Sec. of DOTC vs.

Mabalot, 378 SCRA 129 (2000)

FACTS:

The Sec. of DOTC issued to LTFRB Chairman MO 96-735, transferring the regional functions of that
office to DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending creation of a Regional LTFRO. Later, the new Sec. of
DOTC issued DO 97-1025, establishing the DOTCCAR Regional Office as the Regional Office of the
LTFRB to exercise regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct supervision and
control of the LTFRB Central Office. Mabalot protested.

ISSUE:

W/N the MO and DO are violative of the provision of the Constitution against encroachment on the
powers of the legislative department

HELD:

SC upheld the validity of the issuance of the challenged orders.

In the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory infirmity attending the issuance of
the challenged orders, Court upholds. The President, through his duly constituted political agent and
alter ego, may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the
establishment of the DOTCCAR as the LTFRB Regional Office of CAR with the concomitant transfer
and performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the
LTFRB.

There are three modes of establishing an administrative body: (1) Constitution; (2) Statute; and (3)
by authority of law. This case falls under the third category.

The DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President, is authorized by law to create and establish the
LTFRB-CAR Regional Office. This is anchored on the President’s “power of control” under sec. 17, Art.
VII, 1987 Constitution.

By definition, control is “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the
former for that of the latter.” It includes the authority to order the doing of an act by a subordinate
or to undo such act or to assume a power directly vested in him by law.

Under sec. 20, Bk. III, E.O. 292, the Chief Executive is granted residual powers, stating that “unless
Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in
the President which are provided for under the laws xxx”
What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is PD 1772 which amended PD 1416. These
decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to
abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to
standardize salaries and materials.

Granted that the President has the power to reorganize, was the reorganization of DOTCCAR valid?

In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a

general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to
make bureaucracy more efficient. The reorganization in the instant case was decreed “in the interest
of service” and “for purposes of economy and more effective coOrdination of the DOTC functions in
the Cordillera Administrative Region.” It thus bear the earmarks of good faith.

Eugenio vs. CSC, 243 SCRA 196 (1995)

FACTS:

Eugenio, the Deputy Director of Philippine Nuclear Research Institute, applied for a Career Executive
Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank. But before she got the rank, the CSC passed Resolution No.
93-459, reorganizing itself and changing the CES Board (CESB) to Office for Career Executive Service
of the Civil Service Commission (OCES).

ISSUE:

W/N CSC usurped legislative function of Congress by abolishing the CESB and transferring its budget
to OCES

HELD:

CESB was created by PD 1. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as CESB was created by law, it can
only be abolished by the legislature. While CSC has the power to reorganize under Sec. 17, Chap. 3,
Subtitle A, Title I, Bk. V. of the Administrative Code of 1987, this must be read with sec. 16, which
enumerates the offices under the control of the CSC. CESB is not one of such offices.

CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to CSC. This
essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to respondent
Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of respondent
Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally
inter-related government agency to another is to attain “policy and program coordination.
Phil. Association of Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298; G.R. No. 101279, August 6,
1992

Posted by Pius Morados on November 13, 2011

(Admin Law, DOLE, quasi-legislative power)

Facts:

DOLE Dept. Order No. 16 temporarily suspends the recruitment by private employment agencies of
Filipino DH going to Hong Kong in view of the need to establish mechanisms that will enhance the
protection for the same.

The DOLE, through POEA took over the business of deploying such HK-bound workers. Pursuant to
the above order, POEA issued memorandum circular no. 30 providing guidelines on the government
processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to HK and the accreditation of HK
recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers, and the memorandum circular No.
30, pertaining to the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for HK.

Petitioner contends that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their
rule-making authority in issuing said circulars.

Issue:

WON the take-over of the business deploying DH to HK by DOLE and POEA through an administrative
order and circular is valid.

Held:

Yes. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate
recruitment and placement activities. The challenge administrative issuance discloses that the same
fall within the administrative and police powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred
upon the respondents.
Mateo v. CA

G.R. No. 113219 August 14, 1995

Puno, J.

Issue:

whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Rizal has jurisdiction over a case involving
dismissal of an employee of Morong Water District, a quasi-public corporation

Held:

No. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.)

No. 198, known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. Employees of
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the
Civil Service Commission.

Indeed, the hiring and firing of employees of government-own and controlled corporations
are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations.

Presidential Decree No. 807, Executive Order No. 292, and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum Circular
No. 44 series of 1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private
respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party aggrieved by a
decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government involving termination of services
may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days. Thereafter, private respondent could go on
certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if he still feels aggrieved by the
ruling of the Civil Service Commission.
Carino v. Capulong 222 SCRA 593

G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001

Facts:

During the lifetime of SP04 Santiago S. Carino, he contracted two marriages, the first with Susan
Nicdao Carino with whom he had two offsprings (Sahlee and Sandee) and with Susan Yee Carino
with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation. In 1988, Santiago passed away
under the care of Susan Yee who spent for his medical and burial expenses. Both petitioner and
respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance pertaining to the deceased
from various government agencies. Nicdao was able to collect a total of P146,000.00 and Yee
received a total of P21,000.00. Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao,
contending that the marriage of the latter with Santiago is void ab initio because their marriage was
solemnized without the required marriage license. The trial court ruled in favor of Yee, ordering
Nicdao to pay Yee half of acquired death benefits. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage of Santiago Carino and Susan Nicdao is void for lack of marriage
license.

Ruling:

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of Nicdao and Carino was
solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage and the absence thereof,
subject to certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab initio. In the case at bar, the marriage
does not fall within any of those exceptions and a marriage license therefore was indispensable to
the validity of it. This fact is certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila. Such
being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of Nicdao and Carino has been sufficiently
overcome and cannot stand. The marriage of Yee and Carino is void ab initio as well for lack of
judicial decree of nullity of marriage of Carino and Nicdao at the time it was contracted. The
marriages are bigamous; under Article 148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. The decision of the trial
court and Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290

FACTS:

Petitioner Antonio Carpio as citizen, taxpayer and member of the Philippine Bar, filed this petition,
questioning the constitutionality of RA 6975 with a prayer for TRO.

RA 6875, entitled “AN ACT ESTABLISHIGN THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE UNDER A REORGANIZED
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,” allegedly
contravened Art. XVI, sec. 6 of the 1986 Constitution: “The State shall establish and maintain one
police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and
controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in
their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”

ISSUEs:

Whether or not RA 6975 is contrary to the Constitution

Whether or not Sec. 12 RA 6975 constitutes an “encroachment upon, interference with, and an
abdication by the President of, executive control and commander-in-chief powers”

HELD:

Power of Administrative Control

NAPOLCOM is under the Office of the President.

SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. This
presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends over all executive
officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. In the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa,
the power of control means “the power of the President to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former with that of the latter.” It is said to be at the very “heart of the meaning of Chief
Executive.”
As a corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency.” As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control powers all at the same time
and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinet members.

Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and
administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where
the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the
situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.

Thus, “the President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet
who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department.”

The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an administrative
realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and cooperation among the citizenry, local
executives and the integrated law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies.

Power of Executive Control

Sec. 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief powers. It simply provides for the
transition period or process during which the national police would gradually assume the civilian
function of safeguarding the internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to
repeat, abdicates nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the
preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of the Armed
Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-in-Chief provision “represent only
a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All his other functions are clearly civil in nature.” His
position as a civilian Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional
principle that “civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military.”
LARIN VS. EXECUTVE SECRETARY

FACTS:

Petitioner Aquilino Larin is the Assistant Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and he
also appears to be a co- accused in two criminal cases for violating Section 268(4) of the National
Internal Revenue Code and Section 3 of R.A. 3019. Subsequently petitioner was convicted and this
was reported to the President, the then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary by the authority of the
president issued Memo order 164 creating an executive committee to investigate the administrative
charges.

The committee required that petitioner filed a position paper with regard to the charges against
him, the petitioner complied, and however his statement was that he cannot comment on the
merits of the case for fear of being cited in contempt by the court. Petitioner also alleged that the
committee doesn’t have any jurisdiction over his person, that the case cannot be validly filed
without violating res judicata, his rights against double jeopardy and lastly to proceed with the
investigation would be redundant and oppressive against him. While all this is pending, the
president issued an order for the streamlining of BIR, in which case the office of the petitioner was
abolished by the order. His office being abolished, the petitioner was not reinstated as an assistant
commissioner of BIR, instead another Administrative order was issued in which it stated that he is
being dismissed for being guilty of grave misconduct in connection to the criminal cases filed against
him.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the dismissal of the petitioner was valid or not. a. Who has the power to discipline the
petitioner b. Was due process observed c. What is the effect of the petitioners acquittal in the
criminal case d. Does the president have the power to reorganize BIR e. Was the reorganization done
in bad faith.

HELD:

The court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls under the category of Career Executive Service,
which is appointed by the president and being a presidential appointee, it follows that the president
have the power to discipline the petitioner. Despite the fact that the constitution grants the
president the power to appoint and the inherent power to remove, such power is not without limit.
Under the Administrative code of 1987, career services are characterized to have security of tenure,
therefore the petitioner is protected from being willfully removed by the president, the only way
that the petitioner can be validly removed is for a valid cause and in accordance with the procedural
due process. According to the Court it found that, although the procedural due process was followed
and complied with the petitioner was not removed for a valid cause, since to start with the
committee was created to investigate the administrative aspect of the criminal cases being faced by
the petitioner at that time. Now taking into consideration that the petitioner was acquitted from the
criminal cases, the court believes that there is no ground for the administrative case to continue. It is
admitted that criminal cases and administrative cases usually progress independently, however in
this case it was proven in the criminal case that the petitioner never committed any of the alleged
acts, therefore the case for the administrative case was also terminated, and therefore there is no
longer any valid cause for the removal of the petitioner.

As for the validity of E.O. 132 which reorganized the BIR, the court ruled that the president has the
authority to do so, as seen in the preamble of the E.O. which stated the legal basis of its issuance.
Though it is admitted that the president had the power to reorganize the BIR, the court stated that
such power is not limitless, the reorganization to be valid must be done in good faith. In the instant
case the court found that the reorganization was done in bad faith or at least there are indications of
bad faith, such as when the E.O. abolished the intelligence and investigation office and at the same
time creating Intelligence and Investigation service to do the same functions of the abolished office.
Most importantly is the non reappointment of the petitioner, the petitioner being a holder of a
career service, should have been prioritized or preferred in appointing people to new offices created
by the reorganization, but in this case the petitioner was never reappointed instead he was
dismissed from service without any separation benefits at all. The court ruled that the petitioner is
reinstated as an assistant commissioner and is entitled to back wages.