Deutsche Reichsbahn - The German State

Railway

The primary focus of this article will be to evaluate

the strengths and weaknesses of the Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft (DRG, also DR for
short). It need be noted that the DR was first and foremost a civilian or commercial
organization, supporting the needs of the German Wehrmacht if and when ordered to do so.
In times of war, the DR adhered to military regulations and as such was placed under the
guidance of the German Army General Staff's Transportation Division. Despite the
military's control of the DR during the war, the DR also continued to serve the needs of
German or German controlled economic entities (industry, civilian traffic, etc.). The DR was
a separate entity from the German military's rail arm.

Germany's "Panzerzuege" (Armored Trains) were controlled and commanded directly by the
German military at all times. Only in rare circumstances did they engage themselves in
transporting goods or troops. In most of these circumstances, the Panzerzuege were called to
assist another train remove itself from harms way (breakdown, enemy action, etc.).

The DR's last major peacetime assignment prior to the start of the Second World War was to
transport all of the Wehrmacht's (WH) 86 non-motorized divisions to their respective
(offensive) staging positions along the Polish border and to their (defensive) positions along
Germany's western borders. This task was successfully accomplished by the DR prior to 01
September 1939.

Throughout the Polish campaign, the DR was able to satisfy all of the supply and movement
needs of the German Army despite the fact that Polish military forces successfully disrupted,
if not outrightly destroyed, large sections of the Polish railway network as they retreated
inward. The Luftwaffe (LH) contributed to the damage inflicted onto the Polish rail lines by
bombing numerous key Polish railway junctions and yards as they completed their
interdiction assignments. At the conclusion of the Polish Campaign, all of the battle
damaged Polish rail lines had to be repaired before the DR could gain unimpeded access to
the entire Polish railway network in the new General-Gouvernment (GG). By the middle of
October 1939, the DR and the WH had re-established full rail service between Berlin and
Koenigsberg and Breslau to Oppeln, both via Warsaw.

During the Polish campaign, the DR not only played a key role in moving large numbers of
German troops to their front-line positions, the DR also evacuated wounded troops back to
rear areas and often served as portable field kitchens for larger concentrations of troops.

On the negative side, the DR and the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) quickly
realized that the WH did not posses sufficient numbers of Eisenbahnpionier (railway
engineer) troops. As a result of this deficit, many key sections of Polish track remained
unpassable for periods of time exceeding the desires of the OKW. Quickly, a crash training
program was initiated for the creation of additional railway engineer troops. Of note is that
for this effort, not only did the DR and the Reichs Arbeits Dienst (RAD) provided the
needed personnel - (ethnic) Polish railroading companies or enterprises were also contracted
(salaried) to support the German war effort. Thus, a large number of already trained and
qualified former Polish railway personnel were pressed into German service. As the
Germans occupied one nation after another, native nationals were also pressed into service
as auxiliary railway personnel in their respective nations - this included many Estonians,
Latvians, Lithuanians as well as Slavic peoples on the eastern front. For the overwhelming
number of cases however, the DR performed its duties as expected using German forces as
they were available.

On 26 October 1939, the "Gedob" (Generaldirektion der Ostbahn) was established with its
headquarters in Warsaw. This was a separate entity from the DR and it was responsible for
the administration of the railways in the GG (Poland). Within the Gedob structure, a number
of sub-sections or sub-units were also created to better serve the needs of the German
military. From 1939 to 1941, Gedob controlled only the rail lines in the GG. After 1941, the
rail lines of ex-Austrian Galacia were added to the Gedob. Gedob had to start from scratch
as Germany was not in a position at that time to redirect "surplus" rolling stock to the new
entity. For example, Gedob was forced to requisition or refurbish all of the surviving rolling
stock of the former Polish rail system. Regretfully, much of the Polish system was seriously
damaged in the four weeks of fighting. The DR trains were naturally recalled to perform
other duties in Germany proper and in other war theaters.

After the fall of Poland, the DR's primary responsibilities were to ensure the fulfillment of
the terms of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact signed in August of 1939. As may be recalled, in
return for Soviet "neutrality" during the German campaign against Poland, the Soviet Union
was obliged to deliver large quantities of goods (primarily foodstuffs and raw materials) to
Germany. Because Germany and Poland used standard gauge rail lines (1435mm) and the
Soviets continued to use the Czarist era's wide gauge lines (1528mm) - Germany was
obliged to construct two special gauge conversion yards on the German-Soviet border. One
such yard was built in Malaszevica (Brest-Litovsk) and the other in Przemsyl. 66% of the
required Soviet deliveries were trans-shipped through these two rail yards. Naturally, these
two rail yards also became key rail centers once Germany began with Barbarossa.

Starting in October of 1940, the DR and the Gedob were given orders to prepare and expand
the existing German rail network in the east for a military campaign against the Soviet
Union. The goal was to double the existing rail transportation capacities. This entire
undertaking fell under the auspices of the "Otto" Program. Approximately 30.000 German
and Polish railway employees worked for the program; 60% of the funding came from
Germany and the remaining 40% from the GG. Despite loosing 10.000 "Otto" program
participants to the mandatory "Winterhilfe" duties in Poland during the winter of 1940/1941
and considering the sheer enormity of the project itself - the "Otto" program met its goals on
15 June 1941.

In 1939, 84 trains moved eastwards every day - by June of 1941, eight months after the start
of the "Otto" program, 220 trains moved eastwards every day. Many of the DR trains
serving the needs of the WH during this period were cleverly disguised as normal civilian
trains. After all, the goal was to move 141 German divisions to the Soviet border without
detection. During the fist five months of 1941, nearly 34.000 trainloads of supplies and
troops were unloaded in the east. Remarkably, the German and Polish rail lines in the east
were not used at their maximum capacities during the build-up period. This in fact benefited
the civilian rail commerce greatly and later, it allowed Germany to adjust to the realities of
war faster than anticipated or originally planned for.

Without a doubt, the German railway transportation system played a far more strategic role
on the eastern front than it did in any other German theater of war. With the exception of the
Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) and areas in close proximity to larger Soviet
urban or industrial/production centers, the rail and ground transportation network of the
Soviet Union was in a more primitive state of existence when compared to western Europe
or the United States.

German military railroad planners made one critical error in their Barbarossa calculations -
they did not take the primitiveness of the Soviet interior into account when planning for their
attack. This would cost the Germans dearly later.

In the west, the problems encountered were minimal. All of the defeated nations used
standard gauge rail lines. With little effort, these new networks were amalgamated into the
German system. Only Spain used wide gauge lines, but as long as Spain remained a neutral,
this really did not affect the German military situation any.

One of the first actions taken by the German Transportation Division to prepare itself for the
upcoming war with the Soviet Union was to complete a preliminary analysis of the Soviet
rail network. This effort highlighted the following - only four major east-west running trunk
lines connected the western border regions of the Soviet Union (including the recently
annexed regions of Poland and the Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) with
Soviet rear areas:

 Niemen river to Leningrad (double track)

 Bug river to Orsha to Moscow (double track)
 Bug river to Kremenchug to the Donets basin (double track)
 San river to Odessa (double track)
The four above named trunk-lines were intersected by only six major north-south running
trunk lines:

 Koeningsberg to Kremenchug (double track)

 Riga to Orsha to Kharkov to the Donets basin (double track)
 Odessa to Orsha to Leningrad (double track)
 Sevastopol to Kharkov to Moscow to Archanglesk (double track)
 Leningrad to Moscow to the Donets to the Caucasus (double track)
 Leningrad to Moscow to the Caucasus (double track)

A vital rail line also extended from Leningrad to Murmansk (double track). From rear area
cities such as Moscow and Leningrad, the main rail lines, in double track format, went
further east into Siberia and on to Vladivostok. (However, for the purposes of their planning
purposes, the Germans concentrated their planning efforts on the European portions of
Russia.

This rather sparse network was fed by numerous smaller, single track, feeder lines whose
transport capacities were far from optimal. In fact, the majority of the Soviet rail line
network was the same as it had been for the Czars armies 20 years earlier. In some regions
of the Soviet Union, single track rail lines existed for no apparent reason.

Only three important industrial or urban centers contained a dense network of rail lines; the
Donets industrial region, Leningrad and Moscow. Moscow was in fact a key hub; cut off
Moscow and the entire Soviet rail network would be seriously crippled.

Signals and rail safety efforts were primitive when compared to German or western
European standards. Except for large urban areas, few switches were electrically operated.

Shunting areas, turn-a-round loops (vice turntables) and yard areas covered large tracts of
land. This was in fact good news since dispersing one's locomotives and rolling-stock over
large areas was a more optimal defense to aerial attacks.

Only the Kharkhov to Moscow double track line was placed onto a proper bed. The rest of
the soviet rail network was placed onto sandy beds, or the ties were simply tapped lightly
into the existing ground. The lower the engineering standard of the railway bed, the lower
the amount of weight which could traverse same.

Many of the existing railroad bridges of European Russia were in fact temporary structures.
Most of the bridges were built during the First World War to satisfy the military needs of the
Czars' Army in 1914-1917. Some of these temporary bridges were in fact manufactured of
sheet steel and simply riveted together. By German and western European standards, these
temporary bridges were of no value for the heavier trains (carrying heavier tanks and so on)
of the late 1930's and early 1940's. There were also no double-track bridges, and no one in
Germany knew why. All Soviet double track lines which had to cross a river, did so in a split
fashion; that is, each line had its own bridge. The spacing of the two bridges was set at
approximately 50 to 100 yards apart.

Soviet coal was not of optimal quality locomotives even by Soviet standards. A number of
the larger Soviet rail yards contained coal-processing plants which soaked the Donets coal in
(bunker) oil before it was suitable for use in locomotives. Frequently, wood was used as a
substitute for coal, especially in the northern regions of the Soviet Union.

Soviet water for locomotives was also not of optimal value. For example, on the rail line
between Dniepropetrovsk and Stalino, at each of the 11 water towers, a separate additive had
to be mixed with the water to prevent boiler scales from forming in the locomotives.

All along the 1939-1941 Soviet-German border, the Soviets had re-built all of their border
rail centers to only allow for through traffic. All marshaling yards and other major railroad
transportation and workshop facilities near the western Soviet border areas were removed to
prevent the Germans from making use of same in case they attacked. This precaution in fact
slowed the Germans down during their advance and it also created difficulties for them
during the retreats of 1943, 1944 and 1945.

Since annexing Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, the Soviet Union embarked on a program to
convert all of the existing standard gauge lines of the Baltic States over to wide gauge.
While a few key lines were converted (mostly in Lithuania and Latvia), the Soviets were
slow to covert all of them over. By the time of the German invasion in 1941, much gauge
conversion work still had to be done by the Soviet Union. This was a fortunate factor for the
Germans in the north as they thus had fewer rail lines to convert in the Baltics.

Germany did not posses enough qualified personnel to manage the Soviet rail system
effectively. She would have to supplement her forces with local nationals.

All of these points above were the primary factors which the Germans had to tackle if they
wished for success in their invasion bid.

For the attack on the Soviet Union, three Feldeisenbahndirektionen (FBD) (Military Railway
Administrations) were established during the spring of 1941. These three FBD's would serve
as the main supply life-lines of the German invasion forces. The newly created entities were
FBD 1, FBD, 2 and FBD 3. Each contained a full compliment of administrative personnel,
repair facilities and construction works.

FBD 1 was quickly withdrawn and used for the Balkan campaign before Barbarossa began.
FBD 4 was hastily erected in June of 1941 in Danzig as a replacement for FBD 1. FBD 2
was created during the month of April, 1941, in Dresden. Within a month, the staff was
relocated to Warsaw. FBD 3 was initially headquartered in Warsaw, then relocated to
Cracow. During the spring of 1942, the FBD were redesignated as
"Feldeisenbahnkommando" (FEKdo) (Field Railway Command). This designation was
retained until the end of the war. Later; four Haupteisenbahndirektion(en) were established
in Dniepropetrovsk, Kiev, Minsk and Riga.

As is well known, Heeresgruppe Nord (HGrN) was assigned to fight on the northern wing of
the invasion front. Heeresgruppe Mitte (HGrM) formed the middle wing and Heeresgruppe
Sued (HGrS) was in the south. All three were ordered to penetrate as far as they could and
seize key Soviet railheads and bridges intact. Regretfully for the Germans, with a number of
exceptions, the Soviets were able to destroy nearly every bridge the Germans needed as the
Soviet forces retreated eastwards.
In the north, if Leningrad were to be seized, then all of the rail lines feeding into that city
had first to be cut. (The Germans did not even think of the possibility that the Soviets could
build a rail line over the ice in the winter to feed supplies into the besieged city - they
thought that if the rail lines were cut, then the city would have to starve itself into
submission.) However, before the Germans could begin their siege of the Leningrad
metropolis, they had to get there as quickly as possible. For HGrN, the Germans were able
to supplement the rail transportation network with sea-borne transportation and to a lesser
degree, vehicular transportation modes as a result of the excellent maritime and road
networks in existence in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Thus, fewer rail units would be
needed in the north in the earlier days, the "surplus" could then be redirected towards the
other two invasion groups.

The winter of 1941/1942 placed the German military transportation system into a most
difficult predicament. By 01 January 1942, the German rail system was nearly paralyzed -
nearly! Fortunately, as for example with HGrN, the Germans were able to finish most of
their gauge conversion efforts to such a degree that it was still possible to send supplies from
Germany all the way to the Leningrad front on one track system. During these harsh winter
months, the German conversion and supply shipment efforts could not have been as
successful as they were had it not been for the willing assistance of former Estonian and
Latvian railway personnel. They provided the Germans with invaluable service and technical
expertise; doing so primarily because they were just liberated from the holocaust of the first
Soviet occupation and did not wish to see the Soviets return any time soon. Interestingly, the
Soviet Air Force, the VVS, was strangely inactive in the Leningrad region during these
critical months (though they did attack Estonia once). Had they been more aggressive, they
could have played havoc with the German rail network in German rear areas.

The following gives an indication as to how quickly German railway repair forces were able
to make a destroyed line operable again:

11 July 1941 - 4th Pz Group reaches Porkhov;

18 July 1941 - 1st DRG train arrives same
23 August 1941 - 4th Pz Group reaches Luga;
23 August 1941 - as above
08 August 1941 - 16th Armee reaches Staraya Russa;
29 September 1941 - as above

1942: The winter of 1941/1942 was one of the coldest on record in European Russia. From a
military perspective, the severe weather conditions essentially neutralized all of Germany's
transportation system advantages all along the eastern front. Although the German rail
network also suffered severely due to the extreme winter temperatures, it was also the one
supply system which was able to continue operating day and night (albeit with great
difficulty). As of 12 December 1941, the German military authorities banned home leave for
all troops in Russia. Every soldier was needed on the eastern front so as to avoid a defeat of
epic proportions.

The severe winter of 1941/1942 also placed into question many of Germany's military and
technological advantages over their Soviet foe. As with many other German technologies,
German locomotives contained greater quantities of precision made parts than their Soviet
counterparts. Due to the cold, these delicate parts often froze up or became inoperable
during the winter of 1941/1942. Even German "winterized" locomotives broke down in the
east - a winter in Russia is not the same as a winter in Germany.

One consequence of this was that in the east, only 20% of all of Germany's "winterized"
locomotives were operationally available in late 1941. In total, between 70-80% of all
German locomotives deployed on the eastern front became inoperable. Conversely, Soviet
(and ex-Imperial Russian) locomotives seemed to be in their natural element during the
winter months. The situation improved quite a bit when the Germans borrowed a page from
Soviet construction techniques - they removed all of the precision parts and basically ran
stripped down locomotives until the severe weather receded.

For example, in February of 1942, only eight military supply trains per day ran from Brest to
Minsk to Smolensk. Between January and February of 1942, only 19 military supply trains
per day could be dispatched from Germany/Poland to serve the needs of the entire German
Army on the eastern front. During January of 1942, HGrN needed 30 trainloads of supply a
day just to maintain minimum capabilities. Due to the cold, barely 10 trains a day could be
dispatched. The rail system nearly broke down fully - nearly!

The spring thaw of 1942 was often just as bad as the winter had been. Severe floods
frequently damaged or took out key bridges. While German rear-area and German
construction troops were able to repair the weather caused damage relatively quickly, in the
long run, this too slowed the German supply network to a dismal crawl during these spring
months.

Despite the many setbacks attributed to the harsh winter, administratively and physically, the
DR and the WH continued to expand and establish suitable standard gauge secondary trunk
lines leading up to the front lines. By 01 February 1942, the following standard gauge rail
supply and transportation network existed going towards the front lines:

 Haupteisenbahndirektion (HBD) (HGr Nord) in Riga, Latvia - 17 secondary lines

 Feldeisenbahndirektion (FBD) Nr. 4 in Pskov, Russia - 14 secondary lines
 Haupteisenbahndirektion (HBD) (HGr. Mitte) in Minsk, Byelorussia - 23 secondary
lines
 Feldeisenbahndirektion (FBD) Nr. 2 in Smolensk, Russia - 10 secondary lines
 Haupteisenbahndirektion (HBD) (HGr. Sued) in Kiev, the Ukraine - 21 secondary
lines
 Haupteisenbahndirektion (HBD) (HGr. Ost) in Poltava, the Ukraine - 12 secondary
lines
 Feldeisenbahndirektion (FBD) Nr. 3 in Poltava, the Ukraine - 8 secondary lines

The German summer offensive of 1942 created a rather unique problem for the DR. While
many miles of Russian rail lines were added to the existing German network, and while the
conversion of the Soviet wide gauge lines to standard gauge proceeded relatively effortlessly
- the vast distances the German DR and armored trains now had to cover created numerous
logistical bottlenecks in German rear areas. The creation of a new Feldeisenbahndirektion in
Rostov and Feldeisenbahndirektion Nr. 5 in Kaukaskaya on 10 October 1942 helped to
alleviate a fair number of the bottleneck problems.

The assault on Moscow in 1942 failed primarily because the Germans were not able to
extend their standard gauge line east of Smolensk fast enough. While ample quantities of
supplies were available for the first two phases of the German attack against Moscow, the
German rail transportation system was not able to sustain the shipment of needed military
supplies for the third and final assault phase.

The Germans also made an error in deciding which wide gauge lines running close to the
German front lines should be converted to standard gauge. The German Military
Transportation Department wanted the Nevel-Velikye Luki-Rzhev rail line converted. This
would have greatly eased the supply problems of the eastern wing of HGrM. But a decision
was made not to do the conversion. This caused the Germans many problems during the
winter of 1942/1943.

On the other side of this coin was the fact that the Germans continued to operate wide gauge
trains east of Vyazma to about Rzhev (on the rail line they wanted to convert to standard
gauge). Despite the fact that this rail line could only accommodate no more than two trains a
day to service the supply needs of HGrM in that area - it was miraculously sufficient for the
Germans to hold their own and prevent a Soviet breakthrough.

1943-1945: Between 1943 and 1945, Germany was more and more in a defensive mode. No
longer were the Germans concerned about converting Soviet wide gauge lines to standard
gauge - now they were concentrating on keeping their ever-shrinking network in operational
condition.

The best year for the German rail system was during the summer of 1943. Nearly every
important rail line in the Soviet Union had been converted to the standard gauge. Every day,
over 200 trains departed Germany for the eastern front. HGrS took the lions share of the
supplies for during this period, 125 of the 200 trains were slated to support HGrS. Of note
too is that despite an increase in Soviet partisan activities in central Russia, German train
schedules were affected very little by same. A prime reason for this can be attributed to the
extensive network the Germans had built up in Russia. If the partisans did manage to knock-
out a particular line, the Germans were in an optimal position to re-route the trains through
any number of side lines.

In addition, during the longer summer days, German supply and security trains were able to
operate within visual sight of one another. This greatly increased their security factor and
made it more difficult for Soviet partisans to conduct daylight attacks against the German
trains.

For example, during the month of June 1943, the Germans counted over 840 partisan attacks
against German rail lines in the sector controlled by HGrM. During that same time frame,
the Germans were able to run over 860 troop trains. nearly 1.000 supply trains and over 700
other support trains in the same area.

HGrS, operating in the Ukraine, did not have any major problems with Soviet partisan
activities for most of its time in that area.

It need be noted that the Soviets were very familiar with the problems the German rail
transportation system was encountering. Their partisan efforts were designed to wreak
maximum disruption on the German rear area system.
One of the elder von Moltke's axioms stated that military operations will suffer accordingly
if the rail head is more than 60 miles/100 km from the front lines. If this held true for the
first world war, it also held true for the second world war. However, due to the many
circumstances beyond their control, German military rail planners were often hard pressed to
maintain lesser distances from rail head to the front line - especially when German troops
were on the attack in the first two to three years of the war. Given that motor transportation
methods had now progressed to far greater levels, Moltke's axiom was extended to about
180 miles/300 km. Whenever feasible, narrow gauge "Feldeisenbahnen" were built to fill the
many gaps.

Trains did have one advantage. They could operate day and night. They could also decrease
and increase their speed to adjust to any problems in their respective time schedules.
According to German calculations, on the average, a supply or troop train could cover about
500 miles a day.

One of the biggest problems one can encounter in the railroading business is that of
developing an optimal time schedule and being able to adhere to it in a reasonable fashion.
From the German perspective, the following types trains (and in order of scheduling
priority) had to be considered in German rear and front areas:

 Troop transportation trains; their movement and special troop transfer requirements.
 Supply trains
 Empty trains which had just unloaded and were returning for a new run.
 Military Post/military mail trains
 Medical evacuation trains; hospital trains.
 Rest and Relaxation trains.
 POW trains
 Construction and repair/workshop trains

Consideration also had to be made for "Special Purpose" or "Special Mission" trains, such
as, but not limited to military intelligence mission, covert infiltration, quick re-deployment
of front-line troops, etc.

One result of German prioritization or scheduling efforts were that trains of a lower ranking
often had to wait on side tracks or in yards until its movement priority level once again
permitted it to proceed. The transferring of wounded, the re-loading and off-loading of trains
often also did not adhere to expected "down times". This often delayed or altered existing
schedules by quite a bit.

To the above "military" requirements, one also had to consider the civilian needs. Raw
materials from the German occupation areas had to be brought back to Germany so that the
German industry could make optimal use of them. Industry specialists had to travel from one
city to another, families also had social obligations they wanted to be able to meet, etc.

In terms of supplementing German industrial needs, the following main requirements thus
existed for this category of trains:

 Coal from the Ukraine (never shipped in satisfying quantities).

 Manganese from Nikopol.
  Iron ore from Krivoi-Rog.
 Timber from the Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the Pripet march regions.
 Oil-shale from Estonia (a large percentage of the Kriegsmarine's needs came from
Estonian oil-shale).
 Grains (foodstuffs) from the Ukraine (this was always in surplus as the Ukraine
was/is a very fertile region).

To the above two lists, one must now add a third category of trains. Those serving
administrative or construction needs:

 Building supplies to rebuild or expand captured production centers.

 Ancillary supply trains.
 Repair and recovery trains.
 Trains transporting workers, party officials, civilian administration units, etc.

As but one example of the volume of traffic, during the month of October of 1942, 300
empty goods-wagons departed from the greater Riga area bound for the Ukraine - on a daily
basis.

On 08 September 1942, a priority list was established for shipping goods from the Soviet
Union to Germany:

1. Foodstuffs.
2. Manganese.
3. Coal.
4. Iron ore.
5. Timber.

To help alleviate some of the scheduling requirements, a priority "red-line" and a priority
"green-line" were established for HGrN.

Another factor affecting military rail operations are of course the number of available
locomotives and wagons. With respect to the railway wagons, the following figures
represent the number of German and captured wagons available for use:

On 01 January 1942: 84.000 wagons.

On 01 June 1942: 142.000 wagons.
On 01 December 1942: 203.000 wagons.

Re-wheeling Soviet stock to German norms was not always an optimal solution. Although
the wagon width itself remained unchanged, re-wheeling to German norms also altered-
lowered payload allowances and balance requirements. Soviet wagons were not always the
sturdiest of wagons.

Since taking the advice of an American railway engineer in the mid 1800's, the rail gauge of
Czarist Russia and its successor state, the Soviet Union, has been in the wide gauge. The
theory being that an attacker would encounter more operational and supply problems if he
were forced to convert a wider gauge rail line to "his" gauge (back in the mid 1800's, it was
assumed that Germany was going to be the aggressor). In 1939, only in Lithuania (and to a
lesser degree in Latvia and Estonia) did one find larger concentrations of standard gauge rail
lines which the Soviets had not yet converted to wide gauge after their occupation and
annexation of the Baltic States in 1940. If the Germans wanted to make use of Soviet rail
lines, they had to convert them to the standard gauge. However, this was not as easy as it
might sound!

The 1938 Soviet five-year plan called for the Soviet rail line system to be expanded to
approximately 62.000 miles (100.000km). For the most part, the Soviets were able meet
their construction goals. When the German attack began, most of the Soviet rail lines (and
all of the important ones) were in wide gauge.

The Baltic States confronted the Germans with a unique situation. While most of the rail
lines in Lithuania and western Latvia were in the standard gauge (and thus easy for the
Germans to operate on them), a number of key rail lines in eastern Latvia and Estonia were
still in the wide gauge. Because the Germans had advanced very rapidly into Lithuania and
Latvia and because they were able to capture about 30 serviceable wide-gauge locomotives
and close to 300 railroad wagons in eastern Latvia and a slightly lesser number of
serviceable wide-gauge locomotives and wagons in Tallinn, Estonia - the Germans elected
to temporarily use the available wide gauge equipment to shuttle German troops and
supplies from eastern Latvia and Estonia (as well as from the ports of Riga, Paldiski and
Tallinn) to the front lines of HGrN. The wide gauge line ended at Narva because the Soviets
had blown up the bridge there as they retreated.

As of 01 January 1943, 22.000 miles (35.000km) of the Soviet rail network were under
German control and the majority of that had already been converted to standard gauge by the
Germans. Although the Germans were able to "capture" large quantities of Soviet rolling
stock and railway construction materials, the captured items were for the most part
substandard in quality or antiquated. In the overwhelming number of cases, wide gauge
rolling stock were re-wheeled to standard gauge by the Germans. Locomotives could not be
converted with any degree of service reliability.

If the length of the track one has under one's control is important, so too is the question of
"how good is the rail line itself?" Again, poor Soviet construction standards played a key
role in the German decision making process. Whereas German and most western rail bed
construction methods contained a multi-tiered rock and gravel foundations - Soviet rails
were almost always sitting only on a bed of sand covered occasionally with rocks to
minimize the inevitable dust clouds. The western regions of the Soviet Union suffered a
great rock shortage. To make matters worse, the vast majority of the Soviet rail ties were
made of untreated pine. This meant that their weight capacity fell way below German
railway norms (38kg/m for Soviet lines vs. 49kg/m in Germany).

Soviet rail ties were also placed further apart than American and German norms
(approximately 1.440 ties per km in the Soviet Union vs. 1.500 ties per km in Estonia, 1.600
ties per km in Germany and 2.000 ties per km in the United States). This too added to a
lower overall transportation capacity of the Soviet rail line.

The way a rail is attached to a tie is also of great importance to speed limits and weight
allowances. Soviet rails were attached to the tie with plain spikes. German norms called for
the rails to be attached with an angled washer/base plate and screw type tie-downs. Angled
base plates allow one to increase load factors and rail speeds. Because of the Soviet rail line
construction technique, Soviet cargo and weight capacities were often reduced way below
the official allowances. On many sections of track, German locomotives were proscribed
from operational activity because of their greater weight and stress factors per kg/m.

German rail conversion efforts were completed relatively quickly. In many cases, the
Germans only had to remove one of the rails and move it closer in.

Damaged bridges took longer to repair. Portable bridges, ferries or other trans-shipment
methods were used until the bridges had been repaired. But with few exceptions, most of the
bridges destroyed by the Soviets were quickly made operable again by the Germans. Some
examples:

The bridge at Kaunas: destroyed on 24 June 1941; repaired on 17 July 1941

The bridge at Riga: destroyed on 02 July 1941; repaired on 12 July 1941
The bridge near Petseri: destroyed on 09 July 1941; repaired on 24 July 1941

The authors are not aware of the Germans adding a third rail to allow the use of standard and
wide gauge on the same line. It takes more effort to produce a third rail than it does to
simply move one rail line closer. However, limited uses of such a construction technique
should not be viewed as surprising - especially near urban areas.)

As described above, another technical limitation was the use of Soviet coal. Because of its
lower quality (at least that which was available to the Germans via the Donets region),
Soviet coal, in worst operating conditions, had to be mixed with German coal at a ratio of
1:1. This meant that the Germans had to "import" coal into a region that they were also
"exporting" coal from. Ideally, mixture ratios of 2(Ger):1(SU) or higher were desired to
make the German locomotives run at peak performance.

In addition, Soviet yard and line switches had to be rebuilt, German signals and German
traffic signals had to be installed, etc.

One of the biggest problems the Germans encountered was the fact that the larger Soviet
trains could cover larger distances before they needed to re-water and re-coal. German
trains, required more frequent servicing in this respect. This problem was most acute in the
more remote regions of the middle and southern fronts.

In the Soviet Union, railway personnel knew that they were a notch above the rest in terms
of class and social standing. Not only were they very skilled and dedicated in their jobs, they
also knew how to mess things up for the Germans. However, once the Germans occupied a
region, many "Soviet" railway experts stepped forward and willingly helped the German
cause.

No discussion of German rail during WWII would be complete without a discussion of the
impact Soviet Partisans had on German rear area rail lines.

The Partisan "problem" really started as soon as the German invasion began. In the early
phases of this war, German anti-partisan efforts were relatively successful. German Police
and rear area units usually were able to secure and neutralize the attackers quickly. As the
war progressed, Partisan activities were more and more successful in disrupting German rail
traffic - often with disastrous consequences for the Germans. For example, during the month
of September 1943, an average of 64 attacks per day were taking place against German
trains.

One of the consequences of the increased Partisan activities was that German armored trains
now found themselves more and more engaged in rear area security duties than in supporting
front line units and direct military operations.

German locomotive and wagon types used: In short, if it ran on the tracks - it was put into
service by the Germans - regardless of who the previous owner may have been or what
shape the wagon in question was in. While this is clearly an over-generalization, it also is
not that far from the truth. Germany was always short of rolling stock in the east. For the
purposes of this article, we shall confine the discussions to a few of the major types of
locomotives and wagons - a detailed listing would exceed the intent of this article.

In 1939, Germany possessed not only "German" designed locomotives and rolling stock, she
also had a number of excellently designed Bavarian, Prussian and "empire era" equipment as
well. A standardization effort was called for, but this would take years or decades to realize.
Regardless of origin, all DR locomotives in operation in 1939, served for as long as they
could or until they were destroyed as a result of military actions. All except for a few trial or
evaluation models and a few armored trains, were in the standard gauge. The more esoteric
models were relegated to local duties in and around Germany while the more numerous
production models were sent to the far corners of Europe.

With regard to the DR support to the eastern front (and as mentioned above), Germany
realized that one of its shortcomings was that it did not posses a "German" locomotive
suitable to cover the long distances between coaling stations. Designed in 1942/1943 by the
Borsig Company, the type 53 "super locomotive" was to be the answer. This giant, 2-6-8-0
(U.S. nomenclature) configured , 27m/81ft long locomotive was designed to use only a
minimum of parts, but be flexible enough to operate on all standard gauge tracks and operate
on really all curves. Its prime purpose was however to pull freight trains to and from the
eastern regions. The tender too was of double length to accommodate more coal. For a
myriad of reasons, the locomotive never entered production.

Another strong work-horse was the type 52 locomotive. Built from 1942 to 1950, this 2-10-2
(U.S. nomenclature) (1' E '1 German nomenclature) wheeled locomotive was built primarily
by the Floridsdorfer Werke in Vienna (they built 1168 units). Henschel built another 1068.
Total production was 6303 units. The Waffen und Maschinen-AG in Posen (in today's
Poland) was another manufacturing site for the type 52 locomotive. The Type 52 weighed in
at 84 metric tons and had an output of 1620 horse-power.

The type 42 "Kriegslokomotive" was also a strong work-horse for the DR. First built in
1943, the last type 42 ran with the Austrian State Railways (OBB) in 1967. Clearly a well
designed locomotive for such a long service life. The type 42 was also designed to use only
a minimum of parts and materials. For example, the pre-war type 50 locomotive used
900kg/1.984lbs of brass - the type 42 only 35kg/77lbs. Of 2-10-0 (U.S. nomenclature) (1' E
German nomenclature) configuration, 866 units were built in total.

Of the faster (express) locomotives, the type 05 certainly can be placed in that group. This
locomotive was designed in 1936 for rapid passenger service; the locomotive could boast
175kmh/108mph. Of 4-6-4 (U.S. nomenclature) (2' C '2 German nomenclature)
configuration, it also boasted an output of 3400 horsepower. After 1944, nearly all 05's
received camouflage paint schemes.

The type 50 locomotive was originally intended to be a replacement for the aging Prussian
G10 freight locomotive. Of 2-10-0 (U.S. nomenclature) (1' E h2 German nomenclature)
configuration, 3164 were built by 1943. Henschel was the primary producer. 1630 horse-
power at approximately 80kmh/49mph.

In terms of freight wagons, some of the more major German types were:

 Type SSmys and Sa 705 six-axle heavy load wagon (for heavy tanks, etc)
 Type SSy "Koeln" four axle medium to heavy load wagon
 Type R10 two axle, open stack wagon (about 9.400kg/20723lbs payload)
 Type R10 "Stuttgart" two axle, open stack wagon with a brake-house
 Type Ommr "Dresden" and "Linz" two axle box cars; (these are they wagons seen in
movies transporting the MG or light FLAK crews in some sort of sandbagged
protective position)
 "Villach" type two axle open goods wagons (about 10.000kg/22.246lbs payload)
 Type OOt "Saarbruecken" four axle coal transporter
 Type Om "Breslau" two axle, open goods wagon with a brake-house

For recovery purposes, one type that was available, the SSt 662 six axle heavy steam crane.
German rail recovery teams were really no different from those of anyone else. A fully
equipped recovery unit counted at least one locomotive if not two; supply wagons, a security
detail; a crane suitable for the load it would have to recover; etc.

In terms of rear-area construction or repair facilities, those in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
serve as a good background to detail examples. In 1898, the "Dvigatel" works were
established in Tallinn. Working in concert with their Latvian counterparts, the Dvigatel
works also produced a number or railway wagons for the Czar. After 1918, the Dvigatel
works focused on the construction and refurbishing of Russian "Ow" class locomotives; in
1925, they also built a number of street-cars for the city of Tallinn. In the 1930's, the
Estonian "Krull" machine works also got started in the rail business. It built a number of
locomotives for the Eesti VR. During the second world war, the Krull works did not build
any additional engines, but its facilities, as well as those of the Dvigatel site, and its
personnel were put to use by the Germans to repair their regional fleet.

Between 26 October 1941 and 01 November 1943, 237 locomotives were transferred to the
government of Finland to help replace those damaged by the Soviets. Most of the transferred
locomotives were Soviet , but at least four were former Estonian ones.

During the war one of the largest locomotive and rolling stock servicing facilities on the
eastern front was in Riga, Latvia. Initially established as the Russian-Baltic Iron Wagon
Factory (a.k.a. Baltic Wagon Works) by the German company of "van der Zypen &
Charlier" from Cologne (Koeln), in 1869; the Baltic Wagon Works quickly rose to become
one of the largest in the area. The "Phoenix" works were also erected near Riga; this was
Igor Sikorsky's giant aircraft manufacturing center which later also engaged itself in the rail
road business. Both were evacuated during the first world war to Russian rear areas. The
Sikorsky factory was relocated to Tver and to this day they still construct rail coaches.

After the first world war (1918), German bankers funded the rebuilding of the Phoenix and
Putilov works to build new rail roads. The former Putilov factory now serviced primarily
Russian "O" class locomotives in addition to building coaches and freight wagons.

As the Germans occupied Latvia in 1941, they were able to capture 91 Latvian wide gauge
locomotives. In total, the Germans captured 187 wide gauge locomotives in Latvia. All,
except 17, were converted to standard gauge.

Lithuania did not have any large locomotive or wagon production centers from the late
1800's to 1940; but her rail yards could undertake any repair or servicing required. These too
were put to use by the Germans in 1941. In 1942/1943, the Germans did erect a repair major
rail facility in Palemonas at the rail yard there.