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G.R. No. 107125 January 29, 2001
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and MARIA NICOLAS,
respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago,
Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by
the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without a ruling on his civil liability. On
appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the appellate court
found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents
Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00
as death indemnity, and moral damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the
death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.
The facts of this case are as follows:
On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner
Manantan with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, province of
Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
being then the driver and person-in-charge of an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816,
willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same while along the Daang Maharlika at
Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without
due regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary
precaution to prevent accident to person and damage to property, causing by such
negligence, carelessness and imprudence said automobile driven and operated by him to
sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles Codamon, thereby
causing the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a
passenger of said automobile.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution's evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate
court, showed that:
[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio… decided to catch shrimps
at the irrigation canal at his farm. He invited the deceased who told him that they (should)
borrow the Ford Fiera of the accused George Manantan who is also from Cordon. The
deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera but…said that the accused also wanted to (come)
along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased dropped by the accused at the Manantan
Technical School. They drank beer there before they proceeded to the farm using the Toyota
Starlet of the accused. At the farm they consumed one (more) case of beer. At about 12:00
o'clock noon they went home. Then at about 2:00 or 3:00 o'clock that afternoon, (defense
witness Miguel) Tagangin and (Ruben) Nicolas and the accused returned to the house of
Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck. They cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case of
beer. They ate and drank until about 8:30 in the evening when the accused invited them to go
bowling. They went to Santiago, Isabela on board the Toyota Starlet of the accused who
drove the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at Mabini, Santiago, Isabela but
unfortunately there was no vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant alley they drank one beer
each. After waiting for about 40 minutes and still no alley became vacant the accused invited
his companions to go to the LBC Night Club. They had drinks and took some lady partners at
the LBC. After one hour, they left the LBC and proceeded to a nearby store where they ate
arroz caldo…and then they decided to go home. Again the accused drove the car. Miguel
Tabangin sat with the accused in the front seat while the deceased and Fiscal Ambrocio sat
at the back seat with the deceased immediately behind the accused. The accused was
driving at a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar,
Santiago, Isabela, at the middle portion of the highway (although according to Charles
Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hours on [the] wrong
lane of the highway because the car was overtaking a tricycle) when they met a passenger
jeepney with bright lights on. The accused immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and
move his body away from the steering wheel but he was not able to avoid the oncoming
vehicle and the two vehicles collided with each other at the center of the road.
xxx
As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the side of the
highway immediately at the approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic while the jeep
swerved across the road so that one half front portion landed on the lane of the car while the
back half portion was at its right lane five meters away from the point of impact as shown by a
sketch (Exhibit "A") prepared by Cudamon the following morning at the Police Headquarters
at the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost consciousness. When he regained
consciousness he was still inside the car (lying) on his belly with the deceased on top of him.
Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased and then he was pulled out of the car by Tabangin.
Afterwards, the deceased who was still unconscious was pulled out from the car. Both Fiscal
Ambrocio and the deceased were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died that night
(Exhibit "B") while Ambrocio suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs.2

The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as that of
the prosecution, except that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that Manantan did
not drink beer that night. As to the accident, the defense claimed that:
…The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the center of the
road at about 30 kilometers per hour at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela,
when suddenly a passenger jeepney with bright lights which was coming from the opposite
direction and running very fast suddenly swerve(d) to the car's lane and bumped the car
which turned turtle twice and rested on its top at the right edge of the road while the jeep
stopped across the center of the road as shown by a picture taken after the incident (Exhibit
"1") and a sketch (Exhibit "3") drawn by the accused during his rebuttal testimony. The car
was hit on the driver's side. As a result of the collision, the accused and Miguel Tabangin and
Fiscal Ambrocio were injured while Ruben Nicolas died at the Flores Clinic where they were
all brought for treatment.3
In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court decided
Criminal Case No. 066 in petitioner's favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused NOT
GUILTY of the crime charged and hereby acquits him.
SO ORDERED.4
On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the
trial court's judgment. In their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the Nicolas
spouses prayed that the decision appealed from be modified and that appellee be ordered to
pay indemnity and damages.
On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the
Nicolas spouses, thus:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee is
hereby held civilly liable for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the
proximate cause of the vehicular accident, and sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants in
the amount of P174,400.00 for the death of Ruben Nicolas,
SO ORDERED.5
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident occurred,
Manantan was in a state of intoxication, due to his having consumed "all in all, a total of at
least twelve (12) bottles of beer…between 9 a.m. and 11 p.m."6 It found that petitioner's act
of driving while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136)7 and pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code,8 a statutory
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presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioner's act of violating the Traffic Code is
negligence in itself "because the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury sought to be
prevented by the regulation."9
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24,
1992 denied the motion.
Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following issues for our
consideration:
FIRST – THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OF THE
CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY
FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE ACCUSED'S (PETITIONER'S) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL BE PLACED IN "DOUBLE JEOPARDY" AND
THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING UPON THE SAME ISSUE
AGAIN.
SECOND – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD
DAMAGES AND INDEMNITY TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT
THE NON-DECLARATION OF ANY INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA, BRANCH XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH
THE PETITIONER'S ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE CIVIL ACTION WAS
IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO EXPRESS
WAIVER OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT.
THIRD – THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO
NICOLAS AND MARIA NICOLAS v. GEORGE MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION
SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE FILING FEES NOT
HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.
In brief, the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to
his negligence or reckless imprudence?
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioner's acquittal did not extinguish his civil
liability?
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester
doctrine to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240?

On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the
findings of the trial court on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise of
determining his civil liability. He argues that the trial court's finding that he was neither
imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal, and not reasonable doubt. He submits
that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only placed his
acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in "double jeopardy."
Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioner's guilt had not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that
petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted
him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not extinguished in criminal cases, if the
acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the findings of the
trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.1âwphi1.nêt
Preliminarily, petitioner's claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity
placed him in double jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that "no person shall
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for
the same act."10 When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either
by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the
latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense.11 This is double jeopardy.
For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements must be established: (a) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have terminated; and (3)
the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.12 In the instant case,
petitioner had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the
jeopardy was terminated by his discharge. The judgment of acquittal became immediately
final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondents
was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew in CA-G.R.
CV No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly
show that no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying
the lower court's judgment, the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor
did it order the filing of a second criminal case against petitioner for the same offense.
Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioner's claim of having
been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held
liable for such act or omission.13 There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of
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Court.14 The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence
only.15 This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,16 where the civil
action for damages is "for the same act or omission." Although the two actions have different
purposes, the matters discussed in the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal
case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding cannot be read in evidence in the
civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions involve the same
act or omission.17 The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and
secondarily, different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein
petitioner's acquittal, the Court of Appeals in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not
precluded from looking into the question of petitioner's negligence or reckless imprudence.
On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither
criminally negligent nor recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is predicated on
the criminal offense, he argues that when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be
demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action.
Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial court's judgment shows that the
judgment of acquittal did not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of petitioner's
negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue that his acquittal must be deemed based on
reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to come into play.
Our scrutiny of the lower court's decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of
the appellate court that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioner's civil
liability was not extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial court's declaration that did
not discount the possibility that "the accused was really negligent." However, it found that "a
hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself before the Court"
and since said "hypothesis is consistent with the record…the Court's mind cannot rest on a
verdict of conviction."18 The foregoing clearly shows that petitioner's acquittal was predicated
on the conclusion that his guilt had not been established with moral certainty. Stated
differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil liability for
the same act or omission lies.
On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages
and indemnity, since private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their
claims for damages when the civil case was impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
Petitioner submits that the non-payment of filing fees on the amount of the claim for damages
violated the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149 SCRA
562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988.19 He avers that since
Manchester held that "The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of
the prescribed docket fees," the appellate court was without jurisdiction to hear and try CA-
G.R. CV No. 19240, much less award indemnity and damages.
 PFR | 4

Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant case.
They ask us to note that the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly instituted,
was filed on July 1, 1983, while the Manchester requirements as to docket and filing fees took
effect only with the promulgation of Supreme Court Circular No. 7 on March 24, 1988.
Moreover, the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not allege the
amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily or legally required that the
civil damages sought be stated in the information, the trial court had no basis in assessing
the filing fees and demanding payment thereof. Moreover, assuming that the Manchester
ruling is applied retroactively, under the Rules of Court, the filing fees for the damages
awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no violation of the Manchester
doctrine to speak of.
lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal action. The filing fees are deemed paid from
the filing of the criminal complaint or information. We therefore find no basis for petitioner's
allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court
acquired no jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as
its resolution dated August 24, 1992, denying herein petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil actions with
criminal actions was governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court.20 As
correctly pointed out by private respondents, under said rule, it was not required that the
damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or information. With the
adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111, Section
1 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it
is now required that:

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in
these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the judgment except in an award for actual
damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or
information, the corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing
thereof in court for trial.

The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time
private respondents appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in
1989. Being in the nature of a curative statute, the amendment applies retroactively and
affects pending actions as in this case.

Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the actual
damages claimed by the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation
of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid only if other items of damages such as moral,
nominal, temporate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the complaint or information, or if
they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.21 Recall that the
information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of damages.
Considering that the Rules of Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for
the award of damages are a first lien on the judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said
 PFR | 5

G.R. No. 150785 September 15, 2006

EMMA P. NUGUID, petitioner, Amount

vs.
CLARITA S. NICDAO,1 respondent. 7277

DECISION
P100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
CORONA, J.:
7348
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Emma P. Nuguid
assails the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. No.
23054: 150,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and the Assailed Decision dated 12118
May 10, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court [RTC], Branch 5, Bataan, affirming the Decision
dated January 11, 1999 of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa,
Bataan is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

The petitioner CLARITA S. NICDAO is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged. NO 8812
COSTS.

SO ORDERED.2 50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

Petitioner seeks a review of the decision with respect to the alleged lack of civil liability of 12102
respondent Clarita S. Nicdao. Stemming from two cases of violation of BP 22,3 this petition
involves the following facts:
100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
xxx xxx xxx
7255
Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation of BP 22
in fourteen (14) counts. The criminal complaints allege that sometime in 1996, from April to
August thereof, [respondent] and her husband [,] of Vignette Superstore [,] approached 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
[petitioner] and asked her if they [could] borrow money to settle some obligations. Having
been convinced by them and because of the close relationship of [respondent] to [petitioner], 2286
the latter lent the former her money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release
P100,000.00 to the accused until the total amount reached P1,150,000.00.
50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
As security for the P1,150,000.00, [respondent] gave [petitioner] the following open dated
Hermosa Savings Bank (HSLB) (sic) with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid 8128
within one (1) year, [petitioner] can deposit the check:

Check No. 100,000.00 (Exhibit "A")

 PFR | 6

A verbal and written demand was made upon [respondent] to pay the amount represented by
7254 the bounced checks, but [to] no avail. Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed
against the [respondent]. 4(Citation omitted)

50,000.00 (Exhibit "A") After petitioner instituted 14 criminal cases5 (docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9458-9471) for
violation of BP 22 involving the sum of P1,150,000, corresponding warrants of arrest were
7278 issued against respondent. On November 12, 1997, respondent was arraigned. She pleaded
not guilty and trial ensued.

100,000.00 (Exhibit "A") In a decision dated January 11, 1999, Judge Manuel M. Tan of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan found respondent guilty of the charges against her. Respondent
4540 was sentenced to pay P1,150,000, plus interest, and to suffer imprisonment equivalent to one
year for each violation of BP 22, or a total of 14 years of imprisonment.

50,000.00 (Exhibit "A") On appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan,
Bataan. Respondent elevated the case to the CA. On October 30, 2001, the CA reversed the
4523 decision of the lower courts and acquitted respondent. According to the CA, certain
substantial facts were overlooked by the trial court. These circumstances, if properly
considered, justified a different conclusion on the case.6
50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
Petitioner now comes to us, raising this main issue: whether respondent remains civilly liable
12103 to her for the sum of P1,150,000. In this connection, she asserts that respondent obtained
loans from her in the aggregate amount of P1,150,000 and that these loans have not been
paid.
50,000.00 (Exhibit "A")
From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the
7294 State because of the disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against the private
person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage,
contempt and others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either
100,000.00 (Exhibit "A") because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by
the crime7). What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or
to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done
P1,150,000.00 intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law.8

In June 1997, [petitioner] together with Samson Ching demanded payment of the sums
[above-mentioned], but [respondent] refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Thus, on
October 6, 1977, [petitioner] deposited all aforementioned checks in the bank of Samson
Ching totaling P1,150,000.00 since all the money given by her to [respondent] came from
Samson Ching. The checks were all returned for having been drawn against insufficient funds
(DAIF).
Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist.9
On one hand, as regards the criminal aspect of a violation of BP 22, suffice it to say that:
[t]he gravamen of BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is
dishonored upon its presentment for payment [and] the accused failed to satisfy the amount
 PFR | 7

of the check or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from notice of
dishonor. The act is
malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a
goal intended to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check
was issued is irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the
issuance of the checks are also irrelevant.10
On the other hand, the basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally
liable is also civilly liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil
Code.11 A person acquitted of a criminal charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free
because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution (proof beyond reasonable
doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of evidence12). In
order to be completely free from civil liability, a person's acquittal must be based on the fact
that he did not commit the offense.13 If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt,
the accused may still be held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act
complained of.14 It may only be that the facts proved did not constitute the offense
charged.15
Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the
court declared the accused's liability is not criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the
civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused
was acquitted.16
In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As found by the
CA, her supposed civil liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment.
The statements of the appellate court leave no doubt that respondent, who was acquitted
from the charges against her, had already been completely relieved of civil liability:
employees, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. Indeed, the daily cash payments marked
in evidence as Exhibits 7 to 15 reveal that [respondent] had already paid her obligation to
[petitioner] in the amount of P5,780,000.00 as of July 21, 1997 and that she stopped making
further payments when she realized that she had already paid such amount.
From the foregoing, it would appear that [respondent] made a total payment of
P6,980,000.00, inclusive of the P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which is definitely much more
than P1,150,000.00, the amount she actually borrowed from [petitioner]. These facts were
never rebutted by [petitioner].
Moreover, we find no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that there was a
stipulation in writing that interest will be paid by [respondent] on her loan obligations [as
required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code].
xxx xxx xxx
By and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished long before the
encashment of the subject checks. A check is said to apply for account only when there is still
a pre-existing obligation. In the case at bench, the pre-existing obligation was extinguished
after full payment was made by [respondent]. We therefore find the clear and convincing
documentary evidence of payment presented by [respondent] worthy of credence.17
(emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The October 30, 2001 decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 23054 is AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[Petitioner] does not dispute the fact that payments have already been made by petitioner in
[the stated] amounts but argues that the Demand Draft represented payment of a previous
obligation. However, no evidence of whatever nature was presented by the prosecution to
substantiate their claim that there was indeed a previous obligation involving the same
amount for which the demand draft was given. Except for this bare allegation, which is self-
serving, no documentary evidence was ever adduced that there were previous transactions
involving the subject amount.

Likewise, [petitioner] admitted having received the cash payments from petitioner on a daily
basis but argues that the same were applied to interest payments only. It however appears
that [petitioner] was charging [respondent] with an exorbitant rate of interest…on a daily
basis. xxx In any event, the cash payments [made] were recorded at the back of the cigarette
cartons by [petitioner] in her own handwriting as testified to by [respondent] and her

G.R. No. 177751 January 7, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
FLORENCIO AGACER,* EDDIE AGACER, ELYNOR AGACER, FRANKLIN AGACER and
ERIC*** AGACER, Accused-Appellants.
RESOLUTION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
For resolution is appellants' Motion for Reconsideration1 of our December 14, 2011
Decision2 affirming their conviction for the murder of Cesario Agacer, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the November 17, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01543 which affirmed the August 7, 2001 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8, Aparri, Cagayan, finding appellants Florencio, Franklin, Elynor, Eddie
and Eric, all surnamed Agacer. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, with
the following modifications:
(1) actual damages is DELETED;
(2) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer ₱25,000.0 as temperate
damages; and
(3) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer h interest at the legal
rate of six percent (6%) per annum on all the amounts of damages awarded, commencing
from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.3
Appellants assert that their mere presence at the scene of the crime is not evidence of
conspiracy;4 that there was no treachery since a heated argument preceded the killing of the
victim;5 and that even assuming that their guilt was duly established, the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority should have been appreciated in favor of appellant Franklin Agacer
(Franklin) who was only 16 years and 106 days old at the time of the incident, having been
born on December 21, 1981.6
In our February 13, 2012 Resolution,7 we required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
to comment on the Motion for Reconsideration particularly on the issue of Franklin’s minority.
PFR | 8
Meanwhile, in a letter8 dated June 8, 2012, the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid Prison,
informed us that appellant Florencio Agacer (Florencio) died on February 17, 2007, as
evidenced by the attached Certificate of Death indicating cardio pulmonary arrest secondary
to status asthmaticus as the cause of death.9
The OSG, in its Comment,10 asserts that there exists no cogent reason to disturb our
findings and conclusions as to the guilt of the appellants since the facts and evidence clearly
established conspiracy and treachery. However, it did not oppose and even agreed with
appellants’ argument that minority should have been appreciated as a privileged mitigating
circumstance in favor of Franklin, the same being duly supported by a copy of Franklin’s
Certificate of Live Birth secured from the National Statistics Office (NSO) Document
Management Division.11
Issues
Hence, the following issues for our resolution:
1. Was the evidence sufficient to establish the existence of conspiracy and treachery in the
commission of the crime charged?
2. Should the mitigating circumstance of minority be appreciated in favor of appellant
Franklin?
3. Does the death of appellant Florencio extinguish his criminal and civil liabilities?
Our Ruling
There is partial merit in appellants’ Motion for Reconsideration.
Reiterated Arguments in a Motion for Reconsideration Do Not Need a New Judicial
Determination.
Appellants’ contention that the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to prove conspiracy and
treachery is a mere rehash of their argument set forth in their brief, "which we already
considered, weighed and resolved before we rendered the Decision sought to be
reconsidered."12 It is not a new issue that needs further judicial determination.13 There is
therefore no necessity to discuss and rule again on this ground since "this would be a useless
formality of ritual invariably involving merely a reiteration of the reasons already set forth in
the judgment or final order for rejecting the arguments advanced by the movant."14
As a Minor, Franklin is Entitled to the Privileged Mitigating Circumstance of Minority.
 PFR | 9

Nevertheless, we agree with appellants that Franklin is entitled to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. Franklin’s Certificate of Live Birth shows that he was born on
December 20, 1981, hence, was merely 16 years old at the time of the commission of the
crime on April 2, 1998. He is therefore entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority embodied in Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. It provides that when the
offender is a minor over 15 and under 18 years, the penalty next lower than that prescribed
by law shall be imposed on the accused but always in the proper period. The rationale of the
law in extending such leniency and compassion is that because of his age, the accused is
presumed to have acted with less discernment.15 This is regardless of the fact that his
minority was not proved during the trial and that his birth certificate was belatedly presented
for our consideration, since to rule accordingly will not adversely affect the rights of the state,
the victim and his heirs.
Penalty to be Imposed Upon Franklin.
Pursuant to the above discussion, the penalty imposed upon Franklin must be accordingly
modified. The penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. A degree lower is reclusion
temporal.16 There being no aggravating and ordinary mitigating circumstance, the penalty to
be imposed on Franklin should be reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum,
which ranges from fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months.17 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next
lower in degree is prision mayor, the medium period of which ranges from eight (8) years and
one (1) day to ten (10) years. Due to the seriousness of the crime and the manner it was
committed, the penalty must be imposed at its most severe range.
While Florencio died way back on February 7, 2007, the said information was not timely
relayed to the Court, such that we were unaware of the same when we rendered our
December 14, 2011 Decision. It was only later that we were informed of Florencio’s death
through the June 8, 2012 letter of the Officer-in- Charge of the New Bilibid Prison. Due to this
development, it therefore becomes necessary for us to declare Florencio 's criminal liability as
well as his civil liability ex delicto to have been extinguished by his death prior to final
judgment. The judgment or conviction is thus set aside insofar as Florencio is concerned.
WHEREFORE, appellants' Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED.1âwphi1
Our Decision dated December 14, 2011 is MODIFIED as follows: (a) appellant Franklin
Agacer is sentenced to suffer the penalty often (10) years of prision mayor in its medium
period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four ( 4) months of reclusion temporal in its
medium period, as maximum, and (b) the criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto of
appellant Florencio Agacer are declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment.
The judgment or conviction against him is therefore SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

The Death of Florencio Prior to Our Final Judgment Extinguishes His Criminal Liability and
Civil Liability Ex Delicto.

On the effect of the death of appellant Florencio on his criminal liability, Article 89(1) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished.

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;

xxxx

It is also settled that "upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the
criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto
extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal."18

G.R. No. 167546 July 17, 2009
SONNY ROMERO Y DOMINGUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ISABEL PADUA, REGINA BREIS, MINERVA MONTES
and OFELIA BELANDO BREIS,1 Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:
On April 1, 19992 at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner3 driven by petitioner Sonny Romero
and the Apego Taxi4 driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision along Governor
Jose Fuentebella Highway at Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. The bus was
bound for Naga City while the taxi was going in the opposite direction of Partido Area. The
collision resulted in the death of Gerardo Breis, Sr.,5 Arnaldo Breis,6 Gerardo Breis, Jr.,7
Rene Montes,8 Erwin Breis9 and Jimmy Padua.10 Luckily, Edwin Breis and his son Edmund
Breis survived although they sustained serious injuries.
As a consequence, petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
multiple homicide and multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Ocampo, Camarines Sur.
After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted petitioner of the crime charged in a decision11
dated November 9, 2000. Petitioner was, however, held civilly liable and was ordered to pay
the heirs of the victims the total amount of ₱3,541,900 by way of actual damages, civil
indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate damages and loss of earning capacity.
Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, claiming that the
MTC erred in holding him civilly liable in view of his acquittal. On July 17, 2001, the RTC
affirmed the MTC judgment in toto.12
Refusing to give up, petitioner appealed13 to the Court of Appeals (CA). On March 3, 2005,
the CA rendered the assailed decision14 affirming the RTC.
Left with no other recourse, petitioner now argues15 that his acquittal should have freed him
from payment of civil liability. He also claims that he should be totally exonerated from any
liability because it was Gerardo Breis, Sr., not the regular driver, Jimmy Padua, who was
actually driving the taxi at the time of the accident, which was clearly in violation of insurance
and transportation laws.
We disagree.
PFR | 10
The rule is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.16 Criminal liability will give
rise to civil liability only if the felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another
and is the direct and proximate cause thereof.17 Every crime gives rise to (1) a criminal
action for the punishment of the guilty party and (2) a civil action for the restitution of the
thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses.18
However, the reverse is not always true. In this connection, the relevant portions of Section 2,
Rule 111 and Section 2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provide:
Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended.—xxx
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However,
the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise
did not exist. (emphasis supplied)
Sec. 2. Contents of the judgment.—xxx
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution
absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the rule is that the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily
extinguish his civil liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.19 Courts can acquit an accused on
reasonable doubt but still order payment of civil damages in the same case.20 It is not even
necessary that a separate civil action be instituted.21
In this case, the MTC held that it could not ascertain with moral certainty the wanton and
reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus in view of the condition of the highway
where the accident occurred and the short distance between the bus and the taxi before the
collision. However, it categorically stated that while petitioner may be acquitted based on
reasonable doubt, he may nonetheless be held civilly liable. 221avvphi1
The RTC added that there was no finding by the MTC that the act from which petitioner’s civil
liability may arise did not exist. Therefore, the MTC was correct in holding petitioner civilly
liable to the heirs of the victims of the collision for the tragedy, mental anguish and trauma
they suffered plus expenses they incurred during the wake and interment.23
In view of the pronouncements of the MTC and the RTC, we agree with the conclusion of the
CA that petitioner was acquitted not because he did not commit the crime charged but
because the RTC and the MTC could not ascertain with moral conviction the wanton and
 PFR | 11

reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus at the time of the accident. Put differently,
petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. However, his civil liability for the death, injuries and damages arising from the collision
is another matter.

While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was established
by preponderance of evidence.24 In other words, the failure of the evidence to prove
negligence with moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact compatible with) a ruling that
there was preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold him civilly
liable.

Thus, the MTC (as affirmed by the RTC and the CA) correctly imposed civil liability on
petitioner despite his acquittal. Simple logic also dictates that petitioner would not have been
held civilly liable if his act from which the civil liability had arisen did not in fact exist.

Anent the second issue, it would be well to remind petitioner of the time-honored doctrine that
this Court is not a trier of facts.25 The rule finds greater relevance in this case because the
MTC,26 the RTC27 and the CA28 uniformly held that it was Jimmy Padua, and not Gerardo
Breis, Sr., who was driving the taxi at the time of the accident.

There are of course instances29 when this Court can embark on a re-examination of the
evidence adduced by the parties during trial. Sad to say, none of those instances is present
here.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 210148 December 8, 2014
ANTONIO L. DALURAYA, Petitioner,
vs.
MARLA OLIVA, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated June 28, 2013 and
the Resolution3 dated November 22, 2013 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 125113 finding petitioner Antonio L. Daluraya (Daluraya) civilly liable for the death of
Marina Arabit Oliva (Marina Oliva) despite having been acquitted for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The Facts
On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Information4 for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide in connection with the death5 of Marina Oliva. Records reveal that
sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a
Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the Quezon
Avenue flyover in Quezon City, ran her over.6 While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital
to receive medical attention,she eventually died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent
Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
against Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle.7
During the proceedings, the prosecution presented as witness Shem Serrano (Serrano), an
eye-witness to the incident, who testified that on said date, he saw a woman crossing EDSA
heading towards the island near the flyover and that the latter was bumped by a Nissan
Vanette bearing plate number UPN-172. The prosecution also offered the testimonies of (a)
Marla, who testified as to the civil damages sustained by her family as a result of her
mother’s death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented his findings on the autopsy
conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c) Police Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI
Gomez), who conducted the investigation following the incident and claimed that Marina
Oliva was hit by the vehicle being driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the incident.8
After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss (demurrer)9
asserting, inter alia, that he was not positively identified by any of the prosecution witnesses
as the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was no clear and competent
evidence of how the incident transpired.10
The MeTC Ruling
PFR | 12
In an Order11 dated May 24, 2010, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 38
(MeTC) granted Daluraya’s demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence. It
found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were wanting in material details and
that they failed to sufficiently establish that Daluraya committed the crime imputed upon
him.12 Deconstructing the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses individually, the MeTC
found that: (a) Marla merely testified on the damages sustained by her family but she failed to
identify Daluraya as the driver of the vehicle that hit her mother; (b) Serrano also did not
identify
Daluraya as the driver of the said vehicle; (c) Dr. Ortiz merely testified on the autopsy results;
and (d) PSI Gomez, while he did investigate the incident, likewise declared thathe did not
witness the same.13
Marla moved for reconsideration,14 which the MeTC denied in an Order15 dated November
4, 2010, clarifying that the grant of Daluraya’s demurrer had the effect of an acquittal and that
reconsideration of its Order granting Daluraya’s demurrer would violate the latter’s right
against double jeopardy.16 With respect to the civil aspect of the case, the MeTC likewise
denied the same, holding that no civil liability can be awarded absent any evidence proving
that Daluraya was the person responsible for Marina Oliva’s demise.17
Aggrieved, Marla appealed18 to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 (RTC),
insisting that the MeTC failed to make any finding as to the civil liability of Daluraya,19 which
finding was not precluded by the dismissal of the criminal aspect of the case.
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision20 dated September 8, 2011, the RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
MeTC’s ruling,declaring that "the act from which the criminal responsibility may spring did not
at all exist."21
Marla filed a motion for reconsideration22 which, although filed beyond the reglementary
period, was nonetheless accepted. However, the RTC found the same without merit and
thus, sustained the factual findings and rulings of the MeTC in its Order23 dated May 10,
2012. Dissatisfied, Marla elevated the case to the CA via petition for review, maintaining that
Daluraya must be held civilly liable.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision24 dated June 28, 2013, the CA granted the petition and reversed the RTC
Decision, ordering Daluraya to pay Marla the amounts of ₱152,547.00 as actual damages,
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.25 In so ruling, the CA
held that the MeTC’s Order showed that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that the

prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As such, Daluraya was not
exonerated from civil liability.26
Moreover, the CA considered the following pieces of evidence to support its finding that
Daluraya must be held civilly liable: (a) the inadmissible sworn statement executed by
Daluraya where he admitted that he drove the subject vehicle which hit Marina Oliva; (b) the
conclusion derived from Serrano’s testimony that the woman he saw crossing the street who
was hit by a Nissan Vanette with plate number UPN-172, and the victim who eventually died,
are one and the same; (c) the Philippine National Police Referral Letter of one Police Chief
Inspector Virgilio Pereda identifying Daluraya as the suspectin the case of Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide involving the death of Marina Oliva, and stating that he
brought the victim to the Quezon City General Hospital for treatment but was declared dead
on arrival; and (d) the subject vehicle was registered in the name of Daluraya’s aunt, Gloria
Zilmar,27 who authorized him to claim the vehicle from the MeTC.28
Daluraya filed a motion for reconsideration,29 which the CA denied in a Resolution30 dated
November 22, 2013,hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue advanced for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA was correct in
finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva’s death despite his acquittal in the criminal case
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of
the crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability.31 In Manantan
v. CA,32 the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law and their
concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused, as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the
accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held
liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated inRule 111 of the Rules of
Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established,
PFR | 13
he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence
only.33
In Dayap v. Sendiong,34 the Court explained further:
The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the
civil aspect of the case.1âwphi1 The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused
is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon
the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based on delictmay be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did
not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the
right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. This is because when
the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the
criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the
prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the
demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for
the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private
complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render
judgment on the civil aspect of the case.35
(Emphases supplied)
In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state "whether the
evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed
to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the
act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist."36
A punctilious examination of the MeTC’s Order, which the RTC sustained, will show that
Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to establish that he
was the author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical
when the MeTC declared that "the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in
material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused precisely committed
the crime charged against him."37 Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of the
MeTC’s Order acquitting Daluraya, said court reiterated and firmly clarified that "the
prosecution was not able to establish that the accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette
 PFR | 14

which bumped Marina Oliva"38 and that "there is no competent evidence on hand which
proves that the accused was the person responsible for the death of Marina Oliva."39

Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the
RTC, that Daluraya’s acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt, which would necessarily
call for a remand of the case to the court a quo for the reception of Daluraya’s evidence on
the civil aspect.1âwphi1 Records disclose that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that
"the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist" in view of the failure
of the prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the crime ascribed
against him. Consequently, his civil liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature
of such acquittal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 28, 2013 and the
Resolution dated November 22, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 125113 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated September 8,2011 and the Order
dated May 10, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 are
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Third
Division2 of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed
against herein respondent for alleged violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019
(R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr.
v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts
awarded by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation
of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and
President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo
Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable
cause to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
While there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no
longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable
cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as
follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro
Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO
ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in
conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine
International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of the
PFR | 15
Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was
awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement substantially
amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under
Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision
on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of
PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation
to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO
while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the
Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why
this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused
considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his
alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired
jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he
filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that
the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person,
because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against him on
the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show cause order of the SB, also
contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom
he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated
by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it
appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged
co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court,
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash
and the Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
I government.11
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN
DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS
ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE
DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT
QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers
already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit
thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
PFR | 16
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the
anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting
graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as
enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private
respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein
respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to
the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public
officer who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent
may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with
whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that
the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile
is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the
charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of
Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found
probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A.
3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy
with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all
instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public
officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has
already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for
conspiracy.15 If two or more persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them

pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the act of each of them and they are
jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done by any of the
conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been
said, done, or written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is
alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of trial.17 The death of one of two or more
conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or survivors.18 Thus, this Court
held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The
crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that
one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the acquittal or death of a co-
conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be
found guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against
respondent, which is deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he
(respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that
in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability incurred by a co-
conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the
legislative intent to repress "acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute
graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the
prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-
Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta21 as to the
nature of and the principles governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction,
is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except
when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The
crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the Philippines.
An agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as
long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design,
the sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains
undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or
more malefactors, the existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the
determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In stressing the significance of conspiracy in
criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
PFR | 17
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit
a crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the
existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases a fact of vital importance, when
considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the
consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-
principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective active participation in the
commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in
contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is anchored on the
sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object,
whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each
individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the
whole, the same as though performed by himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one
is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or conspire to commit
a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the
agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly
explained in one case where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the
separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into consideration the close and
inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they all
acted by common agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity of the
act and intent which existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act of the band or
party created by them, and they are all equally responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the
actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. Of
course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be
drawn within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral
ascendancy over the rest of the conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out
the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the
crime amply justifies the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light
that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate indictable offense, but a rule for
collectivizing criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved,
all of the conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-

principals. This rule of collective criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of
conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in consummating their common purpose
is a patent display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such criminal
enterprise they must be held solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with
Secretary Enrile. It is settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature
and involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the allegation of conspiracy against respondent is
better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where respondent can adduce evidence
to prove or disprove its presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to
Resolve25 that in a different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with
the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering
into another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession Agreement
subject of the present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the
SB, through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on the
ground that the SB has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The prosecution
questioned the said SB Resolution before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The
petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this
Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB. This Resolution
became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's
resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in
G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a
Motion for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's
contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation
vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an
accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a
warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction
of the court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very
earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or
pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel.
John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
PFR | 18
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or
impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so
seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise,
he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of
objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives
the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not
confined to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other
matters which called for respondent court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be
heard now to deny said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the
jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only
came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case
should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract
entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a
special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations
of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended
by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals,
accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is
being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary
Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been
charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of
the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not
follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case
involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to
decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other
factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in
the main case and the main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a
referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court would further delay the resolution of the main
 PFR | 19

case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and a speedy
disposition of his case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June
2, 2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition
of Criminal Case No. 28090.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 190696 August 3, 2010
ROLITO CALANG and PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, Philtranco Service
Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco) and Rolito Calang, to challenge our Resolution of February 17,
2010. Our assailed Resolution denied the petition for review on certiorari for failure to show
any reversible error sufficient to warrant the exercise of this Court’s discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.
Antecedent Facts
At around 2:00 p.m. of April 22, 1989, Rolito Calang was driving Philtranco Bus No. 7001,
owned by Philtranco along Daang Maharlika Highway in Barangay Lambao, Sta. Margarita,
Samar when its rear left side hit the front left portion of a Sarao jeep coming from the
opposite direction. As a result of the collision, Cresencio Pinohermoso, the jeep’s driver, lost
control of the vehicle, and bumped and killed Jose Mabansag, a bystander who was standing
along the highway’s shoulder. The jeep turned turtle three (3) times before finally stopping at
about 25 meters from the point of impact. Two of the jeep’s passengers, Armando Nablo and
an unidentified woman, were instantly killed, while the other passengers sustained serious
physical injuries.
The prosecution charged Calang with multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
31, Calbayog City. The RTC, in its decision dated May 21, 2001, found Calang guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide, multiple physical
injuries and damage to property, and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
thirty days of arresto menor, as minimum, to four years and two months of prision
correccional, as maximum. The RTC ordered Calang and Philtranco, jointly and severally, to
pay ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of Armando; ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity
to the heirs of Mabansag; and ₱90,083.93 as actual damages to the private complainants.
The petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-
G.R. CR No. 25522. The CA, in its decision dated November 20, 2009, affirmed the RTC
decision in toto. The CA ruled that petitioner Calang failed to exercise due care and
precaution in driving the Philtranco bus. According to the CA, various eyewitnesses testified
that the bus was traveling fast and encroached into the opposite lane when it evaded a
PFR | 20
pushcart that was on the side of the road. In addition, he failed to slacken his speed, despite
admitting that he had already seen the jeep coming from the opposite direction when it was
still half a kilometer away. The CA further ruled that Calang demonstrated a reckless attitude
when he drove the bus, despite knowing that it was suffering from loose compression, hence,
not roadworthy.
The CA added that the RTC correctly held Philtranco jointly and severally liable with
petitioner Calang, for failing to prove that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family to prevent the accident.
The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. In our Resolution dated
February 17, 2010, we denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error
in the assailed decision to warrant the exercise of this Court’s discretionary appellate
jurisdiction.
The Motion for Reconsideration
In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioners claim that there was no basis to hold
Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang because the former was not a party in the
criminal case (for multiple homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to
property thru reckless imprudence) before the RTC.
The petitioners likewise maintain that the courts below overlooked several relevant facts,
supported by documentary exhibits, which, if considered, would have shown that Calang was
not negligent, such as the affidavit and testimony of witness Celestina Cabriga; the testimony
of witness Rodrigo Bocaycay; the traffic accident sketch and report; and the jeepney’s
registration receipt. The petitioners also insist that the jeep’s driver had the last clear chance
to avoid the collision.
We partly grant the motion.
Liability of Calang
We see no reason to overturn the lower courts’ finding on Calang’s culpability. The finding of
negligence on his part by the trial court, affirmed by the CA, is a question of fact that we
cannot pass upon without going into factual matters touching on the finding of negligence. In
petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is
limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of
are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts.
Liability of Philtranco
 PFR | 21

We, however, hold that the RTC and the CA both erred in holding Philtranco jointly and
severally liable with Calang. We emphasize that Calang was charged criminally before the
RTC. Undisputedly, Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the cause of action
against Calang was based on delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco
jointly and severally liable with Calang, based on quasi-delict under Articles 21761 and 21802
of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of
an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has committed. Such provision of law does
not apply to civil liability arising from delict.
been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer,
as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.4
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the present motion. The Court of Appeals decision that
affirmed in toto the RTC decision, finding Rolito Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and
damage to property, is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Philtranco’s liability should
only be subsidiary. No costs.

If at all, Philtranco’s liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code SO ORDERED
states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of
establishments, as follows:

In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons
or corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases
where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulations shall
have been committed by them or their employees.1avvphil

Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper’s
employees.

The foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code, which reads:

The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed
by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability – Articles 102 and 103 – are
deemed written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the
dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary
liability of the employer.3 Nonetheless, before the employers’ subsidiary liability is enforced,
adequate evidence must exist establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the
convicted employees; (2) they are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the crime was
committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties; and (4) the execution against
the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency. The determination of these conditions may
be done in the same criminal action in which the employee’s liability, criminal and civil, has

G.R. No. 192391
ESTATE OF HONORIO POBLADOR, JR., represented by RAFAEL A. POBLADOR,
Petitioner
vs.
ROSARIO L. MANZANO, Respondent
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari 1 assailing the Decision 2 dated
September 30, 2009 and the Resolution 3 dated May 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. CV No. 78891 that denied the appeal of petitioner Estate of Honorio Poblador, Jr.
(petitioner), represented by Rafael A. Poblador (Rafael), from the Order 4 dated January 13,
2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157 (RTC). Petitioner appealed the
civil aspect of the dismissed criminal case for Esta/a which it filed against respondent Rosario
L. Manzano (Manzano).
The Facts
Petitioner was the subject of settlement proceedings in Special Proceedings No. 9984 before
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (Probate Court). Among its properties was one share of
stock in Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club, Inc. (Wack-Wack Share) covered by
membership Certificate No. 3759 issued on September 17, 1974. 5
In an Order dated May 10, 1996, the Probate Court authorized petitioner's administratrix, Elsa
A. Poblador (Elsa), to negotiate the sale of certain properties of petitioner, including the
Wack-Wack Share. Upon Elsa's instruction, Rafael (one of the heirs of the deceased Honorio
Poblador, Jr.) looked for interested buyers. Subsequently, he engaged the services of
Manzano, a broker of Metroland Holdings Incorporated (Metroland) 6 who, on September 9,
1996, faxed a computation for the sale of the Wack-Wack Share to petitioner, 7 showing a
final net amount of ₱l5,000,000.00. On September 18, 1996, 8 the final net amount to the
seller was increased to Pl 5,200,000.00.
Manzano later introduced Rafael to Moreland Realty, Inc. (Moreland), and in September
1996, the parties entered into a Deed of Absolute Sale 9 with Elsa covering the Wack-Wack
Share for the gross amount of ₱l8,000,000.00. Out of the ₱l8,000,000.00 purchase price,
Moreland directly paid Elsa the amount of ₱l5,200,000.00 through a Metrobank check. 10
The balance of ₱2,800,000.00 was allegedly given to Manzano for the payment of the capital
gains tax, documentary stamp tax, and other pertinent fees, as well as for her service fee. 11
PFR | 22
In October 1996, however, the Probate Court annulled the sale of the Wack-Wack Share.
Thus, Elsa returned to Moreland the amount of ₱l8,000,000.00 which the latter paid for the
Wack-Wack Share, plus interest, and applied with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) for
the refund of the taxes paid for the annulled sale. Petitioner likewise asked Manzano to return
the broker's service fee. 12
Meanwhile, Rafael, through petitioner's accountant, Nonilo P. Torres (Torres), allegedly
requested Manzano for an accounting of the ₱2,800,000.00 she received on behalf of
petitioner. In response, Manzano faxed the following documents addressed to Torres: (a)
Cover letter dated
February 4, 1997;13 (b) Capital Gains Tax Return dated September 23, 1996 indicating the
payment of Pl,480,000.00 as capital gains tax; 14 (c) BIR Certification dated September 23,
1996 indicating the payment of Pl ,480,000.00 as capital gains tax; 15 (d) Authority to Accept
Payment dated September 23, 1996 indicating the payment of P 13 5, 000. 00 as
documentary stamp tax; 16 and (e) Deed of Absolute Sale between petitioner, represented
by Elsa, and Moreland.17 Examining these documents, Rafael and Torres allegedly noticed a
discrepancy in the faxed Capital Gains Tax Return: while the typewritten portion of the Return
indicated Pl,480,000.00 as the capital gains tax paid, the machine validation imprint reflected
only P80,000.00 as the amount paid. To clarify the discrepancy, petitioner secured a certified
true copy of the Capital Gains Tax Return from the BIR that reflected only P80,000.00 as the
capital gains tax paid for the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. 18 As a result, petitioner
demanded 19 Manzano to properly account for the P2,800,000.00 allegedly given to her for
the payment of taxes and broker's fees, but to no avail. 20 This led to the filing, on December
8, 1999, of an Information 21 for the crime of Esta/a under Article 315, paragraph (1) (b) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) against Manzano before the RTC, docketed as Crim. Case
No. 113549. 22 In the course of the proceedings, Manzano filed a Demurrer to Evidence 23
praying for the dismissal of the case for failure of the prosecution to establish the essential
elements of Esta/a with which she was charged. 24
The RTC Ruling
In an Order 25 dated January 13, 2003, the RTC granted Manzano's Demurrer to Evidence
and dismissed the complaint for Esta/a for failure of the prosecution to "prove all the elements
of estafa through misappropriation as defined in and penalized under paragraph 1 (b )[,
Article 315] of the Revised Penal Code, x x x. "26 The R TC found that the element of deceit
was absent, considering that both Manzano and Rafael were equally guilty of defrauding the
government of taxes actually due on the transaction. It pointed out that Rafael knew and
concurred with the plan, including the special arrangements that had to be made with the
BIR, as long as the estate would receive a higher net proceed from the sale. In fact, petitioner
received in full the agreed net sale proceeds of ₱15,200,000.00. Finally, it held that Manzano
was entitled to her broker's fee in the amount of ₱900,000.00 as she was commissioned and
successfully closed the transaction for petitioner. 27

Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 28 which the RTC denied in an
Order29 dated March 11, 2003. Hence, petitioner appealed the civil aspect of the case before
the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision 30 dated September 30, 2009, the CA denied petitioner's appeal, declaring that
the prosecution did not only fail to prove all the elements of Esta/a through misappropriation;
31 it also failed to prove the alleged civil liability of Manzano in the amount of ₱2,800,000.00.
32
It found that the prosecution's evidence failed to show that Manzano personally received the
₱2,800,000.00 earmarked for the payment of taxes and broker's fees. 33 At most, such
evidence only proved that Manzano tried to help broker and negotiate the sale of the Wack-
Wack Share. 34 In fact, Rafael himself admitted that he was unsure if Manzano indeed
received the ₱2,800,000.00. Neither could he state the date when she supposedly received
the same. 35
Moreover, the CA stressed that: (a) petitioner readily admitted receipt of the full amount of
PIS,200,000.00 - the amount agreed upon in the computation sent by Manzano - for the sale
of the Wack-Wack Share which was paid with a check by the buyer, Moreland Realty, Inc.,
and acknowledged by Elsa A. Poblador; 36 (b) Rafael made a categorical admission that he
did not even know who actually paid the taxes to the BIR and that the name of Manzano did
not appear in the documents with respect to the payment of the capital gains tax and
documentary stamp tax; 37 and (c) petitioner knew that Manzano was merely an employee of
Metroland, who talked to and negotiated with it in such capacity, and with whom it would not
have dealt with had she not been Metroland's employee. 38
Finally, the CA observed that this is a case of pari delicto, as
petitioner's predicament would have been avoided if only Rafael sought the permission and
approval of the Probate Court prior to the sale of the Wack-Wack Share.39
Aggrieved, petitioner sought reconsideration, 40 which the CA denied in a Resolution 41
dated May 26, 2010; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner's appeal on
the civil liability ex delicto of Manzano.
The Court's Ruling
PFR | 23
The petition lacks merit.
It is a fundamental rule that "[t]he acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a
judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case.1awp++i1 The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based
on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares
that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not
arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the
civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the [prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused, or the] act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, or where
the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him."42
In the fairly recent case of Dy v. People,43 the Court discussed the concept of civil liability ex
delicto in Esta/a cases under paragraph 1 (b ), Article 315 of the RPC (with which Manzano
was likewise charged), stating that when the element of misappropriation or conversion is
absent, there can be no Estafa and concomitantly, the civil liability ex delicto does not exist.
Particularly, the Court said:
Our laws penalize criminal fraud which causes damage capable of pecuniary estimation
through estafa under Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. In general, the elements of
estafa are:
(1) That the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of
deceit; and
(2) That damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended
party or third person.
The essence of the crime is the unlawful abuse of confidence or deceit in order to cause
damage. As this Court previously held, "the element of fraud or bad faith is indispensable."
Our law abhors the act of defrauding another person by abusing his trust or deceiving him,
such that, it criminalizes this kind of fraud.
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code identifies the circumstances which constitute estafa.
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) states that estafa is committed by abuse of confidence –
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). - ... (b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of
another, money, goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or on
commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially
guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property.

In this kind of estafa, the fraud which the law considers as criminal is the act of
misappropriation or conversion. When the element of misappropriation or conversion is
missing, there can be no estafa. In such case, applying the foregoing discussions on civil
liability ex delicto, there can be no civil liability as there is no act or omission from which any
civil liability may be sourced. However, when an accused is acquitted because a reasonable
doubt exists as to the existence of misappropriation or conversion, then civil liability may still
be awarded. This means that, while there is evidence to prove fraud, such evidence does not
suffice to convince the court to the point of moral certainty that the act of fraud amounts to
estafa. As the act was nevertheless proven, albeit without sufficient proof justifying the
imposition of any criminal penalty, civil liability exists. 44
The Court further clarified that "whenever the elements of estafa are not established, and that
the delivery of any personal property was made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability
arising from the estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case. This is because the civil
liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises from the same act
or omission constituting the crime. Civil liability ex delicto is the liability sought to be
recovered in a civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case."45 In this case, the Court
agrees with the findings of both the R TC and the CA that the prosecution failed to prove all
the elements of estafa through misappropriation as defined in, and penalized under,
paragraph 1 (b ), [Article 315] of the [RPC]. 46 As the RTC aptly noted, Rafael, as the
representative of herein petitioner, very well knew of and concurred with the entire
arrangement, including those which had to be made with the BIR. In fact, petitioner itself
admitted that it received the full amount of ₱15,200,000.00 - the full amount to which it was
entitled to under the terms of the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. For these reasons, petitioner
could not claim that it was deceived. Thus, absent the element of fraud, there could be no
misappropriation or conversion to speak of that would justify the charge of Esta/a and, with it,
the alleged civil liability ex delicto.
More significantly, the CA correctly observed that petitioner's evidence utterly failed to show
that Manzano personally received the ₱2,800,000.00 from petitioner with the duty to hold it in
trust for or to make delivery to the latter.1âwphi1 In fact, Rafael categorically admitted that he
did not even know who actually paid the taxes to the BIR, and that Manzano's name did not
appear in the documents pertaining to the payment of the capital gains tax and documentary
stamp tax. 47 This admission clearly contradicts the disputable presumption under Section 3
(q) of Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, i.e., that the ordinary course of business has been
followed, which petitioner adamantly relies on to support its claim.
A presumption is an assumption of fact resulting from a rule of law which requires such fact to
be assumed from another fact or group of facts found or otherwise established in the action.
48 It is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to
draw from proof of other facts. 49 However, a presumption is not evidence, 50 but merely
affects the burden of offering evidence. 51 Under Section 3, Rule 131, disputable
PFR | 24
presumptions are satisfactory, if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence, as in this case. Apart from Rafael's admission, petitioner further admitted
that: (a) Moreland directly paid Metroland the P2,800,000.00 in check although it did not
actually see and was unaware to whom Moreland gave this check; 52 (b) it did not ask
Moreland to issue the check for the payment of the taxes directly in the name of the BIR; 53
(c) it would not have dealt with Manzano had she not been Metroland' s employee; 54 and (d)
it has several lawyers and an accountant at its disposal, and its representative Rafael is, in
fact, in the real estate business and is familiar with brokerage transactions. 55
With these admissions and under these circumstances, it is thus safe to conclude that the
parties deliberately deviated from the ordinary course of business, and that - at the very least
- Manzano did not deal with it in bad faith. By and large, petitioner failed to prove even by
preponderance of evidence 56 the existence of any act or omission of Manzano that would
support its claim of civil liability ex delicto. In consequence, the present petition must fail.
As a final point, it deserves mentioning that in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court, only questions of law are addressed. It is not the Court's function to
analyze or weigh the evidence (which tasks belong to the trial court as the trier of facts and to
the appellate court as the reviewer of facts). The Court is confined to the review of errors of
law that may have been committed in the judgment under review. 57 "The jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and
revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive."58
All told, the Court finds no reversible error in the CA ruling denying petitioner's appeal as its
findings and conclusion are well supported by the facts and are founded in law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated September 30, 2009 and the
Resolution dated May 26, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78891 are hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y
Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a
decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died
on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic
encephalopathy secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the
Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal.
However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil
liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant
did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The
Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal
should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on
which the civil liability is based.
Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor
General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal
extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel
invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia 2 which held that
the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil
liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability?
In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This
same issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both
his criminal responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?
It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:
PFR | 25
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;
With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory
construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.
The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of
ascertaining the legal import of the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as
contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is final and
executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal
de 1870 which, in part, recites:
La responsabilidad penal se extingue.
1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las
pecuniarias, solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.
xxx xxx xxx
The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is
"sentencia firme" under the old statute?
XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:
SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse
utilizado por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos
legales concedidos al efecto.
"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only
when judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en
condena determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes — "una
verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente,
en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge

Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there
cannot be any determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil
action might arise exists," for the simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator Francisco holds the same view.
Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)
The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code.
Articles 72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is
already enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which
states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for
perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or
the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."
By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive
conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment
beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be
truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.
Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this
case, the right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered
must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs.
Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626,
634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan
observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the
offender might be found guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I
Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.
Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil
liability is sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as
we must, the criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the
anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the
source thereof — criminal liability — does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al.
vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil
suit," which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court
in the cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines
v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in
view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.
As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:
PFR | 26
The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering
that there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and
civil liability of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89,
Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo
and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.
On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v.
Marcelino Polinar 7 and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled
differently. In the former, the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one
accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to
the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of the
administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final judgment
extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89,
paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:
We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became
operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below,
Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical
injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be
considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were
terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33
may yet be enforced separately.
In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:
xxx xxx xxx
It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal
liability under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only
basis. Stated differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal
responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former,
provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not
apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the
crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)

xxx xxx xxx
In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was
charged with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
since said accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject matter
of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused
herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of
human relations remains."
Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused,
notwithstanding the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his
conviction.
To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the
following ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal
of all money claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of
the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money
may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the
CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the
offended party shall be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal
representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should be substituted as defendants-
appellants."
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established
was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on
sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also
extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability
ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-
established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and
convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents.
Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.
This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to
the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear
that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already
extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising
appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's
conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is
civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:
PFR | 27
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego
because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through
falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should
be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in
the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal
action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in
the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered
against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on
appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed
although he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank
vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the
Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal
case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability,
Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this
Court within ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or
not his estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said
heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the
civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in
Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled
rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished
upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.
But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision in
Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.

To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action
impliedly instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due
to death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil
Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:
When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense,
and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a
preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.
Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego.
Nowhere in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction
over the accused's civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What
Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to
demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In
the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case,
the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is
compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action
despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil
liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the
death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
is clear on this matter:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment;
xxx xxx xxx
However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It
allowed claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action
impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal
proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of
converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to
an entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the
filing of criminal proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for
such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the
PFR | 28
same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action, rooted as it is in the court's
pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render fealty to the
intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal
action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant
extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.
In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the
criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when
the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal
thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is
dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an
inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the
criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article
30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw
its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977, however,
failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial
pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as
that contemplated under Article 30.
Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution
of July 8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability
which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13
In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld
Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability.
Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's
civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served
as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.
Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the
Court made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of

money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending
appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment
in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially
provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered
against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on
appeal.
Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law,
this course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice
Regalado:
xxx xxx xxx
I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego
which, relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained
implication therefrom that where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities
had already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the
Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This
pronouncement, which has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and
consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside and abandoned as being clearly
erroneous and unjustifiable.
Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither
authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted
together with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary
conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. .
..
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred
to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.
Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego
was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule
3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money claims while the claims
involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real
property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be
PFR | 29
filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments
for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money
claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could
be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money
claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by
filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be
extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused
pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a
separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other
sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is
premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision
of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action
must be filed against the executor or administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant
to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator.
— No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be
commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal
property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to
recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced
against him.
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering
damages for injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil
Code, the same must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased
accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits
the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money
claims, we stressed, refers only to purely personal obligations other than those which have
their source in delict or tort.
Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate
civil action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the
Rules of Court.
From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:
 PFR | 30

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as
well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard,
"the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the
civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability
ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the
same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of
the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may
arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law 20

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery
therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the
accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate
civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and
prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In
such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 21 of the Civil
Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. 22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of,
i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133978 November 12, 2002
JOSE S. CANCIO, JR., represented by ROBERTO L. CANCIO, petitioner,
vs.
EMERENCIANA ISIP, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raises pure questions of
law involving the March 20, 19981 and June 1, 19982 Orders3 rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. G-3272.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Petitioner, assisted by a private prosecutor, filed three cases of Violation of B.P. No. 22 and
three cases of Estafa, against respondent for allegedly issuing the following checks without
sufficient funds, to wit: 1) Interbank Check No. 25001151 in the amount of P80,000.00; 2)
Interbank Check No. 25001152 in the amount of P 80,000.00; and 3) Interbank Check No.
25001157 in the amount of P30,000.00.4
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed Criminal Case No. 13356, for Violation of
B.P. No. 22 covering check no. 25001151 on the ground that the check was deposited with
the drawee bank after 90 days from the date of the check. The two other cases for Violation
of B.P. No. 22 (Criminal Case No. 13359 and 13360) were filed with and subsequently
dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 1, on the ground of
"failure to prosecute."5
Meanwhile, the three cases for Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga,
Branch 49, and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. G-3611 to G-3613. On October 21, 1997,
after failing to present its second witness, the prosecution moved to dismiss the estafa cases
against respondent. The prosecution likewise reserved its right to file a separate civil action
arising from the said criminal cases. On the same date, the trial court granted the motions of
the prosecution. Thus-
Upon motion of the prosecution for the dismissal of these cases without prejudice to the
refiling of the civil aspect thereof and there being no comment from the defense, let these
cases be dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of the civil aspect of the cases.
SO ORDER[ED].6
PFR | 31
On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for collection of sum of money,
seeking to recover the amount of the checks subject of the estafa cases. On February 18,
1998, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that petitioner’s action is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Respondent further prayed that petitioner should be
held in contempt of court for forum-shopping.7
On March 20, 1998, the trial court found in favor of respondent and dismissed the complaint.
The court held that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent on the ground of
lack of interest or failure to prosecute is an adjudication on the merits which amounted to res
judicata on the civil case for collection. It further held that the filing of said civil case
amounted to forum-shopping.
On June 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.8 Hence, the
instant petition.
The legal issues for resolution in the case at bar are: 1) whether the dismissal of the estafa
cases against respondent bars the institution of a civil action for collection of the value of the
checks subject of the estafa cases; and 2) whether the filing of said civil action violated the
anti-forum-shopping rule.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code;9 and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as felony [e.g. culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under
Article 3110 of the Civil Code,11 intentional torts under Articles 3212 and 34,13 and culpa
aquiliana under Article 217614 of the Civil Code]; or (b) where the injured party is granted a
right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action [Article 33,15 Civil
Code].16 Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject,
however, to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party "cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission" or under both causes.17
The modes of enforcement of the foregoing civil liabilities are provided for in the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Though the assailed order of the trial court was issued on
March 20, 1998, the said Rules, which took effect on December 1, 2000, must be given
retroactive effect in the instant case considering that statutes regulating the procedure of the
court are construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage.18
Section 1, Rule 111, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be
deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,

reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended
party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
xxxxxxxxx
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it
may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter
case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988 and under the present
Rules, the civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted with the criminal action, but the
offended party is given the option to file a separate civil action before the prosecution starts to
present evidence.19
Anent the independent civil actions under Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code,
the old rules considered them impliedly instituted with the civil liability ex-delicto in the
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute
it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Under the present Rules,
however, the independent civil actions may be filed separately and prosecuted independently
even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in the
criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based
on these articles of the Civil Code.20
In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed by petitioner show that his cause of action
is based on culpa contractual, an independent civil action. Pertinent portion of the complaint
reads:
xxxxxxxxx
2. That plaintiff is the owner/proprietor to CANCIO’S MONEY EXCHANGE with office address
at Guagua, Pampanga;
3. That on several occasions, particularly on February 27, 1993 to April 17 1993, inclusive,
defendant drew, issued and made in favor of the plaintiff the following checks:
CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT
1. Interbank Check No. 25001151 March 10, 1993 P80,000.00
PFR | 32
2. Interbank Check No. 25001152 March 27, 1993 P80,000.00
3. Interbank Check No. 25001157 May 17, 1993 P30,000.00
in exchange of cash with the assurance that the said checks will be honored for payment on
their maturity dates, copy of the aforementioned checks are hereto attached and marked.
4. That when the said checks were presented to the drawee bank for encashment, the same
were all dishonored for reason of DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS (DAIF);
5. That several demands were made upon the defendant to make good the checks but she
failed and refused and still fails and refuses without justifiable reason to pay plaintiff;
6. That for failure of the defendant without any justifiable reason to pay plaintiff the value of
the checks, the latter was forced to hire the services of undersigned counsel and agreed to
pay the amount of P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees and P1,000.00 per appearance in court;
7. That for failure of the defendant without any justifiable reason to pay plaintiff and forcing
the plaintiff to litigate, the latter will incur litigation expenses in the amount of P20,000.00.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is prayed of this Court that after due notice and hearing a
judgment be rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff as follows:
a. the principal sum of P190,000.00 plus the legal interest;
b. attorney’s fees of P30,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court appearance;
c. litigation expenses in the amount of P20,000.00
PLAINTIFF prays for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.
x x x x x x x x x.21
Evidently, petitioner sought to enforce respondent’s obligation to make good the value of the
checks in exchange for the cash he delivered to respondent. In other words, petitioner’s
cause of action is the respondent’s breach of the contractual obligation. It matters not that
petitioner claims his cause of action to be one based on delict.22 The nature of a cause of
action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.
The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim
of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself,
its allegations and prayer for relief.23
 PFR | 33

Neither does it matter that the civil action reserved in the October 21, 1997 order of the trial
court was the civil action ex delicto. To reiterate, an independent civil action arising from
contracts, as in the instant case, may be filed separately and prosecuted independently even
without any reservation in the criminal action. Under Article 31 of the Civil Code "[w]hen the
civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, [e.g. culpa contractual] such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." Thus, in Vitola, et al. v. Insular Bank of
Asia and America,24 the Court, applying Article 31 of the Civil Code, held that a civil case
seeking to recover the value of the goods subject of a Letter of Credit-Trust Receipt is a civil
action ex contractu and not ex delicto. As such, it is distinct and independent from the estafa
case filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the result of the criminal
proceedings.

One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action.25 In the instant case, it
must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which
remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act.26 Not
being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the
culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an
entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.

In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases
against respondent did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum-shopping is the
filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by
petitioner arose from the same act or omission of respondent, they are, however, based on
different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the
civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-
shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil
action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.27

Clearly, therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioner’s complaint for collection of the
value of the checks issued by respondent. Being an independent civil action which is
separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution and which require no prior reservation for
its institution, the doctrine of res judicata and forum-shopping will not operate to bar the
same.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The March 20,
1998 and June 1, 1998 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, in Civil
Case No. G-3272 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 108395 March 7, 1997
HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., and ANGELES CUEVAS,
respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 20, which ordered respondent Philippine Rabbit
Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, to pay various amounts in damages to
petitioners, the heirs of the late Teodoro Guaring, Jr.
This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on November 7,
1987, along the North Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the
accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of
the mishap, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas, and a Toyota
Cressida car, driven by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was heading north, at the
speed of 80 to 90 kilometers per hour. Following it was the Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415,
with Plate No. CVD-584. On the other hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the
opposite lane, bound for Manila.
Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this action for damages, based on quasi
delict, in the Regional Trial Court of Manila. Their evidence tended to show that the Rabbit
bus tried to overtake Guaring's car by passing on the right shoulder of the road and that in so
doing it hit the right rear portion of Guaring's Mitsubishi Lancer. The impact caused the
Lancer to swerve to the south-bound lane, as a result of which it collided with the Toyota
Cressida car coming from the opposite direction.
With Teodoro Guaring, Jr. in the Lancer, seated beside him in front, was Bonifacio Clemente.
Riding in the Toyota Cressida driven by Sgt. Eligio Enriquez was his mother, Dolores
Enriquez, who was seated beside him. Seated at the back were his daughter Katherine (who
was directly behind him), his wife Lilian, and his nephew Felix Candelaria.
Killed in the collision were Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who was driving the Lancer, and Dolores
Enriquez, who was riding in the Cressida, while injured were Bonifacio Clemente and the
occupants of the Toyota Cressida.
Private respondents, on the other hand, presented evidence tending to show that the
accident was due to the negligence of the deceased Guaring. They claimed that it was
Guaring who tried to overtake the vehicle ahead of him on the highway and that in doing so
he encroached on the south-bound lane and collided with the oncoming Cressida of U.S. Air
PFR | 34
Force Sgt. Enriquez. Private respondents claim that as a result of the collision the Lancer
was thrown back to its lane where it crashed into the Rabbit bus.
On May 16, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Philippine Rabbit Bus
Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, at fault, and holding them solidarily liable for
damages to petitioners. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants, ordering the latter to pay the former, jointly and severally, the sum of:
1. P500,000.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased Teodoro Guaring, Jr.;
2. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P50,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
4. Costs of suit.
From this judgment, private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. appealed,
contending:
1. The lower court erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the collision was Guaring's
negligence in attempting to overtake the car in front of him.
2. The lower court erred in not holding that PRBL exercised due diligence in the supervision
of its employees.
3. The lower court erred in awarding the amount of P500,000.00 in favor of plaintiffs-
appellees representing Guaring's loss of earning capacity.
4. The lower court erred in awarding moral damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.
5. The lower court erred in awarding attorney's fees in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.
On December 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, setting aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in the civil action for damages and dismissing the
complaint against private respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Cuevas, on the
strength of a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court at San Fernando, Pampanga, in
the criminal case, acquitting the bus driver Angeles Cuevas of reckless imprudence resulting
in damage to property and double homicide. The appellate court held that since the basis of
petitioners' action was the alleged negligence of the bus driver, the latter's acquittal in the
criminal case rendered the civil case based on quasi delict untenable.

Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that
[1] EVIDENCE IN ONE CASE IS INADMISSIBLE IN ANOTHER CASE AGAINST A PERSON
NOT A PARTY IN THE FIRST CASE AND TO HOLD OTHERWISE IS VIOLATIVE OF
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.
[2] THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS WITHOUT FACTUAL FINDINGS
AND DID NOT RESOLVE SQUARELY THE ASSIGNED ERRORS AND IS THEREFORE A
VOID JUDGMENT.
[3] ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE, WHETHER ON
REASONABLE DOUBT OR NOT, IS NO BAR TO THE PROSECUTION FOR DAMAGES
BASED ON QUASI-DELICT.
The question is whether the judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of private
respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, for damages for
the death of Teodoro Guaring, Jr. In absolving private respondents from liability, the Court of
Appeals reasoned:1
Since the appellee's civil action is predicated upon the negligence of the accused which does
not exist as found by the trial court in the said criminal case, it necessarily follows that the
acquittal of the accused in the criminal case carries with it the extinction of the civil
responsibility arising therefrom. Otherwise stated, the fact from which the civil action might
arise, that is, the negligence of the accused, did not exist.
The finding in the criminal case that accused Cuevas was not negligent and the proximate
cause of the accident was the act of deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead
of him likewise exonerates PRB from any civil liability.
Although it did not say so expressly, the appellate court appears to have based its ruling on
Rule 111, §2(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist.
This provision contemplates, however, a civil action arising from crime, whereas the present
action was instituted pursuant to Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
PFR | 35
It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty,
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. Thus, in Tayag v.
Alcantara,2 it was held:
. . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (c), Section 3, Rule 111 [now Rule 111, §2(b)], refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration
in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. . . .
It is noteworthy that the accident in that case also involved a Philippine Rabbit bus and that,
as in this case, the acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt. We held that
the civil case for damages was not barred since the cause of action of the heirs was based
on quasi delict.
Again, in Gula v. Dianala it was held:3
Since the cause of action of plaintiffs-appellants is based on culpa aquiliana and not culpa
criminal, thus precluding the application of the exception in Sec. 3(c) of Rule 111 [now Rule
111, §2(b)], and the fact that it can be inferred from the criminal case that defendant-accused,
Pedro Dianala, was acquitted on reasonable doubt because of dearth of evidence and lack of
veracity of the two principal witnesses, the doctrine in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113, will
not find application. In that case, the acquittal was not based on reasonable doubt and the
cause of action was based on culpa criminal, for which reason we held the suit for damages
barred.
Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the
bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a finding
that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held: 4
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it
includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the
civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt
(PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases;
where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil
in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby
 PFR | 36

incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does
not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted
(Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).
In the present case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC in the criminal case
reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court, entertaining reasonable doubt as to his guilt, the accused is hereby
acquitted, of the offense of reckless imprudence resulting to double homicide and damage to
property as charged in the Information, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
from those presented by the prosecution should have brought home to the appellate court the
fundamental unfairness of considering the decision in the criminal case conclusive of the civil
case.
Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civil case, this case should
be remanded to it so that it may render another decision in accordance with the law and the
evidence. The issues raised by the petitioners are essentially factual and require the
evaluation of evidence, which is the function of the Court of Appeals in the exercise of its
exclusive appellate jurisdiction. They cannot be decided in this Court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and this case is
REMANDED to the Court of Appeals with instruction to render judgment with reasonable
dispatch in accordance with law and the evidence presented in Civil Case No. 88-43860.

It was thus error for the appellate court to skip the review of the evidence in this case and SO ORDERED
instead base its decision on the findings of the trial court in the criminal case. In so doing, the
appellate court disregarded the fact that this case had been instituted independently of the
criminal case and that petitioners herein took no part in the criminal prosecution. In fact this
action was filed below before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action. The
attention of the Court of Appeals was called to the decision in the criminal case, which was
decided on September 7, 1990, only when the decision of the trial court in this case was
already pending review before it (the Court of Appeals).

The appellate court did not even have before it the evidence in the criminal case. What it did
was simply to cite findings contained in the decision of the criminal court. Worse, what the
criminal court considered was reasonable doubt concerning the liability of the bus driver the
appellate court regarded as a categorical finding that the driver was not negligent and, on that
basis, declared in this case that "the proximate cause of the accident was the act of
deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him." The notion that an action for
quasi delict is separate and distinct from the criminal action was thus set aside.

This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case. This is important
because the criminal court appears to have based its decision, acquitting the bus driver on
the ground of reasonable doubt, solely on what it perceived to be the relative capacity for
observation of the prosecution and defense witnesses.6 The prosecution did not call
Bonifacio Clemente to testify despite the fact that shortly after the accident he gave a
statement to the police, pinning the blame for the accident on the Philippine Rabbit bus
driver. Indeed, the civil case involved a different set of witnesses. Petitioners presented Eligio
Enriquez who was driving the Cressida, and Bonifacio Clemente, who was a passenger in
Guaring's car. Thus, both had full view of the accident

It is unfair to bind petitioners to the result of the criminal action when the fact is that they did
not take part therein. That the witnesses presented on behalf of the petitioners are different

G.R. No. 130362 September 10, 2001
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC., petitioner,
vs.
MERLIN J. ARGOS and JAJA C. PINEDA, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 7, 1997, dismissing
the petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by herein petitioner as a consequence of the
orders by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, in Civil Case No. 65026 for
damages.
Petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances (Phils.) Inc., hereafter IFFI, is a corporation
organized and existing under Philippine laws. Respondents Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C.
Pineda are the general manager and commercial director, respectively, of the Fragrances
Division of IFFI.
In 1992, the office of managing director was created to head the corporation's operation in
the Philippines. Hernan H. Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed managing director.
Consequently the general managers reported directly to Costa.
Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the general managers
became redundant, respondents agreed to the termination of their services. They signed a
"Release, Waiver and Quitclaim" on December 10, 1993. On the same date, Costa issued a
"Personnel Announcement" which described respondents as "persona non grata" and urged
employees not to have further dealings with them.
On July 1, 1994, respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel resulting in the filing of two
Informations against Costa docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9917 and 9918 with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro Manila.
On March 31, 1995, respondents fi1ed'a civil case for damages filed and docketed as Civil
Case No. 65026 at the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against Costa and IFFI, in
its subsidiary capacity as employer. Herein petitioner IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint.
On October 23, 1995, the Regional Trial Court granted the motion to dismiss Civil Case No.
65026 for respondents' failure to reserve its right to institute a separate civil action.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court granted in an order dated
January 9, 1996.
PFR | 37
IFFI filed a motion to reconsider said order. This was denied. Hence, IFFI elevated the case
to the Court of Appeals, reiterating the same grounds for the dismissal of the civil complaint
which it invoked before the court a quo. The appellate court dismissed the petition. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals' decision reads:
All told, the allegations of petitioner that the lower court has gravely abused its discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the orders complained of has not been
substantiated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.1
IFFI's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for review, with
petitioner alleging that the Court of Appeals:
I
...GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY
HEREIN PETITIONER AND IN DENYING THE LATTER'S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, THEREBY AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO
CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE COMPLAINT IS ONE TO ENFORCE THE SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY OF
PETITIONER UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE FOR THE ALLEGED "LIBELOUS"
STATEMENTS OF ITS FORMER EMPLOYEE.
B. AN EMPLOYER DOES NOT INCUR SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER THE CIVIL
CODE, BUT ONLY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE. UNDER THE LATTER, AN
EMPLOYER ONLY BECOMES SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE UPON CONVICTION OF THE
ACCUSED EMPLOYEE AND PROOF OF HIS INSOLVENCY.
C. WHILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES MAY PROCEED AGAINST
HERNAN H. COSTA UNDER ARTICLE 33 OF THE CIVIL CODE, NO SUCH ACTION MAY
PROCEED AGAINST PETITIONER TO ENFORCE ITS SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY AS
EMPLOYER UNDER THE SAME ARTICLE.
II
...SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENTS' RIGHT TO FILE THE CIVIL
CASE AGAINST PETITIONER NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR ADMITTED FAILURE TO
MAKE A RESERVATION AND THEIR CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL
CASE.

III
...FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT RESPONDENTS' FAILURE TO RESERVE AND THEIR
CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL CASE BAR THE FILING OF THE
COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AGAINST MR. COST A AND PETITIONER, CONSIDERING
THAT:
A. UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF LITIS PENDENTIA, THE CIVIL ACTION TO ENFORCE
PETITIONER'S SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY MUST BE DISMISSED.
B. THE CIVIL ACTION TO ENFORCE PETITIONER'S SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY MUST
BE DISMISSED TO PREVENT FORUM-SHOPPING OR MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS.2
Despite the foregoing formulation of alleged errors, we find that petitioner raises one principal
issue for the Court's resolution: Could private respondents sue petitioner for damages based
on subsidiary liability in an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during
the pendency of the criminal libel cases against petitioner's employee?
In our view, respondents' suit based on subsidiary liability of petitioner is premature.
At the outset, we are constrained to delve into the nature of Civil Case No.65026,
respondents' complaint for damages against IFFI. Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals
erred when it treated said complaint as one to enforce petitioner's primary liability under
Article 333 of the Civil Code. It asserts that in so doing the appellate court introduced a new
cause of action not alleged nor prayed for in respondents' complaint. Petitioner argues that a
cause of action is determined by the allegations and prayer in a complaint. Respondents in
their complaint did not allege that IFFI was primarily liable for damages. On the contrary,
petitioner says the complaint was replete with references that IFFI was being sued in its
subsidiary capacity. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals could not, on its own,
include allegations which were not in the complaint, nor could it contradict the cause of action
nor change the theory of the case after petitioner had answered. While pleadings should be
liberally construed, says the petitioner, liberal construction should not be abused. Misleading
the adverse party should be avoided. Further, it avers that where allegations in the pleading
are inconsistent, the pleader is bound by those most favorable to its opponent,4 and
consequently, respondents' complaint should not be treated as one to enforce IFFI's primary
liability as the appellate court erroneously did, considering that the complaint plainly adverts
to the alleged subsidiary liability of IFFI as the employer of Costa.
Respondents, on the other hand, aver that the Court of Appeals was correct in treating the
action as a civil action for damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action that
can proceed independently in accordance with Art. 33 of the Civil Code.5 It was also correct
PFR | 38
when it recognized respondents' right to move directly against IFFI as the employer of Costa,
who had long fled the country, respondents added.
On this score, we find petitioner's contentions persuasive and respondents' position
untenable. The well-established rule is that the allegations in the complaint and the character
of the relief sought determine the nature of an action.6 A perusal of the respondents' civil
complaint before the regional trial court plainly shows that respondents is suing IFFI in a
subsidiary and not primary capacity insofar as the damages claimed are concerned.
First, respondents entitled the complaint, "MERLIN J. ARGOS AND JAJA C. PINEDA. v. MR.
HERNAN COSTA, as former Managing Director of IFF (Phil.), Inc., AND INTERNATIONAL
FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHILS.), INC. ...in its subsidiary capacity, as employer of
Hernan H. Costa." Although the title of the complaint is not necessarily determinative of the
nature of the action, it nevertheless indicates respondents' intention.7 The designation of the
nature of the action, or its title is not meaningless or of no effect in the determination of its
purpose and object.8
Second, paragraph 2 of the complaint expressed in categorical terms that respondents were
suing IFFI in its subsidiary capacity .It stated, "defendant IFFI is being sued in its subsidiary
capacity as employer of Hernan H. Costa, in accordance with the pertinent provisions under
the Rules of Court, the Revised Penal Code and/or the Civil Code of the Philippines."9
Third, respondents described the nature of such liability in paragraph 22: "... in case of his
(Costa's) default, defendant (IFFI) should be held subsidiarily liable as an employer of Hernan
Costa. Defendant has the absolute and sole power and authority in matters of company
policies and management (Arts. 100, 101, 102 and 104 of the Revised Penal Code)."10
Lastly, the prayer of the complaint reads:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, this Honorable Court renders
judgment against the defendant, Hernan H. Costa and/or against defendant International
Flavors and Fragrances (Phil.), Inc., in its subsidiary capacity (subsidiary liability) as an
employer...11
To reiterate, nothing could be clearer than that herein respondents are suing IFFI civilly in its
subsidiary capacity for Costa's alleged defamatory acts. Moreover, the appellate court could
not convert allegations of subsidiary liability to read as averments of primary liability without
committing a fundamental unfairness to the adverse party.
Essential averments lacking in a pleading may not be construed into it, nor facts not alleged
by a plaintiff be taken as having no existence.12 Justice requires that a man be apprised of
the nature of the action against him so that he may prepare his defense. A pleading must be
construed most strictly against the pleader. He is presumed to have stated all the facts
 PFR | 39

involved, and to have done so as favorably to himself as his conscience will permit. So, if
material allegations were omitted, it will be presumed in the absence of an application to
amend that those matters do not exist.13 This is a basic rule in pleadings.14
Given the circumstances herein, could petitioner be sued for damages because of its alleged
subsidiary liability under Art. 33 of the Civil Code? In instituting the action for damages with
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, respondents seek to enforce a civil liability
allegedly arising from a crime. Obligations arising from crimes are governed by Article
116115 of the Civil Code, which provides that said obligations are governed by penal laws,
subject to the provision of Article 217716 and the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2,
Preliminary Title, on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of Book IV of the Civil Code.
trial court. Nothing herein said, however, ought to prejudice the reliefs that respondents might
seek at the appropriate time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated February 7, 1997 and August 28, 1997, respectively, are hereby REVERSED
AND SET ASIDE. The civil complaint for damages filed and docketed as Civil Case No.
65026 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against herein petitioner is
ORDERED DISMISSED. Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code is also pertinent. It provides that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In default of the persons criminally liable,
employers engaged in any kind of industry shall be civilly liable for felonies committed by their
employees in the discharge of their duties.17

Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party. Such civil action proceeds independently of the criminal prosecution and
requires only a preponderance of evidence. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto, 12 SCRA 308 (1964), we
held that Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil liability. It
does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability,
because such liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or
when the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to
have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties.18 Any action brought against the
employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is
premature.19

However, we note that by invoking the principle of respondeat superior,20 respondents tried
to rely on Art. 33 to hold IFFI primarily liable for its employee's defamatory statements. But
we also find that respondents did not raise the claim of primary liability as a cause of action in
its complaint before the trial court. On the contrary, they sought to enforce the alleged
subsidiary liability of petitioner as the employer of Costa, the accused in pending criminal
cases for libel, prematurely.

Having established that respondents did not base their civil action on petitioner IFFI's primary
liability under Art. 33 but claimed damages from IFFI based on its subsidiary liability as
employer of Costa, prematurely, we need not delve further on the other errors raised by
petitioner. Plainly both the trial and the appellate courts erred in failing to dismiss the
complaint against herein petitioner by respondents claiming subsidiary liability while the
criminal libel cases against IFFI's employee, Costa, were pending before the metropolitan

G.R. No. L-45404 August 7, 1987
G. JESUS B. RUIZ, petitioner,
vs.
ENCARNACION UCOL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissing the
plaintiff-appellant's complaint for damages against defendant-appellee on the ground of res
judicata. The issue involved being a pure question of law, the appellate court certified the
appeal to us for decision on the merits.
The facts are not disputed, Agustina Tagaca, laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus
B. Ruiz filed an administrative charge against defendant-appellee Encarnacion Ucol, a
midwife in the health center of Sarratt Ilocos Norte. In her answer to the charges, Ucol
alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz who wanted to get back at the
Ucol's because of a case filed by Encarnacion Ucol's husband against Ruiz. She was also
alleged to have made remarks that Atty. Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the
charges.
The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to file his own criminal complaint for
libel against Ucol based on the alleged libelous portion of Ucol's answer.
Upon arraignment, Ucol entered a plea of not guilty. During the proceedings in the libel case,
complainant Atty. Ruiz entered his appearance and participated as private prosecutor. After
trial, the lower court rendered judgment acquitting Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement was made by the trial court as to
the civil liability of the accused.
Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for
damages based on the same facts upon which the libel case was founded.
Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed and that the cause of
action was barred by the decision in the criminal case for libel.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. As earlier stated,
on appeal, the Court of Appeals certified the case to us, the only issue being whether or not
the civil action for damages was already barred by the criminal case of libel.
Before going into the merit of this appeal, it is noteworthy to mention that there are actually
two cases now before us involving the contending parties. Defendant-appellee Ucol filed an
PFR | 40
"appeal by certiorari" before this Court questioning the dissenting opinion of the Court of
Appeals.
Ucol prays for a ruling "that the respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of
discretion in not dismissing the present case but instead in ordering the same remanded to
the lower court for further proceedings ... ."
Any ordinary student in law school should readily know that what comprises a decision which
can be the subject of an appeal or a special civil action is the majority opinion of the members
of the court, but never the dissenting opinion. Moreover, no decision on appeal has as yet
been rendered in this case. The act of the defendant-appellee's counsel in filing such a
petition defies logic or reason. It is totally inexplicable how a member of the bar could be so
careless or, if the act was deliberate, could have the courage to come before this Court
asking us to review a dissenting opinion. Counsel is warned that we do not find his mistake in
the slightest bit amusing.
Turning now to the present appeal, plaintiff-appellant Ruiz contends that there can be no res
judicata since nowhere in its decision did the trial court pass upon the civil aspect of the
criminal case nor did it make any express declaration that the fact on which said case was
predicated did not exist. He cites the pertinent provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code and
Rule III, Section 3 subsection (c) of the Rules of Court which respectively provide:
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. ...
xxx xxx xxx
RULE III, Sec. 3(c) —
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise
did not exist. ...
We may also mention Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an offended party in cases of
defamation, among others, the right to file a civil action separate and distinct from the criminal
proceedings whether or not a reservation was made to that effect.
The plaintiff-appellant's contentions have no merit. The right of the plaintiff-appellant under
the above provisions to file the civil action for damages based on the same facts upon which
he instituted the libel case is not without limitation.

We find the appeal of G. Jesus B. Ruiz without merit. We see no advantage or benefit in
adding to the clogged dockets of our trial courts what plainly appears from the records to be a
harassment suit.
In acquitting Encarnacion Ucol of the libel charge, the trial court made these factual findings:
Clearly then, Atty. Ruiz filed the instant Criminal Case against Encarnacion Ucol as retaliation
for what he believed was an act of ingratitude to him on the part of her husband. The
precipitate haste with which the administrative complaint was filed shows that he was the one
personally interested in the matter. All that Agustina Tagaca told him was double hearsay.
The incident, if there was, happened between the accused and Ceferino in the absence of
Agustina; so that, all that Ceferina allegedly told her, and she in turn told Atty. Ruiz, was
undoubtedly double check hearsay; and Atty. Ruiz should therefore check the facts with
Ceferino, but he did not do that, and he did not even present Ceferino as a witness. For these
reasons, accused has every reason to believe that Atty. Ruiz was the author who concocted
the charges in the administrative complaint and had his laundry-woman, complainant
Agustina Tagaca, sign it. Agustina has very little education and could hardly speak English,
yet the administrative complaint was written in polished English, and who else but Atty. Ruiz
could have authored those phrases in the complaint: "The retention of Mrs. Ucol in this
government service is inimical to the good intentions of the Department to serve humanity
and a disgrace and liability to present administration." As will be shown later on, it appears
that it is this complaint signed by Agustina, but authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is libelous and not
the respondent's answer; and even, assuming that the administrative complaint may not have
been impelled by actual malice, the charge(s) were certainly reckless in the face of proven
facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give bent to their
prejudice. The poor and the humble are, as a general rule, grateful to a fault, that intrigues
and ingratitude are what they abhor. (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 8-10).
The findings in the criminal case, therefore, show a pattern of harassment. First, petitioner
Ruiz had something to do with the administrative complaint. The complaint was dismissed.
Second, he filed a criminal case for libel based on portions of Mrs. Ucol's answer in the
administrative case. Third, he acted as private prosecutor in the criminal case actively
handling as a lawyer the very case where he was the complainant. And fourth, after the
accused was acquitted on the basis of the facts stated above, Atty. Ruiz pursued his anger at
the Ucols with implacability by filing a civil action for damages. As stated by the trial judge,
"court actions are not established for parties to give bent to their prejudice." This is doubly
true when the party incessantly filing cases is a member of the bar. He should set an
example in sobriety and in trying to prevent false and groundless suits.
In Roa v. de la Cruz, et al. (107, Phil. 10) this Court ruled:
Under the above provisions (Art. 33 of the Civil Code), independently of a criminal action for
defamation, a civil suit for the recovery of damages arising therefrom may be brought by the
PFR | 41
injured party. It is apparent, however, from the use of the words "may be," that the institution
of such suit is optional." (An Outline of Philippine Civil Law by J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno,
Vol. I, p. 54) In other words, the civil liability arising from the crime charged may still be
determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it
adjudged, or does not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action against the
defendant. (The case of Reyes v. de la Rosa (52 Off. Gaz., [15] 6548; 99 Phil., 1013) cited by
plaintiff in support of her contention that under Art. 33 of the New Civil Code the injured party
is not required to reserve her right to institute the civil action, is not applicable to the present
case. There was no showing in that case that the offended party intervened in the
prosecution of the offense, and the amount of damages sought to be recovered was beyond
the jurisdiction of the criminal court so that a reservation of the civil action was useless or
unnecessary.) (Dionisio v. Alvendia, 102 Phil., 443; 55 Off. Gaz., [25]4633.])
In the instant case, it is not disputed that plaintiff Maria C. Roa — upon whose initiative the
criminal action for defamation against the defendant Segunda de la Cruz was filed — did not
reserve her right to institute it, subject, always to the direction and control of the prosecuting
fiscal. (Section 15 in connection with section 4 of Rule 106, Rules of Court; Lim Tek Goan v.
Yatco, 94 Phil., 197). The reason of the law in not permitting the offended party to intervene
in the prosecution of the offense if he had waived or reserved his right to institute the civil
action is that by such action her interest in the criminal case has disappeared. Its prosecution
becomes the sole function of the public prosecutor. (Gorospe, et al., v. Gatmaitan, et al., 98
Phil., 600; 52 Off. Gaz., [15] 2526). The rule, therefore, is that the right of intervention
reserved to the injured party is for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability born of the
criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. (People v. Orais, 65 Phil., 744;
People v. Velez, 77 Phil., 1026; People v. Flores, et al., G.R. No. L-7528, December 18,1957;
see also U.S. v. Malabon, 1 Phil., 731; U.S. v. Heery, 25 Phil., 600).
Plaintiff having elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal
case through her appearance or intervention as private prosecutor we hold that the final
judgment rendered therein constitutes a bar to the present civil action for damages based
upon the same cause. (See Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91 Phil., 672; 48 Off.
Gaz., [7] 2745.).
We are, therefore, constrained to dismiss the present appeal. Atty. Ruiz has more than had
his day in court. The then court of first instance acquitted Mrs. Ucol and stated in the
dispositive portion of its decision that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
A review of the court's findings, however, indicates that the disputed Answer of Mrs. Ucol in
the administrative case contains no libel. As stated by the trial court, "As will be shown later, it
appears that it is this complaint signed by Agustina, but authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is
libelous and not the respondent's answer." (Emphasis supplied). The court found the charges
against Ucol, if not malicious, at least reckless in the face of proven facts and circumstances.
The trial court stated.
 PFR | 42

Analyzing defendant's answer Exh. "5", even with meticulous care, the Court did not find any
defamatory imputation which causes dishonor or discredit to the complainant. She was the
victim of an unprovoked, unjustified and libelous attack against her honor, honesty, character
and reputation; she has a right to self-defense, which she did in her answer, to protect her
honesty and integrity and the very job upon which her family depend for their livelihood.
Every sentence in her answer (Exh. "5") is relevant, and constitutes privileged matter. She did
not go further than her interest or duties require. She did not go beyond explaining what was
said of her in the complaint for the purpose of repairing if not entirely removing the effects of
the charge against her. She had absolutely no motive to libel Atty. Ruiz who, by the way, cast
the first stone. ... (Amended Record on Appeal pp. 10-11)

WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by appellant Jesus B. Ruiz is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The petition filed by petitioner Encarnacion Ucol is likewise DISMISSED for patent lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 119398 July 2, 1999
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE and
FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO JR., respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorney's
fees for acts done in the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these
officers exhibited acts characterized by evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But
even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still be held liable for nominal
damages if they had violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside
the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-GR CV No. 39252 promulgated on September
9, 1994. The assailed Decision reversed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2,
in Civil Case No. 91-55873, which disposed of the controversy in favor of herein petitioner in
the following manner: 3
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, ordering them, jointly and severally the following:
ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. To pay P143,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 26, 1986 until complete payment
thereof;
2. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon [from] June 8, 1986 until complete payment
thereof;
3. To pay P142,700.00 plus interest thereon from July 10, 1987 until complete payment
thereof;
4. To pay P70,000.00 plus interest thereon from February 1, 1987 until complete payment
thereof;
PFR | 43
5. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 22, 1987 until complete payment
thereof;
6. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon from April 26, 1987 until complete payment
thereof;
7. To pay P14,000.00 plus interest thereon from May 17, 1987 until complete payment
thereof;
8. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from August 9, 1987 until complete payment
thereof;
9. To pay P174,000.00 plus interest thereon from December 13, 1987 until complete payment
thereof;
10. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from September 18, 1988 until complete
payment thereof;
11. All income derived from the foregoing amounts.
ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Ordering defendant Fernando O. Carrascoso the following:
1. To pay moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);
2. To pay exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00);
3. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00);
4. To pay the costs of suit.
The counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
In a Resolution 4 dated March 7, 1995, Respondent Court denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Facts
The following is the Court of Appeals' undisputed narration of the facts:
 PFR | 44

Plaintiff [herein petitioner] is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses

which he entered in the sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6, 1986 to
September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won the races on various dates, landing first,
second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with the 30% due for
trainer/grooms which are itemized as follows:

Date 3/25/86

Place 1st

Stake Horse Hansuyen

Racewinning 200,000.00

30% Due 57,000.00

Net Amount 143,000.00

6/8/86

Winner
2nd

Prize Claims
Stronghold

Training
40,000.00

Withheld by
12,000.00

28,000.00
Grooms
7/10/86

PCSO
 PFR | 45

1st 60,000.00

Kahala 140,000.00

4/26/87
200,000.00

3rd
57,300.00

Stormy Petril
142,700.00

2/1/87 40,000.00

1st 12,000.00

Devil's Brew 28,000.00

5/17/87
100,000.00

1st
30,000.00

Starring Role
70,000.00

3/22/87 20,000.00

1st 6,000.00

Time to Explode 14,000.00

8/8/87
200,000.00

1st
 PFR | 46

Star Studded 140,000.00

TOTAL
200,000.00

1,450,000.00
60,000.00

4,293,000.00
140,000.00

12/13/87 1,020,700.00

1st
[Herein petitioner] sent letters of demand (Exhibits "A," dated July 3, 1986; "B" dated August
18, 1986; and "C," dated September 11, 1990) to the defendants [herein private respondents]
Charade for the collection of the prizes due him. And [herein private respondents] consistently replied.
(Exhibits 2 and 3) that the demanded prizes are being withheld on advice of Commissioner
Ramon A. Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Government. Finally on January 30,
250,000.00 1991; this case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. But before receipt of the
summons on February 7, Presidential Commission on Good Government advi[s]ed
defendants that "if poses no more objection to the remittance of the prize winnings" (Exh. 6)
75,000.00 to [herein petitioner]. Immediately, this was communicated to Atty. Estelito Mendoza by
[Private Respondent Fernando] Carrascoso [Jr.]. 5

174,000.00 As culled from the pleadings of the parties, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, petitioner's counsel,
refused to accept the prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought
9/18/88 to court.

Ruling of the Trial Court

1st
The trial court ruled that Respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and its
then chairman, Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr., had no authority to withhold the
Hair Trigger subject racehorse winnings of petitioner, since no writ of sequestration therefor had been
issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). It held that it was
Carrascoso's unwarranted personal initiative not to release the prizes. Having been a
200,000.00 previous longtime associate of petitioner in his horse racing and breeding activities, he had
supposedly been aware that petitioner's winning horses were not ill-gotten. The trial court
held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso had acted in bad faith amounting to the
60,000.00 persecution and harassment of petitioner and his family. 6 It thus ordered the PCSO and

Carrascoso to pay in solidum petitioner's claimed winnings plus interests. It further ordered
Carrascoso to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of
suit.1âwphi1.nêt
While the case was pending with the Court of Appeals, petitioner moved for the partial
execution pending appeal of the RTC judgment, praying for the payment of the principal
amount of his prize winnings. Private respondents posed no objection thereto and manifested
their readiness to release the amount prayed for. Hence, the trial court issued on February
14, 1992, an Order 7 for the issuance of a writ of execution in the amount of P1,020,700.
Accordingly, on May 20, 1992, Respondent PCSO delivered the amount to petitioner.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Before the appellate court, herein private respondents assigned the following errors: 8
I Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO);
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ACTED IN
BAD FAITH IN WITHHOLDING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE['S] PRIZE[S];
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED [IN] AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.
In reversing the trial court's finding of bad faith on the part of Carrascoso, the Court of
Appeals held that the former PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction of the
PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of petitioner. It noted that, at the time, the scope of the
sequestration of the properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his cronies was
not well-defined. Respondent Court explained: 9
. . . Under those equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further
instructions from the PCGG, the official government agency on the matter, on what to do with
the prize winnings of the [petitioner], and more so, to obey the instructions subsequently
given. The actions taken may be a hard blow on [petitioner] but defendant Carrascoso had no
alternative. It was the safest he could do in order to protect public interest, act within the
powers of his position and serve the public demands then prevailing. More importantly, it was
the surest way to avoid a possible complaint for neglect of duty or misfeasance of office or an
anti-graft case against him.
The Court of Appeals also noted that the following actuations of Carrascoso negated bad
faith: (1) he promptly replied to petitioner's demand for the release of his prizes, citing
PCGG's instruction to withhold payment thereof; (2) upon PCGG's subsequent advice to
PFR | 47
release petitioner's winnings, he immediately informed petitioner thereof; and (3) he
interposed no objection to the partial execution, pending appeal, of the RTC decision.
Respondent Court finally disposed as follows: 10
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING this case. No pronouncement as to costs.
On September 29, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on
March 7, 1995. Hence, this petition. 11
Issues
Petitioner asks this Court to resolve the following issues:
a. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent Philippine
b. Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should have been dismissed for his
failure to file an appeal brief;
c. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review and reverse the judgment on a
cause of action which was not appealed from by the respondents;
d. Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by
evidence and the law. 12
Being related, the first two issues will be discussed jointly.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
First and Second Issues:
Effect of PCSO's Appeal Brief
Petitioner contends that the appeal filed by the PCSO before Respondent Court of Appeals
should have been dismissed outright. The appealed RTC decision ruled on two causes of
action: (1) a judgment against both PCSO and Carrascoso to jointly and severally pay
petitioner his winnings plus interest and income; and (2) a judgment against Carrascoso
alone for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs. The PCSO,
through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), appealed only the second
item: "the impropriety of the award of damages . . . ." This appealed portion, however,

condemned only Carrascoso, not the PCSO. Technically, petitioner claims, PCSO could not
have appealed the second portion of the RTC Decision which ruled against Carrascoso only,
and not against the government corporation.
Petitioner further avers that Carrascoso failed to file his own appeal brief; accordingly, his
appeal should have, been dismissed. The PCSO brief, he submits, could not have inured to
the benefit of Carrascoso, because the latter was no longer chairman of that office at the time
the brief was filed and, hence, could no longer be represented by the OGCC.
On the other hand, respondents aver that the withholding of petitioner's racehorse winnings
by Respondent Carrascoso occurred during the latter's incumbency as PCSO chairman.
According to him, he had honestly believed that it was within the scope of his authority not to
release said winnings, in view of then President Corazon C. Aquino's Executive Order No. 2
(EO 2), in which she decreed the following:
(1) Freeze all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos
and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close friends, subordinates, business
associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation;
(2) Prohibit any person from transferring, conveying, encumbering or otherwise depleting or
concealing such assets and properties or from assisting or taking part in their transfer,
encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation, under pain of such penalties as are prescribed by
law.
Moreover, he argues that he sought the advice of the PCGG as to the nature of the subject
racehorse winnings, and he was told that they were part of petitioner's sequestered
properties. Under these circumstances and in his belief that said winnings were fruits of
petitioner's ill-gotten properties, he deemed it his duty to withhold them. The chairman of the
PCSO, he adds, is empowered by law to order the withholding of prize winnings.
The representation of the OGCC on behalf of the PCSO and Mr. Carrascoso is pursuant to its
basic function to "act as the principal law office of all government-owned or controlled
corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate offsprings and government acquired asset
corporations and . . . [to] exercise control and supervision over all legal departments or
divisions maintained separately and such powers and functions as are now or may hereafter
be provided by law." 13 The OGCC was therefore duty-bound to defend the PCSO because
the latter, under its charter, 14 is a government-owned corporation. The government
counsel's representation extends to the concerned government functionary's officers when
the issue involves the latter's official acts or duties. 15
Granting that upon his separation from the government, Carrascoso ceased to be entitled to
the legal services of the government corporate counsel, this development does not
automatically revoke or render ineffective his notice of appeal of the trial court's Decision. The
PFR | 48
filing of an appellant's brief is not an absolute requirement for the perfection of an appeal. 16
Besides, when noncompliance with the Rules of Court is not intended for delay or does not
prejudice the adverse party, the dismissal of an appeal on a mere technicality may be stayed
and the court may, at its sound discretion, exercise its equity
jurisdiction. 17 The emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the
constraints of technicalities. 18
What is important is that Respondent Carrascoso filed his notice of appeal on time and that
his counsel before the lower court, who was presumed to have continued representing him
on appeal, 19 had filed an appeal brief on his behalf. The Manifestation of Carrascoso before
the Court of Appeals that he intended to hire the services of another counsel and to file his
own brief did not ipso facto effect a change of counsel under the existing rules of procedure.
The former counsel must first file a formal petition withdrawing his appearance with the
client's consent, and the newly appointed attorney should formally enter his appearance
before the appellate court with notice to the adverse party. 20 But other than Carrascoso's
manifestation of his intention to hire a counsel of his own, the requisites for a change of
counsel were not fully complied with. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, even an effective
change of attorney will not abrogate the pleadings filed before the court by the former
counsel.
All in all, we hold that the appellate court committed no reversible error in not dismissing the
appeal, since this matter was addressed to its sound discretion, and since such discretion
exercised reasonably in accordance with the doctrine that cases should, as much as
possible, be decided on their merits.
Third Issue:
Scope of the Appeal
Before Respondent Court
Petitioner is correct in asserting that the entire RTC judgment was not appealed to
Respondent Court of Appeals. The errors assigned in the appellants' Brief, as quoted earlier,
attacked only the trial court's (1) conclusion that "defendants-appellants acted in bad faith"
and (2) award of damages in favor of herein petitioner. In short, only those parts relating to
the second cause of action could be reviewed by the CA.
Respondent Court could not therefore reverse and set aside the RTC Decision in its entirety
and dismiss the original Complaint without trampling upon the rights that had accrued to the
petitioner from the unappealed portion of the Decision. It is well-settled that only the errors
assigned and properly argued in the brief, and those necessarily related thereto, may be
considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case. 21 The appellate

court has no power to resolve unassigned errors, except those that affect the court's
jurisdiction over the subject matter and those that are plain or clerical errors. 22
Having said that, we note, however, that Respondent Court in its Decision effectively
recognized the confines of the appeal, as it stated at the outset that "this appeal shall be
limited to the damages awarded in the [RTC] decision other than the claims for race winning
prizes." 23 The dispositive portion of the Decision must be understood together with the
aforequoted statement that categorically defined the scope of Respondent Court's review.
Consequently, what the assailed Decision "reversed and set aside" was only that part of the
appealed judgment finding bad faith on the part of herein Private Respondent Carrascoso
and awarding damages to herein petitioner. It did not annul the trial court's order for
Respondent PCSO to pay Petitioner Cojuangco his racehorse winnings, because this Order
had never been assigned as an error sought to be corrected.
On the contrary, Respondent PCSO had probably never intended to further object to the
payment, as it so manifested before the trial court 24 in answer to Petitioner Cojuangco's
Motion 25 for the partial execution of the judgment. In fact, on May 20, 1992, PCSO willingly
and readily paid the petitioner the principal amount of P1,020,700 in accordance with the writ
of execution issued by the trial court on February 14, 1992. 26 Obviously and plainly, the
RTC judgment, insofar as it related to the first cause of action, had become final and no
longer subject to appeal.
In any event, the Court of Appeals' discussion regarding the indispensability of the PCGG as
a party-litigant to the instant case was not pivotal to its reversal of the appealed trial court
Decision. It merely mentioned that the non-joinder of the PCGG made the Complaint
vulnerable or susceptible to dismissal. It did not rule that it was the very ground, or at least
one of the legal grounds, it relied upon in setting aside the appealed judgment. It could not
have legally done so anyway, because the PCGG's role in the controversy, if any, had never
been an issue before the trial court. Well-settled is the doctrine that no question, issue or
argument will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the court a quo. 27
The aforementioned discussion should therefore be construed only in light of the previous
paragraphs relating to Respondent Carrascoso's good faith which, the appellate court
surmised, was indicated by his reliance on PCGG's statements that the subject prize
winnings of Petitioner Cojuangco were part of the sequestered properties. In other words,
Respondent Court's view that the non-inclusion of PCGG as a party made the Complaint
dismissible was a mere aside that did not prejudice petitioner.
Fourth Issue:
Damages
PFR | 49
Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's finding that
Respondent Carrascoso acted in bad faith in withholding his winnings. We do not think so.
Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty
due to some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud. 28
We do not believe that the above judicially settled nature of bad faith characterized the
questioned acts of Respondent Carrascoso. On the contrary, we believe that there is
sufficient evidence on record to support Respondent Court's conclusion that he did not act in
bad faith. It reasoned, and we quote with approval: 29
A close examination of the June 10, 1986 letter of defendant Carrascoso to Jovito Salonga,
then Chairman of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, readily display
uncertainties in the mind of Chairman Carrascoso as to the extent of the sequestration
against the properties of the plaintiff. In the said letter (Exhibit "1") the first prize for the March
16, 1986 draw and the second prize for the June 8, 1986 draw, were, in the meantime, being
withheld to "avoid any possible violation of your sequestration order on the matter" because
while he is aware of the sequestration order issued against the properties of defendant
Eduardo Cojuangco, he is not aware of the extent and coverage thereof. It was for that
reason that, in the same letter, defendant Carrascoso requested for a clarification whether
the prizes are covered by the order and if it is in the affirmative, for instructions on the proper
disposal of the two (2) prizes taking into account the shares of the trainer and the groom.
Correspondingly, in a letter dated June 13, 1986 (Exhibit 2) PCGG Commissioner Ramon A.
Diaz authorized the payment to the trainer and the groom but instructed the withholding of the
amounts due plaintiff Eduardo Cojuangco. This piece of evidence should be understood and
appreciated in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. PCGG was just a newly
born legal creation and "sequestration" was a novel remedy which even legal luminaries were
not sure as to the actual procedure, the correct approach and the manner how the powers of
the said newly created office should be exercised and the remedy of sequestration properly
implemented without violating due process of law. To the mind of their newly installed power,
the immediate concern is to take over and freeze all properties of former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, his immediate families, close associates and cronies. There is no denying that
plaintiff is a very close political and business associate of the former President. Under those
equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further instructions from
the PCGG, the official government agency on the matter, on what to do with the prize
winnings of the plaintiff, and more so, to obey the instructions subsequently given. The
actions taken may be a hard blow on plaintiff but defendant Carrascoso had no alternative. It
was the safest he could do in order to protect public interest, act within the powers of his
position and serve the public demands then prevailing. More importantly, it was the surest
way to avoid a possible complaint for neglect of duty or misfeasance of office or an anti-graft
case against him.

xxx xxx xxx
Moreover, the finding of bad faith against defendant Carrascoso is overshadowed by the
evidences showing his good faith. He was just recently appointed chairman of the PCGG
when he received the first demand for the collection of the prize for the March 16, 1986 race
which he promptly answered saying he was under instructions by the PCGG to withhold such
payment. But the moment he received the go signal from the PCGG that the prize winnings of
plaintiff Cojuangco could already be released, he immediately informed the latter thereof,
interposed no objection to the execution pending appeal relative thereto, in fact, actually paid
off all the winnings due the plaintiff. . . .
Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winnings could not be characterized as arbitrary
or whimsical, or even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from PCGG a
clarification of the extent and coverage of the sequestration order issued against the
properties of petitioner. 30 He had acted upon the PCGG's statement that the subject prizes
were part of those covered by the sequestration order and its instruction "to hold in a proper
bank deposits [sic] earning interest the amount due Mr. Cojuangco." 31 Besides, EO 2 had
just been issued by then President Aquino," freez[ing] all assets and properties in the
Philippines [of] former President Marcos and/or his wife, . . . their close friends, subordinates,
business associates . . ."; and enjoining the "transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or
dissipation [thereof], under pain of such penalties as prescribed by law." It cannot, therefore,
be said that Respondent Carrascoso, who relied upon these issuances, acted with malice or
bad faith.
The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary
damages for acts done in the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of
bad faith, malice or gross negligence. 32 Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation cannot be
imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the grounds provided therefor
under the Civil Code. 33 The trial court's award of these kinds of damages must perforce be
deleted, as ruled by the Court of Appeals.
Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial that Respondent Carrascoso
may still be held liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstruct, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and
liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(6) The rights against deprivation of property without due process of law;
PFR | 50
xxx xxx xxx
In Aberca v. Ver, 34 this Court explained the nature and the purpose of this article as follows:
It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the
deeply cherished rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no
man may seek to violate those sacred rights with impunity. In times of great upheaval or of
social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield — borrowing the words of
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is
necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and
cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The
rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic principles
and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the
expression of the will of the predominant power in the community. "Democracy cannot be a
reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and
by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of
idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain
residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless
controls." 35
Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad
faith. 36 To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of
petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of one's
duties. 37
We hold that petitioner's right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While
Respondent Carrascoso may have relied upon the PCGG's instructions, he could have
further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little exercise of prudence would have
disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the racehorse
winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his
racehorses either. The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima
facie case and due regard for the requirements of due process. 38 The withholding of the
prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order clearly spoke of a
violation of his property rights without due process of law.
Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing
that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. 39 The court may also award
nominal damages in every case where a property right has been invaded. 40 The amount of
such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, with the relevant
circumstances taken into account. 41
 PFR | 51

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision, as herein
clarified, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Private Respondent Fernando O.
Carrascoso Jr. is ORDERED TO PAY petitioner nominal damages in the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000). No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 182976 January 14, 2013
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. PABLITO M. CASTILLO, doing business under the trade name and style of
PERMANENT LIGHT MANUFACTURING ENTERPRISES and GUIA S. CASTILLO,
Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition1 for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Decision2 dated May
21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80572. The Court of Appeals had
affirmed with modification the Decision3dated July 9, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasig City, Branch 168, in Civil Case No. 65224. The appellate court deleted the award to
petitioner Manila Electric Company (Meralco) of the amount of P1, 138,898.86, representing
overpaid electric bills, and ordered petitioner to pay temperate damages to respondents in
the amount of P500,000.
The facts follow.
Respondents Pablito M. Castillo and Guia S. Castillo are spouses engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling fluorescent fixtures, office steel cabinets and related metal
fabrications under the name and style of Permanent Light Manufacturing Enterprises
(Permanent Light).
On March 2, 1994, the Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) approved the award to Permanent Light of a contract for the supply and installation of
1,200 units of lateral steel filing cabinets worth P7,636,800.4 Immediately, Permanent Light
began production of the steel cabinets so that it can obtain the award for the supply of 500
additional units.
In the afternoon of April 19, 1994, Joselito Ignacio and Peter Legaspi, Fully Phased
Inspectors of petitioner Meralco, sought permission to inspect Permanent Light’s electric
meter. Said inspection was carried out in the presence of Mike Malikay, an employee of
respondents.
The results of the inspection, which are contained in a Special Investigation Report,5 show
that the terminal seal of Permanent Light’s meter was deformed, its meter seal was covered
with fake lead, and the 100th dial pointer was misaligned. On the basis of these findings,
Ignacio concluded that the meter was tampered with and electric supply to Permanent Light
PFR | 52
was immediately disconnected. The questioned meter was then taken to Meralco’s laboratory
for verification.
By petitioner Meralco’s claim, it sustained losses in the amount of P126,319.92 over a 24-
month period,6 on account of Permanent Light’s tampered meter. The next day, in order to
secure the reconnection of electricity to Permanent Light, respondents paid P50,000 as down
payment on the differential bill to be rendered by Meralco.7
Thereafter, Meralco performed a Polyphase Meter Test on the disputed meter and made the
following findings:
1. The ST-5 seal#A217447 padlock type was tampered by forcibly pulling out the sealing
hasp while the lead cover seals (ERB#1 (1989) and Meralco#21) were found fake.
2. The meshing adjustment between the 1st driven gear and the rotating disc was found
altered causing the said gear to [disengage] totally from the driving gear of the same disc.
Under this condition, the meter failed to register, hence, had not been registering the energy
(KWhrs) and kw demand used by the customer.
3. The 100th dial pointer of the register was found out of alignment which indicates that the
meter had been opened to manipulate said dial pointer and set manually to the desired
reading.8
Petitioner Meralco billed Permanent Light the amount of P61,709.11, representing the latter’s
unregistered electric consumption for the period of September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994.
Meralco, however, credited the initial payment of P50,000 made by respondents. It assessed
respondents a balance of P11,709.11, but later reduced said amount to P5,538.20 after
petitioner allowed respondents a 10% discount on their total bill. Then, petitioner received the
amount of P5,538.20 as full settlement of the remaining balance.
Subsequently, respondents received an electric bill in the amount of P38,693.53 for the
period of March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994. This was followed by another bill for P192,009.64
covering the period from November 19, 1993 to April 21, 1994. Respondents contested both
assessments in a Letter dated October 12, 1994.9 They likewise complained of a significant
increase in their electric bills since petitioner installed the replacement meter on April 20,
1994.
In a Letter dated December 7, 1994,10 petitioner Meralco explained that the bill for
P38,693.53 was already a "corrected bill." According to petitioner, the bill for P192,009.64
was adjusted on August 25, 1994 to reflect respondents’ payment of P61,709.11 as
settlement of Permanent Light’s electric bills from September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994. It
assured respondents that Permanent Light’s meter has been tested on November 29, 1994
and was found to be in order. In the same letter, petitioner informed respondents that said

meter was replaced anew on December 1, 1994 after it sustained a crack during testing.
While respondents continued to pay, allegedly under protest, the succeeding bills of
Permanent Light, they refused to pay the bill for P38,693.53.
On August 2, 1995, respondents filed against Meralco a Petition11 for Injunction, Recovery of
a Sum of Money and Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order (TRO) and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The case was raffled to Branch 162 of the
Pasig RTC, which was presided over by Judge Manuel S. Padolina, and docketed as Civil
Case No. 65224.
Mainly, respondents prayed for the issuance of a permanent injunction to enjoin petitioner
from cutting power supply to Permanent Light, refrain from charging them unrecorded electric
consumption and demanding payment of P38,693.53, representing their bill for March 22,
1994 to April 21, 1994. Corollary to this, respondents sought reimbursement of the
P55,538.20 that they had paid as the estimated electric bill of Permanent Light from
September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994. They likewise prayed for the reinstatement of their
old meter, which respondents believe accurately records Permanent Light’s electric
consumption.
In an Order12 dated August 29, 1995, the RTC directed the issuance of a TRO to restrain
petitioner Meralco from disconnecting electricity to Permanent Light. Later, in an Order13
dated September 8, 1995, the RTC directed the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P95,000.
While trial was pending, respondents reiterated their request for a replacement meter.
According to them, the meters installed by Meralco ran faster than the one it confiscated
following the disconnection on April 19, 1994.
In 1997, Judge Manuel S. Padolina retired. Thus, the case was heard by Pairing Judge
Aurelio C. Trampe until the parties had presented all their witnesses. On October 30, 1998,
respondents rested their case and submitted a Written Offer of Exhibits.14 Meanwhile,
petitioner filed a Formal Offer of Evidence15 on September 22, 1999. By then, a regular
presiding judge had been appointed to Branch 162 in the person of Hon. Erlinda Piñera Uy.
However, on November 8, 1999, respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Inhibit Ad
Cautelam.16 Judge Uy voluntarily recused herself from hearing the case by Order17 dated
November 10, 1999. Eventually, the case was raffled to Branch 168 of the Pasig RTC
presided by Judge Leticia Querubin Ulibarri.
On November 28, 2001, Meralco installed a new electric meter at the premises of Permanent
Light. Following this, on January 29, 2002, respondents filed an Urgent Motion to Proffer and
Mark the Latest Meralco Bill of P9,318.65 which was Reflected in the 3rd Meralco Electric
Meter
PFR | 53
Recently Installed by Defendant Meralco.18 Despite petitioner’s opposition, the RTC admitted
said bill into evidence.
On July 9, 2003, the Pasig RTC, Branch 168, rendered judgment in favor of respondents.
The fallo of said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners
and against the respondent ordering the latter to pay the former the following:
1. P1,138,898.86 representing overpayments made by the petitioners from May 1994 to
November 2001;
2. P200,000.00 as and for moral damages;
3. P100,000.00 as and for exemplary damages;
4. P100,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and
5. the costs of this suit.
On the other hand, petitioners are hereby ordered to pay to the respondent the amount of
P38,693.53 representing the billing differential.
The Preliminary Injunction issued by the Court is hereby made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.19
The trial court ruled that petitioner failed to observe due process when it disconnected
electricity to Permanent Light. It explained that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 783220
(RA 7832), in order that a tampered meter may constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use
of electricity by the person benefited thereby, the discovery thereof must have been
witnessed by an officer of the law or an authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory
Board (ERB). In this case, however, the RTC noted that no officer of the law or authorized
ERB representative was present when the tampered meter was discovered. Moreover, the
trial court found no direct evidence to prove that respondents were responsible for tampering
with said meter.
On the basis of the proffered bill dated December 29, 2001,21 the RTC concluded that the
replacement meter installed by Meralco did not accurately register Permanent Light’s electric
consumption. Consequently, it ordered petitioner to reimburse respondents in the amount of
P1,138,898.86, representing the supposed overpayment from April 1994 to November 2001.
For failure to observe due process in disconnecting electricity to Permanent Light, the trial

court likewise imposed upon petitioner Meralco moral and exemplary damages in the amount
of P200,000 and P100,000, respectively.
In the assailed Decision dated May 21, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification
the Decision of the RTC. It deleted the award of P1,138,898.86 in favor of respondents and
instead ordered petitioner to pay temperate damages in the amount of P500,000.
The Court of Appeals held that petitioner abused its right when it disconnected the electricity
of Permanent Light. The appellate court upheld the validity of the provision in petitioner’s
service contract which allows the utility company to disconnect service upon a customer’s
failure to pay the differential billing. It however stressed that under Section 9722 of Revised
Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the right of a public utility to discontinue its
service to a customer is subject to the requirement of a 48-hour written notice of
disconnection. Petitioner’s failure in this regard, according to the appellate court, justifies the
award of moral and exemplary damages to respondents.
The Court of Appeals ordered petitioner to reimburse respondents for overpayment on their
electric bills. It sustained the finding of the trial court that the electric meter installed by
petitioner in Permanent Light’s premises on April 20, 1994 was registering a higher reading
than usual. The appellate court based its conclusion on the marked difference between
Permanent Light’s net billing from 1985 to 2001 compared to its consumption after the new
meter was installed, and the consequent decrease after said meter was replaced on
November 28, 2001. However, instead of actual damages, the Court of Appeals awarded
respondents temperate damages in the amount of P500,000.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES IN
FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS;23
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN AWARDING P500,000.00 FOR AND AS TEMPERATE DAMAGES IN
FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENTS.24
Amplified, the issues for our resolution are two-fold: (1) Are respondents entitled to claim
damages for petitioner’s act of disconnecting electricity to Permanent Light on April 19, 1994?
PFR | 54
and (2) Are respondents entitled to actual damages for the supposed overbilling by petitioner
Meralco of their electric consumption from April 20, 1994 to November 28, 2001?
Petitioner faults the Court of Appeals for affirming the award of moral and exemplary
damages to respondents. It argues that respondents failed to establish how the disconnection
of electricity to Permanent Light for one day compromised its production. Petitioner cites
respondents’ admission that soon after the power went out, they used generators to keep the
operations of Permanent Light on track.
Petitioner further negates bad faith in discontinuing service to Permanent Light without notice
to respondents. It contends that the 48-hour notice requirement in Section 97 of Revised
General Order No. 1 applies only to a customer who fails to pay the regular bill. Petitioner
insists that the discovery by its Fully Phased Inspectors of Permanent Light’s tampered meter
justified disconnection of electricity to the latter.
Also, petitioner challenges the award of temperate damages to respondents for the alleged
overbilling. It objects to the admission into evidence of Permanent Light’s December 29, 2001
electric bill, which respondents proffered two years after the case was submitted for decision
by the court a quo. Petitioner disputes the finding of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that
respondents overpaid on Permanent Light’s electric bill. It reasons that the volume of
business of any establishment varies from season to season such that it cannot be expected
to constantly register the same electric consumption. Lastly, petitioner protests the award of
P500,000 in temperate damages as excessive and unconscionable.
In a Memorandum dated May 27, 2009, respondents denied any involvement in the
tampering of Permanent Light’s electric meter. Respondents reiterate that petitioner violated
their right to due process when it disconnected electricity to Permanent Light without
apprising them of their violation and affording them an opportunity to pay the differential bill
within the 10-day grace period provided by law. Respondents claim that such disconnection
imperiled the prompt completion of Permanent Light’s contract with GSIS, thereby causing
them anxiety. They believe that the "embarrassment, humiliation and pain" brought about by
such disconnection justify the award of moral damages in their favor. Respondents invoke
Article 2425 of the Civil Code on parens patriae against the alleged abuse by petitioner
Meralco of its monopoly as an electric service provider.
Respondents also rely on the testimony of Enrique Katipunan, Meralco Billing Expert, to
prove that the sudden increase in Permanent Light’s electric consumption was caused by the
"high-speed" replacement meter installed by petitioner. They reiterate their claim for actual
damages, arguing that absolute certainty as to its amount need not be shown since the loss
has been established.
Upon a careful consideration of the circumstances of this case, the Court resolves to deny
the petition.

The pertinent law relative to the immediate disconnection of electricity is Section 4, RA 7832,
which reads:
SEC. 4. Prima Facie Evidence.–(a) The presence of any of the following circumstances shall
constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, as defined in this Act, by the
person benefitted thereby, and shall be the basis for: (1) the immediate disconnection by the
electric utility to such person after due notice, x x x
(iv) The presence of a tampered, broken, or fake seal on the meter, or mutilated, altered, or
tampered meter recording chart or graph, or computerized chart, graph, or log;
xxxx
(viii) x x x Provided, however, That the discovery of any of the foregoing circumstances, in
order to constitute prima facie evidence, must be personally witnessed and attested to by an
officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB).
Thus, in order for the discovery of a tampered, broken or fake seal on the meter to constitute
prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity by the person who benefits from such illegal
use, the discovery thereof must have been personally witnessed and attested to by an officer
of the law or a duly authorized representative of the ERB.
Citing Quisumbing v. Manila Electric Company,26 we reiterated the significance of this
requirement in Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) v. Chua,27 thus:
The presence of government agents who may authorize immediate disconnections go into
the essence of due process. Indeed, we cannot allow respondent to act virtually as
prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter
tampering. That would not sit well in a democratic country. After all, Meralco is a monopoly
that derives its power from the government. Clothing it with unilateral authority to disconnect
would be equivalent to giving it a license to tyrannize its hapless customers.
On cross-examination, Meralco’s Fully Phased Inspector, Joselito M. Ignacio, recounted who
were present during the inspection:
Q. Mr. Ignacio, let us reconstruct the evidence on April 19, 1994. Before you came across the
Meralco meter of the plaintiffs, where did you come from?
A. We were inspecting other meters within that vicinity.
Q. So you mean to tell us that you were cruising in the vicinity of Cubao, Quezon City on April
19?
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A. Yes, sir.
Q. And were you alone?
A. No, sir, we were two.
Q. Who was with you?
A. Mr. Peter Legaspi, sir.28
On further cross-examination by Atty. Pablito M. Castillo, Ignacio confirmed that only he and
another Fully Phased Inspector were present when they discovered Permanent Light’s
tampered meter:
Q. Who was with you when you entered the compound of the plaintiffs?
ATTY. BONA: Already answered, Mr. Legaspi.
ATTY. CASTILLO: No. They were both on board but the question now is more particular.
ATTY. BONA: At what particular time?
WITNESS:
A. Mr. Legaspi.
COURT: Only?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.29
Absent any showing that an officer of the law or a duly authorized representative of the ERB
personally witnessed and attested to the discovery of Permanent Light’s tampered electric
meter, such discovery did not constitute prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity that
justifies immediate disconnection of electric service.
Besides, even if there is prima facie evidence of illegal use of electricity, Section 4, RA 7832
requires due notice to the person benefited before disconnection of electricity can be
effected. Specifically, Section 6 of RA 7832 calls for prior written notice or warning, thus:
SEC. 6. Disconnection of Electric Service. - The private electric utility or rural electric
cooperative concerned shall have the right and authority to disconnect immediately the
electric service after serving a written notice or warning to that effect, without the need of a

court or administrative order, and deny restoration of the same, when the owner of the house
or establishment concerned or someone acting in his behalf shall have been caught in
flagrante delicto doing any of the acts enumerated in Section 4(a) hereof, or when any of the
circumstances so enumerated shall have been discovered for the second time: Provided,
That in the second case, a written notice or warning shall have been issued upon the first
discovery: x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even when the consumer, or someone acting in his behalf, is caught in flagrante delicto
or in the act of doing any of the acts enumerated in Section 4 of RA 7832, petitioner may not
immediately disconnect electricity without serving a written notice or warning to the owner of
the house or establishment concerned.
Petitioner Meralco submitted a memorandum with Control No. 6033-9430 dated April 19,
1994 to prove that respondents were duly notified of the disconnection. Notwithstanding,
petitioner maintains that the 48-hour notice of disconnection does not apply in this case since
Section 97 of Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission pertains to nonpayment
of bills while the cause for discontinuing service to Permanent Light was the discovery of the
tampered meter.
We do not agree.
On February 9, 1987, the Bureau of Energy approved31 the Revised Terms and Conditions
of Service and Revised Standard Rules and Regulations of Meralco’s Electric Service
Contract. Pertinent to this case, the provision on Discontinuance of Service under the
Revised Terms and Conditions of Service states:
DISCONTINUANCE OF SERVICE:
The Company reserves the right to discontinue service in case the Customer is in arrears in
the payment of bills or for failure to pay the adjusted bills in those cases where the meter
stopped or failed to register the correct amount of energy consumed, or for failure to comply
with any of these terms and conditions, or in case of or to prevent fraud upon the Company.
Before disconnection is made in case of or to prevent fraud, the Company may adjust the bill
of said Customer accordingly and if the adjusted bill is not paid, the Company may
disconnect the same. In case of disconnection, the provisions of Revised Order No. 1 of the
former Public Service Commission (now the Board of Energy) shall be observed. Any such
suspension of service shall not terminate the contract between the Company and the
Customer.32 (Emphasis supplied)
On August 3, 1995, the ERB passed Resolution No. 95-21 or the Standard Rules and
Regulations Governing the Operation of Electrical Power Services which superseded and
revoked Revised Order No. 1, which the Public Service Commission adopted on November
PFR | 56
27, 1941. The relevant provision on disconnection of service is found in Section 48 of ERB
Resolution No. 95-21, which reads:
SEC. 48. Refusal or Discontinuance of Service. – An electric utility shall not refuse or
discontinue service to an applicant, or customer, who is not in arrears to the electric utility,
even though there are unpaid charges due from the premises occupied by the applicant, or
customer, on account of unpaid bill of a prior tenant, unless there is evidence of conspiracy
between them to defraud the electric utility.
Service may be discontinued for the nonpayment of bills as provided for in Section 43 hereof,
provided that a forty eight (48)-hour written notice of such disconnection has been given the
customer; Provided, however, that disconnections of service shall not be made on Fridays,
Saturdays, Sundays and official holidays; Provided, further, that if at the moment of the
disconnection is to be made the customer tenders payment of the unpaid bill to the agent or
employee of the electric utility who is to effect the disconnection, the said agent, or employee
shall be obliged to accept tendered payment and issue a temporary receipt for the amount
and shall desist from disconnecting the service.
The electric utility may discontinue service in case the customer is in arrear(s) in the payment
of bill(s). Any such suspension of service shall not terminate the contract between the electric
utility and the customer.
In the case of arrear(s) in the payment of bill(s), the electric utility may discontinue the service
notwithstanding the existence of the customer’s deposit with the electric utility which will
serve as guarantee for the payment of future bill(s) after service is reconnected. (Emphasis
supplied)
True, Section 48 of ERB Resolution No. 95-21 expressly provides for the application of the
48-hour notice rule to Section 43 on Payment of Bills. However, petitioner Meralco, through
its Revised Terms and Conditions of Service, adopted said notice requirement where
disconnection of service is warranted because (1) the consumer failed to pay the adjusted bill
after the meter stopped or failed to register the correct amount of energy consumed, (2) or for
failure to comply with any of the terms and conditions, (3) or in case of or to prevent fraud
upon the Company.
Considering the discovery of the tampered meter by its Fully Phased Inspectors, petitioner
Meralco could have disconnected electricity to Permanent Light for no other reason but to
prevent fraud upon the Company. Therefore, under the Revised Terms and Conditions of
Service vis-a-vis Section 48 of ERB Resolution No. 95-21, petitioner is obliged to furnish
respondents with a 48-hour notice of disconnection. Having failed in this regard, we find basis
for the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of respondents for the
unceremonious disconnection of electricity to Permanent Light.

Moral damages are awarded to compensate the claimant for physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury.33 Jurisprudence has established the following requisites for the
award of moral damages: (1) there is an injury whether physical, mental or psychological,
which was clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there is a culpable act or omission factually
established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the
injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the
cases stated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.34
Pertinent to the case at hand, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides for the award of moral
damages in cases where the rights of individuals, including the right against deprivation of
property without due process of law, are violated.35 In Quisumbing v. Manila Electric
Company, this Court treated the immediate disconnection of electricity without notice as a
form of deprivation of property without due process of law, which entitles the subscriber
aggrieved to moral damages. We stressed:
More seriously, the action of the defendant in maliciously disconnecting the electric service
constitutes a breach of public policy. For public utilities, broad as their powers are, have a
clear duty to see to it that they do not violate nor transgress the rights of the consumers. Any
act on their part that militates against the ordinary norms of justice and fair play is considered
an infraction that gives rise to an action for damages. Such is the case at bar.36
Here, petitioner failed to establish factual basis for the immediate disconnection of electricity
to Permanent Light and to comply with the notice requirement provided by law. As the court a
quo correctly observed, there is no direct evidence that points to respondents as the ones
who tampered with Permanent Light’s electric meter. Notably, the latter’s meter is located
outside its premises where it is readily accessible to anyone.
In addition to moral damages, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good. In this case, to serve as an example - that before
disconnection of electric supply can be effected by a public utility, the requisites of law must
be complied with - we sustain the award of exemplary damages to respondents.
In the assailed Decision dated May 21, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed the award of
moral damages and exemplary damages to respondents in the amount of P200,000 and
P100,000, respectively. In line with prevailing jurisprudence, however, this Court deems the
award of moral damages in the amount of P100,00037 and exemplary damages in the
amount of P50,00038 appropriate in cases where Meralco has wrongfully disconnected
electric service to its customer.
Nonetheless, the Court finds no reason to order the reimbursement to respondents of the
P55,538.20, which petitioner received as full settlement of Permanent Light’s "differential
billing" for its unregistered consumption from September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994. At this
PFR | 57
point, it is well to clarify that RA 7832 assigns a specific meaning to "differential billing" and
utilizes various methodologies as basis for determining the same. More particularly, Section
639 of RA 7832 defines "differential billing" as the amount to be charged to the person
concerned for the unbilled electricity illegally consumed by him. However, since RA 7832 was
approved only on December 8, 1994 and introduced such concept only on said date, it would
be improper to treat the term "differential billing" as used by Meralco in this case in such
context. Rather, we shall treat the same as a generic term to refer to the unbilled electricity
use of Permanent Light from September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994.
The Computation Worksheet40 of said "differential billing" shows that the amount of
P61,709.11 was derived based on Permanent Light’s average KWhour consumption for the
six months immediately preceding September 20, 1993. We find such method of computation
in accord with the Terms of Service approved by the Bureau of Energy on February 9, 1987,
thus:
PAYMENTS:
Bills will be rendered by the Company to the Customer monthly in accordance with the
applicable rate schedule. Said bills are payable to collectors or at the main or branch offices
of the Company or at its authorized banks within ten (10) days after the regular reading date
of the electric meters. The word "month" as used herein and in the rate schedule is hereby
defined to be the elapsed time between two succeeding meter readings approximately thirty
(30) days apart. In the event of the stoppage or the failure by any meter to register the full
amount of energy consumed, the Customer shall be billed for such period on an estimated
consumption based upon his use of energy in a similar period of like use or the registration of
a check meter.41 (Emphasis supplied)
Spreading the P61,709.11 over the 6-month period covered by the "differential billing" will
yield a monthly rate of P10,284.85 - well within Permanent Light’s average net bill for the
previous months. It is undisputed by respondents that from September 20, 1993 to March 22,
1994, Permanent Light continued to enjoy petitioner’s services even as its electric meter
stopped functioning and no monthly electric bills were issued to it. We cannot therefore allow
respondents to enrich themselves unjustly at the expense of petitioner public utility.
However, we are at a loss as to how petitioner Meralco arrived at the second "differential
billing" for P38,693.53, which represents Permanent Light’s unregistered consumption from
March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994. It bears mentioning that it was not until April 19, 1994 that
petitioner’s Fully Phased Inspectors replaced Permanent Light’s electric meter. In months
prior to that, Permanent Light’s electric meter had been stationary; hence, the first differential
bill for its consumption from September 20, 1993 to March 22, 1994. The first differential bill
was computed in accordance with the Terms of Service approved by the Bureau of Energy. It
is only proper that the same standard be used in estimating Permanent Light’s consumption
for the period of March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994.

Considering, however, that Permanent Light’s electric meter had stopped registering its
consumption for months prior to April 20, 1994, we shall base our estimate on Permanent
Light’s use of energy in a similar period. Permanent Light’s Bill History42 shows that from
March 19, 1992 to April 20, 1992, it consumed 3,648 KWhours of electricity. It last posted the
same level of consumption for the period of July 20, 1993 to August 19, 1993, for which it
was billed P10,834.58. We deem this amount a reasonable approximation of the net bill that
respondents should pay for Permanent Light’s use of electricity from March 22, 1994 to April
21, 1994.
We now turn to the question of whether respondents are entitled to actual damages for the
supposed overbilling by petitioner Meralco of their electric consumption from April 20, 1994 to
November 28, 2001.
Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the position
where it was before the injury. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually
sustained and susceptible of measurement. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a
party is entitled to adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as is duly proven.
Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable
of proof; it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon
competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.43
Respondents anchor their claim for actual damages on the alleged overbilling by petitioner
Meralco of Permanent Light’s electricity use from April 20, 1994 to November 28, 2001. In
support, respondents presented in evidence the Comparative Monthly Meralco Bills of
Permanent Light Mfg. Enterprises from 1985-2001.44 Said document lists the amounts which
respondents supposedly paid based on Permanent Light’s electric bills from the year 1985 to
2001 for a total of P2,466,941.22. In particular, respondents submitted "representative
Meralco bills" of Permanent Light for the years 1985 to 1987, 1993 to 1997 and 2001 to 2002.
On January 29, 2002, respondents filed with the court a quo an Urgent Motion to Proffer and
Mark the Latest Meralco Bill of P9,318.65 which was Reflected in the 3rd Meralco Electric
Meter Recently Installed by Defendant Meralco. Attached to said pleading is a copy of
Permanent Light’s electric bill for the period of November 29, 2001 to December 29, 2001 for
P9,318.65. Apparently, Meralco installed a new electric meter at the premises of Permanent
Light on November 28, 2001.
Respondents claim that the bill for P9,318.65 more accurately reflects Permanent Light’s
normal consumption, consistent with the latter’s electric bills before its meter was first
replaced on April 20, 1994. Respondents argue that, at most, their net bill should be at par
with those of Permanent Light’s neighboring establishments, Eureka Steel and Asiatic Steel
Manufacturing Co., (Asiatic Steel) which are purportedly engaged in the same business. For
the court’s reference, respondents submitted "representative Meralco bills" of Eureka Steel
PFR | 58
for 1996 to 1997 and Asiatic Steel for the years 1994 to 1998. Using the figures in the latter
bills vis-a-vis Permanent Light’s "comparative bills" from 1986 to 2001, respondents seek the
refund of P1,138,898.86, representing their alleged overpayment to Meralco.
However, Section 34,45 Rule 132 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, dictates
that the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. In this case,
respondents rely heavily on the bill for P9,318.65 covering the period of November 29, 2001
to December 29, 2001 to demonstrate a defect in the replacement meter installed at
Permanent Light on April 20, 1994. However, said bill was not included in the Written Offer of
Exhibits which respondents filed much earlier, on October 30, 1998. To be sure, it could not
have been made part thereof.
Yet, even if we disregard the bill for P9,318.65, we cannot ignore the sudden and
unexplainable increase in Permanent Light’s electric consumption following the replacement
of its broken meter. Normally, when a tampered electric meter is replaced, assuming the
same amount of monthly rate of usage, the new electric meter will register the increased use
of electricity that had previously been concealed by the tampered meter.46 While Permanent
Light’s electric meter, indeed, registered a sharp increase in its electricity use after being
replaced on April 20, 1994, there is no direct evidence to suggest that respondents tampered
with said meter. Truth be told, respondents repeatedly sought technical assistance from
Meralco after Permanent Light’s electric meter stopped working on December 7, 1993,47
albeit, without success. This fact remains undisputed by petitioner.
Based on Permanent Light’s Meralco bills of record, its electricity use has increased by
approximately 96.3% from an average of 1,672 KWhours per month in 1985 to 3,282
KWhours per month in 1993. On the other hand, the last recorded electric consumption of
Permanent Light before its meter broke, that is, from August 19, 1993 to September 20,
1993, was 3,432 KWhours while it registered a reading of 11,904 KWhours from June 20,
1994 to July 20, 1994 – a 246.85% increase in consumption over a period of nine (9) months.
This inordinate surge in electric reading is inconsistent with the pattern of steady but gradual
rise in Permanent Light’s consumption over the years. To our mind, the fact that Permanent
Light registered a significant increase in its electric use after the replacement meter was
installed is no reason to automatically conclude that its meter had been running tampered
long before the same stopped working. From 1985 to 1993, petitioner Meralco has observed
nothing irregular with Permanent Light’s recorded electric use such as a drastic and
unexplainable drop in its consumption to arouse suspicion that its meter has been tampered.
As the appellate court correctly observed, petitioner did not even present an iota of proof to
refute the claim that the replacement meter was running at an unusually high speed.48 It
must be underscored that petitioner has the imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper
inspection of its apparatus and equipment to ensure that they do not malfunction, and the due
diligence to discover and repair defects therein.49
 PFR | 59

Notably, respondents complained of a sudden spike in Permanent Light’s net bill in their
Letter50 to Meralco dated December 7, 1993 - two days before Permanent Light’s meter
stopped working. Thus, if it is true that there was evidence of tampering found on April 19,
1994 yet Permanent Light continued to register an increased consumption even after its
meter was replaced, the better view would be that the defective meter was not actually
corrected after the first inspection.
Be that as it may, we cannot award actual damages to respondents.
We reiterate that actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. The award is dependent upon competent proof
of the damage suffered and the actual amount thereof. The award must be based on the
evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy,
remote, speculative and unsubstantial proof.51
An award of attorney’s fees has always been the exception rather than the rule.1âwphi1
Attorney’s fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit. The policy of the Court
is that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate.54 The trial court must make
express findings of fact and law that bring the suit within the exception. What this demands is
that factual, legal or equitable justifications for the award must be set forth not only in the fallo
but also in the text of the decision, or else, the award should be thrown out for being
speculative and conjectural.55
Here, the award of attorney’s fees in favor of respondents appeared only in the fallo of the
trial court’s Decision dated July 9, 2003. Neither did the appellate court proffer any
justification for sustaining said award.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated May 21, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
80572 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, as follows:

In this case, respondents presented a summary of Permanent Light’s electric bills from the
years 1986 to 2001. Said list contains the amounts which respondents allegedly paid on
Permanent Light’s from 1986 to 2001. Curiously, respondents submitted mere "representative
samples" of
Permanent Light’s electric bills for the years 1985 to 1987 and from 1993 to 1997. It appears,
however, that respondents conveniently selected the bills which cover the period from
December to mid-March - months in which demand for electricity is normally less. To our
mind, respondents did this for no other reason than to magnify the disparity between
Permanent Light’s net bill before and after its meter was replaced on April 20, 1994 so that it
can demand greater in damages.
(a) Petitioner is ordered to pay respondents ;P300,000 as temperate damages, ;PI 00,000 as
moral damages and ;P50,000 as exemplary damages;
(b) Respondents are ordered to pay petitioner ; PI 0,834.58, representing the estimate of its
unregistered consumption for the period from March 22, 1994 to April 21, 1994; and
(c) The award of attorney's fees is DELETED for lack of basis.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED

Nonetheless, in the absence of competent proof on the amount of actual damages suffered, a
party is entitled to temperate damages.52 Temperate or moderate damages, which are more
than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered when the court finds
that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the
case, be proved with certainty.53 The amount thereof is usually left to the discretion of the
courts but the same should be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should
be more than nominal but less than compensatory.

In this case, we are convinced that respondents sustained damages from the abnormal
increase in Permanent Light’s electric bills after petitioner replaced the latter’s meter on April
19, 1994. However, respondents failed to establish the exact amount thereof by competent
evidence. Considering the attendant circumstances, an award of temperate damages in the
amount of P300,000 is just and reasonable.

Finally, we delete the award of attorney’s fees for lack of basis.


G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto
Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of
Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and
Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate
Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela
was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries
from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence
of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case
granted the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and
Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court
of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate
Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of
Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date
of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the
damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed
that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong
side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals
found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact
it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times for
violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) — violation which appeared in the
records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he
must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the
Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil
PFR | 60
action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held
responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla
to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals
insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is
found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil
liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of
Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is
applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission
not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon
him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of
Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his
negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action
against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article
1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that
Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an
employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued
in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must
cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos
and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth,
unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our
inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are
likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn
clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal
institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely
apart and independent from delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit
article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be
safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE

ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and
omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not
punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this
book.
xxx xxx xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or
negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages
caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their
authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages
caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or
on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the
damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of
doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be
applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils
or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove
that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
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ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from
the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The exemption from criminal
liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article
11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the
following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by
any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine
but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those
having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no
fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance
with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the
harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may
have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each
one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when
the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town,
and, in all events, whenever the damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities
or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or
causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons,
those doing the act shall be liable, saving always to the latter that part of their property
exempt from execution.

ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of
establishment. — In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any
other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them with
respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of
robbery with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless
committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary liability established in
the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations
engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period;
if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad
enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits
cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the
Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence,
the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been crowded out.
It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study
shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the
distinction between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-
delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce
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civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an
action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This
legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the
Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as
culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or
negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es
de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en daño al otro, pero
acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089,
one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then
article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of
Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to
the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or
cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil
Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if
there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in
which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all
violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of
ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
(See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the
employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Española"
(Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a
diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun
casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia
indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."

The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different
persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with
it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the penal
liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a
collision between two trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the
Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in
which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The
employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del
Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico
could still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion
was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia menos
parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los
quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la
accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades
civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas
agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por
delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones,
que cual la pena misma atañen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de
ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y
menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual
coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para
pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento
y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u
omision, causante de daños o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial
que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin
que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al
128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo,
desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en
terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por
alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre
aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene
al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o
falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales
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estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto
de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo
articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los
actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder;
personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los
establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones.
Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de
intervenir en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por
razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de
la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de
nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte
que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de
proceder, habiendose, por añadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la Compañia del
Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daños y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el
Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo
de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas
arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues del proceso; pero al
declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre
que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex
lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece
incolume, extraña a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that
there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the
losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation is
based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists
in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which give
rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which,
like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the
office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and damages
are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of
effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not
pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil
Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence
intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts
without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal
Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop

and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the
regime under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance with
legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed
comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on
account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor,
make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the
guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according to the
wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard,
the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the
next preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the
subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their
service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so
observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the
criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued
and sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice
and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different
fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch
as the Compaña del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the criminal
case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for
indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice
before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact
when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of
acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately reserved till after
the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony
and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject
matter upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil
obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact
and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the
Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-
contractual are similar to those of the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the
French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without
including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that
it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary
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in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author of the act or
at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the
employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish
translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that
the responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones de
aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para
contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto
legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a
primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal,
segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son
imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa,
pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la
negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueño o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc.
Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad,
incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un daño, la ley presume que el padre, el
tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el daño.
Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en
la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que
esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those
persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it
is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it true that
there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight; but such
assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal,
and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in
question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but
because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the father,
guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone
of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons,
employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian,
teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage.
It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a
responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act.
The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil
Español," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:

Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa,
doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas
personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad.
Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase
distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo
19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo
1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad
precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his
own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts
of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this
responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code distinguishes
between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other,
declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter,
subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903,
the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for
precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one should be
responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the
principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and
distinct legal institution, independent from the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability,
and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly
responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that
case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by
the "compañia Electric Madrileña de Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal
case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action against the street car
company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded
damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles
1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or
negligence had been declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que
el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compañia Electrica Madrileña al pago del daño causado
con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la
sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho,
cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as
pectos, y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho
de que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia
graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso
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de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902
del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de
establecimientos o empresas por los daños causados por sus dependientes en determinadas
condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo
aspecto y al condenar a la compañia recurrente a la indemnizacion del daño causado por
uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo
116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir
atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en
la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the
trial court, in sentencing the Compañia Madrileña to the payment of the damage caused by
the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of the
sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act,
when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its different
aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the act in
question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness or negligence,
and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or
negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to article 1902
of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other persons, the
managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees
under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the
same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an
indemnity for the damage caused by one of its employees, far from violating said legal
provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly followed the
same, without invading attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any
way contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car
company. This is precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not
been sued in a civil action, either alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or
negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he
had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held
primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the
same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of
his own presumed negligence — which he did not overcome — under article 1903. Thus,
there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the

taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability
as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take,
and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It
might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective
method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and
besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment
against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held
liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous
criminal case, with greater reason should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held
liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted.
The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of the
taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while
the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was
brought against a railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the
company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of
the Civil Code, the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna con
relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1.º, que las expediciones facturadas por la compañia
ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan
tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2.º, que
llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el
jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3.º, que la falta de entrega
de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daños y
perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de
vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los
pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que
integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene
accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda en
el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las
partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de
Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la
reparaction de los daños y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada
PFR | 66
y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas,
segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el
articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compañia demandada como
ligada con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia
administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares,
in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in
favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint
should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the said
merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the
station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of
these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of
considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to
realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the
receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as
the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a
contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on
any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of
Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to
asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on
account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned
to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in
article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the defendant
company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage by
relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the
Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and
fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held
to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be
noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year
1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because
the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off
while iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court
held:

It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary
conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies
only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily
liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff
should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not
repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable
primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of
the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law,
subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by
the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be
employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out
that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or
maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the
laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a
broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of
these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these
articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make
the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper
criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof prevailing
in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would
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be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of
Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual
force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article
111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or
separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to
article 112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless
it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil
proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that
could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be
extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal
Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles
suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even
to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is
civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should seek
out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the
enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as
subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process
of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which
liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil courts is
not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal
proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the
Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally
determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws
that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and criminal procedure now
in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the
briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or
negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in
articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer
arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived
from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More
than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the
consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to
which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of pre-existing
duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give rise to duties,
whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject
to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction
may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied

by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract of employment,
that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to the injured bystander
would originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child
Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the
death of the child, who had been run over by an automobile driven and managed by the
defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to
stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going
along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to
be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to
continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the
auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely
reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at
the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been
running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing
Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in
the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the
accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of the
child, and the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile still
moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the
automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant
having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable
accident which caused the death of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a
criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the
Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper
subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime
or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or
culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard
to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a
criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil
liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal
and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of
the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the
child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On
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the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte.
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality
to attend the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were
passing along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant,
Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite
direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the
automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot
water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The
trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But
this Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the
parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was
the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was
led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs.
It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge.
The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of Tacloban, Leyte,
on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in
allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee
the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into
a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs.
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code
must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does
not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction of the
damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of
the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for
reckless or simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of
his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for
the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the
servant in driving an automobile over the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was
a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the
International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of
Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the
plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had
shown that the exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the
presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said:

As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far
as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard
garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently
thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident
occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or
constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also
provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence
of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is
juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily
that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he
has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is
overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not
on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37
[year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so
negligently driven an automobile, which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that
said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article
1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a
business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in
his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs.
Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages
brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his
way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and
pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco
PFR | 69
Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co.,
pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced
accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias.
This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that
of his servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila
Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the
plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck
by the steamer Helen C belonging to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly
licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the
appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C.
Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against the
defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in
the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by
the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly
responsible in damages under article 1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City
of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the
City of Manila and a street car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The
truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was
prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless
imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City
of Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect
the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric
Company to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main
defense was that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court
held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language
authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application by
providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed by the
provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling

under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent
act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the
Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code
affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal
negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code.
Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to
escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence in
the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good
defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or
predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said
further that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our
deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal
articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the
Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary
responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising
from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila
Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary
liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of
the decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability
under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and
independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A
motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by
simple negligence and sentenced, among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the
sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant
as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed
exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption
from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the
diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided
in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case,
because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary
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liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based
on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In
fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the
principle that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is
different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to
recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the
Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code,
and has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not
be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a
crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or
culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction
between civil liability arising from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that
the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal
Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude
that the employer — in this case the defendant-petitioner — is primarily and directly liable
under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to
dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little
understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil
Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and application in
actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of
negligence — even the slightest — would have to be indemnified only through the principle of
civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for
cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring
about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws,
disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use
the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved
and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
 PFR | 71

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not
be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In
such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated
civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to
sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling
the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is
such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on
the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our
view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure
indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common
knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not
have sufficient means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required
in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In
construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right
and justice.
already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action
for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of
the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is
by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by
our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious
and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present
case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we
pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for
fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time
we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so
that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will,
it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an
ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not
depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely
directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and
efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby
affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and
their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and
employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It
is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits resulting from the services of
these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful
conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they
should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection
and all for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just
that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a
careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such
selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or
director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the
employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says
in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee
"vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de
quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the
employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a
peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of
stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres

G.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER PAJARILLO, petitioners,
vs.
LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO TANGCO, VON
LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
(Safeguard) and Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the Decision1 dated July 16, 2004 and
the Resolution2 dated October 20, 2004 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 77462.
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology
Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the bank's
cashier as she would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with
corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard
Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to
deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service
shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against
Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78.
Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The
RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated
January 19, 2000.3 On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as
to the penalty in a Decision4 dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August
25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a
complaint5 for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against
Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer,6 petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the
PFR | 72
latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral
damages and attorney's fees.
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision,7 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline
Tangco, and against defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
ordering said defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:
1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS
(P157,430.00), as actual damages
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death indemnity;
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages;
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorney's fees; and
6. costs of suit.
For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 8
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he
merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline
was seen roaming around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made
such report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the
guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and
necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her
instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-
73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with
Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in
the selection of its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to
show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of
its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend
trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that
supervision includes not only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the

protection of persons and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but
also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its
assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary
under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs.9
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions
are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the
provisions on civil liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since
Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to
be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action
is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense
charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the
extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action
might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense
of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees is
inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their
employees is only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated
October 20, 2004.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following assignment of errors, to
wit:
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner Pajarillo liable to
respondents for the payment of damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code in holding petitioner Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the
payment of damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that petitioner Safeguard
Security Agency, Inc. exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees, hence, should be excused from any liability.10
PFR | 73
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting
Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to
respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based on culpa aquiliana
under Article 217611 of the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is jointly and severally with
Pajarillo. However, since it has established that it had exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated from civil liability.
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a separate civil
action against petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages arising from a crime or
delict, in which case the liability of Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the
Revised Penal Code12 is subsidiary and the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of employee is not available to it.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and
damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from
the same act or omission of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the same on
January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime of homicide,
for which he had already been found guilty of and serving sentence thereof, thus must be
governed by the Revised Penal Code.
We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on
the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law
under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa

aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right
to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat
under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for
the same act or omission or under both causes.13
It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action. The nature of a cause
of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of
action.14 The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by
the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the
complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.15
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and posted in the Ecology
Bank – Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, who was employed and under employment of
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. hence there is employer-employee relationship between co-
defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage to herein plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm
out of her bag, suddenly without exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner,
with the use of his shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M. Tangco, killing her
instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly and severally liable for the
death of Evangeline M. Tangco.16
Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to
recover damages against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by
Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which
provides:
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
PFR | 74
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. In
Dulay v. Court of Appeals,17 we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with
negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive
case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the
offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act
considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration
in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis
supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in
the criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from crime.18 The source of the obligation sought to be
enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law.
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,19 where the issue involved was whether the civil action
filed by plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the reservation
made by the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending
before the court, to file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's
negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot
accept the validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had
already appeared as complainants. While that case was pending, the offended parties
reserved the right to institute a separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a
separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and
not on tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.

We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant
case x x x.
xxxx
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to
enforce the civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and
an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the
latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject
to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-
delict. The fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent
civil action did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.20
(Emphasis supplied)
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final
and executory, such judgment has no relevance or importance to this case.21 It would have
been entirely different if respondents' cause of action was for damages arising from a delict,
in which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.22
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause of action is based
on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was
negligence on the part of the master or the employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer
under Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to
prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of their employee.
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting Evangeline.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a
question of fact, which, as a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on
certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.23 Generally, factual findings
of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA
is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when
the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary
to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are
PFR | 75
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA
are premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record.
[24]
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us to deviate
from the factual finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was
guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline.
Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's purpose in going to the bank was to
renew her time deposit.25 On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun
from her bag and aimed the same at him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-
defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about one meter
or one arm's length26 he stepped backward, loaded the chamber of his gun and shot her.27
It is however unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could still make such movements if indeed
the gun was already pointed at him. Any movement could have prompted Evangeline to pull
the trigger to shoot him.
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his mere
apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim is befuddled by
his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming
under the fly over which was about 10 meters away from the bank28 and saw her talking to a
man thereat;29 that she left the man under the fly-over, crossed the street and approached
the bank. However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show that
indeed Evangeline was seen roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously
prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is no evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of
his head guard or the bank's branch manager regarding his concerns or that he reported the
same to the police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.
Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have already
apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun;
that there were two guards inside the bank30 manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite
incredible that if she really had a companion, she would leave him under the fly-over which is
10 meters far from the bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself without a back-up. In
fact, she would have known, after surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would
not ensure entrance to the bank as there were guards manning the entrance door.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it
must be credible in itself — such as the common experience and observation of mankind can
approve as probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human

testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.31
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was actually in
the act of pulling her gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds
support from the contentions raised in petitioners' petition for review where they argued that
when Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her bag and
petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as a dangerous
threat, shot and killed the deceased out of pure instinct;32 that the act of drawing a gun is a
threatening act, regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be used against
petitioner Pajarillo;33 that the fear that was created in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he
saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was suddenly very real and the former
merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.34
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillo's claim of
self-defense cannot be accepted specially when such claim was uncorroborated by any
separate competent evidence other than his testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillo's
apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a bank robbery has no basis at all. It is
therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of Pajarillo's
imagination which caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. Although she was a
licensed firearm holder, she had no business bringing the gun in such establishment where
people would react instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent, she
could have warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun and did not conduct herself with
suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the bank; that she should not have held the gun
with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the act as hold up or robbery.
We are not persuaded.
As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen
roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident.
Evangeline's death was merely due to Pajarillo's negligence in shooting her on his imagined
threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately shown that it
had exercised the diligence required in the selection and supervision of its employees. It
claims that it had required the guards to undergo the necessary training and to submit the
requisite qualifications and credentials which even the RTC found to have been complied
with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not exercise the diligence required in the
supervision of its employee. Safeguard further claims that it conducts monitoring of the
activities of its personnel, wherein supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of
the security guards which include among others, whether or not they are in their proper post
PFR | 76
and with proper equipment, as well as regular evaluations of the employees' performances;
that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguard's operating procedure is
not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper supervision; that it was
likewise error to say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and
policies were not properly implemented by reason of one unfortunate event.
We are not convinced.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict
committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and
supervision of his employee by operation of law. This presumption may be overcome only by
satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience, and service records.35 On the other hand, due diligence in
the supervision of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the
guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of
the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees
and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or
as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and
beneficial to their employer. To this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting
through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory functions.36
To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers must
submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.

We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in the selection
of Pajarillo since the record shows that Pajarillo underwent a psychological and neuro-
psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de Porres Center where no psychoses
ideations were noted, submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing training course for
security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required in the
supervision of its employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard presented
Capt. James Camero, its Director for Operations, who testified on the issuance of company
rules and regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be Assigned To Banks,37
Weapons Training,38 Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship Training Lesson Plan,39
Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,40 it had also been established during Camero's cross-
examination that Pajarillo was not aware of such rules and regulations.41 Notwithstanding
Camero's clarification on his re-direct examination that these company rules and regulations
are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors during classroom instructions and
not necessary to give students copy of the same,42 the records do not show that Pajarillo
had attended such classroom instructions.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous evaluation
of the security guard's performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service training on
March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as security guard of
Safeguard, which was in collaboration with Safeguard. It was established that the concept of
such training was purely on security of equipments to be guarded and protection of the life of
the employees.43
It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in Toyota, Safeguard had ever
conducted further training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which has
a different nature of business with that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty
in a bank is different from being on duty in a factory since a bank is a very sensitive area.44
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just depositing her firearm for
safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no training or seminar
given on how to handle bank clients and on human psychology.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go around
the bank two times a day to see the daily performance of the security guards assigned
therein, there was no record ever presented of such daily inspections. In fact, if there was
really such inspection made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline could have been taken
noticed and reported.
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual damages in the
amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses incurred by respondents in connection with
PFR | 77
the burial of Evangeline were supported by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity for the death of Evangeline is likewise in order.
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the spouse,
legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may
demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Moral
damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason
of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of
the spiritual status quo ante; thus it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.45 The
intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity
of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the
offender.46
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by Evangeline's death
was so sudden causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother to six children who
were all minors at the time of her death. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,47 we awarded one
million pesos as moral damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered.
In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,48 we likewise awarded the amount
of one million pesos as moral damages to the parents of a third year high school student and
who was also their youngest child who died in a vehicular accident since the girl's death left a
void in their lives. Hence, we hold that the respondents are also entitled to the amount of one
million pesos as Evangeline's death left a void in the lives of her husband and minor children
as they were deprived of her love and care by her untimely demise.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00. Under
Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or
correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory
damages.49 It is awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.50
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the
instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees
in the amount of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 137567 June 20, 2000
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the
Judge of the RTC, Brach 139, Makati City, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to
review and set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A.
Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No.
98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden
Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61." The said Order denied
petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge
Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case
against petitioner on the ground that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
filed by petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at
the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.1
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children,2 petitioner filed a
petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.3
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros
Salting.4 Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage5 under Article
334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City
Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable
cause and ordered the filing of an Information6 against them. The case, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
61.1awphi1
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest,
filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the
criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of
his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge
Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order7 dated August 31, 1998.
PFR | 78
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an
Order dated December 9, 1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case,
petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari,
questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge
Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.8 In an Order9
dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari.
Said Court subsequently issued another Order 10 dated February 23, 1999, denying his
motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial
question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against
him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result
from the civil case for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the
civil case, the trial court might declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's
complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the evidence
shows that his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that
the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the
criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if
petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of
the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and that,
accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he was never
before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. 11
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil
case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
 PFR | 79

raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
Art. 40 of the Family Code provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, 12 this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that
for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void,
whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent
portions of said Decision read:
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment
of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held
as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge
of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage
does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

. . . Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of
an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the
erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of their common children
and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be
adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.

So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a
final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of
the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.

With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage
should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent
pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.

Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Relova 1 cited in Donato vs. Luna 14 where
this Court held that:

. . . Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner,
that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared
can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960
ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner,
vs.
HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ, ETC. ET AL., respondents.
Pedro A. Bandoquillo for petitioner.
Fulvio Pelaez for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari with prohibition to prohibit the judge presiding the Court
of First Instance of Negros Oriental, Hon. Clementino V. Diez, from proceeding further in the
Criminal Case No. V-6520, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Abundio Merced until after
final termination of Civil Case No. R-5387, for the annulment of the marriage of petitioner
Abundio Merced with Elizabeth Ceasar, also pending in same court.
The record disclose the following proceedings in the court a quo: On January 30, 1958,
Abundio Merced filed a complaint for annulment of his second marriage with Elizabeth
Ceasar. The complaint is docketed as Civil Case No. R-5387. The complaint alleges that
defendant Elizabeth Ceasar and her relatives forced, threatened and intimated him into
signing an affidavit to the effect that he and defendant had been living together as husband
and wife for over five years, which is not true; that this affidavit was used by defendant in
securing their marriage of exceptional character, without the need for marriage license; that
he was again forced, threatened and intimated by defendant and her relatives into entering
the marriage with her on August 21, 1957 before Municipal Judge Medardo A. Conde; that
immediately after the celebration of the marriage plaintiff left defendant and never lived with
her; that the defendant wrote him on October 29, 1957, admitting that he was forced into the
marriage and asking him to go to Cebu to have the marriage annulled, but he refused to go
for fear he may be forced into living with the defendant. Merced prays for annulment of the
marriage and for moral damages in the amount of P2,000. On March 3, 1958, Elizabeth
Ceasar filed her answer to the complaint. In her answer, she denies the material allegations
of the complaint and avers as affirmative defenses that neither she nor her relatives know of
plaintiff's previous marriage to Eufrocina Tan; that sometime in July, 1957, plaintiff asked her
mother to intercede on their behalf to secure her father's consent to their marriage as plaintiff
could not concentrate on his studies without marrying Elizabeth, but that her mother advised
him to finish his studies first; that sometime in April, 1957, defendant learned that plaintiff was
engaged to marry Eufrocina Tan, but plaintiff, upon being confronted with such discovery,
showed her a letter which he wrote breaking off his engagement with Tan. As a counterclaim
defendant asks P50,000 as moral damages for the deceit, fraud and insidious machinations
committed upon her by plaintiff.
PFR | 80
On February 19, 1958, after had filed Civil Case No. R-5387 defendant Elizabeth Ceasar filed
a criminal complaint for bigamy 39 3 against plaintiff Abundio Merced with the office of the
City Fiscal of Cebu. On April 7, 1958 the Assistant City Fiscal filed Criminal Case No. V-6520,
charging Merced with bigamy for the second marriage. The information reads.
The undersigned Assistant Fiscal of City of Cebu accuses Abundio Merced of the crime of
bigamy, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of August, 1957, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Abundio Merced, being previously
united in lawful marriage with Eufrocina Tan, and without the said marriage having been
legally dissolved did then and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously contract a second marriage
with Elizabeth Ceasar.
Contrary to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. (Annex "2".)
Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance until final
termination of Civil Case No. R- 5387. Reason alleged for the motion is that the Civil Action
involves facts which if proved will determine the innocence of the accused. After an
opposition thereto was filed by the assistant provincial fiscal, the court granted the motion.
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the fiscal, the order was set aside and
another entered denying the motion of accused for suspension of the criminal proceedings,
which last order is the one sough herein to be annulled. The court held in its last order that
inasmuch as by virtue of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of People vs.
Mendoza, 95 Phil., 50 Off. Gaz. [10], 4767, judicial declaration of nullity of a second and
bigamous marriage is not necessary, there is no need in this case to decide the nullity of the
second marriage, or to determine and declare the existence of the grounds for annulling the
same, but that said grounds should be used as a defense in the criminal action. A motion to
reconsider the second order of the court having been denied, petition herein was filed.
When the petition for certiorari with prohibition was filed, the petitioner secured from this
Court a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondent judge from proceeding further in the
criminal case.
Before this Court the sole question raised is whether an action to annul the second marriage
is a prejudicial question in a prosecution for bigamy.
The definition and the elements of a prejudicial question have been set forth by us as follows:
Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of
which (question) is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another Tribunal (Cuestion prejudicial, es 3o 3 la que surge
en un pleito o causa cuya resolucion sean antecedente logico de la cuestion-objeto del pleito

o causa y cuyo conocimiento corresponda a los Tribunales de otro orden o jurisdiccion. —
Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 228). The prejudicial question must be determinative of
the case before the court; this is its first element. Jurisdiction to try said question must be
lodged in another tribunal; this is the second element. In an action for bigamy for example, if
the accused claims that the first marriage is null and void and the right to decide such validity
is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for nullity must be first decided before the action
for bigamy can proceed, hence, the validity of the first marriage is a prejudicial question.
(People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil., 357; 50 Off. Gaz., No. 10, 4863).
In order that a person may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second and subsequent
marriage must have all the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage. This was the ruling of this Court in People vs. Dumpo, 62
Phil., 246, where we said:
It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all
the essential requisites, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. It
appearing that the marriage alleged to have been contracted by the accused with Sabdapal,
her former marriage with Hassan being undissolved, can not be considered as such,
according to Mohameddan rites, there is no justification to hold her guilty of the crime
charged in the information. (People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246).
One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the
contracting parties must be freely and voluntarily given. Without the element of consent a
marriage would be illegal and void. (Section 29, Act No. 3613, otherwise known as the
Marriage Law.) But the question of invalidity can not ordinarily be decided in the criminal
action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the second marriage,
subject of the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since
prosecution for bigamy does not lie unless the elements of the second marriage appear to
exist, it is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the effect that the second marriage
contains all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.
We have, therefore, in the case at bar, the issue of the validity of the second marriage, which
must be determined before hand in the civil action, before the criminal action can proceed.
We have a situation where the issue of the validity of the second marriage can be determined
or must be determined in the civil action before the criminal action for bigamy can be
prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial
question, because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the
civil action and must precede the criminal action for bigamy.
Spanish jurisprudence, from which the principle of prejudicial question has been taken,
requires that the essential element determinative of the criminal action must be cognizable by
another court. This requirement of a different court is demanded in Spanish jurisprudence
because Spanish courts are divided according to their jurisdictions, some courts being
PFR | 81
exclusively of civil jurisdiction, others of criminal jurisdiction. In the Philippines, where our
courts are vested with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, the principle of prejudicial question
is to be applied even if there is only one court before which the civil action and the criminal
action are to be litigated. But in this case the court when exercising its jurisdiction over the
civil action for the annulment of marriage is considered as a court distinct and different from
itself when trying the criminal action for bigamy.
Our conclusion that the determination of the validity of the marriage in the civil action for
annulment is a prejudicial question, insofar as the criminal action for bigamy is concerned, is
supported by Mr. Justice Moran in his dissenting opinion in De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil.,
207 thus:
La regla general es que cuando hay una cuestion civil y otra criminal sobre un mismo delito u
ofensa, la segunda debe verse antes que la primera, por la razon de que las formas de un
juicio criminal son las mas a proposito para la averiguacion de un delito, y no las de un juicio
civil. Esta regla tiene, sin embargo, una excepcion, y es la que se refiere a una cueston civil
prejudicial. Una cuestion civil es de caracter prejudicial y debe resolverse antes que una
cuestion criminal, cuando versa sonbre un hecho distinto y separado del delito, pero tan
intimamente ligado a el que determina la culpabilidad o inocencia del acusado. Por ejemplo,
una accion criminal por bigamia.
The majority decision in said case of De Leon vs. Mabanag also sustains the theory that
when a civil action is pending in court, in which a validity of a document claimed to be false
and fictitious is in issue, the fiscal may not prosecute the person who allegedly executed the
false document because the issue of the validity of the instrument is sub judice and the
prosecuting officer should be ordered to suspend the criminal action until the prejudicial
question has been finally determined. Thus the Court said"
Hablando en terminos generales la facultad del Fiscal y su deber perseguir los delitos no
deben ser controlados ni coartados por los tribunales; pero no hay duda que esa facultad
puede ser regulada para que no se abuse de ella. Cuando un miembro del Ministerio Fiscal
se desvia de la ley y entorpece la recta administracion de justicia procesando a una persona
por hechos constituvos de delito que se encuentran sub-judice y de los cuales se propone
una cuestion prejudicial administrativa, es deber de los tribunales llamarle la atencion y
obligarle que suspenda toda accion criminal hasta que la cuestion prejudicial administrativa
se haya decidido finalmente. (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil., 207.)
The case of People vs. Mendoza, supra, upon which the trial court and the respondents rely,
presents a different sets of facts from the case at bar. So is the ruling therein as contained in
the syllabus. In the case of People vs. Mendoza, Mendoza was charged with and convicted
of bigamy for a marriage with one Carmencita Panlilio, contracted in August, 1949. Mendoza
was married for the first time in 1946 with Josefa de Asis; then married for the second time
with Olga Lema; and then married for the third time to Panlilio in 1949. On February 2, 1943,
 PFR | 82

Josefa de Asis died. The court citing the provisions of Article 29 of the marriage law, held that
the second marriage of the appellant Mendoza with Lema was operation of law null and void,
because at the time of the second marriage in 1941, appellant's former wife Josefa de Asis
was still living. This marriage of appellant with Lema being null and void at the time the
appellant contracted the said marriage, the impediment of the second marriage did not exist.
Hence the appellant was acquitted of bigamy for the 1949 marriage because his previous
marriage with Lema in 1941, by operation of law, was void ab initio.

In the case at bar, in order that the petitioner be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the
marriage which she contracted for the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar, must first be
declared valid. But its validity has been questioned in the civil action. This civil action must be
decided before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed.

For the foregoing considerations, the petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and
prohibition is hereby granted. The order of the court denying the petition of the herein
petitioner to prohibit the Fiscal from prosecuting the case for bigamy, criminal case no. V-
6520, entitled People vs. Abundio Merced, is hereby set aside and the preliminary injunction
issued by this court to that effect is hereby made permanent. So Ordered

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988
LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B.
ABAYAN, respondents.
Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.
Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.
City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the
resolution of the Court is whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court
of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of
marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the
latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We
sustain him.
The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of
Manila acting thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy
against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of Manila,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of said court. The
information was filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.
On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her
marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was docketed as
Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was based on the ground that private respondent
consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's second one, since she
had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R.
Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed
the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage
license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private
respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the
subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and
deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at
least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978,
PFR | 83
for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of
the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.
Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a
motion to suspend the proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627
seeking the annulment of his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial
question which must first be determined or decided before the criminal case can proceed.
In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is
the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further directed that the
proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.
A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his
grounds for suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la
Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later case than that cited by respondent judge in his
order of denial.
The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April
14, 1980, for lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of
which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance
of which pertains to another tribunal.3 It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the
accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based
but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually
comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed,
because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative
juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case.5
The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that
the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the
second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of
bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B.
Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her
consent was obtained through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared
null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him

by private respondent only sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for
anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs.
Relova 6 may be applied to the present case. Said case states that:
The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a
bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil
actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of
marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it
must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was
obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second
marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of
bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was
indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been
contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who
filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only on
June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint
against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void
on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage was null and
void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the
case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for
the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much less gravely
abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as sought by petitioner.
In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second
marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.
Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is
a later case and as such it should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree.
The situation in the case at bar is markedly different. In the aforecited case it was accused
Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having contracted a second marriage
while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who filed an
action for annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case
wherein it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a
complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained
through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was still subsisting.
Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the second
marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the civil
case.
PFR | 84
Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply
the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered
as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the
petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress, violence and
intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary
one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not
exist in the case at bar.
Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution
of the criminal case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on
September 26, 1978, he had been living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband
and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments
that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and
undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner
and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as
husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their
marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was private respondent
who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.
Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only when
Civil Case No. E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year
from the solemnization of the second marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his
consent to the marriage was secured through the use of force, violence, intimidation and
undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent until November
1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already
previously married.
In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge
did not err in his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in
Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy can be
undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by
the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 161075 July 15, 2013
RAFAEL JOSE-CONSING, JR., Petitioner, vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
An independent civil action based on fraud initiated by the defrauded party does not raise a
prejudicial question to stop the proceedings in a pending criminal prosecution of the
defendant for estafa through falsification. This is because the result of the independent civil
action is irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.
The Case
On appeal is the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) granted the writ of certiorari upon petition by the State in C.A.-G.R. No. 71252
entitled People v. Han. Winlove M Dumayas, Presiding Judge, Branch 59, Regional Trial
Court, Makati City and Rafael Consing, Jr., and set aside the assailed order issued on
November 26, 2001 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, in Makati City deferring
the arraignment of petitioner in Criminal Case No. 00-120 entitled People v. Rafael Consing,
Jr. upon his motion on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question in the civil cases
pending between him and the complainant in the trial courts in Pasig City and Makati City.
Antecedents
Petitioner negotiated with and obtained for himself and his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz (de la
Cruz) various loans totaling ₱18,000,000.00 from Unicapital Inc. (Unicapital). The loans were
secured by a real estate mortgage constituted on a parcel of land (property) covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-687599 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Cavite registered under the name of de la Cruz.2 In accordance with its option to purchase
the mortgaged property, Unicapital agreed to purchase one-half of the property for a total
consideration of ₱21,221,500.00. Payment was effected by off-setting the amounts due to
Unicapital under the promissory notes of de la Cruz and Consing in the amount of
₱18,000,000.00 and paying an additional amount of ₱3,145,946.50. The other half of the
property was purchased by Plus Builders, Inc. (Plus Builders), a joint venture partner of
Unicapital.3
Before Unicapital and Plus Builders could develop the property, they learned that the title to
the property was really TCT No. 114708 in the names of Po Willie Yu and Juanito Tan Teng,
the parties from whom the property had been allegedly acquired by de la Cruz. TCT No.
687599 held by De la Cruz appeared to be spurious.4
PFR | 85
On its part, Unicapital demanded the return of the total amount of ₱41,377,851.48 as of April
19, 1999 that had been paid to and received by de la Cruz and Consing, but the latter ignored
the demands.5
On July 22, 1999, Consing filed Civil Case No. 1759 in the Pasig City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) (Pasig civil case) for injunctive relief, thereby seeking to enjoin Unicapital from
proceeding against him for the collection of the ₱41,377,851.48 on the ground that he had
acted as a mere agent of his mother.
On the same date, Unicapital initiated a criminal complaint for estafa through falsification of
public document against Consing and de la Cruz in the Makati City Prosecutor’s Office.6
On August 6, 1999, Unicapital sued Consing in the RTC in Makati City (Civil Case No. 99-
1418) for the recovery of a sum of money and damages, with an application for a writ of
preliminary attachment (Makati civil case).7
On January 27, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed against Consing
and De la Cruz an information for estafa through falsification of public document in the RTC
in Makati City (Criminal Case No. 00-120), which was assigned to Branch 60 (Makati criminal
case).8
On February 15, 2001, Consing moved to defer his arraignment in the Makati criminal case
on the ground of existence of a prejudicial question due to the pendency of the Pasig and
Makati civil cases. On September 25, 2001, Consing reiterated his motion for deferment of
his arraignment, citing the additional ground of pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 in the
CA. On November 19, 2001, the Prosecution opposed the motion.9
On November 26, 2001, the RTC issued an order suspending the proceedings in the Makati
criminal case on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question, and on March 18,
2001, the RTC denied the Prosecution’s motion for reconsideration.10
The State thus assailed in the CA the last two orders of the RTC in the Makati criminal case
via petition for certiorari (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252).
On May 20, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 71252,11 dismissing
the petition for certiorari and upholding the RTC’s questioned orders, explaining:
Is the resolution of the Pasig civil case prejudicial to the Cavite and Makati criminal cases?
We hold that it is. The resolution of the issue in the Pasig case, i.e. whether or not private
respondent may be held liable in the questioned transaction, will determine the guilt or
innocence of private respondent Consing in both the Cavite and Makati criminal cases.

The analysis and comparison of the Pasig civil case, Makati criminal case, Makati civil case
and Cavite criminal case show that: (1) the parties are identical; (2) the transactions in
controversy are identical; (3) the Transfer Certificate of Titles (TCT) involved are identical; (4)
the questioned Deeds of Sale/Mortgage are identical; (5) the dates in question are identical;
and (6) the issue of private respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions is
identical in all the proceedings.
As discussed earlier, not only was the issue raised in the Pasig civil case identical to or
intimately related to the criminal cases in Cavite and Makati. The similarities also extend to
the parties in the cases and the TCT and Deed of Sale/ Mortgage involved in the questioned
transactions.
The respondent Judge, in ordering the suspension of the arraignment of private respondent
in the Makati case, in view of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, where Unicapital was not a party
thereto, did so pursuant to its mandatory power to take judicial notice of an official act of
another judicial authority. It was also a better legal tack to prevent multiplicity of action, to
which our legal system abhors.
Applying the Tuanda ruling, the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 may be validly invoked
to suspend private respondent’s arraignment in the Makati City criminal case, notwithstanding
the fact that CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 was an offshoot, merely, in the Cavite criminal case.12
In the meanwhile, on October 13, 1999, Plus Builders commenced its own suit for damages
against Consing (Civil Case No. 99-95381) in the RTC in Manila (Manila civil case).13
On January 21, 2000, an information for estafa through falsification of public document was
filed against Consing and De la Cruz in the RTC in Imus, Cavite, docketed as Criminal Case
No. 7668-00 and assigned to Branch 21 (Cavite criminal case). Consing filed a motion to
defer the arraignment on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question, i.e., the
pendency of the Pasig and Manila civil cases. On January 27, 2000, however, the RTC
handling the Cavite criminal case denied Consing’s motion. Later on, it also denied his
motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, Consing commenced in the CA a special civil action
for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction (C.A.-G.R. SP No. 63712), seeking to enjoin his arraignment and trial in
the Cavite criminal case. The CA granted the TRO on March 19, 2001, and later promulgated
its decision on May 31, 2001, granting Consing’ petition for certiorari and setting aside the
January 27, 2000 order of the RTC, and permanently enjoining the RTC from proceeding with
the arraignment and trial until the Pasig and Manila civil cases had been finally decided.
Not satisfied, the State assailed the decision of the CA in this Court (G.R. No. 148193),
praying for the reversal of the May 31, 2001 decision of the CA. On January 16, 2003, the
Court granted the petition for review in G.R. No. 148193, and reversed and set aside the May
31, 2001 decision of the CA,14 viz:
PFR | 86
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA
1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely
acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the
Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his
mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of
the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the
transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal
liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents.
Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive
Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa
through falsification of public document.
Likewise, the resolution of PBI’s right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in
question will not be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for
even if PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso
facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through falsification of public
document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid
the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of liability in the
criminal case where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by
other evidence.
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same
act or omission charged in the criminal action.
Thus, in Rojas v. People, the petitioner was accused in a criminal case for violation of Article
319 of the Revised Penal Code, for executing a new chattel mortgage on personal property in
favor of another party without consent of the previous mortgagee. Thereafter, the offended
party filed a civil case for termination of management contract, one of the causes of action of
which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage while the previous chattel
mortgage was still valid and subsisting. Petitioner moved that the arraignment and trial of the
criminal case be held in abeyance on the ground that the civil case was a prejudicial
question, the resolution of which was necessary before the criminal proceedings could
proceed. The trial court denied the suspension of the criminal case on the ground that no
prejudicial question exist. We affirmed the order of the trial court and ruled that:

… the resolution of the liability of the defendant in the civil case on the eleventh cause of
action based on the fraudulent misrepresentation that the chattel mortgage the defendant
executed in favor of the said CMS Estate, Inc. on February 20, 1957, that his D-6 "Caterpillar"
Tractor with Serial No. 9-U-6565 was "free from all liens and encumbrances" will not
determine the criminal liability of the accused in the said Criminal Case No. 56042 for
violation of paragraph 2 of Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . (i) That, even granting
for the sake of argument, a prejudicial question is involved in this case, the fact remains that
both the crime charged in the information in the criminal case and the eleventh cause of
action in the civil case are based upon fraud, hence both the civil and criminal cases could
proceed independently of the other pursuant to Article 33 of the new Civil Code which
provides: "In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action shall proceed independently of the
criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." (j) That, therefore,
the act of respondent judge in issuing the orders referred to in the instant petition was not
made with "grave abuse of discretion."
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the
alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.15
Turning back to the Makati criminal case, the State moved for the reconsideration of the
adverse decision of the CA, citing the ruling in G.R. No. 148193, supra, to the effect that the
Pasig and Manila civil cases did not present a prejudicial question that justified the
suspension of the proceedings in the Cavite criminal case, and claiming that under the ruling
in G.R. No. 148193, the Pasig and Makati civil cases did not raise a prejudicial question that
would cause the suspension of the Makati criminal case.
In his opposition to the State’s motion for reconsideration, Consing contended that the ruling
in G.R. No. 148193 was not binding because G.R. No. 148193 involved Plus Builders, which
was different from Unicapital, the complainant in the Makati criminal case. He added that the
decision in G.R. No. 148193 did not yet become final and executory, and could still be
reversed at any time, and thus should not control as a precedent to be relied upon; and that
he had acted as an innocent attorney-in-fact for his mother, and should not be held
personally liable under a contract that had involved property belonging to his mother as his
principal.
On August 18, 2003, the CA amended its decision, reversing itself. It relied upon the ruling in
G.R. No. 148193, and held thusly:
CA-G.R. SP No. 63712 is similar with the case at bench. The transactions in controversy, the
documents involved; the issue of the respondent’s culpability for the questioned transactions
PFR | 87
are all identical in all the proceedings; and it deals with the same parties with the exception of
private complainant Unicapital.
However, the Supreme Court, upon review of CA-G.R. SP No. 63712, People of the
Philippines vs. Rafael Jose Consing, Jr. (G.R. No. 148193, January 16, 2003) held that "Civil
Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and attachment on account of alleged fraud committed by
respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to Plus Builders, Inc. is an independent
civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial
question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar." In view of the
aforementioned decision of the Supreme Court, We are thus amending Our May 20, 2003
decision.
WHEREFORE, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration is GRANTED. The Orders dated
November 26, 2001 and March 18, 2002 issued by the respondent Judge are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge is hereby ordered to proceed with the
hearing of Criminal Case No. 00-120 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.16
Consing filed a motion for reconsideration,17 but the CA denied the motion through the
second assailed resolution of December 11, 2003.18
Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issue
Petitioner reiterates his contention that the decision in G.R. No. 148193 was not controlling in
relation to C.A.-G.R. No. 71252, which involved Plus Builders, not Unicapital, the complainant
in Criminal Case No. 00-120. He posits that in arriving at its amended decision, the CA did
not consider the pendency of the Makati civil case (Civil Case No. 99-1418), which raised a
prejudicial question, considering that the resolution of such civil action would include the
issue of whether he had falsified a certificate of title or had willfully defrauded Unicapital, the
resolution of either of which would determine his guilt or innocence in Criminal Case No. 00-
120.
In its comment,19 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that Unicapital brought
the Makati civil case as an independent civil action intended to exact civil liability separately
from Criminal Case No. 00-120 in a manner fully authorized under Section 1(a) and Section
2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.20 It argues that the CA correctly took cognizance of the
ruling in G.R. No. 148193, holding in its challenged amended decision that the Makati civil
case, just like the Manila civil case, was an independent civil action instituted by virtue of
Article 33 of the Civil Code; that the Makati civil case did not raise a prejudicial question that
justified the suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-120; and that as finally settled in G.R. No.
148193, the Pasig civil case did not also raise any prejudicial question, because the sole

issue thereat was whether Consing, as the mere agent of his mother, had any obligation or
liability toward Unicapital.
In his reply,21 Consing submits that the Pasig civil case that he filed and Unicapital’s Makati
civil case were not intended to delay the resolution of Criminal Case No. 00-120, nor to pre-
empt such resolution; and that such civil cases could be validly considered determinative of
whether a prejudicial question existed to warrant the suspension of Criminal Case No. 00-
120.
Did the CA err in reversing itself on the issue of the existence of a prejudicial question that
warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the Makati criminal case?
Ruling
The petition for review on certiorari is absolutely meritless.
Consing has hereby deliberately chosen to ignore the firm holding in the ruling in G.R. No.
148193 to the effect that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 00-120 could not be
suspended because the Makati civil case was an independent civil action, while the Pasig
civil case raised no prejudicial question. That was wrong for him to do considering that the
ruling fully applied to him due to the similarity between his case with Plus Builders and his
case with Unicapital.
A perusal of Unicapital’s complaint in the Makati civil case reveals that the action was
predicated on fraud. This was apparent from the allegations of Unicapital in its complaint to
the effect that Consing and de la Cruz had acted in a "wanton, fraudulent, oppressive, or
malevolent manner in offering as security and later object of sale, a property which they do
not own, and foisting to the public a spurious title."22 As such, the action was one that could
proceed independently of Criminal Case No. 00-120 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code,
which states as follows:
Article 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require
only a preponderance of evidence.
It is well settled that a civil action based on defamation, fraud and physical injuries may be
independently instituted pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, and does not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of a criminal case.23 This was precisely
the Court’s thrust in G.R. No. 148193, thus:
Moreover, neither is there a prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can,
according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the
PFR | 88
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for the same
act or omission charged in the criminal action.
xxxx
In the instant case, Civil Case No. 99-95381, for Damages and Attachment on account of the
alleged fraud committed by respondent and his mother in selling the disputed lot to PBI is an
independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a
prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal case at bar.24
Contrary to Consing’s stance, it was not improper for the CA to apply the ruling in G.R. No.
148193 to his case with Unicapital, for, although the Manila and Makati civil cases involved
different complainants (i.e., Plus Builders and Unicapital), the civil actions Plus Builders and
Unicapital had separately instituted against him were undeniably of similar mold, i.e., they
were both based on fraud, and were thus covered by Article 33 of the Civil Code. Clearly, the
Makati criminal case could not be suspended pending the resolution of the Makati civil case
that Unicapital had filed.
As far as the Pasig civil case is concerned, the issue of Consing’s being a mere agent of his
mother who should not be criminally liable for having so acted due to the property involved
having belonged to his mother as principal has also been settled in G.R. No. 148193, to wit:
In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case (the Cavite criminal case). The issue in Civil Case No. SCA
1759 (the Pasig civil case) for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent (Consing) merely
acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in Civil Case No. 99-95381 (the
Manila civil case), for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his
mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of
the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the
transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal
liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents.
Hence, the determination of the issue involved in Civil Case No. SCA 1759 for Injunctive
Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa
through falsification of public document.25 (Words in parentheses supplied; bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis)
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the amended decision promulgated on August 18, 2003;
and ORDERS petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 172060 September 13, 2010
JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 20 March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
The Antecedent Facts
The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals’ decision:
On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action
for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case
No. Q-04-130415, before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to
Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).
On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court
of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392
(Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before
the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner
asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in
parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case
filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 20053 holding that the pendency of the
case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the
criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-
130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether the case could be tried even if
the validity of petitioner’s marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon City
ruled:
PFR | 89
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the
[Ground] of the Existence of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,5 the RTC Quezon
City denied the motion.
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005
and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC Quezon City.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of
Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the
offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did
not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own
spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of
marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations. The Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner
and respondent would be declared void, it would be immaterial to the criminal case because
prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the crime of frustrated parricide
had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the
charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage
is still subsisting.
Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is
a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated
parricide against petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Civil Case Must be Instituted
Before the Criminal Case

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure6 provides:
Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a)
the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal
action. In this case, the Information7 for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It
was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25 October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on
the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and
trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392 on 7
February 2005.8 Respondent’s petition9 in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November
2004 and was filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after
the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7,
Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed
subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.
Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question
in Criminal Case for Parricide
Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action.
There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and
there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the
criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.10 A prejudicial question is defined as:
x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it
determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it
must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.11
The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of
parricide,12 which punishes any person "who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse."13 The
relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of parricide from
PFR | 90
murder14 or homicide.15 However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship
between the offender and the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is
whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since
petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the
acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which,
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will.16 At the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The
subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is
granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the
subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent
is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission
of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.1avvphi1
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals17 that "the judicial
declaration of the nullity of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to
the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is
concerned x x x." First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of
a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a criminal
liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court
ruled in Tenebro that "[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a
marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences."18 In fact, the Court
declared in that case that "a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are
concerned."19
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in
Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No.
04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 125646 September 10, 1999
CITY OF PASIG, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA,
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents.
G.R. No. 128663 September 10, 1999
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CITY OF PASIG, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the suspension of
plebiscite proceedings pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the
Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig.
G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R. No. 128663
involves the proposed Barangay Napico. The City of Pasig claims these areas as part of its
jurisdiction/territory while the Municipality of Cainta claims that these proposed barangays
encroached upon areas within its own jurisdiction/territory.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be
segregated from its mother Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be
converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as Barangay Karangalan, the
City Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating
Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City. 1 Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was
thereafter set for June 22, 1996.
Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52,
Series of 1996, creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City. 2 Plebiscite for this purpose was set
for March 15, 1997.
Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend
or cancel the respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the Commission on
Elections (hereinafter referred to as COMELEC) on June 19, 1996 (UND No. 96-016)3 and
March 12, 1997 (UND No. 97-002), respectively. In both Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta
PFR | 91
called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the Regional Trial Court of
Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute. 4 According to the Municipality
of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of
said pending case; hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until
after the said case shall have been finally decided by the court.
In UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of Cainta and
ordered the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until
after the court has settled with finality the boundary dispute involving the two municipalities.5
Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by the City of Pasig.
The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002, dismissing the Petition for
being moot in view of the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the
creation of Barangay Napico was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast
therein.6 Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the Municipality of Cainta.
The issue before us is whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays
Karangalan and Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary
dispute between the two local governments.
To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006
involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig
presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the creation
of the proposed barangays may be held.
The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a
civil and criminal action and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the
instant case. While this may be the general rule, this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of
Negros Oriental, Br. 42,7 that, in the interest of good order, we can very well suspend action
on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the
first.
In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the
proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that
portions of the same area are included in the boundary dispute case pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material
bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a
requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified
by metes and bounds or by more or less permanent natural boundaries.8 Precisely because
territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is
resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only
 PFR | 92

be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires
acts of such barangays. Indeed, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,9 we held that —
The importance of drawing, with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of
government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the
limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise
powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Beyond these limits,
its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which
ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare.
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more
prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final determination of whether
or not the entire area of the proposed barangays are truly within the territorial jurisdiction of
the City of Pasig.
Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of
the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been
rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition
before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of Barangay
Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.
Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance
pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the
Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the
plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City,
should be annulled and set aside.
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while
2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The
COMELEC Order in UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the
plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico in the City of
Pasig is declared null and void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in abeyance until after
the courts settle with finality the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the
Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-3006.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED

In Tan v. Commission on Elections,10 we struck down the moot and academic argument as
follows —

Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with
constitutional requisites, the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province
proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case before Us cannot truly be viewed as already
moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly proclaimed province which
petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by this
Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error
should not provide the very excuse for perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield to
the respondents' urging that, as there has been fait accompli, then this Court should
passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable suggestion.
Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with
mischief. Respondents' submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court
decline now to perform its duty of interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be,
this might tempt again those who strut about in the corridors of power to recklessly and with
ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of political subdivisions,
either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future
challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.

G.R. No. 203287
RENATO S.D. DOMINGO on his own behalf and on behalf of his coheirs of the late
SPOUSES FELICIDAD DE DOMINGO and MACARIO C. DOMINGO, Petitioners
vs.
SPOUSES ENGRACIA D. SINGSON and MANUEL F. SINGSON, Respondents
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari - G.R. Nos. 2032871
and 2079362 - under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision3 dated August 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 122054 and the Decision4 dated June
28, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 98026, both issued by the Court of Appeals (CA).
Facts
The spouses Macario C. Domingo (Macario) and Felicidad S..D. Domingo (Felicidad)
(Spouses Domingo) ate the parents of respondent Engracia D. Singson (Engracia) and
petitioners Renato S.D. Domingo (Renato) and his co-heirs whom he represents herein,
namely: Consolacion D. Romero (Consolacion), Josefina D. Borja, and Rafael, Ramon, and
Rosario, all surnamed Domingo (collectively, the petitioners).5
During their lifetime, the Spouses Domingo owned a parcel of land, situated in F. Sevilla
Street, San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TC1) No. 32600
(23937) 845-R,6 and the house built thereon (subject property). Macario died on February 22,
1981, while Fel.icidad died on September 14, 1997.7
It appears that on September 26, 2006, Engracia filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila a complaint8 for ejectment/unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 9534,
against Consolacion, Rosario, Rafael, and Ramon. Engracia claimed that she is the absolute
owner of the subject property, having bought the same from the Spouses Domingo as
evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale9 dated June 6, 2006. She likewise averred that TCT
No. 32600 (23937) 845-R was already cancelled and TCT No. 1257510 covering the subject
property was already issued under her name. The petitioners only learned of the supposed
sale of the subject property when they received the summons and a copy of Engracia's
complaint in Civil Case No. 9534.
Consequently, on July 31, 2006, the petitioners filed a complaint11 with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Pasig City, which sought the nullity of the sale. They alleged that the Absolute
Deed of Sale dated June 6, 2006, upon which Engracia bases her ownership of the subject
property, was a nullity since the signatures of their parents appearing thereon as the
PFR | 93
supposed vendors were forged. 12 The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 70898 and was
raffled to Branch 160 of the RTC.
Meanwhile, on February 28, 2007, Renato, Consolacion, and Ramon filed a Joint Affidavit
Complaint13 with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig City, claiming that
Engracia falsified the signatures of their parents in the Absolute Deed of Sale and, thus,
charging her with the crimes of falsification of public document, estafa, and use of falsified
documents. Consequently, on May 6, 2008, the OCP filed an Information14 with the RTC,
charging Spouses Engracia and Manuel Singson (Spouses Singson) with the crime of estafa
through falsification of public documents. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
137867 and was raffled to Branch 264 of the RTC.
On July 11, 2008, the Spouses Singson filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings Due to
Prejudicial Question15 with the RTC in Criminal Case No. 137867. They alleged that the
validity and genuineness of the Absolute Deed of Sale, which is the subject of Civil Case No.
70898 then still pending with the RTC Branch 160, are determinative of their guilt of the crime
charged. 16 Accordingly, they prayed that the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867 be
suspended pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. 17 The private
prosecutor filed an opposition to the motion, stating that Criminal Case No. 137867 can
proceed independently from Civil Case No. 70898 pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in
relation to Section 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.18
On February 12, 2010, the RTC Branch 264, issued an Order19 in Criminal Case No.
137867, which granted the motion to suspend the proceedings filed by the Spouses Singson.
The private prosecutor sought a reconsideration20 of the Order dated February i2, 2010, but
it was denied by the RTC in its Order21 dated June 7, 2011.
Unperturbed, the petitioners filed a petition for certiorari22 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 122054, claiming that the RTC gravely abused its discretion when it directed the
suspension of the proceedings in · Criminal Case No. 137867 on the ground of prejudicial
question. They pointed out that the bases of their respective claims in both Civil Case No.
70898 and Criminal Case No. 137867 are the forged signatures of their deceased parents.23
They claimed that where both a civil and criminal case arising from the same facts are filed in
court, the criminal case takes precedence. 24
On August 31, 2012, the CA rendered a Decision25 in CA-G.R. SP No. 122054, which
denied the petition for certiorari. The CA opined that all the elements of a prejudicial question
under sections 6 and 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court are present; hence, the RTC did not
abuse its discretion when it directed the suspension of Criminal Case No. 137867.26
Meanwhile, Civil Case No. 70898 was initially set for pre-trial conference on February 7,
2008.27 However, upon motion28 of Engracia, the pre-trial was reset on March 6, 2008.29
During the pre-trial conference on · March 6, 2008, Engracia moved that Rafael be

substituted by his heirs since he had already died on Oc;tober 15, 2007.30 Thus, the RTC
issued an Order31 dated March 6, 2008 directing the petitioners to comment on Engracia's
motion to substitute Rafael as plaintiff in the case below. On April 8, 2008, Engracia filed a
Motion to Dismiss32 the case on the ground that the petitioners failed to substitute the heirs
of Rafael as plaintiff in the case. The motion to dismiss was consequently denied by the RTC
in its Order33 dated November 12, 2008 for lack of merit.
The continuation of the pre-trial conference, which has been sidelined pending the resolution
of Engracia's motion to dismiss, was· then set on March 19, 2009.34 On March 12, 2009,
Engracia's counsel, with her conformity, withdrew his appearance as counsel in the case.35
During the pre-trial conference on March 19, 2009, the petitioners and their counsel
appeared. Engracia was likewise present although without her new counsel. Accordingly, pre-
trial was again reset on June 1, 2009 to afford Engracia time to secure the services of a new
counsel. 36
Thereafter, Atty. Tristram B. Zoleta entered his appearance for Engracia and moved that the
pre-trial conference on June 1, 2009 be reset on July 13 or 20, 2009.37 However, Judge
Amelia A. Fabros (Judge Fabros) was reassigned to Muntinlupa City and Judge Myrna V.
Lim-Verano (Judge Lim-Verano) was named to replace Judge Fabros as Presiding Judge of·
Branch 160.38 On June 17, 2010, Judge Lim-Verano, having previously presided over
Criminal Case No. 137867, recused herself from adjudicating Civil Case No. 70898.39 'Civil
Case No. 70898 was subsequently raffled to Branch 264 of the RTC then presided by Judge
Leoncio M. Janolo, Jr. (Judge Janolo). On July 15, 2010, Judge Janolo issued an Order,40
setting the pre-trial of the case on August 25, 2010.
On August 12, 2010, the petitioners' counsel moved to reset the pre-trial on September 15,
2010 due to previously scheduled hearings in the trial courts of Malolos City and Parañaque
City.41 Accordingly, the pre-trial was reset on October 6, 2010.42 On October 6, 2010, the
respective counsels of the parties jointly agreed to reset the pre-trial on December 9, 2010.43
However, the pre-trial scheduled on December 9, 2010 was again reset on January 24,
2011.44
On December 27, 2010, the petitioners filed a motion,45 which sought to exclude Rafael as
being represented by Renato. They averred that they were unable to effect a substitution of
the heirs of Rafael as plaintiffs in the case since they could not locate them.
On January 27, 2011, the petitioners' counsel failed to appear and the pre-trial was reset on
March 24, 2011.46 In the morning of March 23, 2011, the petitioners' counsel informed
Renato that he would not be able to attend the pre-trial conference since he was indisposed
and asked the latter to go to the RTC and request for a resetting of the hearing. When the
case was called, the petitioners and their counsel failed to appear, which thus prompted
Engracia's counsel to move for the dismissal of the complaint and be given time to file the
PFR | 94
proper pleading. Thus, the RTC gave Engracia's counsel 10 days within which to file a motion
to dismiss. The continuation of the pre-trial was reset on May 26, 2011. 47
On April 5, 2011, Engracia filed a motion to dismiss48 in compliance with the RTC's
directive.49 During the pre-trial on May 26, 2011, the RTC gave the parties' respective
counsels, upon their request, five days to file a comment on the motion to dismiss and a reply
to such comment, after which time the motion to dismiss is deemed submitted for
resolution.50
On July 29, 2011, the RTC Branch 264 issued an Orders' in Civil Case No. 70898, dismissing
the petitioners' complaint due to their and their counsel's repeated failure to appear during the
scheduled pre-trial hearing dates.
The petitioners then filed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 98026,
insisting that the RTC erred in dismissing their complaint on a mere technicality. They also
claimed that Engracia's motion to dismiss is but a mere scrap of paper since the same did not
comply with Sections 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. The CA, in its Decision52
dated June 28, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 98026, affirmed the RTC's dismissal of the
petitioners' complaint.
Issues
Essentially, the issues set forth for the Court's resolution are: first, whether the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 137867 were properly suspended on the ground of prejudicial question;
and second, whether the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 70898 due
to failure · to prosecute was proper.
Ruling of the Court
The petitions are denied.
First Issue: Suspension of the
proceedings in Criminal Case No.
137867 on the ground of prejudicial
Question
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in
a situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases
are similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case
before the criminal action can proceed. 53 The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflict decisions. 54

For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of
the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites
must -be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the
civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3)
jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. 55
Based on the issues raised in both Civil Case No. 70898 and Criminal Case No. 137867
against the Spouses Singson, and in the light of the foregoing concepts of a prejudicial
question, there indeed appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar. The defense of
the Spouses Singson in the civil case for annulment of sale is that Engracia bought the
subject property from her parents prior to their demise and that their signatures appearing on
the Absolute Deed of Sale are true and genuine. Their allegation in the civil case is based on
the very same facts, which would be necessarily determinative of their guilt or innocence as
accused in the criminal case.
If the signatures of the Spouses Domingo in the Absolute Deed of Sale are genuine, then
there would be no falsification and the Spouses Singson would be innocent of the offense
charged. Otherwise stated, a
conviction on Criminal Case No. 137867, should it be allowed to proceed ahead, would be a
gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in Civil Case No.
70898 that indeed the signatures of the Spouses Domingo were authentic.
The petitioners' reliance on Section 356 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Article 3357 of the Civil Code, is misplaced. Section 3 provides that a civil action for damages
in cases provided under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which may also
constitute criminal offenses, may proceed independently of the criminal action. In instances
where an independent civil action is permitted, the result of the criminal action, whether of
acquittal or conviction, is entirely irrelevant to the civil action. 58
The concept of independent civil actions finds no application in this case. Clearly, Civil Case
No. 70898 is very much relevant to the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867. To stress,
the main issue raised in Civil Case No. 70898, i.e., the genuineness of the signature of the
Spouses Domingo appearing in the Absolute Deed of Sale, is intimately related to the charge
of estafa through falsification of public document in Criminal Case No. 137867; the resolution
of the main issue in Civil Case No. 70898 would necessarily be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the Spouses Singson.
Accordingly, the RTC Branch 264 correctly suspended the proceedings in Criminal Case No.
137867 on the ground of prejudicial question since, at the time the proceedings in the
criminal case were suspended, Civil Case No. 70898 was still pending.
PFR | 95
Second Issue: Dismissal of the
petitioners' complaint in Civil Case
No. 70898
Under the Rules of Court, the parties and their counsel are mandated to appear at the pre-
trial. 59 Pre-trial cannot be taken for granted. It is not a mere technicality in court proceedings
for it serves a vital objective: the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not
indeed its dispensation. 60 Thus, the failure of a party to appear at the pre-trial has adverse
consequences. If the absent party is the plaintiff, then his case shall be dismissed, which
shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. If it is the defendant who fails
to appear, then the plaintiff is allowed to present his evidence ex parte and the court shall
render judgment on the basis thereof. 61
Civil Case No. 70898 was initially set for pre-trial on February 7, 2008. In July 2010, after
more than two years, Civil Case No. 70898, which was still in the pre-trial stage, was re-
raffled to Branch 264 presided by Judge Janolo; the latter immediately scheduled the pre-trial
on August 25, 2010. What transpired thereafter is a series of resetting of the hearing due to
the failure of the petitioners and/or their counsel to appear during the scheduled pre-trial
dates. During the scheduled pre-trial on March 23, 2011, the petitioners and their counsel
again failed to appear without informing the RTC of the reason for their non-appearance.
Clearly, the petitioners' wanton disregard of scheduled pre-trial indeed justified the dismissal
of their complaint.
It should be stressed that procedural rules are not to be disregarded or dismissed simply
because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights.
Like all rules they are to be followed, except only when for the most persuasive of reasons
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of
his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.62
The petitioners have not shown any persuasive reason, which would justify a relaxation of the
rules on pre-trial. That the petitioners' counsel was supposedly indisposed during the pre-trial
on March 23, 2011 does not excuse the petitioners themselves from attending the pre-triaL
Moreover, the· petitioners have failed to advance any valid justification for their and their
counsel's failure to attend the previously scheduled pre-trial hearings. Accordingly, the trial
court could not be faulted for dismissing the complaint under Section 5 of Rule 18 of the
Rules of Court.
The petitioners' claim that the motion. to dismiss filed by Engracia with the RTC is a mere
scrap of paper for her failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of Sections 4, 5 and 6
of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court is without merit. Said sections provide that:
 PFR | 96

Sec. 4. Hearing of motion. Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and .the notice of the hearing thereof shall be
served in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days
before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
Sec. 5. Notice of hearing. The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties
concerned, and shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than
ten (10) days after the filing of the motion.
(Sgd.)
TRISTRAM B. ZOLETA
That the notice of hearing is addressed to the petitioners' counsel and not to the petitioners
directly is immaterial and would not be a cause to consider the same defective. The
requirement under Section 4 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court that the notice be addressed to
the opposing party is merely directory; what matters is that adverse party had sufficient notice
of the hearing of the motion. 64 Further, even if the notice of hearing in the motion to dismiss
failed to state the exact date of hearing, the defect was cured when the RTC considered the
same in the hearing that was held on May 26, 2011 and by the fact that the petitioners,
through their counsel, were notified of the existence of the said motion.65

Sec. 6. Proof of service necessary. No written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon Anent the supposed lack of proof of service of the motion to dismiss upon the petitioners,
by the court without proof of service thereof. suffice it to state that a copy of the said motion was served upon and received by the
petitioners' counsel on April 15, 2011.66 The petitioners were duly given the full opportunity
The pertinent portions of the motion to dismiss filed by Engracia with the R TC read: to be heard and to argue their case when the RTC required them to file a comment to the
motion to dismiss during the hearing on May 26, 2011, which they did on May 30, 2011. 67
NOTICE "What the law really eschews is not the lack of previous notice of hearing but the lack of
opportunity to be heard."68
CLERK OF COURT
RTC, Branch 264 Considering, however, that the complaint in Civil Case No. 70898 had already been
Pasig City [San Juan Station] dismissed with prejudice on account of the petitioners' and their counsel's persistent failure to
appear during the scheduled pre-trial hearings, the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 137867
ATTY. EMERITO M. SALVA should now proceed. There is no longer. any prejudicial question in Criminal Case No.
Counsel for the Plaintiffs 137867 · since the complaint in Civil Case No. 70898 had been dismissed without definitely
15th Floor, Washington Tower, Asia World resolving the question of whether the signatures of the Spouses Domingo in the Absolute
Complex, Marina Bay, Pacific Avenue Deed of Sale .are genuine. Thus, it is up for the RTC Branch 264, in Criminal Case No.
Paranaque City 137867, to resolve the said issue.

Greetings:
Please submit the foregoing motion [in compliance with the order of the Honorable Court
during the hearing on March 23, 2011] for the consideration and resolution of the Honorable
Court immediately upon receipt hereof.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 203287 and
207936 are hereby DENIED. The Decision dated August 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. SP No. 122054
and the Decision dated June 28, 2013 in CA-G.R. CV No. 98026 issued by the Court of
Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch
264, is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with Criminal Case No. 137867 with dispatch.

(Sgd.) SO ORDERED.
TRISTRAM B. ZOLETA

EXPLANATION

Copy of this pleading was sent to the counsel for the plaintiffs through registered mail due
to lack of messenger at the time of service rendering personal service not possible.