to receive marriage
counseling and to be taught on how to act during the actual ceremony,
before they went to the mayor's office for the actual solemnization by
9
petitioner. chanrobleslaw
From the foregoing testimonial and documentary evidence, including
the stipulations between the parties, the facts, as taken and
appreciated by the SB, are presented as
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
At the time material to the Informations, the [petitioner] was the
incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, while
Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. was the Municipal Civil Registrar until his
retirement from the service in 2011.
As set forth on the invitation for the Asuncion-Lumanlan Nuptials, the
couple was united in matrimony on October 28, 2009 at around 9:30
in the morning at Cuyapo Town Hall, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. Jorge N.
Lazaro attended the occasion along with his live-in partner Tessie
Atayde, who was one of the principal sponsors. Lazaro was hired as
photographer for the event and was able to capture the actual
ceremony. A marriage certificate was then issued to Spouses
Asuncion, duly signed by the [petitioner] as the solemnizing officer.
Another wedding which took place at the Municipal Hall of Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija on December 18, 2009 at around 9:00 o'clock in the
morning was that of Alex Pascual and Esperanza Arizabal. Among
those present was Arsenio Flores who stood as one of the principal
sponsors. The ceremony was similarly witnessed by Honorato M.
Tolentino, a brother-in-law of the groom who was also hired as
photographer for the said wedding. As proof of the wedding, a
marriage certificate bearing the signature of the [petitioner] as
solemnizing officer was thereafter issued to spouses Pascual.
Displeased with what transpired during the wedding ceremony of Alez
and Esperanza, Arsenio Flores came up with a complaint-affidavit,
dated February 8, 2010, setting forth the violations committed by the
[petitioner] and that of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the former as mere
signatory of the marriage certificates, and the latter acting as the
solemnizing officer on behalf of the mayor. Flores' declaration with
respect to the Pascual-Arizabal nuptial was corroborated by the
affidavit, dated March 22, 2010, of Honorato M. Tolentino, Sr., who
covered the said wedding. Flores included in his affidavit other nuptials
specifically that of Manny and Dina which was held on October 28,
2009 and which was also solemnized by Thelma Corpuz, Sr. His
statement was supported by Jorge Lazaro's affidavit, dated March 22,
2010, inclusive of snapshots he personally took on that day. In view of
Thelma O. Corpuz's entry of plea of guilty for two (2) counts of
usurpation of official functions filed against him before the Municipal
Trial Court of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, the court, in its Decision dated
July 15, 2013, duly considered his plea of guilty as a mitigating
circumstance, and imposed on him the straight penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment for each case.
DISCUSSION
In his memorandum, the [petitioner] maintains his innocence as he
questions the trustworthiness and reliability of the prosecution's
witnesses. According to him, the presumption of authenticity of public
documents, the marriage certificates in these cases, should prevail
over the inconsistent testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution
that it was not him who officiated these ceremonies. According to him
also, the couples themselves through Alex and Manny, who are
definitely in the best position to attest that it was the [petitioner] himself
who solemnized their marriage, did so in open court and expressed
such fact in their Joint Affidavits. Further, the rebuttal evidence of the
prosecution sans the affidavit of recantation of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr.,
did not alter his previous declaration that he did not solemnize the
subject weddings but the herein [petitioner] who rightfully certified his
deed in the marriage certificates. With these, the defense avers that
the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the [petitioner] beyond
reasonable doubt and, therefore, the [petitioner] should be acquitted.
On the other hand, in its memorandum, the prosecution asserts that
from the pieces of evidence presented and the testimonies of its
witnesses, it has proven all the elements of the offense charged based
on the quantum of evidence required by law. The accused clearly
committed falsification of public documents by making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts when, by taking advantage of his
official function, he certified in the marriage certificates of spouses
Asuncion and spouses Pascual that as the Municipal Mayor, he
personally solemnized their marriage when it was Thelmo O. Corpuz,
Sr., the Municipal Civil Registrar, who did so on his behalf. Thus, for
this false declaration, the [petitioner] should be held criminally
10
liable. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Ruling of the Sandiganhayan
In the assailed Decision dated 27 February 2014, the SB found
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the said crimes, the
dispositive portion of which is stated hereunder for ready reference, to
wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the Court finds
[petitioner] Amado R. Corpuz, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
for two (2) counts of Falsification of Public Document, defined and
penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code
and, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, is hereby sentenced
to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, for each count, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00 for each
case, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
11
insolvency. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It ruled that with the prosecution's pieces of evidence taken together,
all the elements of the crime of falsification of public documents, by
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, were adequately
established. The SB further explained that being a local chief
executive and duly authorized officer to solemnize marriage, petitioner
was duty-bound to observe his solemn affirmation on the marriage
certificates. More so, by taking advantage of his official position,
petitioner certified the particulars of an event, the subject marriages,
despite full knowledge that he did not personally solemnize the
exchange of marital vows of spouses Pascual and spouses Asuncion.
In other words, what he certified was absolutely false and for such
reason, petitioner's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.
By way of conclusion, the court stressed that in falsification of public
or official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea
of gain or intent to injure a third person because in the falsification of
public document, what is being punished is the violation of the public
faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
12
proclaimed. chanrobleslaw
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof and his supplemental
thereto were likewise denied for lack of merit in the 23 May 2014
Resolution.
Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the matter through a petition for review
on certiorari before this Court asserting the following errors, grounds
or arguments:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. THE SANDIGANBAYAN (RESPONDENT COURT FOR BREVITY)
COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND
MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN WITHOUT ANY JUSTIFICATION IT
ADMITTED MERE PHOTOCOPIES OF PROSECUTION'S
EVIDENCE, I.E., (1) INVITATION CARDS AND (2) PICTURES OVER
THE OBJECTION OF THE DEFENSE -
1.1 WORSENED BY THE ALLOWANCE OF SECONDARY
EVIDENCE (AS A NECESSARY CONSEQUENCE IN ITS
of
ADMISSION) WITHOUT COMPLIANCE WITH THE
RUDIMENTS ON SECONDARY EVIDENCE; AND
1.2 SERIOUS MISAPPRECIATJON OF FACT UPON ITS
FAlLURE AND/OR OMISSION TO CONSIDER GLARING
DISPARITIES BETWEEN PROSECUTION'S VERY OWN
EVIDENCE, I.E., (SAID) INVITATION CARDS AND ITS
OWN WITNESSES' STATEMENT AS TO THE PLACE
OR VENUE OF SOLEMNIZATION WHICH ON MATTERS
OF CREDIBILITY MORE SO, BY THE SURROUNDING
CIRCUMSTANCES IN HERE, TOUCHES ON THE VERY
ISSUE OF COMPETENCY OF THE WITNESS AND THE
STRICT RULE ON ASSESSMENT OF EVIDENCE
AGAINST THE STATE AND'LIBERAL FOR THE
ACCUSED. THIS RULE WAS SADLY IGNORED. WE
TAKE THIS TO NOTE AS NO TRIVIAL ASPECT AS THE
RESPONDENT COURT PUT IT.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF
LAW AND MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH
CASE LAW WHEN IT CONSIDERED FACTS NOT OFFERED IN
EVIDENCE AND TOTALLY OUT OF THE RECORDS - HOLDING
DEFENSE TWO (2) WITNESSES, THE SPOUSES HUSBANDS,
ALEX PASCUAL, AND MANNY ASUNCION, WERE ALLEGEDLY
INDEBTED OF GRATITUDE TO THE ACCUSED FOR BEING
ALLEGEDLY EMPLOYED BY THE LATTER; HENCE, DEBUNKING
CREDIBILITY OF THEIR TESTIMONIES.
3. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION OF
FACTS ON MATTERS AND SUBSTANCE SO MATERIAL POINTING
TO THE DEFENSE AS ALLEGEDLY THE ONE WHO SAID THAT
THE BEST PERSONS WHO COULD ATTEST WHO THE
SOLEMNIZER WAS IN THEIR RESPECTIVE WEDDINGS WERE
THE COUPLES TliEMSELVES WHICH CORRECT
PRONOUNCEMENT AND ACCURATE OBSERVATION, WAS IN
FACT, MADE BY ONE OF THE HONORABLE JUSTICES, THE
HONORABLE RODOLFO PONFERRADA, IN OPEN COURT NOT
THE ACCUSED WHICH OBSERVATION WE NOT ONLY SUPPORT
BUT TREASURE SO MUCH.
4. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION OF
FACTS ON MATTERS OF SUBSTANCE WHEN IT AGAIN MADE
ANOTHER PRONOUNCEMENT DECLARING THAT "ACCUSED
ONLY RELIED ON DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION OF
REGULARITY WITHOUT PRESENTING ANY OTHER EVIDENCE
NOT TO DOUBT HIS PERSONAL APPEARANCE ON THOSE
DATES AND THAT HE SIGNED THESE DOCUMENTS AFTER
ACTUALLY SOLEMNIZING THE SAID MARRIAGES."
5. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
OF LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS - WHEN IT
DECLARED TIIE PRESENCE OF ALL THE ELEMENTS OF
FALSIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 171 [OF THE] REVISED PENAL
CODE, AGORAVATED BY THE MISAPPLICATION OF THE DICTUM
IN ITS CITED GALEOS VS. PEOPLE.
6. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR OF
LAW AND MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS WHICH ARE MATTERS
OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH CASE LAW ADOPTING
TWO (2) STANDARDS OF APPLICATION OF LAW OVER TWO (2)
OPPOSSING DOCUMENTS, I.E., (1) THE TWO SETS OF
MARRIAGE CERTIFICATES ON ONE HAND, AND (2) THE
ADMITTEDLY FALSIFIED THREE (3) AFFIDAVITS OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES, HONORATO TOLENTINO, JORGE
LAZARO AND THELMO CORPUZ, THEREBY GROSSLY
MISAPPLIED ART. 171 [OF THE] REVISED PENAL CODE AS
CITED IN GALEOS VS. PEOPLE, WHEN IT TURNED DOWN THE
TWO (2) CERTIFICATE OF MARRIAGES IGNORING THE
DECIDENDI IN THE CITED CASE - WHILE CASUALLY
DOWNPLAYED THE FALSIFIED 3 WITNESSES AFFIDAVITS, ITS
LEGAL AND NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES.
7. OVER ALL CONSIDERATIONS, THE RESPONDENT COURT
COMMITTED THE MOST SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW
AND MISAPPRECIATION OF FACTS IN CLINGING TO ITS
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION INSTEAD OF ACQUITTAL ON THE
BASIS OF THE OPPOSING EVIDENCE RESPECTIVELY
PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION ON ONE HAND - AND - THE
DEFENSE ON THE OTHER HEREAFTER PRESENTED IN
13
GRAPHIC FORM. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is the contention of petitioner that none of the five (5) witnesses
presented by the prosecution was competent to testify on accused's
actual solemnization of and presence during the subject marriages.
Neither did any of the documentary evidence submitted by the
prosecution establish beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was not
the one who solemnized the same. Thus, in his defense, petitioner
believes that he is innocent considering that he was able to present
the husbands of the subject marriages, who appeared before him
during the actual solemnizations, and both testified in his favor,
supported by various documentary evidence, such as the subject
marriage certificates, including the joint affidavit of cohabitation and
joint affidavit of confirmation issued by the couples, and also the
counter-affidavit issued by Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the person alleged
to have actually conducted the said solemnization of the subject
marriages; who initially denied being the one who acted as a
solemnizing officer to any marriage ceremony.
Respondents, through its Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed on 28
14
April 2015 its Comment to the instant petition, and counters that the
SB acted in accord with law and jurisprudence on the basis of the
evidence on record when it found petitioner guilty of the felonies
charged; that petitioner raised questions of fact contrary to Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court; that the equipoise doctrine is inapplicable in the
case of petitioner; that petitioner was correctly convicted of the crimes
of falsification of public document since all the elements to establish
the same were proven beyond reasonable doubt; and that the other
issues and arguments raised by petitioner do not constitute reversible
error on the part of the SB.
The Issue
Whether or not petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of falsification of public documents.
The Ruling of the Court
At the outset, the Constitution presumes a person innocent until
proven guilty by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness ofthe defense's
evidence for it has the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the
accused - ei incumbit probatio qui elicit, non que negat - he who
15
asserts, not he who denies, must prove. chanrobleslaw
In other words, the burden of such proof rests with the prosecution,
which must rely on the strength of its case rather than on the weakness
of the case for the defense. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that
quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would
convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of
16
innocence. chanrobleslaw
Worthy to mention that in every criminal onviction, the prosecution is
required to prove two thinss beyond reasonable doubt: first, the fact of
the commission of the crime charged, or the presence of all the
elements of the offense; and second, the fact that the accused was
17
the perpetrator of the crime. chanrobleslaw
In the instant case, petitioner was charged with violation of Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the RPC, which provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary or
ecclesiastical minister. - The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer,
employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall
falsify a document by committing any of the following acts:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryx x x x
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts; x x x
It bears emphasis that what is punished in falsification of a public
document is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the
18
truth as solemnly proclaimed in it. Generally, the elements of Article
171 are: (1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public;
(2) he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he falsifies
19
a document by committing any of the ways it is done. chanrobleslaw
Specifically, paragraph 4 of the said Article requires that: (a) the
offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a
narration of facts; (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by the
20
offender are absolutely false. chanrobleslaw
In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven that the
public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position
in making the falsification. In falsification of public document, the
offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position
when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene
in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of
21
the document which he falsifies. chanrobleslaw
In the case at bench, and as correctly found by the SB, it is undisputed
that petitioner was a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, duly authorized by law to solemnize marriages,
at the time such alleged criminal offense was committed. Likewise, in
issuing marriage certificates, being a public document issued by the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, petitioner had the legal duty to
prepare said document, and not only to attest to the truth of what he
had given account of but more importantly, to warrant the truth of the
22
facts narrated by him thereon. Undoubtedly, these factual
circumstances were clearly established since petitioner himself admits
the same. Accordingly; we are now left with one final matter to
determine, i.e. whether or not the facts narrated by petitioner on the
subject marriage certificates were absolutely false. If answered in the
affirmative, then petitioner is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of falsification of public documents. Otherwise, he shall be exonerated.
Relevant thereto, the initial query to be resolved is whose evidence
between the prosecution and defense is credible in order to determine
the guilt of the accused in a criminal action.
For ready reference, we find the necessity of reproducing hereunder
the actual pertinent portion declared by petitioner in his official
capacity as a solemnizing officer, common to the subject marriage
certificates, which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT BEFORE ME, on the date and place
above written, personally appeared the above-mentioned parties, with
their mutual consent, lawfully joined together in marriage which was conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
24
solemnized by me in the presence of the witnesses named below, all based. chanrobleslaw
of legal age.
A perusal of the offered and admitted evidence, testimonial and
xxxx documentary, reveals some misappreciation of facts of which if
considered� may result in a different conclusion. In other words, there
(Signed)
were findings grounded entirely on speculation and/or premised on
HON. AMADOR. CORPUS, JR.
want of evidence that are needed to be resolved in the case before us.
MUNICIPAL MAYOR
23 Hence, we rule to reverse the SB's ruling of conviction against
CUYAPO, NUEVA ECIJA
petitioner.
From the above-quoted statement, petitioner categorically expresses
that, in both marriages, all parties (referring to spouses Pascual and
First, none of the testimonial and documentary evidence offered by
spouses Asuncion), personally appeared before him, as their
the prosecution was able to dispute the presumption of regularity of
solemnizing officer, in the presence of other witnesses.
an official function and authenticity and due execution of the public
instruments issued by petitioner as the Municipal Mayor, which may
In ruling that petitioner was not the one who solemnized the subject
only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
marriages, the SB relied heavily on the testimonial evidence of the
As can be gleaned from the narration of facts provided by the trial
prosecution's witnesses, particularly on the common fact that they all
court, there is no showing that an actual appearance by the concerned
witnessed an alleged ceremony conducted on said dates wherein
parties (spouses Pascual and spouses Asuncion) before petitioner as
Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., the Municipal Registrar, was the one who
their solemnizing officer did not occur or happen. Looking into the
acted as the solemnizing officer, and not petitioner. It further
evidence presented, the only patent conclusion that can be derived
considered the photos and photocopies of the invitations presented
from the prosecution's evidence, as admitted by the witnesses for the
and offered as additional proofs to establish the aforesaid incidents
defense, is that both couples appeared before. Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr.,
which show spouses Pascual and spouses Asuncion standing in front
for the sole purpose of recetvmg marriage counseling and/or marriage
of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. Moreover, the testimony of Thelmo O.
rehearsals, nothing more.
Corpuz, Sr., being a rebuttal evidence to the claims of Alex Y. Pascual
and Manny M. Asuncion that it was petitioner who solemnized their
Second, as mentioned in the assailed Decision, the SB expressed that
respective marriages, was vastly recognized as acceptable and
the testimonies of the defense's witnesses appear biased considering
damaging to petitioner's defense since the principle of res inter alios
that they "owe their current employment with the accused as these
acta (the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration,
narrations rang no truth and sounded to have been well-coached;"
or mission of another) does not apply in this case.
hence, they found the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses more
credible. Unfortunately, we find this declaration quite odd considering
We are not unaware that settled is the rule that factual findings of the
that there was no iota of evidence to show that both Alex Y. Pascual
SB are conclusive upon this Court. However, there are exceptions to
and. Manny M. Asuncion owe debts of gratitude to petitioner. Indeed
said rule, to wit: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
even it is taken as true that the defense witnesses who are the
speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the inference made is
husbands in the questioned marriages owe their employment to the
manifestly an error or founded on a mistake; (3) there is grave abuse
accused such fact can rightfully be construed as itself the reason why
of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) the findings of fact are premised on a want of evidence and are these witnesses would truly want their respective�marriages
contradicted by evidence on record; and (6) said findings of fact are officiated by the accused. As a matter of fact, it was the prosecution's
witnesses who have manifested some tainted credibility in their
testimonies when it was declared, among others, that: (a) all the
judicial affidavits were prepared by the complainant Arsenio A. Flores
and were given to them for their signatures; (b) Thelma Corpuz III, the
son of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., was separated from the government
service, and that in the recent local election, he sided with petitioner's
political rival; and (c) Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr. and his son, Thelmo
Corpuz, Jr., persuaded Felicisima D. Almonte to vote for the
petitioner's opponent during the local election. Clearly therefore, if
there were any doubts as to the credibility of the witnesses in this case,
it is those of the prosecution who should be considered guilty of
potential political motivations.
Third, as to the testimony of Thelmo O. Corpuz, Sr., we do not find the
same damaging on the part of petitioner considering that his
admission of conducting his own ceremony in the capacity of a
solemnizing officer simply confirms his criminal liability in the case of
usurpation of authority as his conviction was already pronounced by
the MTC. Such testimony does not necessarily result in the falsity of
petitioner's declaration that he nonetheless conducted his own
solemnization of the subject marriages. The fact remains that, as
testified to by Alex Y. Pascual and Manny M. Asuncion, it was
petitioner who solemnized their marriages on said date and at said
office.
Fourth, the burden of proof in estabiishing that petitioner made an
untruthful statement in the marriage certificate in order to be convicted
of the crime of falsification of public instrument solely lies on the
prosecution.
If only to stress the merit of this petition, we repeat the axioms that the
Bill of Rights guarantees the right of an accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. In order to overcome the
presumption of innocence, the prosecution is required to adduce
against him nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
prosecution fails to discharge its heavy burden, then it is not only the
right of the accused to be freed, it becomes the Court's constitutional
25
duty to acquit him. cralawredchanrobleslaw
Lastly, considering that the subject public instrument in this case refers
to the marriage certificate, we find it apropos to point out that the
validity of marriage cannot be collaterally attacked since under existing
laws and jurisprudence, the same may be questioned only in a direct
action. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. In declaring that
the one who solemnized the subject marriages had no authority to do
so would indirectly result in the declaration that said marriages are
26
void. This is what our jurisdiction intends to prevent. chanrobleslaw
By way of reiteration, it is a fundamental rule in criminal procedure that
the State carries the onus probandi in establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt, as a consequence of the tenet ei
incumbit probation, qui dicit, non qui negat, which means that he who
27
asserts, not he who denies, must prove, and as a means of
respecting the presumption of innocence in favor of the man or woman
on the dock for a crime. Accordingly, the State has the burden of proof
to show: (1) the correct identification of the author of a crime, and (2)
the actuality of the commission of the offense with the participation of
the accused. All these facts must be proved by the State beyond
reasonable doubt on the strength of its evidence and without solace
from the weakness of the defense. That the defense the accused puts
up may be weak is inconsequential if, in the first place, the State has
failed to discharge the onus of his identity and culpability. The
presumption of innocence dictates that it is for the� prosecution to
demonstrate the guilt and not for the accused to establish
28
innocence. Indeed, the accused, being presumed innocent, carries
no burden of proof on his or her shoulders.
Furthermore, it has been consistently ruled that "[c]ourts must judge
the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and not on mere
29
conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions." It is iniquitous to base
petitioner's guilt on the presumptions of the prosecution's witnesses
for the Court has, time and again, declared that if the inculpatory facts
and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of
which being consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other or others consistent with his guilt, then the evidence in view of
the constitutional presumption of innocence has not fulfilled the test of
moral certainty and is thus insufficient to support a
30
conviction. chanrobleslaw
In sum, the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution in
this case failed to pass the test of moral certainty necessary to warrant
31
petitioner's conviction. Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. Not
only that, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable
of two or more explanations or interpretations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence does not meet or hurdle the test of
32
moral certainty required for conviction. Accordingly, the prosecution
failed to establish the elements of falsification of public documents.
With the prosecution having failed to discharge its burden of
establishing petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, this Court is
constrained, as is its bounden duty when reasonable doubt persists,
to acquit him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the

Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. SB-12-CRM-0171 and SB-12-
CRM-0172 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Amado Corpuz,
Jr. is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.

Peralta, J., on wellness leave.
 THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183896 : January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner, v. GLORIA GOO
ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
1
Rules of Civil Procedure, questioning the Decision of the Court of
Appeals (CA) dated March 11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which
2
reversed the Decision in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM dated October
5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 109, Pasay City,
and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas (Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria
Goo-Abbas (Gloria) with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil
Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged
the absence of a marriage license, as provided for in Article 4, Chapter
I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as the Family
Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage
to Gloria.
3 No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED
In the Marriage Contract of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage
License No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993,
was presented to the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is
crucial to the resolution of this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria,
a Filipino citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August
4
9, 1992 at the Taipei Mosque in Taiwan. He arrived in the Philippines
in December of 1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5 oclock in the
afternoon, he was at his mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F.
Mu�oz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-in-law arrived with two
men. He testified that he was told that he was going to undergo some
ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines, but
was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he
and Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that
the ceremony was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further
testified that he did not go to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage
license, and that he had never resided in that area. In July of 2003, he
went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to check
on their marriage license, and was asked to show a copy of their
marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be
5
found. The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion,
issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage
license number appearing in the marriage contract he submitted,
Marriage License No. 9969967, was the number of another marriage
license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and Myra
6
Mabilangan. Said certification reads as follows:cralawlibrary
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:cralawlibrary
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in
this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR.
ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January
19, 1993. ???�r?bl?��??r�??l�l??�l?br?r�
AZHAR ABBAS and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever
7
legal purpose or intents it may serve. ?r?l1
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy
cases against him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite to get certification on
whether or not there was a marriage license on advice of his
8
counsel. ?r?l1
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared
under a letter of authority from the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to Marriage
License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
9 21
Mabilangan on January 20, 1993. ?r?l1
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage
10
licenses and that the numbers are issued chronologically. He
testified that the certification dated July 11, 2003, was issued and
signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality of
Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No. 9969967 was
issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19,
1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same
11
serial number, namely 9969967, to any other person. ?r?l1
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented
Reverend Mario Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May
Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of
the Gospel and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to
12
solemnize marriages within the Philippines. He testified that he
solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo at the
13
residence of the bride on January 9, 1993. He stated that the
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary Ann
14
Ceriola. He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since
15
1982, and that he is familiar with the requirements. Rev. Dauz further
testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day
before the actual wedding, and that the marriage contract was
16
prepared by his secretary. After the solemnization of the marriage, it
was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and Rev. Dauz
submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage license with
17
that office. ?r?l1
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the
wedding of Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride,
18
Felicitas Goo. He testified that he requested a certain Qualin to
secure the marriage license for the couple, and that this Qualin
secured the license and gave the same to him on January 8,
19
1993. He further testified that he did not know where the marriage
20
license was obtained. He attended the wedding ceremony on
January 9, 1993, signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and
witnessed the signing of the marriage contract by the couple, the
solemnizing officer and the other witness, Mary Ann Ceriola. ?r?l1
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar
Abbas is her son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding
22
ceremony held on January 9, 1993 at her house. She testified that
she sought the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing
the marriage license, and that a week before the marriage was to take
place, a male person went to their house with the application for
23
marriage license. Three days later, the same person went back to
their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to
Atty. Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing
24
officer. She further testified that she did not read all of the contents
of the marriage license, and that she was told that the marriage license
25
was obtained from Carmona. She also testified that a bigamy case
had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated January 10,
2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of
26
Manila. ?r?l1
As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the counsels for both parties
stipulated that: (a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria
Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the
wedding photos and she could identify all the persons depicted in said
photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo and
Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and
presented the marriage contract bearing their signatures as
27
proof. She and her mother sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in
securing a marriage license, and asked him to be one of the sponsors.
A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will get the
marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an
application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed
did. After Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the
license to Atty. Sanchez who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing
officer. Gloria testified that she and Syed were married on January 9,
28
1993 at their residence. ?r?l1
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June
29
15, 1993. ?r?l1
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who
had married a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the
existence of the previous marriage, and that the case was docketed
30
as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila. ?r?l1
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August
9, 1992 in Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been
celebrated under Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their
marriage was Chinese, and those around them at the time were
31
Chinese. ?r?l1
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid
marriage license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite in favor of Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No.
9969967 had been issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan,
and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite had certified that
32
no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and Syed. It also took
into account the fact that neither party was a resident of Carmona,
Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in
33
violation of Article 9 of the Family Code. As the marriage was not
one of those exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of
a valid marriage license is an absence of a formal requisite, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner,
and against the respondent declaring as follows:cralawlibrary
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar
Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the
petitioner and the respondent even if no property was acquired during
their cohabitation by reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General,
National Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their
respective civil registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed
Azhar Abbas and respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993
in Manila. ???�r?bl?��??r�??l�l??�l?br?r�
34
SO ORDERED. ?r?l1
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but
the RTC denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned
decision to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of
errors:cralawlibrary
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
BETWEEN THE PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND
VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE
EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A
REQUISITE OF A VALID MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING
EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE CEREMONY TOOK
PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING
PARTIES BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR
 40
PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 2008 but
HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT LESS THAN the same was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24,
41
TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE. 2008. ?r?l1

III Hence, this petition.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF
ESTOPPEL BY LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN
ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE COURT
35
BELOW. ?r?l1 ???�r?bl?��??r�??l�l??�l?br?r�
The CA gave credence to Glorias arguments, and granted her appeal.
It held that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to
categorically state that a diligent search for the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus held that said certification
36
could not be accorded probative value. The CA ruled that there was
sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence that Gloria and Syed
had been validly married and that there was compliance with all the
37
requisites laid down by law. ?r?l1
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the
marriage contract. The CA also considered that the parties had
comported themselves as husband and wife, and that Syed only
instituted his petition after Gloria had filed a case against him for
38
bigamy. ?r?l1
Grounds in Support of Petition
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR OF LAW IN CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS
AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY INCONSISTENT AND
CONTRARY TO THE COURTS OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND
LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
42
MARRIAGE. ?r?l1
The Ruling of this Court

The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as The petition is meritorious.

follows:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The
Decision dated 05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The marriage
between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on
09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9,
1993, Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines,
is the applicable law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this
particular case are Articles 3, 4 and 35(3), which read as
follows:cralawlibrary
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:cralawlibrary

39 (1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

SO ORDERED. ?r?l1
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter
2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of
the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age. ???�r?bl?��??r�??l�l??�l?br?r�
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage
voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the
marriage but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall
be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from
beginning:cralawlibrary
xxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the
preceding Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the
Family Code, nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the
solemnizing officer and the conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is
the marriage one that is exempt from the requirement of a valid
marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code. The
resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage
license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid
marriage license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid
marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a
copy thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the
testimonies of her witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To
prove that no such license was issued, Syed turned to the office of the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly
issued said license. It was there that he requested certification that no
such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of
43
Appeals such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, which reads:cralawlibrary
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an
officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that
after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to
exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil
Registrar of Pasig to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license,
the Court held:cralawlibrary
the
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify
that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his
office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found
in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are
public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the
44
marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. ?r?l1
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil
registrar enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records
of data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage
license of Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification
to the effect that no such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was
issued, and that the serial number of the marriage license pertained to
another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A certified
machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was presented, which
was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of Gloria and
Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the
certification, stating that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent
search" in the certification, and since the certification used stated that
no marriage license appears to have been issued, no diligent search
had been conducted and thus the certification could not be given
probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of
45
Appeals. It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in
sustaining the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was
lacking, relied on the Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of
Pasig, which merely stated that the alleged marriage license could not
be located as the same did not appear in their records. Nowhere in the
Certification was it categorically stated that the officer involved
conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely
necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent
contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative
46
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty." No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar was
lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office, thus
the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent
search having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was
indeed located and submitted to the court. The fact that the names in
said license do not correspond to those of Gloria and Syed does not
overturn the presumption that the registrar conducted a diligent search
of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy
thereof to the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was
secured in Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither
party resided. She took no pains to apply for the license, so she is not
the best witness to testify to the validity and existence of said license.
Neither could the other witnesses she presented prove the existence
of the marriage license, as none of them applied for the license in
Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify as
to the contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its
contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and
Felicitas Goo approached for assistance in securing the license,
admitted not knowing where the license came from. The task of
applying for the license was delegated to a certain Qualin, who could
have testified as to how the license was secured and thus impeached
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the
testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin,
the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative
value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage
contract and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license
could have simply been secured from that office and submitted to the
court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to do so, further weakening
her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued for her and
Syed.
47 48
In the case of Cari�o v. Cari�o, following the case of Republic, it
was held that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their
office had no record of a marriage license was adequate to prove the
non-issuance of said license. The case of Cari�o further held that the
presumed validity of the marriage of the parties had been overcome,
and that it became the burden of the party alleging a valid marriage to
prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required marriage
49
license had been secured. Gloria has failed to discharge that burden,
and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage
license was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple
irregularity in the marriage license that would not affect the validity of
the marriage, as no license was presented by the respondent. No
marriage license was proven to have been issued to Gloria and Syed,
based on the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite and Glorias failure to produce a copy of the alleged marriage
license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its
conclusion that Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the
CA:cralawlibrary
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and
documentary, that appellant and appellee have been validly married
and there was compliance with all the requisites laid down by law. Both
parties are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate of legal capacity
was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee. The
parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted that the
signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several
pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the
solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other members of appellants
family, taken during the marriage ceremony, as well as in the
restaurant where the lunch was held after the marriage ceremony.
Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing the
Marriage Contract.
xxx
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has
[sic] one offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June
1993. It took appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01
August 2003 his Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under
Article 4 of the Family Code. We take serious note that said Petition
appears to have been instituted by him only after an Information for
Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against him for
contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon
(Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by
declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in
50
the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy. ?r?l1
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to
cure the absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family
Code is clear when it says, "The absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides
that a marriage solemnized without a license is void from the
beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under
51
Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code. Again, this
marriage cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and
thus, having been solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab
initio.
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it
may well be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade
a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the
failure of the respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage
license, given the weight of evidence presented by petitioner. The lack
of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed to him, as it was Gloria
who took steps to procure the same. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the marriage of
Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby
GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5,
2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of
petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby
REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
1 that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also saw the couple
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner
2
Fr. Rene Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008 decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, (RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos
Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
3
The presented evidence showed that Joey Umadac and Claire
Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at
the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
However, on the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating priest,
Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon learning
that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse,
Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a
wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests,
proceeded to the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also
known as the Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an
Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed
despite having been informed by the couple that they had no marriage
certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple
on the same date. He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the
groom, the bride, their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors
4
and the rest of their invited guests.
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended, was filed against the petitioner before the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly
5
performing an illegal marriage ceremony.
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on
arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified
on the incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while
Mary Anne was the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified
exchange their wedding rings, kiss each other, and sign a
6
document. She heard the petitioner instructing the principal sponsors
to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception,
had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also
identified the wedding invitation given to her by Joey.
7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the
couple declare during the ceremony that they take each other as
8
husband and wife. Days after the wedding, she went to the municipal
local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty. Mariano R.
Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no marriage license
9
was issued to the couple.
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied
that his act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization
of the marriage as contemplated by law.
10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, and imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to
Section 44 of Act No. 3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a
blessing constitutes a marriage ceremony as he made an official
church recognition of the cohabitation of the couple as husband and
11
wife. It further ruled that in performing a marriage ceremony without
the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated Article 352 of the
RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the
Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which
pertinently states that a violation of any of its provisions that is not
specifically penalized or of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be
punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment of not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of
the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the
penalty for violation of the latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC
12
imposed the penalty of a fine in the amount of ₱200.00.
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the
circumstances surrounding the act of the petitioner in "blessing" the
couple unmistakably show that a marriage ceremony had transpired.
It further ruled that the positive declarations of the prosecution
witnesses deserve more credence than the petitioner’s negative
13
statements. The RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the fine
should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that
although there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of marriage, the law provides minimum standards in
determining whether a marriage ceremony has been conducted, viz.:
(1) the contracting parties must appear personally before the
solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses
14
of legal age. According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these
requirements. It added that the presence of a marriage certificate is
15
not a requirement in a marriage ceremony.
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent on whether
Joey or Claire were charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the
16
same Code.
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of
the fine is Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it covers violation of
regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities such as the
RPC.
The Petition
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First,
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not define
what constitutes "an illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that a
marriage ceremony principally constitutes those enunciated in Article
55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the Family Code, these provisions
require the verbal declaration that the couple take each other as
husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties
17
and attested to by the solemnizing officer. The petitioner likewise
maintains that the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting
parties personally declared that they take each other as husband and
18
wife. Second, under the principle of separation of church and State,
the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs such as the
administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the
19
"blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the
"blessing" in good faith for purposes of giving moral guidance to the
20
couple.
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating
Article 350 of the RPC, as amended, should preclude the filing of the
21
present case against him.
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a
penalty. The present case is not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage
Law as the petitioner was not found violating its provisions nor a
22
regulation promulgated thereafter.
THE COURT’S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC,
as amended, were proven by the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized
solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage
ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of
the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage
ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner admitted that he has
authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be
resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony"
which is punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define
a "marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal" performance,
Articles 3(3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters.
23
These provisions were taken from Article 55 of the New Civil Code
24
which, in turn, was copied from Section 3 of the Marriage Law with
25
no substantial amendments. Article 6 of the Family Code provides
that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the
marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the
contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer
and declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
26
age that they take each other as husband and wife." Pertinently,
27
Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the Family Code and particularly
defines a marriage ceremony as that which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband
and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, the rule was clear that no prescribed form of religious rite
for the solemnization of the marriage is required. However, as
correctly found by the CA, the law sets the minimum requirements
constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should be the personal
appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing officer; and
second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses
that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties
appeared before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On
the second requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s
allegation, the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of
Florida, that the contracting parties personally declared that they take
each other as husband and wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading
questions to Florida fails to persuadeus. A judge may examine or
cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to
test the credibility of the witness and to extract the truth. He may seek
to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may
tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It
cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he propounds
happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one
party.
28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge
objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it from belatedly
invoking any irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the
petitioner’s admission regarding the circumstances of the ceremony,
support Florida’s testimony that there had indeed been the declaration
by the couple that they take each other as husband and wife. The
testimony of Joey disowning their declaration as husband and wife
cannot overcome these clear and convincing pieces of evidence.
Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution witnesses,
Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the
petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation
of church and State precludes the State from qualifying the church
"blessing" into a marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s
allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by Article 6 of the
Family Code when it provides that no prescribed form or religious rite
for the solemnization of marriage is required. This pronouncement
gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in conducting its
respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the core
requirements of law be observed.
29
We emphasize at this point that Article 15 of the Constitution
recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and that our
family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract,
but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State
has paramount interest in the enforcement of its constitutional policies
and the preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end, it is within
its power to enact laws and regulations, such as Article 352 of the
RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts resulting in
the disintegration and mockery of marriage.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner
conducted was a marriage ceremony, as the minimum requirements
set by law were complied with. While the petitioner may view this
merely as a "blessing," the presence of the requirements of the law
constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this "blessing" into a
"marriage ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family
Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the
petitioner of this marriage ceremony was illegal.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites
of marriage is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the
present case, the petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had
no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing" of their
relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite
knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set
by law were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal.
The petitioner’s knowledge of the absence of these requirements
negates his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage
certificate negates his criminal liability in the present case. For
purposes of determining if a marriage ceremony has been conducted,
a marriage certificate is not included in the requirements provided by
Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple
negate criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, does not make this an element of the crime. The penalty
imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, this provision clearly provides that it shall be imposed in
accordance with the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty
provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and 44 which provide
as follows: Section 39 of the Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister
solemnizing marriage without being authorized by the Director of the
Philippine National Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage,
refuses to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon to do so
by the parties or parents, grandparents, guardians, or persons having
charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or minister of any church,
religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof require banns or
publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance
with section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of a
marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or
minister solemnizing marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished
by imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than two years,
or by a fine of not less than two hundred pesos nor more than two
thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of MARIANO C. DEL
this Act not specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
CASTILLO
promulgated by the proper authorities, shall be punished by a fine of Associate Justice
Associate Justice
not more than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more
than one month, or both, in the discretion of the court. [emphasis ours]
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling
of the CA and the MTC that the penalty imposable in the present case
is that covered under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage ATTESTATION
Law.
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
the present case.1âwphi1 As correctly found by the MTC, the opinion of the Court's Division.
petitioner was not found violating the provisions of the Marriage Law
but Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. It is only the imposition of the ANTONIO T. CARPIO
penalty for the violation of this provision which is referred to the Associate Justice
Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely under the Chairperson, Second Division
provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty
for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper CERTIFICATION
authorities; Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted
after the Marriage Law, is one of such regulations. Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
pursuant to Section 44 of the Marriage Law. assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Court of Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028. Chief Justice

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 THIRD DIVISION DECISION

REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 175581

PHILIPPINES, CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioner,

- versus - Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No. 175581

and G.R. No. 179474 are Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the
JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent. Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa
x------------------x
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT, G.R. No. 179474 Tecson-Dayot (Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended
[1]
Petitioner, Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006, in CA-
Present:
G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot
AUSTRIA- (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson, The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and
*
- versus - TINGA, Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage was
CHICO-NAZARIO,
** [2]
VELASCO, and solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza. In lieu of a marriage license,
REYES, JJ. [3]
Jose and Felisa executed a sworn affidavit, also dated 24 November
1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and
JOSE A. DAYOT, Promulgated:
Respondent. that being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for
March 28, 2008 at least five years.

[4]
On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint for Annulment and/or
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa
was a sham, as no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he and
x
Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that
his consent to the marriage was secured through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which
led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was introduced to
Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in
Felisas house, the latter being his landlady. Some three weeks later,
Felisa requested him to accompany her to the PasayCity Hall,
ostensibly so she could claim a package sent to her by her brother
from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged signal
from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached
them. They were told that Jose needed to sign the papers so that the
package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do
so. However, Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could
get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their
relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave
them to the man who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when
he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged
that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of
Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was
a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted
Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.
In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations
and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had
maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of
marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred
[5]
contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.
her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose
was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an
action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed an
administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the
Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were both employees of the
[6]
National Statistics and Coordinating Board. The Ombudsman found
Jose administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and
meted out to him the penalty of suspension from service for one year
[7]
without emolument.
[8]
On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing
the Complaint. It disposed:
WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and
analysis of the evidence presented by both parties,
this Court finds and so holds that the [C]omplaint does
not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly,
the above-entitled case is hereby ordered
[9]
DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].
The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence
presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa on 24
November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as
implausible, and rationalized that:
Any person in his right frame of mind would
easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a
In
blank sheet of paper. [Jose] could have already
detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they
were at Pasay City Hall to get a package for [Felisa]
but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of
paper for the release of the said package. Another
indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard
was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told
him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign
the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three
months to discover that the pieces of paper that he
signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage
contract. [Jose] does not seem to be that ignorant, as
perceived by this Court, to be taken in for a ride by
[Felisa.]
[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the
marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged
Felisa Tecson as his wife when he wrote [Felisas]
name in the duly notarized statement of assets and
liabilities he filled up on May 12, 1988, one year after
he discovered the marriage contract he is now
claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again, in his
company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the
person to be contacted in case of emergency. This
Court does not believe that the only reason why her
name was written in his company I.D. was because
he was residing there then. This is just but a lame
excuse because if he really considers her not his
lawfully wedded wife, he would have written instead
the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness
stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her
name voluntarily as a witness to the marriage in the
marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29,
1996) and she further testified that the signature
appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the
signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily affixed
in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on
November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the
Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa
Tecson was really chosen by her brother she
answered yes. The testimony of his sister all the more
belied his claim that his consent was procured
[10]
through fraud.
Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses
[11]
action had prescribed. It cited Article 87 of the New Civil Code which
requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be
commenced by the injured party within four years after the discovery
of the fraud. Thus:
That granting even for the sake of argument
that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through
fraud, trickery and machinations, he could have filed
an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at
the earliest possible opportunity, the time when he
discovered the alleged sham and false marriage
contract. [Jose] did not take any action to void the
marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.
[12]
Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC
Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11 August 2005,
the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The
dispositive portion of the appellate courts Decision reads:
[13]
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage
between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the
circumstances constituting fraud as a ground for annulment of
[14]
marriage under Article 86 of the Civil Code did not exist in the
marriage between the parties. Further, it ruled that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the
prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down
Joses appeal in the following manner:
Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or
intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his
consent to the marriage, the action for the annulment
thereof had already prescribed.Article 87 (4) and (5)
of the Civil Code provides that the action for
annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent
of a party was obtained by fraud, force or intimidation
must be commenced by said party within four (4)
years after the discovery of the fraud and within four
(4) years from the time the force or intimidation
ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly
discovered by Jose in February, 1987 then he had
only until February, 1991 within which to file an action
for annulment of marriage. However, it was only
on July 7, 1993that Jose filed the complaint for
annulment of his marriage to Felisa.
[15]
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion
that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack of a marriage
license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article
[16]
76 of the Civil Code as one of exceptional character, with the parties
executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court
of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit to the effect that
Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period
required by Article 76 did not affect the validity of the marriage, seeing
that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained
therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the
good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer over the falsity of the
affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of
said affidavit of marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing
officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment
to their marriage. Finally, the Court of Appeals dismissed Joses
argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which
Rev. Tomas V. Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals,
Article 56
[17]
of the Civil Code did not require that either one of the
contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing
officers church or religious sect. The prescription was established only
[18]
in Article 7 of the Family Code which does not govern the parties
marriage.
Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for
Reconsideration thereof. His central opposition was that the requisites
for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license
under Article 76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case
at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the man and the
woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at
least five years before the marriage. Essentially, he maintained that

the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was
false.
The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and
reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an Amended Decision, dated 7
November 2006, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11,
2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one
entered declaring the marriage between Jose A.
Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil
[19]
Registrar of Pasay City.
In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the
[20]
ruling of this Court in Nial v. Bayadog, and reasoned that:
In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting
parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage
license on the basis of their affidavit that they had
attained the age of majority, that being unmarried,
they had lived together for at least five (5) years and
that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme
Court ruled as follows:
x x x In other words, the five-year common-
law cohabitation period, which is counted back from
the date of celebration of marriage, should be a period
of legal union had it not been for the absence of the
marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it
should be a period of cohabitation characterized by
exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any
time within the 5 years and continuity that is
unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year
cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to
whether the parties were capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five years, then the law would
be sanctioning immorality and encouraging parties to
have common law relationships and placing them on
the same footing with those who lived faithfully with
their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship
must be respected as such and its requirements must
be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and
a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
is based on the approximation of the requirements of
the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement
and later use the same missing element as a pre-
conceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from
securing a marriage license unless the circumstances
clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should
be noted that a license is required in order to notify
the public that two persons are about to be united in
matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two
shall make it known to the local civil registrar.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a
marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character, shall be void from
the beginning.Inasmuch as the marriage between
Jose and Felisa is not covered by the exception to the
requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore,
void ab initio because of the absence of a marriage
license.
[21]
Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but
[22]
to no avail. The appellate court rendered a Resolution dated 10 May
2007, denying Felisas motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for Review before this
Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended
Decision dated 7 November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack
of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be declared
valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review,
docketed as G.R. No. 179474, similarly assailing the appellate courts
Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to
consolidate the two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court
[23]
rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.
The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following
arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:
I
RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE
PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS
MARRIAGE TO FELISA.
II
RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT
WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN
FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.
III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING
THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF
[24]
MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.
Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of
Appeals misapplied Nial.
[25]
She differentiates the case at bar
from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing
prior marriage, a circumstance which does not obtain in her
cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought
the annulment of their marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and
an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid
liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage
would exonerate Jose from any liability.
For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose
and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue, we shall jointly
tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of
the Philippines and Felisa.
The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several
circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage exists
between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that
any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage by
[26]
citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals. To
buttress its assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by
Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they
used in lieu of a marriage license. It is the Republics position that the
falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of
the marriage, as the essential and formal requisites were complied
with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to investigate as to
whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines
that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the fact that
the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be
invalidated by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated
statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and wife for
at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties
It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was
celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the
Civil Code spells out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all
these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting
parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;

marriage contract states that their marriage was solemnized under (3) Authority of the person performing the
Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties marriage; and

and their witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of (4) A marriage license, except in a
marriage of exceptional
marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic adduces the
character. (Emphasis ours.)
following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988 wherein he wrote Felisas name as his
[27]
Article 58 makes explicit that no marriage shall be
wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil
Chairman 192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose
registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually
and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in said barangay;
resides, save marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the
and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas
[28] [29]
Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. Article 80(3) of the Civil
name as his wife.
Code makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than
The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the
the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the
issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76 of the Civil
[30]
essence of the marriage contract. This is in stark contrast to the old
Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.
 [31]
Marriage Law, whereby the absence of a marriage license did not
make the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of [35]
The reason for the law, as espoused by the Code
a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority
Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license may
granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract [36]
from legalizing their status.
[32]
marriage.

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are
was performed without a marriage license. In lieu thereof, they
covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. To wit,
executed an affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of
these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of
maturity; that being unmarried, they have lived together as husband
death during peace or war, (2) marriages in remote places, (2)
and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they
[33]
consular marriages, (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) [37]
desire to marry each other. One of the central issues in the Petition
religious ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan
at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital cohabitation,
[34]
marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.
where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year
requirement, effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack of
The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital
a marriage license.
cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:

We answer in the affirmative.

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary
when a man and a woman who have attained the age
of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years,
desire to marry each other. The contracting parties
shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized
the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he
took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he
found no legal impediment to the marriage.
Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the
exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal requisite of
a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction,
exceptions, as a general rule, should be strictly
[38]
but reasonably
[39]
construed. They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants,
and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions
 [40]
rather than the exception. Where a general rule is established by
statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to
[41]
the latter by implication. For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is
a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have
attained the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.
A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us
with no other expediency but to read the law as it is plainly written. The
exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those
who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years
and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous
terms, places a minimum period requirement of five years of
cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since the
language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years
of cohabitation is an indispensability carved in the language of the
law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this
material fact cannot be dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not
as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory
character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that
[42]
the contracting parties shall state the requisite facts in an affidavit
before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the
official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state
in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived
together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit
and contracted marriage.The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before
[43]
the celebration of their marriage. The Court of Appeals also noted
Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor,
Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March 1986 after the EDSA
[44]
Revolution. The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony
that it was only in June 1986 when Jose commenced to live in her
[45]
house.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they
satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual in nature. A
question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or
[46]
falsehood of the alleged facts. Under Rule 45, factual findings are
[47]
ordinarily not subject to this Courts review. It is already well-settled
that:
The general rule is that the findings of facts of the
Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A
recognized exception to this rule is when the Court of
Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the
administrative body, make contradictory findings.
However, the exception does not apply in every
instance that the Court of Appeals and the trial court
or administrative body disagree. The factual findings
of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this
 Court if such findings are supported by the record or
based on substantial evidence.
[48] to which the presumption still needs to be applied.There is no question
that Jose and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24
November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a Complaint for
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986,
Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned
executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from the requirement of
the instant consolidated Petitions.
a marriage license, is beyond question.

[51]
In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code that
We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the
every intendment of law or fact leans towards the validity of marriage
falsity of the statements in the parties affidavit will not affect the validity
will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the
of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were
effect of a violation of the law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was
complied with. The argument deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot
entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with
be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated
the stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional
without the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and
circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is
Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article 76, that they should
a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least,
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as
for the perpetration of fraud against innocent and unwary parties,
to be excepted from the requirement of a marriage license.
which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a
[52]
prior license a prerequisite for a valid marriage. The protection of
Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this
marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true
Court holds that the same finds no applicability to the case at [53]
and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well. To
bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is
permit a false affidavit to take the place of a marriage license is to
with reference to the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
fabric of the institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive
[49]
contract of marriage. Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling
schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the
[50]
married. The present case does not involve an apparent marriage
Republic that as a marriage under a license is not invalidated by the
fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not
be invalidated by a fabricated statement that the parties have
cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage
license, and not to the absence of one. Here, there is no marriage
license at all.Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn
affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which
would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement
for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a
quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and
attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the
sworn affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without
force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit at all.
In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the
argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied relief because
he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his
wrongdoing. This is a misplaced invocation. It must be stated that
[54]
equity finds no room for application where there is a law. There is a
law on the ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise
terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the authorities
are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is
[55]
without prejudice to their criminal liability.
The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that
Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage
for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had
lived together from 1986 to 1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent
marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose
seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence,
estoppel had set in.
This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is
[56]
imprescriptible. Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a
marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is
void ab initio. In this case, the right to impugn a void marriage does
not prescribe, and may be raised any time.
Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the
rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period under Article
76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of
celebration of marriage, and refers to a period of legal union had it not
[57]
been for the absence of a marriage. It covers the years immediately
preceding the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity -
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the five years -
[58]
and continuity that is unbroken.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-
Dayot void ab initio, is AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal
liability, if any. No costs.
 MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Acting Chairpersons attestation, it is hereby certified that the
Associate Justice conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
Acting Chairperson the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. REYNATO S. PUNO

Associate Justice Associate Justice Chief Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
 THIRD DIVISION

The antecedent facts are:

RESTITUTO M. G.R. No. 167746
ALCANTARA,
Petitioner, Present: A petition for annulment of marriage
[3]
was filed by petitioner against

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that on 8 December 1982 he

Chairperson, and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who
NACHURA, and
could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a fee,
REYES, JJ.
arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a
Promulgated: [4]
ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR Chapel. They got married on
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, August 28, 2007 the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - through another marriage ceremony at the San Jose
-x de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The
marriage was likewise celebrated without the parties securing a
marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured
DECISION
in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham,
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went
to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave birth to their child
[1] Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate
petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued
[2] declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel
petitioners appeal and affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
[5] [6]
Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case No. 97-1325 the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.

dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of

marriage. Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent
asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a
marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision
of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners dismissing the petitioners appeal. His Motion for Reconsideration was
representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named Rose likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April
[12]
Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named 2005.
[7]
Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992. Petitioner has a mistress
[8]
with whom he has three children. Petitioner only filed the annulment The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is
of their marriage to evade prosecution presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner had not presented any
[9]
for concubinage. Respondent, in fact, has filed a case evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties
for concubinage against petitioner before marriage contract being a public document is a prima facie proof of
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of
[10] [13]
60. Respondent prays that the petition for annulment of marriage be Court.
denied for lack of merit.
In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered for resolution:
its Decision disposing as follows:
a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
reversible error when it ruled that the Petition
The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as
for Annulment has no legal and factual basis
follows:
despite the evidence on record that there was
no marriage license at the precise moment of
1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;
the solemnization of the marriage.
2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month as
reversible error when it gave weight to the
support for their two (2) children on the first five (5)
Marriage License No. 7054133 despite the
days of each month; and
fact that the same was not identified and
[11] offered as evidence during the trial, and was
3. To pay the costs.
not the Marriage license number appearing
on the face of the marriage contract.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a

reversible error when it failed to apply the
 ruling laid down by this Honorable Court in
the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. (G.R. No. The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December
127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]). 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law

d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at
reversible error when it failed to relax the the time of its celebration.
observance of procedural rules to protect and
promote the substantial rights of the party
[14]
litigants. A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of
the Civil Code, the absence of which renders the
[18]
We deny the petition. marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3) in relation to Article
[19]
58 of the same Code.
Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the
[20]
respondent was celebrated, there was no marriage license because Article 53 of the Civil Code which was the law applicable at the time
he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a of the marriage of the parties states:
[15]
fixer who arranged everything for them. The wedding took place at
Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all
the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel where these requisites are complied with:
[16]
Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs. He
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
and respondent did not go to Carmona, Cavite, to apply for a marriage
license.Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was (2) Their consent, freely given;

issued to them, neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the (3) Authority of the person performing the marriage;
and
place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification (4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character.
states that Marriage License number 7054133 was issued in favor of
[17]
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario but their marriage
contract bears the number 7054033 for their marriage license number. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States
demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage,
[21]
in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.
Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly
impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where the court void ab initio.
considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for
[24]
considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In Sy v. Court of Appeals, the marriage license was issued on 17
September 1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place on 15
[22]
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, the Local Civil November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that
Registrar issued a certification of due search and inability to find a the marriage was indeed contracted without a marriage license.
record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was
issued to the parties. The Court held that the certification of due search In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license
and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported marriage
which rendered the marriage void.
license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value,
he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data
Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered
relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said
void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires
certification, the Court held that there is absence of a marriage license
that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the
that would render the marriage void ab initio.
marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by a certification from

[23]
the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to the
In Cario v. Cario, the Court considered the marriage of therein
parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and
petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased Santiago S. Carino as
respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this
void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of
effect was also issued by the local civil registrar
petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, [25]
of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it
as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila,
specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was
their office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that
issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further
the certification issued by the local civil registrar is adequate to prove
validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties
the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been
herein.
solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one
of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the
of Carmona, Cavite, reads: marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a resident
of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient
This is to certify that as per the registry Records of
Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. basis to annul petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a
7054133 was issued in favor of marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of either of
Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss
Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982. the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the
absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period
This Certification is being issued upon the request of
Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the
[26]
or intents it may serve. validity of the marriage.
[30]
An irregularity in any of the formal requisites
of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties
This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
[31]
regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was administratively liable.
[27]
done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage
irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption license number in the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar,
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No.
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it 7054133, while the marriage contract states that the marriage license
becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this argument
support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers act fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere
being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of its a typographical error, as a closer scrutiny of the marriage contract
[28]
lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage
admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued license may read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not
[29]
in Carmona, Cavite. detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and issuance of
said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean
[32]
hands, petitioner cannot pretend that he was not responsible or a
 As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the
party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place necessary document prior to the wedding.
without the requisite marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil
[33] COURT
marriage took place because he initiated it. Petitioner is an educated
person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and What particular document did the church asked you
to produce? I am referring to the San Jose
voluntarily went to the Manila City Hall and likewise, knowingly and de Manuguit church.
voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from
WITNESS
his action and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond
I dont remember your honor.
at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer palatable to his taste
or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His COURT
attempt to make a mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage
bad faith.
[34] License?

WITNESS
Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in
I think they asked us for documents and I said we
a span of less than one year utilizing the same marriage license. There have already a Marriage Contract and I dont
know if it is good enough for the marriage and
is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in
they accepted it your honor.
church under duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was
COURT
executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.
In other words, you represented to the San Jose
de Manuguit church that you have with you
In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they already a Marriage Contract?
presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the marriage contract
WITNESS
executed during the previous wedding ceremony before
Yes your honor.
the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed in petitioners testimony as
follows COURT

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied

WITNESS
the same marriage License in the Marriage
 Contract issued which Marriage License is
Number 7054033. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in
[39]
favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or
WITNESS
fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look
[35]
Yes your honor. upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled;
on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing

participant to all that took place at that time. Obviously, the church WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition

ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals
[36] dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
whatever irregularity or defect attended the civil wedding.
Court, Branch 143 of Makati City, dated 14 February 2000,

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

fixer who arranged everything for them and who facilitated the
SO ORDERED.
ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the
Gospel of the CDCC Br Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a Associate Justice
marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing
[37]
to the contrary. Moreover, the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound
WE CONCUR:
to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and
regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent Chairperson
official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that
said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain whether the contracting MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
[38] NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice