Coutto, An International History of The Brazilian Argentine Rapprochement

The International History Review
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An International History of the Brazilian–Argentine

Rapprochement
Tatiana Coutto
To cite this article: Tatiana Coutto (2014) An International History of the

Brazilian–Argentine Rapprochement, The International History Review, 36:2, 302-323, DOI:
10.1080/07075332.2013.864987
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2013.864987
Published online: 20 Jan 2014.
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Download by: [University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign] Date: 25 June 2016, At: 10:38
The International History Review, 2014
Vol. 36, No. 2, 302–323, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2013.864987
An International History of the Brazilian–Argentine Rapprochement

Tatiana Coutto*
Downloaded by [University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign] at 10:38 25 June 2016
The establishment of political channels that allowed long-standing rivals Brazil

and Argentina to pursue co-operation in the nuclear realm is commonly
attributed to the work of civilian Presidents Jose Sarney and Ra ul Alfonsın as
well as to the re-establishment of democratic regimes in both countries in the
1980s. Nevertheless, archival research, recently declassified documents, and oral-
history interviews confirm the hypothesis that these efforts actually date back to
the 1960s. The initiative gained momentum in the 1970s with the settlement of the
Itaipu-Corpus dispute over common freshwater resources and joint opposition to
the United States’ non-proliferation policy. This article addresses the process
which led to the establishment of stable forms of co-operation between Brazil and
Argentina in the nuclear realm. It explores four different strategies adopted by
each country in order to obtain access to nuclear technology and exert regional
leadership: alignment with the United States (thereby relinquishing nuclear
autonomy); establishment of strategic partnerships with alternative Western
powers; development of indigenous technology through secret programmes; and
bilateral co-operation at the regional level. The international context, domestic
factors, and personal attitudes are taken into account with the aim of providing a
comprehensive analysis of co-operation and trust-building processes in a non-
Western setting.
Keywords: Brazil; Argentina; nuclear co-operation; trust-building; oral history
I. Introduction
The year 2014 marks the twenty-third anniversary of the Brazilian–Argentine
Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), a bilateral
*Email: tatiana.coutto@eui.eu. This work results from a two-year period of research activities
developed at the Getulio Vargas Foundation (CPDOC/FGV) in Rio de Janeiro as part of the
project on ‘The History of Nuclear Energy in Brazil’, as well as a four-month visiting fellow-
ship at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris. The research work was made possible
due to the support received from the Brazilian Research Council (CNPq) and from the EUISS.
I would like to thank Paula Vedoveli and Lucas Assis for their participation in the earlier
phases of the project, Dr Matias Spektor and Rodrigo Mallea for the field research in Buenos
Aires, and Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter and Dr Jean Pascal Zanders (EUISS) for providing
useful insights on regionalism and non-proliferation issues. It would be impossible not to men-
tion the help provided by ABACC’s staff as well as the comments, impressions, and informa-
tion shared by the Secretaries Antonio Oliveira and Odilon Marcuzzo do Canto. No less
important was the support received from the National Archives in Brasilia, who provided me
with relevant sources concerning the topics tackled in this paper - including secret documents
which only become accessible to the public in August 2012. I am also more than grateful to
Dr Roland Popp (CSS/ETH) for the encouragements as well as for the many comments and
suggestions to improve the article, to the reviewer(s)and to the many interviewees who kindly
devoted their time to talk about their experience in Brazil and Argentina’s nuclear history.
Ó 2014 Taylor & Francis

The International History Review 303
venture created with the aim of providing the basis for co-operation in the nuclear
realm which could be, to a certain extent, adapted to other regional settings world-
wide. By contrast, few works adopt a comprehensive and multi-level approach that
seeks to explain the incentives and constraints involved in nuclear co-operation and
trust-building between the two long-standing rivals. Whereas partial explanations
abound, the historical process that led to the formalisation of bilateral security
arrangements and therefore to the establishment of the Agency is still poorly
understood.
Certain authors claim that the regionalisation of security concerns that followed
the detente of East–West relations is among the underlying factors which brought
about change in Brazilian–Argentine relations.1 Since Communism was no longer
perceived as a menace, South American leaders shifted their attention to neighbour-

ing countries and immediate threats.2 Another body of literature identifies the arrival
to power of civilian governments as the main driving force behind this process. The
establishment of a system of mutual inspections of nuclear facilities would thereby
render domestic civil–military relations in the Southern Cone more stable and pro-
mote higher nuclear-safety standards.3 Some scholars are of the opinion that co-
operation was made possible by the isolation of security goals from the development
agenda.4 From this viewpoint, the resolution of the Corpus-Itaipu issue represented
a turning point in this process.5
This article seeks to bring together the domestic explanations, regional factors,
and international conditions which have rendered nuclear bilateralism a viable stra-
tegic choice. With the support of various actors’ narratives and recently declassified
documentation, this paper challenges the idea that co-operation can be explained
exclusively by either regional dynamics or by transformations in the international
system. Motivated by development concerns, domestic political disputes, external
constraints, and long-standing rivalry, Brazil and Argentina adopted several strate-
gies in order to develop (or have access to) nuclear technology despite the remote
possibility of inter-state conflict.6 In that sense, the fully fledged co-operation
observed in the 1990s was the result of a historical, non-linear process through which
both countries sought to attain nuclear capacity in order to ensure energy supply and
improve their standing at both regional and international levels.
This paper does not question the importance of the democratisation process to
regional stability, but contradicts conventional wisdom according to which nuclear
co-operation was solely a result of efforts carried out by President Jose Sarney and
President Ra ul Alfonsın. Declassified documents from the Brazilian and Argentine
Foreign Ministries and personal fonds, along with oral-history interviews, show
that the path that allowed Brazil and Argentina to move from ‘rivalry to friendly
competition’7 and therefore to ‘positive peace’8 started with several specific attempts
to overcome security dilemmas in the late 1960s. Furthermore, the quest for nuclear
autonomy, the opposition to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and the changing
perception of Argentina and Brazil vis- a-vis the interests of the United States in Latin
America have affected each distinct phase of the bilateral relationship.
Another critical factor in the trust-building process was the interplay between the
several institutions responsible for defining and carrying out the two countries’
nuclear policies. The informal agreements and unofficial negotiations regarding
access to sensitive technology and competition between diplomats, technical bodies,
and the armed forces in the definition of nuclear strategies are particularly relevant
to this study. Formalised bilateral co-operation emerges as a more recent option,
304 T. Coutto
although the exchange of information and unofficial intermittent co-ordination had

already taken place under the military regime.9
The process which led to a decline in the level of distrust between Brazil and
Argentina preceded the shift to a civilian government in the region. This emerged
from what diplomats from both countries call a more ‘pragmatic’ foreign policy,
albeit pervaded by unsynchronised initiatives, misperceptions, and efforts to contain
political actors in the domestic sphere. Revisiting the history of Brazil and
Argentina’s nuclear rapprochement sheds light on the dynamics of regional co-oper-
ation between the two countries and adds a non-Western perspective to trust-build-
ing in the nuclear world.
II. Brazil’s and Argentina’s nuclear programmes

Nuclear research in Brazil dates back to studies on fission and prospecting which led
the country to establish its first agreement with the United States in 1940, as well as to
the creation of institutions such as the National Research Council (Conselho Nacional
de Pesquisas, CNPq) in 1950 and the National Commission for Nuclear Energy (Com-
iss~
ao Nacional de Energia Nuclear, CNEN) in 1956. Although successive governments
continued to invest in the development of nuclear capacity, competition among aca-
demic, technical, military, commercial, and diplomatic institutions impeded the imple-
mentation of a continuous and objective nuclear policy.10 These various paths reflect
Brazil’s international aspirations and include: (1) unconditional alignment with Wash-
ington (1964–73), with limited access to nuclear technology and dependence on US
fuel supply; (2) the pursuit of indigenous technology through the development of tho-
rium-based reactors (1965–73), a strategy that was never fully implemented11; (3) the
quest for alternative partners to circumvent the dependence on the United States, to
master the fuel cycle, and to avoid adherence to non-proliferation regimes (1974–9);
(4) the mise en marche of secret and unsafeguarded programmes by the military forces
(1978–86); (5) institutionalised co-operation with Argentina (from 1980 onwards) as a
means of ensuring the ‘full right’ to the development of peaceful nuclear technology
while circumventing constraints posed by the NPT12; and (6) participation in arrange-
ments such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and adherence to non-proliferation
regimes (from the mid-1990s onwards). These dates are indicative, as strategies have
overlapped over time.
The origins of Argentina’s nuclear policy can be traced back to the aftermath of
the Second World War with the establishment of the National Commission for
Atomic Energy (Comisi on Nacional de Energıa At omica, CNEA) by President Juan
Domingo Per on in 1950. After a frustrated attempt steered by Austrian scientist
Ronald Richter to master nuclear-fusion technology in 1948, the CNEA was placed
under the direct control of the presidency and entrusted with the management of
nuclear activities.
Over the following years, the CNEA brought together research, training, and
project-development ventures under the aegis of the government promotion of
nuclear energy.13 Rivalry fostered technological development, since competition
with Brazil for the priority of US support under the ‘Atoms for Peace’ framework
expressed the pursuit for regional supremacy. The nuclear programme received large
resources over time and was marked by its continuity, despite South America’s politi-
cal and economic instability. Under the direction of navy officials Oscar Quihillalt
(1955–73) and Castro Madero (1976–83), the CNEA gained international
prominence: research reactors were built with the participation of Argentine indus-
try, and the country developed the capacity to produce the fuel element (bundles of
nuclear fuel rods), later exported to Germany.14
Argentina’s nuclear policy was also characterised by the involvement of research
institutes and the pursuit of autonomy and self-sufficiency.15 In 1967, after frustrated
negotiations with France and the United Kingdom, an agreement was reached with the
German company Siemens in order to set up Latin America’s first nuclear plant Atucha
I.16 In 1973, following negotiations with West Germany, the United States, and
Canada, the country acquired a pressurized heavy water (PHW) ‘CANDU’ reactor
from the latter. The option for natural uranium-based reactors - which minimised
Argentina’s dependency on external suppliers of nuclear fuel - was a result of what

Hymans calls a combination ‘of national ambition and a sense of the possible’.17 The
stability of the programme was achieved because the CNEA and the presidency were
the only decision-makers which accounted for the country’s regional nuclear leadership.
The programme saw rapid development during the military dictatorship (1976–
83). By the late 1970s, Argentina’s nuclear sector was one of the most important in
the developing world (after India and China). However, the lack of political trans-
parency in the programme resulted in Argentina being regarded as a potential prolif-
erator and a factor for regional instability.18 The possibility that Buenos Aires could
be tempted to develop a plutonium-based device concerned the international com-
munity, most notably after the tests carried out by India, which obtained plutonium
from a similar Canadian reactor, in 1974. Facing international restrictions, Argen-
tina also carried out is autonomous programme, and built a gaseous-diffusion
enrichment facility in Pilcaniyeu. In 1983 enrichment technology had been achieved.
With Alfonsın’s arrival to power a few months later, the CNEA had its autonomy
reduced and the nuclear programme - at that time much more advanced than the
Brazilian - suffered deep cuts to its budget, and virtually stagnated with the economic
crisis. In the 1990s Argentina adhered to disarmament and non-proliferation treaties,
and dismantled the ‘C ondor II’ ballistic-missile project.19
III. The quest for a special relationship with the United States and diplomacy
in the Southern Cone
In March 1967, shortly before his inauguration as President of Brazil, Marshal
Arthur da Costa e Silva paid his first official visit to Buenos Aires, where he had
served between 1950 and 1952 as Military Attache, to meet the Argentine President,
Lieutenant General Juan Carlos Onganıa Carballo. This diplomatic openness sur-
prised both the military leadership and the Itamaraty (Brazilian Foreign Ministry).
The last time Brazil and Argentina had co-ordinated diplomatic positions had been
at the Consultation Meeting of Foreign Ministers from members of the Organization
of American States (OAS) in Punta del Este in January 1962. At that time Argentina,
supported by Brazil, opposed the exclusion of Cuba from the Inter-American sys-
tem.20 One year prior to the meeting, the civilian presidents Jânio Quadros of Brazil
(backed by Christian Democrats [PDC] and the socialists) and Arturo Frondizi of
Argentina (from the Intransigent Radical Civic Union, UCRI) advocated bilateral
co-operation and the adoption of common positions in regional affairs.21 However,
efforts to devise an independent foreign policy failed, notwithstanding US overtures
for co-operation that sought to contain the spread of socialist ideals in the region.22
Facing domestic opposition, and without the support of the armed forces, Quadros
306 T. Coutto
resigned in August 1961, and Vice-President Jo~ao Goulart from the Brazilian Labor
Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, PTB) was ousted in a coup d’ etat supported by
the United States in 1964.23 Frondizi was overthrown in March 1962.
The departure of the two protagonists led to a period of internal instability in the
domestic realm and co-ordination with various developing nations and the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM). Bilateralism remained an interlude. On top of that, the
close alignment with the United States nurtured under Castelo Branco’s administra-
tion steered Brazil away from regional co-operation. Washington’s financial and
political support suggested that Brazil would soon attain regional leadership, thereby
raising concerns among Argentinian officials. Nevertheless, Costa e Silva’s visit in
1967 improved the bilateral relationship: together with trade agreements, a Brazil-
ian–Argentine Executive Commission for Coordination (CEBAC) for nuclear poli-
tics and non-proliferation issues was established. Given the recent history of mistrust
between the two countries, this rather sudden meeting of minds is quite surprising.
Costa e Silva’s resumption of previous efforts to establish co-operative ties with
Argentina demonstrated that regionalism as an idea was not dead.
At the time, an issue that proved highly controversial during the negotiations on
both Tlatelolco (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
and the Caribbean) and the non-proliferation treaties was the definition of the
‘peaceful use’ of nuclear energy, in particular with regard to peaceful nuclear explo-
sions (PNEs). The United States and the USSR maintained that non-nuclear states
did not have the right to carry out such experiments. During the Tlatelolco negotia-
tions, Brazil supported Argentina in its objection to the superpowers, and the Brazil-
ian delegation’s long speeches succeeded in delaying the opening of the treaty for
signature until February 1967.24 The discussions on PNEs were by and large respon-
sible for the involvement in the debate of the Itamaraty, CNEN, and the restricted
decision-making body, the National Security Council (Conselho de Segurança
Nacional, CSN).
The right to carry out PNEs was supported by Costa e Silva on 12 April 1967 in
Punta del Este, as well as by Sergio Corrêa da Costa, then Secretary General at the
Brazilian Foreign Ministry, at the Eighteen Nations Committee on Disarmament,
not to ‘waive the right to conduct research without limitation and to ultimately man-
ufacture or receive nuclear explosives that would enable Brazil to perform great engi-
neering works’.25 In Brazil, the joint work of the CSN and the Foreign Ministry
(Ministerio das Relaç~oes Exteriores, MRE) resulted in the February 1967 drafting of
nuclear-policy guidelines, which included among their long-term objectives ‘the pro-
duction of artefacts for peaceful purposes aimed at geographical engineering’ - a
remark added by Chancellor Magalh~ aes Pinto to CSN’s top-secret document.26
During this period, Argentina and Brazil showed an ambiguous approach vis-
a-vis the United States. Economically and politically dependent but at the same time
aware of Washington’s concern about Communism and Peronism in the region,
Costa e Silva and Onganıa sought to obtain the ‘modernisation of the armed
forces’.27 In short, the possibility that nationalist ideologies could be, once again,
translated into independent foreign-policy strategies or lead to the implementation
of protectionist economic measures in the Southern Cone increased Brazil’s and
Argentina’s bargaining power.
In Brazil, the negotiation process triggered by such an ambivalent position
resulted in North American support for the construction of research reactors and the
provision of nuclear fuel. These agreements are an expression of the first strategy
tackled in this paper: alignment with the United States in order to have access to sen-
sitive technology while relinquishing nuclear autonomy. Such a position resolved,
albeit temporarily, the internal dispute around the model of the first nuclear plant to
be built in the country. The option for the pressurised-water reactor (PWR) and
enriched uranium (supplied by the United States) was made official in 1969. On the
other hand, the fact that technical missions from France and West Germany sought
to establish framework agreements on scientific co-operation in 1968/9 indicate that
Brazil did not neglect the importance of alternative partners when it came to its
national science and technology policy.28
In the interim, a feasibility study conducted exclusively by Argentinian techni-
cians resulted in the publication of an international call for tender for the construc-
tion of Latin America’s first nuclear plant Atucha I through a turnkey contract.
Economic and financial advantages offered by Siemens/Kraftwerk Union (KWU)
accounted for the choice of the West German company to the detriment of Atomic
Energy Canadian Limited (AECL).29 In contrast to Brazil, major guidelines were
decided within the CNEA before negotiations with foreign partners started.30
Although both countries pursued autonomy in the long run, the prevailing Brazilian
strategy was to reduce the gap between its nuclear projects and Argentina’s pro-
gramme, while ensuring energy provision in the short term. Brazil also signed a turn-
key contract, but expected enrichment technology to be absorbed over time. Neither
of the two strategies would allow for the mastery of the fuel cycle. Argentina, how-
ever, strove not to depend on the US fuel supply but to develop expertise to build its
reactor.
Also in 1967, Rear Admiral and CNEA’s President Oscar Quihillalt was elected
President of the IAEA’s Board of Governors, which confirmed the supremacy of the
Argentine nuclear programme vis- a-vis the Brazilian.31 Furthermore, the Ezeiza
Atomic Center came into operation; a delegation from CNEN attended the inaugu-
ration ceremony, as well as representatives of the US Nuclear Commission.32 Despite
the fact that the United States supplied enriched uranium to research reactors built in
Argentina, Brasilia and Buenos Aires both realised the possibility of establishing a
privileged relationship with Washington. The Brazilian Foreign Ministry then pre-
pared a secret document suggesting ‘additional understandings for the NPT negotia-
tions in Geneva’.33 It was clear that the establishment of stronger ties with Argentina
could only be achieved through an exchange of information on the subject.34 Argen-
tina showed only limited receptivity to Costa e Silva’s attempt to reach an agreement
on peaceful nuclear development35, mainly because of the perception that Brazil ulti-
mately aimed at regional leadership at the expense of Argentina’s strategic interests.
IV. The ‘water resources’ dispute: co-operation on standby

A significant obstacle which prevented further co-operation between Argentina and
Brazil concerned the breakdown of negotiations on the use of hydraulic resources
from the Rio de La Plata Basin and the Parana River. The fact that Argentina had a
more advanced nuclear programme, but lacked control over its hydraulic resources,
set its hydroelectric-energy programme back. In early 1968 Chancellor Nicanor
Costa Mendez, an outspoken anti-Communist diplomat who favoured close ties
with the United States - visited Brazil for negotiations on the matter. This was an
opportunity for the Itamaraty to start talks over a possible Latin American Commu-
nity of the Atom (ALATOM)36 in order to promote nuclear safety and establish
308 T. Coutto
common operational procedures. Due to these different expectations, neither objec-

tive - a joint position on the use of the Parana River and policy co-ordination on
nuclear matters - was achieved.
Also in 1968, Brasilia made another attempt to reach an agreement with Argen-
tina on the bilateral development of nuclear-related technology. A CNEA delegate
came to Brazil for informal talks on heavy-water technology, but instead was offered
co-operation through a similar agreement that would be signed between Argentina
and Spain that same year.37 Argentina’s reluctance vis- a-vis these openings led Bra-
zilian policy-makers to consider alternative avenues. The CNEN commissioned a
study to evaluate possibilities for the implementation of a nuclear-energy pro-
gramme, supervised by James Lane from the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and
with technical advice from the IAEA. Concurrently, a group within the Foreign Min-
istry started unofficial talks with West German and Israeli representatives to investi-
gate the possibility of obtaining sensitive technology for Brazil’s incipient nuclear
programme.38
The La Plata Basin disputes started to escalate when Buenos Aires proposed a
permanent diplomatic mechanism for consultation whenever a country wished to
build on the rivers of the basin. Brazilian diplomats considered the mechanism unac-
ceptable, as this could hamper the construction of a hydroelectric power plant with
Paraguay. The main author of this position was Ant^ onio Azeredo da Silveira, a
career diplomat who had returned from NPT negotiations in Geneva to take over as
Ambassador to Argentina in 1969. The following years saw a worsening in bilateral
relations39, as well as suspicions in the media and among specific military spheres
(most notably in the Army) that both countries could be pursuing the development
of nuclear devices. Although high-ranking diplomatic officials admitted that the
nature of the bilateral rivalry was unlikely to lead to an arms race in the region, the
combination of the La Plata Basin quarrel, trade disputes over the price of grain,
negotiations concerning the extension of national sovereignty to the sea, and compe-
tition to attain regional supremacy (including in the nuclear realm), alarmed deci-
sion-making circles in Argentina and Brazil, especially after 1971.40
Successive Argentine governments regarded the Brazilian energy programme and
the agreements signed with Paraguay as an integral part of the Brasil Pot^ encia proj-
ect, which prevented co-operation with Argentina from developing. Brazil remained
closely aligned to the United States. In 1971, the state-owned company, Furnas Cen-
trais Eletricas, signed a turnkey contract with Westinghouse Electric Corporation
for the construction of the country’s first nuclear plant, Angra I, which was based on
a safeguard agreement signed with the United States in 1967 under the auspices of
the IAEA. However, the contract did not include the transfer of technology. While
Argentina took steps towards nuclear autonomy by circumventing the need for
enriched uranium and building reprocessing facilities, managing the fuel cycle
became a priority for Brazil. In late 1972, the Brazilian government reformed the
nuclear sector and created the Companhia Brasileira de Tecnologia Nuclear
(CBTN), which was assigned with the task of negotiating international agreements
aiming at technology transfer together with the Foreign and Energy ministries.
Again, negotiators turned to Westinghouse and the US Energy Department in order
to define a different contract for the setting-up of other plants (Angra II and III).41
When the State Department learned about the agreement, a Presidential veto halted
negotiations. Although France and Germany had also been approached, negotia-
tions with the United States were promising, and the veto fell on the CBTN ‘like a
thunderbolt’.42 Furthermore, the US Security Council changed Brazil’s classification

as a recipient of nuclear assistance, preventing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) from guaranteeing the delivery of enriched uranium to Angra I, and to pro-
hibiting Westinghouse from constructing reprocessing and enrichment plants in Bra-
zil. The event marked the beginning of the second nuclear strategy: the quest for
alternative Western powers.
V. The quest for alternative Western powers

The US non-proliferation policy had two major consequences: firstly, Brazil
enhanced talks on nuclear co-operation with France and West Germany. Secondly,
the perception that rivalry with Argentina hindered co-operation with third countries
increased among Brazilian diplomats. As the extent of the gap between Brazil’s and
Argentina’s programmes was unknown, CSN and Itamaraty sent a young career dip-
lomat to Atucha I in 1972. The official reported back that the director of the plant
had assured him that Argentina was not pursuing weapons capabilities.43 In 1974,
Itamaraty forwarded a proposal to the Energy Ministry and the CSN regarding the
viability of an agreement covering, once again, technical and political co-operation
with Argentina in the nuclear field. The main benefit of the arrangement would be to
avoid the malicious exploitation of a competition to have ‘the bomb’, which could
prevent Brazil from obtaining external credit and jeopardise future co-operation
with third countries.44
In Argentina, developmentalist military officials such as Juan Guglialmelli, who
repeatedly highlighted the importance of reaching an agreement with Brazil in order
to reduce friction between the two countries45, sustained that a nuclear race should
be avoided due to the costs it would impose on other development goals.46 However,
the technological advances of Argentina’s programme were of great concern in Bra-
zil. Notes drafted by Nuclebras’ President Nogueira Batista argued that it was con-
ceivable that Argentina’s stock of plutonium could allow for the development of a
nuclear device within twelve years.47 After India had gone nuclear in May 1974, these
fears increased due to the well-known history of Argentine–Indian co-operation on
nuclear matters.48 Similar concern was raised in the United States, which started to
restrict exports of sensitive material in order to contain proliferation.49 Further
restrictions were imposed by Canada with regard to the construction of the country’s
second plant, Embalse.50
At that time, Itaipu was the main hindrance to the establishment of a nuclear
bilateral arrangement. Notwithstanding Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira’s
remarks on the advantages of co-ordination in terms of national-security interests,
as well as the support provided by the Energy Ministry and the CSN, Geisel stated
that, while recognising the importance of jointly addressing the nuclear agenda, an
agreement would only be discussed once other relevant issues like Itaipu had been
addressed with a satisfactory result.51 The attitude of the President - a disappoint-
ment after such a high level of co-ordination had been reached between Brazilian
ministries - is related to the critical domestic and international challenges faced by
the Geisel administration. The d etente initiated by the superpowers provided both
Europe and the Third World with additional room for manoeuvre for pursuing spe-
cific goals. At the same time, the response to the economic crisis that followed the
end of the milagre had a notable effect on Brazil’s foreign-policy strategy, because
the success of the plan depended on an overture towards alternative partners
310 T. Coutto
throughout the world and co-operation with Latin America, including in areas such
as energy and basic industry. Although development policies could not preclude co-
operation with the North, unconditional alignment with a hegemonic power would
result in failure, as previous policies had proven.52
Conversely, co-operation with Argentina was regarded with mistrust. Silveira’s
years as Ambassador to Argentina had provided the Brazilian Chancellor with a
comprehensive overview of the enjeux politiques in the Southern Cone and had
shaped his understanding of Argentina’s political forces, institutions, and ideas. His
conception of regional strategy should not be based on an active pursuit of leader-
ship, as Brazil’s vast resources would eventually turn the country into a major actor.
The perception that, willing or not, Brazil’s behaviour affected the region was shared
by much of the Foreign Office.
VI. The domestic dimension: bureaucratic disputes and control of the nuclear policy
Silveira’s ideas largely influenced the nuclear programme, while he sometimes had to
compete with the prominence of the CBTN, now renamed Nuclebras. Despite the
dependency on US fuel supply, the development of enrichment capacity remained a
central objective of the Brazilian programme. It was thus important to neutralise cer-
tain groups within the CNEN that advocated the use of natural uranium (as well as
thorium) as nuclear fuel together with the development of indigenous technology.53
Nuclebras received massive resources from the Ministry of Energy, in addition to
CNEN personnel. In contrast to the CNEA, the CNEN was severely weakened by
the reform of the sector, as Nuclebras was entrusted with adapting Silveira’s concept
of ‘responsible pragmatism’ to the nuclear realm.
The appointment of the former Ambassador at Bonn, Paulo Nogueira Batista, as
President of Nuclebras helped bring about the 1975 nuclear agreement with the Fed-
eral Republic54 that would result in the creation of a series of nuclear plants as well
as enrichment and reprocessing facilities with the growing participation of Nucle-
bras’ subsidiaries and Brazilian private industries.55 Negotiated without the full dis-
cretion of the Brazilian Foreign Ministry, the agreement with Germany expressed a
victory of Batista over Silveira, who sought to draw up an agreement with France on
similar bases.
The initial objectives, however, were not entirely fulfilled. Brazil and Germany
experienced strong pressure from the United States to cancel the agreement in order
to impede horizontal proliferation. As Germany refused to concede, the solution was
to change the enrichment technology, from ultracentrifugation to the experimental
jet-nozzle method.56 By 1976 it was evident that Brazil would not have access to sen-
sitive technology, and that economic difficulties would delay the completion of the
works. At the same time, Carter’s presidential campaign indicated that stricter con-
trols on the exports of fissile material would be imposed on non-NPT countries.
The coming to power of General Jorge Rafael Videla on 24 March 1976 was ini-
tially welcomed by Brazil as a stabilising factor. Silveira saw in Videla a chance to
resume diplomatic talks. Although certain military groups posed difficulties to a
more amicable relationship, an improvement in relations between the Brazilian and
Argentine navies helped to create an element of stability.57 In the eyes of Argentine
officials, it was Chile and their claims over the Beagle Channel that posed a threat to
Buenos Aires, not Brazil.
The designation to the Foreign Ministry of career diplomat and former Editor-in-
Chief of the Argentine newspaper El Cların, Oscar Camili on, who had already served
in the Rio de Janeiro Embassy during the Frondizi administration, could be inter-
preted as a signal of the will, or the need, to mitigate animosities between the two
countries. Camili on, however, was aware of the obstacles (most notably Itaipu) that
prevented dialogue from being translated into actual co-operation.58 The Chancellor
reported that Geisel seemed to lack real interest in striking a deal with Argentina
regarding Itaipu; the Brazilian President declared that Argentina delayed the nego-
tiations with Paraguay in order to keep any decision on Itaipu on standby.59 This
perception, coupled with personal difficulties between Camili on and Silveira, kept
nuclear talks at bay. Notwithstanding such differences, Camili on’s legitimacy

vis-
a-vis certain sectors of the military establishment, coupled with and his ability to
use the press as a two-way channel of communication, helped to improve ‘the metab-
olism of the Argentine-Brazilian relationship’.60
The following decade saw an improvement in bilateral relations due to various
factors. An important role was played by personal relationships between Camili on
and CNEN’s President Herv asio de Carvalho, as well as by Castro Madero’s promi-
nence in restricted circles of technical experts from both CNEA and CNEN. Castro
Madero also provided the Germans with advice and personal views on the Brazilian
nuclear programme. However, these initiatives were limited to specific technical mat-
ters until the Itaipu issue was resolved.
Washington’s new proliferation policy linked a co-operative attitude in nuclear
matters to the observance of human rights and adherence to the NPT.61 Addition-
ally, the United States exerted considerable pressure on Western countries to adopt
the same posture. An example of this posture was Vice-President Walter Mondale’s
trip to Europe shortly after his inauguration, and the meeting, two weeks later,
between the Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher and German Chancellor
Helmut Schmidt, with the objective of impeding the transference of enrichment and
reprocessing technologies to Brazil. As in 1967, the Argentine government publicly
declared solidarity with Brazil.62 Pressure from the US government, coupled with the
Nuclebras fiasco and the positive sign from Buenos Aires, proved critical to Silveira’s
decision to advance talks with Argentina and Paraguay on Itaipu-Corpus.63
Nuclear co-operation gained momentum in November 1977, when US Secretary
of State Cyrus Vance visited Argentina and Brazil in order to negotiate the entry
into force of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. After his meeting with Silveira, the US repre-
sentative - apparently by accident - left behind a confidential document entitled
‘Brazil Scope Paper: Implications of the Argentine Visit’, which listed the topics to
be addressed with the Brazilian President.64 In a note to Geisel, Silveira stated that
Vance’s notes contradicted his official discourse.65 Washington strategy would con-
sist of avoiding overt opposition to the German–Brazilian agreement while offering
the provision of enriched fuel if the country relinquished technology transfer.
Argentina, which sought to obtain the technology necessary to produce heavy
water and to recycle plutonium, was facing restrictions to enter the London Group
of nuclear suppliers, in addition to US and Canadian pressure to adhere to the
NPT.66 Washington aimed at stimulating competition between Brazil and Argentina
for what would look like a special relationship with the United States.67 For US ana-
lysts, Argentina was more likely to accept the deal and sign the NPT, because this
movement would reinforce the perception of Brazil as a potential proliferator and
enhance Argentina’s credibility vis- a-vis the international community. On the other
312 T. Coutto
hand, certain sectors within the Itamaraty suggested that complying with Carter’s
guidelines and adopting once more a strategy of alignment with the United States
could prevent Argentina’s advances in the nuclear field from translating into defini-
tive regional leadership.68
The disclosure of information about the real North American interests in the
region led both countries to reassess their positions vis-
a-vis the United States and may
have decisively contributed to the co-operation mechanism that started to function dur-
ing General Jo~ ao Figueiredo’s administration. Nuclebras’ failure to obtain access to
sensitive technology provided legitimized the development of secret nuclear pro-
grammes among top military officials. The same process was observed in Argentina,
albeit always under the auspices of the CNEA and its President Castro Madero.
VII. The secret nuclear programmes

Initial attempts to acquire sensitive technology by Brazil and Argentina date back to
the 1940s and 1950s, when Argentina engaged in the so-called Huemul project and
Brazilian Admiral Alvaro Alberto sought to import German centrifuges for ura-
nium-enrichment purposes. In 1978, attempts were stimulated by what had been per-
ceived as an attack on national sovereignty by the Carter administration. Brazilian–
Argentine rivalry co-existed with the quest for autonomy in the nuclear world. The
third nuclear strategy tackled in this paper led to an increase in nuclear military
capacity in the Southern Cone, but at the same time mitigated mutual threat.
Argentina’s secret programme was started in August 1978 by a group of approxi-
mately 130 scientists and technicians from the Argentine Balseiro Physics Institute,
CNEA, and INVAP (Investigaciones Aplicadas), an organism established in 1976 in
the province of Rio Negro under the auspices of the CNEA. Carter’s Non-Prolifera-
tion Act gave momentum to the programme, as Argentina was prevented from con-
cluding negotiations regarding the sale of research reactors to other countries due to
the lack of enriched uranium.69 The programme was made up of the development of
enrichment technology through gaseous diffusion and the reprocessing of plutonium,
which had already been achieved experimentally in 1967 by Juan Flegenheimer. In
early 1979 an inter-ministerial commission approved an ambitious plan aimed at the
complete mastery of the fuel cycle by 1997 and the completion of an experimental
plant for the production of heavy water by 1980. The unsafeguarded programme
was not affected by the growing tensions with the United Kingdom regarding the
Falklands. On the contrary; a group led by Colonel Ricardo Rapacioli was set up
between 1980 and 1982 with the aim of producing metallic plutonium.
The origin of the Brazilian Autonomous Program of Nuclear Technology (Pro-
grama Aut^ onomo de Tecnologia Nuclear, PATN) is usually described as being an
alternative to the agreement with West Germany.70 However, military projects were
already underway before 1975; the autonomous or ‘parallel’ programme marks the
direct participation of the armed forces in nuclear-policy making, hitherto driven by
Nuclebras, the Ministry of Energy, and the CNEN. The definitive inception of the
PATN can be traced back to 1978 when Commander Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva
returned from a three-year period at MIT, where he was provided with insights into
how to build the enrichment-centrifugation system.71 So far the Navy did not have a
structured nuclear programme, but had become involved in talks with Nuclebras,
Interatom, and the German Ministry of Science and Technology on the possibility of
co-operation with regard to the nuclear propulsion of merchant ships and,
ultimately, of an oceanographic vessel.72 Another attempt at developing indigenous

technology was led by Colonel Jose Alberto do Amarante at the Aerospace Technical
Center (Centro Tecnico Aeroespacial, IEA/CTA) in the state of S~ao Paulo. The CTA
programme sought to develop conversion and enrichment technology in Brazil
through a partnership with Campinas University (UNICAMP) where the application
of laser technology to isotope separation had been taking place since 1973.73
As of 8 March 1979, Pinheiro, who had become acquainted with the CTA’s activ-
ities through a Brazilian colleague at the MIT, was formally assigned the responsibil-
ity to form a civil–military research team to work on various interrelated nuclear
projects. The programme was initially jointly developed by the Navy and the Air
Force, as both were interested in nuclear propulsion. The historical relationship

between the Navy and S~ ao Paulo University (USP) enabled the facilities to be set up
at the Institute for Energy and Nuclear Research (Instituto de Pesquisas Energeticas
e Nucleares, IPEN) laboratory, the only unsafeguarded civilian centre in Brazil. A
pilot plan was set up at the Navy’s Aramar facility. The Navy programme ‘enjoyed
remarkable continuity both in terms of managerial discretion’ and support by succes-
sive Navy ministers.74 Such support continued during President Figueiredo’s term
with funds from the National Security Council (CSN) and institutional support from
CNEN, which was chaired from 1982 to 1990 by Rex Nazare Alves, a civilian physi-
cist with firm connections with the Brazilian Army. The Air Force laser programme
and the Army’s gas-graphite reactor project did not have the same success.
The PATN launched a competition between Itamaraty (supported by a weakened
Nuclebras) and the Navy (supported by a recovering CNEN, IPEN, and the CSN)
for control of the nuclear agenda. Interestingly, both teams had contacts, as well as
some information on the status of the Argentinian programme. Contacts were made
between the foreign ministries or through technical bodies. For example, in 1980
Pinheiro da Silva reluctantly accepted an invitation from a former MIT colleague
and navy official Domingo Giorsetti to visit the Constituyentes atomic centre. At the
facility, Pinheiro realised that Argentina was importing highly enriched uranium
(HEU), most likely from China. Pinheiro reported the visit to Rex Nazare who veri-
fied the possibility of concluding a similar deal with the Chinese, which he succeeded
in doing in 1984.75
The involvement of Brazil and Argentina with emerging (‘second-tier’) suppliers
of nuclear material allowed for advances in both countries’ parallel programs.76 At
the same time, the Brazilian Foreign Ministry was concerned that the PATN would
marginalise the country in the eyes of the international community and started to
closely follow its activities through the CSN. Brazilian–Argentine bilateralism can be
regarded as an arrangement that would allow both countries to continue their pro-
grammes with the aim of ‘being taken seriously’ by the international community.
Such strategy would increase their bargaining power in negotiations in the economic
realm, while avoiding the constraints imposed by the non-proliferation regime.77
The planned and controlled disclosure of information on the PATN was made
possible in 1986 by the publication of a report drafted by a Commission steered
by the scholar Jose Israel Vargas. The document brought about new dynamics in
the field of nuclear co-operation as well as in the reciprocal confidence-building
process.78 In that sense, the Figueiredo presidency marks the formal (i.e. written)
and overt establishment of rules and procedures that would guide nuclear co-oper-
ation, the outcomes of which would become visible during the Alfonsın-Sarney
tandem.
314 T. Coutto
VIII. The improvement of Brazilian–Argentine relations: co-operation

as a viable alternative
Geisel’s choice of General Jo~ao Figueiredo, former head of the National Information
Service (Serviço Nacional de Informaç~ oes, SNI), as his successor aimed at ensuring a
gradual political opening. The Figueiredo presidency, which started on 15 March
1979, was marked by several attempts to resolve the economic crisis characterised by
a sharp increase in foreign debt, downward trends in gross domestic product (GDP)
growth, and hyperinflation. This international economic and political turmoil not
only increased north–south disparities, but also led to increasing cleavages within the
Third World between energy-producing countries and energy importers. Brazil, at
this time a heavy-oil importer, was in a peculiarly vulnerable situation; its energy pol-
icy became more focused on national exploitation of fossil fuels, on the construction
of hydro-electric plants, and on the development of alternative fuels such as sugar-
based ethanol. Another avenue pursued by Brazil was, once more, the diversification
of diplomatic relations, most notably with the Middle East, the USSR, and China.79
In the foreign-policy sphere, the last military government advocated stronger par-
ticipation of the developing world in international relations. This posture was
reflected, for example, in the congruence with the Non-Aligned Movement on a wide
range of issues.80 The guidelines set by Foreign Minister Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro81
also emphasised the expansion of foreign trade with various partners in order to
compensate for trade imbalances. Of particular concern was the improvement of eco-
nomic co-operation with the Southern Cone as well as with the Middle East for the
import of oil and gas.
With respect to Brazil–Argentina relations, the 1979–81 period witnessed the ton-
ing down of bilateral rivalry and the mutual recognition of the need for a ‘practical’
rather than juridical solution to the controversies between the two countries. There
was also a growing awareness that a rapprochement represented a viable alternative
to previous policies, in particular given the constraints imposed by the international
political and economic context, as expressed in informal talks between Guerreiro
and Camili on, who became Argentina’s chancellor in 1981.82 The settlement of the
Itaipu-Corpus controversy paved the way for an alternative approach to bilateral
relations83, together with the settlement of border disputes and negotiation of the
price of grain imported from Argentina: an issue contested since the late 1960s.
Thus, top-secret documents drafted by the Secretary General of the CSN in 1981
highlighted the need to follow up the Argentine nuclear programme, assess their
capabilities, and send technical personnel for short courses offered by the CNEA.84
Domestic variables that shaped Brazilian foreign policy involved the transition to
the next government, together with Silveira’s decreased influence after the question-
able results of Nuclebras, which had so far prevented the crystallisation of agree-
ments with Buenos Aires.
Another critical aspect of the improvement of bilateral relations was Figueiredo’s
personal relationship towards the country where he had spent part of his youth dur-
ing his father’s exile.85 The President’s affection towards Argentina is repeatedly
cited in official correspondence as a factor which played a crucial role in reshaping
the relationship between the two countries.86 Finally, the arrival of Brigadier Carlos
Washington Pastor at the ‘Cancillerıa’ on 6 November 1978 and the ‘sort of implicit
trust’87 that emerged between him and his Brazilian counterpart Guerreiro proved
instrumental in the dynamics of co-operation in the region.
Figueiredo’s visit to President Jorge Rafael Videla on 14 May 1980 - the first of a
Brazilian president in more than forty years - marked the beginning of a series of for-
mal and informal bilateral talks between high-level government officials and techni-
cal experts, despite opposition by more sceptical military officials. A small group of
diplomats set the agenda; ambassadors of the two countries received limited informa-
tion on the meeting, and information was not released to the press in order to avoid
emotional public reactions that might destroy the incipient trust-building process.88
In Brazil, the presidential trip was preceded by specific preparatory events such as a
meeting held in January between CNEA President Castro Madero and Brazilian
ministers Guerreiro and Cesar Cals (Energy), as well as CSN Secretary Danilo Ven-
turini. On this occasion, Madero expressed plans to develop an ‘open’ nuclear policy
involving all Latin American countries.89 Accordingly, the supply of heavy equip-
ment to Argentina based on a contract with KWU for the construction of a new
plant was now warmly welcomed in Brazil by groups from diplomatic and industrial
backgrounds.90
Videla and Figueiredo’s declarations after the latter´s visit to Buenos Aires were
co-ordinated: the former drew attention to shared interests and identity and pro-
posed the adoption of a joint posture to deal adequately with an international cli-
mate of risk and uncertainty. His Brazilian counterpart, in turn, reinforced the idea
of ‘understanding and cooperation as the only possible way to meet the aspirations
of progress and welfare of the peoples of the two countries’.91 By and large, the presi-
dential addresses underlined the importance of finding an amicable solution to dis-
putes concerning the use of the La Plata Basin that would be appropriate for the
newly established status of bilateral co-operation and trust.
It was in a context marked by the economic and energy crises, coupled with restricted
access to nuclear technology from other countries and the quest for nuclear autonomy
through both official and secret programmes that Argentina and Brazil agreed on closer
co-operation. The two countries also agreed to exchange technical information, materi-
als, and products related to the nuclear-fuel cycle. Signed in Buenos Aires on 17 May
1980, the co-operation agreement on the pacific use of nuclear energy contradicted ‘the
legend of a nuclear race between Argentina and Brazil’ and gave way to concrete perspec-
tives in a domain where both countries had shown ‘irreproachable, although not always
understood, behavior’.92 Albeit formally similar to other broad arrangements that had
been previously established between Brazil and third countries, the agreement with
Argentina was remarkable because of its [initial] formal commitment to the improve-
ment of bilateral relations. It may also be regarded as a message to the international com-
munity that Argentina and Brazil would not be caught in a security dilemma, although
both remained outside the NPT. In addition, on 17 May Nuclebras and CNEA signed a
protocol that significantly increased bilateral interdependence. The document stipu-
lated, inter alia, a two-year lease of 120 annual tons of uranium (U3O8) from Argentina
to Brazil, zircaloy supply to for the production of fuel rods, and participation of a Nucle-
bras subsidiary in the construction of Atucha II.93 The protocol would allow Brazil to
develop its programme, and served Buenos Aires’ strategy to become a nuclear supplier
in order to increase its access to equipment it could not produce.94 Co-ordination
between Brazil and Argentina was in line with the campaign launched in July 1980 by the
Non-Aligned Co-ordinating Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, which
was another diplomatically led attempt organised by the ‘have-nots’ to increase access
to nuclear power. This type of deal, however, was not new to Brazil, as other agreements
on uranium import were under negotiation with Algeria, for example.95
316 T. Coutto
The agreements signed during the visit could be understood as part of an inte-
grated strategy to create an embryonic common market in the Southern Cone, as
they also encompassed incorporated contracts for the acquisition of Argentine trac-
tors and oil and gas trade, as well as on the a reduction of in automobile import tax
from 100% to 30%.96 Figueiredo’s visit may be regarded as a point of no return in
Argentine–Brazilian relations.
The success of the May 1980 meeting motivated Videla’s visit to Brazil in August
of the same year and the signing of another protocol, this time between the CNEN
and the CNEA, on the exchange of references and data about nuclear activities.97
The event, however, also highlighted the difference between the postures of the two
countries. Videla was concerned about fighting subversion and reinforcing a strategic
military alliance; Brazil, which was going through a process of abertura and seeking
to re-establish the military agreement with the United States (denounced in 1977),
focused on economic co-operation.98
The inauguration of Videla’s opponent and Commander in-Chief of the Army
Roberto Eduardo Viola on 29 March 1981 had a significant impact on the Argentine
scene. Efforts to manage political openness and to strike a consensus between civil-
ians and military hard-liners led to a severe and serious institutional crisis, enhanced
by the deterioration of the country’s economic situation. Thus, Argentina’s geopoliti-
cal concerns in the South Atlantic were prioritised over trade considerations.99 Nev-
ertheless, such instability did not change the dynamics of the relationship with
Brazil: in May, the two presidents signed new agreements establishing a working
group on economic co-operation and a protocol on industrial co-operation.
The period between 1979 and 1981 - termed the ‘honeymoon’ by Chancellor Guer-
reiro - saw decisive steps being taken towards interdependency and co-operation with
Argentina, as expressed by the resolution of the La Plata Basin dispute and the proto-
cols established between Nuclebras and the CNEA. However, given that neither Bue-
nos Aires nor Brasilia could renounce US support, Guerreiro and Carlos Pastor
sought to change the character of their posture vis- a-vis Washington, from one of
automatic alignment to a ‘mature relationship’. In their view, the formulation of a
Latin American position regarding external debt, and the quest for alternative com-
mercial partners, could strengthen Brazil’s and Argentina’s voice in the hemisphere.
Changes in the international context such as a new geopolitical environment in Africa
and the Middle East created the opportunity for Brazil and Argentina - which had at
the time developed expertise in certain nuclear areas - to succeed in the pursuit of their
foreign-policy goals. Conversely, the ‘honeymoon’ did not preclude mutual suspicions:
firstly, because Brazil and Argentina did not have enough information about each oth-
er’s ‘real’ interests and strategies; and secondly, because bilateral co-operation was not
consensual within the armed forces. Both countries were still military dictatorships
with opaque policies and poorly accountable institutions. With regard to the nuclear
realm, co-operation would reduce the threat posed by the other state and weaken the
main justification for the massive investment in the secret programmes amid severe
economic recession.
IX. From calculations to (cautious) trust: the road to bilateralism

After the meetings in 1980, calculations from Buenos Aires and Brasilia indicated
that the rapprochement, despite mutual suspicions on both sides, was beneficial in
geopolitical terms. The year 1982 saw a significant improvement in these
relationships. The unfolding of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict in April 1982

increased trust and moved the Southern Cone’s political landscape to a new level.
By the early 1980s, sovereignty claims over the Falkland Islands had become a
central aspect of Argentina’s foreign policy. To Figueiredo and Guerreiro, these
claims represented an opportunity to improve relations by supporting Buenos Aires
in international forums. Despite the growing tensions in Anglo-Argentine relations
in 1981, the invasion of the Falklands on 2 April 1982 apparently surprised Guer-
reiro.100 Immediately, the Chancellor declared to the press that Brazil’s recognition
of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas dated back to 1883, and urged the parties
involved to negotiate a peaceful solution, which did not happen despite Brazilian and
US efforts. The Brazilian conduct during and after the crisis - calling for a peaceful
solution and mediating Argentina’s position in international institutions - set a posi-
tive precedent in the bilateral relationship. Brasilia supported Argentina’s claim and
conceded the country a short-term loan, while adopting an officially neutral position
concerning the United Kingdom. By the time the conflict came to a close, Brazil had
increased its international visibility, improved its standing vis-
a-vis the United States
and the Organization of American States (OAS), and represented Argentine’s inter-
ests in the United Kingdom.
Argentina’s defeat contributed to the enhancement of bilateralism: economic col-
lapse and pressure for a democratic transition destroyed regional hegemonic claims,
which affected the future of the CNEA. On 13 January 1983, presidents Reynaldo
Bignone and Figueiredo met in Foz do Iguaçu for discussions on the political open-
ing, together with energy, gas, and oil trade.101 Brazilian diplomats considered that
Argentina’s political turmoil should in fact favour the rapprochement, and praised
co-operation as the only meaningful alternative for the region.
The defeat in the Falklands led the military establishment to accelerate the
nuclear programme while the transition to a civilian government was under negotia-
tion. On 18 October, the Pylcaniyeu atomic facility succeeded in the production of
enriched uranium. A meeting took place between Castro Madero and Alfonsın two
weeks later, and a letter was sent to IAEA’s Secretary General Hans Blix. The 1980
nuclear agreement was ratified in Brazil by the Senate on 20 October 1983. On
18 November, however, co-operation was put to the test when Bignone informed
Brasilia that Argentina had managed to enrich uranium, while reiterating the
country’s full right to the peaceful use of atomic energy.102 Albeit welcomed, this
achievement drove Brazil and Argentina to ‘cautiously trust’ in each other. One of
the main reasons for that was the likely evidence that both countries were purchasing
highly enriched uranium from China between 1982 and 1985, and that Argentina,
according to Brazilian estimates, could have a nuclear device by the mid-1980s.103
These suspicions were reinforced by information obtained by Brazilian officials dur-
ing the visit of foreign military attaches to Ushuaya in November 1983 that reported
the identification, by a Chilean aircraft, of excavations that could be used in nuclear
tests.104 The fear of unilateral defection from the agreement105 and the existence of
secret programmes which could allow for the development of nuclear artefacts con-
tributed to the mutual mistrust.
Another critical aspect in the gradual trust-building process between Argentina
and Brazil concerned the commitment to the exchange of information regarding their
autonomous programmes. The negotiated and planned disclosure of these projects
allowed the two governments to keep radical domestic groups at bay.106 However,
whereas Alfonsın appointed the civilian Alberto Constantini as head of the CNEA,
318 T. Coutto
Figueiredo, as well as his successor, kept Rex Nazare in that position. This fact could
be interpreted as an attempt to reduce the gap between the programmes of the two
countries, or as a ‘prize’ that would satisfy specific groups within the SNI and the
army, which were in favour of the development of a nuclear device as a means of pro-
jecting power in the region and beyond.
Having admitted the existence of PNE projects107, Brazil and Argentina advo-
cated the right to carry out such activities until 1989, when such programmes were to
be deactivated, largely thanks to assertive Argentinian behaviour.108 However, the
nature of their relationship vis-a-vis the military did not change: concerned about
avoiding insurgencies in the armed forces, the newly elected governments maintained
several military prerogatives in order to avoid objections to civilian orders.109
X. Bilateralism and after

Mainstream narratives on Brazilian–Argentine relations often attribute the rap-
prochement to the end of the military regime as well as to the political will of Presi-
dent Sarney and President Alfonsın.110 Bringing on board international, regional,
and domestic elements, this article sheds light on the historical process that allowed
both presidents to make such a strong commitment in a very sensitive field.
This process began in the late 1960s, with US restrictions on national nuclear
development in Latin America. This period shows the risk of ideological and uncon-
ditional alignment to a major power. The bilateral understandings between Brazil
and Argentina did not translate into co-operation. In addition to the fear of Brazil’s
quest for hegemony, and because of the more advanced status of the CNEA’s pro-
gramme, Argentina was not very receptive to Brazilian proposals.
In the 1970s Brazil sought to master the full cycle through an ambitious agree-
ment with West Germany after the US prohibited US energy companies from doing
so. This quest for autonomy is similar to the one pursued by Argentina in the late
1960s when the contract with KWU was established, the difference being that
CNEA had decided not to depend on enrichment technology. Although the build-up
of atomic bombs has always been officially denied, the concept of peaceful use could
justify the development of nuclear devices and tests in the region. India’s experience
proved that bargaining power did indeed increase after tests were carried out. On the
other hand, developing countries faced increasing difficulties in producing (or
obtaining) strategic stocks of fissile materials. Technical co-operation had its advo-
cates in Brazil as well as in Argentina, but further action was vetoed until the La
Plata Basin issues were resolved. On top of that, geopolitical concerns were instru-
mentalised by technical bodies on both sides in order to ensure a continuous alloca-
tion of resources to the nuclear programmes.
The US Non-Proliferation Act (1977) affected the implementation of agreements
established between Argentina and Canada, as well as between Brazil and West
Germany, and encouraged the further development of existing military nuclear proj-
ects - a fact that was known to a certain extent in Argentinian diplomatic and techni-
cal inner circles. The parallel programmes can be regarded as a third alternative to
nuclear development. The fourth strategy - bilateralism - has its roots in presidential
meetings started by President Videla and President Figueiredo in the context of
detente at international level, and which resulted in the definition of mechanisms that
would lead to the establishment of the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and co-
operation, as well as to the system of mutual inspections of nuclear facilities. If
cost–benefit analysis indicated that co-operation was beneficial, the Falklands crisis
and the process of democratisation added a subjective element to the equation. Brazil
and Argentina could not only co-ordinate policies to increase power vis- a-vis other
states, but also build mutual trust.
Notes
1.
E. Vargas, ‘Atomos na Integraç~ao: a Aproximaç~
ao Brasil-Argentina no Campo Nuclear e
a Construç~ao do Mercosul’, Revista Brasileira de Polıtica Internacional, xl (1997), 41–74.
2. B. Buzan and O. Wæver, Regions and Powers: the Structure of International Security
(Cambridge, 2003).
3. A. Velazquez, ‘Civil-Military Affairs and Security Institutions in the Southern Cone:

The Sources of Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation’, Latin American Politics and
Society, xlvi (2004), 29–60.
4. I. Alca~niz, ‘Slipping into Something More Comfortable: Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear
Integration and the Origins of Mercosur’ in G. Derluguian and S. Greer (eds), Question-
ing Geopolitics: Political Projects in a Changing World-System (Westport, 2000), 155–67.
5. M.R. Soares de Lima, ‘Political Economy of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Nuclear Energy,
Trade, and Itaipu’ (Ph.D. dissertation, Vanderbilt University, 1986).
6. S. Sagan, ‘Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? Three Models in Search of a Bomb’,
International Security, xxi (1996/7), 54–86.
7. W. Selcher, ‘Brazilian-Argentine Relations in the 1980s: From Wary Rivalry to Friendly
Competition’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, xxvii (1985), 25–53.
8. A. Oelsner, International Relations in Latin America: Peace and Security in the Southern
Cone (New York, 2005), 6.
9. J. Carasales, ‘The Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Rapprochement’, The Nonproliferation
Review, (1995), 39–48.
10. Oscar Salla (physicist), oral-history interview, [Rio de Janeiro,] C[entro] de P[esquisa] e
D[ocumentaç~ao] de H[ist oria] C[ontemporânea] do B[rasil] CPDOC, 1977.
11. Witold Lepecki, oral-history interview, 13 April 2010, CPDOC.
12. J. Redick, J. Carasales, and P. Wrobel, ‘Nuclear Rapprochement: Argentina, Brazil,
and the Nonproliferation Regime’, The Washington Quarterly, xviii (1995), 107–22.
13. D. Hurtado de Mendoza, ‘De “Atomos Para la Paz” a los Reactores de Potencia.
Tecnologıa y Polıtica Nuclear en la Argentina (1955–1976)’, Revista Iberoamericana de
Ciencia, Tecnologıa y Sociedad, iv (2005), 41–66.
14. C. Madero and S. Takacs, Polıtica Nuclear Argentina ¿Avance o Retroceso? (Buenos
Aires, 1991), 138–9.
15. E. Solingen, Industrial Policy, Technology and International Bargaining: Designing
Nuclear Industries in Argentina and Brazil (Stanford, 1996), 3–24.
16. J. Fernandez, ‘Importaci on de Tecnologıas Capital-Intensivas en Contextos Perifericos:
el Caso de Atucha I (1964–1974)’, Revista Iberoamericana de Ciencia, Tecnologıa y
Sociedad, vi (2011), 9–37.
17. J. Hymans, ‘Of Gauchos and Gringos: Why Argentina Never Wanted the Bomb, and
Why America Thought It Did’, Security Studies, x (2001), 153–85.
18. J. Carasales, ‘The So-Called Proliferator that Wasn’t: The Story of Argentina’s Nuclear
Policy’, The Nonproliferation Review, vi (1999), 51–64.
19. Oelsner, International Relations in Latin America, 147.
20. State Dept. to all posts in American republics, tel. 1230, 9 Jan. 1962, FRUS, 1961–63,
xii, 286–8, 298–9.
21. V.L.C. da Silva, ‘Da operaç~ao pan-americana aos entendimentos de Uruguaiana: as
relaç~
oes Brasil-Argentina (1958–1962)’ (MA dissertation, UFRS, 2005).
22. On Quadros’ reactions to John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress initiative, see: B.
Crandall, Hemispheric Giants: The Misunderstood History of U.S.–Brazil Relations
(Plymouth, 2011), 93–8.
23. White House audio tape, President Lyndon Johnson discussing the impending coup in
Brazil with Under-Secretary of State George Ball, 31 March 1964, National Security
Archives. http://www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB118/ [Accessed 2 March
320 T. Coutto
2012]. For United States–Brazil relations in the early 1960s and US involvement in the
coup see: W. Weis, ‘The Twilight of Pan-Americanism: The Alliance for Progress, Neo-
Colonialism, and Non-Alignment in Brazil, 1961–1964’, International History Review,
xxiii (2001), 322–44 and S. Rabe, The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War
in Latin America (Oxford, 2011).
24. Apresentaç~ao da proposta de diretrizes do governo no campo da energia nuclear, Atas
das Reuni~ oes do CSN, 11 March 1966, [Brasilia,] A[rquivo] N[acional] AN BSB N8.0.
ATA.3.
25. Ambassador Corrêa da Costa, speech, 18 May 1967, Eighteen Nation Committee on
Disarmament, meeting 297, U[niversity] of M[ichigan] D[igital] L[ibrary] UMDL, fo.
17; J. Carasales, ‘The So-Called Proliferator that Wasn’t – The Story of Argentina’s
Nuclear Policy’, The Nonproliferation Review (1999), 55.
26. National Security Council to Foreign Minister Magalh~ aes, aviso n.2-25-SG/CSN-BR,
Polıtica Nacional de Energia Nuclear, 1 Sept. 1967, CPDOC, P[aulo] N[ogueira] B
[atista] ad 1967.02.23, fo. 58-69. http://docvirt.com/docreader.net/docreader.aspx?
bib¼ACER_PNB_AD&PagFis¼1210 [Accessed on 3 March 2012]. The guidelines are
spelled out in Presidential Decree No. 60, 890, 12 April 1967, Di ario Oficial da Uni~
ao.
27. National Intelligence Estimate, 7 Dec. 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, xxi, 146.
28. Correspondence from Dr Felix Prentzel to Ambassador in at London Sergio Corrêa da
Costa, 9 Dec. 1968, CPDOC, PNB ad. 1967.02.23, fo.321. See also fo. 323–9 for con-
tacts between German Scientists scientists such as Alfred Boettcher from the Nuclear
Research Centre, J€ ullich and Hans Joos (who worked at USP in the 1950s) and the
Brazilian Aerospacial Technical Centre (CTA) on the transfer of rocket propulsion and
nuclear propulsion for ships.
29. Castro Madero and Takacs, Polıtica Nuclear Argentina, 54–5.
30. J. Fernandez, ‘Importaci on de Tecnologıas Capital-Intensivas en Contextos Perifericos:
el Caso de Atucha I (1964–1974)’, Revista Iberoamericana de Ciencia, Tecnologıa y
Sociedad, vi (2011), 9–37.
31. J. Carasales, De Rivales a Socios: El Proceso de Cooperaci on Nuclear Entre Argentina y
Brasil (Buenos Aires, 1997), 44–5.
32. CNEA, Boletin Informativo, iii, A~ no X, Oct.–Dec. 1967, 4–5, 7–15.
33. MRE, 24 Feb. 1967, CPDOC, PNB 1967.02.24 fo. 02.
34. Juracy Magalh~aes to Nicanor Costa Mendez, letter n.G/SG/AAA/DAM/DNU/920.(42)
(41), 12 Dec. 1966, MRE A[rquivo] H[ist orico] AH, Dossiê Status Polıtico-Militar da
Argentina e sua Relaç~ao com o Brasil.
35. MRE to the President, Exposiç~ao de Motivos n. 062/74, 8 Sep. 1974, CPDOCs A
[nt^
onio] A[zeredo da] S[ilveira] mre pn 1974.09.11 fo. 01.
36. MRE. Visita ao Brasil de sua excelência o senhor Nicanor Costa Mendez, Jan. 1968,
MRE, Brasilia AH.
37. MRE to President of Republic, Exposiç~ao de Motivos n.062/74, 8 Sep. 1974, CPDOC
AAS mre pn 1974.09.11 fo. 3. Drafted in 1974, the document provides background
information on the issue.
38. Paulo Nogueira Batista to Foreign Minister, Viagem do Ministro Paulo Nogueira
Batista a RFA, em setembro de 1968: relat orio ao Senhor Ministro de Estado, 11 Oct.
1968, CPDOC, PNB ad. 1967.02.23.
39. American Embassy in Brasilia, Brazil to the Department of State, tel. 0769, 7 March
1972, FRUS, 1969–72, E-10: Document 147, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocu-
ments/frus1969-76ve10/d147, vol. 2, fo. 2.
40. Departamento America Latina to Argentinean Foreign Minister, tel., ‘Relaciones com
Brasil: estrategia a corto plazo’, 15 July 1971, [Buenos Aires,] M[inisterio] de R[ela-
ciones] E[xteriores] y C[ulto] MRECIC AH Caja 0043.; Osıris Guillermo Villegas to
ForeignMinister Luis Maria de Pablo Padro, tel n.070, 28 Jan. 1971, MRECIC AN
lata: Varios 1970, Brasil, 1971, pasta Brasil, Correlativas; Embassy of Brazil in Buenos
Aires, Relat orio Basico Republica Argentina, Oct. 1971, [MRE, Brasılia] [AH]; Depar-
tamento America Latina, ‘Panorama Diplom atico Continental y fundamentos de uma
possible ‘entente’ com Brasil’, 1971, MRECIC AH Caja 0043; MRECIC, ‘Conversaci on
com el Embajador Azeredo da Silveira’, 26 July 1971, AH Caja 0043.
41. Lepecki, 2010, CPDOC.
42. Ibid.
43. Interview with Brazilian Foreign Ministry official, Jan. 2010.
44. MRE, Informaç~ao para o Senhor Presidente da Rep ublica, n. 169, 18 July 1974,
CPDOC AAS mre d 1974.03.26.
45. Carasales, De Rivales a Socios, 41.
46. J. Guglialmelli, ‘The Brazilian-German Nuclear Deal: a View From Argentina’, Sur-
vival: Global Politics and Strategy, xviii (1976), 162–5.
47. Nogueira Batista’s personal notes, undated CPDOC, PNB pn n 1975, fo. 345–6.
48. MRE, 21 May 1974, and n.116, 3 June 1974 CPDOC AAA mre d 1974.03.26.
49. Special National Intelligence Estimate, 31–72, ‘Indian Nuclear Developments and their
Likely Implications’, 3 Aug. 1972, Secret, Source: FRUS, 1969–1976 Volume E–7,
Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 298. Domestic support and interna-
tional prestige are also mentioned in US Embassy India cable 6598 to State Department,
‘India’s Nuclear Explosion: Why Now?’ 18 May 1974, Secret.
50. Castro Madero and Takacs, Polıtica Nuclear Argentina, 174–88.
51. CSN to Foreign Minister Azeredo da Silveira, aviso n.288/74, 11 Sep. 1974, CPDOC
AAS mre pn 1974.09.11 fo. 1–3.
52. M. Celina d’Araujo and C. Castro, Ernesto Geisel (Rio de Janeiro, 1997).
53. J. Israel Vargas; Marcio Quint~ao Moreno, Ci^ encia em Tempo de Crise: 1974–2007 (Belo
Horizonte, 2007), 190–3; Jose Israel Vargas oral-history interview on 29 June 2010,
Belo Horizonte, CPDOC.
54. W. Lowerance, ‘Nuclear Futures for Sale: To Brazil from West Germany, 1975’, Inter-
national Security, I, no. 2 (1976), 147–66.
55. C. Syllus, O Programa Brasileiro de Centrais Nucleares (Rio de Janeiro, 1974).
56. Lepecki, 11 May 2010, CPDOC; Syllus, 22 June 2010, CPDOC.
57. During bilateral tensions in 1977, Brazil threatened to close its border to Argentine
transportation vehicles. In response, Argentina threatened to denounce the 1857 Treaty
on the Navigation of the River Plate. Rego Barros, Depoimento, 2011.
58. O. Camili on, Memorias Polıticas, de Frondizi a Menem (1956–1996) (Buenos Aires,
2000).
59. Azeredo da Silveira, oral-history interview, 18 May 1979, CPDOC, tapes 4a–4b.
60. Marcos Azambuja, oral-history interview on 9, 21, and 28 Jan. 2010, CPDOC.
61. Statement by the deputy to the Under-Secretary of State for Security Assistance Science
and Technology Joseph Nye, Salsburg, 2 May 1977, CPDOC, PNB pi Nye,
J.1977.05.02, fo. 1–8.
62. ‘A Sofrida Procura da Paz’, Revista Veja, 21 July 1977.
63. MRE, 6 Aug. 1977, CPDOC AAS mre 1977.02.09. Fo. 2–9.
64. Ibid. Fo. 172–5.
65. MRE to the Brazilian Presidency, 30 Nov. 1977, CPDOC, AAA 1997 n. 287.
66. J. Hymans, ‘Of Gauchos and Gringos: Why Argentina Never Wanted the Bomb, and
Why the United States Thought it Did’, Security Studies, x, no. 3 (2001), 153–85.
67. Brazil Scope Paper, AAS mre 1977.01.27. fo. 172–5.
68. Alternativas para vencer a oposiç~ao dos EUA, CPDOC, PNB pn n.1975.06.11. fo. 17–
18.
69. D. Hurtado de Mendoza, ‘Periferia y fronteras tecnol ogicas. Energıa nuclear y dicta-
dura militar en la Argentina (1976–1983)’, Revista Iberoamericana de Ciencia,
Tecnologıa y Sociedad, xiii (2009), 27–64.
70. Barletta, ‘The Military Program in Brazil’, 4–5.
71. Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva, oral-history interview on 13 Oct. 2010, CPDOC.
72. Advisor Murillo Souto Maior de Castro to Paulo Nogueira Batista, internal communication
AESP no 001/76, Comentarios iniciais sobre a carta do Dr. H. H. Haunschild – Propuls~ ao
nuclear de navios, 15 July 1976, CPDOC, PNB pn n 1976.05.26 http://docvirt.com/doc-
reader.net/docreader.aspx?bib¼ACER_PNB_PN&PagFis¼33038 [Accessed 2 March 2012].
73. W. Santana and O. Freire Junior, ‘Contribution from the Brazilian Physicist Sergio
Porto to Laser Applications and its Introduction in Brazil’, Revista Brasileira de Ensino
de Fısica, xxxii (2010), 3601–8.
74. Barletta, ‘The Military Program in Brazil’, 8.
75. Othon Luiz Pinheiro da Silva, oral-history interview on 15 Dec. 2010, CPDOC.
322 T. Coutto
76. Argentine Embassy in Brasilia to Foreign Ministry of Argentina, tel. 1764, ‘Denuncia de
senador norteamericano sobre exportaci on de tecnologıa nuclear china a Argentina,
Brasil, Pakistan, Sudafrica e Iran’, Oct. 1985, MRECIC AH Caja 0425, Serie 47/
America del Sur.
77. Alca~niz, ‘Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Integration and the Origins of Mercosur’,
155–67.
78. Comiss~ao de Avaliaç~ao do Programa Nuclear Brasileiro, Relat orio ao Presidente da
Rep ublica. Brasılia, Apr. 1986; Jose Israle Vargas, oral-history interview on 20 June
2010, CPDOC.
79. Luiz Augusto de Castro Neves to Geraldo Maciel, private, 5 July 1979, CPDOC, G
[Eraldo] M[aciel] GMa pi Neves, L.A.C. 1980.05.28.
80. Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, oral-history interview, CPDOC (1985), Rio de Janeiro. n.b.
Brazil was never a formal member of the NAM, but sought - and still does - to
co-ordinate positions and support the group in various policy areas.
81. R. Saraiva Guerreiro, Lembranças de um Empregado do Itamaraty (S~ ao Paulo, 1992).
82. R. Saraiva Guerreiro, Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro – depoimento, 1985 (Rio de Janeiro,
2010).
83. W. Selcher, ‘Brazilian-Argentine Relations in the 1980s: From Rivalry to Friendly
Competition’, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, xxvii (1985), 25–53.
84. Secretaria Geral do CSN, Estudo Sucinto no 006-A/81 Acompanhamento Comparativo
do Desenvolvimento Nuclear entre Brasil e Argentina na Express~ ao Militar, Ultrasse-
creto, SG/CSN 1a.SC 5 Aug. 1981, BR AN BSB 2M, E[stado] M[aior] F[orcas]
A[rmadas], Caixa 24, I007074.
85. Azambuja, 13 Jan. 2010, CPDOC.
86. Foreign Ministry of Argentina to President Bignone, ‘Material informativo seleccio-
nado con motivo de la visita del Presidente Reynaldo Benito Bignone a la Rep ublica
Federativa del Brasil, el dıa 13 de enero de 1983, en ocasi
on de su entrevista con el presi-
dente Joao Figueiredo’, late 1982/early 1983, MRECIC AH Caja 0043, Serie 47/
America del Sur; Saraiva Guerreiro, Depoimento1985, CPDOC, 2010, 262.
87. Saraiva Guerreiro, Depoimento, CPDOC.
88. Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, oral-history interview in 1985, CPDOC.
89. ‘El Acuerdo Nuclear con Brasil Sera Procesado en Sucesivas Etapas’, Convicci on, 1 Feb.
1980, 13 apud Andres Cisneros; Carlos Escude, Historia General de las Relaciones Exte-
riores de la Rep
ublica Argentina (Buenos Aires, 2000), ch. 68.
90. Ramiro Saraiva Guerreiro, Cesar Cals and Danilo Venturini to Presidency, 24 Jan.
1980, informaç~ao secreta ao Senhor Presidente da Rep ublica, CPDOC P[aulo]
N[ogueira] B[atista], 01 Jul. 1974 Fo. 126–35.
91. Message from Jo~ao Figueiredo, 13 May 1980, Mensagem a Naç~
ao Argentina: Entendi-
mento e Cooperaç~ao para o Bem Estar de Nossos Povos. Resenha de Polıtica Exterior
do Brasil, xxv, Apr/May/June 1980.
92. MRE, ‘Speech from by Jorge Rafael Videla on the occasion of the signature of bilateral
acts between Brazil and Argentina, 17 May 1980’ in Buenos Aires, Resenha de Polıtica
Exterior do Brasil, xxv, Apr/May/June 1980, p. 26.
93. Protocolo de Cooperaç~ao Industrial entre NUCLEBRAS e CNEA, Buenos Aires, 17
May 1980. MRE, SGEB/CGPC/DAI; S[istema] de A[tos] I[nternacionais], http://dai-mre.
serpro.gov.br/atos-internacionais/bilaterais/1980/b_36/; ‘Cooperaç~
ao Nuclear Entre Brasil
e Argentina Sera Ratificada Nesta Quarta – Feira’, Jornal do Brasil, 25 May 1981.
94. Material informativo reunido con motivo de la visita de Su Excelencia el Se~ nor Cancil-
ler Dr. D. Nicanor Costa Mendez a la Rep ublica Federativa del Brasil dıas 3, 4 y 5 de
marzo de 1982, Jan./Feb. 1982, [MRECIC] A[rquivo] H[ist orico] Box 0043, Serie 47/
America del Sur, C75, A11.
95. CSN to Azeredo da Silveira, Aviso n. 077/78, Secreto, 14 March 1978, CPDOC AAS
mre pn 1974.09.11, fo. 56–60, 68–9. n.b. In the document the CSN Secretary General
Gustavo Reis states that the Council does not oppose to the exchange of uranium from
Algeria for Brazilian civil or military equipment. Uranium imports would be justifiable
for strategic reasons, or due to specific trade policy. Algeria appears as a possible part-
ner because additional safeguards would not be applied.
96. P.F. Vizentini, A Polıtica Externa do Regime Militar Brasileiro. 2nd ed (Porto Alegre,
2004), 303.
97. Protocolo de Execuç~ao n. 2 entre CNEN e a CNEA sobre Informaç~ ao Tecnica, Brasilia,
20 Aug. 1980, MRE, SGEB/CGPC/DAI SAI http://dai-mre.serpro.gov.br/atos-interna-
cionais/bilaterais/1980/b_80/
98. ‘Argentina’s Leader Defends Harsh Rule’, New York Times, 22 Aug. 1980, 5.
99. [Argentine Diplomatic Archives, 1980–1988], CAJA AH/0087 [1981].
100. Saraiva Guerreiro, Depoimento, CPDOC, 271.
101. Carlos Conde, 27 Dec. 1982, ‘Bignone Hace uma Jugada Interna’, Jornal de Brasilia
[Argentine Diplomatic Archives, 1980–1988], box AH/005 [1982–83] folder 1982: Brasil,
relacion polıtica y econ
omica con Argentina.
102. MRE, Resenha de Polıtica Exterior do Brasil, n 39, Oct–Dec 1983, p. 122.
103. Brazilian military attache to Egypt, confidential inform 234 SE 1.1/VII/EME, 18 Nov.
1983, [BR AN BSB 2M], E[stado] M[aior] F[orcas] A[rmadas], Caixa 24, I007070.
104. Ministry of the Navy, secret inform 1483, 29 Nov. 1983, [Brasilia,] BR A[rquivo]
N[acional] BSB 2M, E[stado] M[aior] F[orcas] A[rmadas], Caixa 24, I007069.
105. Argentine Embassy in Brasilia to Foreign Ministry of Argentina, tel. 1734 and 1735,
2 Nov. 1985, MRECIC AH Caja 0425, Serie 47/America del Sur; Argentine Embassy in
Brasilia to Foreign Ministry of Argentina, tel. 1763, Nov. 1985, MRECIC AH Caja
0425, Serie 47/America del Sur.
106. Comiss~ao de Avaliaç~ao do Programa Nuclear Brasileiro, Relat orio ao Presidente da
Republica. Brasılia, Apr. 1986; Jose Israel Vargas, oral-history interview on 20 June
2010, CPDOC.
107. For example, former Brazilian Air Force Minister S ocrates Monteiro and CNEA Direc-
tor Castro Madero admitted to their programmes aimed at developing the capacity of
building a nuclear device. See respectively: C. Castro and M. Celina D’Araujo, Militares
e Polıtica na Nova Rep ublica, (Rio de Janeiro, 2001), 197.
108. Rogelio Pfirter, Skype interview, 16 Feb. 2012.
109. J. Zaverucha, Rumor de Sabres: Controle Civil ou Tutela Militar? (S~ ao Paulo, 1994).
110. J.P. Milanese, ‘A “Nuclear Integration”: Constructing Supranationality in the South
American Southern Cone’, Hiroshima Peace Science, xxix (2009), 107–33.

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The International History Review

ISSN: 0707-5332 (Print) 1949-6540 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rinh20

An International History of the Brazilian–Argentine

To cite this article: Tatiana Coutto (2014) An International History of the

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2013.864987

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An International History of the Brazilian–Argentine Rapprochement

The establishment of political channels that allowed long-standing rivals Brazil

Ó 2014 Taylor & Francis

perceived as a menace, South American leaders shifted their attention to neighbour-

although the exchange of information and unofficial intermittent co-ordination had

II. Brazil’s and Argentina’s nuclear programmes

Argentina’s dependency on external suppliers of nuclear fuel - was a result of what

IV. The ‘water resources’ dispute: co-operation on standby

common operational procedures. Due to these different expectations, neither objec-

thunderbolt’.42 Furthermore, the US Security Council changed Brazil’s classification

V. The quest for alternative Western powers

nuclear talks at bay. Notwithstanding such differences, Camili on’s legitimacy

VII. The secret nuclear programmes

ultimately, of an oceanographic vessel.72 Another attempt at developing indigenous

Force, as both were interested in nuclear propulsion. The historical relationship

VIII. The improvement of Brazilian–Argentine relations: co-operation

IX. From calculations to (cautious) trust: the road to bilateralism

relationships. The unfolding of the Falklands/Malvinas conflict in April 1982

X. Bilateralism and after

3. A. Velazquez, ‘Civil-Military Affairs and Security Institutions in the Southern Cone:

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