G.R. No.
145022 September 23, 2005 offending news reports were printed and first published, the
ARMAND NOCUM and THE PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER,
INC., Petitioners, vs. LUCIO TAN, Respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Doctrine: Jurisdiction vs Venue; Venue can be waived in civil
cases
FACTS: Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter Armand
Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, seeking moral and exemplary
damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations
contained in a news article. INQUIRER and NOCUM alleged that
the venue was improperly laid, among many others. It appeared
that the complaint failed to state the residence of the complainant
at the time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place
where the libelous article was printed and first published.
RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice on the
ground of improper venue. Aggrieved, Lucio Tan filed an
Omnibus Motion seeking reconsideration of the dismissal and
admission of the amended complaint. In par. 2.01.1 of the
amended complaint, it is alleged that "This article was printed and
first published in the City of Makati", and in par. 2.04.1, that "This
caricature was printed and first published in the City of Makati"
RTC admitted the amended complaint and deemed set
aside the previous order of dismissal stating that the mistake or
deficiency in the original complaint appears now to have been
cured in the Amended Complaint. Also, there is no substantial
amendment, but only formal, in the Amended Complaint which
would affect the defendants’ defenses and their Answers.
Dissatisfied, petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals.
Two petitions for certiorari were filed, one filed by petitioners and
the other by defendants .The two petitions were consolidated. CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this PETREV filed by
the petitioners. Petitioners argue that since the original complaint
only contained the office address of respondent and not the
latter’s actual residence or the place where the allegedly
original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in its allegations,
failed to confer jurisdiction on the lower court.
ISSUE: WON THE LOWER COURT ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE CIVIL CASE UPON THE FILING OF
THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
HELD: YES. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based
on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's
causes of action. Here, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the
case when the case was filed before it. From the allegations
thereof, respondent’s cause of action is for damages arising from
libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360
of the Revised Penal Code provides that it is the RTC that is
specifically designated to try a libel case.
Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. The Hon.
Florenz D. Regalado, differentiated jurisdiction and venue as
follows: (a) Jurisdiction is the authority to hear and determine
a case; venue is the place where the case is to be heard or
tried; (b) Jurisdiction is a matter of substantive law; venue,
of procedural law; (c) Jurisdiction establishes a relation
between the court and the subject matter; venue, a relation
between plaintiff and defendant, or petitioner and
respondent; and, (d) Jurisdiction is fixed by law and cannot
be conferred by the parties; venue may be conferred by the
act or agreement of the parties.
Here, the additional allegations in the Amended Complaint
that the article and the caricature were printed and first published
in the City of Makati referred only to the question of venue and
not jurisdiction. These additional allegations would neither confer
jurisdiction on the RTC nor would respondent’s failure to include
the same in the original complaint divest the lower court of its
jurisdiction over the case. Respondent’s failure to allege these
allegations gave the lower court the power, upon motion by a
party, to dismiss the complaint on the ground that venue was not
properly laid. The term "jurisdiction" in Article 360 of the Revised
Penal Code as referring to the place where actions for libel shall
be filed or "venue." The amendment was merely to establish the
proper venue for the action. It is a well-established rule that venue
has nothing to do with jurisdiction, except in criminal actions.
Assuming that venue were properly laid in the court where the
action was instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional
impediment.
The dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was
proper considering that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed
to allege neither the residence of the complainant nor the place
where the libelous article was printed and first published.
Nevertheless, before the finality of the dismissal, the same may
still be amended. In so doing, the court acted properly and without
any grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: WON VENUE MAY BE WAIVED IN CIVIL CASES
HELD: YES. It is elementary that objections to venue in CIVIL
ACTIONS arising from libel may be waived since they do not
involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is
procedural rather than substantive, relating as it does to
jurisdiction of the court over the person rather than the subject
matter. Venue relates to trial and not to jurisdiction. It is a
procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of
trial or geographical location in which an action or proceeding
should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. It is
meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict
their access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. In
contrast, in criminal actions, it is fundamental that venue is
jurisdictional it being an essential element of jurisdiction.
Petitioners’ argument that the lower court has no
jurisdiction over the case because respondent failed to allege the
place where the libelous articles were printed and first published
would have been tenable if the case filed were a criminal case.
The failure of the original complaint to contain such information
would be fatal because this fact involves the issue of venue which
goes into the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This is not to be
because the case before us is a civil action where venue is not
jurisdictional.
CA’s DECISION AFFIRMED.
RULE 4 – VENUE
G.R. No. 133240. November 15, 2000]
RUDOLF LIETZ HOLDINGS, INC., petitioner, vs.
THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF PARAÑAQUE
CITY, respondent.
NATURE:
A petition for review on the decision rendered by RTC of
Parañaque City, Metro Manila involving questions of law.
FACTS:
Petitioner Corporation amended its Articles of Incorporation to
change its name from Rudolf Lietz, Incorporated to Rudolf Lietz
Holdings, Inc. and such was approved by SEC. As a
consequence of its change of name, petitioner sought the
amendment of the transfer certificates of title over real properties
owned by them, all of which were under the old name. For this
purpose, petitioner instituted a petition for amendment of titles
with the RTC Parañaque City.
The petition impleaded as respondent the Registry of Deeds of
Pasay City, apparently because the titles sought to be amended,
all state that they were issued by the Registry of Deeds of Pasay
City. Petitioner likewise inadvertently alleged in the body of the
petition that the lands covered by the subject titles are located in
Pasay City. Subsequently, petitioner learned that the subject
titles are in the custody of the Register of Deeds of Parañaque
City. Hence, petitioner filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit
Amended Petition impleading instead as respondent the Registry
of Deeds of Parañaque City, and alleged that its lands are located
in Parañaque City.
In the meantime, however, the court a quo had dismissed the
petition motu proprio on the ground of improper venue, it
appearing therein that the respondent is the Registry of Deeds of
Pasay City and the properties are located in Pasay City.
Petitioner filed with the lower court a Motion for Reconsideration
but was denied. On the other hand, in view of the dismissal of the
petition, the lower court also denied the Ex-Parte Motion to Admit
Amended Petition.
The Solicitor General filed his Comment contending that the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the res because it appeared
from the original petition that the lands are situated in Pasay City;
hence, outside the jurisdiction of the Parañaque court. Since it
had no jurisdiction over the case, it could not have acted on the
motion to admit amended petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not trial court motu proprio dismiss a complaint on the
ground of improper venue.
HELD:
Venue of real actions
This question has already been answered in Dacoycoy v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, where this Court held that it may
not. The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint by
respondent trial court on the ground of improper venue is plain
error, obviously attributable to its inability to distinguish between
jurisdiction and venue.
Questions or issues relating to venue of actions are basically
governed by Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court. Jurisdiction
over the subject matter or nature of an action is conferred only by
law.[16] It may not be conferred by consent or waiver upon a court
which otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of an action. On the other hand, the venue of an action as
fixed by statute may be changed by the consent of the parties,
and an objection on improper venue may be waived by the failure
of the defendant to raise it at the proper time. In such an event,
the court may still render a valid judgment. Rules as to
jurisdiction can never be left to the consent or agreement of the
parties. Venue is procedural, not jurisdictional, and hence may
be waived. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties,
rather than restrict their access to the courts as it relates to the
place of trial.
Dismissing the complaint on the ground of improper venue is
certainly not the appropriate course of action at this stage of the
proceedings. Where the defendant fails to challenge timely the
venue in a motion to dismiss as provided by Section 4 of Rule 4
of the Rules of Court, and allows the trial to be held and a decision
to be rendered, he cannot on appeal or in a special action be
permitted to belatedly challenge the wrong venue, which is
deemed waived. Indeed, it was grossly erroneous for the trial
court to have taken a procedural short-cut by dismissing motu
proprio the complaint on the ground of improper venue without
first allowing the procedure outlined in the rules of court to take
its proper course.
Amendments as a matter of right
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of right at any
time before a responsive pleading is served or, in the case of a
reply, at any time within ten (10) days after it is served.
Amendments to pleadings are liberally allowed in furtherance of
justice, in order that every case may so far as possible be
determined on its real facts, and in order to speed the trial of
cases or prevent the circuitry of action and unnecessary expense.
The trial court, therefore, should have allowed the amendment
proposed by petitioner for in so doing, it would have allowed the
actual merits of the case to be speedily determined, without
regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner.
The courts should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings
to avoid multiplicity of suits and in order that the real controversies
between the parties are presented, their rights determined and
the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. This
liberality is greatest in the early stages of a lawsuit, especially in
this case where the amendment to the complaint was made
before the trial of the case thereby giving petitioner all the time
allowed by law to answer and to prepare for trial.