FIRST DIVISION

On March 3, 2000, Gary and his father, Alberto,

were charged with the crime of Murder in an
PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 168169 Information which read:
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present: That on or about the 23rd day of
October, 1999, in the municipality of
PUNO, C.J., Malolos, province of Bulacan,
Chairperson, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
CARPIO MORALES, of this Honorable Court, the above-
- versus - LEONARDO-DE named accused, conspiring,
CASTRO, confederating together and mutually
BRION,* and helping each other, armed with bladed
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. instrument and with intent to kill one
Ernesto Canatoy, did then and there
ALBERTO TABARNERO willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously,
and GARY Promulgated: with evident premeditation, abuse of
TABARNERO, superior strength and treachery, attack,
Accused-Appellants. February 24, 2010 assault and stab with the said bladed
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - instrument the said Ernesto Canatoy,
- - - - - - - - - -x hitting the latter on the different parts
of his body, thereby causing him
serious physical injuries which directly
DECISION caused his death.[3]

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: On 27 March 2000, warrants for the arrest of

This is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00027 dated
April 29, 2005. In said Decision, the Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the August 29, 2002
Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78
of Malolos, Bulacan, in Crim. Case No. 888-M-2000,
convicting herein appellants Alberto Tabarnero
(Alberto) and Gary Tabarnero (Gary) of the crime of
Murder.
The factual and procedural antecedents of the
case are as follows:
Gary and Alberto were issued by the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan.[4]
On April 22, 2001, Gary surrendered to
Barangay Tanod Edilberto Alarma.[5] When he was
arraigned on April 30, 2001, Gary pleaded NOT GUILTY
to the crime charged. [6] During this time, Alberto
remained at large.
On May 21, 2001, a pre-trial conference was
conducted. Therein, Gary admitted having killed
Ernesto, but claimed that it was an act of self-
defense. Thus, pursuant to Section 11(e), Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court, a reverse trial ensued.

Late at night on October 23, 1999, Gary went to
the house of the deceased Ernesto Canatoy (Ernesto),
where the former used to reside as the live-in partner
of Mary Jane Acibar (Mary Jane), Ernestos
stepdaughter. Gary and Ernesto had a confrontation
during which the latter was stabbed nine times, causing
his death. The versions of the prosecution and the
defense would later diverge as regards the presence of
other persons at the scene and other circumstances
concerning Ernestos death.
Gary, a 22-year-old construction worker at the
time of his testimony in June 2001, testified that he
stayed in Ernestos house from 1997 to 1999, as he and
Mary Jane were living together. Mary Jane is the
daughter of Teresita Acibar, the wife[7] of
Ernesto. However, Gary left the house shortly before
the October 23, 1999 incident because of a
misunderstanding with Ernesto when the latter
allegedly stopped the planned marriage of Gary and
Mary Jane, who was pregnant at that time.
 On October 23, 1999, Gary was allegedly in his
house in Longos, Malolos, Bulacan at around 11:40 p.m.
with his friend, Richard Ulilian; his father, co-appellant
Alberto; his mother, Elvira; and his brother,
Jeffrey.Overcome with emotion over being separated
from Mary Jane, Gary then went to Ernestos house, but
was not able to enter as no one went out of the house
to let him in. He instead shouted his pleas from the
outside, asking Ernesto what he had done wrong that
caused Ernesto to break him and Mary Jane up, and
voicing out several times that he loved Mary Jane and
was ready to marry her. When Gary was about to leave,
the gate opened and Ernesto purportedly struck him
with a lead pipe. Ernesto was aiming at Garys head, but
the latter blocked the blow with his hands, causing his
left index finger to be broken. Gary embraced Ernesto,
but the latter strangled him. At that point, Gary felt that
there was a bladed weapon tucked at Ernestos
back. Losing control of himself, Gary took the bladed
weapon and stabbed Ernesto, although he cannot recall
how many times he did so.[8]
According to Gary, Ernesto fell to the ground,
and pleaded, saklolo, tulungan niyo po ako three
times. Gary was stunned, and did not notice his father,
co-appellant Alberto, coming. Alberto asked
Gary, anak, ano ang nangyari? To which Gary
responded nasaksak ko po yata si Ka Erning, referring to
Ernesto. Gary and Alberto fled, allegedly out of fear.[9]
Gary denied that he and Alberto conspired to
kill Ernesto. Gary claims that it was he and Ernesto who
had a fight, and that he had no choice but to stab
Ernesto, who was going to kill him.[10]
Garys sister, Gemarie Tabarnero, testified that
she was a childhood friend of Mary Jane. Gemarie
attested that Mary Jane was Garys girlfriend from 1995
to 1999. Sometime in 1999, however, Gary and Mary
Jane were prevented from talking to each other. During
that time, Gary was always sad and appeared catatonic,
sometimes mentioning Mary Janes name and crying.[11]
On the night of the incident on October 23,
1999, Gemarie observed that Gary was crying and
seemed perplexed. Gary told Gemarie that he was going
to Ernestos house to talk to Ernesto about Mary
Jane. Gary allegedly did not bring anything with him
when he went to Ernestos house.[12]
In the meantime, on August 5, 2001, Alberto
was apprehended.[13] On August 20, 2001, he pleaded
NOT GUILTY to the charge.[14] However, while Albertos
defense is denial and not self-defense like Garys, the
court decided to proceed with the reverse trial, as it had
already started that way.[15]
Next on the witness stand was Edilberto Alarma
(Alarma), who was a barangay tanod of Longos,
Malolos, Bulacan since February 2000. Alarma testified
that while he was in a meeting at around 4:00 p.m. on
April 22, 2001, Gary arrived and told him of his intention
to surrender to him. Gary told him that he was
responsible for the incident [that] happened at Daang
Riles. Together with his fellow barangay tanod Zaldy
Garcia, Alarma brought Gary to the Malolos Police
Station, where the surrender was entered in the blotter
report.[16]
Appellant Alberto, a construction worker
employed as leadman/foreman of Alicia Builders, was
45 years old at the time of his testimony in September
2001. He testified that at the time of the incident, he
was living in Norzagaray, Bulacan. On October 23, 1999,
however, he went to visit his children, Gary and
Gemarie, in Barangay Longos, Malolos, Bulacan. Before
going to sleep at 11:00 p.m., he realized that Gary was
not in the place where he would usually sleep. He went
downstairs, thinking that Gary was just urinating. He
waited for five minutes; when Gary did not show up, he
proceeded to Daang Bakal, where Gary had many
friends. He walked for about 10 minutes. About 400
meters from the site of the incident, he saw Gary and
asked him what happened and why he was in a hurry,
to which Gary replied: Wag na kayong magtanong,
umalis na tayo, napatay ko po yata si Kuya
Erning. Alberto and Gary ran in different
directions. Alberto passed through the railways and
exited in front of the capitol compound to wait for a
jeepney going to Sta. Maria, his route toward his home
in Norzagaray.[17]
Alberto claims that he had no knowledge of the
accusation that he conspired with Gary in killing
Ernesto. It was three months after the incident that he
came to know that he was being charged for a crime. At
this time, he was already residing in Hensonville Plaza,
Angeles City, Pampanga, where he was assigned when
his engineer, Efren Cruz, secured a project in said
place.[18]
During cross-examination, Alberto repeated
that he did not return to Garys house after the
incident. He said that it did not occur to him to inform
the authorities about the killing of Ernesto. Later,
Alberto learned from his sibling, whom he talked to by
phone, that Gary had already surrendered. He did not
consider surrendering because, although he wanted to
clear his name, nobody would work to support his
family. He said that he had no previous
misunderstanding with Ernesto.[19]
Answering questions from the court, Alberto
stated that he immediately went home to Norzagaray
because he was afraid to be implicated in the stabbing
of Ernesto. It did not occur to him to stay and help Gary
because he did not know where Gary proceeded after
they ran away. The next time he saw Gary was three
months after the incident, when Gary went to
Norzagaray.[20]
The first to testify for the prosecution was its
eyewitness, Emerito Acibar (Emerito). Emerito, the
brother of Mary Jane,[21] was inside their house in Daang
Bakal, Longos, Malolos, Bulacan with his brother and his
stepfather, Ernesto, at around eleven oclock on the
night of the incident on October 23, 1999. He heard
somebody calling for Ernesto, but ignored it. He then
heard a kalabog, followed by Ernestos plea for
help. Emerito was about to go outside, but, while he
was already at the door of their one-room[22] house, he
saw Ernesto being held by a certain Toning Kulit and
another person, while Gary and Alberto were stabbing
Ernesto with fan knives. Emerito lost count of the
number of thrusts made by Gary and Alberto, but each
inflicted more than one, and the last stab was made by
Alberto. Emerito shouted for help. The four assailants
left when somebody arrived, allowing Emerito to
approach Ernesto and bring him to the Bulacan
Provincial Hospital.[23]
On cross-examination, Emerito confirmed that
Gary and Mary Jane used to reside in Ernestos
house. On the date of the incident, however, Gary had
already left the house, while Mary Jane had moved to
Abra with Teresita (the mother of Emerito and Mary
Jane). According to Emerito, his family did not know that
Mary Jane and Gary had a relationship because they
treated Gary like a member of the family. Ernesto got
mad when his wife, Teresita, found out about Gary and
Mary Janes relationship. On the night of the incident, at
past 11:00 p.m., Emerito was fixing his things inside
their house, when he heard someone calling from
outside, but was not sure if it was Gary.Emerito neither
saw Ernesto leaving the room, nor the fight between
Ernesto and Gary. All he saw was the stabbing, which
happened seven to eight meters away from the
doorway where he was standing. He was sure that there
were four assailants, two of whom went to a bridge 8 to
10 meters from the incident, where they boarded a
yellow XLT-type car.[24]
Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Ronnie Morales
of the Malolos Philippine National Police testified that
he was on duty at the police station on the night of
October 23, 1999. During that night, Emerito reported
at the police station that Ernesto had been
stabbed. SPO2 Morales and Emerito proceeded to the
Bulacan Provincial Hospital, where SPO2 Morales saw
Ernesto in the operating room, very weak due to
multiple injuries. While in the presence of two doctors
on duty, SPO2 Morales asked Ernesto who stabbed
him. Ernesto answered that the assailants were the
father and son, Gary and Alberto Tabarnero from
Longos, Bulacan.[25]
Cross-examined, SPO2 Morales clarified that it
was already 1:00 a.m. of the following day when he and
Emerito proceeded to the hospital. As they went to the
hospital, Emerito did not inform SPO2 Morales that he
witnessed the incident. SPO2 Morales did not find it odd
that Emerito did not tell him who the suspects were
when Emerito reported the incident, because they
immediately proceeded to the hospital, considering
that the victim, Ernesto, was still alive. Ernesto was not
able to affix his signature on the Sinumpaang
Salaysay[26] because he could no longer talk after the
fourth question. Answering questions from the court,
SPO2 Morales further stated that he could not
remember talking to Emerito on their way to the
hospital, since they were in a hurry.[27]
The government physician at the Bulacan
Provincial Hospital who prepared Ernestos death
certificate, Dr. Apollo Trinidad, clarified that Ernesto
died on October 25, 1999. However, considering the
admission by the defense of the fact of death, the cause
thereof, and the execution of the death certificate, the
prosecution no longer questioned Dr. Trinidad on these
matters.[28]
Teresitas testimony was likewise dispensed
with, in light of the admission by the defense that she
was the common-law wife of Ernesto, and that she
incurred P55,600.00 in expenses in relation to Ernestos
death.[29]
 On August 29, 2002, the RTC rendered its
Decision convicting Gary and Alberto of the crime of
murder. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing
considered, this Court hereby finds
accused Alberto Tabarnero and Gary
Tabarnero GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the Crime of Murder defined
and penalized under Art. 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
sentences them to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay private
complainant Teresita Acibar the
amount of P55,600.000 (sic) as actual
damages[,] P50,000.00 as indemnity
for the death of Ernesto
Canatoy[,] P50,000.00 as moral
[30]
damages, and the costs of suit.
Gary and Alberto appealed to this Court. After
the parties had filed their respective briefs, this Court,
in People v. Mateo,[31] modified the Rules of Court in so
far as it provides for direct appeals from the RTC to this
Court in cases where the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Pursuant thereto, this Court
referred[32] the case to the Court of Appeals, where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00027.
On April 29, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction with modification as regards exemplary
damages, disposing of the case in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 78 dated 29 August
2002 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that exemplary damages
in the amount of P25,000.00 is
awarded because of the presence of
treachery.[33]
From the Court of Appeals, the case was
elevated to this Court anew when Gary and Alberto filed
a Notice of Appeal on May 13, 2005.[34] In its Resolution
on August 1, 2005, this Court required both parties to
submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so
desire. Both parties manifested that they were adopting
the briefs they had earlier filed with this Court.
Gary and Alberto, in their brief filed in this Court
before the referral of the case to the Court of Appeals,
assigned the following errors to the RTC:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
NOT CONSIDERING THE JUSTIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE AND
THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER INTERPOSED
BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT GARY
TABARNERO
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THERE WAS
CONSPIRACY IN THE CASE AT BAR
III.
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE CULPABLE,
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY[35]
The justifying circumstance of self-defense on the part
of Gary cannot be considered
The requisites for self-defense are: 1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; 2) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused; and 3)
employment of reasonable means to prevent and repel
aggression.[36]
The defense invokes the said justifying
circumstance, claiming that all of the above three
elements are present in the case at bar. There was
allegedly unlawful aggression on the part of Ernesto
when the latter delivered the first blow with the lead
pipe. According to the defense, the means Gary used to
defend himself was reasonable, and the shouted
professions of his feelings for Mary Jane could not be
considered provocation sufficient for Ernesto to make
the unlawful aggression.
 The Court of Appeals noted that the only
evidence presented by the defense to prove the alleged
unlawful aggression was Garys own
testimony. Citing Casitas v. People,[37] the Court of
Appeals held that the nine stab wounds inflicted upon
Ernesto indicate Garys intent to kill, and not merely an
intent to defend himself. The number of wounds also
negates the claim that the means used by Gary to
defend himself was reasonable.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. Unlawful
aggression is an indispensable requirement of self-
defense.[38] As ruled by the Court of Appeals, the
evidence presented by Gary to prove the alleged
unlawful aggression, namely, his own testimony, is
insufficient and self-serving. The alleged sudden
appearance of Ernesto and his first attack with the lead
pipe the very moment Gary decided to leave seems to
this Court to be all too convenient, considering that
there was no one around to witness the start of the
fight.
The RTC, which had the opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witnesses, found Garys account
concerning the alleged unlawful aggression on the part
of Ernesto to be unconvincing. Factual findings of the
trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, as in this case, are binding on this Court and
are entitled to great respect.[39] It also bears to
emphasize that by invoking self-defense, Gary, in effect,
admitted killing Ernesto, thus, shifting upon him the
burden of evidence to prove the elements of the said
justifying circumstance.[40] A plea of self-defense cannot
be justifiably appreciated where it is not only
uncorroborated by independent and competent
evidence, but also extremely doubtful in itself.[41]
The defense further argues that assuming that
Gary is not qualified to avail of the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, he would nevertheless be
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of incomplete
self-defense under Article 13(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides:
Art. 13. Mitigating
circumstances. The following are
mitigating circumstances:
1. Those mentioned in the
preceding chapter, when all the
requisites necessary to justify the act or
to exempt from criminal liability in the
respective cases are not attendant.
We disagree. Unlawful aggression is a
condition sine qua non, without which there can be no
self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete.[42] There is incomplete self-defense when
the element of unlawful aggression by the victim is
present, and any of the other two essential
requisites for self-defense.[43] Having failed to prove the
indispensable element of unlawful aggression, Gary is
not entitled to the mitigating circumstance, even
assuming the presence of the other two elements of
self-defense.
Gary is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender
The first assignment of error presents another
issue for the consideration of this Court. The defense
argues that Garys yielding to Alarma should be credited
as a mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender. The Solicitor General agreed with the
defense on this point. The Court of Appeals, however,
disagreed, and held that the delay of six
months[44] before surrendering negates
[45]
spontaneity, a requisite for voluntary surrender to be
considered mitigating.
We agree with the Court of Appeals.
In order that the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender may be credited to the accused, the
following requisites should be present: (a) the offender
has not actually been arrested; (b) the offender
surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the
surrender must be voluntary. A surrender, to be
voluntary, must be spontaneous, i.e.,there must be an
intent to submit oneself to authorities, either because
he acknowledges his guilt or because he wishes to save
them the trouble and expenses in capturing him.[46]
In People v. Barcimo, Jr.,[47] the pending warrant
for the arrest of the accused and the latters surrender
more than one year after the incident were considered
by the Court as damaging to the plea that voluntary
surrender be considered a mitigating
circumstance. Thus:
The trial court did not err in
disregarding the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
 To benefit an accused, the following
requisites must be proven, namely: (1)
the offender has not actually been
arrested; (2) the offender surrendered
himself to a person in authority; and (3)
the surrender was voluntary. A
surrender to be voluntary must be
spontaneous, showing the intent of the
accused to submit himself
unconditionally to the authorities,
either because he acknowledges his
guilt, or he wishes to save them the
trouble and expense necessarily
incurred in his search and capture.
Voluntary surrender presupposes
repentance. In People v. Viernes [G.R.
No. 136733-35, 13 December 20010],
we held that going to the police station
to clear ones name does not show any
intent to surrender unconditionally to
the authorities.
In the case at bar, appellant
surrendered to the authorities after
more than one year had lapsed since
the incident and in order to disclaim
responsibility for the killing of the
victim. This neither shows repentance
or acknowledgment of the crime nor
intention to save the government the
trouble and expense necessarily
incurred in his search and capture.
Besides, at the time of his surrender,
there was a pending warrant of arrest
against him. Hence, he should not be
credited with the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.
The records show that Gary surrendered on
April 22, 2001.[48] The commitment order commanding
that he be detained was issued on April 24, 2001.[49] The
surrender was made almost one year and six months
from the October 23, 1999 incident, and almost one
year and one month from the issuance of the warrant
of arrest against him on March 27, 2000.[50] We,
therefore, rule that the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender cannot be credited to Gary.
Alberto is a principal by direct participation in the
killing of Ernesto
In insisting upon Albertos innocence, the
defense claims that there was no conspiracy between
him and his son, Gary. The defense asserts that Alberto
just happened to be near the scene of the crime as he
was looking for his son, whom he saw only after the
altercation.
The basis of Albertos conviction, however, is
not solely conspiracy. A review of the proven facts
shows that conspiracy need not even be proven by the
prosecution in this case, since Alberto was categorically
pointed by the eyewitness, Emerito, as one of the
assailants who actively and directly participated in the
killing of Ernesto:
Q Those 2 persons whom you saw and
who stabbed your stepfather in
the evening of October 23,
1999, if they are now in court,
will you be able to identify
them?
A Yes, sir.
Q Would you please point to those 2
persons?
A (Witness pointing to the persons
who, when asked answered to
the name of Alberto Tabarnero
and Gary Tabarnero)
Q What was the position of Alberto
Tabarnero in that stabbing
incident?
A He was the one whom I saw stabbed
last my stepfather.
xxxx
COURT (TO THE WITNESS):
Q How many times did you see Gary
stabbed your father?
A I cannot count how many stabs Gary
made.
PROS. SANTIAGO:
Q Was it many times or just once?
A I cannot count but more than 1.
 Q How about Alberto Tabarnero, how
many times did you see him
stabbing your stepfather?
A I cannot count also but he was the
last one who stabbed my
stepfather.[51]
Having actually participated in the stabbing of
Ernesto, it was adequately proven that Alberto is a
principal by direct participation.
Even more persuasive is the statement of the
victim himself, Ernesto, as testified to by SPO2 Morales,
that it was the father and son, Gary and Alberto
Tabarnero from Longos, Bulacan who stabbed
him.[52] While Ernesto was not able to testify in court,
his statement is considered admissible under Section
37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 37. Dying declaration. The
declaration of a dying person, made
under the consciousness of an
impending death, may be received in
any case wherein his death is the
subject of inquiry, as evidence of the
cause and surrounding circumstances
of such death.
In applying this exception to the hearsay rule,
we held as follows:
It must be shown that a dying
declaration was made under a
realization by the decedent that his
demise or at least, its imminence -- not
so much the rapid eventuation of death
-- is at hand. This may be proven by the
statement of the deceased himself or it
may be inferred from the nature and
extent of the decedents wounds, or
other relevant circumstances.[53]
In the case at bar, Ernesto had nine stab
wounds which caused his death within the next 48
hours. At the time he uttered his statement accusing
Gary and Alberto of stabbing him, his body was already
very rapidly deteriorating, as shown by his inability to
speak and write towards the end of the questioning.
We have considered that a dying declaration is
entitled to the highest credence, for no person who
knows of his impending death would make a careless or
false accusation. When a person is at the point of death,
every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is
induced by the most powerful consideration to speak
the truth.[54] It is hard to fathom that Ernesto, very weak
as he was and with his body already manifesting an
impending demise, would summon every remaining
strength he had just to lie about his true assailants,
whom he obviously would want to bring to justice.
The killing of Ernesto is qualified by treachery
Emerito had testified that he saw Ernesto being
held by two persons, while Gary and Alberto were
stabbing him with fan knives:
XXXXXXXXX
From said testimony, it seems uncertain
whether Emerito saw the very first stabbing being
thrust. Thus, the defense asseverates that since Emerito
failed to see how the attack commenced, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery cannot be considered,
citing People v. Amamangpang,[56] People v.
Icalla, and People v. Sambulan.[58] In said three cases,
[57]
this Court held that treachery cannot be appreciated as
the lone eyewitness did not see the commencement of
the assault.
Treachery is defined under Article 14(16) of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:
There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution,
without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party
might make.
The Solicitor General argues that treachery was
amply demonstrated by the restraint upon Ernesto,
which effectively rendered him defenseless and unable
to effectively repel, much less evade, the assault.[59]
We agree with the Solicitor General.
 In the cases cited by the appellants, the
eyewitnesses were not able to observe any means,
method or form in the execution of the killing which
rendered the victim defenseless. In Amamangpang, the
first thing the witness saw was the victim already
prostrate on the bamboo floor, blood oozing from his
neck and about to be struck by the accused. In Icalla,
the witnesses merely saw the accused fleeing from the
scene of the crime with a knife in his hand. In Sambulan,
the witness saw the two accused hacking the victim with
a bolo. Since, in these cases, there was no restraint
upon the victims or any other circumstance which
would have rendered them defenseless, the Court ruled
that it should look into the commencement of the
attack in order to determine whether the same was
done swiftly and unexpectedly. However, the swiftness
and unexpectedness of an attack are not the only means
by which the defenselessness of the victim can be
ensured.
In People v. Montejo,[60] the prosecution
witnesses testified that after challenging the victim to a
fight, the accused stabbed the victim in the chest while
he was held in the arms by the accused and a
companion. Not requiring a swift and unexpected
commencement to the attack, the Court held:
Thus, there is treachery where
the victim was stabbed in a
defenseless situation, as when he was
being held by the others while he was
being stabbed, as the accomplishment
of the accused's purpose was ensured
without risk to him from any defense
the victim may offer [People v.
Condemena, G.R. No. L-22426, May
29, 1968, 23 SCRA 910; People v.
Lunar, G.R. No. L-15579, May 29,
1972, 45 SCRA 119.] In the instant
case, it has been established that the
accused-appellant stabbed the victim
on the chest while his companions
held both of the victim's arms.
In People v. Alvarado,[61] the accused and his
companions shouted to the victim: Lumabas ka kalbo,
kung matapang ka. When the victim went out of the
house, the accuseds companions held the victims hands
while the accused stabbed him. Despite the yelling
which should have warned the victim of a possible
attack, the mere fact that the accuseds companions
held the hands of the victim while the accused stabbed
him was considered by this Court to constitute alevosia.
We, therefore, rule that the killing of Ernesto
was attended by treachery. However, even assuming
for the sake of argument that treachery should not be
appreciated, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength would nevertheless qualify the killing
to murder. Despite being alleged in the Information,
this circumstance was not considered in the trial court
as the same is already absorbed in treachery. The act of
the accused in stabbing Ernesto while two persons were
holding him clearly shows the deliberate use of
excessive force out of proportion to the defense
available to the person attacked. In People v.
Gemoya,[62] we held:
Abuse of superior strength is
considered whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between
the victim and the aggressor, assessing
a superiority of strength notoriously
advantageous for the aggressor which
is selected or taken advantage of in the
commission of the crime (People vs.
Bongadillo, 234 SCRA 233 [1994]).
When four armed assailants, two of
whom are accused-appellants in this
case, gang up on one unarmed victim, it
can only be said that excessive force
was purposely sought and employed.
(Emphasis ours.)
In all, there is no doubt that the offense
committed by the accused is murder.
The award of damages should be modified to
include civil indemnity ex delito
In the Decision of the RTC convicting Gary and
Alberto, it awarded the amount of P55,600.00 as actual
damages, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
Ernesto, P50,000.00 as moral damages and an
unidentified amount as costs of suit.[63] The Court of
Appeals modified the RTC Decision by awarding an
additional amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages on account of the presence of treachery.[64]
The Solicitor General claims that the award
of P55,600.00 in actual damages is not proper,
considering the lack of receipts supporting the
same. However, we held in People v. Torio[65] that:
Ordinarily, receipts should
support claims of actual damages, but
where the defense does not contest the
claim, it should be
granted. Accordingly, there being no
objection raised by the defense on
Alma Paulos lack of receipts to support
her other claims, all the amounts
testified to are accepted. (Emphasis
supplied.)
In the case at bar, Teresita Acibars testimony
was dispensed with on account of the admission by the
defense that she incurred P55,600.00 in relation to the
death of Ernesto.[66] This admission by the defense is
even more binding to it than a failure on its part to
object to the testimony. We therefore sustain the
award of actual damages by the RTC, as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
The Solicitor General likewise alleges that a civil
indemnity ex delito in the amount of P50,000.00 should
be awarded. Article 2206[67] of the Civil Code authorizes
the award of civil indemnity for death caused by a
crime.The award of said civil indemnity is mandatory,
and is granted to the heirs of the victim without need of
proof other than the commission of the
crime.[68] However, current jurisprudence have already
increased the award of civil indemnity ex
delicto to P75,000.00.[69] We, therefore, award this
amount to the heirs of Ernesto.
Finally, the Court of Appeals was correct in
awarding exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000.00. An aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party
to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled
meaning of Article 2230[70] of the Civil Code.[71]
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00027 dated April 29,
2005 is hereby AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that appellants Alberto and Gary
Tabarnero are further ordered to pay the heirs of
Ernesto Canatoy the amount of P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE G.R. No. 186541
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Present:
CORONA, C.J.,
Chairperson,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
VICENTE VILBAR, February 1, 2012
Accused-Appellant.
On appeal is the Decision[1] dated February 14, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00270
which modified the Judgment[2] promulgated on August
6, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, of
Ormoc City, in Criminal Case No. 5876-0. The RTC
originally found accused-appellant Vicente Vilbar guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for
treacherously stabbing with a knife the deceased
Guilbert Patricio (Guilbert), but the Court of Appeals
subsequently held accused-appellant liable only for the
lesser crime of homicide.
The Information charging accused-appellant
with the crime of murder reads:
That on or about the 5th day of
May 2000, at around 7:00 oclock in the
evening, at the public market, this city,
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, VICENTE VILBAR alias Dikit,
with treachery, evident premeditation
and intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stab, hit and wound the victim herein
GUILBERT PATRICIO, without giving the
latter sufficient time to defend himself,
thereby inflicting upon said Guilbert
Patricio mortal wound which caused his
death. Post Mortem Examination
Report is hereto attached.
In violation of Article 248,
Revised Penal Code, as amended by
R.A. 7659, Ormoc City, June 13, 2000.[3]

When accused-appellant was arraigned on July
31, 2000, he pleaded not guilty to the criminal charge
against him.[4]
During the pre-trial conference, the parties
already admitted that Guilbert was stabbed at the
Public Market of Ormoc City on May 5, 2000 at around
seven oclock in the evening, and that immediately
before the incident, accused-appellant was at the same
place having a drinking spree with a certain Arcadio
Danieles, Jr. and two other companions. However,
accused-appellant denied that it was he who stabbed
Guilbert Patricio.[5] Trial then ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of
Maria Liza Patricio (Maria Liza),[6] the widow of the
deceased, and Pedro Luzon (Pedro),[7] an eyewitness at
the scene. The defense offered the testimonies of
accused-appellant[8] himself and Cerilo Pelos
[9]
(Cerilo), another eyewitness. On rebuttal, the
prosecution recalled Pedro to the witness stand.[10]
Below is a summary of the testimonies of the
witnesses for both sides:
Maria Liza testified that in the
evening of May 5, 2000, she was
watching her child and at the same time
attending to their store located in
the Ormoc City public market. It was a
small store with open space for tables
for drinking being shared by other
adjacent stores. At around 7:00
oclock in the evening, her husband,
Guilbert Patricio (Guilbert) arrived from
work. He was met by their child whom
he then carried in his arms. Moments
later, Guilbert noticed a man urinating
at one of the tables in front of their
store. The man urinating was among
those engaged in a drinking spree in a
nearby store. It appears that the
accused was with the same group,
seated about two meters away.Guilbert
immediately admonished the man
urinating but the latter paid no
attention and continued relieving
himself.Guilbert then put down his
child when the accused rose from his
seat, approached Guilbert, drew out a
knife and stabbed him below his
breast. The accused, as well as his
companions, scampered away while
Guilbert called for help saying Im
stabbed. At that time, she was getting
her child from Guilbert and about two
feet away from the accused. She easily
recognized the accused because he
would sometimes drink at their
store. Guilbert was immediately
brought to the hospital where he later
expired 11:35 of the same evening. She
declared that for Guilberts medical and
hospitalization expenses, the family
spent about P3,000.00. As for the wake
and burial expenses, she could no
longer estimate the amount because of
her sadness.
Pedro, an eyewitness at the
scene, corroborated Maria Lizas
testimonial account of the events. On
that night, he was drinking together
with a companion in Maria Lizas
store. He recalled Guilbert
admonishing a person urinating in one
of the tables fronting the
store. Thereafter, he saw the accused
pass by him, approach Guilbert and
then without warning, stab the
latter. The accused then ran away and
left. Together with his drinking
companion, they rushed Guilbert to the
hospital. Pedro asserted that the areas
illumination was intense because of the
big white lamp and that he was certain
that it was the accused who attacked
Guilbert.
Denial was the accuseds main
plea in exculpating himself of the
charge that he killed Guilbert. He
claimed that in the evening of May 5,
2000, he and his wife went to the public
market (new building) to collect
receivables out of the sale of
meat. Afterwards, they took a short cut
passing through the public market
where they chanced upon his wifes
acquaintances who were engaged in a
drinking spree while singing
 videoke. Among them were Dodong
Danieles (Dodong for brevity) and his
younger brother. They invited him (the
accused) and his wife to join
them. While they were drinking,
Dodong had an altercation with
Guilbert that stemmed from the latters
admonition of Dodongs younger
brother who had earlier urinated at the
Patricios store premises. Suddenly,
Dodong assaulted Guilbert and stabbed
him.Fearing that he might be
implicated in the incident, the accused
fled and went to the house of his
parents-in-law.Thereafter, he went
back to the market for his wife who was
no longer there. When he learned that
the victim was brought to
the Ormoc District Hospital, he went
there to verify the victims condition. He
was able to talk with the mother and
the wife of Guilbert as well as the
police. He was thereafter invited to the
precinct so that the police can get his
statement. The next day, the parents of
Dodong Danieles came to his parents-
in-laws house to persuade him not to
help the victims family. He
declined. Half a month later, he was
arrested and charged for the death of
Guilbert Patricio.
The defense also presented
one Cerilo Pelos (Cerilo) who claimed
to have personally witnessed the
stabbing incident because he was also
drinking in the public market on that
fateful night. He insisted that Guilbert
was stabbed by someone wearing a
black shirt, whose identity he later on
learned to be Dodong Danieles.[11]
On August 6, 2001, the RTC promulgated its
Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of murder and
decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing
duly considered, the Court finds the
accused Vicente Vilbar alias Dikit
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder as charged, and
hereby sentences him to imprisonment
of reclusion perpetua, [and ordered] to
pay the offended party the sum
of P75,000.00 as indemnity, the sum
of P3,000.00 as medical expenses, the
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages.
If the accused is a detainee, his
period of detention shall be credited to
him in full if he abides by the term for
convicted prisoners, otherwise, for only
4/5 thereof.[12]
The foregoing RTC Judgment was directly
elevated to us for our review, but in accordance with
our ruling in People v. Mateo,[13] we issued a
Resolution[14] dated December 1, 2004 referring the
case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
Accused-appellant, represented by the Public
Attorneys Office, [15] and plaintiff-appellee, through the
Office of the Solicitor General,[16] filed their Briefs on
August 15, 2006 and April 30, 2007, respectively. The
Court of Appeals made the following determination of
the issues submitted for its resolution:
On intermediate review,
accused (now accused-appellant) seeks
the reversal of his conviction for the
crime of murder or in the alternative,
the imposition of the proper penalty for
the crime of homicide. He argues that
the trial court erred in giving credence
to the inconsistent, irreconcilable, and
incredible testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, to wit: (1) the
exact number of persons drinking with
accused-appellant in the adjacent
store; (2) what Maria Liza was doing at
the exact time of stabbing; and (3) the
accused-appellants reaction after he
stabbed the victim. Moreover,
accused-appellant argues that if he was
indeed the culprit, why did he approach
Guilberts family in the hospital
immediately after the stabbing
incident? Granting without admitting
that a crime of murder was committed,
accused-appellant insists that he could
only be held guilty of homicide for it
was not proven beyond reasonable
 doubt that treachery and evident
premeditation existed. He specifically
directs our attention to the following
details: (1) there was a heated
argument between the victim and a
member or members of his group; (2)
the stabbing happened in a spur of the
moment; and (3) the victim then was
not completely defenseless.
Meanwhile, the OSG stresses
that the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses are minor and
inconsequential given the positive
identification of the accused-appellant
as the assailant. As to accused-
appellants contention that he is
innocent because he even went to the
hospital and conferred with Guilberts
relatives immediately after the
stabbing incident, the OSG maintains
that such actuation is not a conclusive
proof of innocence.
The issues for resolution are
first, the assessment of credibility of
the prosecution witnesses; and second,
the propriety of conviction of the
accused-appellant for murder.[17]
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on
February 14, 2008, in which it accorded great respect to
the assessment by the RTC of the credibility of the
witnesses. The inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are relatively
trivial, minor, and do not impeach their credibility. The
positive identification and categorical statements of the
prosecution witnesses that it was accused-appellant
who stabbed Guilbert prevail over accused-appellants
self-serving denial. However, the appellate court did
not find that treachery attended the stabbing of
Guilbert and, thus, downgraded the crime to
homicide. It also reduced the award of civil
indemnity. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals decision sentenced accused-appellant as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the 1 August
2001 Decision appealed from finding
accused-appellant VICENTE VILBAR @
Dikit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
murder is MODIFIED. The Court finds
the accused appellant GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of eight years and one day of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to
fourteen years and eight months
of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum. He is also ordered to pay the
heirs of Guilbert Patricio the amounts
of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Php50,000.00 as moral damages, and
Php3,000.00 as actual damages.[18]
Accused-appellant now comes before us on
final appeal.
In our Resolution[19] dated April 15, 2009, we
gave the parties the opportunity to file their respective
supplemental briefs, but the parties manifested that
they had already exhausted their arguments before the
Court of Appeals.[20]
After a scrutiny of the records of the case, we
find that the submitted evidence and prevailing
jurisprudence duly support the findings and conclusion
of the Court of Appeals.
Evidence in this case chiefly consists of
testimonial evidence. Both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals gave credence and weight to the testimonies of
the prosecution witnesses.
Case laws mandate that when the credibility of a
witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court,
its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its
assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as
its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded
high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if
such findings were affirmed by the appellate court,
since it is settled that when the trial courts findings have
been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally binding upon this Court.[21] There is no
compelling reason for us to depart from the general rule
in this case.
Prosecution witnesses Maria Liza and Pedro
both positively and categorically identified accused-
appellant as the one who stabbed Guilbert.
 Maria Liza vividly recounted her traumatic
moment as follows:
Q: Mrs. Patricio, do you know the
accused in this case in the
person of Vicente Vilbar alias
Dikit?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know him?
A: He used to go there for drinking in
our store.
Q: How long have you known this
person?
A: About three (3) months.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Q: What was the reaction of your
husband when he did not heed
to the advice not to urinate?
A: He put down the child, this Vicente
Vilbar rose.
Q: Rose from where?
A: From the table.
Q: And what happened?
A: Without any word stabbed my
husband.
Q: What did he use in stabbing your
husband, this Vicente Vilbar?
A: Knife.
Q: Do you know, were you able to see
where he kept the knife which
he used in stabbing your
husband?
A: From his waist.
Q: When the said Vicente Vilbar
delivered the stabbed thrust
to your husband, was your
husband hit?
A: He was hit.
Q: On what part of his body was your
husband hit?
A: Just below the breast.
xxxx
The RTC, assessing the aforequoted
testimonies, declared:
Maria Liza Patricio is credible. She
recognizes the accused, she was just
behind him when he stabbed her
husband who was facing the
accused. There was proper illumination
of the place x x x and her testimony was
not destroyed in the cross-
examination. Her testimony is positive
and spontaneous. The Court notes
nothing in her demeanor and flow of
testimony that would indicate some
contradiction or incredibility.
The other witness, Pedro Luzon,
corroborates the testimony of Maria
Liza Patricio. x x x.[24]
The RTC and the Court of Appeals brushed aside
the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of Maria
Liza and Pedro,[25] these being relatively trivial and
insignificant, neither pertaining to the act constitutive
of the crime committed nor to the identity of the
assailant. Also, these minor contradictions were
expected from said witnesses as they differ in their
impressions of the incident and vantage point in
relation to the victim and the accused-appellant.
In contrast, accused-appellant admitted being
present at the scene and time of the commission of the
crime but asserted that one Dodong Danieles was the
perpetrator thereof. Yet, the RTC was unconvinced by
the version of events as testified to by accused-
appellant himself and Cerilo, because:
In the observation of the Court, the
accused is inconsistent and he talked
unintelligibly. His testimony is not
credible and perceived to be flimsy
excuses. If it is true that his wife was
with him at the time of the incident and
he was not involved in the stabbing,
why did he have to leave the place and
his wife and go to the house of his
parents-in-law rather than their
house? The accused should have
presented his wife to corroborate his
testimony in that regard, and also his
 parents-in-law so the latter can testify
regarding the alleged visitors, the
alleged parents of one Dodong Danieles
who came to their place when the
accused was also there days after the
incident, telling him not to help the
family of the victim.
The accuseds witness, Cerilo Pelos, is
the farthest of the expected witnesses
for the defense. He and the accused
were not acquaintances and they only
came to know each other in prison
where Pelos is also detained for
another charge. x x x. The testimony of
the witness is hazy and full of
generalities, even the way he speaks,
the Court notes some inconsistency in
his voice and incoherence in his
testimony.[26]
A closer perusal of the testimony of accused-
appellants corroborating witness, Cerilo, reveals just
how incoherent and elusive he was in giving particular
details about the stabbing incident:
Q: Now, while you were there, what
happened?
A: When I arrived there, I arrived with
this people having a drinking
spree and I myself went to the
other table near this people
and this quite thin or slim guy
was standing in front of them
and one of these people who
were having drinking spree
seemed to relieve himself not
to the C.R. but beside the
store.
Xxxxxx
Q: And what happened after this
person who urinated went
back to the table?
A: They conversed with the one
wearing black and after the
conversation he stood up and
went to the slim guy.
Q: Who stood up?
A: The one named Dodong, the one
who was in black and the one
who stabbed.
Q: So, you said that this one wearing
black approached the slim
guy?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened after that?
A: So then, he stabbed him and the
one he stabbed ran away,
because he was hit.
Q: How about the accused, where was
the accused then when the
man in black stabbed the slim
guy?
A: There, and they were still convering
(sic) with each other with the
slim guy, sir.
Cerilo failed to mention what weapon was used
to stab Guilbert or describe the manner Guilbert was
stabbed.Cerilo also appeared to have mixed-up the
personalities in his narration. He first identified the slim
guy to be Guilbert who reprimanded the person who
urinated, but he subsequently referred to the slim guy
as the person who urinated. Moreover, Cerilos
identification of the purported assailant of Guilbert as a
certain Dodong is highly unreliable, given that Cerilo
admitted that he learned of said assailants name from
an unidentified spectator of the stabbing incident.
The fact that it was accused-appellant who stabbed
Guilbert to death on the night of May 5, 2000 was
already established beyond reasonable doubt. The next
question is what crime for which accused-appellant
should be held liable: murder as held by the RTC or
homicide as adjudged by the Court of Appeals.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that
accused-appellant is guilty only of homicide in the
absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
In a number of cases, surveyed in People v. Rivera,[28] we
ruled that treachery cannot be appreciated simply
because the attack was sudden and unexpected:
[W]e agree with accused-appellant that
the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was not established.
 Surveying the leading decisions on this
question, in People v. Romeo
Magaro we recently stated:
In People v. Magallanes, this
Court held:
There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party
might make. Thus, for treachery or alevosia to be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, the
prosecution must establish the concurrence of two
(2) conditions: (a) that at the time of the attack, the
victim was not in a position to defend himself; and
(b) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack
employed by him. . . .
. . . where the meeting between the accused
and the victim was casual and the attack was
done impulsively, there is no treachery even if
the attack was sudden and unexpected. As has
been aptly observed the accused could not have
made preparations for the attack, . . .; and the
means, method and form thereof could not
therefore have been thought of by the accused,
because the attack was impulsively done.
Treachery cannot also be presumed from the
mere suddenness of the attack. . . . In point is
the following pronouncement we made
in People v. Escoto:
We can not presume that treachery was
present merely from the fact that the attack
was sudden. The suddenness of an attack,
does not of itself, suffice to support a finding
of alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so
long as the decision was made all of a sudden
and the victim's helpless position was
accidental. . . .
In People v. Bautista, it was
held:
. . . The circumstance that an attack was sudden
and unexpected to the person assaulted did not
constitute the element of alevosia necessary to
raise homicide to murder, where it did not appear
that the aggressor consciously adopted such mode
of attack to facilitate the perpetration of the killing
without risk to himself. Treachery cannot be
appreciated if the accused did not make any
preparation to kill the deceased in such manner as
to insure the commission of the killing or to make
it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to
retaliate or defend himself. . . .
Applying these principles to the
case at bar, we hold that the
prosecution has not proven that the
killing was committed with treachery.
Although accused-appellant shot the
victim from behind, the fact was that
this was done during a heated
argument. Accused-appellant, filled
with anger and rage, apparently had no
time to reflect on his actions. It was not
shown that he consciously adopted the
mode of attacking the victim from
behind to facilitate the killing without
risk to himself. Accordingly, we hold
that accused-appellant is guilty of
homicide only.[29]
Similar to Rivera and the cases cited therein, the
prosecution in the instant case merely showed that
accused-appellant attacked Guilbert suddenly and
unexpectedly, but failed to prove that accused-
appellant consciously adopted such mode of attack to
facilitate the perpetration of the killing without risk to
himself. As aptly observed by the Court of Appeals:
While it appears that the attack
upon the victim was sudden, the
surrounding circumstances attending
the stabbing incident, that is, the open
area, the presence of the victims
families and the attending
eyewitnesses, works against
treachery. If accused-appellant wanted
to make certain that no risk would
come to him, he could have chosen
another time and place to stab the
victim. Yet, accused-appellant
nonchalantly stabbed the victim in a
public market at 7:00 oclock in the
evening. The place was well-lighted and
teeming with people. He was
 indifferent to the presence of the
victims family or of the other people
who could easily identify him and point
him out as the assailant. He showed no
concern that the people in the
immediate vicinity might retaliate in
behalf of the victim. In fact, the attack
appeared to have been impulsively
done, a spur of the moment act in the
heat of anger or extreme
annoyance. There are no indications
that accused-appellant deliberately
planned to stab the victim at said time
and place. Thus, we can reasonably
conclude that accused-appellant, who
at that time was languishing in his
alcoholic state, acted brashly and
impetuously in suddenly stabbing the
victim. Treachery just cannot be
appreciated.[30]
Lastly, we review the penalty and damages
imposed by the Court of Appeals upon accused-
appellant.
The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of
homicide is reclusion temporal.[31] Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the
sentence shall be that which could be properly imposed
in view of the attending circumstances, and the
minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next
lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.
Absent any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance in this case, the maximum of the sentence
should be within the range of reclusion temporal in its
medium term which has a duration of fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day, to seventeen
(17) years and four (4) months; and that the minimum
should be within the range of prision mayor which has a
duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12)
years. Thus, the imposition of imprisonment from
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, is in order.
As to the award of damages to Guilberts heirs,
we affirm the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. Medical and burial
expenses were indisputably incurred by Guilberts heirs
but the exact amounts thereof were not duly proven. So
in lieu of actual damages, we award Guilberts
heirs P25,000.00 as temperate damages. Article 2224 of
the Civil Code provides that [t]emperate or moderate
damages, which are more than nominal but less than
compensatory damages, may be recovered when the
court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered
but its amount can not, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty.[32]
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of accused-appellant is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated
February 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR.-H.C. No. 00270 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Vicente Vilbar is
found GUILTY of the crime of HOMICIDE, for which he
is SENTENCED to imprisonment of twelve (12) years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum,
and ORDERED to pay the heirs of Guilbert Patricio the
amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, and P25,000.00 as temperate
damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206381, March 25, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. DANIEL MATIBAG Y DE VILLA @ �DANI�
OR �DANILO,� Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by
accused-appellant Daniel Matibag y De Villa @
�Dani� or �Danilo� (Matibag) assailing the
Decision2 dated September 13, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03759 which
affirmed in toto the Decision3 dated August 1, 2008 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pallocan West, Batangas
City, Branch 3 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 13941, finding
Matibag guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Facts

In an Amended Information4 dated May 5, 2005,
Matibag was charged with the crime of Murder
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), as amended,5 the accusatory portion
of which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about March 27, 2005 at around 8:40
o�clock [sic] in the evening at Iron Street, Twin Villa
Subdivision, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while
armed with a Beretta Caliber .9MM Pistol with Serial
No. 3191M9, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and
with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot with said pistol one Enrico Clar de
Jesus Duhan, while the latter was completely
defenseless, thereby hitting him and causing gunshot
wounds at his head and chest, which directly resulted
to the victim�s death.
That the special aggravating circumstance of the use of
unlicensed firearm is attendant in the commission of
the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6cralawred
cralawlawlibrary
Matibag entered a plea of not guilty during his
arraignment. After the termination of the pre-trial, trial
on the merits ensued.7cralawred
The prosecution asserted that at around 8:40 in the
evening of March 27, 2005, Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan
(Duhan), who just came from a meeting with the other
officers of the homeowners� association of Twin Villa
Subdivision, was walking along Iron Street in Brgy.
Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City when Matibag
confronted Duhan, and asked, �ano bang
pinagsasasabi mo?� Duhan replied �wala,� and
without warning, Matibag delivered a fist blow hitting
Duhan on the left cheek and causing him to teeter
backwards. Matibag then pulled out his gun and shot
Duhan, who fell face-first on the pavement. While
Duhan remained in that position, Matibag shot him
several more times. PO2 Tom Falejo, a member of the
Philippine National Police, positively identified Matibag
and stated on record that he arrested the latter on the
night of March 27, 2005. Dr. Antonio S. Vertido who
conducted an autopsy on Duhan confirmed that the
latter suffered gunshot wounds in the head and chest
which led to his death. 8cralawred
In his defense, Matibag alleged that on said date, he
was at the despedida party of his neighbor when
Duhan arrived together with the other officers of the
homeowners� association. Wanting to settle a
previous misunderstanding, Matibag approached
Duhan and extended his hand as a gesture of
reconciliation. However, Duhan pushed it away and
said, �putang ina mo, ang yabang mo,� thereby
provoking Matibag to punch him in the face. Matibag
saw Duhan pull something from his waist and fearing
that it was a gun and Duhan was about to retaliate,
Matibag immediately drew his own gun, shot Duhan,
and hurriedly left the place. Matibag went to see his
police friend, Sgt. Narciso Amante, to turn himself in,
but the latter was unavailable at the time. As Matibag
headed back home, he was stopped by police officers
who asked if he was involved in the shooting incident.
He then readily admitted his involvement.9cralawred
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision10 dated August 1, 2008, the RTC convicted
Matibag as charged, sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay
the heirs of Duhan the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, ?59,000.00
as actual damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.11cralawred
The RTC refused to give credence to Matibag�s claim
of self-defense as he failed to prove the presence of
unlawful aggression on Duhan�s part, finding that: (a)
Duhan�s words and actions prior to Matibag�s
attack could not be considered as a real threat against
him; (b) no firearm was recovered from the victim; (c)
Matibag�s account that Duhan was about to pull
something from his waist, which thus led him to
believe that he was about to be shot, remained
uncorroborated; and (d) the number of gunshot
wounds Duhan sustained contradicts the plea of self-
defense.12cralawred
Separately, the RTC appreciated the existence of the
qualifying circumstance of treachery since the attack
was sudden, unprovoked, and without any warning on
the victim who was unarmed and in a defenseless
position.13 Likewise, the special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was
appreciated since a firearm was used in the
commission of a crime and, hence, considered
unlicensed.14cralawred
Dissatisfied, Matibag appealed15 to the
CA.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The CA Ruling
In a Decision16 dated September 13, 2012, the CA
affirmed Matibag�s conviction in toto.17cralawred
The CA agreed with the RTC�s findings that: (a)
treachery attended the killing of Duhan as the attack
on him was sudden;18 and (b) an unlicensed firearm
was used in committing the crime, which is considered
as a special aggravating circumstance.19cralawred
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court�s resolution is whether or
not the CA correctly upheld the conviction of Matibag
for Murder.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The Court�s Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In the review of a case, the Court is guided by the long-
standing principle that factual findings of the trial
court, especially when affirmed by the CA, deserve
great weight and respect. These factual findings should
not be disturbed on appeal, unless there are facts of
weight and substance that were overlooked or
misinterpreted and that would materially affect the
disposition of the case. The Court has carefully
scrutinized the records and finds no reason to deviate
from the RTC and CA�s factual findings. There is no
indication that the trial court, whose findings the CA
affirmed, overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case.
Hence, the Court defers to the trial court on this score,
considering too that it was in the best position to
assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses
presented by both parties.20cralawred
On this score, the Court now proceeds to resolve this
case on points of law.
Matibag is charged with the crime of Murder, which is
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the RPC, as
amended. In order to warrant a conviction, the
prosecution must establish by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was killed; (b) the
accused killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended
by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing is not
Parricide or Infanticide.21cralawred
Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when
the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might
make. In People v. Tan,22 the Court explained that the
essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected
attack, without the slightest provocation on the part of
the person attacked.23 In People v. Perez,24 it was
explained that a frontal attack does not necessarily
rule out treachery. The qualifying circumstance may
still be appreciated if the attack was so sudden and so
unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare
for his or her defense.25cralawred
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that
Matibag, who was armed with a gun, confronted
Duhan, and without any provocation, punched and
shot him on the chest.26 Although the attack was
frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which
it was made rendered it impossible for Duhan to
defend himself, adding too that he was
unarmed.27 Matibag also failed to prove that a heated
exchange of words preceded the incident so as to
forewarn Duhan against any impending attack from his
assailant.28 The deliberateness of Matibag�s act is
further evinced from his disposition preceding the
moment of execution. As the RTC aptly pointed out,
Matibag was ready and destined to effect such
dastardly act, considering that he had an axe to grind
when he confronted Duhan, coupled with the fact that
he did so, armed with a loaded handgun.29 Based on
these findings, the Court concludes that treachery was
correctly appreciated.
This finding of treachery further correlates to
Matibag�s plea of self-defense. Note that by invoking
self-defense, Matibag, in effect, admitted to the
commission of the act for which he was charged, albeit
under circumstances that, if proven, would have
exculpated him. With this admission, the burden of
proof shifted to Matibag to show that the killing of
Duhan was attended by the following circumstances:
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person
resorting to self-defense.30cralawred
Among the foregoing elements, the most important is
unlawful aggression. It is well-settled that there can be
no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete,
unless the victim had committed unlawful aggression
against the person who resorted to self-
defense.31 Jurisprudence states that not every form or
degree of aggression justifies a claim of self-
defense.32 For unlawful aggression to be appreciated,
there must be an actual, sudden, and unexpected
attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude,33 as against the
one claiming self-defense.
Evidently, the treacherous manner by which Matibag
assaulted Duhan negates unlawful aggression in the
sense above-discussed. As mentioned, the prosecution
was able to prove that the attack was so sudden and
unexpected, and the victim was completely
defenseless. On the other hand, Matibag�s version
that he saw Duhan pull something from his waist
(which thereby impelled his reaction), remained
uncorroborated. In fact, no firearm was recovered
from the victim.34 Hence, by these accounts,
Matibag�s allegation of unlawful aggression and,
consequently, his plea of self-defense cannot be
sustained. The foregoing considered, the Court
upholds Matibag�s conviction for the crime of
Murder, qualified by treachery, as charged.
Moreover, as the RTC and CA held, the special
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm,
which was duly alleged in the Information, should be
appreciated in the imposition of penalty. Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1866,35 as amended by Republic Act
No. (RA) 8294,36 treats the unauthorized use of a
licensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of
homicide or murder as a special aggravating
circumstance:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended,
is hereby further amended to read as follows:
�Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition,
Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or
Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. � x x
x.chanrobleslaw
xxxx
�If homicide or murder is committed with the use of
an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
cralawlawlibrary
Further, under Section 5 of RA 8294, the scope of the
term �unlicensed firearm� has already been
expanded as follows:37cralawred
Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. �
The term unlicensed firearm shall include:
1. firearms with expired license; or
2. unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the
commission of the crime. (Emphasis supplied)
cralawlawlibrary
Therefore, when Matibag killed Duhan with his
firearm, the use thereof was unauthorized under the
purview of RA 8294 and is equally appreciated as a
special aggravating circumstance. As a result, the
imposition of the maximum penalty of death, which is
reduced to reclusion perpetua in light of RA
9346,38 stands proper. To this, the Court adds that
Matibag is not eligible for parole.39cralawred
Finally, case law provides that for death resulting from
the crime of Murder, the heirs of the victim are
entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim without need of
evidence other than the commission of the crime;40 (b)
actual or compensatory damages to the extent
proved,41 or temperate damages when some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be
provided with certainty;42 (c) moral damages;43 and (d)
exemplary damages when the crime was committed
with one or more aggravating
circumstances.44cralawred
In line with recent jurisprudence, civil indemnity in the
amount of P100,000.00 and moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 are awarded to Duhan�s heirs
without need of evidence other than the commission
of the crime and Duhan�s death. Considering further
that the crime was committed with treachery,
exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00 is also
granted.45cralawred

The award of P59,000.00 as actual damages should,
however, be deleted as the records do not show that
the prosecution was able to prove the amount actually
expended. In lieu thereof, P25,000.00 as temperate
damages is awarded to conform with prevailing
jurisprudence.46 In addition, interest at the legal rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from date of finality of this
Decision until fully paid is imposed on all monetary
awards.47cralawred
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision
dated September 13, 2012 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03759 finding accused-appellant
Daniel Matibag y De Villa @ �Dani� or
�Danilo�� GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole, and ordering him to pay
the Heirs of Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan the amounts of
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral
damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in lieu of actual
damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of judgment
until full payment.
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
G.R. No. 196735 May 5, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANILO FELICIANO, JR., JULIUS VICTOR MEDALLA,
CHRISTOPHER SOLIVA, WARREN L. ZINGAPAN, and
ROBERT MICHAEL BELTRAN ALVIR, Accused-
appellants.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
It is in the hallowed grounds of a university where
students, faculty, and research personnel should feel
safest. After all, this is where ideas that could probably
solve the sordid realities in this world are peacefully
nurtured and debated. Universities produce hope.
They incubate all our youthful dreams.
Yet, there are elements within this academic milieu
that trade misplaced concepts of perverse
brotherhood for these hopes. Fraternity rumbles exist
because of past impunity. This has resulted in a
senseless death whose justice is now the subject
matter of this case. It is rare that these cases are
prosecuted. It is even more extraordinary that there
are credible witnesses who present themselves
courageously before an able and experienced trial
court judge.
This culture of impunity must stop. There is no space in
this society for hooliganism disguised as fraternity
rumbles. The perpetrators must stand and suffer the
legal consequences of their actions. They must do so
for there is an individual who now lies dead, robbed of
his dreams and the dreams of his family. Excruciating
grief for them will never be enough.
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, at around
12:30 to 1:00 in the afternoon, seven (7) members of
the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch at the
Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the
University of the Philippines, Diliman, when they were
attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats
and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that
required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis
Venturina, died from his injuries.
An information1 for murder, docketed as Criminal Case
No. Q95-6113 3, was filed against several members of
the Scintilla Juris fraternity, namely, Danilo Feliciano,
Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan, Robert
Michael Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo
G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo, George Morano,
Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict
Guerrero, and Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219. The
information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in
Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused,
wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise,
conspiring, confederating with other persons whose
true names, identities and whereabouts have not as
yet been ascertained, and mutually helping one
another, with intent to kill, qualified with treachery,
and with evident premeditation, taking advantage of
superior strength, armed with baseball bats, lead
pipes, and cutters, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ
personal violence upon the person of DENNIS F.
VENTURINA, by then and there hitting him on the head
and clubbing him on different parts of his body thereby
inflicting upon him serious and mortal injuries which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said DENNIS
F. VENTURINA. (Emphasis supplied)
Separate informations were also filed against them for
the attempted murder of Sigma Rho fraternity
members Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.,2 Cristobal Gaston,
Jr.,3 and Leandro Lachica,4 and the frustrated murder
of Sigma Rho fraternity members Mervin Natalicio5 and
Amel Fortes.6 Only 11 of the accused stood trial since
one of the accused, Benedict Guerrero, remained at
large.
A trial on the merits ensued.
The facts, according to the prosecution, are as follows:
Leandro Lachica, Amel Fortes, Derinis Venturina,
Mervin Natalicio, Cristobal Gaston, Jr., Felix
Tumaneng,7 and Cesar Magrobang, Jr. are all members
of the Sigma Rho Fraternity. On December 8, 1994, at
around 12:30 to 1 :00 p.m., they were having lunch at
Beach House Canteen, located at the back of the Main
Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
Quezon City.8 Suddenly, Dennis Venturina shouted,
"Brads, brods!"9
According to Leandro Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma
Rho Fraternity, he looked around when Venturina
shouted, and he saw about ten (10) men charging
toward them.10 The men were armed with baseball
bats and lead pipes, and their heads were covered with
either handkerchiefs or shirts.11 Within a few seconds,
five (5) of the men started attacking him, hitting him
with their lead pipes.12 During the attack, he
recognized one of the attackers as Robert Michael
Beltran Alvir because his mask fell off.13
Lachica tried to parry the blows of.his attackers,
suffering scratches and contusions.14
He was, however, able to run to the nearby College of
Education.15 Just before reaching it, he looked back
and saw Warren Zingapan and Julius Victor L. Medalla
holding lead pipes and standing where the commotion
was.16 Both of them did not have their masks on.17 He
was familiar with Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla because
he often saw them in the College of Social Sciences and
Philosophy (CSSP) and Zingapan used to be his
friend.18 The attack lasted about thirty (30) to forty-five
(45) seconds.19
According to Mervin Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon
of Sigma Rho, he looked to his left when Venturina
shouted.20He saw about fifteen (15) to twenty (20)
men, most of who were wearing masks, running
toward them.21 He was stunned, and he started
running.22 He stumbled over the protruding roots of a
tree.23 He got up, but the attackers came after him and
beat him up with lead pipes and baseball bats until he
fell down.24 While he was parrying the blows, he
recognized two (2) of the attackers as Warren
Zingapan and Christopher L. Soliva since they were not
wearing any masks.25 After about thirty (30) seconds,
they stopped hitting him.26
He was lying on his back and when he looked up, he
saw another group of four (4) to five (5) men coming
toward him, led by Benedict Guerrero.27 This group
also beat him up.28 He did not move until another
group of masked men beat him up for about five (5) to
eight (8) seconds.29
When the attacks ceased, he was found lying on the
ground.30 Several bystanders brought him to the U.P.
Infirmary where he stayed for more than a week for
the treatment of his wounds and fractures.31
According to Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma
Rho, he also looked back when Venturina shouted and
saw a group of men with baseball bats and lead pipes.
Some of them wore pieces of cloth around their
heads.32 He ran when they attacked, but two (2) men,
whose faces were covered with pieces of cloth,
blocked his way and hit him with lead pipes.33 While
running and parrying the blows, he recognized them as
Gilbert Merle Magpantay and Carlo Jolette Fajardo
because their masks fell off.34 He successfully evaded
his attackers and ran to the Main Library.35 He then
decided that he needed to help his fraternity brothers
and turned back toward Beach House.36 There, he saw
Venturina lying on the ground.37 Danilo Feliciano, Jr.
was beating Venturina up with a lead pipe while
Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit Venturina.38 When
they saw him, they went toward his direction.39 They
were about to hit him when somebody shouted that
policemen were coming. Feliciano and Narag then ran
away.40
Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. then saw Amel Fortes. Fortes
accompanied him to his car so they could bring
Venturina to the U.P. Infirmary.41 When they brought
the car over, other people, presumably bystanders,
were already loading Venturina into another
vehicle.42 They followed that vehicle to the U.P.
Infirmary where they saw Natalicio.43 He stayed at the
infirmary until the following morning.44
According to Cristobal Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma
Rho, he immediately stood up when he heard
someone shout, "Brods!"45 He saw a group of men
charging toward them carrying lead pipes and baseball
bats.46 Most of them had pieces of cloth covering their
faces.47 He was about to run when two (2) of the
attackers approached him.48 One struck him with a
heavy pipe while the other stabbed him with a bladed
instrument.49 He was able to parry most of the blows
from the lead pipe, but he sustained stab wounds on
the chest and on his left forearm.50
He was able to run away.51 When he sensed that no
one was chasing him, he looked back to Beach House
Canteen and saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Warren
Zingapan, and George Morano.52 He decided to go
back to the canteen to help his fraternity
brothers.53 When he arrived, he did not see any of his
fraternity brothers but only saw the ones who attacked
them.54 He ended up going to their hang-out instead to
meet with his other fraternity brothers.55 They then
proceeded to the College of Law where the rest of the
fraternity was already discussing the incident.56
According to Amel Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, he
also ran when he saw the group of attackers coming
toward them.57 When he looked back, he saw Danilo
Feliciano, Jr. hitting Venturina.58 He was also able to
see Warren Zingapan and George Morano at the
scene.59
Leandro Lachica, in the meantime, upon reaching the
College of Education, boarded a jeepney to the College
of Law to wait for their other fraternity brothers.60 One
of his fraternity brothers, Peter Corvera, told him that
he received information that members of Scintilla Juris
were seen in the west wing of the Main Library and
were regrouping in SM North.61 Lachica and his group
then set off for SM North to confront Scintilla Juris and
identify their attackers.62
When they arrived in SM North, pillboxes and stones
were thrown at them.63 Lachica saw Robert Michael
Beltran Alvir and Warren Zingapan and a certain Carlo
Taparan.64 They had no choice but to get away from
the mall and proceed instead to U.P. where the Sigma
Rho Fraternity members held a meeting.65
On the night of December 8, 1994, the officers of
Sigma Rho advised the victims to lodge their
complaints with the National Bureau of
Investigation.66 Their counsel, Atty. Frank Chavez, told
the U.P. Police that the victims would be giving their
statements before the National Bureau of
Investigation, promising to give the U.P. Police copies
of their statements. In the meantime, Venturina was
transferred from the U.P. Infirmary to St. Luke's
Hospital on December 8, 1994. He died on December
10, 1994.67 On December 11, 1994, an autopsy was
conducted on the cadaver of Dennis Venturina.68 Dr.
Rolando Victoria, a medico-legal officer of the National
Bureau of Investigation, found that Venturina had
"several contusions located at the back of the upper
left arm and hematoma on the back of both
hands,"69 "two (2) lacerated wounds at the back of the
head,70 generalized hematoma on the skull,"71 "several
fractures on the head,"72 and "inter-cranial
hemorrhage."73 The injuries, according to Dr. Victoria,
could have been caused by a hard blunt object.74 Dr.
Victoria concluded that Venturina died of traumatic
head injuries.75
On December 12, 1994, Lachica, Natalicio,
Mangrobang, Fortes, and Gaston executed their
respective affidavits76before the National Bureau of
Investigation and underwent medico-legal
examinations77 with their medicolegal officer, Dr.
Aurelio Villena. According to Dr. Villena, he found that
Mervin Natalicio had "lacerated wounds on the top of
the head, above the left ear, and on the fingers;
contused abrasions on both knees; contusion on the
left leg and thigh,"78 all of which could have been
caused by any hard, blunt object. These injuries
required medical attendance for a period of ten (10)
days to thirty (30) days from the date of infliction.79
Dr. Villena found on Amel Fortes "lacerated wounds on
the head and on the right leg which could have been
caused by a blunt instrument."80 These injuries
required hospitalization for a period of ten (10) days to
thirty (30) days from date of infliction.81 He also found
on Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. a "healed abrasion on the
left forearm which could possibly be caused by contact
with [a] rough hard surface and would require one (1)
to nine (9) days of medical attention."82 He found on
Leandro Lachica "contusions on the mid auxiliary left
side, left forearm and lacerated wound on the infra
scapular area, left side."83 On Christopher Gaston, Jr.
he found "lacerated wounds on the anterior chest, left
side, left forearm; swollen knuckles of both hands;
contusions on the mid auxiliary left side, left forearm
and lacerated wound on the infra scapular area, left
side."84
On September 18, 1997, after the prosecution
presented its evidence-in-chief, the court granted the
demurrer to evidence filed by Rodolfo Penalosa, Jr. on
the ground that he was not identified by the
prosecution's witnesses and that he was not
mentioned in any of the documentary evidence of the
prosecution.85
Upon the presentation of their evidence, the defense
introduced their own statement of the facts, as
follows:
According to Romeo Cabrera,86 a member of the U.P.
Police, he was on foot patrol with another member of
the U.P. Police, Oscar Salvador, at the time of the
incident. They were near the College of Arts and
Sciences (Palma Hall) when he vaguely heard
somebody shouting, "Rumble!" They went to the place
where the alleged rumble was happening and saw
injured men being helped by bystanders. They helped
an injured person board the service vehicle of the
Beach House Canteen. They asked what his name was,
and he replied that he was Mervin Natalicio. When he
asked Natalicio who hit him, the latter was not able to
reply but instead told him that his attackers were
wearing masks. Oscar Salvador87 corroborated his
testimony.
Benjamin Lato,88 a utility worker of the Beach House
Canteen, likewise testified that the identities of the
attackers were unrecognizable because of their masks.
He, however, admitted that he did not see the attack;
he just saw a man sprawled on the ground at the time
of the incident.
Frisco Capilo,89 a utility worker of U.P. assigned to the
Main Library, was buying a cigarette at a vendor
located nearby. From there, he allegedly saw the
whole incident. He testified that ten (10) men, wearing
either masks of red and black bonnets or with shirts
covering their faces, came from a red car parked
nearby. He also saw three (3) men being hit with lead
pipes by the masked men. Two (2) of the men fell after
being hit. One of the victims was lifting the other to
help him, but the attackers overtook him. Afterwards,
the attackers ran away. He then saw students helping
those who were injured. He likewise helped in carrying
one of the injured victims, which he later found out to
be Amel Fortes.
A U.P. student and member of the Sigma Alpha Nu
Sorority, Eda Panganiban,90 testified that she and her
friends were in line to order lunch at the Beach House
Canteen when a commotion happened. She saw
around fifteen (15) to eighteen (18) masked men
attack a group of Sigma Rhoans. She did not see any
mask fall off. Her sorority sister and another U.P.
student, Luz Perez,91 corroborated her story that the
masked men were unrecognizable because of their
masks. Perez, however, admitted that a member of
Scintilla Juris approached her to make a statement.
Another sorority sister, Bathalani Tiamzon,92 testified
on substantially the same matters as Panganiban and
Perez. She also stated that she saw a person lying on
the ground who was being beaten up by about three
(3) to five (5) masked men. She also stated that some
of the men were wearing black masks while some were
wearing white t-shirts as masks. She did not see any
mask fall off the faces of the attackers.
According to Feliciana Feliciano,93 accused-appellant
Danilo Feliciano, Jr.'s motlier, her son was in Pampanga
to visit his sick grandfather at the time of the incident.
She alleged that her son went to Pampanga before
lunch that day and visited the school where she
teaches to get their house key from her.
According to Robert Michael Beltran Alvir,94 he had not
been feeling well since December 5, 1994. He said that
he could not have possibly been in U.P. on December
8, 1994 since he was absent even from work. He also
testified that he wore glasses and, thus, could not have
possibly been the person identified by Leandro
Lachica. He also stated that he was not enrolled in U.P.
at the time since he was working to support himself.
According to Julius Victor Medalla,95 he and another
classmate, Michael Vibas, were working on a school
project on December 8, 1994. He also claimed that he
could not have participated in the rumble as he had an
injury affecting his balance. The injury was caused by
an incident in August 1994 when he was struck in the
head by an unknown assailant. His testimony was
corroborated by Jose Victor Santos96 who stated that
after lunch that day, Medalla played darts with him
and, afterwards, they went to Jollibee.
Christopher Soliva,97 on the other hand, testified that
he was eating lunch with his girlfriend and another
friend in Jollibee, Philcoa, on December 8, 1994. They
went back to U.P. before 1:00 p.m. and went straight
to their fraternity hang-out where he was told that
there had been a rumble at the Main Library. He also
met several Sigma Rhoans acting suspiciously as they
passed by the hang-out. They were also told by their
head, Carlo Taparan, not to react to the Sigma Rhoans
and just go home. Anna Cabahug,98 his girlfriend,
corroborated his story.
Warren Zingapan99 also testified that he was not in
U.P. at the time of the incident. He claimed to have
gone to SM North to buy a gift for a friend's wedding
but ran into a fraternity brother. He also alleged that
some Sigma Rhoans attacked them in SM North that
day.
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its
decision100 with the finding that Robert Michael Alvir,
Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor
Medalla, and Warren Zingapan were guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder
and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.101 The trial court,
however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette
Fajardo, Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and
Raymund Narag.102 The case against Benedict Guerrero
was ordered archived by the court until his
apprehension.103 The trial court, m evaluating the
voluminous evidence at hand, concluded that:
After a judicious evaluation of the matter, the Court is
of the considered view that of the ten accused, some
were sufficiently identified and some were not. The
Court believes that out of the amorphous images
during the pandemonium, the beleaguered victims
were able to espy and identify some of the attackers
etching an indelible impression in their memory. In this
regard, the prosecution eyewitnesses were emphatic
that they saw the attackers rush towards them
wielding deadly weapons like baseball bats, lead pipes,
pieces of wood and bladed ones, and pounce on their
hapless victims, run after them, and being present with
one another at the scene of the crime during the
assault. Although each victim had a very strong motive
to place his fraternity rivals permanently behind bars,
not one .of them testified against all of them. If the
prosecution eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans,
were simply bent on convicting Scintilla Juris members
for that matter, they could have easily tagged each and
every single accused as a participant in the atrocious
and barbaric assault to make sure that no one else
would escape conviction. Instead, each eyewitness
named only one or two and some were candid enough
to say that they did not see who delivered the blows
against them.104
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion
perpetua, the case was brought to this court on
automatic appeal. However, due to the amendment of
the Rules on Appeal,105 the case was remanded to the
Court of Appeals.106 In the Court of Appeals, the case
had to be re-raffled several Times107 before it was
eventually assigned to Presiding Justice Andres B.
Reyes, Jr. for the writing of the decision.
On December 26, 2010, the Court of Appeals, in a
Special First Division of Five, affirmed108 the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, with three (3) members
concurring109 an one (1) dissenting.110
The decision of the Court of Appeals was then brought
to this court for review.
The issue before this court is whether the prosecution
was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellants attacked private complainants and
caused the death of Dennis Venturina.
On the basis, however, of the arguments presented to
this court by both parties, the issue may be further
refined, thus:
1. Whether accused-appellants' constitutional
rights were violated when the information
against them contained the aggravating
circumstance of the use of masks despite the
prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that
the masks fell off; and
2. Whether the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals correctly ruled, on the basis
of the evidence, that accused-appellants were
sufficiently identified.
I
 An information is sufficient
when the accused is fully
apprised of the charge against
him to enable him to prepare
his defense
It is the argument of appellants that the information
filed against them violates their constitutional right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against them. They argue that the prosecution should
not have included the phrase "wearing masks and/or
other forms of disguise" in the information since they
were presenting testimonial evidence that not all the
accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell
off.
It is enshrined in our Bill of Rights that "[n]o person
shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without
due process of law."111 This includes the right of the
accused to be presumed innocent until proven guilty
and "to be informed of the nature and accusation
against him."112
Upon a finding of probable cause, an information is
filed by the prosecutor against the accused, in
compliance with the due process of the law. Rule 110,
Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that:
A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the
name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained
of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended pary; the approximate date of the
commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.
In People v. Wilson Lab-ea,113 this court has stated
that:
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it
enables a person of common understanding to know
the charge against him, and the court to render
judgment properly. x x x The purpose is to allow the
accused to fully prepare for his defense, precluding
surprises during the trial.114
Contrary to the arguments of the appellants, the
inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other
forms of disguise" in the information does not violate
their constitutional rights.
It should be remembered that every aggravating
circumstance being alleged must be stated in the
information. Failure to state an aggravating
circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be
appreciated as such.115 It was, therefore, incumbent on
the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance
of "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in
the information in order for all the evidence,
introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial
court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating
circumstance because, like nighttime, it allows the
accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he
carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial
evidence that tends to prove that the accused were
masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them
from including disguise as an aggravating
circumstance.116 What is important in alleging disguise
as an aggravating circumstance is that there was a
concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion
of disguise in the information was, therefore, enough
to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the
commission of the offense they were being charged
with, they tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some
of the accused were not wearing masks is also not
violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the
accused. Conspiracy presupposes that "the act of one
is the act of all."117 This would mean all the accused
had been one in their plan to conceal their identity
even if there was evidence later on to prove that some
of them might not have done so.
In any case, the accused were being charged with the
crime of murder, frustrated murder, and attempted
murder. All that is needed for the information to be
sufficient is that the elements of the crime have been
alleged and that there are sufficient details as to the
time, place, and persons involved in the offense.
II
Findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the
appellate court, are entitled
to great weight and credence
As a general rule, the findings of fact by the trial court,
when affirmed by the appellate court, are given great
weight and credence on review. The rationale for this
was explained in People v. Daniel Quijada,118 as
follows:
Settled is the rule that the factual findings of the trial
court, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are
accorded great weight and respect. For, the trial court
has the advantage of observing the witnesses through
the different indicators of truthfulness or falsehood,
such as the angry flush of an insisted assertion or the
sudden pallor of a discovered lie or the tremulous
mutter of a reluctant answer or the forthright tone of a
ready reply;
or the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the
hesitation, the sincere or the flippant or sneering tone,
the heat, the calmness, the yawn, the sigh, the candor
or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the
solemnity of an oath, the carriage and mien.119
There are, of course, recognized exceptions to this
rule. In People v. Leticia Labarias,120 this court stated
that:
It is the policy of this Court to sustain the factual
findings of the trial court on the reasonable
assumption that it is in a better position to assess the
evidence before it, particularly the testimonies of the
witnesses, who reveal much of themselves by their
deportment on the stand. The exception that makes
the rule is where such findings arc clearly arbitrary or
erroneous as when they are tainted with bias or
hostility or are so lacking in basis as to suggest that
they were reached without the careful study and
perceptiveness that should characterize a judicial
decision.121(Emphasis supplied)
In criminal cases, the exception gains even more
importance since the presumption is always in favor of
innocence. It is only upon proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt that a conviction is sustained.
In this case, a total of eleven (11) witnesses for the
prosecution and forty-two (42) witnesses for the
defense were put on the stand from 1995 to 2001. In
an eighty-three (83)-page decision, the trial court
acquitted six (6) and convicted five (5) of the accused.
On the basis of these numbers alone, it cannot be said
that the trial court acted arbitrarily or that its decision
was "so lacking in basis" that it was arrived at without
a judicious and exhaustive study of all the evidence
presented.
Inasmuch, however, as the trial court's findings hold
great persuasive value, there is also nothing that
precludes this court from coming to its own
conclusions based on an independent review of the
facts and the evidence on record.
The accused were sufficiently
identified by the witnesses for
the prosecution
The trial court, in weighing all the evidence on hand,
found the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution to be credible. In its decision, the trial
court stated that:
x x x. Although each victim had a very strong motive to
place his fraternity rivals permanently behind bars, not
one testified against all of them. If the prosecution
eyewitnesses, who were all Sigma Rhoans, were simply
bent on convicting Scintilla Juris members for that
matter, they could have easily tagged each and every
accused as a participant in the atrocious and barbaric
assault to make sure no one would escape conviction.
Instead, each eyewitness named only one or two and
some were candid enough to say that they did not see
who delivered the blows against them.
Thus, the prosecution witnesses, Ernest Paulo Tan,
Dennis Gaio and Darwin Asuncion, testified to have
seen it all but they could not, and did not, disclose any
name. Lachica, on the other hand, said that he did not
have the opportunity to see and identify the person
who hit him in the back and inflicted a two-inch cut.
His forearm was also hit by a lead pipe but he did not
see who did it. Natalicio, one of the other three who
were hospitalized, was severely beaten by three waves
of attackers totalling more than 15 but he could only
name 3 of them. He added, however, that he would be
able to recognize those he saw if he would see them
again. Of them, Mangrobang pointed to at least 5 but
he stressed that he did not see Zingapan, Soliva,
Guerrero, Del Rosario, Daraoay, Denoista, and
Penalosa during the onslaught. Gaston could have
named any of the accused as the one who repeatedly
hit him with a heavy pipe and stabbed him but he
frankly said their faces were covered. Like Natalicio,
Fortes was repeatedly beaten by several groups but
did not name any of the accused as one of those who
attacked him. The persons he identified were those
leading the pack with one of them as the assailant of
Venturina, and the two others who he saw standing
while he was running away. He added that he saw
some of the accused during the attack but did not
know then their names.122 (Emphasis supplied)
We agree.
The trial court correctly held that "considering the
swiftness of the incident,"123 there would be slight
inconsistencies in their statements. In People v.
Adriano Cabrillas,124 it was previously observed that:
It is perfectly natural for different witnesses testifying
on the occurrence of a crime to give varying details as
there may be some details which one witness may
notice while the other may not observe or remember.
In fact, jurisprudence even warns against a perfect
dovetailing of narration by different witnesses as it
could mean that their testimonies were prefabricated
and rehearsed.125 (Emphasis supplied)
According to their testimonies, Lachica was able to
identify Alvir, Zingapan, and Medalla;126
Natalicio was able to identify Medalla, Zingapan, and
Soliva;127 and Fortes was able to identify Feliciano,
Medalla, and Zingapan.128 Their positive identification
was due to the fact that they either wore no masks or
that their masks fell off.
It would be in line with human experience that a victim
or an eyewitness of a crime would endeavor to find
ways to identify the assailant so that in the event that
he or she survives, the criminal could be apprehended.
It has also been previously held that:
It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal
violence to strive to see the looks and faces of their
assailants and observe the manner in which the crime
was committed. Most often the face of the assailant
and body movements thereof, creates a lasting
impression which cannot be easily erased from their
memory.129
In the commotion, it was more than likely that the
masked assailants could have lost their masks. It had
been testified by the victims that some of the
assailants were wearing masks of either a piece of
cloth or a handkerchief and that
Alvir,130 Zingapan,131 Soliva,132 and Feliciano133 had
masks on at first but their masks fell off and hung
around their necks.
Equally telling was the testimony of defense witness
Frisco Capilo during cross-examination who observed
that some of the attackers were wearing masks and
some were not, thus:
Q Mr. Capilo, do you know this Scintilla Juris
Fraternity?
A No, sir.
Q During the incident of December 8, 1994, there were
a lot of people eating in the Beach House Canteen, and
then running towards different directions, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And some people were wearing masks and some
were not?
A Yes, sir.134
While the attack was swift and sudden, the victims
would have had the presence of mind to take a look at
their assailants if they were identifiable. Their positive
identification, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, must be upheld to be credible.
It has been argued that the trial court did not give
Mangrobang's testimony credence while Gaston's
testimony was found to be "hazy." This argument is
unmeritorious.
It should be noted that it was the trial court itself that
stated that the acquittal of the Scintilla Juris members
identified by Mangrobang "should not be.
misinterpreted to mean that the tt:'.stimony of
Mangrobang was an absolute fabrication."135 The court
went on to state that they "were exonerated merely
because they were accorded the benefit of the doubt
as their identification by Mangrobang, under
tumultuous and chaotic circumstances were [sic] not
corroborated and their alibis, not refuted."136 There
was, therefore, no basis to say that Mangrobang was
not credible; it was only that the evidence presented
was not strong enough to overcome the presumption
of innocence.
Gaston's testimony, on the other hand, was considered
"hazy"137 by the trial court only with regard to his
identification of Zingapan's companion. Gaston
testified that he saw Zingapan with Morano, with
Zingapan moving and Morano staying in place. Fortes,
however, testified that both Zingapan and Morano
were running after him. Lachica also testified that it
was Medalla, not Morano, who was with Zingapan.
Because of this confusion, the trial court found that
there was doubt as to who was really beside Zingapan.
The uncertainty resulted into an acquittal for Morano.
Despite this, the court still did not" impute doubt in
their testimonies that Zingapan was present at the
scene.
Be that as it may, the acquittals made by the trial court
further prove that its decision was brought about only
upon a thorough examination of the evidence
presented: It accepted that there were inconsistencies
in the testimonies of the victims but that these were
minor and did not affect their credibility. It ruled that
"[s]uch inconsistencies, and even probabilities, are not
unusual 'for there is no person with perfect faculties or
senses."'138
Evidence as part of the res
gestae may be admissible but
have little persuasive value in
this case
According to the testimony of U.P. Police Officer
Salvador,139 when he arrived at the scene, he
interviewed the bystanders who all told him that they
could not recognize the attackers since they were all
masked. This, it is argued, could be evidence that could
be given as part of the res gestae.
As a general rule, "[a] witness can testify only to the
facts he knows of his personal knowledge; that is,
which are derived from his own perception, x x
x."140 All other kinds of testimony are hearsay and are
inadmissible as evidence. The Rules of Court, however,
provide several exceptions to the general rule, and one
of which is when the evidence is part of res gestae,
thus:
Section 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a
person while a starting occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect
to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence
as part of res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue,
and giving it a legal significance, may be received as
part of the res gestae.141
In People v. Rodrigo Salafranca,142 this court has
previously discussed the admissibility of testimony
taken as part of res gestae, stating that:
A declaration or an utterance is deemed as part of the
res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an
exception to the hearsay rule when the following
requisites concur, to wit: (a) the principal act, the res
gestae, is a startling occurrence; (b) the statements are
made before the declarant had time to contrive or
devise; and (c) the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances.
xxxx
The term res gestae has been defined as "those
circumstances which are the undersigned incidents of
a particular litigated act and which are admissible
when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res
gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and
declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve
to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the
idea of deliberation and fabrication. The rule on res
gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements
made by either the participants, victims, or spectators
to a crime immediately before, during, or immediately
after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were
made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired
by the excitement of the occasion and there was no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of
evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore,
whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so
intimately interwoven or connected with the principal
fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as
a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it
clearly negatives any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.143
There is no doubt that a sudden attack on a group
peacefully eating lunch on a school campus is a
startling occurrence. Considering that the statements
of the bystanders were made immediately after the
startling occurrence, they are, in fact, admissible as
evidence given in res gestae.
In People v. Albarido,144 however, this court has stated
that "in accord to ordinary human experience:"
x x x persons who witness an event perceive the same
from their respective points of reference. Therefore,
almost always, they have different accounts of how it
happened. Certainly, we cannot expect the testimony
of witnesses to a crime to be consistent in all aspects
because different persons have different impressions
and recollections of the same incident. x x x145
(Emphasis supplied)
The statements made by the bystanders, although
admissible, have little persuasive value since the
bystanders could have seen the events transpiring at
different vantage points and at different points in time.
Even Frisco Capilo, one of the bystanders at the time of
the attack, testified that the attackers had their masks
on at first, but later on, some remained masked and
some were unmasked.
When the bystanders' testimonies are weighed against
those of the victims who witnessed the entirety of the
incident from beginning to end at close range, the
former become merely corroborative of the fact that
an attack occurred. Their account of the incident,
therefore, must be given considerably less weight than
that of the victims.
The belated identification by
the victims do not detract from
their positive identification of
the appellants
It is argued that the fact that the victims stayed silent
about the incident to the U.P. Police or the Quezon
City Police but instead executed affidavits with the
National Bureau of Investigation four (4) days after the
incident gives doubt as to the credibility of their
testimonies.
U.P. Police Officer Romeo Cabrera146 testified that on
their way to the U.P. Infirmary, he interviewed the
victims who all told him they could not recognize the
attackers because they were all wearing masks.
Meanwhile, Dr. Mislang147testified to the effect that
when she asked Natalicio who attacked them, Natalicio
answered that he did not know because they were
masked.
It must be remembered that the parties involved in
this case belong to rival fraternities. While this court
does not condone their archaic and oftentimes
barbaric traditions, it is conceded that there are
certain practices that are unique to fraternal
organizations.
It is quite possible that at this point in time, they knew
the identities of their attackers but chose not to
disclose it without first conferring with their other
fraternity brothers. This probability is bolstered by the
actions of Sigma Rho after the incident, which showed
that they confronted the members of Scintilla Juris in
SM North. Because of the tenuous relationship of rival
fraternities, it would not have been prudent for Sigma
Rho to retaliate against the wrong fraternity.
Their act of not disclosing the correct information to
the U.P. Police or to Dr. Mislang does not make the
police officer or the doctor's testimonies more credible
than that of the victims. It should not be forgotten that
the victims actually witnessed the entire incident,
while Officer Salvador, Officer Cabrera, and Dr. Mislang
were merely relaying secondhand information.
The fact that they went to the National Bureau of
Investigation four (4) days after the incident also does
not affect their credibility since most of them had been
hospitalized from their injuries and needed to recover
first.
Since a fraternity moves as one unit, it would be
understandable that they decided to wait until all of
them were well enough to go to the National Bureau
of Investigation headquarters in order to give their
statements.
Seniority is also often the norm in fraternities. It was
upon the advice of their senior "brads" and their legal
counsel that they executed their sworn statements
before the National Bureau of Investigation four (4)
days after the incident.
The decision to report the incident to the National
Bureau of Investigation instead of to the U.P. Police
was the call of their legal counsel who might have
deemed the National Bureau of Investigation more
equipped to handle the investigation. This does not,
however, affect the credibility of the witnesses since
they were merely following the legal advice of their
counsel.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that the National
Bureau of Investigation is better equipped than the
U.P. Police to handle the investigation of the case. As
stated in the U.P. College of Economics website:
The UP Diliman Police (UPDP) is tasked with
maintaining campus security. Their station is located in
front of the College of Architecture.
The primary missions of the UPDP are to maintain
peace and order, secure and protect lives and
property, enforce basic laws, applicable Quezon City
Ordinances, and University Rules and Regulations
including policies and standards; and to perform such
other functions relative to the general safety and
security of the students, employees, and residents in
the U.P. Diliman Campus. x x x.148 (Emphasis supplied)
It can be seen that the U.P. Police is employed by U.P.
primarily for campus security. They are by no means an
actual police force that is equipped to handle a full-
blown murder investigation. Fraternity-related
violence in U.P. has also increasingly become more
frequent, which might possibly have desensitized the
U.P. Police in such a way that would prevent their
objectivity in the conduct of their investigations. The
victims' reliance on the National Bureau of
Investigation, therefore, is understandable.
III
Alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the
victim
It is settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over
the positive identification of the victim.149 In People v.
Benjamin Peteluna,150 this court stated that:
It is a time-honored principle that the positive
identification of the appellant by a witness destroys
the defense of alibi and denial. Thus:
x x x. It is well-entrenched that alibi and denial are
inherently weak and have always been viewed with
disfavor by the courts due to the facility with which
they can be concocted. They warrant the least
credibility or none at all and cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the appellant by the
prosecution witnesses. For alibi to prosper, it is not
enough to prove that appellant was somewhere else
when the crime was committed; he must also
demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him
to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of
its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and
convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-
serving, and undeserving of any weight in law. Denial,
like alibi, as an exonerating justification[,] is inherently
weak and if uncorroborated regresses to blatant
impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving
negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater
evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible
witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.151
In this case, the victims were able to positively identify
their attackers while the accused-appellants merely
offered alibis and denials as their defense. The
credibility of the victims was upheld by both the trial
court and the appellate court while giving little
credence to the accused-appellants' alibis. There is,
thus, no reason to disturb their findings.
Accused-appellants were
correctly charged with
murder, and there was
treachery in the commission
of the crime
According to the provisions of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, the accused-appellants were
correctly charged with murder. Article 248 states:
ART. 248. Murder.-Any person who, not falling within
the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, shall be
guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua, to death if committed with any of the
following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior
strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing
means to weaken the defense, or of means or persons
to insure or afford impunity;
xxxx
It is undisputed that on December 8, 1994, a group of
men armed with lead pipes and baseball bats attacked
Dennis Venturina and his companions, which resulted
in Venturina's death.
As correctly found by the trial court and the appellate
court, the offense committed against Dennis Venturina
was committed by a group that took advantage of its
superior strength and with the aid of armed men. The
appellate court, however, incorrectly ruled out the
presence of treachery in the commission of the
offense.
It has been stated previously by this court that:
[T]reachery is present when the offender commits any
of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.152
Similarly, in People v. Leozar Dela Cruz,153 this court
stated that:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of
the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution, which tend
directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. The essence of treachery
is that the attack comes without a warning and in a
swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording
the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape. For treachery to be
considered, two elements must concur: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the
persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves
or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were
deliberately or consciously adopted.154 (Emphasis
supplied)
The appellate court, in affirming the conviction of the
accused-appellants, ruled that contrary to the findings
of the trial court, there was no treachery involved. In
particular, they ruled that although the attack was
sudden and unexpected, "[i]t was done in broad
daylight with a lot of people who could see
them"155 and that "there was a possibility for the
victims to have fought back or that the people in the
canteen could have helped the victims."156
This reasoning is clearly erroneous. The victims in this
case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at a
place where they would be reasonably expected to be
on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men.
The victims, who were unarmed, were also attacked
with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way they
could parry the blows was with their arms. In a
situation where they were unnamed and
outnumbered, it would be impossible for them to fight
back against the attackers. The attack also happened in
less than a minute, which would preclude any
possibility of the bystanders being able to help them
until after the incident.
The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave
no opportunity for the victims to retaliate or even to
defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present
in this case.
The presence of conspiracy
makes all of the accused-
appellants liable for murder
and attempted murder
In the decision of the trial court, all of the accused-
appellants were found guilty of the murder of Dennis
Venturina and the attempted murder of Mervin
Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr. Leandro Lachica,
Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr. The appellate
court, however, modified their liabilities and found
that the accused-appellants were guilty of attempted
murder only against Natalicio and Fortes, and not
against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston.
It is the appellate court's reasoning that because
Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer chased by
the attackers,"157 it concluded that accused-appellants
"voluntary desisted from pursuing them and from
inflicting harm to them, which shows that they did not
have the intent to do more than to make them suffer
pain by slightly injuring them."158 It also pointed out
that the wound inflicted on Gaston "was too shallow to
have been done with an intent to kill."159
Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants would
have been guilty only of slight physical injuries.
This is erroneous.
It should be remembered that the trial court found
that there was conspiracy among the accused-
appellants160 and the appellate court sustainedthis
finding.161
Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching
liability to all of the accused, regardless of their degree
of participation, thus: Once an express or implied
conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable
as co-principals regardless of the extent and character
of their respective active participation in the
commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all.
The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle
that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a
criminal object, whether through the physical volition
of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each
individual whose evil will actively contributes to the
wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the
same as though performed by himself alone." Although
it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than
his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire
to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts
of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or
conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon
the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where
this Court held that
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of
each (conspirator) without taking into consideration
the close and inseparable relation of each of them with
the criminal act, for the commission of which they all
acted by common agreement ... The crime must
therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent
which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as
the act of the band or party created by them, and they
are all equally responsible
Verily, the moment it is established that the
malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of
the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the
conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even
investigate as to the actual degree of participation of
each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the
crime. x x x.162 (Emphasis supplied)
The liabilities of the accused-appellants m this case
arose from a single incident wherein the accused-
appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead
pipes, all in agreement to do the highest amount of
damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run
away and take cover, but the others would fall prey at
the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was
already present at the moment of attack and that
intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants alike
when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is,
therefore, immaterial to distinguish between the
seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to
determine the respective liabilities of their attackers.
What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs
as a result of that intent to kill and whether there are
qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances
that can be appreciated.
The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the
accused-appellants guilty only of slight physical
injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite
the swiftness and suddenness of the attack, the
attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and
Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica,
Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill was
evident from the moment the accused-appellants took
their first swing, all of them were liable for that intent
to kill.1âwphi1
For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable
for the murder of Dennis Venturina and the attempted
murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr.,
Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and Cristobal Gaston, Jr.
A Final Note
It is not only the loss of one promising young life;
rather, it is also the effect on the five other lives whose
once bright futures are now put in jeopardy because of
one senseless act of bravado. There is now more honor
for them to accept their responsibility and serve the
consequences of their actions. There is, however,
nothing that they can do to bring back Dennis
Venturina or fully compensate for his senseless and
painful loss.
This is not the first fraternity-related case to come to
this court; neither will it be the last. Perhaps this case
and many cases like it can empower those who have a
better view of masculinity: one which valorizes
courage, sacrifice and honor in more life-saving
pursuits.
"Giting at dangal" are words of the anthem of the
University of the Philippines. It colors the stories of
many who choose to expend their energy in order that
our people will have better lives. Fraternity rumbles
are an anathema, an immature and useless
expenditure of testosterone. It fosters a culture that
retards manhood. It is devoid of "giting at dangal."
This_ kind of shameful violence must stop.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR N). 01158 dated November 26, 2010 is
AFFIRMED insofar as the accused-appellants Danilo
Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor Medalla, Christopher Soliva,
Warren L. Zingapan, and Robert Michael Beltran Alvir
are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder
in. Criminal Case No. Q95-61133 with the
MODIFICATION that they be fouhd GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Attempted Murder in Criminal
Case Nos. Q95-61136, Q95-61135, Q95-61134, Q95-
61138, and Q95-61137.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 195525 February 5, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
WILFREDO GUNDA alias FRED, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
On appeal is the March 30, 2010 Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR-HC No. 00397 which
affirmed with modification the May 20, 2005
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, finding appellant
Wilfredo Gunda alias Fred (appellant) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Factual Antecedents
At about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 25,
1997, the victim, Eladio Globio, Sr., and his son, Eladio
Jr., were walking along a trail at Sitio Candulungon,
Barangay Cabay, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar.
Suddenly, when Eladio Jr. was about 10 meters ahead
of his father, the latter was waylaid by appellant and
his unidentified companions. The John Does held the
victim's arms whereupon appellant stabbed him
several times. Fearing for his life, Eladio Jr. fled. The
unidentified assailants pursued him. Fortunately, he
was able to outrun them and was able to reach their
house. In the morning of the following day, Eladio Jr.
went to the house of his sister and informed her of the
death of their father. They then reported the incident
to the police authorities who eventually arrested the
appellant. The body of the victim was recovered and
post-mortem examinations revealed that he suffered
multiple stab wounds which caused his death.
Aside from Eladio Jr., Teofilo Ambal, Jr. (Ambal) who is
a brother-in-law of the appellant, also witnessed the
crime. In the afternoon of May 25, 1997, while Ambal
was at his farm gathering feeds for his pigs, he saw
appellant who was armed with a wooden pole position
himself at the back of the victim and strike the latter’s
head with the wood. The companions of appellant
then held the victim’s arms whereupon appellant drew
a bolo locally known as depang from his waist and
stabbed the victim several times. Fearing for his life,
Ambal likewise left the crime scene.
On July 31, 1997, an Information3 was filed charging
appellant and the John Does with the crime of murder.
The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on May 25, 1997, at about 4:00 o’clock in the
afternoon at Sitio Candulungon, Barangay Cabay,
Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, and without justifiable
cause, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault, stab and wound Eladio
Globio, Sr., with the use of a sharp bladed weapon
(Depang) which the accused provided themselves for
the purpose, thereby inflicting injuries upon the latter,
which injuries caused the death of the victim, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with aggravating circumstances
that the crime committed in an uninhabited place and
the superior strength [sic].4
Arraigned on September 10, 1997, appellant pleaded
not guilty to the charge.5 The other accused who have
not been identified remained at large.
Appellant denied the charge against him. He claimed
that in the afternoon of May 25, 1997, he was at
Barangay Camada gathering and cleaning rattan poles.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On May 20, 2005, the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
Branch 2, rendered its Decision6 finding appellant
guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Wilfredo Gunda guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH; and to pay
the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, another sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages; and another sum of ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.7
The trial court disregarded the denial of the appellant.
On the other hand, it lent full credence to the
testimonies of Eladio Jr. and Ambal who both positively
identified appellant as the assailant. The RTC noted
that their testimonies coincided with the postmortem
findings of Dr. Samuel Baldono that the victim suffered
multiple stab wounds which caused his death. The RTC
likewise brushed aside the alibi of appellant. It noted
that although he claimed that he was in Barangay
Camada at the time of the incident, appellant failed to
prove that it was physically impossible for him to be
present at Barangay Cabay where the crime took place.
Appellant even admitted that the distance between
the two barangays could be traversed in an hour or
even less. The RTC also found that appellant conspired
with the John Does in committing the crime. It also
noted that treachery attended the commission of the
crime because the victim was unarmed and totally
unaware of the impending attack. The attack was
sudden thus depriving the victim of any opportunity to
escape or defend himself.
In imposing the death penalty, the RTC considered
treachery and conspiracy as qualifying circumstances.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 30, 2010, the CA rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is
DENIED. The Decision dated May 20, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), 8th Judicial Region, Branch
2, Borongan, Eastern Samar, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the lesser penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua instead of Death be imposed against
appellant.
SO ORDERED.8
The CA affirmed the factual findings of the trial court
that indeed, it was appellant, in conspiracy with the
other John Does, who killed the victim. The CA also
agreed with the findings of the trial court that the
killing was done in a treacherous manner. However,
the CA noted that although the trial court properly
appreciated treachery and conspiracy to have
attended the commission of the crime, the presence of
both would not warrant the imposition of the death
penalty. It ratiocinated that -
Treachery in the present case is a qualifying, not a
generic aggravating circumstance. Its presence served
to characterize the killing as murder; it cannot at the
same time be considered as a generic aggravating
circumstance to warrant the imposition of the
maximum penalty. Since treachery qualified the
commission of the crime to murder, this circumstance
could no longer be appreciated anew as a generic
aggravating circumstance to warrant the imposition of
the death penalty. Furthermore, although there was
conspiracy in this case, it is neither a qualifying
circumstance [nor] a generic aggravating circumstance
to warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of
death.
The penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. The two penalties being both
indivisible, and there being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the
deed, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua should
be applied pursuant to the second paragraph of the
Revised Penal Code.9
Aggrieved, appellant filed this appeal10 to which the CA
gave due course in its Resolution11 of December 1,
2010.
On March 21, 2011, we required the parties to file
their respective supplemental briefs.12 However, both
parties opted not to file their briefs anymore
considering that their arguments had been amply
discussed in the briefs that they filed before the CA.13
Our Ruling
We dismiss the appeal.
Based on the above narrations, we find no cogent
reason to depart from the findings of the trial court as
affirmed by the CA, that appellant is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Two
prosecution witnesses positively identified him as the
person who waylaid the victim, and with the help of his
conspirators, stabbed the victim several times.
According to the postmortem findings, the victim
suffered 12 stab wounds which caused his death.
There is also no doubt in our mind that the attack on
the victim was attended by treachery. The victim was
unarmed and had no inkling of the impending attack
on his person. In fact, he was just on his way home
together with his son Eladio Jr. The victim was attacked
by appellant from behind with a blow to his head with
a wooden pole. His cohorts then held the victim’s arms
rendering him helpless and immobile. In such position,
there is no opportunity for the victim to escape or
even offer a feeble resistance. Appellant then
delivered the coup de grâce by stabbing the victim
multiple times. Undoubtedly, treachery qualified the
killing to murder. "There is treachery when the
offender commits [a crime] against the person,
employing means, methods or forms in the execution
thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make."14 As
regards conspiracy, the CA correctly ruled that it is not
a circumstance which would aggravate or qualify the
crime.
shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.21
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The March 30,
2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB
CR-HC No. 00397 which affirmed with modification the
May 20, 2005 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, finding appellant
Wilfredo Gunda alias Fred guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. As modified, appellant is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole and is ordered to pay the heirs of
the victim the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, PS0,000.00 as moral damages, ₱30,000.00
as exemplary damages, and ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages. Interest on all damages awarded is imposed
at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the SO ORDERED.

penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to
death.1âwphi1 There being no other aggravating
circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, the CA correctly held that the proper
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, the lower of
the two indivisible penalties. "It must be emphasized,
however, that [appellant is] not eligible for parole
pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 which
states that ‘persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentence will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act,
shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
as amended’."15

As regards the damages, the amount of civil indemnity

must be increased to ₱75,000.00 in line with prevailing
jurisprudence.16 Exemplary damages must likewise be
increased to ₱30,000.00.17 Moral damages in the
amount of ₱50,000.00, however, was correctly
awarded by the trial court and the CA.18 Moreover, we
note that the trial court and the CA did not award
actual damages. In lieu thereof, we award temperate
damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 "as it cannot be
denied that the heirs of the [victim] suffered pecuniary
loss although the exact amount was not
proved."19 "This award is adjudicated so that a right
which has been violated may be recognized or
vindicated, and not for the purpose of
indemnification."20 In addition, all damages awarded