Case 149

The United States and China, 1944-1946

James R. Howard & David S. Painter

ISBN 1-56927-345-6
Copyright © 1989 by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy

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Part A
The United States and China, 1944–1946
JA M E S R . HO W A R D AND D AV I D S. P A I N T E R
During World War II, U.S. policy makers realized that
the Chinese Communist Party posed a challenge to the
U.S.-backed Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-
shek. To achieve its goal of a strong, unified, and pro-
Western China, the United States, from mid-1944 to the
end of 1946, attempted to mediate a political settlement
between the Nationalist and Communist Chinese in
hope of averting a full-scale civil war and a possible
Communist victory. These efforts failed, and as 1947
began, the United States found itself in the position of
supporting a reactionary and corrupt regime being suc-
cessfully challenged by a popular and growing Commu-
nist-led insurgency.
By the end of 1944, Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese Com-
munist forces controlled one-fourth of China, gov-
erned more than ninety million people, and were able
to field a well-disciplined army of almost one million
men. Although still vastly outnumbered by Chiang Kai-
shek’s Nationalist forces, Chinese Communist strength
had increased dramatically since 1935, when 30,000 dis-
eased and hungry troops had straggled into Yenan, in
China’s remote northwestern Shensi province, after a
year-long, 6,000 mile retreat to escape annihilation at
the hands of the Nationalist armies.
Mao’s Communists represented an obstacle not
only to Chiang Kai-shek’s efforts to unify all of China
under the Nationalist government but also to the
realization of U.S. postwar aims for China. As envi-
sioned by U.S. policy makers, a strong, unified, and
pro-Western China was needed to act as a stabilizing
force in East Asia following Japan’s defeat. A strong and
independent China would also serve as a buffer against
possible Soviet expansion in northeast Asia. Commit-
ted to that end, U.S. policy in 1945 aimed to strengthen
the Nationalist government while attempting to avert a
Chinese civil war by securing Communist participation
in a coalition government headed by Chiang Kai-shek.
MEDIATION: HURLEY’S NEGOTIATIONS
Efforts to unify the Nationalists and the Communists
began in August 1944, with General Patrick J. Hurley,
U.S. Ambassador to China, acting as mediator. Hurley
faced the formidable task of overcoming twenty years of
violent political struggle between the two factions.
Formed in the early 1920s under the sponsorship of the
Soviet-dominated Communist International (Comin-
tern), the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), at Soviet
urging, entered a working alliance with Sun Yat-sen’s
Soviet-backed Kuomintang (National People’s Party or
KMT) in 1924. In April 1927, Chiang Kai-shek, who had
1
2 James R. Howard and David S. Painter
assumed the leadership of the KMT following Sun Yat-
sen’s death in 1925, broke with the CCP. In the “White
Terror” that followed, Chiang expelled his Soviet advis-
ers and ordered the massacre of thousands of Chinese
Communists and their sympathizers. In 1931, Chiang
launched the first of five “Bandit Extermination Cam-
paigns” against the surviving Chinese Communists who
had regrouped under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung.
In 1934, after three years of bitter struggle against the
Nationalists and facing annihilation, the Communists
began the “Long March” to Yenan.
Since 1937, when the Nationalists and Commu-
nists joined in a “United Front” to combat Japanese
aggression, an unsettled truce had existed between the
two sides. Most China experts within the U.S. State
Department believed that a resumption of open hostili-
ties between the Nationalists and Communists was
unlikely as long as the war against Japan continued.
Once the war ended, however, in the words of one U.S.
official, “the active struggle for political control in
China is likely to be renewed.”1
By December 1944, Hurley’s efforts to mediate an
agreement between the Nationalists and Communists
had achieved little. The Nationalists demanded that the
integration of Communist forces into a national army
should precede the establishment of a coalition govern-
ment. The Communists, believing that any integration
of their forces into a national army without prior politi-
cal guarantees was suicidal, insisted that the formation
of a coalition government in which they had substantial
power had to precede the integration of the armed
forces. Moreover, in the eyes of the Chinese Commu-
nists, Hurley’s efforts at mediation were suspect.
Shortly after his appointment as Ambassador, Hurley
defined his role in the following terms: “(l) To prevent
the collapse of the National Government, (2) to sustain
Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic and Gen-
eralissimo of the Armies, (3) to harmonize relations
between the Generalissimo and the American Com-
mander, (4) to promote production of war supplies in
China and prevent economic collapse, and (5) to unify
all the military forces in China for the purpose of
defeating Japan.”2 Subsequently, in reporting to the
President on the course of the negotiations, Hurley
stated, “I have not agreed to any principles or sup-
ported any method that in my opinion would weaken
the National Government or the leadership of Chiang
Kai-shek.”3
THE FAR EASTERN AGREEMENT
Lack of progress in the negotiations led President
Franklin D. Roosevelt to seek a CCP-KMT settlement
by securing Soviet recognition of both Chiang’s Nation-
alist Government and support for a coalition govern-
ment. Roosevelt believed that Soviet support for a
settlement would pressure the Chinese Communists
into entering a coalition government, thereby averting
civil war. His thinking was echoed by Hurley, who
believed that the Communists would be forced to
accept terms for a coalition government if they could be
politically and militarily isolated. At Yalta, on February
11, 1945, Roosevelt and Stalin signed the Far Eastern
Agreement that granted territorial and economic con-
cessions to the Soviet Union in exchange for Soviet
entry into the war against Japan and support for the
Nationalist Chinese Government. The Agreement stip-
ulated that after Japan’s defeat,
1. The status quo in Outer Mongolia (The Mongo-
lian People’s Republic) shall be preserved.
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the
treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be
restored, viz.
a. the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the
islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the
Soviet Union.
b. the commercial port of Darien shall be interna-
tionalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet
Union in this port being safeguarded, and the
lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR
restored.
c. the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-
Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to
Darien shall be jointly operated by the establish-
ment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being
understood that the preeminent interest of the
Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China
shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria.
3. The Kuril islands shall be handed over to the
Soviet Union.
It is understood that the agreement concerning
Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to
 The United States and China, 1944-1946
above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chi-
ang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order
to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Sta-
lin.4
ADVICE AND DISSENT
After Roosevelt had obtained Soviet agreement at Yalta
to conclude a pact of friendship and alliance with the
National government of China, Hurley renewed his
efforts to mediate a settlement while rejecting Chinese
Communist requests for material with which to fight
the Japanese. There was widespread consensus among
U.S. Foreign Service officers in China that instead of
reducing the likelihood of civil war, the current U.S.
policy would probably precipitate it. At the end of Feb-
ruary 1945, while Hurley was en route to Washington
for consultations with the President, the U.S. embassy’s
Foreign Service officers questioned the viability of U.S.
policy in a cable to the State Department:
The situation in China appears to be developing in
some ways that are not conducive to effective pros-
ecution of the war, nor to China’s future peace and
unity.
1. The recent American attempt through diplo-
matic and persuasive means [Hurley’s mission] to
assist compromise between the factions in China
was a necessary first step in the handling of the
problem. Unity was correctly taken to be the
essence not only of the most effective conduct of
the war by China but also of the peaceful and
speedy emergence of a strong, united and demo-
cratic China.
But the cessation of Japanese offensives, the open-
ing of the road from China, the rapid development
of our Army plans for rebuilding Chiang’s armies,
the increase of other assistance such as the War
Production Board, the expectation that the Cen-
tral Government will share in the making of impor-
tant decisions at San Francisco, and belief that we
are intent upon the definite support and strength-
ening of the Central Government alone . . . as the
only possible channel for aid to other groups—
these circumstances have combined to increase
greatly Chiang’s feeling of strength and have
3
resulted in unrealistic optimism on his part and
lack of willingness to make any compromise. . . .
2. The Communists for their part have come to the
conclusion that we are definitely committed to the
support of Chiang alone, and that we will not force
Chiang’s hand in order to be able to aid or cooper-
ate with them. In what they consider self-protec-
tion, they are . . . actively increasing their forces
and aggressively expanding their areas southward. .
. . In grasping time by the forelock, the Commu-
nists intend to take advantage of the isolation of
East China by the Japanese capture of the Canton-
Hankow Railway, to make themselves as nearly
invincible as possible before Chiang’s new armies . .
. are ready, and to present us the dilemma of
accepting or refusing their aid if our forces land
anywhere on the China coast. Communists close to
the leaders are now talking of the necessity of their
seeking Soviet assistance. . . .
3. Although our intentions have been good and our
actions in refusing to deal with or assist any group
but the Central Government have been diplomati-
cally correct, if this situation continues . . . chaos in
China will be inevitable and the probable outbreak
of disastrous civil conflict will be accelerated. Even
for the present it is obvious that this situation, in
which we are precluded from cooperation with the
large, aggressive and strategically situated armies
and organized population of the Communist areas .
. . is unsatisfactory and hampering from a purely
military standpoint. . . .
Unless checked, this situation is apt to develop with
increasing acceleration as the tempo of the war in
China and the whole Far East is raised and the inev-
itable resolution of China’s internal conflict
becomes more urgent. The time is short and it will
be dangerous to allow affairs to drift.
4. If the high military authorities of our Govern-
ment agree that some cooperation with the Com-
munists and other groups who have proved
themselves willing and are in position to fight the
Japanese is or will be necessary or desirable, we
believe that the immediate and paramount consid-
4 James R. Howard and David S. Painter
eration of military necessity should be made the
basis for a further step in American policy. . . .
The first step we propose for consideration is that
the President inform the Generalissimo in definite
terms that military necessity requires that we supply
and cooperate with the Communists and other suit-
able groups who can assist the war against Japan
[emphasis added]. . . . We can assure the Generalis-
simo that we are not contemplating reducing our
aid to the Central Government. . . . We may include
in the statement that we will keep the Central Gov-
ernment informed of the extent and types of such
aid. We can also tell the Generalissimo that we will
be able to use the lever of our supplies and cooper-
ation to limit independence and aggressive action
on their part, restricting them to their present
areas. And we can point out the advantages of hav-
ing the Communists helped by us rather than seek-
ing Russian aid or intervention, direct or indirect.
[T]he Generalissimo . . . might also be told . . . that
although our effort to persuade the various groups
of the desirability of unification has failed and we
can no longer delay measures for the most effective
prosecution of the war, we consider it obviously
desirable that our military assistance to all groups
be based on unity and the coordination of military
command; that we are prepared to continue to lend
our good offices to this end . . . and that while we
believe that the proposal should come from the
Generalissimo, we would be disposed to support:
(1) The formation of . . . a supreme war council or
war cabinet in which Communists and other
groups would have effective representation and
some share in responsibility for the formulation
and execution of joint war plans, and (2) the nomi-
nal incorporation of Communist and other selected
forces into the Central Government armies under
the operational command of American officers des-
ignated by the Generalissimo on the advice of Gen-
eral Wedemeyer, on agreement by all parties that
these troops would operate only within their pres-
ent areas or specified extended areas. It should be
made clear, however, that our decision to cooper-
ate with any forces able to assist the war will not be
delayed by or contingent on the completion of such
internal Chinese arrangements. . . .
The Generalissimo and his Government will not at
this time on their own initiative take any forward
step which will mean loss of face, prestige or per-
sonal power. The Communists will not, without
guarantees in which they have confidence, take any
forward step which will involve dispersion and
eventual elimination of their forces upon which
their present strength and future political exis-
tence depend. The step we propose taking will
exert on both parties the force necessary to break
this deadlock, and the modus operandi embodied
in those two proposals should initiate concrete mil-
itary and, as an inevitable result, political coopera-
tion and accordingly provide a foundation for
increasing future development toward unity. . . .
Even though not made public, however, the fact of
our assistance to the Communists and other forces
would soon become generally known throughout
China. This, we believe, would have profound and
desirable political effects in China. There is tre-
mendous internal pressure in China for unity based
on a reasonable compromise with the Communists
and a chance for the presently repressed liberal
groups to express themselves. . . . By these steps we
would prove that we are not so committed [to the
KMT], we would greatly raise the morale and pres-
tige of these liberal groups, and we would exert the
strongest possible influence through these internal
forces to impel Chiang to put his own house in
order and make the concessions necessary to unity.
There is no question that such a policy would be
greatly welcomed by the vast majority of the Chi-
nese people (although not by the very small reac-
tionary minority in control of the Kuomintang)
and that it would raise American prestige. . . . The
majority of Chinese believe that the settlement of
China’s internal problem is not so much a matter of
mutual concessions as reform of the Kuomintang
itself. They also declare, with justification, that
American “non-intervention” in China cannot help
but be in fact intervention in favor of the present
conservative leadership.
Also by such policy, which we consider realistically
accepts the facts in China, we could expect to
secure the cooperation of all of China’s forces in the
 The United States and China, 1944-1946
war, to hold the Communists to our side rather
than throw them into the arms of Russia . . . to con-
vince the KMT of the undesirability of its apparent
present plans for eventual civil war, and to bring
about some unification which, even though not
immediately complete, would provide the basis for
peaceful future development toward full democ-
racy.5
Hurley strongly opposed these recommendations.
In a news conference on April 2, following a meeting
with the President, Hurley reiterated the U.S. position
of recognizing and supporting only the Nationalist Gov-
ernment. In response to a reporter’s question, Hurley
denied that the Chinese Communists had ever
requested military aid or political recognition from the
United States.6
THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CCP:
HOW STRONG THE LINK?
President Roosevelt’s death and Harry S. Truman’s
assumption of the presidency in April marked no
immediate change in U.S. policy toward China. As the
summer of 1945 progressed, and Hurley’s efforts to
mediate the Nationalist-Communist dispute continued
with little result, the debate over U.S. policy toward
China continued. John Paton Davies, a career foreign
service officer and second secretary at the U.S. embassy
in Moscow, again questioned the course of U.S. policy
in a memorandum prepared for Averell Harriman, U.S.
Ambassador to the Soviet Union. The son of missionary
parents, Davies had been born and raised in China and
had served in China as General Joseph Stillwell’s politi-
cal officer from 1942 to 1945. In this memorandum of
April 15, which briefed Harriman on one of Hurley’s
visits to Moscow, Davies pointed out the following:
In attempting to estimate the course of future polit-
ical and military developments in China, the fol-
lowing comments may be helpful.
1. Since the middle of the 19th Century China has
been undergoing a revolution—political, eco-
nomic, military and social. Japan’s attack in 1937
caught China in mid passage between medievalism
and modern statehood. The old had not died and
5
the new had not been born. Japan’s aggression
imposed an armistice on the contending forces in
China seeking to shape that country’s destiny. But
the internal conflicts have been too great. The
truce has begun to break down.
2. The principal contending forces in China are:
(a) The National Government. Although it is a one-
party (Kuomintang) Government, the party —and
therefore the Government—is not of a single mind.
A left wing faction is sympathetic to immediate
multiparty coalition government. However, all
Government factions, for opportunistic and other
reasons, are more or less committed to the Genera-
lissimo and his resolve to create a unified state
under his personal preceptorship.
(b) Residual warlords. They are mostly in West
China. Because they wish fully to recover their feu-
dal rights, they are anti-Chungking and anti-com-
munist.
(c) Separatist elements in South China. These are
composed of politicians and generals who, during
last winter, established practically autonomous
regimes. The most prominent of these leaders has
been making overtures to the Communists. These
elements are anti-Chungking.
(d) The League of Democratic Parties. The league
is made up of several minority parties, individually
of little strength but collectively significant, espe-
cially as the League has been working with the
Communists. However, it is the only force here
listed without troops—a critical weakness.
(e) Chinese Communist Regime. The Chinese
Communists are more than a Party. They are a de
facto regime claiming about 650,000 square kilo-
meters and 90 million people under their control
and 600,000 regular troops, plus 1,500,000 militia.
The Communists are the major challenge to
Kuomintang supremacy.
(f ) The puppets.7 These outright opportunists,
with an estimated 300,000 troops in Manchuria and
900,000 in China Proper, work for the highest
6 James R. Howard and David S. Painter
bidder. When collaboration with the Japanese
ceases to be profitable, they will offer their armies
and civilian retinues to whomever they believe
willing and able to assure them the best terms. For
the puppets, the Communists will be difficult (but
not impossible) to do business with. Chiang will
probably grant more attractive terms because his
need of puppet aid is greater and his attitude
toward the collaborators more tolerant. Those
puppets in Manchuria and much of North China
will, however, scarcely be able to establish military
contact with Chiang’s forces and so will probably
be compelled by circumstances to seek terms from
the Communists—and possibly the Red Army.
3. In the confused Chinese domestic struggle, the
Government-Communist conflict is paramount
both in magnitude and future portent. The other
forces tend to arrange themselves with one or the
other of major contestants.
4. The prospect for the attainment of Chinese unity
through negotiation would not seem to be bright.
The central issue in Chiang-Communist negotia-
tions has been the establishment of a coalition gov-
ernment. Chiang knows both the Kuomintang and
Communists too well to accede to this seemingly
innocent proposal. He knows that the Kuomintang
is corrupt and vulnerable to boring from within. He
knows that the Communists are so well organized
and so well disciplined that they would sooner or
later dominate the coalition. . . .
As for the Communists, they are not likely to com-
promise with Chiang on anything short of coali-
tion. They would like coalition because it would
mean a relatively cheap acquisition of control over
most if not all of China. But if coalition is not forth-
coming, they can afford to wait. The Communists
reckon that time is on their side. Their steady
expansion southward behind the Japanese
advances of last year continued as they negotiated.
Expansion and consolidation presumably still con-
tinue in North, Central, and South China. And then
there is always the possibility of eventual positive
support from the Soviet Union.
5. The prospect for the attainment of Chinese unity
through military action by the Government is
scarcely more hopeful. It is difficult to believe that
Chiang’s armies, even though rejuvenated by
American supplies and training, can accomplish
what the Japanese have, in nearly eight years of
effort, failed to do—effectively conquer North
China. With the solid support of the masses (which
the Government armies do not have) the Commu-
nist forces may be expected at the very least to hold
what they now have North of the Yellow River.
Should the Red Army enter North China, the pic-
ture would radically change. In such an eventual-
ity, we may anticipate that Chiang’s troops could
not and would not advance into that part of North
China occupied by Soviet forces.
Whatever action the Soviet Union may initiate, any
serious attempt by Chiang to take over Communist
areas by military measures will precipitate bitter
and violent civil conflict. It is possible that with
American help, Chiang can, over a period of years
and at the cost of disruptive civil war, effectively
conquer the Communist enclaves in the Yangtze
Valley and South China. But most of North China
would seem to be permanently lost to him.
6. If China cannot be unified under Chiang through
either political or military measures, can his Gov-
ernment be strengthened to the extent that it will
serve as a dependable balance and buffer in eastern
Asia? The answer is: perhaps— depending on (a)
the extent of foreign support given him and (b)
whether the Chinese Government is able to reform
itself so that it commands positive popular backing.
The extent of foreign intervention required to set
up Chiang’s Government as a dependable balance
and buffer should not be underestimated. Foreign
underwriting of the Chinese Government militar-
ily, economically and politically would be neces-
sary. And on a scale which might well be
repudiated by the electorates of the underwriting
Governments.
Nor should there be illusions regarding the funda-
mental weakness of Chiang’s Kuomintang Govern-
 The United States and China, 1944-1946
ment and its need of reform. It lacks active popular
support. It has at present no program which prom-
ises to attract active popular support. It is venal,
inefficient and stale. If it is to exist alongside a
dynamic and disciplined Communist China and
hope to survive, it must, in addition to receiving
far-reaching foreign aid, radically reform itself. It is
debatable whether the Kuomintang Government is
at this late time capable of reforming itself. It may
well be that, like the Bourbons, it has learned noth-
ing and forgotten nothing.
7. What is the nature of the Communist regime?
The Chinese Communist Party began as an instru-
ment of Moscow’s policy of world revolution. With
the Kremlin’s abandonment, however temporary,
of that policy the Chinese Communists were left
pretty much to shift for themselves. Realizing that
their strength must be based on the masses and rec-
ognizing that the Chinese masses are composed of
conservative individualistic peasants, they revised
their platform in the direction of moderation. They
adopted agrarian democracy as their immediate
goal, socialism as their distant one.
The trend in the direction of nationalist rather than
international thinking was given further impetus by
the formation of the United Front in 1937 and
Japan’s invasion of China. This feeling has presum-
ably been reinforced by the fact that the Chinese
Communists have attained the status of a de facto
regime and can look forward with some hope to
functioning as the established administration of
North China.
Although Communist political leaders at Yenan will
not admit any disappointment over the failure of
the Kremlin to aid them while acting as lightning
rod for the Soviet Union, they would scarcely be
human if they did not feel some resentment on that
score.
With the growth of the nationalist feeling among
the Chinese Communists, the shabby treatment
which they have received from the Kremlin during
the past nine years and the possible prospect of the
Red Army invading Manchuria and North China
and Russian suzerainty being imposed on the
7
Yenan regime, it would seem to be logical to
assume that there are at least some elements among
the Chinese Communists who might welcome for-
eign support designed to ensure the continuance of
their expansion and independence. . . .
8. At this point it may be useful to examine the
American position in relation to the problem of
China. If we conclude that the Chinese Commu-
nist regime is here to stay; that China cannot be
unified; and that we cannot with any assurance of
success attempt to build up the Kuomintang Gov-
ernment as a balance and buffer in eastern Asia, is it
worth our while to embark upon a policy of coop-
eration with and assistance to the Chinese Commu-
nists?
Before discussing this question, it should be said
that an affirmative answer does not imply abandon-
ment of Chiang’s Government. Presumably, such a
policy would be predicated on the assumption that
when dealing with as uncertain a situation as that
which exists in China, it may be prudent not to
commit all of our policy eggs to one basket.
(a) In considering a possible American policy of
cooperation with and assistance to the Chinese
Communists, the first consideration is probably —
will the Chinese Communists be willing to cooper-
ate with us on terms equal or better than those
which they will extend to the Soviet Union? In
other words, will they be voluntary creatures of
Russian foreign policy? We do not know. And the
operations of Communist-dominated regimes in
Europe do not give us convincing indication of how
the older and more self-sufficient Chinese Commu-
nist regime would react to American overtures.
Further investigation of Moscow-Yenan ties by a
competent observer at Yenan might throw more
light on this important issue.
What can be said at this juncture, however, is that if
any communist regime is susceptible to political “cap-
ture” by the United States, it is Yenan [emphasis
added].
(b) If we set out to formulate a policy of aid to and
cooperation with the Chinese Communist regime,
8 James R. Howard and David S. Painter
we should recognize that such a policy will involve
competing with Russian drawing-power rather
than seeking to block it off, as would be the case
were we to bolster Chiang as a balance and buffer.
To have any chance of success, such competition
would in the economic field have to be on or about
the same scale as now planned for Chiang’s Gov-
ernment and in the cultural field on a greater scale.
In so far as political considerations are concerned,
there would not seem to be reason for large-scale
military aid and cooperation. Finally, American aid
and cooperation in all fields would be utterly abor-
tive if not integrated under expert and resolute
political direction. . . . 8
ESTIMATE OF SOVIET POLITICAL POLICY
REGARDING CHINA
Davies’ assessment that the United States might be able
to “detach” the Chinese Communists from the Soviet
Union was questioned by Eldridge Dubrow, chief of the
Division of Eastern European affairs, in a memo of May
10. Dubrow, a career foreign service officer with experi-
ence in eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, regarded
the Chinese Communists as an extension of Soviet
Communism.
While the Soviet Government has been preoccu-
pied in the European war, it has not played a prom-
inent part in China but has been content to permit
the United States to take the lead in that area. It
has, nevertheless, been following developments
closely and through its encouragement of the Chi-
nese Communists in central China it has main-
tained an effective apparatus in that country for
future eventualities. . . .
It is obvious that the Soviet Government does not
look with favor on the Chungking Government and
while they pay lip service to it now by continuing
to recognize it they will in all probability endeavor
to undermine its influence still further by either
giving additional and substantial assistance to the
Chinese Communists or if a coalition is effected
between the Communist and Chungking Govern-
ments the Soviet authorities will immediately
apply their well-perfected infiltration tactics to
take over control of the coalition. Under present
circumstances, they would undoubtedly prefer the
latter course to civil war and, therefore, they may
not be expected to oppose any efforts made by the
United States to bring about such a coalition.
On the basis of reports from American observers in
Yenan, it is evident that the structure of the Com-
munist Government is a replica of that of the Soviet
Government. If and when the Soviet authorities
decide to take a more active part in China, they
will, if they wish to use it, have at their disposal an
effective machine to build upon and expand their
influence in a somewhat similar manner to the
methods they have used in central and eastern
Europe. The principal difference will be that they
will be dealing with an agricultural population with
a comparatively small number of urban workers.
This fact may make their task more difficult since
the Marxian appeal is usually more difficult of
implementation with rural populations who by
instinct are individualistic and only desire outside
aid in order to increase their own individual well
being and economic plight. The Soviet authorities,
therefore, will champion a policy which will be
directed to win over the peasantry by a well-inte-
grated program of land reforms and promises of
material aid for the rural population which will be
implemented by some positive action coupled with
a large share of glowing promises, which may be
fulfilled later.
Therefore, unless the Chungking Government can
liberalize itself, [and] adopt a definite forward-
looking program . . . the chances are that the Com-
munist-controlled groups will prevail in the end.
It is evident that the Soviet authorities desire the
complete destruction of Japan as a force in the East
so that, as in the west, with the defeat of Germany
there will not be any powerful force to either
threaten the Soviet Union itself or prevent, or be in
a position to hinder, the extension of Soviet influ-
ence in this region. . . .
While we should in no case try to prevent the
attainment of legitimate Soviet interests in China,
we should in our own interests exert every effort to
 The United States and China, 1944-1946
prevent Soviet influence from becoming predominant
in China [emphasis added]. To do this, it would
appear that we should bend every effort to bring
about a liberalization of the Chungking Govern-
ment, assist them in drawing up a positive pro-
gram which would have a direct appeal to a large
section of the population and assist them finan-
cially and materially to carry out effectively such a
program. The United States is in a position to fur-
nish the material aid necessary to implement such a
program while the Soviet Union is not. For this rea-
son, the Soviet Government will find it difficult to
give large-scale material assistance to the Commu-
nist elements in China in order to help them carry
out their promises. If we, on the other hand, can
furnish such material assistance to liberal non-
Communist elements, many of whom may now,
because of lack of faith in the present policies of
Chungking, be fuming to the Communist groups,
we should be in a position to minimize the influ-
ence of the Soviet Union in this area and start
China on the path which should lead eventually to
the creation of a truly liberal regime rather than the
establishment of another “proletarian” dictator-
ship.9
The viewpoints of Davies and Dubrow, however
different, were in stark contrast to those of Hurley. Fol-
lowing his meeting with Stalin in April 1945, Hurley
reported that Stalin “agreed unqualifiedly to America’s
policy in China as outlined to him during the conversa-
tion.” To Hurley, Stalin pledged “his complete support
for the unification of the armed forces of China with full
recognition of the National Government under the
leadership of Chiang Kai-shek.”10 In July 1945, with
negotiations between Nationalist and Soviet represen-
tatives underway in Moscow for the conclusion of a
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, Hurley
again expressed his conviction to the Secretary of State
that the Chinese Communists could be pressured into
accepting Nationalist terms.
We are convinced that the influence of the Soviet
will control the action of the Chinese Communist
Party. The Chinese Communists do not believe
that Stalin has agreed or will agree to support the
National Government of China under the leader-
ship of Chiang Kai-shek. The Chinese Communists
9
still fully expect the Soviet to support the Chinese
Communists against the National Government. . . .
Nothing will change their opinion on this subject
until a treaty has been signed between the Soviet
and China in which the Soviet agrees to support
the National Government. When the Chinese
Communists are convinced that the Soviet is not
supporting them, they will settle with the National
Government if the National Government is realistic
enough to make generous political settlements.
The negotiations between the National Govern-
ment and the Communist Party at this time are
merely marking time pending the result of the con-
ference at Moscow.
The leadership of the Communist Party is intelli-
gent. When the handwriting is on the wall, they
will be able to read. No amount of argument will
change their position. Their attitude will be
changed only by inexorable logic of events. The
strength of the armed forces of the Chinese Com-
munist has been exaggerated. The area of territory
controlled by the Communists has been exagger-
ated. The number of Chinese people who adhere to
the Chinese Communist Party has been exagger-
ated. State Department officials, Army officials,
newspaper and radio publicity have in a large mea-
sure accepted the Communist leaders’ statements
in regard to the military and political strength of
the Communist Party in China. Nevertheless, with
the support of the Soviet the Chinese Communists
could bring about civil war in China. Without the
support of the Soviet the Chinese Communist
Party will eventually participate as a political party
in the National Government.11
Hurley’s optimism proved unfounded. Despite the
signing of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and
Alliance on August 14, 1945, in which the Soviets
pledged their “moral, material, and military support to
China and solely to the Chinese National Government,”
negotiations for a settlement between the Nationalists
and Chinese Communists remained stalemated. Both
sides clung to their respective positions: The National-
ists insisted that Mao’s Communist forces be incorpo-
rated into the Nationalist Army prior to any political
reorganization of the government. The Communists,
10 James R. Howard and David S. Painter
distrustful of Nationalist intentions, pressed their
demands that any unification of the armies be preceded
by political reform and a true sharing of political power.
Efforts to avert a civil war through negotiation were
overtaken by the Japanese surrender on August 14,
which was followed by the outbreak of fighting between
Nationalist and Communist forces.
U.S. INTERVENTION: THE MARINES IN CHINA
AND THE MILITARY ADVISORY GROUP
By mid-summer, with the war in the Pacific drawing to
a close, a key issue facing U.S. policy makers was how to
secure the surrender of the two million Japanese and
almost one million Japanese puppet troops in China.
Given the stiff resistance encountered in the Pacific bat-
tles against the Japanese, and their apparent willing-
ness to fight to the death, Joint Chiefs of Staff ( JCS)
planners were concerned that Japanese forces in China
might continue to resist after the Japanese government
in Tokyo had surrendered.
The JCS believed that the Nationalist Chinese
forces were incapable of effecting the timely surrender
of Japanese forces in China without the employment of
U.S. forces. The JCS feared that any Japanese troops
remaining in China, assuming a political agreement
between the Nationalists and Communists was not
reached, would be sucked into the resulting civil war.
On August 10, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed
Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer, Com-
mander of U.S. Forces in China, to assist the Nationalist
government in both securing the surrender of Japanese
forces and restoring Nationalist control in the Japanese-
occupied areas. In carrying out these directives, Wede-
meyer was ordered to avoid involvement in “fratricidal
warfare.” Five days later, President Truman, in General
Order No. 1, directed that all Japanese forces in China
surrender only to the forces of the Nationalist Govern-
ment or its designated representatives.
On August 19, in a cable to the Chief of Staff,
Wedemeyer noted, “Whereas the United States pur-
ported intent is to assist the Chinese Central Govern-
ment in the surrender and repatriation of the Japanese
in China, actually in effect and concomitantly we are
making an important contribution to preclude success-
ful operations by Communist forces.” Wedemeyer also
warned that the use of U.S. transports to move Nation-
alist forces into the specified areas and the deployment
of U.S. Marines ran the risk of involving U.S. personnel
in “clashes” between Communist and Nationalist forces.
In closing, he remarked that while U.S. personnel “have
been instructed to withdraw from the vicinity of
clashes,” he intended “to employ U.S. combat air forces
or other appropriate means . . . to carry out my mission
and to protect American lives and property that may be
endangered.”12
Amid the concern over the deployment of U.S.
Marines and the transport of Nationalist forces, T.V.
Soong, the National Government’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs, arrived in Washington. In a series of meetings
with Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal and Sec-
retary of State James F. Byrnes, Soong requested the
dispatch of a U.S. military mission to China to help train
and advise the Nationalist forces. In a meeting with
President Truman on September 7, Soong was
informed by Truman that the State, War, and Navy
Departments were studying the request.
On October 22, the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Subcommittee for the Far East outlined a program for
sending a 4,000 man military advisory group to China.
The program included a JCS proposal that consider-
ation should be given to obtaining certain economic
and military rights or “concessions” in return for U.S.
support. “Essential concessions,” as outlined in the JCS
proposal, included the following: “China will impose
no import, excise, consumption or other tax, duty or
impost, on material, equipment, supplies, or goods
shipped by the U.S. . . . to be used or consumed by U.S.
military personnel in China; U.S. service military or
naval courts . . . will have exclusive jurisdiction over all
members of . . . the Military Advisory Group and over
American nationals employed by or accompanying
these forces; and the Chinese will agree that purchases
from foreign powers other than the U.S. of arms,
ammunition and military equipment will be made only
after consultation with the . . . Group.”13
“Desirable concessions” included the following:
“Preferential treatment for U.S. Government, citizens,
and commercial organizations in respect of pipelines,
roads, air bases, and other installations in China con-
structed by or at expense of United States,” and Chinese
agreement “not to pursue or support any policy or mea-
sure, which has the effect of denying us access to, or the
ready processing of strategic or critical raw materials
either for current use or for future stockpiling.”14
 The United States and China, 1944-1946
The JCS proposal elicited a sharp rebuttal from
John Carter Vincent, an old “China Hand” and Director
of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs. “The size and char-
acter of the Group, the statement of concessions
desired, and the general tenor of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff papers,” Vincent informed Secretary of State
Byrnes on November 12, “raise a question as to whether
we are not moving toward establishment of a relation-
ship with China which has some of the characteristics of
a de facto protectorate with a semi-colonial Chinese
army under our direction.” Exploring the possible
impact of such military assistance, Vincent noted, “Chi-
ang Kai-shek has in the past shown a decided prefer-
ence for military methods, rather than political
methods, in seeking a solution of internal difficulties in
China. . . . “ Consequently, Vincent argued, “It is not
unreasonable to anticipate that American military assis-
tance on the scale contemplated might encourage Chi-
ang to continue along the line without promise of
success, and discourage attempts at unity by peaceful
methods.”15 Byrnes endorsed Vincent’s objections and
implementation of the program was delayed for their
consideration.
By mid-October, fighting between Nationalist and
Communist forces was reported in eleven of China’s
twenty-eight provinces. In the interim, almost 60,000
United States Marines had arrived in China to protect
vital rail lines, ports, and airfields. On November 5,
Wedemeyer reported that Nationalist forces were in a
position to accept the surrender of Japanese forces in
North China and he was prepared to begin the phased
withdrawal of U.S. Marines from China.
Wedemeyer’s cable sparked debate over when, and
under what circumstances, the Marines were to be
withdrawn. Everett Drumwright, former second secre-
tary of the U.S. Embassy in China and current chief of
the Division of Chinese Affairs, responded on Novem-
ber 16 that the Marines should remain in-country and
their mission be expanded to include supporting the
movement of Nationalist forces into Manchuria.
THE SITUATION IN CHINA:
A DISCUSSION OF UNITED STATES
POLICY WITH RESPECT THERETO
It will be clear that the situation in China has
reached a critical state and that the developments
of the next few weeks will have a momentous bear-
11
ing on the future of China, of the Far East and the
world.
It is evident that the Chinese Communists are mak-
ing a supreme effort to assert control of north
China. It is becoming more and more clear that the
Chinese Communists are, furthermore, making a
strong bid to seize control of Manchuria. It appears
that in this effort to absorb Manchuria, the Chinese
Communists have been aided and abetted by the
U.S.S.R. which has been in control of all or parts of
Manchuria since about the middle of August 1945.
Without Soviet assistance, it is difficult to see how
the Chinese Communists could have become so
securely entrenched in Manchuria as they appear
to be today. . . .
It is assumed that our primary objective in this
uncertain and disordered world—certainly prior to
the establishment of an effective world organiza-
tion to ensure world peace—is the promotion of
the security of the United States.
What policy of policies should we follow with
respect to China in order to attain this primary
objective—the security of the United States? It has
been our traditional policy to advocate and support
respect for the territorial integrity and political
independence of China. As a corollary to that pol-
icy, we have sought the emergence of a strong, uni-
fied, progressive government in China. Since 1928
we, in common with the great majority of the Pow-
ers, have recognized the National Government of
China as the legitimate government of China . . . .
How may we best safeguard our security and inter-
ests in the light of developments in China as
described above?
We appear to be faced with two major alternatives:
(1) to give vigorous and sustained support to the
National Government to the end that it may obtain
effective control of all parts of China, including
Manchuria, or (2) withdrawal of our support from
the National Government and of our armed forces
and facilities from China.
In the interests of our own security and peace and
stability in the Far East, we should move resolutely
12 James R. Howard and David S. Painter
and effectively to assist the National Government of
China to effect restoration of the recovered areas of
China, including Manchuria [emphasis added]. We
appear to be on firm legal and moral grounds in
pursuing such a policy, and its implementation will,
it seems clear, offer the best opportunity for the
unification of China and diminution of the possibil-
ity of foreign intervention. Failure to afford sub-
stantial assistance to the National Government in
this respect is likely to result in the creation in
Manchuria and perhaps in parts of north China and
Inner Mongolia of a strongly entrenched Chinese
Communist regime contiguous to the U.S.S.R. . . .
Such a Communist regime could hardly be
expected to regard the United States in a friendly
light.
The United States, bearing in mind the close ideo-
logical and other ties that exist between the Chi-
nese Communists and the U.S.S.R., could scarcely,
for its part, view the development of such a state,
de facto or otherwise, with equanimity. Consider-
ing the character, the ideology and the past attitude
of the Chinese Communists, it is difficult to per-
ceive how American interests of any kind could
flourish is such a Communist state. The creation of
such a Communist state would seem, in effect, to
bring about a situation which in many important
particulars would be little different from that
obtaining before the defeat of Japan. Instead of a
Japanese-dominated puppet regime we should
probably find in its place one dominated by the
U.S.S.R. Obviously such a development is neither
one that was contemplated by us when we went to
war with Japan nor one that will promote the secu-
rity and interests of the United States. . . .
It is submitted that in the implementation of our
policies toward China we should be guided primar-
ily . . . by considerations of our own security inter-
ests. Other considerations, such as democracy in
China, questions as to the relative efficiency of the
two contending factions, the questions of “fratri-
cidal strife,” et cetera, would thus seem to be of sec-
ondary concern and should accordingly be so
regarded at this time.
It is submitted that any policy of American with-
drawal from China at this juncture or of half-
hearted assistance to China will destroy what we
wish to achieve—a strong, united China with close
and friendly attachments to the United States.16
Drumwright’s assessment of Soviet intentions
toward China was subsequently challenged by George
R. Kennan, U.S. chargé d’affaires in the Soviet Union,
who wrote the following to Secretary of State Byrnes
on January 10, 1946:
Since we note that interpretation of Soviet aims
and tactics in China and of Soviet relations with
Chinese Communists presented in some of [the]
material received from Washington seems to reveal
[an] imperfect understanding of this subject, we
venture to set forth below [a] survey of these ques-
tions as seen from Moscow. . . .
[The] USSR seeks predominant influence in China.
It does so because, by revolutionary tradition, by
nationalist ambition and by kinetic nature, Russia is
an expansionist force. . . .
It would be a mistake to assume that [the] USSR
necessarily seeks in Manchuria [a] regime com-
posed predominately of Yenan Communists. In
most respects [the] USSR can perhaps be better
served by docile opportunists of all colors of [the]
political spectrum than by exclusively Yenan per-
sonnel who are ideologically acceptable but who as
[a] result of their nationalist sentiments may prove
headstrong. . . .
We frankly do not know with any degree of cer-
tainty what [the] present relationship between
Moscow and Yenan is. Although we have received
convincing evidence of Moscow control over Com-
munist parties in Europe, our files contain no evi-
dence either proving or disproving that Yenan now
receives and acts on Moscow’s orders. . . .
We are quite prepared to believe that [the] Chinese
CP [Communist Party] like other CP’s is subservi-
ent to Moscow.
 The United States and China, 1944-1946
Yet we hesitate to accept such an interpretation as
definitive. We submit that Moscow-Yenan relations
are more subtle and obscure [than] any in [interna-
tional Communism]. We would not be surprised
for example to learn that Yenan enjoyed what might
seem to be a surprising degree of independence of
Moscow. Our reasons are:
1. Chinese Communists have little reason to be
grateful to [the] USSR. They have survived and
grown not because of but despite relations with
Moscow. Adherence to early Comintern direc-
tives resulted in near disaster for [the] CCP. And
in [the] Sino-Jap[anese] conflict [the] USSR sup-
plied only Chungking which used some of those
arms in blockading Yenan. Current Soviet strip-
ping of Manchuria is plucking [the] plums on
which Chinese Communists have long had their
eye.
2. [The] Chinese Communist Party is [the] most
mature of all Communist Parties and has devel-
NOTES
1. Warren L. Cohen, 2d ed., America’s Response to China:
An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), p. 171.
2. U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with
China, With Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949 (Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 71.
3. Ibid., p. 82.
4. Cohen, America’s Response to China, pp. 175–76.
5. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States, vol. 7 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1945), pp. 242–46. The message was drafted
by George A. Atcheson “with the assistance and agreement of
all the political officers at the embassy.”
6. Ibid., pp. 317–22.
13
oped its own brand of Marxism and indigenous
traditions.
3. Chinese Communists are no fugitive band of con-
spirators. For 10 years they have had an estab-
lished de facto regime, their own army and civil
administration. Consequently, they have devel-
oped substantial vested interests.
4. Chinese Communists have taken on nationalist
coloration. From 1936 to [the] Jap[anese] surren-
der they were confronted with and their propa-
ganda concentrated against an external foe. Rapid
expansion of their armed forces and civilian fol-
lowing was largely on [the] basis of nationalism.
While foregoing factors would seem to represent
forces tending to wean Yenan away from Moscow,
it should be remembered that Yenan has no lati-
tude of choice in its foreign relations. Events have
tended to keep Yenan in— or force it back into—
Soviet orbit. . . .17
7. Chinese collaborators with the Japanese. In February
1932, after seizing Manchuria, Japan sponsored the formation
of the puppet state of Manchukuo, which subsequently
declared its independence from China.
8. Foreign Relations (1945), pp. 334–38.
9. Ibid., pp. 863–65.
10. United States Relations with China, pp. 95–8.
11. Foreign Relations (1945), pp. 430–33.
12. Ibid., pp. 531–33.
13. Ibid., pp. 583–98.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid., pp. 615–17.
16. Ibid., pp. 629–34.
17. Foreign Relations, vol. 9 (1946), pp. 116–19.
Part B
The United States and China, 1944–1946
J A M E S R . HO W A R D AND
MARSHALL’S MISSION
Although Truman and his advisers had no desire to
involve the United States directly in a civil war, a
divided China was inconsistent with U.S. policy objec-
tives. Following the resignation of Ambassador Hurley
on November 27, 1945, Truman chose to continue seek-
ing a negotiated settlement by naming General George
C. Marshall as Hurley’s replacement. Truman also
decided that the United States would continue support-
ing Nationalist forces in their bid to reoccupy North
China and Manchuria.
In a conversation with Secretary of State Byrnes,
General Marshall, and Admiral Leahy on December 11,
1945, President Truman discussed at length the situa-
tion in China. General Marshall summarized the Presi-
dent’s point of view.
The President stated that he wished to have a clear
and complete understanding among us as to just
what was the basis on which I was to operate in
China in representing him. Mr. Byrnes outlined the
policy of this Government as he understood and
advocated it. In effect he stated this, that first of all
D AV I D S. P A I N T E R
we, that is the Army and Navy, were being autho-
rized to proceed at once with the arrangement of
shipping for the transfer of the armies of the Gener-
alissimo to Manchuria and for their logistical sup-
port; also for the evacuation of Japanese from
China; and finally, though this was to be main-
tained in a status of secrecy, for the present, for the
transfer of the Generalissimo’s troops into North
China for the purpose, on our part, of releasing the
Japanese forces in that area and facilitating their
evacuation and deportation to Japan.
Mr. Byrnes stated that the reason for holding secret
for the present the preparations for the movement
of the Generalissimo’s troops into North China was
to enable General Marshall to utilize that uncer-
tainty for the purpose of bringing influence to bear
both on the Generalissimo and the Communist
leaders toward concluding a successful negotiation
for the termination of hostilities, and the develop-
ment of a broad unified Chinese government.
The President stated his concurrence with the
proposition outlined by Mr. Byrnes and informed
General Marshall that he would back him in his . . .
efforts whatever they might be to bring about the
desired result.
 The United States and China, 1944-1946
General Marshall stated that his understanding
then was that he would do his best to influence the
Generalissimo to make reasonable concessions in
his negotiations with the democratic and commu-
nist leaders, holding in abeyance the information
that this Government was actually preparing ship-
ping to assist the Generalissimo in moving his
troops into North China for the purpose of releas-
ing the Japanese in that region and, incidentally,
taking over control of the railroads. That, on the
other hand, General Marshall, was to utilize the
same uncertainty as to the attitude of our Govern-
ment toward the establishment of the Generalis-
simo’s troops in North China in the effort to bring
the Communist leaders to the point of making rea-
sonable concessions in order to bring about desir-
able political unification. That in the event that the
Communist leaders refused to make what, in Gen-
eral Marshall’s opinion, were reasonable conces-
sions, he was authorized to back the Generalissimo
by assisting in the movement of troops into the
region. . . .
Finally General Marshall stated, that if the Genera-
lissimo, in his [General Marshall’s] opinion, failed
to make reasonable concessions, and this resulted
in the breakdown of efforts to secure political unifi-
cation, and the U.S. abandoned continued support
of the Generalissimo, there would follow the tragic
consequence of a divided China and of a probable
Russian reassumption of power in Manchuria, the
combined effect of this resulting in the defeat or
loss of the major purpose of our war in the Pacific.
Under these circumstances, General Marshall
inquired whether or not it was intended for him, in
that unfortunate eventuality, to go ahead and assist
the Generalissimo in the movement of troops into
North China. . . .
The President and Mr. Byrnes concurred . . . [that]
we would have to back the Generalissimo to the
extent of assisting him to move troops into North
China in order that the evacuation of the Japanese
might be completed.
There was some discussion and Mr. Byrnes re-
stated the policy of this Government adding specif-
ically that it was not the purpose of the U.S. to send
15
additional troops, divisions—he mentioned, to
China, that he was opposed to that and that it
would be contrary to the expressions of policy he
had made public up to this time. The President
agreed with this point of view. . . .1
About another conversation with President Tru-
man and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson three
days later, General Marshall noted the following:
The President handed me a final draft of his letter
of instructions. . . .
I stated that my understanding of one phase of my
directive was not in writing . . . that in the event
that I was unable to secure necessary action by the
Generalissimo, which I thought reasonable and
desirable, it would still be necessary for the U.S.
Government, through me, to continue to back the
National Government of the Republic of China—
through the Generalissimo. . . .
The President stated that the foregoing was a cor-
rect summation of this direction. . . .
The Under Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson,
confirmed this as his understanding of my direc-
tions. . . .2
On December 15, President Truman outlined U.S.
policy toward China in a public statement:
It is the firm belief of this Government that a
strong, united and democratic China is of the
utmost importance to the success of this United
Nations Organization and for world peace. A China
disorganized and divided either by foreign aggres-
sion, such as that undertaken by the Japanese, or by
violent internal strife, is an undermining influence
to world stability and peace, now and in the future.
The United States Government has long subscribed
to the principle that the management of internal
affairs is the responsibility of the peoples of the
sovereign nations. Events of this century, however,
would indicate that a breach of peace anywhere in the
world threatens the peace of the entire world. It is
thus in the most vital interest of the United States and
all the United Nations that the people of China over-
16 James R. Howard and David S. Painter
look no opportunity to adjust their internal differ-
ences promptly by means of peaceful negotiation
[emphasis added].
The Government of the United States believes it
essential:
(1) That a cessation of hostilities be arranged
between the armies of the National Government
and the Chinese Communists and other dissident
Chinese forces for the purpose of completing the
return of all China to effective Chinese control,
including the immediate evacuation of the Japanese
forces.
(2) That a national conference of representatives of
major political elements be arranged to develop an
early solution to the present internal strife—a solu-
tion which will bring about the unification of
China.
The United States and the other United Nations
have recognized the present National Government
of the Republic of China as the only legal govern-
ment in China. It is the proper instrument to
achieve the objective of a unified China. . . .
In continuation of the constant and close collabora-
tion with the National Government of the Repub-
lic of China in the prosecution of this war, in
consonance with the Potsdam Declaration, and to
remove [the] possibility of Japanese influence
remaining in China, the United States has assumed
a definite obligation in the disarmament and evacu-
ation of the Japanese troops. Accordingly the
United States has been assisting and will continue
to assist the National Government of the Republic
of China in effecting the disarmament and evacua-
tion of Japanese troops in the liberated areas. The
United States Marines are in North China for that
purpose.
The United States recognizes and will continue to
recognize the National Government of China and
cooperate with it in international affairs and specif-
ically in eliminating Japanese influence from China.
The United States is convinced that a prompt
arrangement for a cessation of hostilities is essen-
tial to the effective achievement of this end. United
States support will not extend to United States mil-
itary intervention to influence the course of any
Chinese internal strife.
The United States has already been compelled to
pay a great price to restore the peace which was
first broken by Japanese aggression in Manchuria.
The maintenance of peace in the Pacific may be
jeopardized, if not frustrated, unless Japanese influ-
ence in China is wholly removed and unless China
takes her place as a unified, democratic and peace-
ful nation. This is the purpose of the maintenance
for the time being of United States military and
naval forces in China.
The United States is cognizant that the present
National Government of the Republic of China is a
“one-party government” and believes that peace,
unity and democratic reform in China will be fur-
thered if the basis of this Government is broadened
to include other political elements in the country.
Hence, the United States strongly advocates that
the national conference of representatives of major
political elements in the country agree upon
arrangements which would give those elements a
fair and effective representation in the Chinese
National Government. It is recognized that this
would require modification of the one-party “polit-
ical tutelage” established as an interim arrangement
in the progress of the nation toward democracy by
the father of the Chinese Republic, Dr. Sun Yat-sen.
The existence of autonomous armies such as that of
the Communist army is inconsistent with, and
actually makes impossible, political unity in China.
With the institution of a broadly representative
government, autonomous armies should be elimi-
nated as such and all armed forces in China inte-
grated effectively in to the Chinese National Army.
. . .3
Marshall’s first efforts at mediation were rewarded
with the successful negotiation of agreements in Janu-
ary and February that seemed to offer hope for a peace-
ful settlement of Nationalist-Communist differences.
On January 10, 1946, an agreement for the cessation of
hostilities between both sides was reached. The agree-
 The United States and China, 1944-1946
ment provided for the establishment of a joint Execu-
tive Headquarters in Peking to enforce the truce, and it
stipulated that all troop movements were to cease. With
CCP concurrence, however, Nationalist forces were
free to continue moving into Manchuria for the purpose
of reestablishing Chinese sovereignty in accordance
with the Sino-Soviet Treaty of August 1945. On January
31, the Political Consultative Conference (PCC),
involving representatives of almost every political fac-
tion in China, adopted a series of resolutions providing
for the establishment of an interim coalition govern-
ment, the convening of a National Assembly in May to
adopt a constitution, and the guarantee of civil rights.
One month later, on February 25, a third agreement
was reached detailing a program for the integration of
Nationalist and Communist forces into a unified
national army subordinate to the civilian government.
Initially hailed by both the Nationalists and Com-
munists as a major breakthrough in the effort to avert a
civil war, the spirit of compromise was quickly under-
mined by the situation in Manchuria, where both sides
continued to consolidate their positions. The with-
drawal of Soviet forces from the region in April soon
created a vacuum both sides sought to fill, leading to
new clashes between Nationalist and Communist
forces. A temporary truce halting the fighting in Man-
churia, negotiated by Marshall in early June, collapsed
in early July as a result of Chiang Kai-shek’s decision to
force a settlement by military means.
Chiang’s decision was apparently based on his
growing belief that the United States would not aban-
don the Nationalist government, or permit a Commu-
nist victory in China, even if the Nationalist
government was responsible for initiating a full-scale
civil war. In reaction, Marshall, unable to convince Chi-
ang to alter his course, requested an embargo on the
shipment of all arms and munitions to China. Marshall’s
request was approved by President Truman, who
explained his decision in a letter to the Generalissimo
early in August:
The rapidly deteriorating political situation in
China, during recent months, has been a cause of
grave concern to the American people. While it is
the continued hope of the United States that an
influential and democratic China can still be
achieved under your leadership, I would be less
than honest if I did not point out that latest devel-
17
opments have forced me to the conclusion that the
selfish interests of extremist elements, both in the
Kuomintang and the Communist Party, are
obstructing the aspirations of the people of China.
A far sighted step toward the achievement of
national unity and democracy was acclaimed in the
United States when the agreements were reached
on January 31st [1946] by the Political Consulta-
tive Conference. Disappointment over failure to
implement the agreements of the PCC by concrete
measures is becoming an important factor in the
American outlook with regard to China.
In the United States, there now exists an increasing
school of thought which maintains that our whole
policy toward China must be re-examined in the
light of spreading strife, and notably by evidence of
the increasing trend to suppress the expression of
liberal views among intellectuals as well as freedom
of the press . . . and there is increasing belief that an
attempt is being made to resort to force, military or
secret police rather than democratic processes to
settle major social issues.
The firm desire of the people of the United States
and of the American Government is still to help
China achieve lasting peace and a stable economy
under a truly democratic government. . . .
It cannot be expected that American opinion will
continue in its generous attitude toward your
nation unless convincing proof is shortly forthcom-
ing that genuine progress is being made toward a
peaceful settlement of China’s internal problems.
Furthermore, it will be necessary for me to rede-
fine and explain the position of the United States to
the people of America.
I earnestly hope that in the near future I may
receive some encouraging word from you which
will facilitate the achievement of our mutually
declared aims.4
On August 30, 1946, the United States concluded
with the National Government of China an agreement
for the sale of $500 million worth of U.S. military sur-
plus supplies and equipment. Although the sale did not
18 James R. Howard and David S. Painter
include arms or ammunition, the Chinese Communist
Party claimed in a memorandum to Marshall two weeks
later that the Nationalists were using these supplies
solely in the civil war effort. Marshall later had to con-
cede to Chou En-lai, the Chinese Communists’ chief
negotiator, that the Nationalists were in fact reselling
the material to finance the purchase of weapons and
munitions.
Dear General Marshall,
Your mediation in China’s internal dispute has been
generally acknowledged as a great success during
the first three months after your arrival. However,
this initial success was not made lasting and your
efforts were nullified by the fact that the Kuomin-
tang Government soon tore the agreements to
pieces and carried the war from Manchuria into
China proper, which quickly assumed the nature of
an all-out offensive against all Communist-led Lib-
erated Areas. . . . In analyzing this grave situation,
one cannot fail to draw the conclusion that the one-
sided American financial and war and otherwise
material assistance to the Kuomintang Govern-
ment, even viewed singularly, has contributed
much to the civil war policy of the Government
authorities.
I wish to recall that, as far as is known, since the
Sino-Japanese War the U.S. Government has
granted to China 14 loans with a total credit of US
$1,314,590,000; this plus other account transfers
now leave at the disposal of the Chinese Govern-
ment a deposit of US $700,000,000 in the United
States. In addition to that, according to a despatch
datelined Washington July 21, the U.S. Govern-
ment has since 1942 under the Lend Lease Act
delivered to China a total of over US
$1,500,000,000 worth of arms and war-supplies,
about three-fifths of which was made available
since the V-J day. During the past twelve months
the Kuomintang Government has made ruthless
use of these vast resources practically all for sup-
porting its full-fledged civil war and nothing else.
Most recently, while the civil war is reaching its
pitch, the U.S. Government has concluded with the
Kuomintang Government an additional agreement
governing the sale of US $825,000,000 worth of sur-
pluses and equipment, which being tantamount to
adding fuel to flame would evoke nothing but agita-
tion and bitter resentment among the Chinese peo-
ple. I wish further to draw your attention to the fact
that such moves on part of the U.S. Government
are inconsistent with its enunciated policy toward
China, as was specifically expressed in the follow-
ing words of President Truman’s statement of
December 15 last: “United States support will not
extend to United States military intervention to
influence the course of any Chinese internal strife.”
As early as the Chinese Communist Party learned
that a negotiation for the sale of surpluses was
underway, it filed a protest on August 23 with you,
as representative of the U.S. Government to China,
voicing opposition to the sale at this moment and
pointing out the serious consequences involved
therein. Notwithstanding our protest, the deal was
concluded on August 31. I am therefore again
instructed on behalf of the Chinese Communist
Party and the 140,000,000 population in the Com-
munist-led Liberated Areas to lodge a formal pro-
test through you to the U.S. Government over this
sale and demand that the U.S. Government would
freeze up all supplies, shipping, etc. covered by this
agreement pending a settlement at the time when
peace and unity is restored and a coalition govern-
ment is initiated in China. . . .5
The August sale of equipment, coupled with Tru-
man’s decision in February 1946 to authorize the estab-
lishment of a U.S. Military Advisory Group— although
smaller than the one first proposed in October 1945—
contributed to both Chiang’s determination to continue
seeking a military solution and the Chinese Commu-
nist’s growing perception that further negotiation was
pointless. Marshall’s efforts at continued mediation col-
lapsed in mid-October following the success of a
Nationalist offensive in Chahar Province. In a Septem-
ber 30 memorandum, Chou had warned Marshall that if
Nationalist military operations were not halted, “the
Chinese Communist Party feels itself forced to presume
that the Government is thereby giving public
announcement of a total national split, and that it has
ultimately abandoned its pronounced policy of peaceful
settlement.”6 On November 19, the Communist delega-
tion broke off further negotiations. General Marshall,
 The United States and China, 1944-1946
with the concurrence of Admiral Charles M. Cooke,
Commander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, requested the
phased withdrawal of the U.S. Marines from North
China before they became entangled in a full-scale civil
war.
On December 1, Marshall met with Chiang Kai-
shek. Attempting to dissuade the Nationalist leader
from using force to settle KMT-CCP differences, Mar-
shall warned that the Communists were too strong to
defeat militarily and argued the necessity of resuming
negotiations. About the meeting, Marshall stated the
following:
The Generalissimo opened the meeting by asking
me what was to be done in the present situation;
the Communists not having replied to my question
as to whether or not I continued to be acceptable to
them in the role of mediator and also considering
their refusal to participate in the National Assem-
bly or in further negotiations.
I outlined at length the various developments
which had led to the present situation emphasizing
the fact, in my opinion, that the complete distrust
of the Government in the good intentions of the
Communists of last Spring had now been replaced
by an overwhelming distrust on the part of the
Communists of the good intent of any proposal of
the Government towards a pacific settlement of
differences. . . .
I summed up the situation with the comment that
the Communists were too large a military and too
large a civil force to be ignored; that even if one dis-
regarded the brutality of the inevitable procedure
they could not be eliminated. Therefore, it was
imperative that the efforts to bring them into the
Government should continue and the greatest care
should be taken to avoid having military action dis-
rupt the procedure of negotiations.
The Generalissimo replied in a statement of more
than an hour. He expressed again his firm convic-
tion that the Communists never intended to coop-
erate with the Government; that they were acting
under Soviet influence; that their purpose was to
disrupt the Government and to influence its for-
eign policy. . . .
19
The Generalissimo stated that he felt that it was
necessary to destroy the Communist military
forces. If that were done there would not be great
difficulty in handling the Communist question. He
estimated that some eight to ten months would be
required for this purpose. . . .
The Generalissimo then expressed the opinion that
I should consider that my mission was not exclu-
sively confined to bringing the Central Govern-
ment and the Communist Party together, that now
that the Communists had displayed an unwilling-
ness to cooperate, my role should be to facilitate
the development of stability in the present Govern-
ment of China and in the Far East. . . .
I did not discuss what to me was of vital concern
and that was the collapse of the Kuomintang Party
and the growing disapproval of the people in the
character of government or misgovernment the
party was giving the country.7
On December 18, 1946, President Truman, in a
public statement on U.S. policy toward China, reaf-
firmed “that a united and democratic China is of the
utmost importance to world peace.” Recounting Mar-
shall’s unsuccessful attempts to mediate a peaceful solu-
tion of “China’s internal difficulties,” he noted that the
plans for political and military unification agreed to in
January and February, although never implemented,
remained “fundamentally sound.” Noting that “our
position is clear,” Truman declared that the United
States remained pledged “not to interfere in the internal
affairs of China.”8 Three weeks later, Truman recalled
Marshall to Washington. Upon his departure, Marshall
released a statement outlining the reasons behind the
breakdown in negotiations between the Nationalists
and Chinese Communists.
In the first place, the greatest obstacle to peace has
been the complete, almost overwhelming suspi-
cion with which the Chinese Communist Party and
the Kuomintang regard each other.
On the one hand, the leaders of the Government
are strongly opposed to a communistic form of
government. On the other, the Communists frankly
state that they are Marxists and intend to work
20 James R. Howard and David S. Painter
toward establishing a communistic form of govern-
ment in China, though first advancing through the
medium of a democratic form of government of the
American or British type.
The leaders of the Government are convinced in
their minds that the Communist-expressed desire
to participate in a government of the type endorsed
by the Political Consultative Conference last Janu-
ary had for its purpose only a destructive intention.
The Communists felt, I believe, that the govern-
ment was insincere in its apparent acceptance of
the PCC resolutions for the formation of the new
government and intended by coercion of military
force and the action of a secret police to obliterate
the Communist Party. Combined with this mutual
deep distrust was the conspicuous error by both
parties of ignoring the effect of the fears and suspi-
cions of the other party in estimating the reason for
proposals or opposition regarding the settlement of
various matters under negotiation. They each
sought only to take counsel of their own fears. . . .
I think the most important factors involved in the
recent breakdown of negotiations are these: On the
side of the National Government . . . there is a dom-
inant group of reactionaries who have been
opposed, in my opinion, to almost every effort I
have made to influence the formation of a genuine
coalition government. . . . They were quite frank in
publicly stating their belief that cooperations by the
Chinese Communist Party in the government was
inconceivable and that only a policy of force could
definitely settle the issue. . . .
On the side of the Chinese Communist Party there
are, I believe, liberals as well as radicals, though
this view is vigorously opposed by many who
believe that the Chinese Communist Party disci-
pline is too rigidly enforced to admit of such differ-
ences of viewpoint. Nevertheless, it has appeared
to me that there is a definite liberal group among
the Communists . . . men who put the interest of
the Chinese people above ruthless measures to
establish a Communist ideology in the immediate
future. The dyed-in-the-wool Communists do not
hesitate at the most drastic measures to gain their
end as, for instance, the destruction of communica-
tions in order to wreck the economy of China and
produce a situation that would facilitate the over-
throw or collapse of the Government, without any
regard to the immediate suffering of the people
involved. They completely distrust the leaders of
the Kuomintang and appear convinced that every
Government proposal is designed to crush the Chi-
nese Communist Party. . . .
Sincere efforts to achieve settlement have been
frustrated time and again by extremist elements of
both sides. The agreements reached by the Political
Consultative Conference a year ago were a liberal
and forward-looking charter which then offered
China a basis for peace and reconstruction. How-
ever, irreconcilable groups within the Kuomintang,
interested in the preservation of their own feudal
control of China, evidently had no real intention of
implementing them. Though I speak as a soldier, I
must here also deplore the dominating influence of
the military. Their dominance accentuates the
weakness of civil government in China. . . .
Most certainly, the course which the Chinese Com-
munist Party has pursued in recent months indi-
cated an unwillingness to make a fair compromise.
It has been impossible even to get them to sit down
at a conference table with Government representa-
tives to discuss given issues. Now the Communists
have broken off negotiations by their last offer
which demanded the dissolution of the National
Assembly and a return to the military positions of
January 13th which the Government could not be
expected to accept.
Between this dominant reactionary group in the
Government and the irreconcilable Communists
who, I must state, did not so appear last February,
lies the problem of how peace and well-being are to
be brought to the long-suffering and presently inar-
ticulate mass of the people of China. The reaction-
aries in the Government have evidently counted on
substantial American support regardless of their
actions. The Communists by their unwillingness to
compromise in the national interest are evidently
counting on an economic collapse to bring about
the fall of the Government, accelerated by exten-
sive guerilla action against the long lines of rail
 The United States and China, 1944-1946
communications— regardless of the cost in suffer-
ing to the Chinese people.
The salvation of the situation, as I see it, would be
the assumption of leadership by the liberals in the
Government and in the minority parties, a splendid
group of men, but who as yet lack the political
power to exercise a controlling influence. Success-
ful action on their part under the leadership of
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek would, I believe,
lead to unity through good government.
In fact, the National Assembly has adopted a demo-
cratic constitution which in all major respects is in
accordance with the principles laid down by the
all-party Political Consultative Conference of last
January. It is unfortunate that the Communists did
not see fit to participate in the Assembly since the
constitution that has been adopted seems to
include every major point that they wanted.
Soon the Government in China will undergo major
reorganization pending the coming into force of
the constitution following the elections to be com-
pleted before Christmas Day 1947. Now that the
NOTES
1. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States, vol. 7 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1945), p. 768.
2. Ibid., p. 770.
3. U.S. Department of State, United States Relations with
China, With Special Reference to the Period 1944–1949 (Wash-
ington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949), pp.
607–09.
4. George C. Marshall and Lyman P. Van Slyke, Mar-
21
form for a democratic China has been laid down by
the newly adopted constitution, practical mea-
sures will be the test. It remains to be seen to what
extent the Government will give substance to the
form by a genuine welcome of all groups actively to
share in the responsibility of government. . . .
It has been stated officially and categorically that
the period of political tutelage under the Kuomin-
tang is at an end. If the termination of one-party
rule is to be a reality, the Kuomintang should cease
to receive financial support from the Government.
I have spoken very frankly because in no other way
can I hope to bring the people of the United States
to even a partial understanding of this complex
problem. I have expressed all these views privately
in the course of negotiations; they are well known,
I think, to most of the individuals concerned. I
express them now publicly, as it is my duty, to pres-
ent my estimate of the situation and its possibilities
to the American people who have a deep interest in
the development of conditions in the Far East
promising an enduring peace in the Pacific.9
shall’s Mission to China, December 1945-January 1947 (Arling-
ton, Virginia: University Publications of America, 1976), pp.
381–82.
5. Ibid., pp. 395–97.
6. Foreign Relations of the United States, vol. 10 (1946),
pp. 258–59.
7. Ibid., pp. 575–78.
8. Marshall’s Mission to China, pp. 481–89.
9. Ibid., pp. 516–21.
22 James R. Howard and David S. Painter
APPENDIX
Two Opinions
Later in 1947, two articles contrasted two different
points of view on U.S. policy toward China. In a July 21,
1947, editorial entitled “Gambler’s Choice in China,”
the New Republic outlined its perspective on U.S. pol-
icy:
To face the future in China requires of America a
certain amount of courage. No likely solution will
please our ethics or tradition. All we can seek is the
solution that will be the least dangerous and costly.
Two ruthless groups are contending for the con-
trol of the people of China. Chiang rests on terror
and American support; his terror is tempered by no
return of more rice, more land or better living to
the people. The Communists who contend with
Chiang are ruthless men, too. But in return for the
sacrifices they demand of the people, they give
control of the land to the people who till it.
The policy advocated by those who demand sup-
port for Chiang is based upon these assumptions:
that no matter how embarrassing Chiang’s political
countenance, he is good because he hates Commu-
nists; that communism everywhere is the same
brutal conspiracy; that, finally, all Communists
everywhere are tools of Moscow.
All of these assumptions need careful study. Chi-
ang, to be sure, hates Communists—but that in
itself does not make him good. Hitler, too, hated
Communists.
Communism, to be sure, has brutality sealed in the
core of it; but in China, Chiang Kai-shek is far more
brutal.
The last assumption—that all Communists are
tools of Moscow—is the most dangerous. Beyond
doubt the Chinese Communists are a Communist
Party of the classic Marxist model. But they have a
history of bitter disagreement with Moscow. The
Chinese Communist Party has been riven again and
again by the struggle between doctrinaire followers
of the Kremlin and men who give their first alle-
giance to China herself. In China, the present lead-
ership of the party is in the hands of native
Chinese, not Moscow functionaries. When the
Kremlin presses too closely, Chinese Communists
rebel. Mao Tse-tung has in the past gone so far as to
imprison Comintern representatives and to force
their Chinese adherents out of his policy commit-
tee.
Nothing we can do will create democracy in China.
A policy of nickel-and-dime aid cannot salvage Chi-
ang from defeat—it must eventually force the Chi-
nese Communists to seek aid in Moscow and
commit their entire policy to Moscow’s direction. .
..
The only policy left is one of complete withdrawal,
a hands-off gamble. This gamble can mean that
China relapses into unending strife and chaos,
proving to the world that China as yet lacks the
makings of greatness. Or, it can mean that the Chi-
nese people will choose their own leadership and
that this leadership will be responsible to Chinese
interests alone, not to the military security of either
the United States or the Soviet Union. This is an
uncertain gamble; but these are the best alterna-
tives that history can give us in this age of struggle.
Under the title “China: A Report to the American
People,” William C. Bullitt, the former U.S. Ambassa-
dor to the Soviet Union, wrote the following in Life
magazine in October 1947:
To prevent the domination of China by any nation
which might eventually mobilize the 450,000,000
Chinese for war against us is a vital interest of the
United States.
Today Soviet Imperialism, using the Chinese Com-
munists as instruments of its power politics, is
striving to make China a Soviet satellite. In self-
defense, therefore, we must keep China out of the
hands of Stalin. But by what means?. . . .
The problem must be attacked at once on three
fronts: (1) economic and financial; (2) military; (3)
political. Since the essence of the problem is the
ejection of every armed Communist from China,
an intelligent project can only be based on an esti-
 The United States and China, 1944-1946
mate of the time it will take to win the war. Ameri-
can military experts believe that this may take three
years. Let us try to sketch a Three-Year Plan and
estimate its cost.
1. During the next three years China will need large
quantities of American cotton, tobacco, wheat, oil,
gasoline, and many manufactured articles, from
locomotives to spare parts for trucks. She will,
therefore, need credits. The highest figure for such
necessary credits given by American and Chinese
economic experts is $250,000,000 a year—a tiny
fraction of Europe’s requirements. Let us scale that
down to $200,000,000, and budget for our total
Three-Year Plan $600,000,000 of credits for pur-
chases in the United States. . . .
2. According to estimates of the ablest American
and Chinese military men, to drive out of Manchu-
ria the 350,000 Communists will require re-equip-
ment of the Chinese divisions which now have
worn out American arms, and also the training and
equipment of ten new divisions.
In North China the problem is one of cornering
guerrillas. For this purpose light-armed, fast-mov-
ing troops are needed. American and Chinese offi-
cers estimate that 20 divisions properly equipped
should be able to clean up North China.
Even a small air force would greatly facilitate oper-
ations in both North China and Manchuria. We
have thousands of planes which are obsolete and
valueless in terms of our air force but first-rate
material for the Chinese. To declassify this mate-
23
rial and turn it over the Chinese would cost us
nothing.
The total cost to the United States of the military
element in this Three-Year Plan would probably be
no more that $200,000,000 a year— $600,000,000 in
all. . . .
3. But all this aid will be ineffective unless the Chi-
nese, in addition to supplying the men who fight
and die, can revitalize their political life, arouse a
new spirit in the country, and raise morale in the
army. Can we help them to do that, or will sugges-
tions from us be considered impertinent? They will
not be, if they are made by the right man in the
right way.
We have in the Far East today a general who pos-
sesses the military knowledge, political skill, and
personal magnitude to organize such cooperation.
If President Truman were to ask General MacAr-
thur to add to his present duties and powers the
title of Personal Representative of the President
and the rank of Ambassador, and to organize with
the Generalissimo a joint plan to prevent the subju-
gation of China by the Soviet Union, the whole Far
Eastern horizon would brighten with hope.
If China falls into the hands of Stalin, all Asia,
including Japan, sooner or later will fall into his
hands. The man power and resources of Asia will
be mobilized against us. The independence of the
United States will not live a generation longer than
the independence of China.