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Morphogenesis Versus Structuration On Combining Structure and Action Archer1982
Morphogenesis Versus Structuration On Combining Structure and Action Archer1982
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Morphogenesisversusstructuration:
on combiningstructureand actionl
The fundamental problem of linking human agency and social
structurestalks throughthe history of sociologicaltheory. Basically
it concernshow to develop an adequatetheoreticalaccount which
deals simultaneouslywith men constitutingsociety and the social
formationof humanagents. For any theorist,except the holist, social
structureis ultimatelya humanproduct,but for any theorist,except
advocatesof psychologism,this product in turn shapes individuals
and influences their interaction. However successive theoretical
developmentshave tilted either towardsstructureor towardsaction,
a slippagewhichhas gatheredin momentumover time.
Initially this meant that one element became dominant and the
other subordinate:human agency had become pale and ghostly in
mid-centuryfunctionalism,whilst structure betook an evanescent
fragility in the re-floweringof phenomenology.Eventuallycertain
schools of thought repressedthe second elementalmostcompletely.
On the one hand structuralistMarxismand normativefunctionalism
virtuallysnuffed-outagency-the acting subjectbecameincreasingly
lifeless whilst the structuralor culturalcomponentsenjoyeda life of
their own, self-propellingor self-maintaining.On the other hand
interpretativesociologybusily banishedthe structuralto the realmof
objectificationand facticity-human agencybecamesovereignwhilst
social structure was reduced to supine plasticity because of its
constructednature.
Although proponents of these divergentviews were extremely
vociferous,they were also extensivelycriticizedandpreciselyon the
groundsthat both structureand action were indispensablein socio-
logical explanation.2 Moreover serious efforts to re-addressthe
problem and to re-unitestructureand actionhad alreadybegunfrom
inside 'the two Sociologies',3when they were characterizedin this
manicheanway. These attemptsemergedafter the earlysixties from
'general' functionalists,4'humanistic' marxists5 and from inter-
actionistsconfrontingthe existence of stronglypatternedconduct.6
Furthermorethey werejoined in the samedecadeby a bold attempt
The British Journal of Sociology Volume 33 Number 4 December 1982
OR.K.P. 1982 0007 1315/823304-0455 $1.50
455
' Structure
T1
' Action
T2 T3
StructuralElaboration '
T4
FIGURE I
1oo 15%
in tos
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
INITIAL Sm 20
1 2 3 4
YEARS
FIGURE II TOTALPOPULATION
T4 is thus the new T1, and the next cycle must be approachedafresh
analytically, conceptually and theoretically.Giddens is completely
correctthat laws in the socialsciencesarehistoricalin character(i.e.
mutable over time), but whereashis endorsementof this view rests
principally on the reflexive knowledge and behaviourof actors,52
mine resideson changesin the socialstructureitself which requireus
to theorize about it in different ways since our subjectmatterhas
altered. A new explanandumcalls for a new explanans,though this
does not rule out the possibility that the latter can be subsumed
undera more generallaw.
Paradoxicallyfor all Giddens'sstressupon the importanceof time,
it is the past in the presentand the futurein the presentwhichmatter
for him; the presentbeinga successionof 'passingmoments'in which,
quotingWilliamJames approvingly,'the dying rearwardof time and
its dawningfuture forever mix their lights'.53This continuousflow
defies periodization.Consequentlyhe has to stressthe quintessential
polyvalence of each 'moment',both replicatoryand transformatory
(reproductionalways carriesits two connotations).Yet he is never-
thelessdrivento recognizethe existenceof 'criticalphases'in the long
term and to accord (excessive) theoretical significanceto them (as
times of institutionalspot-welding).Whatis lackingin Giddens'swork
is the length of time between the 'moment'and the 'criticalphase'
-in which the slow work of structuralelaborationis accomplished
and needs theorizingabout.
remaln equlvoca ..
Moreover,not only does the lattermethod fail to solvetheproblem
of identifying'structuralprinciples'it also revealsa majordifficulty
surrounding the relationship between the 'principles' and the
'modalities'.This is crucial because it is their articulationwhich
constitutes the mainstay of Giddens's'parts-whole'account. In (b)
the combination(s) of the 'modalities'is held to be governedby
principles operative at higher levels (homeostasis, feed-back or
reflexive self-regulation),otherwise the 'principles'are not identifi-
able throughthe 'modalities'.Here social interchangeat lowerlevels
is being presentedas the product of the system (incidentallya much
strongerinfluence than the structuralconditioning of the micro-
by the macro endorsedin generalsystems theory). But this is not
consistent with Giddens'sown conceptualizationof the 'modalities'
and specificallythe generativepowerswith whichhe endowsthem-
put anotherway, it conflicts with the micro-levelactingback on the
macro-level.
To him, for all that the three 'modalities'are media (structural
components) of the system, they nevertheless have significant
autonomy as drawnupon creativelyby actors. If each 'mode' pre-
supposes unprogrammedtransformations,then their combinatory
possibilitiesareopen not closed,problematicnot given.ThisGiddens
considers as quintessentialto the duality of structure.Yet if this
autonomyis granted,then the combinationsof thesethreedimensions
actuallymanifestedin interactionarenot necessarilygovernedby the
'structuralprinciples'.In other words any regularitiesdetected via
interpolation of the 'modalities' need not be the effects of the
'principles'but may reflect the regularexploitationof autonomyby
agency.Giddenswishes to say that they areboth, but if he wants to
have it both ways then he is left with no method for detectinghis
'principles'.
Once again the duality notion has produced two unreconciled
images:the one presentsthe 'principles'as governingthe 'modalities'
(the macro-dominatingthe micro-),the otherportraysthe 'modalities'
as cyclically transformingthe 'principles'(the micro- directingthe
macro-).The attemptto interrelatethem fails on logicalgrounds,the
attempt to identify the principalcomponentsalso fails on practical
grounds. The unsuccessful articulation of the two key concepts
CONCLUSION
POSTCRIPT