University of St.

Andrews
Scots Philosophical Association

Hobbes, Mechanism, and Egoism

Author(s): Bernard Gert
Source: The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-), Vol. 15, No. 61 (Oct., 1965), pp. 341-349
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Scots Philosophical Association and
the University of St. Andrews
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2218259
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 341

HOBBES, MECHANISM, AND EGOISM

Hobbes is often regarded as the leading exponent of psychological egoism.

While some merely claim that Hobbes' description of man's motive
that of a psychological egoist, others claim that his mechanism, i.e., h
mechanical account of human behaviour, entails an egoistic psychology
In this article I shall not consider the claim that Hobbes' description o
man's motives is that of an egoist but shall be concerned only with th
claim that his mechanism entails psychological egoism. I shall show th
psychological egoism cannot be validly deduced from any version of Hob
mechanical account of human behaviour and, further, that there is no ot
causal account of human behaviour from which psychological egoism c
be validly deduced.
Psychological egoism is the theory that the only motive for human
action is self-interest. To show that Hobbes is not a psychological egoi
it would be necessary to provide a clarification of the concepts of 'moti
and 'self-interest'. However, simply to show that psychological ego
cannot be deduced from Hobbes' mechanism, it is not necessary to investigat
the concept of ' self-interest', only that of 'motive '. For the fact tha
psychological egoism is a theory about motives is sufficient to make it
impossible for it to be derived from any mechanical theory, including
Hobbes '.

Most often one talks of motives in connection with crimes, for exam
murder. In these cases, the most common answers to the question 'W
was his motive ? ' are one word answers, for example, revenge, jealo
money. However, for these answers to be correct the person commi
the murder must have certain beliefs; for example, if the motive for
murder is revenge, then the person must believe that his victim or som
related to him has injured someone. Further, he must regard this be
as his reason for committing the murder. To have a motive for doin
action entails both that one have some belief and that he regard this b
as his reason for doing that action. But not every belief can prov
motive for any action, not even if it is regarded by the actor as his re
for doing that action. For example, the belief that someone's third co
once took a penny from my third cousin does not provide a motive fo
killing him, even if I regard it as doing so. Such a belief would not be thou
to provide an adequate explanation of my action and so it would not
regarded as providing a motive.2 If holding a certain belief does not pr
1See e.g., A. Campbell Garnett, Ethics, A Critical Introduction (New York, 1
pp. 123 ff.
2This depends partly on the customs prevalent at the time and partly on the n
of the particular person. So that, given suitable customs and a person with an ext
upbringing, even the above belief might be thought to provide a motive. But in
thing like normal circumstances it would not.

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 342 BERNARD GERT

an adequate explanation for do

not provide a motive for that
sincerely claims that the beli
Thus motives are very compl
about his motives are not inc
speak the language sincerely s
the matter. But a person who
that a certain belief provided
dispute that claim. For we ma
quate explanation for his actio
Motives are also unlike anger
then if he continues to act in
for example, he is rehearsing
counted. But if a person since
doing an action, then no matt
be completely discounted. For
belief as providing his reason
his motive by anyone else.
Thus, to have a motive in doi
(a) you, yourself, regard as pro
(b) provides an adequate expla
satisfy either (a) or (b) it does
(a) but does not satisfy (b) th
merely counts as a rationaliza
sought. If the belief does not
does satisfy (b), then that bel
satisfies either (a) or (b), then
in causal terms, i.e., by citing
The following examples may
case, someone believes that dr
him healthier. He also regards th
If this belief provides an adeq
then we can say that his motive
In the second case, someone b
him to drink two quarts of m
for his drinking the milk now
our psychological theory, do
drinking the milk, then we s
motive for his action. If he h
planation of his action, whethe
for his action or not, then we
suffering from a calcium deficie
30bviously, it is much more complicated than this. For example, you may not
now have any belief which provides an explanation, but may have had some belief
at some time in your distant past, which in some way explains your present actions.
4Also one could cite habit, but I am only interested in these three types of explana-
tion-motive, unconscious motive, and bodily cause.

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 HOBBES, MECHANISM, AND EGOISM 343

From these examples it is clear that one also can, with

speak of causes and motives for desires as well as for action
vide an adequate explanation for someone wanting to drin
milk a day by citing a motive, for example, his belief that
healthier. We can also provide an adequate explanation of
citing an unconscious motive, for example, his belief that
his mother. And finally we can provide an adequate explan
desire in causal terms, for example, by pointing out that he is
a calcium deficiency. Although there is no logical incompati
all three of these explanations, if an adequate explanation is
of motives, one does not generally look for an explanation i
conscious motives or causes, i.e., the condition of the body.
Although it seems from the terminology that an explanation
unconscious motives is more like an explanation in terms o
one in terms of causes, the opposite is, in fact, true. The o
between a causal explanation and one in terms of unconsci
that in the latter the state of one's mind, rather than the s
body, provides the explanation. That is, an explanation in
conscious motives differs from the usual causal explanation onl
to psychological facts, i.e., present or past beliefs, rather th
biological, etc., facts. Both differ from explanations in term
that the person whose actions or desires are being explained
of the facts used in the explanation. One cannot be unawa
used in explaining his action in terms of motives; for to ex
in terms of motives requires that the person whose action is be
have a belief which he regards as the reason for his doing th
It follows from this that if I do not know why I am doin
do not have a motive in doing it. It also follows that I can
such-and-such is my motive and it turn out later that I h
motive. It does not follow, however, that I cannot think tha
action with such-and-such a motive and it turn out later that I did not
have any motive at all in doing it. This would happen when the belief I
cite as my reason for doing an action does not provide an adequate explana-
tion of it. Here an explanation would be sought in terms of unconscious
motives or causes. For example, I may be hypnotized and told to open a
window in ten minutes. If ten minutes later I open the window, I may
offer any number of beliefs as my reason for doing so, but most likely none
will be accepted. I will be told that I opened the window because I was
hypnotized and told to do so and that my reasons are only rationalizations.5
If I accept this, as I am likely to do, I am admitting not that my motive
for opening the window was different from that which I offered, but that I
had no motive at all. And, in general, when I accept someone else's explana-
tion of my action I am not accepting an explanation in terms of motives.
Rather I am admitting that an adequate explanation of my action cannot
be given in terms of motives, but must be given in terms of unconscious
motives or causes.

5Cf. Kurt Baier, The Moral Point of View (Ithaca, 1960), pp. 163 ff.

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 344 BERNARD GERT

Psychological egoism is not a theory about unconscious motives or

causes; it is a theory about motives. According to psychological egoism an
adequate explanation of at least some human action can be given in terms
of motives, and these motives will always be motives of self-interest. Psycho-
logical egoism thus entails that at least some human actions can be ade-
quately explained by the actor's belief that his actions are in his own self-
interest. If someone were to deny that any beliefs of any sort, including
beliefs about what was in one's own self-interest, ever provided an
adequate explanation of any human action, then he would be denying that
there were ever any motives for human action. So that anyone who main-
tained that the only adequate explanation of human action was in terms of
matter in motion, would be denying that there were ever any motives for
human action and consequently would be holding a position incompatible
with psychological egoism.
II
According to Hobbes' mechanical picture all voluntary motion, for
example, walking or talking, is caused by some change in the vital motion,
i.e., that internal motion which is vital or necessary for continued preserva-
tion. Anything that affects the vital motion will affect the voluntary motion.
If the vital motion is hindered the animal will automatically act in such a
way as to remove the hindrance; if the vital motion is helped, the animal
will act in such a way as to prolong that help. For Hobbes, nothing affects
motion except some other motion, so that if the vital motion is either helped
or hindered this change must come from some other motion. Since the
only other motion in the body is the motion of sense, i.e., those motions
of the external world which have affected a sense organ, it follows that if
the vital motion is to be affected at all it must be affected by the motion of
sense. There are only three possible relationships of the motions of sense
to the vital motion-they can help it, hinder it, or have no effect at all.6
When the motion of sense helps the vital motion there will be minute motion
toward the object causing it, an attempt to prolong the help; when the
motion of sense hinders the vital motion, there will be minute motion
away from the object causing the motion, an attempt to avoid the hindrance;
when the motion of sense does not affect the vital motion, there will be no
motion at all with regard to the object causing the motion of sense.
According to Hobbes,
These small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear
in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called
ENDEAVOUR. This endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is
called APPETITE, or DESIRE. . . . And when the endeavour is fromward
something, it is generally called AVERSION.7
Although Hobbes admits that such motions may be, and often are, insensible,
he contends that this ". .. doth not hinder, but that such motions are "8,
6By ' help ', Hobbes seems to mean ' speed up '; by ' hinder ', ' slow down '. For
Hobbes, greater vitality accompanies a quickening of the vital motion; lessening of
vitality accompanies a slowing down of the vital motion; and a complete cessation of
the vital motion results in death.
7Leviathan, ed. by Michael Oakeshott (Oxford, 1957), p. 31.
8Ibid.

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 HOBBES, MECHANISM, AND EGOISM 345

i.e., that we are unaware of these motions is no argument

existence. So far, all of Hobbes' psychology seems to be a p
The vital motion is like a gyroscope, and whenever the m
affect the vital motion, the body acts in such a way as best
vital motion. Hobbes may be said to have crudely anticipa
logical theory of homeostasis, that organisms act in such a
tain an internal equilibrium.
There is, in this version of Hobbes' account of voluntar
mention of pleasure or pain, for they, like the phantasms o
real effects.
As, in sense, that which is really within us, is . . . only motion . . so, when
the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs
to the heart, the real effect there is nothing but motion, or endeavour; which
consisteth in appetite, or aversion, to or from the object moving. But the
apparence, or sense of that motion, is that we either call delight, or trouble of
mind.9

Motion causes motion and on the way creates appearances, but according
to this version of Hobbes, these appearances have no effects at all. The
motion of sense produces an appearance, for example, the sight of a pretty
girl, and it also effects the vital motion, thus causing a small internal motion
toward the object. This motion, known as appetite, produces an appearance
of pleasure or delight and also causes voluntary motion toward the object.
On this account, appearances have no causal efficacy at all; they do not
even cause other appearances. Though the appearance of the pretty girl
always precedes the appearance of pleasure or delight, it is not the cause
of it. Rather, both are the effects of motion.
This psychology of motion receives a succinct statement in the opening
paragraph of Leviathan.
For seeing life is but a motion of limbs, the beginning whereof is in some principal
part within; why may we not say, that all automata (engines that move them-
selves by springs and wheels as doth a watch) have an artificial life ? For what
is the heart, but a spring; and the nerves, but so many strings; and the joints,
but so many wheels, giving motion to the whole body, such as was intended by
the artificer ?10

What Hobbes calls " appetite " and " aversion ", the immediate causes of our
voluntary actions, are merely some internal motions of the body which we
are usually unaware of. Had Hobbes not named them " appetite " and
" aversion ", there would not be the slightest temptation to regard him as
having provided anything other than a completely mechanical account of
voluntary action, which, far from entailing psychological egoism, is actually
incompatible with it. For it does not admit anything but motion as pro-
viding an adequate explanation of human action.
However, the above, which is a completely mechanical account of volun-
tary action that leaves no room for motives, egoistic or otherwise, is not
the only interpretation of Hobbes' mechanism. He sometimes seems to
offer a mechanical account of the causes, not of behaviour but of desires.l1
9Leviathan, p. 33. Cf. Human Nature, pp. 31 ff. (in The English Works of Thomas
Hobbes, ed. Molesworth (London, 1845), vol. IV). See also, De Corpore, ibid., Vol. I,
pp. 406 f.
lLeviathan, p. 5.
1See Human Nature, p. 31.

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 346 BERNARD GERT

When Hobbes' mechanism is inte

entails egoism becomes more plau
claim that appetite and aversio
these terms in their ordinary sen
sense effect the vital motion, an
desire, and a hindrance, aversion
longer considered motions, but
those things which help our vi
those things which hinder it. For
seeing a pretty girl or eating a st
From this, it follows that whatev
our vital motion. This, indeed,
form of psychological egoism.
However, the statement ' whateve
our vital motion' is ambiguous. I
desire because we believe it will b
for wanting that thing is that it
indeed a statement of psychologi
may also be taken to mean 'what
the vital motion', i.e., that when
this causes us to desire that thin
said about our motive for desirin
is a causal relationship between s
our desiring that thing.
Obviously only this latter inte
Hobbes' mechanical theory. And
benefits my vital motion, this caus
I desire it because I believe that i
even know that the thing in ques
this belief could not provide me
Hobbes does maintain that our de
our vital motion, he never claims
we believe it will benefit our vita
the belief that our vital motion w
or doing anything.
Thus Hobbes' mechanical account of the causes of desire does not entail
that the motives for desire are always motives of self-interest. In fact,
this account there are no motives for desires, only causes. However, it m
still be thought that this version of Hobbes' mechanism does entail psych
logical egoism. The argument might run thus: (1) we act only to attain
what we desire, (2) we desire only those things which benefit our vital motio
therefore, we act only to attain those things which benefit our vital motion.
(1), we act only to attain what we desire-is sometimes taken, by itsel
as a statement of psychological egoism. This is obviously incorrect.
Hobbes himself notes, we can desire to help others as well as desiring ou
own self-interest.l2 In this argument, this premise is taken as analytic
although this involves some stretching of the concept of desire.
12Leviathan, p. 34. See definitions of 'benevolence ' and 'good nature '.

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 HOBBES, MECHANISM, AND EGOISM 347

The second premise is the crucial one, and it has already

be ambiguous in an important way. (2) may mean 'when
benefits our vital motion, this causes us to desire it', which is
of Hobbes' mechanism. But this forces us to interpret the
'when anything benefits our vital motion, this causes us t
attain it', which is not a statement of psychological egoism
mean 'we desire only those things which we believe will b
motion ', which is itself, and yields a conclusion that is, a
psychological egoism. But this is not a part of any ver
mechanism. Thus the conclusion of the argument, if interp
ment of psychological egoism, does not follow from Hobb
or, if it does, it cannot be interpreted as a statement of psych
However, the kind of thought which leads one to think h
Hobbes' mechanism to psychological egoism can easily b
first look upon a person as a machine responding only to those
affect its vital motion; seeking those things which have hel
ened it, and avoiding those things which have hindered or
Then, since there is a tremendous temptation to anthropom
talking about machines at all, it is almost impossible not t
this temptation when one is talking about that machine w
posedly is. We now credit this machine with the simplest
what has benefited the vital motion will continue to do so-and the machine
now acts, though in a somewhat limited fashion, to benefit its vital motio
Thus we have the machine acting from a motive of self-interest. Holdin
this view, we can even account for the fact that these machines, i.e., peopl
do not always act in their own interest; something which used to benef
the vital motion no longer does so. But although this account may b
plausible, it obviously does not contain a valid deduction of psychologica
egoism from Hobbes' mechanism, for beliefs are illegitimately attributed
a machine. Further, only if the actions of the machine are explained by
these beliefs, and not merely by the past effects of things on the vital motion
can one say that the machine, which no longer seems like a machine at al
is acting from motives of self-interest.
In showing that psychological egoism cannot be validly deduced from
Hobbes' mechanism, in either version, it was not necessary to investigat
the concept of self-interest, only that of motive. By showing that havin
a motive entails having a belief and that neither version of Hobbes' mech
nism entails having any beliefs, it was possible to conclude that Hobbes'
mechanism could not entail any theory about motives, and in particular
could not entail psychological egoism. Thus the truism that psychologic
egoism is about motives is sufficient to show that it cannot be valid
deduced from Hobbes' mechanism.

III

The conclusion that psychological egoism cannot be deduced f

version of Hobbes' mechanism has some wider implications. It is

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348 BERNARD GERT

peculiarities of Hobbes' mechan

it impossible to deduce psychol
human behaviour can entail psy
enough if we restrict ourselve
dition of one's body to explai
action is caused by some Hobbes
in some more elaborate physi
terms, nothing follows about m
did or did not have a motive in
explain my drinking two quart
suffering from a calcium defi
about my motives for drinkin
motives or not. I may know tha
and believe that drinking milk
my motive for drinking milk m
I may not know of this deficienc
But in either case-whether I k
might still offer this fact abou
quarts of milk a day. Thus it c
of actions, at least those which
entail anything about motives.
What is not obvious is that ca
about one's mind, e.g., explanati
than some fact about the body
It may sound odd to say that al
motive for doing that action, n
doing it; but the oddity is due s
as if unconscious motives were sim
If this were the case, it would be
of which the actor is unaware, no
be absurd to say that from facts
nothing follows about motives
motives are not ordinary motive
Similarly, immaterial objects ar
immaterial, and unfelt pain is n
Just as it is part of the concep
aware of it, so it is part of the
that motive is aware of it. Thu
as if it meant simply an ordinar
scious, would be as wrong as tak
simply an ordinary pain which
In the case of both 'unconscio
happened is that an essential featu
while less central features have
ficially related to the old one

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 HOBBES, MECHANISM, AND EGOISM 349

unfelt pain, we note that the physiological symptoms of pain

including even the neurological disturbance, and yet an
of the ordinary concept of pain is absent, namely the p
may be quite natural in some circumstances to call this c
phenomena "unfelt pain ", yet this terminology is danger
sound as if being felt were not an essential part of the
Whereas what we are really doing is saying that we now
phenomena present which usually occur only with pain b
occur without it. Likewise, in the case of " unconscious m
that many of the features of ordinary motives are presen
essential feature is absent, namely the person does not a
belief as his reason for doing the action. It is quite natura
stances to call this combination of phenomena " unconscio
this suffers from a danger similar to the one cited above
if regarding a certain belief as your reason for doing an
essential part of the concept of motive. Whereas what we
is saying that there are a combination of features which r
bination of features that accompany motives, except that
to whom the motive is attributed does not acknowledge
That unconscious motives are not ordinary motives of
unaware, but are a quite distinct sort of thing, is not with
Motives can be used as explanations only of voluntary act
motives may be invoked to explain not only involuntary
stuttering, but also such things as headaches. Whether o
conscious motives causes, or put them in a category by t
clear that they are not ordinary motives. It should now
no explanation of human action in terms of unconscious m
anything about the motives for that action. No matter w
motive is cited as explaining my action it does not follow
any particular belief as my reason for doing that action.
regarded Hobbes' mechanism as providing unconscious mo
i.e., as meaning that though we were not aware of it the b
would benefit our vital motion was the cause of our seeki
unwarranted interpretation), it would still not entail psyc
Thus not only can psychological egoism not be deduced
mechanical account of human nature, but also there is no
causal explanation of human action from which it can be
theories about unconscious motives. For none of these causal accounts
entails that the person, whose action is being explained, is even a
any of the facts used in the explanation. Whereas psychological e
a theory about motives, and thus entails that the person whose act
being explained has a belief which he regards as explaining his actio

BERNARD GERT
Dartmouth College, U.S.A.

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