FIRST DIVISION

FELIPE E. ABELLA, A.C. No. 5688

Complainant,
June 4, 2009
- versus -

ATTY. ASTERIA E. CRUZABRA,

Respondent.

x--------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

Felipe E. Abella (complainant) filed a complaint for violation of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 7(b)(2)
of Republic Act No. 6713[1] (RA 6713) or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees against Atty.
Asteria E. Cruzabra (respondent). In his affidavit-complaint[2] dated 8 May 2002, complainant charged respondent with engaging in
private practice while employed in the government service.

Complainant alleged that respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar on 30 May 1986 and was appointed as Deputy Register of
Deeds of General Santos City on 11 August 1987.[3] Complainant asserted that as Deputy Register of Deeds, respondent filed a petition
for commission as a notary public and was commissioned on 29 February 1988 without obtaining prior authority from the Secretary of
the Department of Justice (DOJ).[4] Complainant claimed that respondent has notarized some 3,000 documents.[5]Complainant pointed
out that respondent only stopped notarizing documents when she was reprimanded by the Chief of the Investigation Division of the
Land Registration Authority.[6]

Complainant contended that respondent could not justify her act by pretending to be in good faith because even non-lawyers are not
excused from ignorance of the law. Complainant branded as incredible respondents claim that she was merely motivated by public
service in notarizing 3,000 documents. Complainant pointed out that respondent spent money to buy the Notarial Register Books and
spent hours going over the documents subscribed before her, thereby prejudicing her efficiency and performance as Deputy Register
of Deeds. Complainant believed that even if respondent had obtained authority from the DOJ, respondent would still be guilty of
violating Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 because her practice as a notary public conflicts with her official functions.[7]

In her Comment, respondent admitted that she was a notary public from 29 February 1988 to 31 December 1989.[8] Respondent stated
that she was authorized by her superior, the Register of Deeds, to act as a notary public. Respondent pointed out that the Register of
Deeds, Atty. Pelagio T. Tolosa, also subscribed petitions and documents that were required to be registered. [9] Respondent explained
that the Register of Deeds imposed the following conditions for her application as a notary public:

xxx

4. That the application for commission was on the condition that respondent cannot charge fees for documents
required by the Office to be presented and under oath.[10]

Respondent contended that when she filed her petition for commission as a notary public, the requirement of approval from the DOJ
Secretary was still the subject of a pending query by one of the Registrars and this fact was not known to respondent. [11] Respondent
maintained that she had no intention to violate any rule of law. Respondent, as a new lawyer relying on the competence of her superior,
admitted that an honest mistake may have been committed but such mistake was committed without willfulness, malice or
corruption.[12]

Respondent argued that she was not engaged in illegal practice as a notary public because she was duly commissioned by the
court.[13] Respondent denied that she violated Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 because she was authorized by her superior to act as a
notary public. Respondent reasoned that her being a notary public complemented her functions as Deputy Register of Deeds because
respondent could immediately have documents notarized instead of the registrants going out of the office to look for a notary public.
Respondent added that she did not charge fees for the documents required by the office to be presented under oath. [14]

Respondent insisted that contrary to complainants claims, she only notarized 135 documents as certified by the Clerk of Court of the
11th Judicial Region, General Santos City.[15]

In her Report and Recommendation (Report) dated 25 January 2005, Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro recommended to
the IBP Board of Governors the dismissal of the complaint against respondent for lack of merit. The Report reads in part:
However, the fact that she applied for commission as Notary Public without securing the approval of the proper
authority although she was allowed to do so by her superior officer, was not her own undoing for having relied on
the ample authority of her superior officer, respondent being a neophyte in the law profession for having newly
passed the bar a year after at that time.

Records further showed that after having been reprimanded by Atty. Flestado for said mistake which was done in
good faith respondent ceased and desisted to perform notarial work since then up to the present as could be gleaned
from the Certification issued by Clerk of Court VI Atty. Elmer D. Lastimosa of the 11th Judicial Region General Santos
City; dated December 23, 2004 that 135 documents have been notarized by the respondent from February 29, 1988
to December 31 1989 and there was no record of any notarized documents from January 19, 1990 to December 21,
1991.[16]
In a Resolution dated 12 March 2005, the IBP Board of Governors, in adopting and approving the Report, dismissed the case for lack
of merit.

Complainant claims that in dismissing the complaint for lack of merit despite respondents admission that she acted as a notary public
for two years, the IBP Board of Governors committed a serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction or authority. [17]

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 provides:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any
public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or

xxx

Memorandum Circular No. 17[18] of the Executive Department allows government employees to engage directly in the private practice
of their profession provided there is a written permission from the Department head. It provides:

The authority to grant permission to any official or employee shall be granted by the head of the ministry or agency
in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, which provides:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking
without a written permission from the head of Department; Provided, That this prohibition
will be absolute in the case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities
require that their entire time be at the disposal of the Government: Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, the time so devoted outside of
office hours should be fixed by the chief of the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way
the efficiency of the other officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is
necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve any
real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence
him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise
or become an officer or member of the board of directors,
Subject to any additional conditions which the head of the office deems necessary in each particular case in the
interest of the service, as expressed in the various issuances of the Civil Service Commission. (Boldfacing supplied)
It is clear that when respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public, she did not obtain a written permission from the
Secretary of the DOJ. Respondents superior, the Register of Deeds, cannot issue any authorization because he is not the head of the
Department. And even assuming that the Register of Deeds authorized her, respondent failed to present any proof of that written
permission. Respondent cannot feign ignorance or good faith because respondent filed her petition for commission as a notary public
after Memorandum Circular No. 17 was issued in 1986.

In Yumol, Jr. v. Ferrer Sr.,[19] we suspended a lawyer employed in the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) for failing to obtain a
written authority and approval with a duly approved leave of absence from the CHR. We explained:

Crystal clear from the foregoing is the fact that private practice of law by CHR lawyers is not a matter of right.
Although the Commission allows CHR lawyers to engage in private practice, a written request and approval thereof,
with a duly approved leave of absence for that matter are indispensable. In the case at bar, the record is bereft of
any such written request or duly approved leave of absence. No written authority nor approval of the practice and
approved leave of absence by the CHR was ever presented by respondent. Thus, he cannot engage in private practice.

As to respondents act of notarizing documents, records show that he applied for commission as notary public on 14
November 2000, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 42. This was granted by
RTC Executive Judge Pedro M. Sunga, Jr., on 01 December 2000. However, the CHR authorized respondent to act as
notary public only on 29 October 2001. Considering the acts of notarization are within the ambit of the term practice
of law, for which a prior written request and approval by the CHR to engage into it are required, the crucial period to
be considered is the approval of the CHR on 29 October 2001 and not the approval of the RTC on 04 December
2000.[20]

In Muring, Jr. v. Gatcho,[21] we suspended a lawyer for having filed petitions for commission as a notary public while employed as a
court attorney. We held:

Atty. Gatcho should have known that as a government lawyer, he was prohibited from engaging in notarial practice,
or in any form of private legal practice for that matter. Atty. Gatcho cannot now feign ignorance or good faith, as he
did not seek to exculpate himself by providing an explanation for his error. Atty. Gatchos filing of the petition for
commission, while not an actual engagement in the practice of law, appears as a furtive attempt to evade the
prohibition.[22]
Under the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, engaging in the private practice of profession, when unauthorized,
is classified as a light offense punishable by reprimand.[23]

WHEREFORE, we find Atty. Asteria E. Cruzabra guilty of engaging in notarial practice without the written authority from the Secretary
of the Department of Justice, and accordingly we REPRIMAND her. She is warned that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future shall merit a more severe sanction.

SO ORDERED.
WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738
Complainant,
Vs.

ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,

Respondent. Promulgated:
February 19, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot[1] and the building erected thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate,
Manila. His mother and brother, Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu[2] and Antonio
Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated
against them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila[4] where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to conciliation meetings.[5] When the parties failed
to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.

Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 11. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this, complainant filed the
instant administrative complaint,[6] claiming that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when
he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants
as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the barangays Lupong
Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of the Lupon, he
performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able
to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance.
He acceded to her request. He handled her case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the
commission of a patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation. As there was
no factual issue to thresh out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit their respective position
papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.[7]

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay, he presided over the conciliation proceedings and
heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented Elizabeth and Pastor
in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio. In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the
answer with counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713: [8]

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions
of any public official ands employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their incumbency
shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; xxx (emphasis
supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis supplied)
For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension from the practice of law for one month with a
stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. [9] This was adopted and approved by
the IBP Board of Governors.[10]

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable
penalty.

RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule
applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in connection with any matter in which he intervened while in said service.
In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service.

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not
covered by that provision.

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION 7(B)(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS

THE PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during their incumbency, from engaging in the private
practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict
with their official functions. This is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160[12] governs:

SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing
their profession or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office;

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local
government unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when the sanggunian member
concerned is defending the interest of the Government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions
of emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession by elective local officials. As a special law with
a definite scope (that is, the practice of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713,
the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat
generalibus.[13]

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays are the following: the governor, the
vice governor and members of the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor and the members of
the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor, the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for
municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang barangay and the members of the sangguniang
kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession
or engaging in any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are required to
render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and attention to the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice
their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they may practice their
professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal
mayors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan are required to hold regular
sessions only at least once a week.[14] Since the law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for them to secure prior permission or authorization
from any other person or office for any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors)
are expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction
is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[15] Since they
are excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this stands to reason
because they are not mandated to serve full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions only twice
a month.[16]

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured
prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED TO

PRACTICE LAW MUST SECURE PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD OF
HIS DEPARTMENT
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can
engage in the private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned. [17] Section 12, Rule
XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation,
or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a
written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the
disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside
activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in
any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case
of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in
the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of Interior and
Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as
a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty to society is to obey
the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis
supplied)

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed
to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the
legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the
bar.[18] Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal
profession.[19]

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyers oath[20] and/or
for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a
lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition of similar acts
shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G.
Rellosa. The Office of the Court Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, acting through and represented by EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, Officer in Charge, Office of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, and ATTY.
CARLITOD. CATAYONG, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 196232

WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT, Petitioner,

vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F.
ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D.SULAY and ATTY. FROILAN MONTALBAN, .JR., in their capacities as CHAIRMAN and MEMBERS of
the OFFICE OF MALACAÑANG LEGAL AFFAIRS, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

The Case

These two petitions have been consolidated not because they stem from the same factual milieu but because they raise a common
thread of issues relating to the President's exercise of the power to remove from office herein petitioners who claim the protective
cloak of independence of the constitutionally-created office to which they belong - the Office of the Ombudsman.

The first case, docketed as G.R. No. 196231, is a Petition for Certiorari (with application for issuance of temporary restraining order or
status quo order) which assails on jurisdictional grounds the Decision1 dated March 31, 2011 rendered by the Office of the President in
OP Case No. 10-J-460 dismissing petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, Deputy Ombudsman for the Military and Other Law Enforcement
Offices (MOLEO), upon a finding of guilt on the administrative charges of Gross Neglect of Duty and Grave Misconduct constituting a
Betrayal of Public Trust. The petition primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which gives the President the power to dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office
of the Ombudsman.

The second case, docketed as G.R. No. 196232, is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for issuance of a temporary
restraining order or status quo order) seeking to annul, reverse and set aside (1) the undated Order 2 requiring petitioner Wendell
Barreras-Sulit to submit a written explanation with respect to alleged acts or omissions constituting serious/grave offenses in relation
to the Plea Bargaining Agreement (PLEBARA) entered into with Major General Carlos F. Garcia; and (2) the April 7, 2011 Notice of
Preliminary Investigation,3 both issued by the Office of the President in OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003, the administrative case initiated
against petitioner as a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman. The petition likewise seeks to declare as unconstitutional
Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 giving the President the power to dismiss a Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The facts from which these two cases separately took root are neither complicated nor unfamiliar.

In the morning of August 23, 2010, news media scampered for a minute-by-minute coverage of a hostage drama that had slowly
unfolded right at the very heart of the City of Manila. While initial news accounts were fragmented it was not difficult to piece together
the story on the hostage-taker, Police Senior Inspector Rolando Mendoza. He was a disgruntled former police officer attempting to
secure his reinstatement in the police force and to restore the benefits of a life-long, and erstwhile bemedaled, service. The following
day, broadsheets and tabloids were replete with stories not just of the deceased hostage-taker but also of the hostage victims, eight
of whom died during the bungled police operation to rescue the hapless innocents. Their tragic deaths triggered word wars of foreign
relation proportions. One newspaper headline ran the story in detail, as follows:

MANILA, Philippines - A dismissed policeman armed with an assault rifle hijacked a bus packed with tourists, and killed most of its
passengers in a 10 hour-hostage drama shown live on national television until last night.

Former police senior inspector Rolando Mendoza was shot dead by a sniper at past 9 p.m. Mendoza hijacked the bus and took 21
Chinese tourists hostage, demanding his reinstatement to the police force.

The hostage drama dragged on even after the driver of the bus managed to escape and told police that all the remaining passengers
had been killed.
Late into the night assault forces surrounded the bus and tried to gain entry, but a pair of dead hostages hand-cuffed to the door made
it difficult for them. Police said they fired at the wheels of the bus to immobilize it.

Police used hammers to smash windows, door and wind-shield but were met with intermittent fire from the hos-tage taker.

Police also used tear gas in an effort to confirm if the remaining hostages were all dead or alive. When the standoff ended at nearly 9
p.m., some four hostages were rescued alive while Mendoza was killed by a sniper.

Initial reports said some 30 policemen stormed the bus. Shots also rang out, sending bystanders scampering for safety.

It took the policemen almost two hours to assault the bus because gunfire reportedly rang out from inside the bus.

Mendoza hijacked the tourist bus in the morning and took the tourists hostage.

Mendoza, who claimed he was illegally dismissed from the police service, initially released nine of the hostages during the drama that
began at 10 a.m. and played out live on national television.

Live television footage showed Mendoza asking for food for those remaining in the bus, which was delivered, and fuel to keep the air-
conditioning going. The disgruntled former police officer was reportedly armed with an M-16 rifle, a 9 mm pistol and two hand grenades.

Mendoza posted a handwritten note on the windows of the bus, saying "big deal will start after 3 p.m. today." Another sign stuck to
another window said "3 p.m. today deadlock."

Stressing his demand, Mendoza stuck a piece of paper with a handwritten message: "Big mistake to correct a big wrong decision." A
larger piece of paper on the front windshield was headed, "Release final decision," apparently referring to the case that led to his
dismissal from the police force.

Negotiations dragged on even after Mendoza's self-imposed deadline.

Senior Police Officer 2 Gregorio Mendoza said his brother was upset over his dismissal from the police force. "His problem was he was
unjustly removed from service. There was no due process, no hearing, no com-plaint," Gregorio said.

Last night, Gregorio was arrested by his colleagues on suspicions of being an accessory to his brother's action. Tensions rose as
relatives tried to prevent lawmen from arresting Gregorio in front of national television. This triggered the crisis that eventually forced
Mendoza to carry out his threat and kill the remaining hostages.

Negotiators led by Superintendent Orlando Yebra and Chief Inspector Romeo Salvador tried to talk Mendoza into surrendering and
releasing the 21 hostages, mostly children and three Filipinos, including the driver, the tourist guide and a photographer. Yebra
reportedly lent a cellphone to allow communications with Mendoza in-side the bus, which was parked in front ofthe Quirino Grandstand.

Children could be seen peeking from the drawn curtains of the bus while police negotiators hovered near the scene.

Manila Police District (MPD) director Chief Superinten-dent Rodolfo Magtibay ordered the deployment of crack police teams and snipers
near the scene. A crisis man-agement committee had been activated with Manila Vice Mayor Isko Moreno coordinating the actions with
the MPD.

Earlier last night, Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez had a meeting with Moreno to discuss Mendoza's case that led to his dismissal
from the service. Ombudsman spokesman Jose de Jesus said Gutierrez gave a "sealed letter" to Moreno to be delivered to Mendoza.
De Jesus did not elaborate on the contents of the letter but said Moreno was tasked to personally deliver the letter to Mendoza.

MPD spokesman Chief Inspector Edwin Margarejo said Mendoza was apparently distraught by the slow process of the Ombudsman in
deciding his motion for reconside-ration. He said the PNP-Internal Affairs Service and the Manila Regional Trial Court had already
dismissed crim-inal cases against him.

The hostage drama began when Mendoza flagged down the Hong Thai Travel Tourist bus (TVU-799), pretend-ing to hitch a ride.
Margarejo said the bus had just left Fort Santiago in Intramuros when Mendoza asked the driver to let him get on and ride to Quirino
Grandstand. Upon reaching the Quirino Grandstand, Mendoza an-nounced to the passengers that they would be taken hostage. "Having
worn his (police) uniform, of course there is no doubt that he already planned the hostage taking," Margarejo said. - Sandy Araneta,
Nestor Etolle, Delon Porcalla, Amanda Fisher, Cecille Suerte Felipe, Christi-na Mendez, AP Grandstand Carnage, The Philippine Star,
Updated August 24, 2010 12:00 AM, Val Rodri-guez.4

In a completely separate incident much earlier in time, more particularly in December of 2003, 28-year-old Juan Paolo Garcia and 23-
year-old Ian Carl Garcia were caught in the United States smuggling $100,000 from Manila by concealing the cash in their luggage and
making false statements to US Customs Officers. The Garcia brothers pleaded guilty to bulk cash smuggling and agreed to forfeit the
amount in favor of the US Government in exchange for the dismissal of the rest of the charges against them and for being sentenced
to time served. Inevitably, however, an investigation into the source of the smuggled currency conducted by US Federal Agents and
the Philippine Government unraveled a scandal of military corruption and amassed wealth -- the boys' father, Retired Major General
Carlos F. Garcia, former Chief Procurement Officer of the Armed Forces, had accumulated more than ₱ 300 Million during his active
military service. Plunder and Anti-Money Laundering cases were eventually filed against Major General Garcia, his wife and their two
sons before the Sandiganbayan.

G.R. No. 196231

Sometime in 2008, a formal charge5 for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries) was filed
before the Philippine National Police-National Capital Region (PNP-NCR) against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.)
Rolando Mendoza, and four others, namely, Police Inspector Nelson Lagasca, Senior Police Inspector I Nestor David, Police Officer III
Wilson Gavino, and Police Officer II Roderick Lopena. A similar charge was filed by the private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before
the Office of the City Prosecutor, Manila, docketed as I.S. No. 08E-09512.

On July 24, 2008, while said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional Director of the National Police Commission (NPC)
turned over, upon the request of petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication.6 Subsequently, Case No. OMB-P-A-08-0670-H for Grave
Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers, who filed their respective verified position
papers as directed.

Meanwhile, on August 26, 2008, I.S. No. 08E-09512 was dismissed7 upon a finding that the material allegations made by the
complainant had not been substantiated "by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged."
Similarly, the Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution8 dated October 17, 2008 recommending the dismissal without
prejudice of the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear in three (3) consecutive
hearings despite due notice.

However, on February 16, 2009, upon the recommendation of petitioner Emilio Gonzales III, a Decision9 in Case No. OMB-P-A-08-
0670-H finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman.
The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that respondents P/S Insp. ROLANDO DEL ROSARIO MENDOZA and PO3 WILSON
MATIC GAVINO of PRO-ARMM, Camp Brig. Gen. Salipada K. Pendatun, Parang, Shariff Kabunsuan; P/INSP. NELSON URBANO
LAGASCA, SPO1 NESTOR REYES DAVID and PO2 RODERICK SALVA LOPEÑA of Manila Police District, Headquarters, United
Nations Avenue, Manila, be meted the penalty of DISMISSAL from the Service, pursuant to Section 52 (A), Rule IV, Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, with the accessory penalties of forfeiture of retirement benefits and perpetual disqualification
from reemployment in the government service pursuant to Section 58, Rule IV of the same Uniform Rules of Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service, for having committed GRAVE MISCONDUCT.

On November 5, 2009, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 of the foregoing Decision, followed by a Supplement to the Motion for
Reconsideration11 on November 19, 2009. On December 14, 2009, the pleadings mentioned and the records of the case were assigned
for review and recommendation to Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Dennis L. Garcia, who released a draft Order 12 on April 5,
2010 for appropriate action by his immediate superior, Director Eulogio S. Cecilio, who, in turn, signed and forwarded said Order to
petitioner Gonzalez's office on April 27, 2010. Not more than ten (10) days after, more particularly on May 6, 2010, petitioner endorsed
the Order, together with the case records, for final approval by Ombudsman Merceditas N. Gutierrez, in whose office it remained
pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of August 23,
2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the police service.

In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of
seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the
creation of the Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC),13 chaired by Justice Secretary Leila de Lima and vice-chaired by
Interior and Local Government Secretary Jesus Robredo. It was tasked to determine accountability for the incident through the conduct
of public hearings and executive sessions. However, petitioner, as well as the Ombudsman herself, refused to participate in the IIRC
proceedings on the assertion that the Office of the Ombudsman is an independent constitutional body.

Sifting through testimonial and documentary evidence, the IIRC eventually identified petitioner Gonzales to be among those in whom
culpability must lie. In its Report,14 the IIRC made the following findings:

Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own rules of procedure by
allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine (9) months without any justification, in violation of the
Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from
submission. The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the desperate resort
to hostage-taking.

More so, Mendoza's demand for immediate resolution of his motion for reconsideration is not without legal and compelling bases
considering the following:

(a) PSI Mendoza and four policemen were investigated by the Ombudsman involving a case for alleged robbery (extortion),
grave threats and physical injuries amounting to grave misconduct allegedly committed against a certain Christian Kalaw. The
same case, however, was previously dismissed by the Manila City Prosecutors Office for lack of probable cause and by the
PNP-NCR Internal Affairs Service for failure of the complainant (Christian Kalaw) to submit evidence and prosecute the case.
On the other hand, the case which was filed much ahead by Mendoza et al. against Christian Kalaw involving the same
incident, was given due course by the City Prosecutors Office.

(b) The Ombudsman exercised jurisdiction over the case based on a letter issued motu proprio for Deputy Ombudsman Emilio
A. Gonzalez III, directing the PNP-NCR - without citing any reason - to endorse the case against Mendoza and the arresting
policemen to his office for administrative adjudication, thereby showing undue interest on the case. He also caused the
docketing of the case and named Atty. Clarence V. Guinto of the PNP-CIDG-NCR, who indorsed the case records, as the
nominal complainant, in lieu of Christian Kalaw. During the proceedings, Christian Kalaw did not also affirm his complaint-
affidavit with the Ombudsman or submit any position paper as required.

(c) Subsequently, Mendoza, after serving preventive suspension, was adjudged liable for grave misconduct by Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales (duly approved on May 21, 2009) based on the sole and uncorroborated complaint-affidavit of Christian
 Kalaw, which was not previously sustained by the City Prosecutor's Office and the PNP Internal Affairs Service. From the said
Resolution, Mendoza interposed a timely motion for reconsideration (dated and filed November 5, 2009) as well as a
supplement thereto. No opposition or comment was filed thereto.

(d) Despite the pending and unresolved motion for reconsideration, the judgment of dismissal was enforced, thereby abruptly
ending Mendoza's 30 years of service in the PNP with forfeiture of all his benefits. As a result, Mendoza sought urgent relief
by sending several hand-written letter-requests to the Ombudsman for immediate resolution of his motion for reconsideration.
But his requests fell on deaf ears.

xxxx

By allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for nine long (9) months without any justification, Ombudsman Gutierrez
and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed complete and wanton violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rule to resolve motions
for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission (Sec. 8, Ombudsman Rules of Procedure).
The inaction is gross, there being no opposition to the motion for reconsideration.

Besides, the Ombudsman, without first resolving the motion for reconsideration, arbitrarily enforced the judgment of dismissal and
ignored the intervening requests for immediate resolution, thereby rendering the inaction even more inexcusable and unjust as to
amount to gross negligence and grave misconduct.

SECOND, Ombudsman Gutierrez and Deputy Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious disregard of due process, manifest injustice
and oppression in failing to provisionally suspend the further implementation of the judgment of dismissal against Mendoza pending
disposition of his unresolved motion for reconsideration.

By enforcing the judgment of dismissal without resolving the motion for reconsideration for over nine months, the two Ombudsman
officials acted with arbitrariness and without regard to due process and the constitutional right of an accused to the speedy disposition
of his case. As long as his motion for reconsideration remained pending and unresolved, Mendoza was also effectively deprived of the
right to avail of the ordinary course of appeal or review to challenge the judgment of dismissal before the higher courts and seek a
temporary restraining order to prevent the further execution thereof.

As such, if the Ombudsman cannot resolve with dispatch the motion for reconsideration, it should have provisionally suspended the
further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal without prejudice to its re-implementation if the reconsideration is eventually denied.
Otherwise, the Ombudsman will benefit from its own inaction. Besides, the litigant is entitled to a stay of the execution pending
resolution of his motion for reconsideration. Until the motion for reconsideration is denied, the adjudication process before the
Ombudsman cannot be considered as completely finished and, hence, the judgment is not yet ripe for execution.

xxxx

When the two Ombudsman officials received Mendoza's demand for the release of the final order resolving his motion for
reconsideration, they should have performed their duty by resolving the reconsideration that same day since it was already pending
for nine months and the prescribed period for its resolution is only five days. Or if they cannot resolve it that same day, then they
should have acted decisively by issuing an order provisionally suspending the further enforcement of the judgment of dismissal subject
to revocation once the reconsideration is denied and without prejudice to the arrest and prosecution of Mendoza for the hostage-taking.
Had they done so, the crisis may have ended peacefully, without necessarily compromising the integrity of the institution. After all, as
relayed to the negotiators, Mendoza did express willingness to take full responsibility for the hostage-taking if his demand for release
of the final decision or reinstatement was met.

But instead of acting decisively, the two Ombudsman officials merely offered to review a pending motion for review of the case, thereby
prolonging their inaction and aggravating the situation. As expected, Mendoza - who previously berated Deputy Gonzales for allegedly
demanding Php150,000 in exchange for favorably resolving the motion for reconsideration - rejected and branded as trash ("basura")
the Ombudsman [sic] letter promising review, triggering the collapse of the negotiations. To prevent the situation from getting out of
hand, the negotiators sought the alternative option of securing before the PNP-NCRPO an order for Mendoza's provisional reinstatement
pending resolution of the motion for reconsideration. Unfortunately, it was already too late. But had the Ombudsman officials performed
their duty under the law and acted decisively, the entire crisis may have ended differently.

The IIRC recommended that its findings with respect to petitioner Gonzales be referred to the Office of the President (OP) for further
determination of possible administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper administrative proceedings.

On October 15, 2010, the OP instituted a Formal Charge15 against petitioner Gonzales for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in
the Performance of Official Duty under Rule XIV, Section 22 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292 and other
pertinent Civil

Service Laws, rules and regulations, and for Misconduct in Office under Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.16 Petitioner
filed his Answer17 thereto in due time.

Shortly after the filing by the OP of the administrative case against petitioner, a complaint dated October 29, 2010 was filed by Acting
Assistant Ombudsman Joselito P. Fangon before the Internal Affairs Board of the Office of the Ombudsman charging petitioner with
"directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official
capacity has to intervene under the law" under Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and also, with solicitation or
acceptance of gifts under Section 7(d) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards.18 In a Joint Resolution19 dated February 17, 2011,
which was approved by Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez, the complaint was dismissed, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding no probable cause to indict respondent Emilio A. Gonzales III for violations of Section 3(b)
of R.A. No. 3019 and Section 7(d) of R.A. No. 6713, the complaint is hereby be [sic] DISMISSED.

Further, finding no sufficient evidence to hold respondent administratively liable for Misconduct, the same is likewise DISMISSED.

Meanwhile, the OP notified20 petitioner that a Preliminary Clarificatory Conference relative to the administrative charge against him was
to be conducted at the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) on February 8, 2011. Petitioner Gonzales
alleged,21 however, that on February 4, 2011, he heard the news that the OP had announced his suspension for one year due to his
delay in the disposition of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration. Hence, believing that the OP had already prejudged his case
and that any proceeding before it would simply be a charade, petitioner no longer attended the scheduled clarificatory conference.
Instead, he filed an Objection to Proceedings22 on February 7, 2011. Despite petitioner's absence, however, the OP pushed through
with the proceedings and, on March 31, 2011, rendered the assailed Decision,23 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Office finds Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales III guilty of Gross Neglect of Duty and
Grave Misconduct constituting betrayal of public trust, and hereby meted out the penalty of DISMISSAL from service.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, the petition.

G.R. No. 196232

In April of 2005, the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his
wife Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several unknown persons with Plunder
(Criminal Case No. 28107) and Money Laundering (Criminal Case No. SB09CRM0194) before the Sandiganbayan.

On January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's urgent petition for bail holding that strong prosecution evidence
militated against the grant of bail. On March 16, 2010, however, the government, represented by petitioner, Special Prosecutor Wendell
Barreras-Sulit ("Barreras-Sulit") and her prosecutorial staff sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea Bargaining Agreement
(hereinafter referred to as "PLEBARA") entered into with the accused. On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution finding
the change of plea warranted and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential guidelines.

Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow Major General Garcia to get off the hook with nothing but a slap on the hand
notwithstanding the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of his culpability for serious public offenses, the House of Representatives'
Committee on Justice conducted public hearings on the PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public hearings, the Committee on Justice
passed and adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,24recommending to the President the dismissal of petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the
service and the filing of appropriate charges against her Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate government office for having
committed acts and/or omissions tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust, which are violations
under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and grounds for removal from office under the Ombudsman Act.

The Office of the President initiated OP-DC-Case No. 11-B-003 against petitioner Barreras-Sulit. In her written explanation, petitioner
raised the defenses of prematurity and the lack of jurisdiction of the OP with respect to the administrative disciplinary proceeding
against her. The OP, however, still proceeded with the case, setting it for preliminary investigation on April 15, 2011.

Hence, the petition.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 196231, petitioner Gonzales raises the following grounds, to wit:

(A)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, HAS NO CONSTITUTIONAL OR
VALID STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO SUBJECT PETITIONER TO AN ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION AND TO THEREAFTER ORDER HIS
REMOVAL AS DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN.

(B)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE OTHER INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT CONDUCTED ITS INVESTIGATION AND RENDERED ITS
DECISION IN VIOLATION OF PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.

(C)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER COMMITTED DELAY IN THE DISPOSITION OF
MENDOZA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

(D)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER TOOK UNDUE INTEREST IN MENDOZA'S CASE.
(E)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FAULTING PETITIONER FOR NOT RELEASING THE RESOLUTION ON
MENDOZA'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR NOT SUSPENDING MENDOZA'S DISMISSAL FROM SERVICE DURING THE
HOSTAGE CRISIS.

(F)

RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN FINDING THAT THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SHOW THAT
PETITIONER DEMANDED A BRIBE FROM MENDOZA.25

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 196232, petitioner Barreras-Sulit poses for the Court the question -

AS OF THIS POINT IN TIME, WOULD TAKING AND CONTINUING TO TAKE ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDING
AGAINST PETITIONER BE LAWFUL AND JUSTIFIABLE?26

Re-stated, the primordial question in these two petitions is whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally-created Office of the
Ombudsman.

The Court's Ruling

Short of claiming themselves immune from the ordinary means of removal, petitioners asseverate that the President has no disciplinary
jurisdiction over them considering that the Office of the Ombudsman to which they belong is clothed with constitutional independence
and that they, as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor therein, necessarily bear the constitutional attributes of said office.

The Court is not convinced.

The Ombudsman's administrative

disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not exclusive.

It is true that the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations proceeds from its constitutional
mandate to be an effective protector of the people against inept and corrupt government officers and employees, 27 and is subsumed
under the broad powers "explicitly conferred" upon it by the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770.28

The ombudsman traces its origins to the primitive legal order of Germanic tribes. The Swedish term, which literally means "agent" or
"representative," communicates the concept that has been carried on into the creation of the modern-day ombudsman, that is,
someone who acts as a neutral representative of ordinary citizens against government abuses.29 This idea of a people's protector was
first institutionalized in the Philippines under the 1973 Constitution with the creation of the Tanodbayan, which wielded the twin powers
of investigation and prosecution. Section 6, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution provided thus:

Sec. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known as Tanodbayan, which shall receive and
investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, make appropriate
recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file and prosecute the corresponding criminal, civil, or
administrative case before the proper court or body.

The framers of the 1987 Constitution later envisioned a more effective ombudsman vested with authority to "act in a quick, inexpensive
and effective manner on complaints against administrative officials", and to function purely with the "prestige and persuasive powers
of his office" in correcting improprieties, inefficiencies and corruption in government freed from the hampering effects of prosecutorial
duties.30 Accordingly, Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the following powers, functions, and duties of the
Office of the Ombudsman, viz:

(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite
any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.

(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it
with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public
funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.

(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine,
if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.

(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make
recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.

(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by
law.31

Congress thereafter passed, on November 17, 1989, Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act of 1989, to shore up the Ombudsman's
institutional strength by granting it "full administrative disciplinary power over public officials and employees," 32 as follows:

Sec. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over
all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.(Emphasis supplied)

In the exercise of such full administrative disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman was explicitly conferred the statutory
power to conduct administrative investigations under Section 19 of the same law, thus:

Sec. 19. Administrative complaints. - The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which:

1. Are contrary to law or regulation;

2. Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

3. Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency's functions, though in accordance with law;

4. Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;

5. Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or

6. Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.

While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or
elective, with the exception only of those officials removable by impeachment, the members of congress and the judiciary, such
authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority
of the Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all government officials, Section 8(2),
on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. Thus:

Section 8. Removal; Filling of Vacancy.-

xxxx

(2) A Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal
of the Ombudsman, and after due process.

It is a basic canon of statutory construction that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect,
on the theory that it was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. A construction that
would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever
possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.33Otherwise stated, the law must not be read in truncated parts. Every part
thereof must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.34

A harmonious construction of these two apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that
Congress had intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over petitioners as Deputy
Ombudsman and Special

Prosecutor, respectively. This sharing of authority goes into the wisdom of the legislature, which prerogative falls beyond the pale of
judicial inquiry. The Congressional deliberations on this matter are quite insightful, viz:

x x x Senator Angara explained that the phrase was added to highlight the fact that the Deputy Tanodbayan may only be removed for
cause and after due process. He added that the President alone has the power to remove the Deputy Tanodbayan.

Reacting thereto, Senator Guingona observed that this might impair the independence of the Tanodbayan and suggested that the
procedural removal of the Deputy Tanodbayan...; and that he can be removed not by the President but by the Ombudsman.

However, the Chair expressed apprehension that the Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman may try to protect one another. The
Chair suggested the substitution of the phrase "after due process" with the words after due notice and hearing with the President as
the ultimate authority.
Senator Guingona contended, however, that the Constitution provides for an independent Office of the Tanodbayan, and to allow the
Executive to have disciplinary powers over the Tanodbayan Deputies would be an encroachment on the independence of the
Tanodbayan.

Replying thereto, Senator Angara stated that originally, he was not averse to the proposal, however, considering the Chair's observation
that vesting such authority upon the Tanodbayan itself could result in mutual protection, it is necessary that an outside official should
be vested with such authority to effect a check and balance.35

Indubitably, the manifest intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act was
to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the power of administrative discipline
over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the
Ombudsman over all government officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended
to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to protect one another from
administrative liabilities.

This would not be the first instance that the Office of the President has locked horns with the Ombudsman on the matter of disciplinary
jurisdiction. An earlier conflict had been settled in favor of shared authority in Hagad v. Gozo Dadole. 36 In said case, the Mayor and
Vice-Mayor of Mandaue City, and a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, were charged before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for the Visayas with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 6713, and the Revised Penal Code. The pivotal issue raised therein was
whether the Ombudsman had been divested of his authority to conduct administrative investigations over said local elective officials
by virtue of the subsequent enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), the pertinent provision of which states:

Sec. 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints.- A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared
as follows:

(a) A complaint against any elective official of a province, a highly urbanized city, an independent component city or component city
shall be filed before the Office of the President.

The Court resolved said issue in the negative, upholding the ratiocination of the Solicitor General that R.A. No. 7160 should be viewed
as having conferred on the Office of the President, but not on an exclusive basis, disciplinary authority over local elective officials.
Despite the fact that R.A. No. 7160 was the more recent expression of legislative will, no repeal of pertinent provisions in the
Ombudsman Act was inferred therefrom. Thus said the Court:

Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent
provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable,
as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not
favored, and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear
finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et
concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws
on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all
efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject. 37

While Hagad v. Gozo Dadole38 upheld the plenary power of the Office of the Ombudsman to discipline elective officials over the same
disciplinary authority of the President under R.A. No. 7160, the more recent case of the Office of the Ombudsman v. Delijero39 tempered
the exercise by the Ombudsman of such plenary power invoking Section 23(2)40 of R.A. No. 6770, which gives the Ombudsman the
option to "refer certain complaints to the proper disciplinary authority for the institution of appropriate administrative proceedings
against erring public officers or employees." The Court underscored therein the clear legislative intent of imposing "a standard and a
separate set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public school teachers" 41 with the
enactment of R.A. No. 4670, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers." It thus declared that, while the
Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary authority over a public school teacher is concurrent with the proper investigating committee
of the Department of Education, it would have been more prudent under the circumstances for the Ombudsman to have referred to
the DECS the complaint against the public school teacher.

Unquestionably, the Ombudsman is possessed of jurisdiction to discipline his own people and mete out administrative sanctions upon
them, including the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service. However, it is equally without question that the President has
concurrent authority with respect to removal from office of the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, albeit under specified
conditions. Considering the principles attending concurrence of jurisdiction where the Office of the President was the first to initiate a
case against petitioner Gonzales, prudence should have prompted the Ombudsman to desist from proceeding separately against
petitioner through its Internal Affairs Board, and to defer instead to the President's assumption of authority, especially when the
administrative charge involved "demanding and soliciting a sum of money" which constitutes either graft and corruption or bribery,
both of which are grounds reserved for the President's exercise of his authority to remove a Deputy Ombudsman.

In any case, assuming that the Ombudsman's Internal Affairs Board properly conducted a subsequent and parallel administrative action
against petitioner, its earlier dismissal of the charge of graft and corruption against petitioner could not have the effect of preventing
the Office of the President from proceeding against petitioner upon the same ground of graft and corruption. After all, the doctrine of
res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers.42 In Montemayor v.
Bundalian,43 the Court sustained the President's dismissal from service of a Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and
Highways (DPWH) who was found liable for unexplained wealth upon investigation by the now defunct Philippine Commission Against
Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). The Court categorically ruled therein that the prior dismissal by the Ombudsman of similar charges
against said official did not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case.

By granting express statutory power to the President to remove

a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor, Congress
merely filled an obvious gap in the law.

Section 9, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution confers upon the President the power to appoint the Ombudsman and his Deputies, viz:

Section 9. The Ombudsman and his Deputies shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least six nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three nominees for every vacancy thereafter. Such appointments shall require no
confirmation. All vacancies shall be filled within three months after they occur.

While the removal of the Ombudsman himself is also expressly provided for in the Constitution, which is by impeachment under Section
244 of the same Article, there is, however, no constitutional provision similarly dealing with the removal from office of a Deputy
Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a gap in the law
without running afoul of any provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2, authorizes
Congress to provide for the removal of all other public officers, including the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not
subject to impeachment.

That the Deputies of the Ombudsman were intentionally excluded from the enumeration of impeachable officials is clear from the
following deliberations45 of the Constitutional Commission, thus:

MR. REGALADO. Yes, thank you. On Section 10, regarding the Ombudsman, there has been concern aired by Commissioner Rodrigo
about who will see to it that the Ombudsman will perform his duties because he is something like a guardian of the government. This
recalls the statement of Juvenal that while the Ombudsman is the guardian of the people, "Quis custodiet ipsos custodies", who will
guard the guardians? I understand here that the Ombudsman who has the rank of a chairman of a constitutional commission is also
removable only by impeachment.

MR. ROMULO. That is the intention, Madam President.

MR. REGALADO. Only the Ombudsman?

MR. MONSOD. Only the Ombudsman.

MR. REGALADO. So not his deputies, because I am concerned with the phrase "have the rank of". We know, for instance, that the City
Fiscal of Manila has the rank of a justice of the Intermediate Appellate Court, and yet he is not a part of the judiciary. So I think we
should clarify that also and read our discussions into the Record for purposes of the Commission and the Committee. 46

xxx

THE PRESIDENT. The purpose of the amendment of Commissioner Davide is not just to include the Ombudsman among those officials
who have to be removed from office only onimpeachment. Is that right?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes, Madam President.

MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote on the amendment, may I ask a question?

THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Rodrigo is recognized.

MR. RODRIGO. The Ombudsman, is this only one man?

MR. DAVIDE. Only one man.

MR. RODRIGO. Not including his deputies.

MR. MONSOD. No.47 (Emphasis supplied)

The Power of the President to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman

and a Special Prosecutor is Implied from his Power to
Appoint.

Under the doctrine of implication, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove.48 As a general rule, therefore, all officers
appointed by the President are also removable by him.49 The exception to this is when the law expressly provides otherwise - that is,
when the power to remove is expressly vested in an office or authority other than the appointing power. In some cases, the Constitution
expressly separates the power to remove from the President's power to appoint. Under Section 9, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
the Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower courts shall be appointed by the President. However, Members of the Supreme
Court may be removed after impeachment proceedings initiated by Congress (Section 2, Article XI), while judges of lower courts may
be removed only by the Supreme Court by virtue of its administrative supervision over all its personnel (Sections 6 and 11, Article
VIII). The Chairpersons and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission Section 1(2), Article IX(B), the Commission on Elections
Section 1(2), Article IX(C), and the Commission on Audit Section 1(2), Article IX(D) shall likewise be appointed by the President, but
they may be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI). As priorly stated, the Ombudsman himself shall be appointed by
the President (Section 9, Article XI) but may also be removed only by impeachment (Section 2, Article XI).

In giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express terms
an authority that is already implied from the President's constitutional authority to appoint the aforesaid officials in the Office of the
Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman is charged with monumental tasks that have been generally categorized into investigatory power,
prosecutorial power, public assistance, authority to inquire and obtain information and the function to adopt, institute and implement
preventive measures.50 In order to ensure the effectiveness of his constitutional role, the Ombudsman was provided with an over-all
deputy as well as a deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. However, well into the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, a provision for the appointment of a separate deputy for the military establishment was necessitated by Commissioner
Ople's lament against the rise within the armed forces of "fraternal associations outside the chain of command" which have become
the common soldiers' "informal grievance machinery" against injustice, corruption and neglect in the uniformed service,51 thus:

In our own Philippine Armed Forces, there has arisen in recent years a type of fraternal association outside the chain of command
proposing reformist objectives. They constitute, in fact, an informal grievance machinery against injustices to the rank and file soldiery
and perceive graft in higher rank and neglect of the needs of troops in combat zones. The Reform the Armed Forces Movement of RAM
has kept precincts for pushing logistics to the field, the implied accusation being that most of the resources are used up in Manila
instead of sent to soldiers in the field. The Guardians, the El Diablo and other organizations dominated by enlisted men function, more
or less, as grievance collectors and as mutual aid societies.

This proposed amendment merely seeks to extend the office of the Ombudsman to the military establishment, just as it champions
the common people against bureaucratic indifference. The Ombudsman can designate a deputy to help the ordinary foot soldier get
through with his grievance to higher authorities. This deputy will, of course work in close cooperation with the Minister of National
Defense because of the necessity to maintain the integrity of the chain of command. Ordinary soldiers, when they know they can turn
to a military Ombudsman for their complaints, may not have to fall back on their own informal devices to obtain redress for their
grievances. The Ombudsman will help raise troop morale in accordance with a major professed goal of the President and the military
authorities themselves. x x x

The add-on now forms part of Section 5, Article XI which reads as follows:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one over-all Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. A separate deputy for the military
establishment shall likewise be appointed.(Emphasis supplied)

The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities
that affect the general morale and professionalism in the military is certainly of primordial importance in relation to the President's
own role asCommander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the President
concurrent disciplinary authority over the Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law enforcement offices.

Granting the President the Power to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman

does not Diminish the Independence of the Office of the Ombudsman.

The claim that Section 8(2) of R.A. No. 6770 granting the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally
frustrates, if not resultantly negates the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is tenuous. The independence which the Office
of the Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it from political considerations in pursuing its constitutional mandate to be a
protector of the people. What the Constitution secures for the Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political independence. This
means nothing more than that "the terms of office, the salary, the appointments and discipline of all persons under the office" are
"reasonably insulated from the whims of politicians."52 And so it was that Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution had declared
the creation of the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman and his Deputies, who are described as
"protectors of the people" and constitutionally mandated to act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against public
officials or employees of the Government Section 12, Article XI. Pertinent provisions under Article XI prescribes a term of office of
seven years without reappointment Section 11, prohibits a decrease in salaries during the term of office Section 10, provides strict
qualifications for the office Section 8, grants fiscal autonomy Section 14 and ensures the exercise of constitutional functions Section
12 and 13. The cloak of independence is meant to build up the Office of the Ombudsman's institutional strength to effectively function
as official critic, mobilizer of government, constitutional watchdog53 and protector of the people. It certainly cannot be made to extend
to wrongdoings and permit the unbridled acts of its officials to escape administrative discipline.

Being aware of the constitutional imperative of shielding the Office of the Ombudsman from political influences and the discretionary
acts of the executive, Congress laid down two restrictions on the President's exercise of such power of removal over a Deputy
Ombudsman, namely: (1) that the removal of the Deputy Ombudsman must be for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the
Ombudsman and (2) that there must be observance of due process. Reiterating the grounds for impeachment laid down in Section 2,
Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, paragraph 1 of Section 8 of R.A. No. 6770 states that the Deputy Ombudsman may be removed
from office for the same grounds that the Ombudsman may be removed through impeachment, namely, "culpable violation of the
Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust." Thus, it cannot be rightly said that
giving the President the power to remove a Deputy Ombudsman, or a Special Prosecutor for that matter, would diminish or compromise
the constitutional independence of the Office of the Ombudsman. It is, precisely, a measure of protection of the independence of the
Ombudsman's Deputies and Special Prosecutor in the discharge of their duties that their removal can only be had on grounds provided
by law.

In Espinosa v. Office of the Ombudsman,54 the Court elucidated on the nature of the Ombudsman's independence in this wise -

The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To insulate the Office from outside
pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as RA 6770 has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory powers virtually free from legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This Court consistently refrains from interfering
with the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, 'beholden to no one,
acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of public service.

Petitioner Gonzales may not be removed from office where the

questioned acts, falling short of constitutional standards, do not
constitute betrayal of public trust.

Having now settled the question concerning the validity of the President's power to remove the Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, we now go to the substance of the administrative findings in OP Case No. 10-J-460 which led to the dismissal of herein
petitioner, Deputy Ombudsman Emilio A. Gonzales, III.

At the outset, the Court finds no cause for petitioner Gonzales to complain simply because the OP proceeded with the administrative
case against him despite his non-attendance thereat. Petitioner was admittedly able to file an Answer in which he had interposed his
defenses to the formal charge against him. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.55 Due process is simply
having the opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.56

The essence of due process is that a party is afforded reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in
support of his defense.57 Mere opportunity to be heard is sufficient. As long as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side
and present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute
lack of opportunity to be heard.58 Besides, petitioner only has himself to blame for limiting his defense through the filing of an Answer.
He had squandered a subsequent opportunity to elucidate upon his pleaded defenses by adamantly refusing to attend the scheduled
Clarificatory Conference despite notice. The OP recounted as follows -

It bears noting that respondent Deputy Ombudsman Gonzalez was given two separate opportunities to explain his side and answer the
Formal Charge against him.

In the first instance, respondent was given the opportunity to submit his answer together with his documentary evidence, which
opportunity respondent actually availed of. In the second instance, this Office called a Clarificatory Conference on 8 February 2011
pursuant to respondent's express election of a formal investigation. Despite due notice, however, respondent Deputy Ombudsman
refused to appear for said conference, interposing an objection based on the unfounded notion that this Office has prejudged the
instant case. Respondent having been given actual and reasonable opportunity to explain or defend himself in due course, the
requirement of due process has been satisfied.59

In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence, 60 which is more than a
mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 61 The fact,
therefore, that petitioner later refused to participate in the hearings before the OP is not a hindrance to a finding of his culpability
based on substantial evidence, which only requires that a decision must "have something upon which it is based." 62

Factual findings of administrative bodies are controlling when supported by substantial evidence. 63 The OP's pronouncement of
administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the corresponding penalty of removal from office was
based on the finding of gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct in office amounting to a betrayal of public trust, which is a
constitutional ground for the removal by impeachment of the Ombudsman (Section 2, Article XI, 1987 Constitution), and a statutory
ground for the President to remove from office a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act.

The OP held that petitioner's want of care and wrongful conduct consisted of his unexplained action in directing the PNP-NCR to elevate
P/S Insp. Mendoza's case records to his office; his failure to verify the basis for requesting the Ombudsman to take over the case; his
pronouncement of administrative liability and imposition of the extreme penalty of dismissal on P/S Insp. Mendoza based upon an
unverified complaint-affidavit; his inordinate haste in implementing P/S Insp. Mendoza's dismissal notwithstanding the latter's non-
receipt of his copy of the Decision and the subsequent filing of a motion for reconsideration; and his apparent unconcern that the
pendency of the motion for reconsideration for more than five months had deprived P/S Insp. Mendoza of available remedies against
the immediate implementation of the Decision dismissing him from the service.

Thus, taking into consideration the factual determinations of the IIRC, the allegations and evidence of petitioner in his Answer as well
as other documentary evidence, the OP concluded that: (1) petitioner failed to supervise his subordinates to act with dispatch on the
draft resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration and thereby caused undue prejudice to P/S Insp. Mendoza by
effectively depriving the latter of the right to challenge the dismissal before the courts and prevent its immediate execution, and (2)
petitioner showed undue interest by having P/S Insp. Mendoza's case endorsed to the Office of the Ombudsman and resolving the
same against P/S Insp. Mendoza on the basis of the unverified complaint-affidavit of the alleged victim Christian Kalaw.

The invariable rule is that administrative decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be set aside on proof of gross
abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of law.64 In the instant case, while the evidence may show some amount of wrongdoing on the part
of petitioner, the Court seriously doubts the correctness of the OP's conclusion that the imputed acts amount to gross neglect of duty
and grave misconduct constitutive of betrayal of public trust. To say that petitioner's offenses, as they factually appear, weigh heavily
enough to constitute betrayal of public trust would be to ignore the significance of the legislature's intent in prescribing the removal of
the Deputy Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor for causes that, theretofore, had been reserved only for the most serious violations
that justify the removal by impeachment of the highest officials of the land.

Would every negligent act or misconduct in the performance of a Deputy Ombudsman's duties constitute betrayal of public trust
warranting immediate removal from office? The question calls for a deeper, circumspective look at the nature of the grounds for the
removal of a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor vis-a-vis common administrative offenses.

Betrayal of public trust is a new ground for impeachment under the 1987 Constitution added to the existing grounds of culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption and other high crimes. While it was deemed broad enough to cover
any violation of the oath of office,65 the impreciseness of its definition also created apprehension that "such an overarching standard
may be too broad and may be subject to abuse and arbitrary exercise by the legislature."66 Indeed, the catch-all phrase betrayal of
public trust that referred to "all acts not punishable by statutes as penal offenses but, nonetheless, render the officer unfit to continue
in office"67 could be easily utilized for every conceivable misconduct or negligence in office. However, deliberating on some workable
standard by which the ground could be reasonably interpreted, the Constitutional Commission recognized that human error and good
faith precluded an adverse conclusion.

MR. VILLACORTA: x x x One last matter with respect to the use of the words "betrayal of public trust" as embodying a ground for
impeachment that has been raised by the Honorable Regalado. I am not a lawyer so I can anticipate the difficulties that a layman may
encounter in understanding this provision and also the possible abuses that the legislature can commit in interpreting this phrase. It
is to be noted that this ground was also suggested in the 1971 Constitutional Convention. A review of the Journals of that Convention
will show that it was not included; it was construed as encompassing acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross
faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of
discretionary powers. I understand from the earlier discussions that these constitute violations of the oath of office, and also I heard
the Honorable Davide say that even the criminal acts that were enumerated in the earlier 1973 provision on this matter constitute
betrayal of public trust as well. In order to avoid confusion, would it not be clearer to stick to the wording of Section 2 which reads:
"may be removed from office on impeachment for and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, and other
high crimes, graft and corruption or VIOLATION OF HIS OATH OF OFFICE", because if betrayal of public trust encompasses the earlier
acts that were enumerated, then it would behoove us to be equally clear about this last provision or phrase.

MR. NOLLEDO: x x x I think we will miss a golden opportunity if we fail to adopt the words "betrayal of public trust" in the 1986
Constitution. But I would like him to know that we are amenable to any possible amendment. Besides, I think plain error of judgment,
where circumstances may indicate that there is good faith, to my mind, will not constitute betrayal of public trust if that statement will
allay the fears of difficulty in interpreting the term."68 (Emphasis supplied)

The Constitutional Commission eventually found it reasonably acceptable for the phrase betrayal of public trust to refer to "acts which
are just short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence
of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers."69 In other words, acts that should constitute betrayal of public trust
as to warrant removal from office may be less than criminal but must be attended by bad faith and of such gravity and seriousness as
the other grounds for impeachment.

A Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor are not impeachable officers. However, by providing for their removal from office on
the same grounds as removal by impeachment, the legislature could not have intended to redefine constitutional standards of culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, as well as betrayal of public trust, and apply
them less stringently. Hence, where betrayal of public trust, for purposes of impeachment, was not intended to cover all kinds of official
wrongdoing and plain errors of judgment, this should remain true even for purposes of removing a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor from office. Hence, the fact that the grounds for impeachment have been made statutory grounds for the removal by the
President of a Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor cannot diminish the seriousness of their nature nor the acuity of their scope.
Betrayal of public trust could not suddenly "overreach" to cover acts that are not vicious or malevolent on the same level as the other
grounds for impeachment.

The tragic hostage-taking incident was the result of a confluence of several unfortunate events including system failure of government
response. It cannot be solely attributed then to what petitioner Gonzales may have negligently failed to do for the quick, fair and
complete resolution of the case, or to his error of judgment in the disposition thereof. Neither should petitioner's official acts in the
resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's case be judged based upon the resulting deaths at the Quirino Grandstand. The failure to immediately
act upon a party's requests for an early resolution of his case is not, by itself, gross neglect of duty amounting to betrayal of public
trust. Records show that petitioner took considerably less time to act upon the draft resolution after the same was submitted for his
appropriate action compared to the length of time that said draft remained pending and unacted upon in the Office of Ombudsman
Merceditas N. Gutierrez. He reviewed and denied P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion for reconsideration within nine (9) calendar days reckoned
from the time the draft resolution was submitted to him on April 27, 2010 until he forwarded his recommendation to the Office of
Ombudsman Gutierrez on May 6, 2010 for the latter's final action. Clearly, the release of any final order on the case was no longer in
his hands.

Even if there was inordinate delay in the resolution of P/S Insp. Mendoza's motion and an unexplained failure on petitioner's part to
supervise his subordinates in its prompt disposition, the same cannot be considered a vicious and malevolent act warranting his removal
for betrayal of public trust. More so because the neglect imputed upon petitioner appears to be an isolated case.

Similarly, petitioner's act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp. Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing any reason
therefor cannot, by itself, be considered a manifestation of his undue interest in the case that would amount to wrongful or unlawful
conduct. After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the request of concerned agencies or private parties is part and parcel of the
constitutional mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of the people." The factual circumstances that the case
was turned over to the Office of the Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that administrative liability was pronounced against P/S
Insp. Mendoza even without the private complainant verifying the truth of his statements; that the decision was immediately
implemented; or that the motion for reconsideration thereof remained pending for more than nine months cannot be simply taken as
evidence of petitioner's undue interest in the case considering the lack of evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or business
affiliation with any of the parties to the case that could have impelled him to act as he did. There was likewise no evidence at all of
any bribery that took place, or of any corrupt intention or questionable motivation.

Accordingly, the OP's pronouncement of administrative accountability against petitioner and the imposition upon him of the
corresponding penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or misconduct in office do not
amount to a betrayal of public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be vested with authority, cannot order the removal of petitioner
as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.

This is not to say, however, that petitioner is relieved of all liability for his acts showing less than diligent performance of official duties.
Although the administrative acts imputed to petitioner fall short of the constitutional standard of betrayal of public trust, considering
the OP's factual findings of negligence and misconduct against petitioner, the Court deems it appropriate to refer the case to the Office
of the Ombudsman for further investigation of the charges in OP Case No. 10-J-460 and the imposition of the corresponding
administrative sanctions, if any.
Inasmuch as there is as yet no existing ground justifying his removal from office, petitioner is entitled to reinstatement to his former
position as Deputy Ombudsman and to the payment of backwages and benefits corresponding to the period of his suspension.

The Office of the President is vested with statutory authority to proceed

administratively against petitioner Barreras-Sulit to determine the
existence of any of the grounds for her removal from office as provided
for under the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act.

Petitioner Barreras-Sulit, on the other hand, has been resisting the President's authority to remove her from office upon the averment
that without the Sandiganbayan's final approval and judgment on the basis of the PLEBARA, it would be premature to charge her with
acts and/or omissions "tantamount to culpable violations of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust," which are grounds for removal
from office under Section 8, paragraph (2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989; and which also constitute a violation of Section 3, paragraph
(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) - causing undue injury to the Government or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
With reference to the doctrine of prejudicial procedural antecedent, petitioner Barreras-Sulit asserts that the propriety of taking and
continuing to take administrative disciplinary proceeding against her must depend on the final disposition by the Sandiganbayan of the
PLEBARA, explaining that if the Sandiganbayan would uphold the PLEBARA, there would no longer be any cause of complaint against
her; if not, then the situation becomes ripe for the determination of her failings.

The argument will not hold water. The incidents that have taken place subsequent to the submission in court of the PLEBARA shows
that the PLEBARA has been practically approved, and that the only thing which remains to be done by the Sandiganbayan is to
promulgate a judgment imposing the proper sentence on the accused Major General Garcia based on his new pleas to lesser offenses.
On May 4, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution declaring that the change of plea under the PLEBARA was warranted and that
it complied with jurisprudential guidelines. The Sandiganbayan, thereafter, directed the accused Major General Garcia to immediately
convey in favor of the State all the properties, both real and personal, enumerated therein. On August 11, 2010, the Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution, which, in order to put into effect the reversion of Major General Garcia's ill-gotten properties, ordered the
corresponding government agencies to cause the transfer of ownership of said properties to the Republic of the Philippines. In the
meantime, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) informed the Sandiganbayan that an Order70 had been issued by the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 on November 5, 2010 allowing the transfer of the accused's frozen accounts to the Republic of the
Philippines pursuant to the terms of the PLEBARA as approved by the Sandiganbayan. Immediately after the OSP informed the
Sandiganbayan that its May 4, 2010 Resolution had been substantially complied with, Major General Garcia manifested 71 to the
Sandiganbayan on November 19, 2010 his readiness for sentencing and for the withdrawal of the criminal information against his wife
and two sons. Major General Garcia's Motion to Dismiss,72 dated December 16, 2010 and filed with the Sandiganbayan, reads:

1.0 The Co-Accused were impleaded under the theory of conspiracy with the Principal Accused MGen. Carlos F. Garcia (AFP Ret.),
(Principal Accused) with the allegation that the act of one is the act of the others. Therefore, with the approval by the Honorable Court
of the Plea Bargaining Agreement executed by the Principal Accused, the charges against the Co-Accused should likewise be dismissed
since the charges against them are anchored on the same charges against the Principal Accused.

On December 16, 2010, the Sandiganbayan allowed accused Major General Garcia to plead guilty to the lesser offenses of direct bribery
and violation of Section 4(b), R.A. No. 9160, as amended. Upon Major General Garcia's motion, and with the express conformity of the
OSP, the Sandiganbayan allowed him to post bail in both cases, each at a measly amount of ₱ 30,000.00.

The approval or disapproval of the PLEBARA by the Sandiganbayan is of no consequence to an administrative finding of liability against
petitioner Barreras-Sulit. While the court's determination of the propriety of a plea bargain is on the basis of the existing prosecution
evidence on record, the disciplinary authority's determination of the prosecutor's administrative liability is based on whether the plea
bargain is consistent with the conscientious consideration of the government's best interest and the diligent and efficient performance
by the prosecution of its public duty to prosecute crimes against the State. Consequently, the disciplining authority's finding of
ineptitude, neglect or willfulness on the part of the prosecution, more particularly petitioner Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit, in failing
to pursue or build a strong case for the government or, in this case, entering into an agreement which the government finds "grossly
disadvantageous," could result in administrative liability, notwithstanding court approval of the plea bargaining agreement entered
into.

Plea bargaining is a process in criminal cases whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of
the case subject to court approval.73 The essence of a plea bargaining agreement is the allowance of an accused to plead guilty to a
lesser offense than that charged against him. Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the procedure
therefor, to wit:

SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. -- At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor,
may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. After
arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not
guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (Sec. 4, Cir. 38-98)

Plea bargaining is allowable when the prosecution does not have sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the accused of the crime
charged.74 However, if the basis for the allowance of a plea bargain in this case is the evidence on record, then it is significant to state
that in its earlier Resolution75 promulgated on January 7, 2010, the Sandiganbayan had evaluated the testimonies of twenty (20)
prosecution witnesses and declared that "the conglomeration of evidence presented by the prosecution is viewed by the Court to be of
strong character that militates against the grant of bail."

Notwithstanding this earlier ruling by the Sandiganbayan, the OSP, unexplainably, chose to plea bargain with the accused Major General
Garcia as if its evidence were suddenly insufficient to secure a conviction. At this juncture, it is not amiss to emphasize that the
"standard of strong evidence of guilt which is sufficient to deny bail to an accused is markedly higher than the standard of judicial
probable cause which is sufficient to initiate a criminal case."76Hence, in light of the apparently strong case against accused Major
General Garcia, the disciplining authority would be hard-pressed not to look into the whys and wherefores of the prosecution's turnabout
in the case.

The Court need not touch further upon the substantial matters that are the subject of the pending administrative proceeding against
petitioner Barreras-Sulit and are, thus, better left to the complete and effective resolution of the administrative case before the Office
of the President.

The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act has, nonetheless, failed to obtain the necessary votes to
invalidate the law, thus, keeping said provision part of the law of the land. To recall, these cases involve two distinct issues: (a) the
constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act; and (b) the validity of the administrative action of removal taken against
petitioner Gonzales. While the Court voted unanimously to reverse the decision of the OP removing petitioner Gonzales from office, it
was equally divided in its opinion on the constitutionality of the assailed statutory provision in its two deliberations held on April 17,
2012 and September 4, 2012. There being no majority vote to invalidate the law, the Court, therefore, dismisses the challenge to the
constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act in accordance with Section 2(d), Rule 12 of the Internal Rules of the Court.

Indeed, Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution requires the vote of the majority of the Members of the Court actually taking
part in the deliberation to sustain any challenge to the constitutionality or validity of a statute or any of its provisions.

WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-J-460 isREVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with payment of backwages corresponding to the period of suspension
effective immediately, even as the Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed with the investigation in connection with the above
case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-B-003 against Special Prosecutor
Wendell Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution and a betrayal of public trust,
in accordance with Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.

The challenge to the constitutionality of Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 191560, March 29 : 2011]

HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ALEJANDRO
S. URRO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE NEW APPOINTEE VICE HEREIN PETITIONER HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL,
NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, RESPONDENT.

HON. LUIS MARIO M. GENERAL, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION, PETITIONER, VS. PRESIDENT GLORIA
MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, THRU EXECUTIVE SECRETARY LEANDRO MENDOZA, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE APPOINTING
POWER, HON. RONALDO V. PUNO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT AND AS EX-OFFICIO CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION AND HON. EDUARDO U. ESCUETA,
ALEJANDRO S. URRO, AND HON. CONSTANCIA P. DE GUZMAN AS THE MIDNIGHT APPOINTEES, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court are the Consolidated Petitions for Quo Warranto,[1] and Certiorari and/or Prohibition[2]with urgent prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction filed by Atty. Luis Mario General (petitioner). The
petitioner seeks to declare unconstitutional the appointments of Alejandro S. Urro, Constancia P. de Guzman and Eduardo U. Escueta
(collectively, the respondents) as Commissioners of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), and to prohibit then Executive
Secretary Leandro Mendoza and Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary Ronaldo V. Puno from enforcing the
respondents' oath of office. Particularly, the petitioner asks that respondent Urro be ousted as NAPOLCOM Commissioner and he be
allowed to continue in office.

THE ANTECEDENTS

On September 20, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (PGMA) appointed Imelda C. Roces (Roces) as acting Commissioner
of the NAPOLCOM, representing the civilian sector.[3] On January 25, 2006, PGMA reappointed Roces as acting NAPOLCOM
Commissioner.[4] When Roces died in September 2007, PGMA appointed the petitioner on July 21, 2008 [5] as acting NAPOLCOM
Commissioner in place of Roces. On the same date, PGMA appointed Eduardo U. Escueta (Escueta) as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner
and designated him as NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.[6]

Later, PGMA appointed Alejandro S. Urro (Urro) in place of the petitioner, Constancia P. de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and
Escueta as permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners. Urro's appointment paper is dated March 5, 2010; while the appointment
papers of De Guzman and Escueta are both dated March 8, 2010.[7] On March 9, 2010, Escueta took his oath of office before
Makati Regional Trial Court Judge Alberico Umali.[8]

In a letter dated March 19, 2010, DILG Head Executive Assistant/Chief-of-Staff Pascual V. Veron Cruz, Jr. issued separate
congratulatory letters to the respondents. The letter uniformly reads.

You have just been appointed COMMISSIONER xxx National Police Commission. xxx Attached is your appointment paper duly signed
by Her Excellency, President Macapagal Arroyo.[9]

After being furnished a copy of the congratulatory letters on March 22, 2010,[10] the petitioner filed the present petition questioning
the validity of the respondents' appointments mainly on the ground that it violates the constitutional prohibition against midnight
appointments.[11]

On March 25, 2010 and April 27, 2010, respondents Urro and de Guzman took their oath of office as NAPOLCOM Commissioners before
DILG Secretary Puno and Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Jose R. Hernandez, respectively.[12]

On July 30, 2010, the newly elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, His Excellency Benigno S. Aquino III, issued Executive
Order No. 2 (E.O. No. 2) "Recalling, Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in Violation of
the Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments." The salient portions of E.O. No. 2 read:

SECTION 1. Midnight Appointments Defined. - The following appointments made by the former President and other appointing
authorities in departments, agencies, offices, and instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered as midnight appointments:

(a) Those made on or after March 11, 2010, including all appointments bearing dates prior to March 11, 2010 where the appointee
has accepted, or taken his oath, or assumed public office on or after March 11, 2010, except temporary appointments in the
executive positions when continued vacancies will prejudice public service or endanger public safety as may be determined
by the appointing authority.

(b) Those made prior to March 11, 2010, but to take effect after said date or appointments to office that would be vacant only
after March 11, 2010.

(c) Appointments and promotions made during the period of 45 days prior to the May 10, 2010 elections in violation of Section
261 of the Omnibus Election Code.

SECTION 2. Recall, Withdraw, and Revocation of Midnight Appointments. Midnight appointments, as defined under
Section 1, are hereby recalled, withdrawn, and revoked. The positions covered or otherwise affected are hereby declared
vacant. (Emphasis supplied.)

THE PETITION
The petitioner claims that Roces was supposed to serve a full term of six years counted from the date of her appointment in October
(should be September) 2004.[13] Since she failed to finish her six-year term, then the petitioner is entitled to serve this unexpired
portion or until October (should be September) 2010.[14] The petitioner invokes Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975[15] (otherwise known as
the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990) which requires that vacancies in the NAPOLCOM "shall be filled up
for the unexpired term only."[16] Because of the mandatory word "shall," the petitioner concludes that the appointment issued to him
was really a "regular" appointment, notwithstanding what appears in his appointment paper. As a regular appointee, the petitioner
argues that he cannot be removed from office except for cause.

The petitioner alternatively submits that even if his appointment were temporary, a temporary appointment does not give the President
the license to abuse a public official simply because he lacks security of tenure.[17] He asserts that the validity of his termination from
office depends on the validity of the appointment of the person intended to replace him. He explains that until a presidential
appointment is "officially released," there is no "appointment" to speak of. Since the appointment paper of respondent Urro, while
bearing a date prior to the effectivity of the constitutional ban on appointments,[18] was officially released (per the congratulatory letter
dated March 19, 2010 issued to Urro) when the appointment ban was already in effect, then the petitioner's appointment, though
temporary in nature, should remain effective as no new and valid appointment was effectively made.

The petitioner assails the validity of the appointments of respondents De Guzman and Escueta, claiming that they were also made in
violation of the constitutional ban on appointments.

THE COMMENTS OF THE RESPONDENTS and THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (OSG)

Prefatorily, the respondents characterize Escueta's inclusion in the present petition as an error since his appointment, acceptance and
assumption of office all took place before the constitutional ban on appointments started. Thus, there is no "case or controversy" as to
Escueta.

The respondents posit that the petitioner is not a real party-in-interest to file a petition for quo warranto since he was merely appointed
in an acting capacity and could be validly removed from office at anytime.

The respondents likewise counter that what the ban on midnight appointments under Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution prohibits
is only the making of an appointment by the President sixty (60) days before the next presidential elections and until his term expires;
it does not prohibit the acceptance by the appointee of his appointment within the same prohibited period.[19] The respondents claim
that "appointment" which is a presidential act, must be distinguished from the "acceptance" or "rejection" of the appointment, which
is the act of the appointee. Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution is directed only against the President and his act of appointment,
and is not concerned with the act/s of the appointee. Since the respondents were appointed (per the date appearing in their
appointment papers) before the constitutional ban took effect, then their appointments are valid.

The respondents assert that their appointments cannot be considered as midnight appointments under the Dominador R. Aytona v.
Andres V. Castillo, et al.[20] ruling, as restated in In Re: Appointments dated March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela, et
al.[21] and Arturo M. de Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council, et al.,[22] since the petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that their
appointments were made only "for the purpose of influencing the Presidential elections," or for "partisan reasons." [23]

The respondents pray for the issuance of a TRO to stop the implementation of E.O. No. 2, and for the consolidation of this case with
the pending cases of Tamondong v. Executive Secretary[24] and De Castro v. Office of the President[25] which similarly assail the validity
of E.O. No. 2.

On the other hand, while the OSG considers the respondents' appointments within the scope of "midnight appointments" as defined
by E.O. No. 2, the OSG nonetheless submits that the petitioner is not entitled to the remedy of quo warranto in view of the nature of
his appointment. The OSG claims that since an appointment in an acting capacity cannot exceed one year, the petitioner's
appointment ipso factoexpired on July 21, 2009.[26]

PETITIONER'S REPLY

The petitioner argues in reply that he is the legally subsisting commissioner until another qualified commissioner is validly appointed
by the new President to replace him.[27]

The petitioner likewise claims that the respondents appeared to have skirted the element of issuance of an appointment in considering
whether an appointment is made. The petitioner asserts that to constitute an appointment, the President's act of affixing his signature
must be coupled with the physical issuance of the appointment to the appointee - i.e., the appointment paper is officially issued in
favor of the appointee through the President's proper Cabinet Secretary. The making of an appointment is different from
its issuance since prior to the official issuance of an appointment, the appointing authority enjoys the prerogative to change his mind.
In the present case, the respondents' appointment papers were officially issued and communicated to them only on March 19, 2010,
well within the period of the constitutional ban, as shown by the congratulatory letters individually issued to them.

Given this premise, the petitioner claims that he correctly impleaded Escueta in this case since his appointment also violates the
Constitution. The petitioner adds that Escueta was appointed on July 21, 2008, although then as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner.
By permanently appointing him as NAPOLCOM Commissioner, he stands to be in office for more than six years, in violation of R.A. No.
6975.[28]

The petitioner argues that even granting that the President can extend appointments in an acting capacity to NAPOLCOM
Commissioners, it may not be done by "successive appointments" in the same capacity without violating R.A. No. 6975, as amended,
which provides a fixed and staggered term of office for NAPOLCOM Commissioners. [29]

THE COURT'S RULING

We dismiss the petition for lack of merit.

When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites
are present: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) the existence of personal and substantial interest on the part of
the party raising the constitutional question; (3) recourse to judicial review is made at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.[30]

Both parties dwelt lengthily on the issue of constitutionality of the respondents' appointments in light of E.O. No. 2 and the subsequent
filing before the Court of several petitions questioning this Executive Order. The parties, however, appear to have overlooked the basic
principle in constitutional adjudication that enjoins the Court from passing upon a constitutional question, although properly presented,
if the case can be disposed of on some other ground.[31] In constitutional law terms, this means that we ought to refrain from resolving
any constitutional issue "unless the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case."

Lis mota literally means "the cause of the suit or action." This last requisite of judicial review is simply an offshoot of the presumption
of validity accorded the executive and legislative acts of our co-equal branches of the government. Ultimately, it is rooted in the
principle of separation of powers. Given the presumed validity of an executive act, the petitioner who claims otherwise has the burden
of showing first that the case cannot be resolved unless the constitutional question he raised is determined by the Court.[32]

In the present case, the constitutionality of the respondents' appointments is not the lis mota of the case. From the submitted
pleadings, what is decisive is the determination of whether the petitioner has a cause of action to institute and maintain this present
petition - a quo warranto against respondent Urro. If the petitioner fails to establish his cause of action for quo warranto, a discussion
of the constitutionality of the appointments of the respondents is rendered completely unnecessary. The inclusion of the grounds
for certiorari and/or prohibition does not alter the essential character of the petitioner's action since he does not even allege that he
has a personal and substantial interest in raising the constitutional issue insofar as the other respondents are concerned.

The resolution of whether a cause of action exists, in turn, hinges on the nature of the petitioner's appointment. We frame the issues
under the following questions:

1. What is the nature of the petitioner's appointment as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner?

2. Does the petitioner have the clear right to be reinstated to his former position and to oust respondent Urro as NAPOLCOM
Commissioner?

I. Nature of petitioner's appointment

a. A staggered term of office is not

inconsistent with an acting
appointment

The petitioner asserts that contrary to what appears in his appointment paper, the appointment extended to him was really a regular
appointment; thus, he cannot be removed from office except for cause. The petitioner argues that the appointment of
an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner or, at the very least, the "successive appointments" of NAPOLCOM Commissioners in an acting
capacity contravenes the safeguards that the law - R.A. No. 6975[33] - intends through the staggered term of office of NAPOLCOM
Commissioners.

Notably, the petitioner does not expressly claim that he was issued a permanent appointment; rather, he claims that his appointment
is actually a regular appointment since R.A. No. 6975 does not allegedly allow an appointment of a NAPOLCOM Commissioner in an
acting capacity.

At the outset, the petitioner's use of terms needs some clarification. Appointments may be classified into two: first, as to its nature;
and second, as to the manner in which it is made.[34]

Under the first classification, appointments can either be permanent or temporary (acting). A basic distinction is that a permanent
appointee can only be removed from office for cause; whereas a temporary appointee can be removed even without hearing or
cause.[35] Under the second classification, an appointment can either be regular or ad interim. A regular appointment is one made
while Congress is in session, while an ad interim appointment is one issued during the recess of Congress. In strict terms, presidential
appointments that require no confirmation from the Commission on Appointments [36] cannot be properly characterized as either a
regular or an ad interim appointment.

In this light, what the petitioner may have meant is a permanent (as contrasted to a temporary or acting) appointment to the office of
a NAPOLCOM Commissioner, at least for the duration of the unexpired portion of his predecessor (Roces).

Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise
specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of
the office involved.[37] The President's power to issue an acting appointment is particularly authorized by the Administrative Code of
1987 (Executive Order No. 292).

CHAPTER 5
POWER OF APPOINTMENT

Section 16. Power of Appointment. - The President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the Constitution
and laws.

Section 17. Power to Issue Temporary Designation. –

(1) The President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent
person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch, appointment to which is vested in him by law, when:
 (a) the officer regularly appointed to the office is unable to perform his duties by reason of illness, absence or any other
cause; or (b) there exists a vacancy;

(2) xxx

(3) In no case shall a temporary designation exceed one (1) year.

The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person
to discharge those functions pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee. An acting appointee accepts the position on
the condition that he shall surrender the office once he is called to do so by the appointing authority. Therefore, his term of office is
not fixed but endures at the pleasure of the appointing authority. His separation from the service does not import removal but merely
the expiration of his term -- a mode of termination of official relations that falls outside the coverage of the constitutional provision on
security of tenure[38] since no removal from office is involved.

The power to appoint is essentially executive in nature[39] and the limitations on or qualifications in the exercise of this power are
strictly construed.[40] In the present case, the petitioner posits that the law itself, R.A. No. 6975, prohibits the appointment of a
NAPOLCOM Commissioner in an acting capacity by staggering his term of office. R.A. No. 6975, on the term of office, states:

Section 16. Term of Office. - The four (4) regular and full-time Commissioners shall be appointed by the President upon the
recommendation of the Secretary. Of the first four (4) commissioners to be appointed, two (2) commissioners shall serve for six (6)
years and the two (2) other commissioners for four (4) years. All subsequent appointments shall be for a period of six (6) years each,
without reappointment or extension.

Generally, the purpose for staggering the term of office is to minimize the appointing authority's opportunity to appoint a majority of
the members of a collegial body. It also intended to ensure the continuity of the body and its policies.[41] A staggered term of office,
however, is not a statutory prohibition, direct or indirect, against the issuance of acting or temporary appointment. It does not negate
the authority to issue acting or temporary appointments that the Administrative Code grants.

Ramon P. Binamira v. Peter D. Garrucho, Jr.,[42] involving the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA), is an example of how this Court has
recognized the validity of temporary appointments in vacancies in offices whose holders are appointed on staggered basis. Under
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 189,[43] (the charter of the PTA, as amended by P.D. No. 564[44] and P.D. No. 1400[45]), the members of
the PTA's governing body are all presidential appointees whose terms of office are also staggered.[46] This, notwithstanding, the Court
sustained the temporary character of the appointment extended by the President in favor of the PTA General Manager, even if the
law[47] also fixes his term of office at six years unless sooner removed for cause.

Interestingly, even a staggered term of office does not ensure that at no instance will the appointing authority appoint all the members
of a body whose members are appointed on staggered basis.

The post-war predecessor of the NAPOLCOM was the Police Commission created under R.A. No. 4864.[48]Pursuant to the 1987
constitutional provision mandating the creation of one national civilian police force,[49] Congress enacted R.A. No. 6975 and created
the NAPOLCOM to exercise, inter alia, "administrative control over the Philippine National Police." Later, Congress enacted R.A. No.
8551 which substantially retained the organizational structure, powers and functions of the NAPOLCOM. [50] Under these laws, the
President has appointed the members of the Commission whose terms of office are staggered.

Under Section 16 of R.A. No. 6975, the NAPOLCOM Commissioners are all given a fixed term of six years (except the two of the first
appointees who hold office only for four years). By staggering their terms of office however, the four regular commissioners would not
vacate their offices at the same time since a vacancy will occur every two years.

Under the NAPOLCOM set up, the law does not appear to have been designed to attain the purpose of preventing the same President
from appointing all the NAPOLCOM Commissioners by staggering their terms of office. R.A. No. 6975 took effect on January 1, 1991.
In the usual course, the term of office of the first two regular commissioners would have expired in 1997, while the term of the other
two commissioners would have expired in 1995. Since the term of the President elected in the first national elections under the 1987
Constitution expired on June 30, 1998, then, theoretically, the sitting President for the 1992-1998 term could appoint all the succeeding
four regular NAPOLCOM Commissioners. The next President, on the other hand, whose term ended in 2004, would have appointed the
next succeeding Commissioners in 2001 and 2003.

It is noteworthy, too, that while the Court nullified the attempt of Congress to consider the terms of office of the then NAPOLCOM
Commissioners as automatically expired on the ground that there was no bona fide reorganization of the NAPOLCOM,[51] a provision
on the staggering of terms of office is evidently absent in R.A. No. 8551 - the amendatory law to R.A. No. 6975. Section 7 of R.A. No.
8551 reads:

Section 7. Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6975 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 16. Term of Office. - The four (4) regular and full-time Commissioners shall be appointed by the President for a term of six (6)
years without re-appointment or extension."

Thus, as the law now stands, the petitioner's claim that the appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner is not allowed based
on the staggering of terms of office does not even have any statutory basis.

Given the wide latitude of the President's appointing authority (and the strict construction against any limitation on or qualification of
this power), the prohibition on the President from issuing an acting appointment must either be specific, or there must be a clear
repugnancy between the nature of the office and the temporary appointment. No such limitation on the President's appointing power
appears to be clearly deducible from the text of R.A. No. 6975 in the manner we ruled in Nacionalista Party v. Bautista.[52] In that
case, we nullified the acting appointment issued by the President to fill the office of a Commissioner of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) on the ground that it would undermine the independence of the COMELEC. We ruled that given the specific nature of the
functions performed by COMELEC Commissioners, only a permanent appointment to the office of a COMELEC Commissioner can be
made.

Under the Constitution, the State is mandated to establish and maintain a police force to be administered and controlled by a national
police commission. Pursuant to this constitutional mandate, the Congress enacted R.A. No. 6975, creating the NAPOLCOM with the
following powers and functions:[53]

Section 14. Powers and Functions of the Commission. -- The Commission shall exercise the following powers and functions:

(a) Exercise administrative control and operational supervision over the Philippine National Police which shall mean the power to:

xxxx

b) Advise the President on all matters involving police functions and administration;

c) Render to the President and to the Congress an annual report on its activities and accomplishments during the thirty (30) days after
the end of the calendar year, which shall include an appraisal of the conditions obtaining in the organization and administration of
police agencies in the municipalities, cities and provinces throughout the country, and recommendations for appropriate remedial
legislation;

d) Recommend to the President, through the Secretary, within sixty (60) days before the commencement of each calendar year, a
crime prevention program; and

e) Perform such other functions necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act and as the President may
direct. [Emphasis added.]

We find nothing in this enumeration of functions of the members of the NAPOLCOM that would be subverted or defeated by the
President's appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a permanent appointee.
Viewed as an institution, a survey of pertinent laws and executive issuances [54] will show that the NAPOLCOM has always remained as
an office under or within the Executive Department.[55] Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the petitioner's acting appointment,
on one hand, and the nature of the functions of the NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.

b. R.A. No. 6975 does not prohibit the appointment of an acting

NAPOLCOM Commissioner in filling up vacancies in the NAPOLCOM

The petitioner next cites Section 18 of R.A. No. 6975 to support his claim that the appointment of a NAPOLCOM Commissioner to fill a
vacancy due to the permanent incapacity of a regular Commissioner can only be permanent and not temporary:

Section 18. Removal from Office. - The members of the Commission may be removed from office for cause. All vacancies in the
Commission, except through expiration of term, shall be filled up for the unexpired term only: Provided, That any person who shall be
appointed in this case shall be eligible for regular appointment for another full term.

Nothing in the cited provision supports the petitioner's conclusion. By using the word "only" in Section 18 of R.A. No. 6975, the law's
obvious intent is only to prevent the new appointee from serving beyond the term of office of the original appointee. It does not prohibit
the new appointee from serving less than the unexpired portion of the term as in the case of a temporary appointment.

While the Court previously inquired into the true nature of a supposed acting appointment for the purpose of determining whether the
appointing power is abusing the principle of temporary appointment,[56] the petitioner has not pointed to any circumstance/s which
would warrant a second look into and the invalidation of the temporary nature of his appointment. [57]

Even the petitioner's citation of Justice Puno's[58] dissenting opinion in Teodoro B. Pangilinan v. Guillermo T. Maglaya, etc.[59] is inapt.
Like the petitioner, Pangilinan was merely appointed in an acting capacity and unarguably enjoyed no security of tenure. He was
relieved from the service after exposing certain anomalies involving his superiors. Upon hearing his plea for reinstatement, the Court
unanimously observed that Pangilinan's relief was a punitive response from his superiors. The point of disagreement, however, is
whether Pangilinan's lack of security of tenure deprives him of the right to seek reinstatement. Considering that the law (Administrative
Code of 1987) allows temporary appointments only for a period not exceeding twelve (12) months, the majority considered Pangilinan
to be without any judicial remedy since at the time of his separation, he no longer had any right to the office. Justice Puno dissented,
arguing that Pangilinan's superiors' abuse of his temporary appointment furnishes the basis for the relief he seeks.

In the present case, the petitioner does not even allege that his separation from the office amounted to an abuse of his temporary
appointment that would entitle him to the incidental benefit of reinstatement.[60] As we did in Pangilinan,[61] we point out that the
petitioner's appointment as Acting Commissioner was time-limited. His appointment ipso facto expired on July 21, 2009 when it was
not renewed either in an acting or a permanent capacity. With an expired appointment, he technically now occupies no position on
which to anchor his quo warranto petition.

c. The petitioner is estopped

from claiming that he was
permanently appointed

The petitioner's appointment paper is dated July 21, 2008. From that time until he was apprised on March 22, 2010 of the appointment
of respondent Urro, the petitioner faithfully discharged the functions of his office without expressing any misgivings on the character
of his appointment. However, when called to relinquish his office in favor of respondent Urro, the petitioner was quick on his feet to
refute what appeared in his appointment papers.

Under these facts, the additional circumstance of estoppel clearly militates against the petitioner. A person who accepts an appointment
in an acting capacity, extended and received without any protest or reservation, and who acts by virtue of that appointment for a
considerable time, cannot later on be heard to say that the appointment was really a permanent one so that he could not be removed
except for cause.[62]

II. An acting appointee has no

cause of action for quo warranto
against the new appointee

The Rules of Court requires that an ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action,[63] which is defined as an act or omission
of one party in violation of the legal right of the other which causes the latter injury. While a quo warranto is a special civil action, the
existence of a cause of action is not any less required since both special and ordinary civil actions are governed by the rules
on ordinary civil actions subject only to the rules prescribed specifically for a particular special civil action.[64]

Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public office. Generally, quo warranto proceedings are
commenced by the Government as the proper party-plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual
may commence such action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another. We stress that the person
instituting the quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf must show that he is entitled to the office in dispute; otherwise, the action
may be dismissed at any stage.[65] Emphatically, Section 6, Rule 66 of the same Rules requires the petitioner to state in the petition
his right to the public
office and the respondent's unlawful possession of the disputed position.

As early as 1905,[66] the Court already held that for a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suing private individual must show
a clear right to the contested office.[67] His failure to establish this right warrants the dismissal of the suit for lack of cause of action; it
is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by virtue of his appointment, continues in the undisturbed possession
of his office.[68]

Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to
maintain the present petition.[69] The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time
by the appointing authority.[70] The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of
usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right[71] to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail.

From this perspective, the petitioner must first clearly establish his own right to the disputed office as a condition precedent to the
consideration of the unconstitutionality of the respondents' appointments. The petitioner's failure in this regard renders a ruling on the
constitutional issues raised completely unnecessary. Neither do we need to pass upon the validity of the respondents' appointment.
These latter issues can be determined more appropriately in a proper case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH
DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

"All government is a trust, every branch of government is a trust, and immemorially acknowledged so to
be[.]"1ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition2 filed on March 25, 2015 by petitioner Conchita Carpio Morales, in her
capacity as the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing: (a) the Resolution 3 dated
March 16, 2015 of public respondent the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, which granted private respondent Jejomar
Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) against the implementation of the Joint
Order4 dated March 10, 20,15 of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-A-15-0058 to 0063 (preventive suspension order) preventively suspending
him and several other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati, for six (6) months without pay; and (b) the
Resolution5 dated March 20, 2015 of the CA, ordering the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt6 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 139504.

Pursuant to the Resolution7 dated April 6, 2015, the CA issued a writ of preliminary injunction8 (WPI) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 which
further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order, prompting the Ombudsman to file a supplemental petition9 on
April 13, 2015.

The Facts

On July 22, 2014, a complaint/affidavit10 was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay, Jr., et al), accusing
them of Plunder11 and violation of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as "The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in
connection with the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking
Building).13

On September 9, 2014, the Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of Investigators14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation, submit
an investigation report, and file the necessary complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel).15 Pursuant to the Ombudsman's directive,
on March 5, 2015, the 1st Special Panel filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint) against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6)
administrative cases17for Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, and six
(6) criminal cases18 for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB
Cases).19

As to Binay, Jr., the OMB Complaint alleged that he was involved in anomalous activities attending the following procurement and
construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project, committed during his previous and present terms as City Mayor of Makati:

Binay, Jr.'s First Term (2010 to 2013)20

(a) On September 21, 2010, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase III of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's
Construction Corporation (Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the corresponding contract 22 on September 28, 2010,23 without
the required publication and the lack of architectural design,24 and approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as
follows: (1) P130,518,394.80 on December 15, 2010;25 (2) P134,470,659.64 on January 19, 2011;26 (3)
P92,775,202. on February 25, 2011; (4) P57,148,625.51 on March 28, 2011; (5) P40,908,750.61 on May 3, 2011;29 and (6)
27 27 28

P106,672,761.90 on July 7, 2011;30

(b) On August 11, 2011, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award31 for Phase IV of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and
consequently, executed the corresponding contract32 on August 18, 2011,33 without the required publication and the lack of
architectural design,34 and approved the release of funds therefor in the following amounts as follows: (1) P182,325,538.97 on October
4, 2O11;35 (2) P173,132,606.91 on October 28,2011;36 (3) P80,408,735.20 on December 12, 2011;37 (4) P62,878,291.81 on February
10, 2012;38 and (5) P59,639,167.90 on October 1, 2012;39

(c) On September 6, 2012, Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award40 for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project to Hilmarc's, and
consequently, executed the corresponding contract41 on September 13, 2012,42 without the required publication and the lack of
architectural design,43 and approved the release of the funds therefor in the amounts of P32,398,220.05 44 and P30,582,629.3045 on
December 20, 2012; and

Binay, Jr.'s Second Term (2013 to 2016)46

(d) On July 3, 2013 and July 4, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the September 13, 2012
contract with Hilmarc's for Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of P27,443,629.97;47 and

(e) On July 24, 2013, Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the remaining balance of the contract48 with MANA Architecture &
Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design and architectural services covering the Makati Parking Building project in the amount of
P429,011.48.49

On March 6, 2015, the Ombudsman created another Special Panel of Investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation and
administrative adjudication on the OMB Cases (2nd Special Panel).50Thereafter, on March 9, 2015, the 2nd Special Panel issued separate
orders51 for each of the OMB Cases, requiring Binay, Jr., et al. to file their respective counter-affidavits.52

Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits, the Ombudsman, upon the recommendation of the 2nd Special Panel, issued
on March 10, 2015, the subject preventive suspension order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive suspension for not more than
six (6) months without pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases.53 The Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive
suspension of a public officer are present,54 finding that: (a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was strong given that (1) the losing
bidders and members of the Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City had attested to the irregularities attending the Makati Parking
Building project; (2) the documents on record negated the publication of bids; and (3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and official
receipts showed the release of funds; and (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service; (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant removal from
public service under the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS), and (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective
positions give them access to public records and allow them to influence possible witnesses; hence, their continued stay in office may
prejudice the investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed against them.55 Consequently, the Ombudsman directed the Department of
Interior and Local Government (DILG), through Secretary Manuel A. Roxas II (Secretary Roxas), to immediately implement the
preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr., et al., upon receipt of the same.56

On March 11, 2015, a copy of the preventive suspension order was sent to the Office of the City Mayor, and received by Maricon Ausan,
a member of Binay, Jr.'s staff.57

The Proceedings Before the CA

On even date,58 Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari59 before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, seeking the nullification
of the preventive suspension order, and praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin its implementation.60Primarily, Binay,
Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively liable for any anomalous activity attending any of the five (5) phases of
the Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b)
Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term effectively
condoned his administrative liability therefor, if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him moot and academic.61In
any event, Binay, Jr. claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order failed to show that the evidence of guilt
presented against him is strong, maintaining that he did not participate in any of the purported irregularities.62 In support of his
prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold public office, having won by landslide
vote in the 2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of evidence to sustain the
charges against him, his suspension from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the services of the person they have
conscientiously chosen and voted into office.63

On March 16, 2015, at around 8:24 a.m., Secretary Roxas caused the implementation of the preventive suspension order through the
DILG National Capital Region - Regional Director, Renato L. Brion, CESO III (Director Brion), who posted a copy thereof on the wall of
the Makati City Hall after failing to personally serve the same on Binay, Jr. as the points of entry to the Makati City Hall were closed.
At around 9:47 a.m., Assistant City Prosecutor of Makati Billy C. Evangelista administered the oath of office on Makati City Vice Mayor
Romulo V. Peña, Jr. (Peña, Jr.) who thereupon assumed office as Acting Mayor.64

At noon of the same day, the CA issued a Resolution65 (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding
Pena, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.67Citing the case of Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA,68 the CA found that it
was more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness of the issues raised,
considering that if it were established that the acts subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all committed during his
prior term, then, applying the condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he can no longer be administratively
charged.69 The CA then directed the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for certiorari .70

On March 17, 2015, the Ombudsman manifested71 that the TRO did not state what act was being restrained and that since the
preventive suspension order had already been served and implemented, there was no longer any act to restrain.72

On the same day, Binay, Jr. filed a petition for contempt,73 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, accusing Secretary Roxas, Director
Brion, the officials of the Philippine National Police, and Pena, Jr. of deliberately refusing to obey the CA, thereby allegedly impeding,
obstructing, or degrading the administration of justice.74 The Ombudsman and Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima were
subsequently impleaded as additional respondents upon Binay, Jr.'s filing of the amended and supplemental petition for
contempt75 (petition for contempt) on March 19, 2015.76 Among others, Binay, Jr. accused the Ombudsman and other respondents
therein for willfully and maliciously ignoring the TRO issued by the CA against the preventive suspension order.77

In a Resolution78dated March 20, 2015, the CA ordered the consolidation of CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504,
and, without necessarily giving due course to Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt, directed the Ombudsman to file her comment
thereto.79 The cases were set for hearing of oral arguments on March 30 and 31, 2015.80

The Proceedings Before the Court

Prior to the hearing of the oral arguments before the CA, or on March 25, 2015, the Ombudsman filed the present petition before this
Court, assailing the CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution, which granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, and the
March 20, 2015 Resolution directing her to file a comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504.81 The
Ombudsman claims that: (a) the CA had no jurisdiction to grant Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO, citing Section 14 of RA 6770, 82 or "The
Ombudsman Act of 1989," which states that no injunctive writ could be issued to delay the Ombudsman's investigation unless there is
prima facie evidence that the subject matter thereof is outside the latter's jurisdiction;83 and (b) the CA's directive for the Ombudsman
to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt is illegal and improper, considering that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer,
and therefore, cannot be subjected to contempt proceedings.84
In his comment85 filed on April 6, 2015, Binay, Jr. argues that Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution specifically grants the CA
judicial power to review acts of any branch or instrumentality of government, including the Office of the Ombudsman, in case of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which he asserts was committed in this case when said office issued
the preventive suspension order against him.86 Binay, Jr. posits that it was incumbent upon the Ombudsman to1 have been apprised
of the condonation doctrine as this would have weighed heavily in determining whether there was strong evidence to warrant the
issuance of the preventive suspension order.87 In this relation, Binay, Jr. maintains that the CA correctly enjoined the implementation
of the preventive suspension order given his clear and unmistakable right to public office, and that it is clear that he could not be held
administratively liable for any of the charges against him since his subsequent re-election in 2013 operated as a condonation of any
administrative offenses he may have committed during his previous term.88 As regards the CA's order for the Ombudsman to comment
on his petition for contempt, Binay, Jr. submits that while the Ombudsman is indeed an impeachable officer and, hence, cannot be
removed from office except by way of impeachment, an action for contempt imposes the penalty of fine and imprisonment, without
necessarily resulting in removal from office. Thus, the fact that the Ombudsman is an impeachable officer should not deprive the CA
of its inherent power to punish contempt.89

Meanwhile, the CA issued a Resolution90 dated April 6, 2015, after the oral arguments before it were held,91 granting Binay, Jr.'s
prayer for a WPI, which further enjoined the implementation of the preventive suspension order. In so ruling, the CA found that Binay,
Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, namely, the nullification of the preventive suspension order, in view of the
condonation doctrine, citing Aguinaldo v. Santos.92 Particularly, it found that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive
suspension against Binay, Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising
from anomalous activities relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.93 In this regard, the CA added that,
although there were acts which were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term — namely, the alleged payments on
July 3, July 4, and July 24, 2013,94 corresponding to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively
liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima v. Guingona, Jr.,95 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica96 wherein the condonation doctrine
was still applied by the Court although the payments were made after the official's re-election, reasoning that the payments were
merely effected pursuant to contracts executed before said re-election.97 To this, the CA added that there was no concrete evidence of
Binay, Jr.'s participation for the alleged payments made on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013.98

In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the Ombudsman filed a supplemental
petition99 before this Court, arguing that the condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong for purposes of issuing preventive suspension orders. The Ombudsman also maintained that a reliance on the condonation
doctrine is a matter of defense, which should have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the administrative proceedings, and that,
at any rate, there is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.100

On April 14 and 21, 2015,101 the Court conducted hearings for the oral arguments of the parties. Thereafter, they were required to file
their respective memoranda.102 In compliance thereto, the Ombudsman filed her Memorandum103 on May 20, 2015, while Binay, Jr.
submitted his Memorandum the following day.104

Pursuant to a Resolution105 dated June 16, 2015, the Court directed the parties to comment on each other's memoranda, and the OSG
to comment on the Ombudsman's Memorandum, all within ten (10) days from receipt of the notice.

On July 15, 2015, both parties filed their respective comments to each other's memoranda. 106Meanwhile, on July 16, 2015, the OSG
filed its Manifestation In Lieu of Comment,107 simply stating that it was mutually agreed upon that the Office of the Ombudsman would
file its Memorandum, consistent with its desire to state its "institutional position." 108 In her Memorandum and Comment to Binay, Jr.'s
Memorandum, the Ombudsman pleaded, among others, that this Court abandon the condonation doctrine.109 In view of the foregoing,
the case was deemed submitted for resolution.

The Issues Before the Court

Based on the parties' respective pleadings, and as raised during the oral arguments conducted before this Court, the main issues to
be resolved in seriatim are as follows:

I. Whether or not the present petition, and not motions for reconsideration of the assailed CA issuances in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504, is the Ombudsman's plain, speedy, and adequate remedy;cralawlawlibrary

II. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453;cralawlawlibrary
III. Whether or not the CA has subject matter jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining the implementation of a
preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman;cralawlawlibrary
IV. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the WPI in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 enjoining the implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation
doctrine; and
V. Whether or not the CA's directive for the Ombudsman to ' comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA- G.R.
SP No. 139504 is improper and illegal.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

I.

A common requirement to both a petition for certiorari and a petition for prohibition taken under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is that the petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Sections 1 and 2
thereof provide:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a
verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the
proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

xxxx

Section 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts r with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

x x x x (Emphases supplied)

Hence, as a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari or prohibition since a motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the pre-requisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case.110

Jurisprudence states that "[i]t is [the] inadequacy, [and] not the mere absence of all other legal remedies and the danger of failure of
justice without the writ, that must usually determine the propriety of certiorari [or prohibition]. A remedy is plain, speedy[,] and
adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or
agency, x x x."111

In this light, certain exceptions were crafted to the general rule requiring a prior motion for reconsideration before the filing of a petition
for certiorari, which exceptions also apply to a petition for prohibition.112 These are: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where
the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon
by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of
arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.113

In this case, it is ineluctably clear that the above-highlighted exceptions attend since, for the first time, the question on the authority
of the CA - and of this Court, for that matter - to enjoin the implementation of a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of
the Ombudsman is put to the fore. This case tests the constitutional and statutory limits of the fundamental powers of key government
institutions - namely, the Office of the Ombudsman, the Legislature, and the Judiciary - and hence, involves an issue of transcendental
public importance that demands no less than a careful but expeditious resolution. Also raised is the equally important issue on the
propriety of the continuous application of the condonation doctrine as invoked by a public officer who desires exculpation from
administrative liability. As such, the Ombudsman's direct resort to certiorari and prohibition before this Court, notwithstanding her
failure to move for the prior reconsideration of the assailed issuances in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 and CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 before
the CA, is justified.

II.

Albeit raised for the first time by the Ombudsman in her Memorandum,114 it is nonetheless proper to resolve the issue on the CA's lack
of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453, in view of the well-established rule that a
court's jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. The rationale is that subject matter
jurisdiction is conferred by law, and the lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment
on the action.115 Hence, it should be preliminarily determined if the CA indeed had subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R.
SP No. 139453 petition, as the same determines the validity of all subsequent proceedings relative thereto. It is noteworthy to point
out that Binay, Jr. was given the opportunity by this Court to be heard on this issue,116 as he, in fact, duly submitted his opposition
through his comment to the Ombudsman's Memorandum.117 That being said, the Court perceives no reasonable objection against ruling
on this issue.

The Ombudsman's argument against the CA's lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the main petition, and her corollary prayer for its
dismissal, is based on her interpretation of Section 14, RA 6770, or the Ombudsman Act,118 which reads in full:

Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to delay an investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction
of the Office of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme
Court, on pure question of law.

The subject provision may be dissected into two (2) parts.

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is a prohibition against any court (except the Supreme Court119) from issuing a writ of
injunction to delay an investigation being conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman. Generally speaking, "[injunction is a judicial
writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain act. It may be the main action or merely
a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action." 120 Considering the textual qualifier "to delay," which connotes a
suspension of an action while the main case remains pending, the "writ of injunction" mentioned in this paragraph could only refer to
injunctions of the provisional kind, consistent with the nature of a provisional injunctive relief.

The exception to the no injunction policy is when there is prima facie evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside
the office's jurisdiction. The Office of the Ombudsman has disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, with the exception only of impeachable officers, Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary.121 Nonetheless, the Ombudsman retains the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly
committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.122 Note
that the Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over certain administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts
or administrative agencies, but has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.123

On the other hand, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 provides that no appeal or application for remedy may be heard
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, with the exception of the Supreme Court on pure questions of law. This paragraph,
which the Ombudsman particularly relies on in arguing that the CA had no jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition,
as it is supposedly this Court which has the sole jurisdiction to conduct a judicial review of its decisions or findings, is vague for two
(2) reasons: (1) it is unclear what the phrase "application for remedy" or the word "findings" refers to; and (2) it does not specify
what procedural remedy is solely allowable to this Court, save that the same be taken only against a pure question of law. The task
then, is to apply the relevant principles of statutory construction to resolve the ambiguity.

"The underlying principle of all construction is that the intent of the legislature should be sought in the words employed to express it,
and that when found[,] it should be made to govern, x x x. If the words of the law seem to be of doubtful import, it may then perhaps
become necessary to look beyond them in order to ascertain what was in the legislative mind at the time the law was enacted; what
the circumstances were, under which the action was taken; what evil, if any, was meant to be redressed; x x x [a]nd where the law
has contemporaneously been put into operation, and in doing so a construction has necessarily been put upon it, this construction,
especially if followed for some considerable period, is entitled to great respect, as being very probably a true expression of the legislative
purpose, and is not lightly to be overruled, although it is not conclusive." 124

As an aid to construction, courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body in interpreting a statute of
doubtful meaning. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative
deliberations may be adopted,125 albeit not controlling in the interpretation of the law.126

A. The Senate deliberations cited by the Ombudsman do not pertain to the second paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770.

The Ombudsman submits that the legislative intent behind Section 14, RA 6770, particularly on the matter of judicial review
of her office's decisions or findings, is supposedly clear from the following Senate deliberations:127

Senator [Edgardo J.] Angara, x x x. On page 15, Mr. President, line 14, after the phrase "petition for" delete the word "review" and
in lieu thereof, insert the word CERTIORARI. So that, review or appeal from the decision of the Ombudsman would only be taken not
on a petition for review, but on certiorari.

The President [Jovito R. Salonga]. What is the practical effect of that? Will it be more difficult to reverse the decision
under review?

Senator Angara. It has two practical effect ways, Mr. President. First is that the findings of facts of the Ombudsman would be
almost conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Second, we would not unnecessarily clog the docket of the
Supreme Court. So, it in effect will be a very strict appeal procedure.

xxxx

Senator [Teofisto T.] Guingona, [Jr.]. Does this mean that, for example, if there are exhaustive remedies available to a respondent,
the respondent himself has the right to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, that is correct.

Senator Guingona. And he himself may cut the proceeding short by appealing to the Supreme Court only on certiorari ?

Senator Angara. On question of law, yes.

Senator Guingona. And no other remedy is available to him?

Senator Angara. Going to the Supreme Court, Mr. President?

Senator Guingona. Yes. What I mean to say is, at what stage, for example, if he is a presidential appointee who is the respondent,
if there is f no certiorari available, is the respondent given the right to exhaust his administrative remedies first before the
Ombudsman can take the appropriate action?

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, because we do not intend to change the administrative law principle that before one can go to
court, he must exhaust all administrative remedies xxx available to him before he goes and seeks judicial review.

xxxx

Senator [Neptali A.] Gonzales. What is the purpose of the Committee in changing the method of appeal from one of a
petition for review to a petition for certiorari?
Senator Angara. To make it consistent, Mr. President, with the provision here in the bill to the effect that the finding of
facts of the Ombudsman is conclusive if supported by substantial evidence.

Senator Gonzales. A statement has been made by the Honorable Presiding Officer to which I concur, that in an appeal
by certiorari , the appeal is more difficult. Because in certiorari it is a matter of discretion on the part of the court,
whether to give due course to the petition or dismiss it outright. Is that not correct, Mr. President?

Senator Angara. That is absolutely correct, Mr. President

Senator Gonzales. And in a petition for certiorari , the issue is limited to whether or not the Ombudsman here has acted
without jurisdiction and has committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Is that not the
consequence, Mr. President.

Senator Angara. That is correct, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. And it is, therefore, in this sense that the intention of the Committee is to make it harder to have a
judicial review, but should be limited only to cases that I have enumerated.

Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Gonzales. I think, Mr. President, our Supreme Court has made a distinction between a petition for review and a petition
for certiorari ; because before, under the 1935 Constitution appeal from any order, ruling or decision of the COMELEC shall be by
means of review. But under the Constitution it is now by certiorari and the Supreme Court said that by this change, the court
exercising judicial review will not inquire into the facts, into the evidence, because we will not go deeply by way of review into the
evidence on record but its authority will be limited to a determination of whether the administrative agency acted without, or in
excess of, jurisdiction, or committed a grave abuse of discretion. So, I assume that that is the purpose of this amendment, Mr.
President.

Senator Angara. The distinguished Gentleman has stated it so well.

Senator Gonzales. I just want to put that in the Record. Senator Angara. It is very well stated, Mr. President.

xxxx

The President. It is evident that there must be some final authority to render decisions. Should it be the Ombudsman or
should it be the Supreme Court?

Senator Angara. As I understand it, under our scheme of government, Mr. President, it is and has to be the Supreme Court to
make the final determination.

The President. Then if that is so, we have to modify Section 17.

Senator Angara. That is why, Mr. President, some of our Colleagues have made a reservation to introduce an appropriate change
during the period of Individual Amendments.

xxxx

The President. All right. Is there any objection to the amendment inserting the word CERTIORARI instead of "review"? [Silence]
Hearing none, the same is approved.128

Upon an assiduous scrutiny of these deliberations, the Court is, however, unconvinced that the provision debated on was Section 14,
RA 6770, as the Ombudsman invokes. Note that the exchange begins with the suggestion of Senator Angara to delete the word "review"
that comes after the phrase "petition for review" and, in its stead, insert the word "certiorari" so that the "review or appeal from the
decision of the Ombudsman would not only be taken on a petition for review, but on certiorari" The ensuing exchange between Senators
Gonzales and Angara then dwells on the purpose of changing the method of review from one of a petition for review to a petition
for certiorari - that is, to make "the appeal x x x more difficult." Ultimately, the amendment to the change in wording, from "petition
for review" to "petition for certiorari" was approved.

Noticeably, these references to a "petition for review" and the proposed "petition for certiorari" are nowhere to be found in the text of
Section 14, RA 6770. In fact, it was earlier mentioned that this provision, particularly its second paragraph, does not indicate what
specific procedural remedy one should take in assailing a decision or finding of the Ombudsman; it only reveals that the remedy be
taken to this Court based on pure questions of law. More so, it was even commented upon during the oral arguments of this case129 that
there was no debate or clarification made on the current formulation of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 per the available
excerpts of the Senate deliberations. In any case, at least for the above-cited deliberations, the Court finds no adequate support to
sustain the Ombudsman's entreaty that the CA had no subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition.

On the contrary, it actually makes greater sense to posit that these deliberations refer to another Ombudsman Act provision, namely
Section 27, RA 6770. This is because the latter textually reflects the approval of Senator Angara's suggested amendment, i.e., that
the Ombudsman's decision or finding may be assailed in a petition for certiorari to this Court (fourth paragraph), and further, his
comment on the conclusive nature of the factual findings of the Ombudsman, if supported by substantial evidence (third paragraph):

Section 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions.— (1) All provisionary orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective
and executory.

A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after
receipt of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following grounds:
 (1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order, directive or decision;

(2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration
shall be resolved within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive. Any order, directive or decision
imposing the penalty of public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more than one (1) month's salary shall be final and
unappealable.

In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives, or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed
to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The above rules may be amended or modified by the Office of the ' Ombudsman as the interest of justice may require. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

At first blush, it appears that Section 27, RA 6770 is equally ambiguous in stating that a "petition for certiorari" should be taken in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as it is well-known that under the present 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitions
for certiorari are governed by Rule 65 of the said Rules. However, it should be discerned that the Ombudsman Act was passed way
back in 1989130and, hence, before the advent of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.131 At that time, the governing 1964 Rules of
Court,132 consistent with Section 27, RA 6770, referred to the appeal taken thereunder as a petition for certiorari , thus possibly
explaining the remedy's textual denomination, at least in the provision's final approved version:

RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

SECTION 1. Filing of Petition with Supreme Court. - A party may appeal by certiorari , from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, by
filing with the Supreme Court a petition forcertiorari , within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or of the denial of his motion
for reconsideration filed in due time, and paying at the same time, to the clerk of said court the corresponding docketing fee. The
petition shall not be acted upon without proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of Appeals. (Emphasis supplied)

B. Construing the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.

The Senate deliberations' lack of discussion on the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 notwithstanding, the other principles of
statutory construction can apply to ascertain the meaning of the provision.

To recount, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 states that "[n]o court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy
against the decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law." ;

As a general rule, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 bans the whole range of remedies against issuances of the
Ombudsman, by prohibiting: (a) an appeal against any decision or finding of the Ombudsman, and (b) "any application of remedy"
(subject to the exception below) against the same. To clarify, the phrase "application for remedy," being a generally worded provision,
and being separated from the term "appeal" by the disjunctive "or",133 refers to any remedy (whether taken mainly or provisionally),
except an appeal, following the maxim generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda: general words are to be understood in a general
sense.134 By the same principle, the word "findings," which is also separated from the word "decision" by the disjunctive "or", would
therefore refer to any finding made by the Ombudsman (whether final or provisional), except a decision.

The subject provision, however, crafts an exception to the foregoing general rule. While the specific procedural vehicle is not explicit
from its text, it is fairly deducible that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 excepts, as the only allowable remedy against
"the decision or findings of the Ombudsman," a Rule 45 appeal, for the reason that it is the only remedy taken to the Supreme
Court on "pure questions of law," whether under the 1964 Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

Rule 45, 1964 Rules of Court

RULE 45
Appeal from Court of Appeals to Supreme Court

xxxx

Section 2. Contents of Petition. — The petition shall contain a concise statement of the matters involved, the assignment of errors
made in the court below, and the reasons relied on for the allowance of the petition, and it should be accompanied with a true copy of
the judgment sought to be reviewed, together with twelve (12) copies of the record on appeal, if any, and of the petitioner's brief as
filed in the Court of Appeals. A verified statement of the date when notice of judgment and denial of the motion for reconsideration, if
any, were received shall accompany the petition.

Only questions of law may be raised in the petition and must be distinctly set forth. If no record on appeal has been filed in the
Court of Appeals, the clerk of the Supreme Court, upon admission of the petition, shall demand from the Court of Appeals the elevation
of the whole record of the case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

RULE 45
Appeal by Certiorari to the Supreme Court

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment, final order or resolution of
the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by
law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.
The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in the same action or proceeding at any time during its
pendency. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

That the remedy excepted in the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 could be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1964
Rules of Court or the 1997 Rules of Procedure is a suggestion that defies traditional norms of procedure. It is basic procedural law that
a Rule 65 petition is based on errors of jurisdiction, and not errors of judgment to which the classifications of (a) questions of fact, (b)
questions of law, or (c) questions of mixed fact and law, relate to. In fact, there is no procedural rule, whether in the old or new Rules,
which grounds a Rule 65 petition on pure questions of law. Indeed, it is also a statutory construction principle that the lawmaking body
cannot be said to have intended the establishment of conflicting and hostile systems on the same subject. Such a result would render
legislation a useless and idle ceremony, and subject the laws to uncertainty and unintelligibility.135 There should then be no confusion
that the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 refers to a Rule 45 appeal to this Court, and no other. In sum, the appropriate
construction of this Ombudsman Act provision is that all remedies against issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman are prohibited,
except the above-stated Rule 45 remedy to the Court on pure questions of law.

C. Validity of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770.

Of course, the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770's extremely limited restriction on remedies is inappropriate since a Rule 45
appeal -which is within the sphere of the rules of procedure promulgated by this Court - can only be taken against final decisions or
orders of lower courts,136 and not against "findings" of quasi-judicial agencies. As will be later elaborated upon, Congress cannot
interfere with matters of procedure; hence, it cannot alter the scope of a Rule 45 appeal so as to apply to interlocutory "findings"
issued by the Ombudsman. More significantly, by confining the remedy to a Rule 45 appeal, the provision takes away the remedy
of certiorari, grounded on errors of jurisdiction, in denigration of the judicial power constitutionally vested in courts. In this light, the
second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 also increased this Court's appellate jurisdiction, without a showing, however, that it gave
its consent to the same. The provision is, in fact, very similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 (as above-cited), which
was invalidated in the case of Fabian v. Desiertoni137 (Fabian).138

In Fabian, the Court struck down the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770 as unconstitutional since it had the effect of increasing
the appellate jurisdiction of the Court without its advice and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.139 Moreover, this provision was found to be inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45 of the present 1997 Rules of Procedure
which, as above-intimated, applies only to a review of "judgments or final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the
Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other courts authorized by law;" and not of quasi-judicial agencies, such as the Office
of the Ombudsman, the remedy now being a Rule 43 appeal to the Court of Appeals. In Ruivivar v. Office of the
Ombudsman,140 the Court's ratiocinations and ruling in Fabian were recounted:

The case of Fabian v. Desierto arose from the doubt created in the application of Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman's Act)
and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) on the availability of appeal before the
Supreme Court to assail a decision or order of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. In Fabian, we invalidated Section 27 of
R.A. No. 6770 (and Section 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 7 and the other rules implementing the Act) insofar as it provided for
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 from the decisions or orders of the Ombudsman in administrative cases. We held that
Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 had the effect, not only of increasing the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice
and concurrence in violation of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution; it was also inconsistent with Section 1, Rule 45
of the Rules of Court which provides that a petition for review on certiorari shall apply only to a review of "judgments or
final orders of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals, the Regional Trial Court, or other
courts authorized by law." We pointedly said:

As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line
with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under the provisions of
Rule 43.141 (Emphasis supplied)

Since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 limits the remedy against "decision or findings" of the Ombudsman to a Rule 45
appeal and thus - similar to the fourth paragraph of Section 27, RA 6770142 - attempts to effectively increase the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction without its advice and concurrence,143 it is therefore concluded that the former provision is also unconstitutional
and perforce, invalid. Contrary to the Ombudsman's posturing,144Fabian should squarely apply since the above-stated Ombudsman Act
provisions are in part materia in that they "cover the same specific or particular subject matter," 145 that is, the manner of judicial
review over issuances of the Ombudsman.

Note that since the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is clearly determinative of the existence of the CA's subject matter
jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition, including all subsequent proceedings relative thereto, as the Ombudsman
herself has developed, the Court deems it proper to resolve this issue ex mero motu (on its own motion146). This procedure, as was
similarly adopted in Fabian, finds its bearings in settled case law:

The conventional rule, however, is that a challenge on constitutional grounds must be raised by a party to the case, neither of whom
did so in this case, but that is not an inflexible rule, as we shall explain.

Since the constitution is intended for the observance of the judiciary and other departments of the government and the judges are
sworn to support its provisions, the courts are not at liberty to overlook or disregard its commands or countenance evasions thereof.
When it is clear , that a statute transgresses the authority vested in a legislative body, it is the duty of the courts to declare that the
constitution, and not the statute, governs in a case before them for judgment.

Thus, while courts will not ordinarily pass upon constitutional questions which are not raised in the pleadings, the rule has been
recognized to admit of certain exceptions. It does not preclude a court from inquiring into its own jurisdiction or compel it to enter a
judgment that it lacks jurisdiction to enter. If a statute on which a court's jurisdiction in a proceeding depends is unconstitutional, the
court has no jurisdiction in the proceeding, and since it may determine whether or not it has jurisdiction, it necessarily follows that it
may inquire into the constitutionality of the statute.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected unless the
jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be raised at any time or on
the court's own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact
is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.147 (Emphasis supplied)

D. Consequence of invalidity.

In this case, the Rule 65 petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 was filed by Binay, Jr. before the CA in order to nullify the
preventive suspension order issued by the Ombudsman, an interlocutory order,148 hence, unappealable.149

In several cases decided after Fabian, the Court has ruled that Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances150 of the
Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not directly before this Court:

In Office of the Ombudsman v. Capulong151 (March 12, 2014), wherein a preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman was - similar to this case - assailed through a Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by the public officer before the CA, the
Court held that "[t]here being a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it was certainly imperative for the
CA to grant incidental reliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65."152

In Dagan v. Office of the Ombudsman153 (November 19, 2013), involving a Rule 65 petition for certiorariassailing a final and
unappealable order of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case, the Court remarked that "petitioner employed the
correct mode of review in this case, i.e., a special civil action for certiorari before the Court of Appeals."154 In this relation, it stated
that while "a special civil action for Certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals, such petition should be initially filed with the Court of Appeals in observance of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts." Further,
the Court upheld Barata v. Abalos, Jr.155 (June 6, 2001), wherein it was ruled that the remedy against final and unappealable orders
of the Office of the Ombudsman in an administrative case was a Rule 65 petition to the CA. The same verdict was reached
in Ruivivar156(September 16, 2008).

Thus, with the unconstitutionality of the second paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, the Court, consistent with existing jurisprudence,
concludes that the CA has subject matter jurisdiction over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 petition. That being said, the Court now
examines the objections of the Ombudsman, this time against the CA's authority to issue the assailed TRO and WPI against the
implementation of the preventive suspension order, incidental to that main case.

III.

From the inception of these proceedings, the Ombudsman has been adamant that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue any provisional
injunctive writ against her office to enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she invokes the first paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770 in conjunction with her office's independence under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that "[i]n order to further
ensure [her office's] independence, [RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial intervention," 157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs
traditionally obtainable from the courts,"158 claiming that said writs may work "just as effectively as direct harassment or political
pressure would."159

A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.

Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:

Section 5. There is hereby created the independent Office of the Ombudsman, composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao. A separate Deputy for the military
establishment may likewise be appointed. (Emphasis supplied)

In Gonzales III v. Office of the President160 (Gonzales III), the Court traced the historical underpinnings of the Office of the
Ombudsman:

Prior to the 1973 Constitution, past presidents established several Ombudsman-like agencies to serve as the people's medium for
airing grievances and for direct redress against abuses and misconduct in the government. Ultimately, however, these agencies failed
to fully realize their objective for lack of the political independence necessary for the effective performance of their function as
government critic.

It was under the 1973 Constitution that the Office of the Ombudsman became a constitutionally-mandated office to give it political
independence and adequate powers to enforce its mandate. Pursuant to the ( 1973 Constitution, President Ferdinand Marcos enacted
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1487, as amended by PD No. 1607 and PD No. 1630, creating the Office of the Ombudsman to be known
as Tanodbayan. It was tasked principally to investigate, on complaint or motu proprio, any administrative act of any administrative
agency, including any government-owned or controlled corporation. When the Office of the Tanodbayan was reorganized in 1979, the
powers previously vested in the Special Prosecutor were transferred to the Tanodbayan himself. He was given the exclusive authority
to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file the corresponding information, and control the
prosecution of these cases.

With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, a new Office of the Ombudsman was created by constitutional fiat. Unlike in the 1973
Constitution, its independence was expressly and constitutionally guaranteed. Its objectives are to enforce the state policy in
Section 27, Article II and the standard of accountability in public service under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution. These
provisions read:
Section 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service and take positive and effective measures against graft
and corruption.
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.161 (Emphasis
supplied)

More significantly, Gonzales III explained the broad scope of the office's mandate, and in correlation, the impetus behind its
independence:

Under Section 12, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Office of the Ombudsman is envisioned to be the "protector of the people"
against the inept, abusive, and corrupt in the Government, to function essentially as a complaints and action bureau. This constitutional
vision of a Philippine Ombudsman practically intends to make the Ombudsman an authority to directly check and guard against the
ills, abuses and excesses , of the bureaucracy. Pursuant to Section 13 (8), Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted RA
No. 6770 to enable it to further realize the vision of the Constitution. Section 21 of RA No. 6770 provides:

Section 21. Official Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over
all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies, including Members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be
removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

As the Ombudsman is expected to be an "activist watchman," the < Court has upheld its actions, although not squarely falling under
the broad powers granted [to] it by the Constitution and by RA No. 6770, if these actions are reasonably in line with its official function
and consistent with the law and the Constitution.

The Ombudsman's broad investigative and disciplinary powers include all acts of malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance of all
public officials, including Members of the Cabinet and key Executive officers, during their tenure. To support these broad powers, the
Constitution saw it fit to insulate the Office of the Ombudsman from the pressures and influence of officialdom and
partisan politics and from fear of external reprisal by making it an "independent" office, x x x.

xxxx

Given the scope of its disciplinary authority, the Office of the Ombudsman is a very powerful government constitutional agency that is
considered "a notch above other grievance-handling investigative bodies." It has powers, both constitutional and statutory, that are
commensurate , with its daunting task of enforcing accountability of public officers.162 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Gonzales III is the first case which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's independence vis-a-vis the independence of the
other constitutional bodies. Pertinently, the Court observed:

(1) "[T]he independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman and by the Constitutional Commissions shares certain
characteristics - they do not owe their existence to any act of Congress, but are created by the Constitution itself;
additionally, they all enjoy fiscal autonomy. In general terms, the framers of the Constitution intended that these
'independent' bodies be insulated from political pressure to the extent that the absence of 'independence' would result
in the impairment of their core functions"163;

(2) "[T]he Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility needed
in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the manner the independent
constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal
autonomy and violative not only [of] the express mandate of the Constitution, but especially as regards the Supreme Court,
of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based"; 164 and

(3) "[T]he constitutional deliberations explain the Constitutional Commissions' need for independence. In the deliberations of
the 1973 Constitution, the delegates amended the 1935 Constitution by providing for a constitutionally-created Civil Service
Commission, instead of one created by law, on the premise that the effectivity of this body is dependent on its
freedom from the tentacles of politics. In a similar manner, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the Commission
on Audit highlighted the developments in the past Constitutions geared towards insulating the Commission on Audit from
political pressure."165

At bottom, the decisive ruling in Gonzales III, however, was that the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, as well
as that of the foregoing independent bodies, meant freedom from control or supervision of the Executive Department:

[T]he independent constitutional commissions have been consistently intended by the framers to be independent from executive
control or supervision or any form of political influence. At least insofar as these bodies are concerned, jurisprudence is not
scarce on how the "independence" granted to these bodies prevents presidential interference.

In Brillantes, Jr. v. Yorac (G.R. No. 93867, December 18, 1990, 192 SCRA 358), we emphasized that the Constitutional Commissions,
which have been characterized under the Constitution as "independent," are not under the control of the President, even if they
discharge functions that are executive in nature. The Court declared as unconstitutional the President's act of temporarily appointing
the respondent in that case as Acting Chairman of the [Commission on Elections] "however well-meaning" it might have been.

In Bautista v. Senator Salonga (254 Phil. 156, 179 [1989]), the Court categorically stated that the tenure of the commissioners of the
independent Commission on Human Rights could not be placed under the discretionary power of the President.

xxxx

The kind of independence enjoyed by the Office of the Ombudsman certainly cannot be inferior - but is similar in degree and kind - to
the independence similarly guaranteed by the Constitution to the Constitutional Commissions since all these offices fill the political
interstices of a republican democracy that are crucial to its existence and proper functioning.166 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, in Gonzales III, the Court declared Section 8 (2), RA 6770, which provides that "[a] Deputy or the Special Prosecutor, may be
removed from office by the President for any of the grounds provided for the removal of the Ombudsman, and after due process,"
partially unconstitutional insofar as it subjected the Deputy Ombudsman to the disciplinary authority of the President for violating the
principle of independence. Meanwhile, the validity of Section 8 (2), RA 6770 was maintained insofar as the Office of the Special
Prosecutor was concerned since said office was not considered to be constitutionally within the Office of the Ombudsman and is, hence,
not entitled to the independence the latter enjoys under the Constitution.167

As may be deduced from the various discourses in Gonzales III, the concept of Ombudsman's independence covers three (3) things:

First: creation by the Constitution, which means that the office cannot be abolished, nor its constitutionally specified functions and
privileges, be removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is made;

Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office "may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or dispose of [its] funds for
purposes germane to [its] functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically decreased by officials of the political branches of
government so as to impair said functions; and

Third: insulation from executive supervision and control, which means that those within the ranks of the office can only be
disciplined by an internal authority.

Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to protect the Office of the Ombudsman from political harassment and
pressure, so as to free it from the "insidious tentacles of politics."169

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman independence cannot be invoked as basis to insulate the Ombudsman from judicial
power constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as impartial tribunals and apply
even justice to all. Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be exempt from an incident of judicial power - that is, a provisional writ
of injunction against a preventive suspension order - clearly strays from the concept's rationale of insulating the office from political
harassment or pressure.

B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the Court under the 1987
Constitution.

The Ombudsman's erroneous abstraction of her office's independence notwithstanding, it remains that the first paragraph of Section
14, RA 6770 textually prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office.
Despite the usage of the general phrase "[n]o writ of injunction shall be issued by any court," the Ombudsman herself concedes that
the prohibition does not cover the Supreme Court.170 As support, she cites the following Senate deliberations:

Senator [Ernesto M.] Maceda. Mr. President, I do not know if an amendment is necessary. I would just like to inquire for the
record whether below the Supreme Court, it is understood that there is no injunction policy against the Ombudsman by
lower courts. Or, is it necessary to have a special paragraph for that?

Senator Angara. Well, there is no provision here, Mr. President, that will prevent an injunction against the Ombudsman being issued.

Senator Maceda. In which case, I think that the intention, this being one of the highest constitutional bodies, is to subject
this only to certiorari to the Supreme Court. I think an injunction from the Supreme Court is, of course, in order but no
lower courts should be allowed to interfere. We had a very bad experience with even, let us say, the Forestry Code where no
injunction is supposed to be issued against the Department of Natural Resources. Injunctions are issued right and left by RTC
judges all over the country.

The President. Why do we not make an express provision to that effect?

Senator Angara. We would welcome that, Mr. President.

The President. No [writs of injunction] from the trial courts other than the Supreme Court.

Senator Maceda. I so move, Mr. President, for that amendment.

The President. Is there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the same is approved.171

Further, she acknowledges that by virtue of Sections 1 and 5 (1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, acts of the Ombudsman,
including interlocutory orders, are subject to the Supreme Court's power of judicial review As a corollary, the Supreme Court may issue
ancillary mjunctive writs or provisional remedies in the exercise of its power of judicial review over matters pertaining to ongoing
investigations by the Office of the Ombudsman. Respecting the CA, however, the Ombudsman begs to differ.172

With these submissions, it is therefore apt to examine the validity of the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 insofar as it prohibits
all courts, except this Court, from issuing provisional writs of injunction to enjoin an Ombudsman investigation. That the
constitutionality of this provision is the lis mota of this case has not been seriously disputed. In fact, the issue anent its constitutionality
was properly raised and presented during the course of these proceedings. 173 More importantly, its resolution is clearly necessary to
the complete disposition of this case.174

In the enduring words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. The Electoral Commission (Angara),175 the "Constitution has blocked out with deft
strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative[,] and the judicial departments of the government."176 The
constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of government is more commonly known as the principle of separation of
powers. In the landmark case of Belgica v. Ochoa, Jr. (Belgica),177 the Court held that "there is a violation of the separation of powers
principle when one branch of government unduly encroaches on the domain of another." 178 In particular, "there is a violation of the
principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department's functions."179
Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power is allocated to the Supreme Court and all such lower
courts:

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

This Court is the only court established by the Constitution, while all other lower courts may be established by laws passed by
Congress. Thus, through the passage of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP) 129,180 known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,"
the Court of Appeals,181 the Regional Trial Courts,182 and the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts183were established. Later, through the passage of RA 1125,184 and Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1486,185the Court of Tax
Appeals, and the Sandiganbayan were respectively established.

In addition to the authority to establish lower courts, Section 2, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution empowers Congress to
define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of all courts, exceptthat it may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5186 of the same Article:

Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, ' and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts but may not
deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof.

xxxx

Jurisdiction, as hereinabove used, more accurately pertains to jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action. In The Diocese ofBacolod
v. Commission on Elections,187 subject matter jurisdiction was defined as "the authority 'to hear and determine cases of the
general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes
the court and defines its powers.'"

Among others, Congress defined, prescribed, and apportioned the subject matter jurisdiction of this Court (subject to the
aforementioned constitutional limitations), the Court of Appeals, and the trial courts, through the passage of BP 129, as amended.

In this case, the basis for the CA's subject matter jurisdiction over Binay, Jr.'s main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 is Section 9(1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended:

Section 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

1. Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and
auxiliary writs or processes, whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction[.]

Note that the CA's certiorari jurisdiction, as above-stated, is not only original but also concurrent with the Regional Trial Courts
(under Section 21 (1), Chapter II of BP 129), and the Supreme Court (under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution).
In view of the concurrence of these courts' jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts should be
followed. In People v. Cuaresma,188 the doctrine was explained as follows:

[T]his concurrence of jurisdiction is not x x x to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy
is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary
writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of
Appeals.189

When a court has subject matter jurisdiction over a particular case, as conferred unto it by law, said court may then exercise its
jurisdiction acquired over that case, which is called judicial power.

Judicial power, as vested in the Supreme Court and all other courts established by law, has been defined as the "totality of powers
a court exercises when it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case."190 Under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution, it includes "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.191 the Court explained the expanded scope of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution:

The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement of conflicting rights as
conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of f judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review
what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of
the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because they are
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic
phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.192
Judicial power is never exercised in a vacuum. A court's exercise of the jurisdiction it has acquired over a particular case
conforms to the limits and parameters of the rules of procedure duly promulgated by this Court. In other words, procedure
is the framework within which judicial power is exercised. In Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General,193 the Court elucidated that
"[t]he power or authority of the court over the subject matter existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause
began. Procedure does not alter or change that power or authority; it simply directs the manner in which it shall be fully
and justly exercised. To be sure, in certain cases, if that power is not exercised in conformity with the provisions of the procedural
law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. This does not mean that it loses jurisdiction of
the subject matter."194

While the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is, by constitutional design, vested unto
Congress, the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts belongs exclusively to this Court. Section 5 (5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such
rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)

In Echegaray v. Secretary of Justice195 (Echegaray), the Court traced the evolution of its rule-making authority, which, under the
1935196 and 1973 Constitutions,197 had been priorly subjected to a power-sharing scheme with Congress.198 As it now stands, the 1987
Constitution textually altered the old provisions by deleting the concurrent power of Congress to amend the rules, thus
solidifying in one body the Court's rule-making powers, in line with the Framers' vision of institutionalizing a "[s]tronger and
more independent judiciary."199

The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission would show200 that the Framers debated on whether or not the
Court's rule-making powers should be shared with Congress. There was an initial suggestion to insert the sentence "The National
Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court", right after the
phrase "Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged^" in the enumeration of
powers of the Supreme Court. Later, Commissioner Felicitas S. Aquino proposed to delete the former sentence and, instead, after the
word "[underprivileged," place a comma (,) to be followed by "the phrase with the concurrence of the National Assembly." Eventually,
a compromise formulation was reached wherein (a) the Committee members agreed to Commissioner Aquino's proposal to delete the
phrase "the National Assembly may repeal, alter, or supplement the said rules with the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court"
and (b) in turn, Commissioner Aquino agreed to withdraw his proposal to add "the phrase with the concurrence of the National
Assembly." The changes were approved, thereby leading to the present lack of textual reference to any form of
Congressional participation in Section 5 (5), Article VIII, supra. The prevailing consideration was that "both bodies, the
Supreme Court and the Legislature, have their inherent powers."201

Thus, as it now stands, Congress has no authority to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure.
As pronounced in Echegaray:

The rule making power of this Court was expanded. This Court for the first time was given the power to promulgate rules concerning
the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. The Court was also r granted for the first time the power to disapprove rules
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies. But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took away the power of
Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to
promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the
Executive.202 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Under its rule-making authority, the Court has periodically passed various rules of procedure, among others, the current 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. Identifying the appropriate procedural remedies needed for the reasonable exercise of every court's
judicial power, the provisional remedies of temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction were thus
provided.

A temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction both constitute temporary measures availed of during the pendency
of the action. They are, by nature, ancillary because they are mere incidents in and are dependent upon the result of the main action.
It is well-settled that the sole objectof a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory
or mandatory, is to preserve the status quo203 until the merits of the case can be heard. They are usually granted when it is made
to appear that there is a substantial controversy between the parties and one of them is committing an act or threatening the immediate
commission of an act that will cause irreparable injury or destroy the status quo of the controversy before a full hearing can be had on
the merits of the case. In other words, they are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive rights or interests, and, hence,
not a cause of action in itself, but merely adjunct to a main suit.204 In a sense, they are regulatory processes meant to prevent a case
from being mooted by the interim acts of the parties.

Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure generally governs the provisional remedies of a TRO and a WPI. A preliminary injunction
is defined under Section 1,205 Rule 58, while Section 3206 of the same Rule enumerates the grounds for its issuance. Meanwhile, under
Section 5207 thereof, a TRO may be issued as a precursor to the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction under certain procedural
parameters.

The power of a court to issue these provisional injunctive reliefs coincides with its inherent power to issue all auxiliary writs,
processes, and other means necessary to carry its acquired jurisdiction into effect under Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules
of Court which reads:

Section 6. Means to carry jurisdiction into effect. - When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs,
f processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer; and if the procedure to be
followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law208 or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of
proceeding may be adopted which appears comfortable to the spirit of the said law or rules.

In City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuerdo,209 which is a case involving "[t]he supervisory power or jurisdiction of the [Court of Tax Appeals]
to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction"210 over "decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases
originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction,"211 the Court ruled that said power
"should coexist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC,
in order to have complete supervision over the acts of the latter:"212

A grant of appellate jurisdiction implies that there is included in it the power necessary to exercise it effectively, to make all
orders that ; will preserve the subject of the action, and to give effect to the final determination of the appeal. It carries
with it the power to protect that jurisdiction and to make the decisions of the court thereunder effective. The court, in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, has authority to control all auxiliary and incidental matters necessary to the efficient and proper exercise of that jurisdiction.
For this purpose, it may, when necessary, prohibit or restrain the performance of any act which might interfere with the proper exercise
of its rightful jurisdiction in cases pending before it.213 (Emphasis supplied)

In this light, the Court expounded on the inherent powers of a court endowed with subject matter jurisdiction:

[A] court which is endowed with a particular jurisdiction should have powers which are necessary to enable it to act effectively within
such jurisdiction. These should be regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court must possess
them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress any abuses of its process and to t defeat any attempted
thwarting of such process.

xxxx

Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to
those expressly conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient
exercise of jurisdiction; or are essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due
administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers;
and include the power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 214 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)

Broadly speaking, the inherent powers of the courts resonates the long-entrenched constitutional principle, articulated way back in the
1936 case of Angara, that "where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of
the one or the performance of the other is also conferred."215

In the United States, the "inherent powers doctrine refers to the principle, by which the courts deal with diverse matters over which
they are thought to have intrinsic authority like procedural [rule-making] and general judicial housekeeping. To justify the invocation
or exercise of inherent powers, a court must show that the powers are reasonably necessary to achieve the specific purpose
for which the exercise is sought. Inherent powers enable the judiciary to accomplish its constitutionally mandated
functions."216

In Smothers v. Lewis217 (Smothers), a case involving the constitutionality of a statute which prohibited courts from enjoining the
enforcement of a revocation order of an alcohol beverage license pending appeal,218 the Supreme Court of Kentucky held:

[T]he Court is x x x vested with certain "inherent" powers to do that which is reasonably necessary for the administration
of justice within the scope of their jurisdiction. x x x [W]e said while considering the rule making power and the judicial power
to be one and the same that ". . . the grant of judicial power [rule making power] to the courts by the constitution carries
with it, as a necessary incident, the right to make that power effective in the administration of justice." (Emphases supplied)

Significantly, Smothers characterized a court's issuance of provisional injunctive relief as an exercise of the court's inherent power,
and to this end, stated that any attempt on the part of Congress to interfere with the same was constitutionally impermissible:

It is a result of this foregoing line of thinking that we now adopt the language framework of 28 Am.Jur.2d, Injunctions, Section 15,
and once and for all make clear that a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as an incidental to its
constitutional grant of power, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary to the administration of justice in the case before
it. In the exercise of this power, a court, when necessary in order to protect or preserve the subject matter of the
litigation, to protect its jurisdiction and to make its judgment effective, may grant or issue a temporary injunction in aid
of or ancillary to the principal action.

The control over this inherent judicial power, in this particular instance the injunction, is exclusively within the
constitutional realm of the courts. As such, it is not within the purview of the legislature to grant or deny the power nor
is it within the purview of the legislature to shape or fashion circumstances under which this inherently judicial power
may be or may not be granted or denied.

This Court has historically recognized constitutional limitations upon the power of the legislature to interfere with or to inhibit the
performance of constitutionally granted and inherently provided judicial functions, x x x

xxxx
We reiterate our previously adopted language, ". . . a court, once having obtained jurisdiction of a cause of action, has, as incidental
to its general jurisdiction, inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary f to the administration of justice in the case before it.
. ." This includes the inherent power to issue injunctions. (Emphases supplied)

Smothers also pointed out that the legislature's authority to provide a right to appeal in the statute does not necessarily mean that it
could control the appellate judicial proceeding:

However, the fact that the legislature statutorily provided for this appeal does not give it the right to encroach upon the constitutionally
granted powers of the judiciary. Once the administrative action has ended and the right to appeal arises the legislature is
void of any right to control a subsequent appellate judicial proceeding. The judicial rules have come into play and have
preempted the field.219 (Emphasis supplied)

With these considerations in mind, the Court rules that when Congress passed the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 and, in so
doing, took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, it
encroached upon this Court's constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by nature, provisional reliefs
and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of the Rules of Court, are matters of procedure which belong exclusively within the
province of this Court. Rule 58 of the Rules of Court did not create, define, and regulate a right but merely prescribed the means of
implementing an existing right220 since it only provided for temporary reliefs to preserve the applicant's right in esse which is threatened
to be violated during the course of a pending litigation. In the case of Fabian,211 it was stated that:

If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as
a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.

Notably, there have been similar attempts on the part of Congress, in the exercise of its legislative power, to amend the Rules of Court,
as in the cases of: (a) In Re: Exemption of The National Power Corporation from Payment of Filing/ Docket Fees;222 (b) Re: Petition for
Recognition of the Exemption of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) from Payment of Legal Fees;223 and (c) Baguio
Market Vendors Multi-Purpose Cooperative (BAMARVEMPCO) v. Cabato-Cortes224 While these cases involved legislative enactments
exempting government owned and controlled corporations and cooperatives from paying filing fees, thus, effectively modifying Rule
141 of the Rules of Court (Rule on Legal Fees), it was, nonetheless, ruled that the prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish
new rules of procedure225 solely belongs to the Court, to the exclusion of the legislative and executive branches of
government. On this score, the Court described its authority to promulgate rules on pleading, practice, and procedure as exclusive
and "[o]ne of the safeguards of [its] institutional independence."226

That Congress has been vested with the authority to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts under Section
2, Article VIII supra, as well as to create statutory courts under Section 1, Article VIII supra, does not result in an abnegation of the
Court's own power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice, and procedure under Section 5 (5), Article VIII supra. Albeit operatively
interrelated, these powers are nonetheless institutionally separate and distinct, each to be preserved under its own sphere of
authority. When Congress creates a court and delimits its jurisdiction, the procedure for which its jurisdiction is exercised
is fixed by the Court through the rules it promulgates. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 is not a jurisdiction-vesting
provision, as the Ombudsman misconceives,227 because it does not define, prescribe, and apportion the subject matter jurisdiction of
courts to act on certiorari cases; the certiorari jurisdiction of courts, particularly the CA, stands under the relevant sections of BP 129
which were not shown to have been repealed. Instead, through this provision, Congress interfered with a provisional remedy
that was created by this Court under its duly promulgated rules of procedure, which utility is both integral and inherent
to every court's exercise of judicial power. Without the Court's consent to the proscription, as may be manifested by an
adoption of the same as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular issued therefor, there thus,
stands to be a violation of the separation of powers principle.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the breach of Congress in prohibiting provisional injunctions, such as in the first paragraph
of Section 14, RA 6770, does not only undermine the constitutional allocation of powers; it also practically dilutes a court's ability
to carry out its functions. This is so since a particular case can easily be mooted by supervening events if no provisional
injunctive relief is extended while the court is hearing the same. Accordingly, the court's acquired jurisdiction, through which
it exercises its judicial power, is rendered nugatory. Indeed, the force of judicial power, especially under the present Constitution,
cannot be enervated due to a court's inability to regulate what occurs during a proceeding's course. As earlier intimated, when
jurisdiction over the subject matter is accorded by law and has been acquired by a court, its exercise thereof should be undipped. To
give true meaning to the judicial power contemplated by the Framers of our Constitution, the Court's duly promulgated rules of
procedure should therefore remain unabridged, this, even by statute. Truth be told, the policy against provisional injunctive writs in
whatever variant should only subsist under rules of procedure duly promulgated by the Court given its sole prerogative over the same.

The following exchange between Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) and the Acting Solicitor General Florin
T. Hilbay (Acting Solicitor General Hilbay) mirrors the foregoing observations:

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay. Now, would you know what rule covers injunction in the Rules of Court?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Rule 58, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
58, that is under the general rubric if Justice Bersamin will correct me if I will be mistaken under the rubric of what is called
provisional remedies, our resident expert because Justice Peralta is not here so Justice Bersamin for a while. So provisional remedy
you have injunction, x x x.

xxxx

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, Now, we go to the Constitution. Section 5, subparagraph 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution, if you have a copy of the
Constitution, can you please read that provision? Section 5, Article VIII the Judiciary subparagraph 5, would you kindly read that
provision?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY.

"Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts..."

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, we can stop with that, promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. This is the power, the
competence, the jurisdiction of what constitutional organ?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

The Supreme Court, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
The Supreme Court. This is different from Article VIII Sections 1 and 2 which we've already been discussed with you by my other
colleagues, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Okay, so in Section 2, [apportion] jurisdiction that is the power of Congress, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
On the other hand, the power to promulgate rules is with the Court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
A TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction, would it be a separate case or is it part of litigation in an ordinary case?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

It is an ancillary remedy, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In fact, it originated as an equitable remedy, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In order to preserve the power of a court so that at the end of litigation, it will not be rendered moot and academic, is
that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
In that view, isn't Section 14, first paragraph, unconstitutional?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

No, Your Honor.

xxxx

JUSTICE LEONEN.
Can Congress say that a Court cannot prescribe Motions to Dismiss under Rule 16?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Your Honor, Congress cannot impair the power of the Court to create remedies, x x x.

JUSTICE LEONEN.
What about bill [of] particulars, can Congress say, no Court shall have the power to issue the supplemental pleading called the bill of
t particular [s]? It cannot, because that's part of procedure...

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

That is true.

JUSTICE LEONEN
...or for that matter, no Court shall act on a Motion to Quash, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
So what's different with the writ of injunction?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Writ of injunction, Your Honor, requires the existence of jurisdiction on the part of a court that was created by Congress. In the
absence of jurisdiction... (interrupted)

JUSTICE LEONEN:
No, writ of injunction does not attach to a court. In other words, when they create a special agrarian court it has all procedures with
it but it does not attach particularly to that particular court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICTOR GENERAL HILBAY:

When Congress, Your Honor, creates a special court...

JUSTICE LEONEN:
Again, Counsel, what statute provides for a TRO, created the concept of a TRO? It was a Rule. A rule of procedure and the Rules of
Court, is that not correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE LEONEN:
And a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction does not exist unless it is [an] ancillary to a particular injunction in a court, is that not
correct?

ACTING SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:

Correct, Your Honor.

xxxx228 (Emphasis supplied)

In Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010,229 the Court instructed that "[i]t is through the Constitution that the
fundamental powers of government are established, limited and defined, and by which these powers are distributed among the several
departments. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons, including
the highest officials of the land, must defer." It would then follow that laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken
down for being unconstitutional.230

However, despite the ostensible breach of the separation of powers principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy considerations
behind the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar import. Thus, pending deliberation
on whether or not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it proper
to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin
investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an administrative
circular duly issued therefor.

Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of procedure (through passing the first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770) without the
Court's consent thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the implementation
of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point, these issuances were merely ancillary to the
exercise of the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and which it had
already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 case.

IV.

The foregoing notwithstanding, the issue of whether or not the CA gravely abused its jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and WPI in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453 against the preventive suspension order is a persisting objection to the validity of said injunctive writs. For its
proper analysis, the Court first provides the context of the assailed injunctive writs.

A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the preventive suspension order.

By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a penalty but only a preventive measure. In Quimbo v. Acting
Ombudsman Gervacio,231 the Court explained the distinction, stating that its purpose is to prevent the official to be
suspended from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses
or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him:

Jurisprudential law establishes a clear-cut distinction between suspension as preventive measure and suspension as penalty. The
distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable as they have different ends sought to be
achieved.

Preventive suspension is merely a preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose
of the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and prerogatives of his office
to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If
after such investigation, the charge is established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or
removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty.

That preventive suspension is not a penalty is in fact explicitly provided by Section 24 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292) and other Pertinent Civil Service Laws.
Section. 24. Preventive suspension is not a punishment or penalty for misconduct in office but is considered to be a preventive measure.
(Emphasis supplied)

Not being a penalty, the period within which one is under preventive suspension is not considered part of the actual penalty of
suspension. So Section 25 of the same Rule XIV provides:

Section 25. The period within which a public officer or employee charged is placed under preventive suspension shall not be
considered part of the actual penalty of suspension imposed upon the employee found guilty.232(Emphases supplied)

The requisites for issuing a preventive suspension order are explicitly stated in Section 24, RA 6770:

Section 24. Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge against such officer
or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges
would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six (6)
months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence
or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein
provided. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In other words, the law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive suspension
pending an investigation, namely:

(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first requirement:
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;

(b) The charge would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.233

B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the condonation doctrine.

Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 would, however, show that the Ombudsman's non-compliance with the
requisites provided in Section 24, RA 6770 was not the basis for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.

The CA's March 16, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed TRO was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr.
v. CA234 (Governor Garcia, Jr.), wherein the Court emphasized that "if it were established in the CA that the acts subject of the
administrative complaint were indeed committed during petitioner [Garcia's] prior term, then, following settled jurisprudence, he can
no longer be administratively charged."235 Thus, the Court, contemplating the application of the condonation doctrine, among others,
cautioned, in the said case, that "it would have been more prudent for [the appellate court] to have, at the very least, on account of
the extreme urgency of the matter and the seriousness of the issues raised in the certiorari petition, issued a TRO x x x"236 during
the pendency of the proceedings.

Similarly, the CA's April 6, 2015 Resolution which directed the issuance of the assailed WPI was based on the condonation doctrine,
citing the case of Aguinaldo v. Santos237 The CA held that Binay, Jr. has an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for, i.e., the
nullification of the preventive suspension order, finding that the Ombudsman can hardly impose preventive suspension against Binay,
Jr. given that his re-election in 2013 as City Mayor of Makati condoned any administrative liability arising from anomalous activities
relative to the Makati Parking Building project from 2007 to 2013.238 Moreover, the CA observed that although there were acts which
were apparently committed by Binay, Jr. beyond his first term , i.e., the alleged payments on July 3, 4, and 24, 2013,239 corresponding
to the services of Hillmarc's and MANA - still, Binay, Jr. cannot be held administratively liable therefor based on the cases of Salalima
v. Guingona, Jr.,240 and Mayor Garcia v. Mojica,241 wherein the condonation dobtrine was applied by the Court although the
payments were made after the official's election, reasoning that the payments were merely effected pursuant to contracts executed
before said re-election.242

The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA to have considered the condonation doctrine since it was a matter of
defense which should have been raised and passed upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary proceedings.243 However,
the Court agrees with the CA that it was not precluded from considering the same given that it was material to the propriety of
according provisional injunctive relief in conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr., which was the subsisting jurisprudence at
that time. Thus, since condonation was duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA did not err in
passing upon the same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his
petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,245it appears that the CA found that the application of the condonation doctrine was already sufficient
to enjoin the implementation of the preventive suspension order. Again, there is nothing aberrant with this since, as remarked in the
same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if it was established that the acts subject of the administrative complaint were indeed committed
during Binay, Jr.'s prior term, then, following the condonation doctrine, he can no longer be administratively charged. In other words,
with condonation having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary
to determine if the evidence of guilt against him was strong, at least for the purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs.

With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the assailed writs herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to determine if
the CA gravely abused its discretion in applying the condonation doctrine.

B. The origin of the condonation doctrine.

Generally speaking, condonation has been defined as "[a] victim's express or implied forgiveness of an offense, [especially] by
treating the offender as if there had been no offense."246

The condonation doctrine - which connotes this same sense of complete extinguishment of liability as will be herein elaborated
upon - is not based on statutory law. It is a jurisprudential creation that originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board ofNueva Ecija,247 (Pascual), which was therefore decided under the 1935 Constitution.

In Pascual, therein petitioner, Arturo Pascual, was elected Mayor of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, sometime in November 1951, and
was later re-elected to the same position in 1955. During his second term, or on October 6, 1956, the Acting Provincial
Governor filed administrative charges before the Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija against him for grave abuse of authority
and usurpation of judicial functions for acting on a criminal complaint in Criminal Case No. 3556 on December 18 and 20,
1954. In defense, Arturo Pascual argued that he cannot be made liable for the acts charged against him since they were
committed during his previous term of office, and therefore, invalid grounds for disciplining him during his second term. The
 Provincial Board, as well as the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, later decided against Arturo Pascual, and when the case
reached this Court on appeal, it recognized that the controversy posed a novel issue - that is, whether or not an elective
official may be disciplined for a wrongful act committed by him during his immediately preceding term of office.

As there was no legal precedent on the issue at that time, the Court, in Pascual, resorted to American authorities and
"found that cases on the matter are conflicting due in part, probably, to differences in statutes and constitutional provisions,
and also, in part, to a divergence of views with respect to the question of whether the subsequent election or appointment
condones the prior misconduct."248Without going into the variables of these conflicting views and cases, it proceeded
to state that:

The weight of authorities x x x seems to incline toward the rule denying the right to remove one from office because of
misconduct during a prior term, to which we fully subscribe.249 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The conclusion is at once problematic since this Court has now uncovered that there is really no established weight of authority in the
United States (US) favoring the doctrine of condonation, which, in the words of Pascual, theorizes that an official's re-election denies
the right to remove him from office due to a misconduct during a prior term. In fact, as pointed out during the oral arguments of this
case, at least seventeen (17) states in the US have abandoned the condonation doctrine.250 The Ombudsman aptly cites several rulings
of various US State courts, as well as literature published on the matter, to demonstrate the fact that the doctrine is not uniformly
applied across all state jurisdictions. Indeed, the treatment is nuanced:

(1)
For one, it has been widely recognized that the propriety of removing a public officer from his current term or office for
misconduct which he allegedly committed in a prior term of office is governed by the language of the statute or constitutional
provision applicable to the facts of a particular case (see In Re Removal of Member of Council Coppola).251 As an example, a
Texas statute, on the one hand, expressly allows removal only for an act committed during a present term: "no officer shall
be prosecuted or removed from office for any act he may have committed prior to his election to office" (see State ex rel.
Rowlings v. Loomis).252 On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma allows removal from office for "acts of commission,
omission, or neglect committed, done or omitted during a previous or preceding term of office" (see State v.
Bailey)253 Meanwhile, in some states where the removal statute is silent or unclear, the case's resolution was contingent upon
the interpretation of the phrase "in office." On one end, the Supreme Court of Ohio strictly construed a removal statute
containing the phrase "misfeasance of malfeasance in office" and thereby declared that, in the absence of clear legislative
language making, the word "office" must be limited to the single term during which the offense charged against the public
officer occurred (see State ex rel. Stokes v. Probate Court of Cuyahoga County)254 Similarly, the Common Pleas Court of
Allegheny County, Pennsylvania decided that the phrase "in office" in its state constitution was a time limitation with regard
to the grounds of removal, so that an officer could not be removed for misbehaviour which occurred; prior to the taking of
the office (see Commonwealth v. Rudman)255 The opposite was construed in the Supreme Court of Louisiana which took the
view that an officer's inability to hold an office resulted from the commission of certain offenses, and at once rendered him
unfit to continue in office, adding the fact that the officer had been re-elected did not condone or purge the offense (see State
ex rel. Billon v. Bourgeois).256 Also, in the Supreme Court of New York, Apellate Division, Fourth Department, the court
construed the words "in office" to refer not to a particular term of office but to an entire tenure; it stated that the whole
purpose of the legislature in enacting the statute in question could easily be lost sight of, and the intent of the law-making
body be thwarted, if an unworthy official could not be removed during one term for misconduct for a previous one (Newman
v. Strobel).257

(2) For another, condonation depended on whether or not the public officer was a successor in the same office for which he
has been administratively charged. The "own-successor theory," which is recognized in numerous States as an exception to
condonation doctrine, is premised on the idea that each term of a re-elected incumbent is not taken as separate and distinct,
but rather, regarded as one continuous term of office. Thus, infractions committed in a previous term are grounds for removal
because a re-elected incumbent has no prior term to speak of258 (see Attorney-General v. Tufts;259State v. Welsh;260Hawkins
v. Common Council of Grand Rapids;261Territory v. Sanches;262 and Tibbs v. City of Atlanta).263

(3) Furthermore, some State courts took into consideration the continuing nature of an offense in cases where the condonation
doctrine was invoked. In State ex rel. Douglas v. Megaarden,264 the public officer charged with malversation of public funds
was denied the defense of condonation by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, observing that "the large sums of money illegally
collected during the previous years are still retained by him." In State ex rel. Beck v. Harvey265 the Supreme Court of Kansas
ruled that "there is no necessity" of applying the condonation doctrine since "the misconduct continued in the present term of
office[;] [thus] there was a duty upon defendant to restore this money on demand of the county commissioners." Moreover,
in State ex rel. Londerholm v. Schroeder,266 the Supreme Court of Kansas held that "insofar as nondelivery and excessive
prices are concerned, x x x there remains a continuing duty on the part of the defendant to make restitution to the country x
x x, this duty extends into the present term, and neglect to discharge it constitutes misconduct."

Overall, the foregoing data clearly contravenes the preliminary conclusion in Pascual that there is a "weight of authority" in
the US on the condonation doctrine. In fact, without any cogent exegesis to show that Pascual had accounted for the numerous
factors relevant to the debate on condonation, an outright adoption of the doctrine in this jurisdiction would not have been
proper.

At any rate, these US cases are only of persuasive value in the process of this Court's decision-making. "[They] are not relied
upon as precedents, but as guides of interpretation."267 Therefore, the ultimate analysis is on whether or not the condonation
doctrine, as espoused in Pascual, and carried over in numerous cases after, can be held up against prevailing legal norms.
Note that the doctrine of stare decisis does not preclude this Court from revisiting existing doctrine. As adjudged in the case
of Belgica, the stare decisis rule should not operate when there are powerful countervailing considerations against its
application.268 In other words, stare decisis becomes an intractable rule only when circumstances exist to preclude reversal of
standing precedent.269 As the Ombudsman correctly points out, jurisprudence, after all, is not a rigid, atemporal abstraction;
it is an organic creature that develops and devolves along with the society within which it thrives.270 In the words of a recent
US Supreme Court Decision, "[w]hat we can decide, we can undecide." 271

In this case, the Court agrees with the Ombudsman that since the time Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically
 shifted. Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935 Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the
experience of the Filipino People under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting, including,
of course, the sheer impact of the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual's judicious re-examination.

D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.

Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:

First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for each term is
separate and distinct:

Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is
especially true where the constitution provides that the penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond the removal
from office, and disqualification from holding office for the term for which the officer was elected or appointed. (67 C.J.S.
p. 248, citing Rice vs. State, 161 S.W. 2d. 401; Montgomery vs. Nowell, 40 S.W. 2d. 418; People ex rel.Bagshaw vs. Thompson, 130
P. 2d. 237; Board of Com'rs of Kingfisher County vs. Shutter, 281 P. 222; State vs. Blake, 280 P. 388; In re Fudula, 147 A. 67; State
vs. Ward, 43 S.W. 2d. 217).
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms x x x.272

Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right to remove him
therefor; and

[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to
remove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. vs. Hasty, 184 Ala. 121, 63 So. 559, 50 L.R.A. (NS) 553.273(emphasis
supplied)

Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are assumed to have known the life and character of candidates, of their right to
elect officers:

As held in Conant vs. Grogan (1887) 6 N.Y.S.R. 322, cited in 17 A.I.R. 281, 63 So. 559, 50 LRA (NS) 553 —
The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive
the people of their right to elect their officers. When the people have elected a man to office, it must be assumed that they
did this with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any. It is not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to practically overrule the will of the
people.274 (Emphases supplied)

The notable cases on condonation following Pascual are as follows:

(1) Lizares v. Hechanova275 (May 17, 1966) - wherein the Court first applied the condonation doctrine, thereby quoting the
above-stated passages from Pascual in verbatim.

(2) Insco v. Sanchez, et al.276 (December 18, 1967) - wherein the Court clarified that the condonation doctrine does not
apply to a criminal case. It was explained that a criminal case is different from an administrative case in that the former
involves the People of the Philippines as a community, and is a public wrong to the State at large; whereas, in the latter, only
the populace of the constituency he serves is affected. In addition, the Court noted that it is only the President who may
pardon a criminal offense.

(3) Aguinaldo v. Santos277 (Aguinaldo; August 21, 1992) - a case decided under the 1987 Constitution wherein the
condonation doctrine was applied in favor of then Cagayan Governor Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo although his re-election merely
supervened the pendency of, the proceedings.
(4) Salalima v. Guinsona, Jr.278 (Salalima; May 22, 1996) -wherein the Court reinforced the condonation doctrine by
stating that the same is justified by "sound public policy." According to the Court, condonation prevented the elective
official from being "hounded" by administrative cases filed by his "political enemies" during a new term, for which he has to
defend himself "to the detriment of public service." Also, the Court mentioned that the administrative liability condoned by
re-election covered the execution of the contract and the incidents related therewith.279

(5) Mayor Garcia v. Mojica280 (Mayor Garcia; September 10, 1999) - wherein the benefit of the doctrine was extended to
then Cebu City Mayor Alvin B. Garcia who was administratively charged for his involvement in an anomalous contract for the
supply of asphalt for Cebu City, executed only four (4) days before the upcoming elections. The Court ruled that
notwithstanding the timing of the contract's execution, the electorate is presumed to have known the petitioner's background
and character, including his past misconduct; hence, his subsequent re-election was deemed a condonation of his prior
transgressions. More importantly, the Court held that the determinative time element in applying the condonation doctrine
should be the time when the contract was perfected; this meant that as long as the contract was entered into during
a prior term, acts which were done to implement the same, even if done during a succeeding term, do not negate
the application of the condonation doctrine in favor of the elective official.

(6) Salumbides, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman281 (Salumbides, Jr.; April 23, 2010) - wherein the Court explained the
doctrinal innovations in the Salalima and Mayor Garcia rulings, to wit:

Salalima v. Guingona, Jr. and Mayor Garcia v. Hon. Mojica reinforced the doctrine. The condonation rule was applied even if the
administrative complaint was not filed before the reelection of the public official, and even if the alleged misconduct
occurred four days before the elections, respectively. Salalima did not distinguish as to the date of filing of the administrative
complaint, as long as the alleged misconduct was committed during the prior term, the precise timing or period of which Garcia did
not further distinguish, as long as the wrongdoing that gave rise to the public official's culpability was committed prior to the date of
reelection.282 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor,283 also clarified that the condonation doctrine would not apply to appointive
officials since, as to them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.

(7) And finally, the above discussed case of Governor Garcia, Jr. -wherein the Court remarked that it would have been prudent for
the appellate court therein to have issued a temporary restraining order against the implementation of a preventive suspension order
issued by the Ombudsman in view of the condonation doctrine.

A thorough review of the cases post-1987, among others, Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. - all cited by
the CA to justify its March 16, 2015 and April 6, 2015 Resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs - would show
that the basis for condonation under the prevailing constitutional and statutory framework was never accounted for. What remains
apparent from the text of these cases is that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was - and still remains - the above-
cited postulates of Pascual, which was lifted from rulings of US courts where condonation was amply supported by their own state laws.
With respect to its applicability to administrative cases, the core premise of condonation - that is, an elective official's re-election cuts
qff the right to remove him for an administrative offense committed during a prior term - was adopted hook, line, and sinker in our
jurisprudence largely because the legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing legal norms. As in the US, the propriety
of condonation is - as it should be -dependent on the legal foundation of the adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an
examination of our current laws in order to determine if there is legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine of condonation.

The foundation of our entire legal system is the Constitution. It is the supreme law of the land; 284 thus, the unbending rule is that
every statute should be read in light of the Constitution.285 Likewise, the Constitution is a framework of a workable government; hence,
its interpretation must take into account the complexities, realities, and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of
government.286

As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in 1959. Therefore, it was decided within the context of the 1935 Constitution
which was silent with respect to public accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public trust. The provision in the 1935
Constitution that comes closest in dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II which states that "[t]he defense of the State is a
prime duty of government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens may be required by law to render personal military or civil
service."287 Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution's silence on public accountability, and considering the dearth of jurisprudential
rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in the policy considerations, there was no glaring objection confronting the Pascual Court
in adopting the condonation doctrine that originated from select US cases existing at that time.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in dealing with public officers underwent a significant change. The new charter
introduced an entire article on accountability of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof positively recognized,
acknowledged, and declared that "[p]ublic office is a public trust." Accordingly, "[p]ublic officers and employees shall serve
with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall remain accountable to the people."

After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino People have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which sets forth
in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in Article II that "[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public
service and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption."288 Learning how unbridled power could corrupt
public servants under the regime of a dictator, the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service by declaring it as a
constitutional principle and a State policy. More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and solidified what has been first
proclaimed in the 1973 Constitution by commanding public officers to be accountable to the people at all times:

Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all timesbe accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency and act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.

In Belgica, it was explained that:

[t]he aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public trust," is an
overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions only in accordance with the
principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people's trust. The notion of a public trust connotes
accountability x x x.289 (Emphasis supplied)

The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative Code under the section of the Civil Service Commission, 290 and also, in the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.291

For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official from office are
stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No. 7160,292 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC), which was
approved on October 10 1991, and took effect on January 1, 1992:

Section 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Action. - An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed from office on any
of the r following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines;
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution;
(c) Dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, gross negligence, or dereliction of duty;
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense punishable by at least prision mayor;
(e) Abuse of authority;
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, except in the case of members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlunsod, sanggunian bayan, and sangguniang barangay;
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws.

An elective local official may be removed from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court.
Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which states that those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case shall be disqualified from running for any elective local position:

Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

xxxx

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the accessory
penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office:

Section 52. - Administrative Disabilities Inherent in Certain Penalties. -

a. The penalty of dismissal shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, and bar from taking the civil service examinations.

In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the elective local
official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office. Note, however, that the
provision only pertains to the duration of the penalty and its effect on the official's candidacy. Nothing therein states that the
administrative liability therefor is extinguished by the fact of re-election:

Section 66. Form and Notice of Decision. - x x x.

xxxx

(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every
administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the
qualifications required for the office.

Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the conclusion that the doctrine
of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.

To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people at
all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official's administrative
liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of office, or
even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional
or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative
offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted
in Llamas v. Orbos293 to apply to administrative offenses:

The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole
exclusion of impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised only in criminal cases, it would indeed
be unnecessary to provide for the exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution.
Following petitioner's proposed interpretation, cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as the same do not
necessarily involve criminal offenses.

In the same vein, We do not clearly see any valid and convincing , reason why the President cannot grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly
less serious than criminal offenses.

Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be invoked
against an elective local official to hold him administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact, Section 40 (b) of the LGC
precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected
to an elective local position due to a direct disqualification from running for such post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS
imposes a penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.

To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were decided by US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of condonation of
administrative liability was supported by either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect, that an officer cannot
be removed by a misconduct committed during a previous term,294 or that the disqualification to hold the office does not extend
beyond the term in which the official's delinquency occurred.295 In one case,296 the absence of a provision against the re-election
of an officer removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the justification behind condonation. In another case,297 it was deemed
that condonation through re-election was a policy under their constitution - which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter to our
present Constitution's requirements on public accountability. There was even one case where the doctrine of condonation was not
adjudicated upon but only invoked by a party as a ground;298 while in another case, which was not reported in full in the official series,
the crux of the disposition was that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was
deemed to be incompetent.299Hence, owing to either their variance or inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as basis for the
continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under our existing laws.
At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of the
elective local official's prior term, and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election This treatment is similar to People ex rel
Bagshaw v. Thompson300 and Montgomery v. Novell301 both cited in Pascual, wherein it was ruled that an officer cannot
be suspended for a misconduct committed during a prior term. However, as previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b) states that
the elective local official's administrative liability is extinguished by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal provision actually
supports the theory that the liability is condoned.

Relatedly it should be clarified that there is no truth in Pascual's postulation that the courts would be depriving the electorate of their
right to elect their officers if condonation were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains to the process by which a
particular constituency chooses an individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is, again, no legal basis to conclude that
election automatically implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say that every democratic and republican state has an
inherent regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective official's administrative liability would perhaps, be allowed in this
jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the time of Pascual or
at present, by no means has it been shown that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory provision, exists. Therefore,
inferring from this manifest absence, it cannot be said that the electorate's will has been abdicated.

Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge
of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Suffice it to state
that no such presumption exists in any statute or procedural rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to human experience that the
electorate would have full knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman correctly points out the reality that most corrupt
acts by public officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the public. Misconduct committed by an elective official is
easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the electorate when they cast their votes.303 At a conceptual level,
condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation
of an act that is unknown. As observed in Walsh v. City Council of Trenton304 decided by the New Jersey Supreme Court:

Many of the cases holding that re-election of a public official prevents his removal for acts done in a preceding term of office are
reasoned out on the theory of condonation. We cannot subscribe to that theory because condonation, implying as it does forgiveness,
connotes knowledge and in the absence of knowledge there can be no condonation. One cannot forgive something of which one has
no knowledge.

That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can be seen from
this discourse, it was a doctrine adopted from one class of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus, out of touch from - and now rendered
obsolete by - the current legal regime. In consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the condonation doctrine that originated
from Pascual, and affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which
were all relied upon by the CA.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the
reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system
of the Philippines.305 Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound
to follow its interpretation. As explained in De Castro v. Judicial Bar Council.306

Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent
that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those
duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.307

Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to
its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected. The landmark case on this matter is People v.
Jabinal,308 wherein it was ruled:

[W]hen a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and
should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Later, in Spouses Benzonan v. CA,309 it was further elaborated:

[Pursuant to Article 8 of the Civil Code "judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the
legal system of the Philippines." But while our decisions form part of the law of the land, they are also subject to Article 4 of the Civil
Code which provides that "laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided." This is expressed in the familiar legal
maxim lex prospicit, non respicit, the law looks forward not backward. The rationale against retroactivity is easy to perceive. The
retroactive application of a law usually divests rights that have already become vested or impairs the obligations of contract and hence,
is unconstitutional.310ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can greatly benefit from hindsight and rectify its ensuing course. Thus, while
it is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine which is barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in our jurisprudence for a considerable
length of time, this Court, under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now abandons the condonation doctrine.

E. Consequence of ruling.

As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed injunctive writs.

It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in
a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.311 It
has also been held that "grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal patently violates the Constitution,
the law or existing jurisprudence."312

As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs were all hinged
on cases enunciating the condonation doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject TRO
was based on the case of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based
on the cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled precedents on
the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA committed a grave
abuse of discretion based on its legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order
was correctly issued.

With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for the CA to resolve the main petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
139453 on the merits. However, considering that the Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr. administratively
liable and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding
public office, for the present administrative charges against him, the said CA petition appears to have been mooted.313 As initially
intimated, the preventive suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that, at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of
the Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the office's
process of investigation in the instant administrative case.

F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.

This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive suspension
order subject of this case does not preclude any of its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of the condonation
doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the moot and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court
in resolving a case. The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the
exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review."314 All of these scenarios obtain in this case:

First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold and defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the condonation
doctrine now that its infirmities have become apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued application of the condonation doctrine
is simply impermissible under the auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates that public office is a public trust and
that public officials shall be accountable to the people at all times.

Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials to escape
administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus, this is a situation
of exceptional character which this Court must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served as a perennial obstacle against
exacting public accountability from the multitude of elective local officials throughout the years, it is indubitable that paramount public
interest is involved.

Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine clearly requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public. The issue does not only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative law principles, but also puts to the
forefront of legal discourse the potency of the accountability provisions of the 1987 Constitution. The Court owes it to the bench, the
bar, and the public to explain how this controversial doctrine came about, and now, its reasons for abandoning the same in view of its
relevance on the parameters of public office.

And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently invoked by elective local officials against the administrative charges
filed against them. To provide a sample size, the Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for the period of July 2013 to December
2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the ground of condonation. Thus,
in just one and a half years, over a hundred cases of alleged misconduct - involving infractions such as dishonesty, oppression, gross
neglect of duty and grave misconduct - were placed beyond the reach of the Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial
powers."315 Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade review.

In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own jurisprudential
creation and may therefore, pursuant to its mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it notwithstanding supervening
events that render the subject of discussion moot.

V.

With all matters pertaining to CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 passed upon, the Court now rules on the final issue on whether or not the CA's
Resolution316 dated March 20, 2015 directing the Ombudsman to comment on Binay, Jr.'s petition for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No.
139504 is improper and illegal.

The sole premise of the Ombudsman's contention is that, as an impeachable officer, she cannot be the subject of a charge for indirect
contempt317 because this action is criminal in nature and the penalty therefor would result in her effective removal from
office.318 However, a reading of the aforesaid March 20, 2015 Resolution does not show that she has already been subjected to contempt
proceedings. This issuance, in? fact, makes it clear that notwithstanding the directive for the Ombudsman to comment, the CA has
not necessarily given due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition:

Without necessarily giving due course to the Petition for Contempt respondents [Hon. Conchita Carpio Morales, in her capacity
as the Ombudsman, and the Department of Interior and Local Government] are hereby DIRECTED to file Comment on the
Petition/Amended and Supplemental Petition for Contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 139504) within an inextendible period of three (3) days
from receipt hereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, even if the Ombudsman accedes to the CA's directive by filing a comment, wherein she may properly raise her objections to the
contempt proceedings by virtue of her being an impeachable officer, the CA, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, may still
opt not to give due course to Binay, Jr.'s contempt petition and accordingly, dismiss the same. Sjmply put, absent any indication that
the contempt petition has been given due course by the CA, it would then be premature for this Court to rule on the issue. The
submission of the Ombudsman on this score is perforce denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Under the premises of this Decision, the Court resolves as follows:

(a) the second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while the policy against the
issuance of provisional injunctive writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman under the first paragraph of the said provision is DECLARED ineffective until the Court adopts the same as part of
the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued therefor;

(b) The condonation doctrine is ABANDONED, but the abandonment is PROSPECTIVE in effect;

(c) The Court of Appeals (CA) is DIRECTED to act on respondent Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.'s (Binay, Jr.) petition for certiorari in CA-
G.R. SP No. 139453 in light of the Office of the Ombudsman's supervening issuance of its Joint Decision dated October 9, 2015 finding
Binay, Jr. administratively liable in the six (6) administrative complamts, docketed as OMB-C-A-15-0058, OMB-C-A-15-0059, OMB-C-
A-15-0060, OMB-C-A-15-0061, OMB-C-A-15-0062, and OMB-C-A-15-0063; and

(d) After the filing of petitioner Ombudsman Conchita Carpio Morales's comment, the CA is DIRECTED to resolve Binay, Jr.'s petition
for contempt in CA-G.R. SP No. 139504 with utmost dispatch.

SO ORDERED.
 EN BANC

JOSE C. MIRANDA, G.R. NO. 154098

Petitioner,

- versus -
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, CARPIO,
July 27, 2005
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

First, the facts.

The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda (Mayor Miranda) then the mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, under preventive
suspension for six months from 25 July 1997 to 25 January 1998 for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.[1]Subsequently, then Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro
(Vice Mayor Navarro) filed a Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) on 1 December 1997 which was docketed as
OMB-1-97-2312.[2] In the said Complaint, Vice Mayor Navarro alleged that Mayor Miranda committed the following acts on 24
November 1997 despite the continuing effectivity of the Ombudsmans preventive suspension order: (a) issued a memorandum
addressed to Navarro advising her that he was assuming his position as City Mayor;[3] (b) gave directives to the heads of offices and
other employees;[4] (c) issued Office Order No. 11-021 which authorized certain persons to start work;[5] and (d) insisted on performing
the functions and duties of Mayor despite Navarrros requests to desist from doing so without a valid court order and in spite of the
order of Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez directing him to cease from reassuming
the position.[6] Vice Mayor Navarro contended that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of usurpation of authority or official functions
under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).[7]

In his counter-affidavit, Mayor Miranda asserted that he reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and in good faith.[8] He contended
that under Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code, local elective officials could not be preventively suspended for a period beyond
60 days.[9] He also averred that, on the day he reassumed office, he received a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel
Sanchez instructing him to vacate his office and he immediately complied with the same.[10] Notably, Mayor Mirandas counter-affidavit
also stated that he left the mayoralty post after coercion by the Philippine National Police. [11]

On 28 October 1998, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan an Information against Mayor Miranda for violation of
Article 177 of the RPC, penalizing usurpation of authority. On 20 November 1998, the Sandiganbayan ordered the Office of Special
Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation of the case in light of the manifestations made by prosecution and defense counsel. [12] After
reinvestigation, Special Prosecution Officer Rodrigo V. Coquia (Coquia) recommended the dismissal of the case in a Resolution dated
14 September 2000.[13] Coquia held that Miranda reassumed his office in good faith and on mistake of fact due to the difficult questions
of law involved.[14]

Then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto (Ombudsman Desierto) referred Coquias resolution to the Ombudsmans Chief Legal
Counsel for review. The Chief Legal Counsel disagreed with Coquias findings and recommended the filing of the case against Mayor
Miranda.[15] He pointed out that Mayor Mirandas invocation of good faith was belied by the fact that he received a memorandum from
the DILG informing him that his view of the preventive suspension period was untenable and that he should serve out its remaining
period.[16] He further noted that Miranda violated the orders of both the Ombudsman and the DILG. [17] Ombudsman Desierto adopted
the Chief Legal Counsels recommendation,[18] and the case was re-raffled to Special Prosecution Officer Evelyn T.
Lucero. Subsequently, the prosecution filed an amended Information with the Sandiganbayan,[19] to which the petitioner
interposed a negative plea.[20]

On 28 November 2001, the prosecution filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to suspend Mayor
Miranda pendente lite based on Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. No. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.[21] Miranda opposed the motion on the ground that the offense of usurpation of authority or official
functions under Article 177 of the RPC is not embraced by Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 which only contemplates offenses enumerated
under R.A. No. 3019, Title VII, Book II of the RPC or which involve fraud upon government or public funds or property. [22]

In a Resolution dated 4 February 2002, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Mayor Miranda from office
for 90 days.[23] The anti-graft court held that a violation of Article 177 of the RPC involves fraud which in a general sense is deemed
to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty,
trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in damage to another or by which an undue and unconscious advantage is taken of
another.[24] It further ruled that Mirandas act fell within the catch-all provision x x x or for any offense involving fraud upon
government.[25] Mirandas motion for reconsideration was denied in the Sandiganbayans Resolution dated 17 June 2002.[26] Hence,
the present petition assailing the Sandiganbayans orders of preventive suspension. The petitioner contends that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it preventively suspended him on a ground not authorized by law and raises the
following issues: (1) whether Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 applies only to fraudulent acts involving public funds or property; and (2)
whether the crime of usurpation of authority or official functions involves fraud upon government or public funds or property found in
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.

We rule in the negative.

First. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, provides:

Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any
 offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

In the event that such convicted officer, who may have already been separated from the service, has already
received such benefits he shall be liable to restitute the same to the Government.

The Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 as covering two types of offenses: (1) any offense
involving fraud on the government; and (2) any offense involving public funds or property. Contrary to the submission of the petitioner,
nothing in R.A. No. 3019 evinces any legislative intent to limit Section 13 only to acts involving fraud on public funds or property. The
phrase any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is clear and categorical. To limit the use of government
as an adjective that qualifies funds is baseless. The word public precedes funds and distinguishes the same from private funds. To
qualify further public funds as government funds, as petitioner claims is the laws intent, is plainly superfluous. We are bound by the
rule that a statute should be construed reasonably with reference to its controlling purpose and its provisions should not be given a
meaning that is inconsistent with its scope and object. R.A. No. 3019, commonly known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
should be read to protect the State from fraud by its own officials.

Second. We further hold that the Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion when it ruled that petitioners act fell
within the catch-all provision x x x or for any offense involving fraud upon government. The term fraud is defined, viz.:
An instance or an act of trickery or deceit esp. when involving misrepresentation: an act of deluding[27]

It is obvious to the eyes that the phrase fraud upon government means any instance or act of trickery or deceit against the government.
It cannot be read restrictively so as to be equivalent to malversation of funds as this is covered by the preceding phrase any offense
involving . . . public funds or property. It ought to follow that fraud upon government was committed when the petitioner allegedly
assumed the duties and performed acts pertaining to the Office of the Mayor under pretense of official position.

The dissent opines that fraud upon government is not necessarily an essential element of the crime of usurpation of authority.
The submission may be correct as a general proposition but general propositions hardly decide a case. In the case at bar, the issue is
whether the alleged acts of usurpation of authority committed by the petitioner involve fraud upon government or public funds or
property as the term is understood under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling in the affirmative, the Sandiganbayan held:
Let us take a look at the acts complained of as alleged in the Amended Information dated July 27, 2001:

x x x the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the elected City Mayor of
Santiago City, while under preventive suspension did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
knowingly and under pretense of official position, assume the duties and functions of the Office of
the Mayor, issue directives and memoranda, and appoint certain persons to various positions in
the City Government and perform acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was deprived
of.

Moreover, in private complainant Amelita S. Navarros Affidavit of Complaint dated November 26, 1997, she
said: x x x, he proceeded to his office and started giving directives to the various heads of office and other employees,
the unexpected acts of respondents had caused serious disruptions in the day to day affairs of the city government.

Accuseds acts therefore in assuming the duties and function of the Office of the Mayor despite his suspension
from said office resulted to a clear disruption of office and worst, a chaotic situation in the affairs of the government
as the employees, as well as the public, suffered confusion as to who is the head of the Office. This actuation of
herein accused constitutes fraud which in general sense is deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive,
including all acts, omissions, and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly
reposed, resulting in damage to another or by which an undue and unconscious advantage is taken of another (37
Am. Jur. 2d 19 at Sec. 19). Hence, the act complained of against accused herein falls in the catchall provision x x x
or for any offense involving fraud upon government x x x.

Moreover, the firmly entrenched doctrine which was held by the Highest Tribunal in a long line of cases is
that x x x under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law, the suspension of a public officer is mandatory
after a determination has been made of the validity of the Information x x x. In fact, as early as 1984 in the case
of Bayot v. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 383, the Honorable Supreme Court speaking thru Justice Relova said:

Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and substance, then the Court must
issue the order of suspension as a matter of course. There are no ifs and buts about it. x x x

After a perusal of the amended information herein, it clearly appeared that the same was apparently valid
for it conforms to the requirements laid down under Section 6[,] Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. In fact, accused
herein interposed a negative plea thereto thereby tacitly acquiescing to the validity of the said Information.

There being no valid ground raised by the accused sufficient enough to warrant denial of the prayer of the
prosecution in its Motion to Suspend Accused Pende[n]te Lite (sic) and in consonance with the imperious mandate
of the law, the said prayer should be accorded affirmative relief.[28] (Citations omitted)

In denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the Sandiganbayan further held:

Accused in his motion substantially alleged that Article 177 (Usurpation of Authority and Official Function)
of the Revised Penal Code, which is the charge against herein accused, does not fall under the catchall provision of
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 x x x or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
 property x x x. He said that the acts complained of as alleged in the Information do not constitute fraud upon
government or public fund or property.

Though the argument by the accused seems plausible, this Court is still inclined to uphold its ruling
suspending accused pendente lite. The accused argued that the fraud contemplated in the law is one involving (1)
government funds or property; and (2) public funds or property. This is precisely availing in the case at bar. The
Information in herein case, says: x x x accused x x x assume the duties and functions of the Office of the Mayor,
issue directives and memoranda and appoint certain persons to various positions in the city government, and perform
acts pertaining to an office to which he knowingly was deprived of. When accused-mayor appointed persons in various
positions, he indirectly dealt with the citys funds as those persons appointed will be given their respective salaries,
benefits and other monetary consideration which will be paid wholly or mainly out of the citys funds. Additionally,
when he performed acts pertaining to the Office of the Mayor, i.e.[,] approval of vouchers, and payment of other
expenses which is subject to proof, he likewise indirectly dealt with the funds of the city.

Moreover, as the prosecution said, when accused Miranda, willfully and knowingly, during the effectivity of
his suspension barged into the City Hall, issued orders and directives and performed functions as City Mayor, he was
sending the unwritten yet visible message that he was authorized to do and function as such. x x x. We hold this as
a fraud upon government resulting in the chaos or confusion albeit temporary, as the employees would be in a
quandary whom to follow or obey.

Hence, considering that the charge herein evidently falls within the compass of the suspension provision
invoked by the prosecution, there is no cogent reason for this Court to depart from its previous ruling. Further,
considering the mandatory tenor of Section 13[,] Republic Act No. 3019, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
denied.

Accordingly, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.[29]

This Court finds no reason to disagree with the Sandiganbayan. Its conclusions are amply supported by the record.
Additionally, the issue of whether petitioner committed fraud upon the government or public funds or property is essentially factual.
In a special civil action for certiorari, the only question that may be raised is whether or not the respondent acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The Court cannot correct errors of fact or law which do not amount to grave abuse of
discretion.[30]

The dissenting opinion, however, says there was no fraud. It holds that it would be fraud of public funds if these public officials
just collected their salaries without rendering service to the government. It further asserts that fraud upon government must be
read so as to require that malversation of funds was committed.[31] This is a complete volte face from its claim that Section 13 of
R.A. No. 3019 covers two types of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud upon the government; and (2) any offense
involving public funds or property.[32] What is more, adopting the dissenting opinions line of reasoning would render superfluous
the phrase fraud upon government as malversation is subsumed by any offense involving public funds or property.

Third. We are not a bit persuaded by the posture of the petitioner that he reassumed office under an honest belief that he
was no longer under preventive suspension. Petitioners pretense cannot stand scrutiny. Petitioners own affidavit states:[33]
8. That on November 24, 1997, at that time, (sic) I had already served my single preventive suspension for
a total number of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY (120) days more or less counted from July 24, 1997, which far exceeds
the allowable period of 60 days as maximum preventive suspension, for a single suspension for a local elective official
like me as provided for under the Local Government Code of 1991 (sic) on the same date, November 24, 1997 in
good faith and upon the advise (sic) of my lawyers, I notified both the Ombudsman and DILG of my intention to
assume my office as the duly elected City Mayor of Santiago City;

9. That earlier on November 24, 1997 I started to reassume my office and functions as City Mayor of
Santiago City; surprisingly on the same date, November 24, 1997 I received a memorandum issued by
Undersecretary Manuel R. Sanchez of DILG instructing me to cease and desist from my plan to reassume the functions
and duties of my office;

10. For less than a week, after November 24, 1997 Vice-Mayor AMELITA NAVARRO relentlessly
harassed and threatened me and my constituents with bodily harm using the strong arm of the law thru the brute
force of the PNP courteousy (sic) of Undersecretary Manuel R. Sanchez I was constrained to ceased (sic) from
performing my duties and functions to avoid any possible unfortunate incident that may happen to me
and any constituents; x x x.[34](Emphases supplied)

By petitioners own admission, he refused to leave his position despite the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez
and left only a few days after receipt thereof due to the coercion of the Philippine National Police. This contradicts his assertion
that he immediately complied with the memorandum of Undersecretary Sanchez.[35] Petitioner cannot escape from his own
admission.

To be sure, petitioners honest belief defense is old hat. In the 1956 case of People v. Hilvano,[36] the facts are:
When Mayor Fidencio Latorre of Villareal, Samar, departed for Manila on official business early in the
morning of September 22, 1952, he designated the herein defendant Francisco Hilvano, councilor, to discharge the
duties of his office. Later, during office hours on that same day, Vice-Mayor Juan Latorre went to the municipal
building; and having found Hilvano acting in the place of the Mayor, he served written notices to the corresponding
municipal officers, including Hilvano, that he (Juan Latorre) as Vice-Mayor was assuming the duties of the absent
mayor. However, Hilvano refused to yield, arguing that he had been designated by the Mayor. Whereupon the Vice-
Mayor sent a telegram to the Executive Secretary informing the latter of the controversy. And the said Secretary
replied by letter, that under sec. 2195 of the Revised Administrative Code it was the Vice-Mayor who should discharge
the duties of the Mayor during the latters temporary absence. Shown this official pronouncement, Hilvano still refused
 to surrender the position. Again the Vice-Mayor sought the opinion of the Provincial Fiscal, who by letter (Exhibit D),
replied that the Vice-Mayor had the right to the office. Notwithstanding such opinion which was exhibited to him
Hilvano declined to vacate the post, which he held for about a month, appointing some policemen, solemnizing
marriages and collecting the corresponding salary for mayor.

Wherefore Francisco Hilvano was prosecuted and after trial was convicted of usurpation of public authority
under Republic Act No. 10. He appealed in due time.

In rejecting the defense of the accused Hilvano, we ruled:[37]

There is no excuse for defendant-appellant. In the beginning he might have pleaded good faith, invoking
the designation by the Mayor; but after he had been shown the letter of the Executive Secretary and the opinion of
the provincial fiscal, he had no right thereafter stubbornly to stick to the position. He was rightfully convicted.

Petitioners excuse for violating the order of preventive suspension is too flimsy to merit even a side-glance. He alleged that
he merely followed the advice of his lawyer. If petitioner and his counsel had an iota of respect for the rule of law, they should
have assailed the validity of the order of suspension in court instead of taking the law into their own hands.

Fourth. It should be stressed that petitioner was suspended by the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019,
this suspension is mandatory if the information is sufficient. Understandably, the dissent argues that the Amended Information is
insufficient in form as it should have expressly and clearly stated that Miranda re-assumed office to defraud the government or that in
re-assuming office Miranda committed acts that defrauded the government[38] and that it is improper to take into account the
petitioners admissions in his affidavit for this purpose.

With due respect, the dissent is way off-line. The records will show that petitioner did not file a motion to quash the information
or a motion for bill of particulars before pleading to the information. It is basic that entering a plea waives any objection the petitioner
may have to the validity of the information except on the following grounds: (1) the information charges no offense; (2) the trial court
has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (3) the penalty or the offense has been extinguished; and (4) double jeopardy has
attached.[39] Objections to the sufficiency of the allegations in the Amended Information do not fall among the exceptions to the rule.
They fall under the objection that the information does not conform substantially to the prescribed form. [40] Needless to state, the
petitioner has by his acts acquiesced to the validity and sufficiency of the Amended Information. It is, thus, incorrect for the dissenting
opinion to peddle the proposition that the petitioner has been deprived of his constitutional right to be apprised of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him. Worse, it is improper for the dissenting opinion to raise this issue motu proprio. Under our Rules of
Court, it is the petitioner who should raise this objection in a motion to quash or motion for bill of particulars before entering
his plea.[41] The irregular procedure followed by the dissent would encourage the pernicious practice of sandbagging where counsel
foregoes raising a pleading defect before trial where it can be easily corrected only to raise the defect later in the hope of obtaining an
arrest of judgment or new trial from a sympathetic magistrate.[42] It is precisely this evil that is addressed by Rule 117, Section 9 of
our Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Even assuming for the nonce, that the objection to the sufficiency of the information was raised in a timely fashion by the
petitioner, the dissenting opinions arguments still do not convince. The validity or sufficiency of allegations in an information is
determined according to the provisions of Section 9 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, viz:
SECTION 9. Cause of the Accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and
the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily
in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know
what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.[43]

The test is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms with such particularity as to apprise the accused, with reasonable
certainty, of the offense charged. The raison detre of the rule is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.[44] A perusal of
the Amended Information will bear out that it has hurdled this legal bar. We quote its contents:
That on or about 24 November 1997, in the City of Santiago, Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the elected City Mayor of Santiago
City, while under preventive suspension, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and knowingly and under pretense
of official position, assume the duties and function of the Office of the Mayor, issue directives and memoranda, and
appoint certain persons to various positions in the city government, and perform acts pertaining to an office to which
he knowingly was deprived of.[45]

Using this test, it cannot be said that the Amended Information failed to properly apprise the petitioner of the charge against
him. The information charged the petitioner with assuming the duties and performing acts pertaining to the office of Mayor willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly under the pretense of official position. Moreover, it states some of the specific acts which constitute usurpation
of official functions, namely, issuing directives and memoranda and appointing certain persons to various positions in the city
government. These allegations are clear enough for a layman to understand. Indeed, even the petitioner does not complain about their
ambiguity. Only the dissent does.

Fifth. The dissenting opinion also contends that the Ombudsmans authority to preventively suspend local elective officials
for 6 months is limited by Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code. Under the latter law, petitioner can only be suspended for a
maximum period of 60 days. It then jumps to the conclusion that petitioner could not have usurped authority because he reassumed
office after 60 days.[46]

With due respect, the dissent fails to focus on the proper issue. The issue before this Court is whether
the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of discretion in suspending the petitioner for 90 days. The validity of
the Ombudsmans order of preventive suspension of the petitioner for 6 months is not the one assailed in the case at bar. The
irrelevance of the suspension order of the Ombudsman notwithstanding, the reliance of the dissenting opinion on Garcia v.
Mojica is inapropos. In Garcia, we held:
Given these findings, we cannot say now that there is no evidence sufficiently strong to justify the imposition
of preventive suspension against petitioner. But considering its purpose and the circumstances in the case
brought before us, it does appear to us that the imposition of the maximum period of six months is
unwarranted.

On behalf of respondents, the Solicitor General stated during his oral argument at the hearing that the
documents mentioned in respondents' comment (such as purchase orders, purchase requests, and disbursement
vouchers), documents that show petitioner's guilt, were obtained after petitioner had been suspended. Even if an
afterthought, he claimed they strengthen the evidence of respondents against petitioner. If the purpose of the
preventive suspension was to enable the investigating authority to gather documents without
intervention from petitioner, then, from respondents' submission, we can only conclude that this purpose
was already achieved, during the nearly month-long suspension of petitioner from June 25 to July 19,
1999. Granting that now the evidence against petitioner is already strong, even without conceding that
initially it was weak, it is clear to us that the maximum six-month period is excessive and definitely
longer than necessary for the Ombudsman to make its legitimate case against petitioner. We must
conclude that the period during which petitioner was already preventively suspended, has been sufficient for the
lawful purpose of preventing petitioner from hiding and destroying needed documents, or harassing and preventing
witnesses who wish to appear against him.

We reach the foregoing conclusion, however, without necessarily subscribing to petitioner's

claim that the Local Government Code, which he averred should apply to this case of an elective local
official, has been violated. True, under said Code, preventive suspension may only be imposed after the issues
are joined, and only for a maximum period of sixty days. Here, petitioner was suspended without having had the
chance to refute first the charges against him, and for the maximum period of six months provided by the
Ombudsman Law. But as respondents argue, administrative complaints commenced under the Ombudsman
Law are distinct from those initiated under the Local Government Code. Respondents point out that the
shorter period of suspension under the Local Government Code is intended to limit the period of suspension that may
be imposed by a mayor, a governor, or the President, who may be motivated by partisan political considerations. In
contrast the Ombudsman, who can impose a longer period of preventive suspension, is not likely to be
similarly motivated because it is a constitutional body. The distinction is valid but not decisive, in our view, of
whether there has been grave abuse of discretion in a specific case of preventive suspension. [47] (Emphases supplied)

Nowhere in Garcia is it stated that the limits provided in the Local Government Code apply to the Ombudsman. In fact, the
Court expressly stated that its decision was rendered without subscribing to the petitioners claim that the Local Government Code
had been violated. In fine, the Court only ruled that the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in imposing a 6-month
preventive suspension since it was admitted that the documents required were already obtained by 19 July 1999 or 24 days after the
imposition of the preventive suspension. Therefore, the purpose for which the suspension was imposed was already served.

The dissenting opinion also cites the case of Rios v. Sandiganbayan[48] as basis for assailing the Ombudsmans order of
preventive suspension. Rios is neither here nor there since the powers of the Sandiganbayan were at issue in that case, not those
of the Ombudsman. It is also worth noting that Rios cited Section 63 of the Local Government Code as its legal basis. This provision
provides:
SECTION 63. Preventive Suspension. -

(a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:

(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized or an
independent component city;

(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or municipality; or

(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay.

(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the evidence of guilt is
strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the continuance in office of the
respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and
other evidence: Provided, That, any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend
beyond sixty (60) days: Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases are filed
against an elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a
single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first suspension.
(c) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective official shall be deemed reinstated in office
without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him, which shall be terminated within one
hundred twenty (120) days from the time he was formally notified of the case against him. However, if the
delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal duly filed,
the duration of such delay shall not be counted in computing the time of termination of the case.

It is plain that the provision was only meant as a cap on the discretionary power of the President, governor and mayor to
impose excessively long preventive suspensions. The Ombudsman is not mentioned in the said provision and was not meant to be
governed thereby. Indeed, the reason is not hard to distill. The President, governor and mayor are political personages. As such, the
possibility of extraneous factors influencing their decision to impose preventive suspensions is not remote. The Ombudsman, on the
other hand, is not subject to political pressure given the independence of the office which is protected by no less than the Constitution.
This view was embraced by the Court in Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole[49] and Garcia v. Mojica.[50] In Hagad, we held:
 Respondent local officials contend that the 6-month preventive suspension without pay under
Section 24 of the Ombudsman Act is much too repugnant to the 60-day preventive suspension provided
by Section 63 of the Local Government Code to even now maintain its application. The two provisions
govern differently. In order to justify the preventive suspension of a public official under Section 24 of R.A. No.
6770, the evidence of guilt should be strong, and (a) the charge against the officer or employee should involve
dishonestly, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) that the charges should
warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office would prejudice the case filed
against him. The Ombudsman can impose the 6-month preventive suspension to all public officials, whether elective
or appointive, who are under investigation. Upon the other hand, in imposing the shorter period of sixty (60) days
of preventive suspension prescribed in the Local Government Code of 1991 on an elective local official (at any time
after the issues are joined), it would be enough that (a) there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent
has committed the act or acts complained of, (b) the evidence of culpability is strong,(c) the gravity of the offense
so warrants, or (d) the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the
safety and integrity of the records and other evidence.[51]

In the same vein, we made the following observations in Garcia, viz.:

Respondents may be correct in pointing out the reason for the shorter period of preventive suspension
imposable under the Local Government Code. Political color could taint the exercise of the power to suspend local
officials by the mayor, governor, or President's office. In contrast the Ombudsman, considering the
constitutional origin of his Office, always ought to be insulated from the vagaries of politics, as
respondents would have us believe. x x x

It was also argued in Hagad, that the six-month preventive suspension under the Ombudsman
Law is "much too repugnant" to the 60-day period that may be imposed under the Local Government
Code. But per J. Vitug, "the two provisions govern differently." [52] (Emphases supplied)

There is no reason to reverse this ruling. Our above ruling is in accord with the intent of the law. It bears emphasis that
Senator Pimentel[53] explained during the Senate deliberations that the purpose of Section 63 of the Code is to prevent the abuse
of the power of preventive suspension by members of the executive branch, to wit:
The President.[54] I recall that in the case of Iloilo City Mayor Ganzon, he challenged the right of the
President, acting through the Secretary of Local Government, I think, Luis Santos, to suspend him - -

Senator Pimentel. That is true, Mr. President.

The President. - - contending that under the new Constitution, even the President does not have that
right.

Senator Pimentel. Now, as far as we are concerned, the Senate Committee is ready to adopt a
more stringent rule regarding the power of removal and suspension by the Office of the President over
local government officials, Mr. President. We would only wish to point out that in a subsequent section, we have
provided for the power of suspension of local government officials to be limited only to 60 days and not more than
90 days in any one year, regardless of the number of administrative charges that may be filed against a local
government official. We, in fact, had in mind the case of Mayor Ganzon of Iloilo where the Secretary of
Local Government sort of serialized the filing of charges against him so that he can be continuously
suspended when one case is filed right after the other, Mr. President.

The President. Can that be done under this new Code?

Senator Pimentel. Under our proposal, that can no longer be done, Mr. President.[55]

Verily, Section 63 of the Local Government Code does not govern preventive suspensions imposed by the Ombudsman, which
is a constitutionally created office and independent from the Executive branch of government.[56] The Ombudsmans power of preventive
suspension is governed by Republic Act No. 6770,[57] otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, which provides:
SECTION 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively suspend any officer
or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a)
the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued
stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but
not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of the case by the Office of the
Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall
not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.[58] (Emphasis supplied)

The six-month period of preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman[59] was indubitably within the limit provided by its enabling
law. This enabling law has not been modified by the legislature.

The dissenting opinion submits that providing for a six-month limit for the Ombudsman while keeping the limit for executive
officials at sixty days violates the constitutional proscription against equal protection of the law. In essence, it avers that there is no
substantial distinction between preventive suspensions handed down by the Ombudsman and those imposed by executive officials. On
the contrary, there is a world of difference between them. The Constitution has endowed the Ombudsman with unique safeguards to
ensure immunity from political pressure. Among these statutory protections are fiscal autonomy, [60] fixed term of office[61] and
classification as an impeachable officer.[62] This much was recognized by this Court in the earlier cited case of Garcia v.
Mojica.[63] Moreover, there are stricter safeguards for imposition of preventive suspension by the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman Act
of 1989 requires that the Ombudsman determine: (1) that the evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) that any of the following
circumstances are present: (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or
neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay
in office may prejudice the case filed against him.[64]

The dissenting opinion finally points out the possibility of abuse by the Ombudsman in imposing preventive suspensions. The
short reply is that all powers are susceptible of abuse but that is no reason to strike down the grant of power. Suffice it to say that the
proper remedies against abuse in the exercise of power are a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
or amendment of the Ombudsmans enabling law by the legislature, not a contortionist statutory interpretation by this Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DISMISSED there being no showing that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in issuing its Resolution of 4 February 2002, preventively suspending the petitioner for 90 days.

SO ORDERED.