truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants such as those
Barcelona v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 130087, 24 September 2003
FACTS:
Respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally
married union begot five children. On 29 March 1995,
private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon filed a Petition for
Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M.
Barcelona. Petition further alleged that petitioner Diana was
psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration
of their marriage to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the present time.
The petition allegedthe non-complied marital obligations.
During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to
their varied upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich
family, wasa disorganized housekeeper and was frequently
out of the house. She would go to her sister‘s house or
would play tennis the whole day. When the family had crisis
due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and the
sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and
eventually refused to speak to her husband.
On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months
pregnant with Cristina Maria and on the pretext of re-
evaluatingher feelings with petitioner, requested the latter to
temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. In his desire to
keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondent‘s
pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their
conjugal dwelling. The respondent at the time of the
celebration of their marriage was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with theessential obligation of
marriage and such incapacity subsisted up to and until the
present time. Such incapacity wasconclusively found in the
psychological examination conducted on the relationship
between the petitioner and therespondent Diana claims that
petitioner falls short of the guidelines stated in Molina case
and there is no cause for action.
ISSUE:
Whether of not petitioner stated a cause of action against
Diana.
RULING:
YES, since petition stated legal right of Tadeo, correlative
obligation of Diana, and her act or omission as seen infacts
FAILURE TO STATE ROOT CAUSE AND GRAVE
NATURE OF ILLNESS. Sec 2 of rules of declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage – petition does not need to
show root cause sinceonly experts can determine it b the
physical manifestations of physical incapacity.PETITION IS
DENIED, THERE IS CAUSE OF ACTION.
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
The Supreme Court held that psychological incapacity
should refer to a mental incapacity that causes a party to be
enumerated in Article 68 of the Family Code and must be
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and
incurability.
The elements of Psychological incapacity are:
(a) Grave – It must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence – It must be rooted in the history
of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurable and Permanent – It must be incurable or, even
if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of
the party involved.
Republic vs Quintero-Hamano
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004
FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano,
a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological
incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a
month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed
there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November
16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor,
Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to
Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the
holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two
months and after that he stopped giving financial support.
She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991,
she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country
but did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus
summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently,
in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect
service of summons by publication. The motion was
granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the
petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation
giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to
respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus,
Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for
investigation.

ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated
to perform his marital obligation.
HELD:
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution
and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the
marriage.
Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible
but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind
of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical
examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped
Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or
clinically identified Toshio’s illness. This could have been
done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person
show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some
psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio was not
considered as psychologically incapacitated.
Republic vs. Encelan
[Civil Law: marriage; psychological incapacity]
Republic of the Philippines, Petitioner vs. Cesar
Encelan, Respondent
G.R. No. 170022; January 09, 2013
Facts: Cesar Married Lolita, and they had two children.
To support the family, Cesar went abroad and worked as an
OFW in Saudi Arabia. After two years of working abroad,
Cesar learned that Lolita is having an illicit affair with Alvin
Perez, and thereafter, left the conjugal dwelling together
with the two children. But even with such circumstances,
Cesar never failed to send financial support for the family.
On June 1995, Cesar filed a petition against Lolita for the
declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolita’s
psychological incapacity. Cesar, during a hearing even
presented a psychological evaluation report on Lolita with
the finding that “Lolita was not suffering from any form of
psychiatric illness, but had been unable to provide the
expectations expected of her for a good and lasting marital
relationship.... and her transferring from one job to another
depicts some interpersonal problem with co-workers as well
as her impatience in attaining her ambitions .... and her
refusal to go with her husband abroad signifies her
reluctance to work out a good marital and family
relationship...” Cesar found ally in RTC as it gave him a
favourable decision which declared his marriage to Lolita
null and void. The court of Appeals also affirmed the
decision of RTC, and thereafter, the case was elevated to the
Supreme Court, thus, this case.
Issue: Whether or not psychological incapacity is indeed
present in the person of Lolita as to nullify a valid marriage.
Ruling: No. Marriage is an inviolable social institution
protected by the State and any doubt should be resolved in
favour of its existence and continuation against its
dissolution and nullity. In this case, sexual infidelity and
abandonment of the conjugal dwelling do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply
grounds for legal separation. To constitute psychological
incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and
abandonment are manifestations of a disordered personality
that actually prevented the erring spouse from discharging
the essential marital obligations, which the court found not
present in the person of Lolita.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 201988, October 11, 2017 ]
MARIA VICTORIA SOCORRO LONTOC-CRUZ,
PETITIONER, VS. NILO SANTOS CRUZ,
RESPONDENT.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
The most challenging part of being in a difficult marriage is
to thrive in one. In the case of petitioner Maria Victoria
Socorro Lontoc-Cruz (Marivi) and respondent Nilo Santos
Cruz (Nilo), their marriage withered as this was beset with
problems such as the lack of quality time, recriminations,
disillusionment, loss of passion, and infidelity. The
estranged spouses considered their union as non-functional,
attributing the failure of their marriage to their respective
personality disorders that repelled each other.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] challenges the
November 22, 2011 Decision[2] and May 29, 2012
Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 93736 that affirmed the Decision[4] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 207, Muntinlupa City in Civil Case
No. 05-095 which refused to declare the marriage void ab
initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Factual Antecedents
Twenty-two-year-old Marivi met 28-year old Nilo sometime
in March 1986. They became steady in August of the same
year. Nilo, whose job was then in Hong Kong, prodded 3. Marivi would exhibit volatile temperament if
Marivi to marry him so she could join him there soonest. things did not go her way; would not admit
Marivi agreed. The couple married in a civil ceremony[5] on mistakes, and blame others instead;
October 21, 1986 followed by a church wedding[6] on
4. Marivi would make decisions impulsively, such as
February 8, 1987. The marriage produced two sons: Antonio changing an item she gets tired of, or demanding
Manuel, born on April 25, 1988, and Jose Nilo, born on that Nilo change a motor vehicle simply because
September 9, 1992. she did not like it; and

On July 7, 2005, Marivi filed with the RTC of Muntinlupa 5. She lacked respect for Nilo, and would speak to
City a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage [7] based him degradingly, and even accuse him of being gay
or a homosexual.[12]
on psychological incapacity. She averred that it had been
medically ascertained that Nilo was suffering from
On October 11, 2006, the trial court rendered a Partial
"inadequate personality disorder related to masculine
Decision[13] approving the parties' Compromise
strivings associated with unresolved oedipal
Agreement[14] pertaining to custody, support, and dissolution
complex,"[8] while she herself was found to be suffering
of the properties. Trial on the issue of the nullity of marriage
from a "personality disorder of the mixed type, [h]istrionic,
on the ground of psychological incapacity ensued.
[n]arcissistic with immaturity x x x." [9]

Marivi's Version
To show that Nilo failed to provide her with the necessary
emotional, psychological, and physical support, Marivi cited
Marivi narrated that when they were still going steady, Nilo
the following:
would only spend Saturdays and Sundays with her and
devote the weekdays to partying with his friends; that even
after their engagement, Nilo would still meet other women
1. His infidelity and his non-commitment to the
and accept invitations to beauty pageants and
marriage as he continued to act like a bachelor;
cocktails;[15] that Nilo was not the type who would kiss
2. The lack of 'oneness' in the marriage as Nilo would passionately; that Nilo would not engage in foreplay during
make decisions (on financial matters) without sex, but wished only to satisfy himself; that Nilo would
consulting or considering her suggestions; treating engage in anal sex and would only stop when she
her as a housemate or a "mayordoma;" keeping complained that it was painful; that Nilo would thereafter
from her his whereabouts, when he would come sleep, leaving her feeling "used," and that Nilo was
home or how much his income was;
impulsive, daring, and adventurous.[16]
3. The lack of sexual contact for more than a decade
as Nilo made excuses; She also claimed that Nilo would habitually come home
late; that Friday nights were Nilo's boys' night out; that
4. Putting up a facade that he is a caring, concerned, unless she would ask him to take her out on a date, Nilo
and loving husband, especially to his bosses; and would not do so; and that Nilo would call her a "nagger"
even if she was merely asking him to come home early. [17]
5. Preference towards the company of his
peers/friends.[10]
Marivi further narrated that Nilo would engage in
[11]
In his Answer, Nilo claimed that he was madly in love extramarital affairs; that a few months into their marriage,
with Marivi; that at the start of their relationship, both he Nilo had an affair with an unmarried female
and Marivi would exhibit negative personality traits which officemate;[18] that Nilo ended the affair only after she
they overlooked; that he believed that both he and Marivi (Marivi) threatened to tell his employer/supervisor;[19] that
were suffering from psychological incapacity; and that he Nilo had another affair a few weeks after the birth of their
was not singularly responsible for the breakdown of their second son; that when confronted with his womanizing and
marriage. He stressed that Marivi also contributed to the made to choose between her and the children or the other
deterioration of their union, to wit: women, Nilo replied that he was "confused," [20] which
prompted her to leave and stay in Cebu with her parents; and
that she heard from her friends that while she was in Cebu,
1. Marivi would demand that he behave in ways he Nilo was living a bachelor's life.[21]
was not accustomed to or inconsistent with his
career position; Marivi added that she eventually reconciled with Nilo but
despite the reconciliation, Nilo never really changed, and
2. Marivi was jealous of his friends; and would often that he remained indifferent, insensitive, and unappreciative.
make hasty conclusions that he was having an According to Marivi, she would instead call up her parents
affair with other women;
and sisters to talk about their family problems;[22] that while
he (Nilo) told people that he was proud of her, he never gave
her the emotional, psychological, and physical support she
needed.[23] She felt like she was no more than a mayordoma
to him, and that they were just "housemates." Nilo would
come home late on weekdays and preferred to go out with
his friends. Their quarrels were frequent and their
conversations were superficial; Nilo would rather talk about
himself, instead of asking Marivi about her day or about
their children. He was controlling and domineering,[24] and
refused to consider her suggestions; he would not want his
money mingled with her (Marivi's) money.[25] Nilo would
shell out money when he wanted to buy things, but would
make excuses when it came to Marivi's suggestion for a
family vacation.[26] Marivi also claimed that Nilo had no
sense of companionship with their children; and that Nilo
even told their son that their brand new house was
everything to him.[27]
Marivi was moreover bothered by Nilo's effeminate ways;
he was vain and would have weekly "beauty"
treatments.[28] Furthermore, they no longer had sex after the
birth of their second son. While they tried to have sex twice,
Nilo failed to have an erection. After that, Nilo would refuse
to have sex with her which made her (Marivi) question his
sexual orientation, so much so that Nilo physically hurt her
when she questioned his virility.[29]
Marivi's father, Manuel, likewise stated that Marivi would
call them up for help because Nilo had hurt her during the
couple's quarrel; that their marriage was not harmonious due
to Marivi's youth and her unfamiliarity with Nilo's
personality and family values. He considered Nilo only as a
provider, not as a husband and a good father to his sons. [30]
Marivi's younger sister, Margarita Ledesma (Margarita),
who lived for four years with Nilo and Marivi, claimed to
have witnessed how lonely Marivi was. She alleged that
Nilo was absent when Marivi gave birth to their second son;
that Nilo was short-tempered when driving; and that the
couple would often fight because Nilo would always come
home late or because Marivi suspected Nilo of infidelity.
Margarita believed that Nilo did not really want to save the
marriage, although he told her that he loves Marivi and the
children.[31]
Nilo's Version
Nilo acknowledged his contribution to the breakdown of the
marriage because his job required him to come home late,
his inability to sexually perform adequately, his failure to be
the "ideal husband,"[32] and because he had had extramarital
affairs in the years 1992, 2002, and 2006. [33] At the same
time, Nilo insisted that Marivi also contributed to the
collapse of their union.
According to Nilo, Marivi would always want to know his
companions and whereabouts; would demand information
about his female acquaintances; and would even call up his
workplace to ask where he was. Moreover, her conceit and
her "prima donna" attitude embarrassed him. Marivi would
order him to act in accordance with their stature in life, and
would demand that he instruct his office staff to accord her
special treatment as Hewlett Packard's "first lady" during the
time that he was Hewlett Packard's President. Marivi would
also instruct their housemaids to call him "señorito;" and she
would make a "big deal" out of her being a "mestiza," and
would think of herself a "trophy wife." [34]
Nilo claimed that Marivi was "unappreciative" of him, had a
misdirected sense of self-entitlement, and would complain if
she did not get her own way, as she was used to, she being
her father's favorite daughter; Marivi did not even care about
discussing family finances with him as long as she got what
she wanted. She also had a violent temper and would hurl
things at him during their fights; that she would blame him
for everything, and would keep on reciting his past mistakes.
Marivi did not understand the demands of his job, and
unfairly compared his work to her father's job, the operation
of which was limited to a single area, a compound in a mine
site in Cebu. He explained that the multinational companies
he then worked for required him to work beyond the normal
office hours because he has to meet "sales quotas in millions
of dollars," entertain people from different headquarters, and
meet with different clients from areas far from his
residence.[35]
Worse, Nilo was turned off by Marivi's act of broadcasting
to her whole clan his inadequacies during their intimate
sexual relations, which began after he witnessed Marivi
giving birth to their first child. When he confided to Marivi
about this, she instead accused him of having another affair.
Since then, he did not feel any sexual excitement and
attraction toward her when they were together. Instead of
discussing the problem with him candidly, she accused him
of being gay. Nilo stated that the last time they had sex was
in 1997 or in 1998.[36]
The Clinical Findings
In support of her claim that she and Nilo were suffering
from psychological incapacity, Marivi presented Dr. Cecilia
Villegas (Dr. Villegas), a psychiatrist, and Dr. Ruben
Encarnacion (Dr. Encarnacion), a clinical psychologist.
Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nilo to have "inadequate personality
disorder related to masculine strivings associated with
unresolved oedipal complex,"[37] while she diagnosed Marivi
to have "personality disorder of the mixed type, [h]istrionic,
[n]arcissistic, with immaturity x x x." [38]
In the March 21, 2005 Psychiatric Report,[39] Dr. Villegas
stated:
The root cause of the above clinical conditions on the part of
Marivi Cruz, were the overindulgence and over attention of
her parents, in a prolonged manner, carried over to adult
adjustments. On the part of Nilo Cruz, his negative
identification and resentments towards his father and close
attachments to his mother, continued by his long-time maid,
to the point of an oedipal situation led to his inadequacy,
along masculine strivings, with difficult assertions of his
authority and power.
The above clinical conditions existed prior [to] marriage but
became manifest only after the celebration due to marital
stresses and demands. Both are considered as permanent in
nature, because they started early in their developmental
stage, and therefore became so deeply engrained into their
personality structures. Both are considered grave in degree,
because they hampered, interfered and disrupted their
normal functioning related to heterosexual adjustments.[40]
According to Dr. Villegas, both parties could not tolerate
each others' weaknesses and that the incapacities of the
parties are grave because they preferred to satisfy their own
needs rather than to give in to the other's needs.[41]
She claimed that Nilo's lack of a father figure weakened his
masculinity. He cross-identified himself with his mother
because his father, a disciplinarian and the thrifty one, was
often absent because of his military service. While he was
still a teenager, his mother migrated to Canada and their
long-time maid acted as his surrogate mother. Nilo sought
from his wife his mother's nurturing qualities, but he felt
hostility when Marivi failed to meet his ego ideal. His
aggression was in the form of passivity, punishing his wife
by not sexually performing.[42]
Dr. Villegas noted that Nilo would put on a facade, a
compensatory mechanism according to social norms. While
he was not exactly a homosexual. he covered up his weak
masculine traits by being a "playboy." Nilo could only
comply with the financial obligation of marital life, but not
the psychological and emotional parts of it.[43] Nilo likewise
was an inadequate father figure to his own two sons,
especially the younger, who has already manifested strong
feminine traits.[44]
Marivi, on the other hand, expected that her interactions
with the world would be like that of her own close-knit
family, a perception attributable to her parents' prolonged
gratification of her dependency needs. Her father was a
dedicated, devoted, and responsible family man who
regularly came home to spend time with them, while her
mother was a good housewife, who always found time to
personally attend to their needs. Dr. Villegas described
Marivi as one with strong mood fluctuations, emotionally
immature, with low self-esteem, has difficulty neutralizing
the outbreak of negativity in her behavior, is suggestible,
egocentric, and impelled by a desire to "extort" from others.
To Dr. Villegas, the couple's respective personality
disorders were mutually repelling, their brain waves not
being in sync because what Marivi expected from Nilo
happened to be Nilo's weakest point.[45]
Dr. Encarnacion supported Dr. Villegas' diagnosis. On the
basis of Nilo's five-to-six sessions and Marivi's eight bi-
weekly psychotherapy sessions with him, Dr. Encarnacion
concluded that there was no chance of a successful marriage
in a dysfunctional union when there is double psychological
incapacity. He categorically stated that Nilo was incapable
of being a good husband and a good father. Nilo lacked an
individual coherent identity and instead went by the
standards of general society, which is driven by the desire to
gain material wealth, power, and control. Nilo did not like
close relationships and was incapable of forming some; his
social anxiety, associated with paranoid fears, was
manifested by excessive vanity. Nilo projected an image of
a wealthy, successful, handsome man surrounded by
women, in none of whom, however, he was interested in a
long-term sexual relationship; he saw himself as a
performer-provider and was disinterested in spending
quality time with his family, in carrying on conversations
with members of his family, insensitive, intolerant, and
demanding.[46]
Dr. Encarnacion attributed respondent's psychological
disorder to his childhood, in which he did not have fond
memories of tender moments and vacation times with his
family. Nilo grew up very close to his mother who always
listened to his complaints and with whom he sympathized,
hence his unresolved oedipal issues; even as he patterned his
masculinity strivings after his stingy father, the family
provider, but whom he nonetheless described as
"unappreciative, undemonstrative, and quite materialistic."
At the age of 18, when his parents migrated to Canada and
left him in the Philippines, he then lost his role models,
incapacitating him from creating his own identity. Thus,
when he began working at the age of 21, he imbibed the
values of his workplace, where feelings and emotional
discussions were absent, factors that nonetheless somehow
worked to his advantage in his job.[47] Dr. Encarnacion
opined that Nilo's incapacity was his "rigidity," which drove
him into imposing his family upbringing on his own family,
instead of adjusting to the modem family setup, i.e., that the
modem father should take on new roles and be part of
family activities where his family needs him to
be, e.g. taking the children to the pediatrician or to the park,
camping with the family, or being with them in church,
instead of strictly confining himself to being a provider. [48]
As for Marivi, Dr. Encarnacion found that she exhibited
"Histrionic Personality Behaviors and Features" as
manifested by her impressionistic speech, her exaggerated
expression of emotions, and her suggestibility. He stated
that Marivi's "inflexibility" consisted in her expecting a high
standard of faithfulness from all men as exemplified by her
dad, who was also very devoted to her mother. However,
because dissatisfied and frustrated by her actual marital
situation, she sought attention, externalized blame, displayed
anger, mistrust, resentment, and self-indulgence.[49]
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its October 13, 2008 Decision,[50] the RTC denied the
Petition.
The RTC took a dim view of the expert witnesses'
attribution of a double psychological incapacity to Marivi's
nature of being a "father figure woman," and to Nilo's
"oedipal complex." The court noted that Marivi already
disengaged herself from her father as her standard of an
ideal husband when she married Nilo, despite the latter's
limitations and his then being already very focused on his
job. Marivi's need for assurance that she is loved, vis-a-vis
her looking up to her father as her standard, was not by itself
sufficient to declare her psychologically incapacitated.
As for Nilo, the RTC found no concrete evidence of
"oedipal complex;" the RTC held that prioritizing his work
over the emotional needs of his family was not reflective of
his psychological incapacity because what he did was still
for his family's benefit. Neither was Nilo's lack of sexual
interest in Marivi a case of psychological incapacity, for this
was a result of his being turned off by Marivi's unabated
naggings and her revelations to her family of his sexual
inadequacies.
From the RTC's verdict, petitioner appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its November 22, 2011 Decision,[51] the CA united with
the RTC in rejecting the alleged. existence of psychological
incapacity pointed out by Dr. Villegas and by Dr.
Encarnacion.
The CA found that Dr. Villegas and Dr. Encarnacion failed
to paint a clear picture of the supposed gravity or
seriousness of Nilo's psychological incapacity, and that it
was unconvinced of the doctors' conclusion that Nilo had a
deep propensity to cover up for his serious inadequacies.
It ruled that Marivi failed to prove that Nilo's failure to
comply with his sexual obligation was due to some
psychological condition or makeup, as this could very well
be explained by the stress brought about by Marivi's
negative attitude toward Nilo, who was turned off by her act
of revealing to her clan their bedroom secrets instead of
privately resolving the problem with him. Moreover, the CA
said it is a non sequitur, that just because he could not
sexually perform according to Marivi's standard, he should
thus be labelled a gay or homosexual. It appears that Nilo
has "selective" impotency, for while he could not have an
erection for Marivi, he nevertheless had had extramarital
affairs. Neither did the CA see anything wrong with Nilo's
"put-on facade" of a happy marriage to protect the family's
privacy.
The CA did not even consider Marivi's alleged histrionic
traits as ref1ected in her behavior, e.g., her persistent
demand as to Nilo's whereabouts, her constant naggings, her
attention-seeking acts, grave or serious enough to qualify as
psychological incapacity. The CA ruled that it was the
couple's irreconcilable differences that marred their
marriage; that the negative acts or actions of one spouse
were neutralized or offset by the other's negative acts or
actions, and that these are "mere character flaws or bad
habits that the spouses developed over the years [which] can
be modified or changed depending on the desire of either
spouse to do so."[52] The CA thereafter disposed of the
appeal, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The decision of the
Regional Trial Court in CV No. 05-095 denying the petition
tor declaration of nullity of marriage between appellant
Maria Victoria Socorro Lontoc-Cruz and appellee Nilo
Santos Cruz for insufficiency of evidence is hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[53]
Marivi moved for a reconsideration but it was denied in the
CA's May 29, 2012 Resolution.[54]
Issue
At issue before us is whether the psychological conditions of
the parties fall under Article 36 of the Family Code to
warrant the declaration of nullity of marriage.
Our Ruling
We sustain the findings of both the RTC and the CA. Article
36 of the Family Code states:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
We have laid down guidelines in interpreting and applying
this provision. In Republic v. De Gracia,[55] we reiterated the
doctrine in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[56] "that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by: (a)
gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in a marriage); (b) juridical antecedence (i.e., it
must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage); and (c) incurability (i.e., it must be
incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be
beyond the means of the party involved)." Also, in Republic
v. Court of Appeals,[57] we reiterated the well-settled
guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage, as embodied in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[58] viz.:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity. x x x.
x x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. x x x.
x x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time
of the celebration' of the marriage. x x x.
x x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. x x x.
x x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts' cannot be accepted
as root causes. x x x.
x x x x
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-
complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts. x x x.
x x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. x x x.
Notably, "mere showing of 'irreconcilable differences' and
'conflicting personalities' [as in the present case,] in no wise
constitutes psychological incapacity." [59] "Nor does failure
of the parties to meet their responsibilities and duties as
married persons" amount to psychological incapacity. [60] We
further elucidated in Yambao v. Republic[61] that the
psychological condition should render the subject totally
unaware or incognitive of the basic marital obligations:
Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations and
not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance
of marital obligations or ill will. This incapacity consists of
the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself
must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering
of mutual help, the procreation and education of offspring;
and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. It is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to
meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so
due to some psychological illness.[62]
In Marcos v. Marcos,[63] the actual medical examination of
the one claimed to have psychological incapacity is not a
condition sine qua non, for what matters is the totality of
evidence to sustain a finding of such psychological
incapacity. While it behooves this Court to weigh the
clinical findings of psychology experts as part of the
evidence, the court's hands are nonetheless free to make its
own independent factual findings. "It bears repeating that
the trial courts, as in all the other cases they try, must always
base their judgments not solely on the expert opinions
presented by the parties but on the totality of evidence
adduced in the course of the proceedings."[64]
With specific reference to the case before us, even granting
that both parties did suffer from personality disorders as
evaluated by the expert witnesses, we find that the
conclusions reached by these expert witnesses do not
irresistibly point to the fact that the personality disorders
which plague the spouses antedated the marriage; that these
personality disorders are indeed grave or serious; or that
these personality disorders are incurable or permanent as to
render the parties psychologically incapacitated to carry out
and carry on their marital duties. What can be inferred from
the totality of evidence, at most, is a case of incompatibility.
For a personality disorder to be declared clinically or
medically incurable or permanent is one thing; for a spouse
to refuse or to be reluctant to perform his/her marital duties
is another.[65]
Indeed, we are loath to overturn the findings of the RTC and
the CA. More than that, too, the evidence on record do not
square with the existence of psychological incapacity as
contemplated by law and jurisprudence. In the case of Nilo,
what brought about the breakdown of his relationship with
Marivi was not necessarily attributable to his so-called
"psychological disorder" but can be imputed to his work and
marital stress, and his ordinary human failings.
With regard to his failure to sexually perform "adequately,"
the same appeared to be a case of "selective impotency," as
he was turned off by Marivi's disclosure of their bed secrets
to her family. Furthermore, Nilo testified that the sexual
problem with Marivi did not crop up until the birth of their
second son, and that he felt that the blame was invariably
and unfairly laid on upon him, thus:
THE COURT:
The Court has just some questions with regard to the
main issue. During your direct testimony; Mr. Witness,
you mentioned some of your faults which [may be] the
reason why the instant case was filed. x x x one of those
faults is no sex. When did that happen? x x x
If I recall it right, Your Honor; I [had] some challenge[s]
immediately after the first birth of my eldest son which I
A.
x x x shared with the psychologist or psychiatrist who
[had] examined me.
THE COURT:
But when you got married with your wife that was not a
problem until the birth of your last son?
A. Yes, your Honor.
ATTY. STA MARIA, JR.:
So it is attributable to the petitioner though you claim
Q.
that it is your fault, is that correct?
Because, your Honor, that kind of situation, I always get
blamed, so for the purpose of settling all these questions,
when you make that mistake, you'll always be the one to
be blamed although as per the psychologist and the
psychiatrist, there's also a reason why I am not able to
perform sex to my wife because in those ten (10) years
that we were together, after the first one, [didn't] have
any other affairs but I kept being blamed that I [had] just
A.
because I [was] not able to perform sex to her. The whole
family, her family knows that in that premise because I
got, one time, in one of our quarrels x x x told me,
"maybe you're not making love with my daughter
because you are having an affair with another woman."
So, I know I made a mistake in the past but if I'm x x x
kept [being] reminded of it, it's a punishment, your
Honor.
xxxx
What you initially said was your fault was...as you're
Q. now talking before this Honorable Court, is really the
fault of the petitioner; is that what you are saying?
There [were] times, your Honor, I would say it was my
fault. There [were] times it was caused by her faults as
well. It's not one plus one it was hers and one plus one it
was mine, it depends on the situation. We've been
A. dealing with cases before so not all the time it's the fault
of Mrs. Cruz. And not all the time it's the fault of Mr.
Cruz. It's a relationship, there are times it's hers, there are
times, it's mine but we're able to fix it until this
annulment situation came.
x x x x[67]
Nor can it be said that Nilo's failure to provide quality time
for the family was caused by his "inadequate personality
disorder" or "unresolved oedipal complex." Nilo explained
that he has a taxing and demanding job, and that
unfortunately, with his working hours eating up his home
life, while he was able to provide his family with an
adequate standard of living, the lack of quality time for his
wife became attenuated and resulted in severing his bond
with Marivi, who failed to understand the nature of his job.
They were a happy couple during the period of courtship,
and even during the early years of their marriage. Nilo
testified:
ATTY. REVILLA:
Q. x x x What was the reason why you had to stay up late?
Ma'am, I'm...in those I.T. companies that I worked for
whether manager or managing director, my companies
are...the companies are involved in sales and marketing
A. and support so it entails entertainment of clients,
entertainment of principals coming from headquarters
and entertainment of customers with my staff and other
company.
Q. When you say I.T., what does it stand for?
A. Information Technology.
You also referred to a headquarters. What do you mean
Q.
by headquarters?
Headquarters, if you work in a multinational company
like companies I worked for, they have headquarters in
A.
Hong Kong, they have headquarters in Singapore, they
have headquarters in the U.S.
So you had to entertain principals corning from [these]
Q.
headquarters?
As a part of the job as required by the principals who
A.
[visit] us.
 How often were you required to stay out late because of
Q.
your job?
Ma'am, it is unpredictable. Sometimes, we were required
A. to stay for dinner and entertainment thereafter.
Sometimes, we can go home early also.
Could you not refuse the invitations of going out and just
Q.
go home and spend time with your family?
Sometimes I can refuse, sometimes I cannot. Because it
A.
becomes a condition of sale of the clients x x x.
xxxx
So x x x what's the latest time of the night that you
Q.
usually come home?
My objective as a husband and as a father is to really
come as early as I can which I have explained on and on,
your Honor. But to meet my million dollar targets of the
country, I have to do things beyond 5 o'clock. In several
occasions when I tried to go home early, to my
A. disappointment, my kids are not at home because they
were borrowed by my in-laws to have merienda. That's
why I complained to my wife that time that "please tell
me if they are going with my in-laws because I don't
want to deprive them also of the few times I'm able to go
home early."
So, you are saying that you only have few times of
Q.
coming home early?
A. Well, yes, but not very few.
Okay. Have you tried to make an effort to remedy the
Q.
situation?
Well, if I have my way to be able to direct my
appointments in the South, my meetings in Amkor
Anam, Mamplasan, in Sta. Rosa then that will allow me
A. to be home at least 5-6 o'clock. But most of my meetings
in Makati, Quezon City, Manila especially with
government clients [do] allow me to go home early, your
Honor.
x x x x[68]
THE COURT:
What about another fault you mentioned which is staying
late, when did this thing happen?
When I came back from my assignment in Hong Kong in
A.
1988 when I was given a new job in sales and marketing.
xxxx
THE COURT:
So before the birth of your children, that is after your
marriage with the petitioner, this was not a problem?
Because, your Honor, I was assigned in Hong Kong and I
A. was only twelve (12) minutes [away] by [foot] to our
office x x x.
xxxx
And I was not in [sales] and marketing, I was the
Administrative Assistant of the President of IBM in
Southeast Asia so it's the...purely management
administrative work as an administrative assistant so
there's [not] much of entertaining done in Hong Kong.
THE COURT:
Okay, so in other words, at that time, that was not a
problem. It was only a problem when you were appointed
to your position in...
A. IBM.
THE COURT:
That was so many years after you got married with your
wife?
We got married, your Honor, in 1987 then we went back
to the Philippines in July 1988 [when] I was given a new
A. marketing and [sales] role as a manager of general
marketing which is...which encompasses all industries
aside [from] the government.
THE COURT:
So you mean to say that this problem of staying late only
happened lately?
xxxx
The definition, your Honor, of my family...late is when
you don't make it at 7:00 o'clock or...[with] the family at
A.
7:00 o'clock in the evening. So if I don't make it at seven,
I considered myself late.
THE COURT:
What is the reason why you have been late?
Your Honor, my job is not a 9 to 5 job because we...we
call on customers, we entertain customers, partners,
principals, we also have fellowship with our teams. So,
we either have dinner or we have happy hours. We also
see friends after. So but, physically I cannot do that
everyday, your Honor, because I also wake up
A.
automatically at 6:00 everyday whether I have a drink, or
have dinner, or I worked out in the evening or play[ed]
basketball during that time, I always wake up at six. So if
I stayed up late like previously...like 2, 3, it's gonna be a
burden for me physically and [I would be] unable to
perform my job well. So, like I mentioned earlier in a
hearing, your Honor, many times I tried to be home by 10
 to be able to watch. Before 10 to be able to watch the
10:00 o'clock news and be able to enjoy my ice cream
while watching it.
THE COURT:
Well, one of those faults you mentioned is also working
hard, why did you say that it is your fault?
In our industry, your Honor, when you work out, you will
A. definitely end up late several couple of times, but not all
the time.
xxxx
Your Honor, sometimes, I get all these complaints. But
when they saw my picture in the newspaper or in the TV
having success stories and contract signing, they are
proud of me.
THE COURT:
When you say "so proud of me," to whom are you
referring x x x?
My family. They call me, they congratulate me, we have
A. dinners together to celebrate but to get to that, is the
working hard and staying away from the family.
xxxx
THE COURT:
How long did you court your wife?
A. Six (6) months, your Honor.
x x x x[69]
THE COURT:
Could you say that you were a perfect couple at that
time?
When we were starting, your Honor, we [were] happy,
and during the time that we were in Hong Kong. But
when we went back to Manila, there are times (the
A.
witness is in tears)...adjusting to work and family that is
why it affected my relationship to her family and
combination of mistakes happened which I admitted.
THE COURT:
How would you describe your wife during your first
years of marriage?
A. [She was] a very good wife.
THE COURT:
Did she perform her duties as a wife and as a mother?
A. Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT:
And was she that independent from her parents or she
was too dependent [on] her parents?
On her performing her duties, with the...as a wife and as
A. a friend, she's independent. When it comes to our
problems, she would consult her family.
THE COURT:
So only those times when you have a problem. Like what
problems, Mr. Witness?
A. Our relationship, your Honor.
THE COURT:
But most of the time, you were able to patch up your
problems?
A. Yes, your Honor.
x x x x[70]
Interestingly, when asked if there was no more functional
marital life between him and Marivi, Nilo candidly
highlighted his different perception from his estranged wife:
ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.:
So, Mr. Witness, well in reality today, Mr. Witness, even
the petitioner believes that there is no more functional
Q.
marital life in this relationship, would you agree with
that?
If that's the way she thinks, I...I will have my own way of
A.
looking at things because...
xxxx
Even...as I was saying since she was asking for nullity
and you were asking for nullity, it's a fact of life as of
Q.
today, as you speak today that there is no more functional
marital life between the two (2) of you?
You see, your Honor, that's why we're different. Her style
is conclude and conclude. I have a different style because
A. of my background. I will only stop till death. I cannot
share her legal counsel's statement with my own
thinking, your Honor.
x x x x[71]
Even the psychiatrist Dr. Villegas pinpointed the differences
of the estranged couple which led to squabbles -
ATTY. STA. MARIA, JR.:
 Doctor, from your examination of both respondent and
Q. petitioner the obligation of trust and respect for each
other, how did it not manifest in this relationship?
The respondent [sees] the petitioner as one who's very
negativistic on him or who's very demanding and who is
A. also trying to put him down because according to him,
the petitioner would always see his weak points rather
than his strong points.
Are you saying that this developed a non-trust just
Q.
between them?
None trust. They do not trust each other anymore. On the
part of the petitioner, because of his womanizing
A. activities and on the part of the respondent, that the
petitioner is always looking at his weak points rather than
his strong points.
x x x x[72]
It is significant to note that Marivi failed to substantiate
Nilo's penchant for womanizing as a manifestation of his
psychological incapacity. Aside from her bare allegations,
which were chiefly based on what other people told her, she
never presented irrefutable proof to corroborate her claims
of his sexual proclivities, i.e., that these proclivities were
already existing before the marriage and during the first
years of their marriage. Nilo, on the other hand,
categorically admitted to having extramarital affairs in 1992,
2002, and 2006, the period when the marriage was already
on the rocks. Neither is there evidence of Nilo's alleged
oedipal complex, the manifestations of which were not cited
by the experts, that caused the couple to fall out of love.
Anent Marivi's case, based on her family history as reflected
in the experts' clinical evaluation, she grew up in a well-
functioning, supportive, and emotionally healthy family
environment. Even Nilo himself attested that she was a good
wife and a good mother to their children. Her demand for
attention, time, love, and fidelity is normal for a wife. The
anger she felt within her is also a legitimate reaction.
Yet the psychologist Dr. Encarnacion himself acknowledged
that Marivi's so-called psychological incapacity is in fact,
curable. Thus:
ATTY. REVILLA:
So even without the respondent, Nilo Cruz, petitioner
Q.
would still be psychologically incapacitated?
I beg to [differ] from that because the needs were not
fulfilled in this particular marriage, it's like a tendency to
have cancer, but if you take care of yourself with the
A. right environment, you will not catch cancer. Those were
previous positions, that's why I called them Histrionic
Personality Traits Behaviors and Features not a full
blown Histrionic Personality Disorder, the needs were
badly unfulfilled in this marriage because she married a
man who did not know the language of feeling of
showing some attention towards his spouse, meaning, if
she is put in a relationship with a man who is able to
address these needs, she would be better, she would be
better in a marriage.
So this psychological incapacity of the petitioner is only
Q.
dormant at the time that she was not yet married?
A. Well, it's grave...
Q. Was it grave already at the time...
A. Yes, it is, it's grave but...
Q. Even before the marriage?
...but not incurable, that is the only adjective, grave, pre-
A.
existing...
Q. Pre-existing?
Grave and pre-existing, yes, incurable, no, in the sense
that if she married properly if her needs were addressed,
it would not appear in that marriage.
But because of her marriage to the respondent, are you
Q.
saying now that her psychological incapacity now...
A. Became an incapacity, yes.
Q. ...became incurable?
A. No.
xxxx
Okay. I am quite curious about the curability of the
personality disorder of the petitioner. Now, if her needs
Q. are satisfied with...in case, assuming the petitioner enters
into another relationship and her needs are satisfied then
her incapacity is cured, is that what you're saying?
A. In effect, yes, in effect, yes.
Would you say, what are these needs of the petitioner
Q.
that [you're]...not satisfied of the respondent?
Need to be paid attention to, need to be valued, need to
have an effect on someone, it is a universal need. She
was made to feel that she did not have any effect on him
A.
and so are the children, x x x well, the father made the
children feel that they, wife and two sons did not have
any effect on him, ma'am.
x x x[73]
One last question. The needs of the petitioner, like you
Q. say, do you think she was able to convey, clearly convey
her needs to the respondent, properly convey?
 Very clearly, yes, and then when they were still not being
heard, well, iyon na nga eh, yung hostility niya and
A. resentment would get the better of her as a ano...so it
would become dysfunctional reaction upon reaction.
That's a good question.[74]
Upon the view we take of this case, thus, this Court believes
that the protagonists in this case are in reality simply
unwilling to work out a solution for each other's personality
differences, and have thus become overwhelmed by feelings
of disappointment or disillusionment toward one another.
Sadly, a marriage, even if unsatisfactory, is not a null and
void marriage.[75]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner Yolanda E. Garlet assails in this Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court the: (1) Decision[1] dated June 21, 2010 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89142, which reversed and
set aside the Decision[2] dated November 27, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 159, Pasig City in
JDRC Case No. 6796; and (2) Resolution[3] dated August
24, 2010 of the appellate court in the same case, which
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
Petitioner and respondent Vencidor T. Garlet met each other
sometime in 1988. They became intimately involved and as
a result, petitioner became pregnant. Petitioner gave birth to
their son, Michael Vincent Garlet (Michael), out of wedlock
on November 9, 1989. Petitioner and respondent eventually
got married on March 4, 1994. Their union was blessed with
a second child, Michelle Mae Garlet (Michelle), on January
23, 1997. However, petitioner and respondent started
experiencing marital problems. After seven years of
marriage, petitioner and respondent separated in 2001.
Petitioner now has custody over their two children.
On May 6, 2005, petitioner filed a Petition[4] for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of respondent's
psychological incapacity to fulfill his essential marital
obligations to petitioner and their children. The Petition was
docketed as JDRC Case No. 6796. On June 30, 2005,
respondent filed his Answer[5] to the Petition.
At the pre-trial, the parties admitted the following facts:
1. The petitioner and respondent contracted marriage
on [March[6]] 4, 1994;
2. The parties' first son was named Michael Vincent
Garlet and was born on November 9, 1989;
3. The petitioner gave birth to another child named
Michelle Mae Garlet on January 23, 1997;
4. The respondent is aware that the petitioner is
working in Japan as an entertainer;
5. There is no ante-nuptial agreement prior to the
celebration of the marriage;
6. There is no separation of properties during the
marriage;
7. The petitioner has the custody and the one
supporting the children from the time the
respondent lost communication with the children as
he does not exert effort to see them;
8. The petitioner admitted that the parties acquired
several properties during cohabitation with
qualification that the same was bought out of the
efforts and finances of the petitioner; and
9. The petitioner likewise admitted that the
respondent was not subjected to psychological
examination by the psychologist sought by the
petitioner with qualification that respondent was
given several opportunities to attend the
psychological evaluation but failed to do so.[7]
Thereafter, trial ensued.
Testifying for petitioner were petitioner herself; Marites
Ereve (Marites), petitioner's sister who served as the
children's nanny from 1993 to 2001; and Ms. Nimia
Hermilia C. De Guzman (De Guzman), the clinical
psychologist.
Petitioner and respondent were introduced to each other by a
common friend in 1988. Respondent courted petitioner and
they became close. One day, after partying and drinking
liquor with some friends, petitioner and respondent lost their
inhibitions and indulged in sexual intercourse. Petitioner
became pregnant as a result. Respondent doubted if he
fathered the unborn child and refused to support petitioner.
Respondent urged petitioner to have an abortion, to which
she did not agree. During petitioner's pregnancy, respondent
did not visit her nor did he give any financial assistance.
After giving birth to Michael, respondent visited petitioner
only once.[8]
In order to support Michael, petitioner left for Japan to work
for six months as a cultural dancer. Petitioner temporarily
entrusted Michael's care and custody to her mother and
siblings in Bicol. Upon returning to the Philippines,
petitioner took Michael back to live in Manila. Petitioner
also brought Marites with them to Manila to serve as the
nanny.[9] Respondent visited petitioner and Michael several
times but respondent still did not offer petitioner any
monetary help as he was jobless.[10]
From 1990 to 1994, petitioner returned to Japan several
more times to work, but she maintained her relationship
with respondent for the sake of their son. Sometime in 1992,
petitioner instructed respondent to scout for a real property
on which she may invest her money. With the money
petitioner remitted, respondent purchased a 210-square
meter lot in Morong, Rizal (Morong property), [11] but
registered the Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. M-
38509[12] covering said property in his name. Despite
petitioner's pleas, respondent refused to transfer the
certificate of title to the Morong property in petitioner's
name.[13] Later on, respondent, without petitioner's consent,
sold a 69-square meter portion of the Morong property to
spouses Avelino Garlet (Avelino) and Cipriana A. Garlet,
respondent's brother and sister-in-law, respectively, who
secured TCT No. M-56993 for said portion in their
names.[14] Respondent also mortgaged the Morong property
to his sister-in-law's friend, which forced petitioner to
redeem it for P50,000.00.[15]
Petitioner bought another parcel of land in Pila, Laguna on
March 3, 1994 (Pila property).[16] Respondent insisted on
including his name as one of the buyers in the deed of sale
for the Pila property even though he was jobless and had no
money to contribute for the purchase of said property.[17]
It was also in 1992 that petitioner and respondent started
living together on the Morong property. They often
quarreled but respondent stayed with petitioner because she
was the breadwinner of the family. Respondent later asked
petitioner to marry him. Thinking it was for the best interest
of their son, petitioner agreed and she married respondent on
March 4, 1994.[18]
After their wedding, respondent turned into a "selfish,
greedy, irresponsible, philandering and physically abusive
husband." From 1994 to 1997, their family relied on
petitioner's savings for their needs. Petitioner purchased a
jeepney to augment their family's finances but respondent
did not ply the jeepney.[19]
Petitioner hoped and asked respondent to change his ways.
But even after the birth of their daughter, Michelle,
respondent never bothered to look for a stable job. Worse,
respondent maintained his vices of gambling, drinking, and
womanizing.[20] Respondent neglected Michael and
Michelle, and relied on Marites to take care of the
children.[21]
In 1998, petitioner was forced to work in Japan again as all
her savings had been exhausted. Petitioner was able to save
enough money to invest in a mini-grocery store. Petitioner
placed respondent in charge of the store but the store
suffered losses, which respondent could not account.
Petitioner infused additional capital into the store but it still
ultimately closed.[22]
Upon returning to the Philippines in 2000, petitioner felt
devastated upon learning that respondent had squandered
her hard-earned money, pawned her jewelry, and incurred
debts in her name.[23] Petitioner also discovered the incident
when respondent allowed a "male friend" to sleep in the
master's bedroom. According to petitioner, this was highly
unusual as they never previously allowed anyone to sleep at
their house.[24]
Additionally, every time petitioner came home and brought
presents for her parents and siblings, respondent got angry
and demanded from petitioner all her earnings. [25]
Petitioner and respondent were fighting constantly.
Sometime in 2001, they had a serious altercation during
which, respondent strangled petitioner. Fortunately, a third
person intervened and saved petitioner.[26]
Petitioner and respondent tried to settle their marital issues
before the barangay. There, respondent admitted taking
petitioner's money and jewelry because he had no means to
support himself and the family. Realizing that there was no
more love and respect between them and that respondent
was just using her, petitioner finally separated from
respondent.[27] Petitioner and respondent executed on
September 10, 2001 before the barangay a Kasunduang
Pag-aayos[28] wherein they agreed that respondent would
leave the house in exchange for the jeepney, tricycle, and
P300,000.00; and that respondent would have visitation
rights, i.e., twice a week, over their children. Since the
separation, petitioner had been solely supporting their
children with the income from her businesses in Bicol,
Bulacan, and Pasig.
Petitioner filed an application for support, alleging that she
had been spending approximately P15,000.00 a month for
the two children, and paying the children's tuition fees in the
following amounts[29]:
Michael Michelle
P
Grade 6 P 18,118.10 Nursery
18,280.00
1st year high
20,366.00 Grade 1 21,741.00
school
2nd year high
24,241.00 Grade 2 15,050.00
school
3rd year high
26,996.00 Grade 3 17,704.00
school
4th year high
29,676.00
school
In addition, petitioner had expended around P15,000.00 for
the children's medical and dental needs and about
P100,000.00 for the children's clothing needs since 2001. As
the children would be starting school again, Michael would
need P15,000.00 for his tuition fee for the first semester in
college, plus P20,000.00 for his monthly allowance, books,
supplies, and other miscellaneous expenses; while Michelle
would need P30,000.00 for her annual tuition fee, as well as
P15,000.00 for food allowance, school supplies, tutorials,
clothing, and other miscellaneous expenses.[30]
Considering the children's foregoing expenses, petitioner
asserted that her demand for respondent to pay P20,000.00
per month, or P10,000.00 a month for each child, was just
and reasonable.[31]
Clinical psychologist, Ms. De Guzman, reported that she
interviewed petitioner and gathered information from the
couple's relatives and neighbors.[32] Ms. De Guzman's
attempts to talk to respondent at his house were
unsuccessful. Ms. De Guzman, however, explained that her
failure to personally interview respondent would not affect
her findings, saying that "what is being tapped in the
psychological assessment is the unconscious level, more or
less. And what is represented or uncovered in the
unconscious level would be correlated to the manifested
behavior. Having observed the respondent since the time
that I have been appearing in this case, there are some
aspects or some attitudes and behaviors that correlated with
the descriptions of those people whom I interviewed." [33]
In her report entitled "Psychological Capacity of Petitioner
Yolanda Ereve Garlet"[34] (Psychological Report), Ms. De
Guzman cleared petitioner of any psychological disorder,
saying that petitioner has the capacity to understand and
comply with her marital obligations. In contrast, Ms. De
Guzman found respondent to be suffering from a narcissistic
type of personality disorder. Quoted below are Ms. De
Guzman's test results and her evaluation of both petitioner
and respondent:
Petitioner is endowed with an average intellectual capacity
and possesses practical sounding cognitive skills that
enables her to confront her challenges in an efficient
manner. However, her better judgment and analytical
functions are inclined to falter when pressures and stresses
overwhelm her.
Personality profile reveals a woman who is overly
submissive to the point of being gullible such that she
normally gets the raw end of a deal in most social situations.
As much as possible, she would want a smooth sailing
interaction especially with her loved ones, trying to
compensate for lost time when she is not around them.
She is however, the type who knows and honors her
commitments and obligations even if the people she trusts,
as in the case of her wayward husband – Respondent have
already betrayed her.
She is basically goal-focused and independent-minded but
these mature and positive traits easily dwindle when her
sentimental nature gets the better of her. She welcomes
praises and attention accorded to her by her milieu such that
she sometimes fail to decipher who among them are merely
taking advantage of her generosity/kindness. Consequently,
she easily gets fooled, particularly as she could really be too
trusting.
Assertiveness and strength of character are the least among
her traits but Petitioner always makes it a point to maintain a
positive outlook and disposition in life despite her failures.
She is very sensitive and considerate of the feelings of other
people.
Pyschosexual adjustment is basically adequate even if she
has developed a wary attitude towards members of the
opposite sex.
Over-all analysis of the test data failed to yield traces of any
on-going psychopathological condition nor of any type of
personality disorder. Thus, Petitioner is
still Psychologically Capacitated to understand, comply
and execute her marital obligations.
The same could not be said as true for the Respondent
who is undoubtedly suffering from the Narcissistic Type
of Personality Disorder, as evidenced by the following
symptomatic behavior:
1. He is unable to maintain his own direction in life
without the financial help and support of other
people. He clings to the Petitioner, who is the
breadwinner, sacrificing to be away from home to
be able to build up a stable future, for his finances.
He also maintains an amorous relationship with
different women as a source of added emotional
support, boost of and satisfaction of his self-
directed/immediate needs and desires.
2. He is not motivated to work and likewise
capitalizes on his physical assets to attain what he
wants to achieve.
3. He is contented with his present lifestyle without
thought of others and has no foresight to prepare
for a healthy family, emotionally and socially. He
is not bothered by his conscience and even flaunts
his indiscretions publicly.
4. He has marked adjustment difficulties with his
immediate relatives.
5. He has a very poor impulse control, easily using
invectives/verbal tirades and at times unable to
control his aggressions that physical fights with
Petitioner arose.
6. He took advantage of Petitioner's kindness,
resourcefulness and industry, by not fulfilling his
part of the marriage covenant. He never cared nor
attended to his children but often delegated them to
whoever would be willing to assist him.
7. He appears not to make use of his judgment and
decision making abilities as he is under the mercy
of his immature impulses where the important
aspect of his life, is himself and immediate
gratification of his needs.
Thus, attending to his responsibility, understanding and
complying with his obligations in marriage are beyond his
capacity. Conclusively, the breakdown of their marriage
could be traced to Respondent's aforementioned traits plus
his inadequacy and insecurity in dealing with mature roles.
Respondent's traits and attitudes have been present even
before marriage so that to effect any change or improvement
in his dispositions, would be difficult to do. The
Psychological Incapacitation is pervasive, permanent and
clinically proven to be incurable. Respondent has accepted it
as his means of coping with stressing life demands and is
not aware that it was the source of their estrangement and
final breakdown of their marital relationship.
The root cause of which started in his early days of training
where ambivalent/matter-of-fact treatment was received
from immediate caregivers. Because of his ordinal position
among the children, being the youngest boy, he was always
given the choice of what to do, favored or praised. He was
not able to overcome such indulgence, carried it to his
adolescent/adult years, as he was always given the most
attention.
Contrarily, they were also somehow neglected because of
financial lack so much so that parents had to work overtime
to earn adequately for their living. Respondent together with
his younger siblings were left to the care of elder
brothers/sisters who just simply/literally followed what their
parents would want of them. Guidance and discipline were
imposed upon the elder siblings but became oblivious
towards the Respondent. It developed in Respondent on how
he would go about his life without experiencing the
deprivation and hardship that he had undergone. He became
self-focused and at the same time hunted for women
vulnerable to his superficialities.
Thus, they are better off apart for the sake of everyone who
are within their bounds of reach" for Respondent does not
realize the pain he is causing towards other people,
specifically his legal wife – the Petitioner as well as their
children.
It is therefore recommended that their marriage covenant be
dissolved for everyone's peace of mind, through due process
in this Honorable Court.[35]
Respondent testified on his own behalf. However, in an
Order[36] dated September 14, 2006, the RTC declared
respondent's direct testimony stricken off the record because
of respondent's failure to appear for his cross-examination.
After petitioner submitted her Memorandum,[37] the case
was deemed submitted for decision.[38]
In its Decision dated November 27, 2006, the RTC gave
weight to Ms. De Guzman's conclusion that respondent was
suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder and ruled
that:
Based on the evidence submitted, the parties never shared a
true married life.
After a careful evaluation of the records, this Court finds the
petition to be impressed with merit. The respondent is
described as suffering from narcissistic personality disorder
found to be permanent, severe, serious, and incurable,
rendering him as psychologically incapacitated to perform
the marital obligations.
Respondent neglected his obligations as a husband and
father to their children. Even prior to the marriage, the
respondent manifested his psychological incapacity. He
suspected the paternity of his son with the petitioner and
even turned his back upon learning it. He has visited only on
the day of giving birth by the petitioner of their son. He
never cared for his son and would only visit him once in a
while. He never worked to support his son. In fact, the
respondent was financially dependent on the petitioner even
before the marriage. He defrauded the petitioner by
registering all the properties bought by the petitioner from
the latter's exclusive income under his name declaring
themselves as married. Worst, he sold a portion of the
property in Morong without the knowledge of the petitioner.
During the marriage, the respondent's laziness became
manifest. He focused on his self and does not care who gets
hurt for as long as it satisfies him. He gambles and drinks at
the expense of the petitioner. He was given the chance to
earn for himself and for the family and still, he did not
handle it well and instead continued with his vices.
The respondent disregarded his obligations to spend quality
time with the petitioner and especially with their children.
He even committed infidelities.
All deeds and actions of the respondent are clear
demonstrations of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
By reason of the respondent's immaturity and
irresponsibility stemming from his NARCISSISTIC
PERSONALITY DISORDER, he was unable to fulfill his
duties and responsibilities towards his wife and children,
thus constituting psychological incapacity.
The psychological report shows that respondent's
psychological incapacity is characterized by juridical
antecedence as it was found to have existed even prior to the
time he contracted marriage with petitioner. Respondent's
personality disorder, the root cause of which can be traced in
his childhood years was found to be pervasive and
permanent. Being the youngest boy, Respondent was always
favored and praised but was not properly guided and
disciplined by his parents as the latter were pre-occupied
with improving their finances.
It also speaks of gravity because respondent is incapable of
rendering marital obligations like commitment, fidelity,
trust, support and love toward the petitioner and their
children which are very vital in a marital relationship. In
fact, Ms. De Guzman stated in her report that attending to
his responsibilities, understanding and complying with his
obligations in marriage are beyond respondent's capacity.
It is incurable because the psychological incapacity of the
respondent is deeply rooted, it is already in his character. No
amount of therapy, no matter how intensive, can possibly
change the respondent insofar as incapability to perform his
essential marital obligations with the petitioner and to his
children are concerned. Respondent has already accepted
such incapacity as his means of coping with stressing life
demands.[39]
The RTC further held that all of the properties which were
acquired during the marriage were bought with petitioner's
exclusive funds, thus, negating the presumption of equality
of shares between the parties in a void marriage under
Article 147 of the Family Code. The RTC awarded the
custody of the children to petitioner, but granted weekly
visitation rights to respondent and ordered respondent to
give support to the children.
In the end, the RTC adjudged:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage between YOLANDA EREVE GARLET and
VENCIDOR TAEP GARLET held at the Office of the
Mayor, Morong, Rizal on March 4, 1994, as NULL AND
VOID AB INITIO on [the] ground of psychological
incapacity of the respondent to perform the essential marital
obligations in accordance with Article 36 of the Family
Code, with all the legal effects thereon.
The property relation between the petitioner and respondent
under Article 147 of the Family Code is deemed
DISSOLVED. The real properties acquired prior to marriage
and cohabitation is hereby declared exclusive properties of
the petitioner particularly the real property covered by
Transfer Certificate [of Title] No. M-38509 of the Registry
of Deeds of Rizal; and the tricycle and jeepney covered by
Certificate of Registration Nos. 13175616 and 27224267,
respectively.
The parties are directed to submit list of properties for
liquidation, partition and distribution; and the delivery of
presumptive legitime of their common children with notice
to their creditors upon finality of this decision.
The custody of the children, namely: 1) Michael Vincent E.
Garlet; and 2) Michelle Mae E. Garlet is hereby awarded to
the petitioner subject to visitorial right of the respondent
once a week at the most convenient time of the said
children. The respondent is hereby adjudged to give support
to the children in the amount of P3,000.00 a month each to
be deposited every 5th day of the month in their respective
bank accounts under trust of the petitioner; and he is hereby
directed to provide at least one-half of the cost of their
education.
The petitioner shall revert to the use of her maiden name.
The Local Civil Registrars of Morong, Rizal, and Pasig
[City] are directed to cause the entry of the foregoing
judgment in the Book of Marriages upon issuance thereof.
A decree of declaration of nullity of marriage shall be issued
upon compliance with the foregoing judgment.[40]
The RTC denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration in
its Order dated February 26, 2007.
Respondent's appeal before the Court of Appeals was
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 89142. The Court of Appeals,
in its Decision dated June 21, 2010, reversed the RTC
judgment, reasoning as follows:
[W]e scrutinized the totality of evidence adduced by
Yolanda and found that the same was not enough to sustain
a finding that Vencidor was psychologically incapacitated.
In essence, Yolanda wanted to equate Vencidor's addiction
to alcohol, chronic gambling, womanizing, refusal to find a
job and his inability to take care of their children as akin to
psychological incapacity. At best, Yolanda's allegations
showed that Vencidor was irresponsible, insensitive, or
emotionally immature. The incidents cited by Yolanda did
not show that Vencidor suffered from a psychological
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive him of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond.
Yolanda's portrayal of Vencidor as jobless and irresponsible
is not enough. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons;
it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological illness. Indeed,
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do
not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to
a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological
illness that is contemplated by this rule. What the law
requires to render a marriage void on the ground of
psychological incapacity is downright incapacity, not refusal
or neglect or difficulty, much less ill will.
In ruling for Yolanda, the trial court gave credence to the
psychological report prepared by Ms. De Guzman. x x x
While it is true that courts rely heavily on psychological
experts for its understanding of human personality, still the
root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified
as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully
explained, and said incapacity established by the totality of
the evidence presented during trial. Likewise, although there
is no requirement that a party to be declared psychologically
incapacitated should be personally examined by a physician
or a psychologist (as a condition sine qua non),there is
nevertheless still a need to prove the psychological
incapacity through independent evidence adduced by the
person alleging said disorder.
In the instant case, the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature and the
incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained. What can
be perused from the psychological report prepared by Ms.
De Guzman is that it only offered a general evaluation on
the supposed root cause of Vencidor's personality disorder.
The report failed to exhaustively explain the relation
between being a pampered youngest son and suffering from
a psychological malady so grave and permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond.
The psychological report failed to reveal that the personality
traits of Vencidor were grave or serious enough to bring
about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Ms. De Guzman merely stated in the said report
that it is beyond the capacity of Vencidor to attend to his
responsibility and understand and comply with his marital
obligations. Such statement is a mere general conclusion
which, unfortunately, is unsubstantiated. We cannot see how
Vencidor's supposed personality disorder would render him
unaware of the essential marital obligations or to be
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by him.
Also, we cannot help but note that Ms. De Guzman's
conclusions about Vencidor's psychological incapacity were
primarily based on the informations fed to her by Yolanda
whose bias for her cause cannot be doubted. Moreover, Ms.
De Guzman testified that the informations that she obtained
from Yolanda were the result of one-hour interview with
Yolanda and initial testing given at intervals.
While this circumstance alone does not disqualify the
psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and
conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and
stringent set of standards. Ms. De Guzman only examined
Vencidor from a third-party account. To make conclusions
on x x x Vencidor's psychological condition based on the
information fed by Yolanda, during a one-hour interview, is
not different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of
the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the
preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the
sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. Presumption is always in favor of
the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio.[41]
The dispositive portion of the foregoing Court of Appeals
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
instant appeal is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the
assailed Decision dated November 27, 2006 and the Order
dated February 26, 2007 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage between herein parties is hereby
declared as still subsisting and valid.[42]
Petitioner received a copy of the Decision of the appellate
court on June 28, 2010. Petitioner filed a motion[43] seeking
an extension of twenty days, or until August 2, 2010, within
which to file a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner filed
her Motion for Reconsideration on August 2, 2010.
However, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution[44] on
August 24, 2010 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration for being filed out of time, citing the ruling
in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon[45] that the filing of
the motion for extension of time does not toll the fifteen-day
period for filing a motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner seeks redress from this Court through the instant
Petition, grounded on the following assignment of errors:
I Lastly, petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND DECLARING
THAT THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN YOLANDA
GARLET AND VENCIDOR GARLET TO BE
SUBSISTING. THE COURT OF APPEALS
MISINTERPRETED AND MISAPPRECIATED THE
APPLICABLE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING THE
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND
CONSEQUENTLY DECREEING THAT THE MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS FILED OUT OF
TIME.[46]
Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred in (a)
disregarding Ms. De Guzman's findings for being based
solely on petitioner's version of events, which was a third
party account; (b) treating petitioner's evidence as "no
different from hearsay;" (c) finding that the root cause of
respondent's psychological incapacity was not sufficiently
explained; and (d) declaring the marriage of petitioner and
respondent as valid.
Petitioner argues that based on Marcos v. Marcos,[47] it is
not required that the psychologist personally examine the
spouse who is alleged to be suffering from a psychological
disorder. What matters is that the totality of petitioner's
evidence establish psychological incapacity.
Petitioner asserts that her evidence consists of not just her
testimony, but also those of her witnesses. Petitioner's
description of her marriage was substantiated by the
statements of respondent's brother, sister-in-law, and
neighbors, which were incorporated in the Psychological
Report. What is more, the root cause of respondent's
psychological incapacity had been properly alleged in the
Petition, clinically identified, and proven by Ms. De
Guzman in her testimony and her Psychological Report.
Petitioner points out that the RTC gave considerable weight
to her evidence, and found respondent to be suffering from a
Narcissistic Personality Disorder so permanent, serious,
severe, and incurable that it rendered respondent incapable
of performing his marital obligations. Considering that the
RTC had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses when they testified, its findings are entitled to
respect from the appellate courts. Underscoring the
importance of the appreciation of the facts by the trial court
in determining whether a party to a marriage is
psychologically incapacitated, petitioner refers to the case
of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu-Te [48] wherein the findings of the
trial court were declared to be final and binding on the
appellate courts. Based on the totality of the evidence,
petitioner maintains that her marriage should be declared
null and void on account of respondent's psychological
incapacity.
denying her Motion for Reconsideration for being filed out
of time based on Habaluyas Enterprises, and pleads for
liberality in the application of the rules in the interest of
substantial justice.
The Petition is without merit.
The Court shall first address the procedural issue regarding
the denial of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration by the
Court of Appeals for being filed out of time.
In its Resolution issued on May 30, 1986 in Habaluyas
Enterprises, the Court already elucidated, for the guidance
of Bench and Bar, that:
1.) Beginning one month after the promulgation of this
Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
[Court of Appeals]. Such a motion may be filed only in
cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last
resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny
the extension requested.[49]
The foregoing rule is still good presently. The Court, in the
more recent case of V.C. Ponce Company, Inc. v.
Municipality of Parañaque,[50] still observed strict adherence
to the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises. The Court
acknowledged in said case that it sometimes allowed a
liberal reading of the rules in the interest of equity and
justice, so long as the petitioner is able to prove the
existence of cogent reasons to excuse its non-observance.
However, the Court also found therein that petitioner's
reason for failing to meet the deadline, i.e., it was without
aid of counsel, did not warrant a relaxation of the rules as "it
is incumbent upon the client to exert all efforts to retain the
services of new counsel."
Petitioner's counsel in the instant case sought extension of
time to file the motion for reconsideration of the Court of
Appeals Decision claiming that she had already started the
draft of said motion but was unable to finalize the same "due
to heavy pressure of work in the preparation of pleadings in
other equally important cases requiring immediate
attention."[51] The excuse of petitioner's counsel does not
constitute cogent reason or extraordinary circumstance that
warrant a departure from the general rule. Pressure and large
volume of legal work do not excuse a counsel for filing a
pleading out of time. It is the counsel's duty to devote
his/her full attention, diligence, skills, and competence to
every case that he/she accepts.[52]
The Court stressed in De Leon v. Hercules Agro Industrial
Corporation[53] that compliance with the reglementary
period for perfecting an appeal is not only a procedural
issue, but jurisdictional, thus:
As the period to file a motion for reconsideration is non-
extendible, petitioner's motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration did not toll the reglementary
period to appeal; thus, petitioner had already lost his right to
appeal the September 23, 2005 decision. As such, the RTC
decision became final as to petitioner when no appeal was
perfected after the lapse of the prescribed period.
Doctrinally-entrenched is that the right to appeal is a
statutory right and the one who seeks to avail that right must
comply with the statute or rules. The requirements for
perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period
specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are
considered indispensable interdictions against needless
delays. Moreover, the perfection of appeal in the manner
and within the period set by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional as well, hence, failure to perfect the same
renders the judgment final and executory.
The CA correctly ordered that petitioner's appellant's brief
be stricken off the records. As the CA said, the parties who
have not appealed in due time cannot legally ask for the
modification of the judgment or obtain affirmative relief
from the appellate court. A party who fails to question an
adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy within the
period prescribed by law loses his right to do so. As
petitioner failed to perfect his appeal within the period for
doing so, the September 23, 2005 decision has become final
as against him. The rule is clear that no modification of
judgment could be granted to a party who did not appeal. It
is enshrined as one of the basic principles in our rules of
procedure, specifically to avoid ambiguity in the
presentation of issues, facilitate the setting forth of
arguments by the parties, and aid the court in making its
determinations. It is not installed in the rules merely to make
litigations laborious and tedious for the parties. It is there for
a reason.
Petitioner received a copy of the Decision dated June 21,
2010 of the Court of Appeals on June 28, 2010 and the 15-
day reglementary period expired on July 13, 2010 without
her filing a motion for reconsideration or an appeal, hence,
the said judgment already became final.
Moreover, the Court is unconvinced that it should set aside
the finality of the Court of Appeals judgment for the sake of
substantive justice, as the appellate court did not commit
reversible error in ruling that the marriage of petitioner and
respondent is subsisting and valid because petitioner failed
to establish respondent's psychological incapacity.
Petitioner insists on respondent's psychological incapacity, a
ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code,[54] which provides:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization.
Jurisprudence had laid down guiding principles in resolving
cases for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground
of psychological incapacity. In Azcueta v. Republic,[55] the
Court presented a summation of relevant jurisprudence on
psychological incapacity, reproduced hereunder:
Prefatorily, it bears stressing that it is the policy of our
Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family. Our family law is based on the
policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the state is vitally interested. The State
can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break up of families weakens our social and
moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not the concern
alone of the family members.
Thus, the Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals and Molina stringent guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code, to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is
rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family.
Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation". It
decrees marriage as legally "inviolable", thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must
be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family
Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological –
not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita v.
Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, 108), nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence
may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's". The manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself
must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically
or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the
same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant
to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician
may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations
of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect
or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also
be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in
the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be
given great respect by our courts x x x.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court declared that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. It
should refer to "no less than a mental, not physical,
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage." The
intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
"psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.
However, in more recent jurisprudence, we have observed
that notwithstanding the guidelines laid down
in Molina, there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as
well which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. Each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for
annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all
fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as
much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for
that of the trial court. With the advent of Te v. Te, the Court
encourages a reexamination of jurisprudential trends on the
interpretation of Article 36 although there has been no major
deviation or paradigm shift from the Molina doctrine.
(Citations omitted.)
It bears to stress that the burden of proving the nullity of the
marriage falls on petitioner. Petitioner's evidence shall still
be scrutinized and weighed, regardless of respondent's
failure to present any evidence on his behalf. Any doubt
shall be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation
of the marriage. Tested against the present guidelines, the
Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that the totality of
petitioner's evidence is insufficient to establish respondent's
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner imputes almost every imaginable negative
character trait against respondent, but not only do they not
satisfactorily constitute manifestations of respondent's
psychological incapacity as contemplated in the Family
Code, petitioner's averments are riddled with inconsistencies
that are sometimes contradicted by her own evidence.
Petitioner avers that respondent tried to persuade her to have
an abortion when she became pregnant with Michael and
respondent even questioned Michael's paternity. Yet,
notably, respondent never sought the correction of Michael's
Certificate of Live Birth, which specifically named him as
Michael's father. The following verbal exchanges between
the couple in the Kasunduang Pag-aayos[56] also show that
respondent acknowledged his children with petitioner,
namely, Michael and Michelle, and was concerned with
their welfare:
Ayoko na nga basta umalis ka sa bahay natin at
Yoly - kung hindi ka aalis kami ng mga anak mo ang
aalis.
Vencidor Paano mga anak natin, sinong mag-aalaga sa
– kanila.
Ako na ang bahala sa mga anak ko bubuhayin ko
Yoly –
sila.
xxxx
Makikita mo pa naman ang mga anak mo,
Yoly – puwede mo rin naman dalawin kahit dalawang
beses sa isang lingo.
Ayoko yata Yoly na magkahiwalay tayo paano
Vencidor
na ako, sino ang mag-iintindi sa mga anak ko,
–
halimbawa na umalis ka uli papunta abroad.
Even assuming that respondent initially reacted adversely to
petitioner's pregnancy with Michael, it would appear from
respondent's subsequent actuations that he had come to
accept that he is indeed Michael's father.
In her testimony, petitioner claimed that her relationship
with respondent was cut off when she got pregnant; that
respondent never visited her during her pregnancy; and that
respondent visited her only once after she gave birth to
Michael on November 9, 1989. According to petitioner, she
had no relationship with respondent until she purchased the
Pila property on March 3, 1994.[57] The records, though,
bear out the continuous relationship between petitioner and
respondent. First, petitioner stated in her own Memorandum
before the RTC that she "did not sever her ties with
[respondent]."[58] Second, petitioner remitted money to
respondent sometime in 1992 for the purchase of the
Morong property, where they eventually lived. Third, Ms.
De Guzman recounted in her Psychological Report that
sometime "[i]n 1992, Petitioner and Respondent started to
live [in] Morong, Rizal."[59] And fourth, petitioner married
respondent on March 4, 1994, which would just be the day
after she bought the Pila property.
Petitioner further alleges that respondent meddled with the
purchase and registration of the Morong and Pila properties.
Although he did not make any monetary contribution at all
for the said purchases, respondent registered the TCT of the
Morong property in his name and as one of the owners in
the TCT of the Pila property. In addition, respondent
purportedly sold a portion of the Morong property without
petitioner's consent. But the Court notes that petitioner and
respondent had already deported themselves as husband and
wife long before the purchase of the Morong and Pila
properties and their actual marriage. Petitioner had a direct
hand in the preparation of Michael's Certificate of Live
Birth in 1989 and she made it to . appear therein that she and
respondent were already married on December 27, 1988 in
Pasay City. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that petitioner
and respondent continued to misrepresent themselves as a
married couple in the purchase of the Pila property and in
the case of the Morong property, the purchase took place
when petitioner was then working in Japan. It appears that
petitioner belatedly renounced respondent's authority to
purchase and register the subject properties, as well as to sell
a portion of the Morong property, only after their
relationship had gone sour.
Furthermore, petitioner complains about respondent's
joblessness, gambling, alcoholism, sexual infidelity, and
neglect of the children during their marriage.
Contrary to petitioner's assertion, it appears that respondent
took on several jobs. As indicated in Michael's Certificate of
Live Birth, respondent's occupation was listed as a "vendor."
Respondent was also in-charge of the mini-grocery store
which he and petitioner put up. Most recently, respondent
worked as a jeepney driver. Petitioner's claim that
respondent never plied the jeepney[60] was contradicted by
her own sister and witness, Marites, who testified that
respondent sometimes plied the jeepney himself or asked
somebody else to drive it for him.[61] Petitioner criticized
respondent for not looking for a stable job, but did not
specify what job suits respondent's qualifications. More
importantly, it is settled in jurisprudence that refusal to look
for a job per se is not indicative of a psychological defect.[62]
As for respondent's alleged drinking and gambling vices,
petitioner herself had no personal knowledge of the same,
relying only on what relatives relayed to her while she was
in Japan.[63] Being hearsay evidence, petitioner's testimony
on the matter had no probative value[64] even if allowed by
the Court as part of her narration. It is Marites, in her
testimony[65] and Sinumpaang Salaysay,[66] who recounted
that petitioner would often play tong-its and mahjong until
early morning, come home drunk, sleep until afternoon, and
leave again to gamble. While respondent could have
indulged in the vices of drinking and gambling, it was not
established that it was due to some debilitating
psychological condition or illness or that it was serious
enough as to prevent him from performing his essential
marital obligations. As the Court pronounced in Suazo v.
Suazo[67]:
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job,
while indicative of psychological incapacity, do not, by
themselves, show psychological incapacity. All these simply
indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform
marital obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds,
cannot be considered to be constitutive of psychological
incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness.
There is utter lack of factual basis for respondent's purported
sexual infidelity. Aside from petitioner's bare allegations, no
concrete proof was proffered in court to establish
respondent's unfaithfulness to petitioner. Petitioner failed to
provide details on respondent's supposed affairs, such as the
names of the other women, how the affairs started or
developed, and how she discovered the affairs. Ms. De
Guzman, in her Psychological Report, quoted respondent's
brother, Avelino, as saying that different women often
looked for and visited respondent at the latter's house after
petitioner and respondent separated, but this is still
insufficient evidence of respondent's marital infidelity.
The Court already declared that sexual infidelity, by itself, is
not sufficient proof that a spouse is suffering from
psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of
unfaithfulness are manifestations of a disordered personality
which makes the spouse completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of marriage.[68] In Navales v.
Navales,[69] the Court still found no factual basis for the
husband's claim that his wife, being flirtatious and sexually
promiscuous, was psychologically incapacitated, regardless
of the submitted psychological report concluding that the
wife was a nymphomaniac. The Court reasoned as follows:
The Court finds that the psychological report presented in
this case is insufficient to establish Nilda's psychological
incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is
a nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual, has a
borderline personality, has strong sexual urges which are
incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife,
has a very weak conscience or superego, emotionally
immature, a social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her
infidelity on several occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from
anti-social personality disorder, fails to conform to social
norms, deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggressive,
irresponsible and vain. She further defined "nymphomania"
as a psychiatric disorder that involves a disturbance in motor
behavior as shown by her sexual relationship with various
men other than her husband.
The report failed to specify, however, the names of the
men Nilda had sexual relationship with or the
circumstances surrounding the same. As pointed out by
Nilda, there is not even a single proof that she was ever
involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than
her husband. Vatanagul claims, during her testimony,
that in coming out with the report, she interviewed not
only Reynaldo but also Jojo Caballes, Dorothy and
Lesley who were Reynaldo's sister-in-law and sister,
respectively, a certain Marvin and a certain Susan.
Vatanagul however, did not specify the identities of these
persons, which information were supplied by whom, and
how they came upon their respective informations.
Indeed, the conclusions drawn by the report are vague,
sweeping and lack sufficient factual bases. As the report
lacked specificity, it failed to show the root cause of Nilda's
psychological incapacity; and failed to demonstrate that
there was a "natal or supervening disabling factor" or an
"adverse integral element" in Nilda's character that
effectively incapacitated her from accepting, and thereby
complying with, the essential marital obligations, and that
her psychological or mental malady existed even before the
marriage, x x x. (Citations omitted.)
That respondent delegated the care for the children to
Marites, petitioner's sister, does not necessarily constitute
neglect. While it is truly ideal that children be reared
personally by their parents, in reality, there are various
reasons which compel parents to employ the help of others,
such as a relative or hired nanny, to watch after the children.
In the instant case, it was actually petitioner who brought
Marites from Bicol to Manila to care for Michael, and also
later on, for Michelle. Granting that Marites was primarily
responsible for the children's care, there is no showing that a
serious psychological disorder has rendered respondent
incognizant of and incapacitated to perform his parental
obligations to his children. There is no allegation, much less
proof, that the children were deprived of their basic needs or
were placed in danger by reason of respondent's neglect or
irresponsibility.
Petitioner additionally accuses respondent of taking her
money and jewelry after their marital dispute sometime in
2001, and submitted the Kasunduang Pag-aayos they
executed before the barangay in which respondent admitted
doing so. The submitted document recorded the exchange
between the couple, thus:
VencidorO sige Yoly ibabalik ko yong alahas mo at pera
– mo magsimula uli tayo.
Ayoko na nga makisama sa iyo, basta ibalik mo na
Yoly –
lang ang pera ko at mga alahas ko.
Vencidor
Paano naman ako dapat tayo ay hati.
–
Yoly – O sige ibalik mo ang P150,000.00, at alahas ko.
Vencidor
Gawin mo namang P300,000.00.
–
O sige gawin mo ng Tatlong daan, pati bahay sa
Yoly – Pila, Laguna jeep at trysikel sa iyo na umalis ka
lang ng bahay.
Vencidor Saan naman ako uuwi, pero pansamantala lang ito
– di ba?
Makikita mo pa naman ang mga anak mo, puwede
Yoly – mo rin naman dalawin kahit dalawang beses sa
isang lingo.
Ayoko yata Yoly na magkahiwalay tayo paano
Vencidor
na ako, sino ang mag-iintindi sa mga anak ko,
–
halimbawa na umalis ka uli papunta abroad.
Ayoko na nga makisama sayo kung [di] ka aalis
Yoly –
mapipilitan ako na itataas ko na ito kaso natin.
Vencidor O sige kukunin ko ang pera sa bangko at ibibigay
– ko sa iyo dadalhin ko sa bahay.
Yoly – Ang kikita (sic) ko lagi niyang sinisilip.
Vencidor Dapat naman mag-asawa naman tayo kung ano
– ang iyo ay akin rin yon di ba.
Yoly – Bakit mo kinuha ang pera ko [?]
Ginalaw ko iyon kasi inuunahan mo ako. Di mo
ako pinalalapit pagtulog ay mag-asawa tayo. At
Vencidor
yong Hapon palaging tumatawag, kaya naitago
–
ko ang mga alahas mo. Hinabol pa niyan ng
saksak.
Sinisiraan niya ako sa Hapon ay iyon ay mga
Yoly – kustomer ko. Masasakit ang mga sinasabi niya sa
kin.
Vencidor
Binabalewala niya ako.
–
Basta umalis ka na sa baliay at naibigay ko na sa
iyo ang [b]ahay sa [L]aguna, jeep, trysikel at pera
ano pa ang gusto mo[?] [S]a amin ng mga anak
Yoly –
mo ang bahay sa Natividad St., Ibaba. Wala ka
pakialam roon at ako ang nagpundar
noon.[70] (Emphases supplied.)
A perusal of the aforequoted verbal exchange between
petitioner and respondent in the Kasunduang Pag-
aayos, though, reveals that respondent only hid petitioner's
money and jewelry as a desperate attempt to stop petitioner
from leaving him, taking with her the children. In fact,
respondent repeatedly expressed concern about saving their
marriage, offering to return the money and jewelry back to
petitioner as long as they stay together. It was petitioner who
categorically stated that she no longer wanted to live with
respondent, offering to the latter P300,000.00 cash, the Pila
property, the jeepney and the tricycle, just for respondent to
leave their marital home.
Petitioner asserts too that she had been physically abused by
respondent, but offers no substantiating evidence, such as
details on the instances of abuse, pictures of her injuries,
medico-legal report, or other witness' testimony.
While the Court does not hold respondent totally without
blame or free of shortcomings, but his failings as husband
and father are not tantamount to psychological incapacity
which renders their marriage void from the very beginning.
Worthy of reiterating herein is the declaration of the Court
in Agraviador v. Amparo-Agraviador[71] that:
These acts, in our view, do not rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that the law requires, and should be
distinguished from the "difficulty," if not outright "refusal"
or "neglect," in the performance of some marital obligations
that characterize some marriages. The intent of the law has
been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders – existing at
the time of the marriage – clearly demonstrating an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. The psychological illness that must have
afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a
malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume. (Emphases
supplied, citations omitted.)
Finally, the Court is not bound by Ms. De Guzman's
Psychological Report. While the Court previously held that
"there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a
physician," yet, this is qualified by the phrase, "if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity."[72] The psychologist's findings
must still be subjected to a careful and serious scrutiny as to
the bases of the same, particularly, the source/s of
information, as well as the methodology employed.
In Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua,[73] the Court did not give
credence to the clinical psychologist's report because:
We cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about
the respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the
information fed to her by only one side – the petitioner –
whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While
this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist
for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions
deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of
standards in the manner we discussed above. For,
effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from
the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear,
see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have
reacted and responded to the doctor's probes.
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's
narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to
be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who
"believes that the world revolves around him"; and who
"used love as a . . . deceptive tactic for exploiting the
confidence [petitioner] extended towards him." Dr. Tayag
then incorporated her own idea of "love"; made a
generalization that respondent was a person who "lacked
commitment, faithfulness, and remorse," and who engaged
"in promiscuous acts that made the petitioner look like a
fool"; and finally concluded that the respondent's character
traits reveal "him to suffer Narcissistic Personality Disorder
with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be
grave and incurable."
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently
in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a
psychological incapacity existed that prevented the
respondent from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the
respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove
that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it
explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor
show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling
his duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not
physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that
Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report – i.e., that the
respondent suffered "Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be
grave and incurable – is an unfounded statement, not a
necessary inference from her previous characterization and
portrayal of the respondent. While the various tests
administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair
gauge to assess her own psychological condition, this same
statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent's
condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the
respondent's psychological condition based on the
information fed by only one side is. to our mind, not
different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
The Court similarly rejected the psychiatric evaluation
report presented by the petitioner in Agraviador for the
following reasons:
The Court finds that Dr. Patac's Psychiatric Evaluation
Report fell short in proving that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital duties. We emphasize that Dr. Patac did not
personally evaluate and examine the respondent; he, in fact,
recommended at the end of his Report for the respondent to
"undergo the same examination [that the petitioner]
underwent." Dr. Patac relied only on the information fed by
the petitioner, the parties' second child, Emmanuel, and
household helper, Sarah. Largely, the doctor relied on the
information provided by the petitioner. Thus, while his
Report can be used as a fair gauge to assess the petitioner's
own psychological condition (as he was, in fact, declared by
Dr. Patac to be psychologically capable to fulfill the
essential obligations of marriage), the same statement
cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition.
The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of the examination
required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder.
We do not suggest that a personal examination of the party
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory.
We have confirmed in Marcos v. Marcos that the person
sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated must be
personally examined by a psychologist as a condition sine
qua non to arrive at such declaration. If a psychological
disorder can be proven by independent means, no reason
exists why such independent proof cannot be admitted and
given credit. No such independent evidence appears on
record, however, to have been gathered in this case. [74]
Much in the same way, the Court finds herein that Ms. De
Guzman's sources and methodology is' severely lacking the
requisite depth and comprehensiveness to judicially
establish respondent's psychological incapacity. Ms. De
Guzman relied on the information given by petitioner;
Avelino, respondent's brother; Ramil Ereve, petitioner's
brother; an anonymous female cousin of petitioner;[75] and
the couple's neighbors who refused to give their
names.[76] On the basis thereof, Ms. De Guzman determined
that respondent suffered from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, the root cause of which, Ms. De Guzman traced
back to respondent, as the youngest child in the family,
being favored, praised, and indulged by his caregivers. From
there, Ms. De Guzman already concluded that respondent's
disorder rendered it beyond his capacity to understand,
comply, and attend to his obligations in the marriage; was
present even before marriage; and was "pervasive,
permanent and clinically proven to be incurable." To put it
simply, Ms. De Guzman is saying that respondent was a
spoiled child, and while it can be said that respondent has
grown up to be a self-centered and self-indulgent adult, it
still falls short of establishing respondent's psychological
incapacity characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence,
and incurability, so as to render respondent's marriage to
petitioner void ab initio.
All told, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals in
declaring that the marriage of petitioner and respondent as
subsisting and valid. As the Court decreed in Republic v.
Galang[77]:
The Constitution sets out a policy of protecting and
strengthening the family as the basic social institution, and
marriage is the foundation of the family. Marriage, as an
inviolable institution protected by the State, cannot be
dissolved at the whim of the parties. In petitions for the
declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to
show the nullity of marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless
the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a
marriage by reason of a grave and serious psychological
illness existing at the time it was celebrated, we are
compelled to uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for
Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated June 21, 2010 and Resolution dated August 24, 2010
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89142
are AFFIRMED.
MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III, PETITIONER, VS. NORA
REYES BAKUNAWA, RESPONDENT,
RESOLUTION
REYES, JR., J:
For resolution of the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari[1] filed by Manuel R. Bakunawa III (Manuel)
challenging the Decision[2]dated March 27, 2014 and
Resolution[3] dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98579, which upheld the validity
of his marriage to Nora Reyes Bakunawa (Nora).
The Facts
Manuel and Nora met in 1974 at the University of the
Philippines where they were students and became
sweethearts. When Nora became pregnant, she and Manuel
got married on July 26, 1975 at St. Ignatius Church, Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City.[4]
Because Manuel and Nora were both college undergraduates
at that time, they lived with Manuel's parents. While Nora
was able to graduate, Manuel had to stop his studies to help
his father in the family's construction business. Manuel was
assigned to provincial projects and came home only during
weekends. This setup continued even as Nora gave birth to
their eldest child, Moncho Manuel (Moncho). However,
whenever Manuel came back from his provincial
assignments, he chose to spend his limited time with friends
and girlfriends instead of his family. Nora resented this and
they started quarreling about Manuel's behavior. Worse,
Manuel depended on his father and on Nora for their
family's needs.[5]
In 1976, Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's
parents. It was during this period that Manuel first observed
Nora's passiveness and laziness; she was moody and
mercurial. Their house was often dirty and disorderly. Thus,
Manuel became more irritated with Nora and their verbal
quarrels escalated to physical violence.[6]
On May 9, 1977, Nora gave birth to their second child.
However, nothing changed in their relationship. Manuel
spent most of his time with friends and engaged in drinking
sprees. In 1979, he had an extramarital affair and seldom
came home. He eventually left Nora and their children in
1980 to cohabit with his girlfriend. They considered
themselves separated.[7]
In 1985, Manuel, upon Nora's request, bought a house for
her and their children. After Manuel spent a few nights with
them in the new house, Nora became pregnant again and
thereafter gave birth to their third child.[8]
On June 19, 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City,[9] on the ground that he and Nora are
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.
Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr.
Villegas), who testified that Manuel has Intermittent
Explosive Disorder, characterized by irritability and
aggressive behavior that is not proportionate to the cause.
Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nora with Passive Aggressive
Personality Disorder, marked by a display of negative
attitude and passive resistance in her relationship with
Manuel. Her findings were based on her interview with
Manuel and the parties' eldest son, Moncho, because Nora
did not participate in the psychological assessment.[10]
Manuel alleges in his petition that he continues to live with
his common-law wife and has a son with her, whereas, Nora
lives alone in her unit in Cubao, Quezon City. Their house
and lot was already foreclosed following Nora's failure to
pay a loan secured by a mortgage on the said property. [11]
Ruling of the RTC
The RTC granted the petition in its Decision[12] dated March
28, 2011. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby-
rendered declaring the marriage between MANUEL R.
BAKUNAWA III and NORA REYES BAKUNAWA null
and void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Office of the City Civil Registrar of Quezon City is
hereby ordered to make entries into the records of the
respective parties pursuant to the judgment of the Court.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished upon the Office of
Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Quezon City, the Office of the Civil Registrars of Quezon
City, and the National Statistics Office, as well as the parties
and counsel.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Nora appealed the RTC decision to the CA, arguing inter
alia that the RTC erred in finding that the testimony of the
psychiatrist is sufficient to prove the parties' psychological
incapacity.
Ruling of the CA
The CA, in its Decision[14] dated March 27, 2014, granted
Nora's appeal and reversed the RTC decision. The decretal
portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal
filed by [Nora] is GRANTED. The Decision dated March
28, 2011 of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region in
Civil Case No. Q-08-62822 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[15]
The CA denied Manuel's motion for
reconsideration[16] through a Resolution[17] dated April 22,
2015.
Manuel filed the present petition raising the following
grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT
UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE MARRIAGE
OF THE PARTIES DESPITE MORE THAN
CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE TO
DECLARE ITS NULLITY DUE TO THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF EITHER
OR BOTH PARTIES TO PERFORM THEIR
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS; and
II. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT
FAILED TO RECONSIDER ITS DECISION
DATED MARCH 27, 2014 DESPITE MORE
THAN COMPELLING REASONS FOR THE
REVERSAL THEREOF.[18]
Ruling of the Court
As the CA correctly ruled, the totality of evidence presented
by Manuel comprising of his testimony and that of Dr.
Villegas, as well as the latter's psychological evaluation
report, is insufficient to prove that he and Nora are
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with
Intermittent Explosive Disorder and that Nora has Passive
Aggressive Personality Disorder which render them
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family
Code,[19] is solely based on her interviews with Manuel and
the parties' eldest child, Moncho. Consequently, the CA did
not err in not according probative value to her psychological
evaluation report and testimony.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang,[20] the Court held
that "[i]f the incapacity can be proven by independent
means, no reason exists why such independent proof cannot
be admitted to support a conclusion of psychological
incapacity, independently of a psychologist's examination
and report."[21] In Toring v. Toring, et al.,[22] the Court stated
that:
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from
persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close
friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify
on the allegedly incapacitated spouses' condition at or about
the time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that
trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time
of marriage.[23]
In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas
aside from Manuel for the spouses' psychological evaluation
was Moncho, who could not be considered as a reliable
witness to establish the psychological incapacity of his
parents in relation to Article 36 of the Family Code, since he
could not have been there at the time his parents were
married.
The Court also notes that Dr. Villegas did not administer
any psychological tests on Manuel despite having had the
opportunity to do so. While the Court has declared that there
is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally
examined by a physician,[24] much less be subjected to
psychological tests, this rule finds application only if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity. In this case, the supposed
personality disorder of Manuel could have been established
by means of psychometric and neurological tests which are
objective means designed to measure specific aspects of
people's intelligence, thinking, or personality.[25]
With regard to the Confirmatory Decree[26] of the National
Tribunal of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the
Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese
of Manila in favor of nullity of the Catholic marriage of
Manuel and Nora, the Court accords the same with great
respect but does not consider the same as controlling and
decisive, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.[27]
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
The Decision dated March 27, 2014 and Resolution dated
April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
98579 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Yaptinchay v. Torres, 28 SCRA 489
FACTS: Teresita C. Yaptinchay alleged that the deceased
Isidro Yaptinchay had lived with her continuously, openly
and publicly as husband and wife for 19 year. The deceased
died without a will left an estate consisting of personal and
real properties situated in the Philippines, Hongkong and
other places with an estimated value of about P500,000. The
deceased left three daughters, Virginia Yaptinchay, Mary
Yaptinchay Eligir and Asuncion Yaptinchay, who carted
away from the residences aforesaid personal properties
belonging to the deceased together with others exclusively
owned by petitioner. It was averred that in these
circumstances the appointment of a special administrator to
take custody and care of the interests of the deceased
pending appointment of a regular administrator became an
urgent necessity.
ISSUE: Can petitioner claim ownership.
HELD: Until such right to co-ownership is duly established,
petitioner's interests in the property in controversy cannot be
considered the "present right" or title that would make
available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of
injunction. For, the existence of a clear positive right
especially calling for judicial protection is wanting.
Injunction indeed, is not to protect contingent or future
rights; nor is it a remedy to enforce an abstract right.
Common-law wife was not able to prove that they jointly
bought the property in Forbes Park so it belonged to the
legal marriage.
MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY,
GR No. 196049, 2013-06-26
Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who
married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in
the Philippines[2] on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not
sit well with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not
bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with
each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara
(Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in
Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to
Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse
from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.[3]
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay
obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which
declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void
on the ground of bigamy.[4] On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled:
"Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the
Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the
bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and
41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;[5] and (3) for the
RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the
Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse
such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the
petition
The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC)
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
The... petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was
consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the
Philippines[11] on bigamy and was therefore entitled to
recognition by Philippine courts.[12]
Issues:
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
Ruling:
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy
and other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are...
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine
courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state.
Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to... the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply
prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce
law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully...
consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous
marriages are declared void from the beginning under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can
prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
judgment... in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
Principles:
Civil Law
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its
parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
Philippines, Philippine courts must... determine if the
foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy
and other mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or
to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are...
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private
international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for
effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine
courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status,
condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a
marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot
presume to know the foreign laws under which the... foreign
judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their
judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the
foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state.
Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to... the rules of evidence.
Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen
Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, Jenneth Quiazon and Maria
Jennifer Quiazon v. Ma. Lourdes Belen, for and in behalf of
Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon
G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
Perez, J.
FACTS:
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992. On 12
September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise),
represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes),
filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.
In her Petition, Elise claims that she is the natural child of
Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her
parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting
on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise
impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by
claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted
during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito).
To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others,
attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. In
the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real
properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties
worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of
Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise
sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s
estate.
ISSUE:
Did the Court err in declaring the marriage of Amelia to
Eliseo void?
HELD:
No. The existence of a previous marriage between Amelia
and Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the
Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and
signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas
de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate
is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification
from the National Archive that no information relative to the
said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of
the entries therein.
in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it
cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party
may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without
prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of
the parties to the marriage. Relevant to the foregoing, there
is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be
prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn
the existence of such marriage even after the death of her
father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by
filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally
by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of
the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar.
Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of
action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party
to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of
action.
REPUBLIC v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, GR No.
189538, 2014-02-10
Facts:
Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in
the latter's marriage contract... the assailed Order denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of
the
Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG).
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of
the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five
years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was
already married to a certain
Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the
Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said
marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged
husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing...
officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage
certificate is not hers.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and
explained that she could not have appeared before Judge
Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the
time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was
then in Makati working as a medical... distributor in Hansao
Pharma.
she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the
marriage as she had met them while she was working as a
receptionist in Tadels Pension House.
her name was... used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned
a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances
in order for her to obtain a passport.
Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina
Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed
that... the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in
their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared
was definitely not respondent.
a document examiner testified that the signature appearing
in the marriage contract was... forged.
RTC granted petition
RTC rendered the assailed Decision
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the
assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no
clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in
the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and
(2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife
portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect,
declaring the marriage void ab initio
Issues:
whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage
contract which, in effect, nullifies the... marriage may be
undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding.
Ruling:
We deny the petition.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects... the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial,
and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Republic v. Valencia[19] in 1986, the Court has repeatedly
ruled that "even substantial... errors in a civil registry may
be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with
the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the
error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding.
An appropriate adversary suit or... proceeding is one where
the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant
facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish
the opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and... considered.
as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are
followed, it is the... appropriate adversary proceeding to
effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the
civil register
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the
certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims
that her signature was forged and she was not the one who
contracted marriage with the purported husband. In... other
words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or
if there was, she was not the one who entered into such
contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to
obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she
was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She... then sought the
cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage
certificate.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was
presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather,
respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no
marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware
of such existence. The testimonial and documentary...
evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of
marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery.
in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
court did not, in any way, declare... the marriage void as
there was no marriage to speak of.
Principles:
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is
summary. If the rectification affects... the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial,
and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Republic v. Valencia[19] in 1986, the Court has repeatedly
ruled that "even substantial... errors in a civil registry may
be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with
the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by the
error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding.
Weigel vs Sempio-Diy
FACTS:
Karl Heinz Weigel asked for the declaration of Nullity of his
marriage with Lilia Oliva Weigel on the ground that the
latter has existing marriage with Eduardo A. Maxion.
Lilia claimed that prior marriage was null and void because
she and Eduardo were forced to enter said marital union.
She likewise alleged that Eduardo was married to someone
else.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Karl's marriage with Lilia is void.
RULING:
Yes. It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first
marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be void
but merely voidable(Art. 85, Civil Code). Such marriage is
valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made,
it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly
married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage
to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing
evidence on Lilia's prior marriage for then such marriage
though void still needs a judicial declaration before she can
remarry. Accordingly, Karl and Lilia’s marriage are
regarded void under the law.
Terre vs. Terre
211 SCRA 6
FACTS:
Dorothy Terre was then married to a certain Merlito
Bercenillo, her first cousin. Atty. Jordan Terre successfully
convinced Dorothy that her marriage was void ab initio for
the reason of public policy and that they are free to contract
marriage. They got married in 1977 where he wrote single
under Dorothy’s status. After getting Dorothy pregnant,
Atty. Terre abandoned them and subsequently contracted
another marriage to Helina Malicdem in 1986. Atty. Terre
was charged with abandonment of minor and bigamy.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Terre’s marriage with Dorothy
is null and void.
HELD:
Dorothy’s first marriage is indeed void ab initio considering
that Merlito is her first cousin thereby against public policy.
However, she did not file any declaration for the nullity of
their marriage before she contracted her marriage with Atty.
Terre thus, her second marriage is void. Article 40 states
that the absolute nullity of a former marriage may be
invoked for the purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
VERONICO TENEBRO, petitioner, v.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondent.
G.R. No. 150758. February 18, 2004.
Facts:
Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with
private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990. The
two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City
Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro and Ancajas lived
together continuously and without interruption until the
latter part of 1991, when Tenebro informed Ancajas that he
had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy
of a marriage contract between him and Villareyes. Invoking
this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left
the conjugal dwelling which he shared with Ancajas, stating
that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another
marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas, before
Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned of this third
marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was
indeed married to petitioner. In a handwritten letter,
Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was
indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against
petitioner.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for
the crime of bigamy despite clear proof that the marriage
between the accused and private complainant had been
declared null and void ab initio and without legal force and
effect
Ruling:
As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent
declaration that the second marriage is void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the
subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to Villareyes,
petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab
initio completely regardless of petitioner’s psychological
capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during
the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the
nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for
the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was
celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence of the
valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been
consummated. Moreover, the declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is not an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to
Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. In this
case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of
marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas. Both
were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily
contracted the second marriage with the required license
before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of
Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses.
The decision of the Court of Appeals convicting petitioner
Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy is AFFIRMED.
Capili vs People GR 183805
FACTS: On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the
crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City. Petitioner
thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging
that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of
nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo
City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that
the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate
him from the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the
civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant
criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity
of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of the
criminal case for bigamy.
RULING: NO. It is undisputed that a second marriage
between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on
December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first
marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. Medina-Capili
contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of
Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous nature of the
second marriage between petitioner and
private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration
of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does
not bar the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN,
JR. CASE DIGEST [G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013,
CARPIO, J.]
TOPIC: Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage
(Article 148)
DOCTRINE: Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the
benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions, in accord with
Article 148.
FACTS: Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic
relationship in 1979. Sally’s father was against the
relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an office in
Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage
contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured
him that the marriage contract would not be registered. Sally
filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public
documents against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage
contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of
nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that
his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the
formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked
the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired
with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family
Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties
during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of
Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44
registered properties became the subject of the partition
before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37
properties in her answer.
The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with
the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office
because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s
subsisting marriage with Azucena. The trial court ruled that
the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are
void for not having a marriage license
2. Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s
property relations
3. Whether bigamy was committed by the petitioner
HELD:
1. YES.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the same
time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a
marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered
by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void
from the beginning.” In this case, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It
was duly established that no marriage license was issued to
them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match
the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The
case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35which made
their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the
general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article
1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely
simulated or fictitious are “inexistent and void from the
beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab initio and non-
existent.
2. YES.
The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code which states: Art. 148. In
cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article,
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are
presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the
manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if
both parties are in bad faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of
marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them
through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties
being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s
father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer
to the petition before the trial court even admitted that
“Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of
properties to his children and their respective spouses which
included Sally x x x.”
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the
decision of the CA is more in accord with the evidence on
record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was
registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.
The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in
the name of Benjamin with the descriptive title “married to
Sally.” The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
were registered in the name of Sally with the descriptive
title “married to Benjamin” while the properties under TCT
Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of
Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words
“married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner. Such
words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-
ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.
3. NO.
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under
the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, the
marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or
former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of
the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is
valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and there is no
trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their
marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was
void not because of the existence of the first marriage but
for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy
was not committed. For bigamy to exist, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites
for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.In
this case, there was really no subsequent
marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported
marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and
the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage.
130 Phil. 528
REYES, J. B. L., J.:
On February 4, 1963, Gloria G. Jocson commenced in the
Juvenile 6 Domestic Relations Court an action for the
annulment of marriage to Ricardo R. Robles (Civ. Case
No. E-00013), on the ground that it was bigamous. It was
alleged in the amended complaint previous to his marriage
to plaintiff on May 27, 1958, defendants Robles had
contracted a first marriage with Josefina Fausto, who had
instituted a criminal action for Bigamy against the same
defendant in the Court of First Instance of Manila (Crim.
Case No. 64124). Plaintiff also demanded from the
defendant moral and exemplary damages, attorneys' fees,
and costs, claiming that during their cohabitation, she was
subjected to physical maltreatment by her husband, resulting
in the premature birth of their first child, who died three
days later.
In his answer, defendant also assailed the validity of the
marriage. But he charged plaintiffs' parents
with having compelled him by force, threat and
intimidation, to contract that marriage with her
notwithstanding their knowledge that he is a married man;
and that said threat and intimidation allegedly persisted until
January, 1963 when he was finally able to get away and live
apart from the plaintiff.
Thereafter, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment,
on the ground that no genuine issue of fact is involved in the
case. It was claimed that defendant's contention, that his
consent to the marriage was secured by force and
intimidation employed upon his person by the relatives of
plaintiff, was allegedly supported by the joint affidavit of
plaintiff's father and brother, dated October 28, 1963,
attached to the motion (pp. 22-32, Record on
Appeal). Plaintiff, on the other hand, submitted the case for
judgment on the pleadings.
On December 23, 1963, defendant's motion for summary
judgment was denied, the court ruling that before it can pass
upon plaintiff's prayer for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage to defendant, there is necessity for proof that when
he contracted marriage with plaintiff, defendant Robles had
a previous and subsisting valid marriage. The evidentiary
requirement to establish these facts, according to the court,
was not met in the motion for summary
judgment. Defendant's plea to have his marriage declared as
having been brought about by force and intimidation, was
also denied, the court finding indications of collusion
between the parties in their attempt to secure the
nullification of said marriage. Reconsideration of this order,
sought by defendant, was denied on January 18, 1964. And,
when both parties failed to appear at the scheduled hearing
on March 9, 1964, the court directed the dismissal of the
action.
On April 17, 1964, defendant notified the court below of his
intention to appeal to this Court from the abovementioned
orders of December 23, 1963, January 18, 1964, and March
9, 1964. The appeal bond and amended record on appeal,
dated April 15, 1964, were thereafter approved.
It is noted that, as specified in the notice of appeal,
defendant is taking exception from the lower court's orders
of December 23, 1963, January 18, 1964, and March 9,
1964; however, there is no indication or certification or
proof that the filing of the appeal notice, bond and record on
appeal on April 17, 1964 were made within
the reglementary period, as required by the provisions of
Section 6, Revised Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court. Thereunder, the record on appeal must contain, not
only the full names of all the parties to the proceeding, as
well as the pleadings, petitions, motions and orders related
to the order or judgment subject of the anneal and which are
necessary for the proper understanding of the issue involved
therein, but also "such data as will show that the appeal was
perfected on time." This requirement, incorporated in the
new Rules of Court to enable the appellate courts to
determine without protracted inquiry whether an appeal was
timely made or not, was held to be jurisdictional, failure to
comply with which shall cause the dismissal of the
appeal.[1] There is here no showing that the present appeal
was perfected within the reglementary period, which datum
should have appeared in the record on appeal.
On the merits, we are satisfied that the Court of Domestic
Relations correctly denied the motion for summary
judgment in view of the first paragraph of Articles 88 and
101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that expressly
prohibit the rendition of a decree of annulment of a marriage
upon a stipulation of facts or a confession of judgment. The
affidavits annexed to the petition for summary judgment
practically amount to these methods not countenanced by
the Civil Code.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, this proceeding is
hereby dismissed conformable to Section (a) of Revised
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court, and the judgment appealed
from is affirmed. Costs against the appellant.
155 Phil. 1
MAKASIAR, J.:
Petitioner prays for the nullification of the order dated July
29, 1963 of the respondent judge of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila.
On April 26, 1962, petitioner Romulo Tolentino filed a suit
for annulment of his marriage to private respondent Helen
Villanueva, alleging that his consent was obtained through
fraud because immediately after the marriage celebration, he
discovered that private respondent was pregnant despite the
fact that he had no sexual relations with her prior to the
marriage ceremony; and that they did not live as husband
and wife as immediately after the marriage celebration,
Helen Villanueva left his house and her whereabouts
remained unknown to him until January, 1962 when he
discovered that she is residing in San Francisco, Cebu. Said
marriage was solemnized by Quezon City Judge Mariano R.
Virtucio on September 28, 1959. Said case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 43347 of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Manila.
Despite the fact that she was served with summons and copy
of the complaint, Helen failed to file a responsive pleading,
for which reason petitioner filed on June 13, 1962 a motion
to declare her in default and to set the date for the
presentation of his evidence.
In an order dated June 28, 1962, respondent Judge declared
private respondent in default, but, pursuant to the provision
of Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for
investigation to determine whether collusion exists between
the parties, directing the City Fiscal to submit his report
within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof, and, in the event
of a negative finding, to represent the State at the trial of the
case to prevent fabrication of evidence; and likewise
directed herein petitioner to furnish the City Fiscal with
copies of the complaint and such other documents necessary
for the City Fiscal's information and guidance.
On July 3, 1962, thru counsel, petitioner submitted to the
City Fiscal only a copy of his complaint.
Assistant City Fiscal Rafael A. Jose, assigned to the case,
issued a subpoena to petitioner's counsel requiring him to
bring petitioner with him as well as copies of other
documents in connection with the annulment case on August
27, 1962 at 10:00 A.M.
Plaintiff's counsel, in a letter dated August 24, 1962,
informed Assistant City Fiscal Jose that he could not comply
with the subpoena for it will unnecessarily expose his
evidence.
In a motion dated and filed on October 29, 1962, petitioner,
thru counsel, prayed the respondent Judge to set the date for
the reception of his evidence on the ground that the City
Fiscal had not submitted a report of his findings despite the
lapse of sixty (60) days from July 10, 1962 when he
submitted to the City Fiscal a copy of the complaint.
On November 6, 1962, respondent Judge denied the
aforesaid motion of petitioner unless he submits himself for
interrogation by the City Fiscal to enable the latter to report
whether or not there is collusion between the parties.
In an order dated July 29, 1963, respondent Judge dismissed
the complaint in view of the fact that petitioner is not willing
to submit himself for interrogation by the City Fiscal
pursuant to the provisions of the second paragraph of Article
101 of the New Civil Code.
His motions for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order
having been denied on July 29, 1963 and on April 11, 1964,
petitioner now files his petition to annul said order of July
29, 1963 and to compel the respondent Judge to receive his
evidence.
Articles 88 and 101 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
expressly prohibit the rendition of a decision in suits for
annulment of marriage and legal separation based on a
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment and direct
that in case of non-appearance of defendant, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not
collusion between the parties exists, and if none, said
prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State to prevent
fabrication of evidence for the plaintiff. Thus, Articles 88
and 101 state:
"ART. 88. No judgment annulling a marriage shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment.
"In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the provisions
of article 101, paragraph 2, shall be observed."
"ART. 101. No decree of legal separation shall be
promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of
judgment.
"In case of non-appearance of the defendant, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not a
collusion between the parties exists. If there is no collusion,
the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in order
to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is not
fabricated."
Even the 1940 Rules of Court, which preceded the 1950
Civil Code of the Philippines, direct that actions for the
annulment of marriage or divorce shall not be decided
unless the material facts alleged in the complaint are proved
(Sec. 10, Rule 35, 1940 Rules of Court). The same rule is
reiterated in Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1964 Revised Rules,
with "legal separation" being substituted for "divorce",
obviously because the present Civil Code does not authorize
absolute divorce.
The prohibition expressed in the aforecited laws and rules is
predicated on the fact that the institutions of marriage and of
the family are sacred and therefore are as much the concern
of the State as of the spouses; because the State and the
public have vital interest in the maintenance and
preservation of these social institutions against desecration
by collusion between the parties or by fabricated evidence.
The prohibition against annulling a marriage based on the
stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment or by non-
appearance of the defendant stresses the fact that marriage is
more than a mere contract between the parties; and for this
reason, when the defendant fails to appear, the law enjoins
the court to direct the prosecuting officer to intervene for the
State in order to preserve the integrity and sanctity of the
marital bonds (De Ocampo vs. Florenciano, 107 Phil. 35,
38-40; Brown vs. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, 172; Bigornia de
Cardenas vs.Cardenas, et. al., 98 Phil. 73, 78-79;
Roque vs. Encarnacion, et. al., 95 Phil. 643, 646).
Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that the petition is
without merit.
WHEREFORE, THE ORDER DATED JULY 29, 1963 IS
HEREBY AFFIRMED AND THE PETITION IS HEREBY
DISMISSED. WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER.
Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat
April 25, 1941
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Baguio.
Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de Buccat met in
March 1938, became engaged in September, and got
married in Nov 26.
On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting married) Luida, who
was 9 months pregnant, gave birth to a son. After knowing
this, Godofredo left Luida and never returned to married life
with her.
On March 23, 1939, he filed for an annulment of their
marriage on the grounds that when he agreed to married
Luida, she assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo Buccat’s marriage
be granted on the grounds that Luida concealed her
pregnancy before the marriage?
Held:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in order to nullify a
marriage, a sacred institution in which the State is interested
and where society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof that there was
concealment of pregnancy constituting fraud as a ground
for annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo, a first-year
law student, did not suspect anything about Luida’s
condition considering that she was in an advanced stage of
pregnancy (highly developed physical manifestation, ie.
enlarged stomach ) when they got married.
Decision:
SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. Costs to plaintiff-
appellant
Aquino vs. Delizo
109 Phil 21
FACTS:
Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on
the ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that at the date
of her marriage with the former on December 1954,
concealed the fact that she was pregnant by another man and
sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their
marriage, gave birth to a child. During the trial, Provincial
Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to
prevent collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only
documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract
between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented
any evidence.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of
marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a petition for
certiorari to review the decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as
alleged by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would
annul a marriage.
HELD:
The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of
the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of
marriage. Delizo was allegedly to be only more than four
months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage,
it is hard to say that her pregnancy was readily apparent
especially since she was “naturally plump” or fat. It is only
on the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the
woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the umbilicus,
making the roundness of the abdomen more general and
apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case
for new trial and decision complained is set aside.
Anaya vs. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in
1953. Palaroan filed an action for annulment of the
marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was
obtained through force and intimidation. The complaint was
dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and
granting Aurora’s counterclaim. While the amount of
counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to
her that several months prior to their marriage, he had pre-
marital relationship with a close relative of his. According
to her, the non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret
constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed for
the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such
ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her
husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman
is a ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
The concealment of a husband’s pre-marital relationship
with another woman was not one of those enumerated that
would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is
further excluded by the last paragraph providing that “no
other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity” shall give
ground for an action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at
bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not
warrant an annulment of marriage.
Jimenez vs. Canizares
L-12790, August 31, 1960
FACTS:
Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition for the
annulment of his marriage with Remedios Canizares on the
ground that the orifice of her genitals or vagina was too
small to allow the penetration of a male organ for
copulation. It has existed at the time of the marriage and
continues to exist that led him to leave the conjugal home
two nights and one day after the marriage. The court
summoned and gave a copy to the wife but the latter did not
file any answer. The wife was ordered to submit herself to
physical examination and to file a medical certificate within
10 days. She was given another 5 days to comply or else it
will be deemed lack of interest on her part and therefore
rendering judgment in favor of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be annulled with
only the testimony of the husband.
HELD:
The wife who was claimed to be impotent by her husband
did not avail of the opportunity to defend herself and as
such, claim cannot be convincingly be concluded. It is a
well-known fact that women in this country are shy and
bashful and would not readily and unhesitatingly submit to a
physical examination unless compelled by competent
authority. Such physical examination in this case is not self-
incriminating. She is not charged with any offense and
likewise is not compelled to be a witness against herself.
Impotence being an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The case was remanded to trial court
Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil 179
FACTS: Marciana Escano and Arthur Jones got married in
December 1914. On January 10, 1918, Jones secured a
passport. She never heard from him again. In 1919, she filed
for a proceeding to judicially declare Arthur missing. On
October 25, 1919, the court declared Arthur as an absentee
with the proviso that said judicial declaration of absence
would not take effect until six months after its publication in
the official newspapers pursuant to Art. 186 of the Old Civil
Code. In 23 April 1921, the court issued another order for
the taking effect of the declaration of absence, publication
thereof having been made in the Official Gazette and in "El
Ideal." On May 6, 1927, Marciana contracted a second
marriage with Felix Hortiguela. When Marciana died
intestate, Felix was appointed as judicial administrator of the
estate. Angelita Jones, Marciana’s daughter from her first
marriage, filed a case and alleged that she is the only heir of
her mother and that her mother’s marriage to Felix was null
and void on the ground that from April 23, 1921 (when the
court issued an order for the taking effect of declaration of
absence & publication thereof) to May 6, 1927 (her mother
and Felix’s marriage) was below the 7-year prescriptive
period. With this, the marriage would be null and void and
would render her as the sole heir.
ISSUE: W/N the marriage of Marciana and Felix is null and
void. W/N Felix is a legitimate heir of Marciana.
HELD. Yes and Yes. the absence of Marciana Escaño's
former husband should be counted from January 10, 1918,
the date on which the last news concerning Arthur W. Jones
was received, and from said date to May 6, 1927, more than
nine years elapsed. The validity of the marriage makes him a
legitimate heir.

Lukban vs Republic
L-8492, February 29, 1956

FACTS:

Lourdes Lukban and Francisco Chuidian got married in

1933 and after a violent quarrel he left Lukban and has not
been heard of since then. She diligently looked for him
asking the parents and friends but no one knew his
whereabouts. She believes that husband is already dead
since he was absent for more than 20 years and because she
intends to marry again, she desires to have her civil status
put in order to be relieved on any liability under the law.

ISSUE: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of

presumptive death before she can remarry.

HELD:

The court ruled that Lukban does not need to secure

declaration of presumptive death of her husband because
Civil Code prevails during their marriage in 1933. It
provides that “for the purposes of the civil marriage law, it
is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially
declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its
sole purpose to enable the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the
law only requires that the former spouse has been absent for
seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage,
that the spouse present does not know his or her former
spouse to be living, that each former spouse is generally
reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.