Conversion-Characteristics
Vda. de Tan Toco v. Municipal Council of Iloilo, G.R. No. L-24950
FACTS: The widow of Tan Toco sued the municipal council of Iloilo for the two strips of
land with the amount of P42,966.40, which the municipality of Iloilo had appropriated for
widening said street. CFI Ilo-ilo ordered the said municipality to pay Mrs. Tantoco the
said amount, plus its interest. Said judgment was appealed, and was affirmed by the
Supreme Court. On account of lack of funds the municipality of Iloilo was unable to pay
the said judgment, wherefore plaintiff had a writ of execution issue against the property
of the said municipality, by virtue of which the sheriff attached two auto trucks, one
police patrol automobile, the police stations on Mabini street, and in Molo and
Mandurriao and the concrete structures, with the corresponding lots. After notice of the
sale of said property had been made the provincial fiscal of Iloilo filed a motion with the
CFI praying that the attachment on the said property be dissolved, that the said
attachment be declared null and void as being illegal and violate the rights of the
municipality. To which the Court agree, declaring the attachment levied upon the
aforementioned property of the municipality null and void. Mrs. Tantoco appealed the
decision of CFI Ilo-ilo.
ISSUE: Whether the Municipal properties can be executed in lieu of the unsatisfied
obligation?
RULING: The principle is that the property for public use of the State is not within the
commerce of man and, consequently, is unalienable and not subject to prescription. In
this case a parcel of land adjacent to the Mississippi River, which formerly was the shore
of the river and which later enlarged itself by accession, was converted into a wharf by
the city for public use, who charged a certain fee for its use. It was held that the land was
public property as necessary as a public street and was not subject to execution on
account of the debts of the city. After a judgment is rendered against a municipality, and
the latter has no property subject to execution, the proper remedy for the creditor
collecting the judgment was by way or mandamus.
Patrimonial Property
Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene, Co., Inc. v. Bercilles, G.R. No. L-40474
FACTS: The City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193, declared the terminal
portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not
being included in the City Development Plan. Resolution No. 2755 was also passed,
authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. The lot was
awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest bidder. The City of Cebu, executed a
deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00. By
virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application to have its
title to the land registered. The Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to
dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a
public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore
outside the commerce of man and cannot be subject to registration by any private
individual. The trial court dismissed application for registration of title.
ISSUE: Does the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property
of the City of Cebu which may be the object of a common contract?
RULING: The City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street. Since that
portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was
withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial
property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.
Besides, the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu heretofore quoted, in very clear and
unequivocal terms, states that: "Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be
used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City
may be lawfully used or conveyed." Accordingly, the withdrawal of the property in
question from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the
petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.
Laurel v. Garcia, G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990, 187 SCRA 797
FACTS: The subject property in this case is one of the 4 properties in Japan acquired by
the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement entered into with Japan, the
Roppongi property. The said property was acquired from the Japanese government
through Reparations Contract No. 300. It consists of the land and building for the
Chancery of the Philippine Embassy. As intended, it became the site of the Philippine
Embassy until the latter was transferred to Nampeidai when the Roppongi building
needed major repairs. President Aquino created a committee to study the
disposition/utilization of Philippine government properties in Tokyo and Kobe, Japan.
The President issued EO 296 entitling non-Filipino citizens or entities to avail of
separations' capital goods and services in the event of sale, lease or disposition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Chief Executive, her officers and agents, have the authority
and jurisdiction, to sell the Roppongi property.
RULING: It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government
on his or her own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a
law enacted by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. It is
indeed true that the Roppongi property is valuable not so much because of the inflated
prices fetched by real property in Tokyo but more so because of its symbolic value to all
Filipinos, veterans and civilians alike.
Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155650
FACTS: MIAA received Final Notices of Real Estate Tax Delinquency from the City of
Parañaque for the taxable years 1992 to 2001. MIAA’s real estate tax delinquency was
estimated at P624 million. The City of Parañaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of
levy and warrants of levy on the Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor of the City of
Parañaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA
fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original
petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order.
The petition sought to restrain the City of Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying
against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport Lands and Buildings. Paranaque’s
Contention: Section 193 of the Local Government Code expressly withdrew the tax exemption
privileges of “government-owned and-controlled corporations” upon the effectivity of the
Local Government Code. Respondents also argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is
that the express mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international
airport is not among the exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code.
Thus, respondents assert that MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are
exempt from real estate tax.
MIAA’s contention: Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government
cannot tax itself. The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not
inure to any public advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.
ISSUE: Whether Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under
existing laws?
RULING: Yes. Ergo, the real estate tax assessments issued by the City of Parañaque, and all
proceedings taken pursuant to such assessments, are void.
1. MIAA is Not a Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation
MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the
National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. MIAA is not a stock corporation
because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares.
MIAA is also not a non-stock corporation because it has no members. A non-stock corporation
must have members. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to
perform efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government
instrumentality, the only difference is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. When the
law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does not
become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not only governmental
but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the governmental powers of eminent
domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, MIAA
exercises “all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order.”
2. Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are Owned by the Republic
a. Airport Lands and Buildings are of Public Dominion
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore
owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. No one can dispute that properties of
public dominion mentioned in Article 420 of the Civil Code, like “roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State,” are owned by the State. The term “ports”
includes seaports and airports. The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port”
constructed by the State. Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the MIAA Airport Lands and
Buildings are properties of public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the
Philippines. The Airport Lands and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used
by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that the MIAA
collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the character of the
Airport Lands and Buildings as properties for public use.
The charging of fees to the public does not determine the character of the property whether it is
of public dominion or not. Article 420 of the Civil Code defines property of public dominion
as one “intended for public use.” The terminal fees MIAA charges to passengers, as well as the
landing fees MIAA charges to airlines, constitute the bulk of the income that maintains the
operations of MIAA. The collection of such fees does not change the character of MIAA as an
airport for public use. Such fees are often termed user’s tax. This means taxing those among
the public who actually use a public facility instead of taxing all the public including those
who never use the particular public facility.
b. Airport Lands and Buildings are Outside the Commerce of Man
The Court has also ruled that property of public dominion, being outside the commerce of
man, cannot be the subject of an auction sale. Properties of public dominion, being for public
use, are not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private sale. Any
encumbrance, levy on execution or auction sale of any property of public dominion is void for
being contrary to public policy. Essential public services will stop if properties of public
dominion are subject to encumbrances, foreclosures and auction sale. This will happen if the
City of Parañaque can foreclose and compel the auction sale of the 600-hectare runway of the
MIAA for non-payment of real estate tax.
c. MIAA is a Mere Trustee of the Republic
MIAA is merely holding title to the Airport Lands and Buildings in trust for the Republic.
Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the Administrative Code allows instrumentalities like MIAA
to hold title to real properties owned by the Republic. n MIAA’s case, its status as a mere
trustee of the Airport Lands and Buildings is clearer because even its executive head cannot
sign the deed of conveyance on behalf of the Republic. Only the President of the Republic can
sign such deed of conveyance.
d. Transfer to MIAA was Meant to Implement a Reorganization
The transfer of the Airport Lands and Buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation to
MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial ownership of these assets from the Republic to
MIAA. The purpose was merely to reorganize a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation
into a separate and autonomous body. The Republic remains the beneficial owner of the
Airport Lands and Buildings. MIAA itself is owned solely by the Republic. No party claims
any ownership rights over MIAA’s assets adverse to the Republic.
e. Real Property Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable
Sec 234 of the LGC provides that real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines or
any of its political subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for
consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person following are exempted from payment of the
real property tax. However, portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings that MIAA leases to
private entities are not exempt from real estate tax. For example, the land area occupied by
hangars that MIAA leases to private corporations is subject to real estate tax.
C. LAND; HOW ACQUIRED The appellate court dismissed the appeal of Casio. Casio elevated his case to this
Meaning of patent Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari, wherein the SC denied Casios Petition for
Martinez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 170409, Jan. 28, 2008, 542 SCRA 604 being insufficient in form and substance. The said Resolution became final and
executory. Casio filed an Application for Free Patent on the subject property before the
Bureau of Lands. Casios application was ordered cancelled upon the request of herein
FACTS: Respondents are the heirs of the late Melanio Medina, Sr. who during his
petitioner Pedro Tan, the declared owner of the subject property.
lifetime inherited the properties from his mother, Rosa Martinez Emitaño, who in turn
inherited them from her own mother, Celedonia Martinez (Celedonia). The complaint
In 2000, the spouses Tan filed their Application for Registration of Title to the subject
alleged that sometime in 1992, petitioner, GregoriaMerquines, represented herself as
property. The application of the spouses Tan invoked the provisions of Act No. 496
Gregoria Martinez and as thus one of the descendants of Celedoniaand under that name
and/or Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141. The Office of the Solicitor General
applied for free patents over the properties with the CENRO. Unbeknownst to private
entered its appearance on behalf of the Republic, but failed to submit a written opposition
respondents, the corresponding OCTs were thus issued in the name of Gregoria Martinez.
to the application of the spouses Tan. When no opposition to the application of the
When private respondents later filed an application for land registration over the same
spouses Tan was filed by the time of the initial hearing of LRC Case, the RTC issued an
properties, petitioner opposed the same. This impelled private respondents to file the
order of general default, except as against the Republic. Thereafter, the spouses Tan were
instant complaint. The only issue raised at the trial was whether the free patents and land
allowed to present their evidence ex-parte.
titles should be annulled due to fraud and misrepresentation in their procurement. The
trial court rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of petitioner’s titles. Before the
RTC heard the testimony of John B. Acero (Acero), nephew and lone witness of the
Court of Appeals, She argued the titles secured were already indefeasible in view of the
spouses Tan. Acero recounted the facts already presented above and affirmed that the
lapse of one year from the issuance of the titles. Concerning the alleged indefeasibility of
spouses Tans possession of the subject property had been open, public, adverse and
the titles issued to petitioner, the Court of Appeals ruled that the argument is untenable
continuous. RTC rendered a Decision granting the application of the spouses Tan.
since petitioner employed fraud in the proceedings which led to the issuance of the free
patents and the titles.
Court of Appeals rendered a Decision granting the appeal of the Republic, and reversing
and setting aside the Decision of the RTC on the ground that the spouses Tan failed to
ISSUE: Whether or not titles of the petitioner are already indefeasible and comply with Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the
incontrovertible following the lapse of one year from their issuance Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which requires possession
of the subject property to start on or prior to 12 June 1945.
RULING: No. The titles of the petitioner are not considered indefeasible and
incontrovertible notwithstanding the lapse of one year from their issuance since the ISSUE: Whether or not the Spouses Tan has complied with the requirements under the
certificate of title in this case has been issued on the basis of free patent procured through Public Land Act in order to have registrable rights over the property.
fraud manifested in the facts that Gregoria Merquines has misrepresented herself as
Gregoria Martinez who happened to be one of the descendants of Celedonia. Under the RULING: The Court rules in the negative and, thus, finds the present Petition devoid of
recent jurisprudence, a certificate of title issued on the basis of free patent procured merit. As the law now stands, a mere showing of possession for thirty years or more is
through fraud or in violation of the law may be cancelled since such title is not cloaked not sufficient. It must be shown, too, that possession and occupation had started on 12
with indefeasibility. Furthermore, the principle of title is unavailing where fraud attended June 1945 or earlier. Petitioners admit that based on the previous evidence on record,
the issuance of the free patents and titles. The petition is denied. their possession and occupation of the subject property fall short of the period prescribed
by law. The earliest evidence of possession and occupation of the subject property can be
traced back to a tax declaration issued in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only
b. Patent issued over private land
in 1952. In this case, it bears stressing that Tax Declaration No. 4627 (covering the
Spouses Tan v. Republic, G.R. No. 177797, Dec. 4, 2008, 573 SCRA 89.
subject property issued in 1948 in the name of their predecessor-in-interest) was only
submitted by the Spouses Tan together with their Motion for Reconsideration of the 28
FACTS: The spouses Tan were natural-born Filipino citizens, who became Australian
February 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals. The reason given by the Spouses Tan
citizens. They seek to have the subject property registered in their names. The subject
why they belatedly procured such evidence was because at the time of trial the only
property was declared alienable and disposable, as established by a Certification DENR
evidence available at hand was the 1952 tax declaration. More so, they also believed in
CENRO. Prior to the spouses Tan, the subject property was in the possession of Lucio
good faith that they had met the 30-year period required by law. They failed to realize
and Juanito Neri and their respective spouses. The spouses Tan acquired the subject
that under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, a mere showing of
property by virtue of a duly notarized Deed of Sale of Unregistered Real Estate
possession for thirty years or more is not sufficient because what the law requires is
Property. However, a certain Patermateo Casio claimed a portion of the subject property,
possession and occupation on or before 12 June 1945. This Court, however, finds the
prompting the spouses Tan to file a Complaint for Quieting of Title. The RTC rendered a
reason given by the Spouses Tan unsatisfactory.
Decision favoring the spouses Tan.

c. Reclaimed lands and Marshy lands
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No. 133250, Jul. 9, 2002
FACTS: On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including
foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any
and all kinds of lands." On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential
Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore
of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project
(MCCRRP).
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517,
granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-
Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one
million nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square
meters." Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Parañaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of
PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the
southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Parañaque City. PEA and AMARI
entered into the JVA through negotiation without public bidding. On April 28, 1995, the
Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245, confirmed the JVA. On June 8,
1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres,
approved the JVA.
The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate Committee
Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. Among the conclusions of their report are: (1)
the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the
public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore
PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands
are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative
Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA
in view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were
the Secretary of Justice, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, and the Government
Corporate Counsel. The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the
conclusions reached by the Senate Committees.
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez ("Petitioner" for brevity) as a taxpayer,
filed the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the
government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to
AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the
JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution
on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Due to the
approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now prays that on
"constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared null and void."
ISSUE: Whether the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer
to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed violate the 1987
Constitution.
RULING: The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is
rooted in the Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of
the public domain. The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented
in 1907 was thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect.
Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by
the government and classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case
they would fall under the classification of government reclaimed lands. After the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands
of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private parties . These
lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain the government could not sell to private parties. Since then and until now, the
only way the government can sell to private parties government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain is for the legislature to pass a law authorizing such
sale. CA No. 141 does not authorize the President to reclassify government reclaimed and
marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 59 (d). In order for PEA to
sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain, there
must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands, though any legislative
authority granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would
be subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands
of the public domain, such legislative authority could only benefit private individual.
e. Limitations
Alfredo v. Borras, G.R. No. 144225, Jun. 17, 2003, 404 SCRA 145
FACTS: The registered owners of the Subject Land were petitioner spouses, Godofredo
and Carmen. The Subject Land is covered by an OCT issued to Godofredo and Carmen
under a Homestead Patent. Private respondents, spouses Borras, filed a complaint for
specific performance alleging in their complaint that Godofredo and Carmen mortgaged
the Subject Land for P7,000.00 with the DBP. To pay the debt, Carmen and Godofredo
sold the Subject Land to Borras for P15,000.00, the buyers to pay the DBP loan.
Godofredo and Carmen introduced Armando and Adelia, as the new owners of the
Subject Land, to the Natanawans, the old tenants of the Subject Land. In 1994, Borras
learned that hired persons had entered the Subject Land and were cutting trees under
instructions of allegedly new owners of the Subject Land. Subsequently, Armando and
Adelia discovered that Godofredo and Carmen had re-sold portions of the Subject Land
to several persons. The Borras filed an adverse claim with the Register of Deeds of
Bataan. Armando and Adelia discovered that Godofredo and Carmen had secured an
owners duplicate copy of OCT after filing a petition in court for the issuance of a new
copy.
In their answer, Godofredo and Carmen and the Subsequent Buyers argued that the action
is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. Petitioners pointed out that there is no
written instrument evidencing the alleged contract of sale over the Subject Land. The trial
court rendered its decision in favor of the Borras.
ISSUE: Whether the alleged sale of the Subject Land in favor of Armando and Adelia is
valid and enforceable, where it was entered into during the 25-year prohibitive period for
alienating the Subject Land without the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources.
RULING: A grantee or homesteader is prohibited from alienating to a private
individual a land grant within five years from the time that the patent or grant is issued. A
violation of this prohibition renders a sale void. This prohibition, however, expires on the
fifth year. From then on until the next 20 years the land grant may be alienated provided
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources approves the alienation. The
Secretary is required to approve the alienation unless there are “constitutional and legal
grounds” to deny the approval. In this case, there are no apparent constitutional or legal
grounds for the Secretary to disapprove the sale of the Subject Land. The absence of
approval by the Secretary does not nullify a sale made after the expiration of the 5-year
period, for in such event the requirement of Section 118 of the Public Land Act becomes
merely directory or a formality. The approval may be secured later, producing the effect
of ratifying and adopting the transaction as if the sale had been previously authorized.
ii. Public Land Act, Com. Act No. 141 (1936), § 119.
Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 83992
FACTS: Private respondents Gabriel Abellano and Francisca Sequitan obtained a loan
in the amount of P45,000.00 from the petitioner. The terms thereof called for payment of
the loan in two (2) equal installments. As security for the loan, the private respondents
mortgaged with the petitioner a parcel of land, belonging to them. The land was acquired
through a homestead patent. The NHA filed a complaint for the expropriation of several
parcels of land located in Davao City to carry out its Slum Improvement and
Resettlement Program; said action was directed against the private respondents, with
respect to the mortgaged property, and fifteen (15) other persons. As mortgagee, the
petitioner filed therein a motion to intervene, which the court granted. Upon arrival of the
loan's maturity dates, private respondents failed to pay their obligation to the petitioner.
The latter therefore caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject property. During
the foreclosure sale held 1979, the petitioner submitted the highest bid. Private
respondents, however, failed to redeem the foreclosed property within the period of two
(2) years from the date of registration, or up to 7 December 1981. In due course, the
private respondents' certificate of title was canceled. On 1983, CFI of Davao City issued
an order requiring the NHA to pay the amount of P85.00 per square meter for the
properties sought to be expropriated, which included the aforementioned foreclosed
property. Private respondents notified the petitioner of their desire to repurchase the
foreclosed property pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act (C.A. No.
141).Rebuffed by the latter, private respondents filed a complaint for reconveyance of
their foreclosed property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the two-year redemption period fixed by the Rural Banks’ Act in
a foreclosure sale of property acquired through a homestead patent superseded the five-
year repurchase period prescribed in Section 119 of the Public Land Act.
RULING: The homestead laws were designed to distribute disposable agricultural lots of
the State to land-destitute citizens for their home and cultivation. The right to repurchase
under Section 119 cannot be waived by the party entitled thereto and applies with equal
force to both voluntary and involuntary conveyances. The Court rules that as a
consequence of the inchoate character of the right during the redemption period, Act No.
3135 allows the purchaser at the foreclosure sale to take possession of the property only
upon the filing of a bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the property for a period
of twelve (12) months, to indemnify the mortgagor in case it be shown that the sale was
made without violating the mortgage or without complying with the requirements of the
Act. If the land is mortgaged to a rural bank under R.A. No. 720, as amended, the
mortgagor may redeem the property within two (2) years from the date of foreclosure or
from the registration of the sheriff's certificate of sale at such foreclosure if the property
is not covered or is covered, respectively, by a Torrens title. If the mortgagor fails to
exercise such right, he or his heirs may still repurchase the property within five (5) years
from the expiration of the two (2) year redemption period pursuant to Section 119 of the
Public Land Act (C.A. No. 141). If the land is mortgaged to parties other than rural
banks, the mortgagor may redeem the property within one (1) year from the registration
of the certificate of sale pursuant to Act No. 3135. If he fails to do so, he or his heirs may
repurchase the property within five (5) years from the expiration of the redemption period
also pursuant to Section 119 of the Public Land Act.
Capistrano v. Limcuando, G.R. No. 152413, Feb. 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 176.
FACTS: Petitioner owned a parcel of land, with an estimated area of 224 square meters
located at Barangay Talaga, Rizal, Laguna, covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-
10302 pursuant to a Free Patent issued on August 23, 1977. She sold this parcel of land
with a right of repurchase in favor of spouses Felimon Zuasola and Anita Subida on
December 31, 1985.On February 1, 1989, petitioner sold half of the same parcel of land
to respondents for the price of ₱75,000.00 on the understanding that respondents shall
pay the amount of ₱10,000.00 as partial payment and the balance to be paid by monthly
installments. Petitioner received the partial payment of ₱10,000.00 but signed a deed of
absolute sale disposing half of the property in favor of respondents purportedly in
consideration of the amount received. Subsequently, respondents defaulted on their
monthly installments. Petitioner repeatedly demanded for the payment of the balance of
₱65,000.00 from respondents but the latter refused to pay and claimed that they had
already fully satisfied the consideration for the disputed land according to the terms of the
subject deed of sale. Respondents learned afterwards that the disputed land had been
previously sold by the petitioner to the spouses Zuasola and Subida which led
respondents to file a criminal complaint for estafa against petitioner on April 10, 1991.
Petitioner was eventually convicted. On August 19, 1991, petitioner repurchased the
parcel of land from the spouses Zuasola and Subida. She also offered to repurchase from
respondents the portion of the disputed land which she sold to them but the latter refused.
In the instant case, plaintiff-appellant [petitioner] was convicted of estafa by reason of the
double sale over the same property. She repurchased the property from the first buyer
only after an information had already been filed against her. It is inescapable that when
she filed the complaint with the court a quo she was with unclean hands. It is an act that
negates the gratuitous reward by the State.
ISSUE: Whether the deed of sale the petitioner executed in favor of respondents should
be declared null and void.
RULING: Our prevailing jurisprudence requires that the motive of the patentee, his
widow, or legal heirs in the exercise of their right to repurchase a land acquired through
patent or grant must be consistent with the noble intent of the Public Land Act—the right
to repurchase of a patentee should fail if his underlying cause is contrary to everything
that the Public Land Act stands for. Analogous to the rationale in the foregoing cited
cases, we cannot sustain the right to repurchase of a patentee when such repurchase
would reward rather than sanction an act of injustice committed by her in her fraudulent
dealings with land that she acquired from the government under the Public Land Act. We
uphold the CA’s finding that petitioner is guilty of bad faith and that she only made
efforts to repurchase the property from the first buyers after an information for estafa had
been filed against her by the second buyers. To be sure, petitioner only made an effort to
enforce her right to repurchase from the second buyers (by filing the complaint subject of
the present petition) during the pendency of the said criminal action for estafa. Indeed,
petitioner’s successive conveyances of the disputed land for valuable consideration to
different vendees clearly indicate the profit-making motive of petitioner and her lack of
intention to preserve the land for herself and her family. This Court cannot countenance
such a betrayal of the ultimate objective of the law.
2. Civil Code
a. Accretion-Private
New Regent Sources, Inc. v. Tanjuatco, Jr., G.R. No. 168800, Apr. 16, 2009
FACTS: The petitioner filed a complaint on rescission/declaration of nullity of contract,
reconveyance and damages against the respondent. Petitioner allegedly authorized
Vicente Cuevas being its Chairman and President to apply on its behalf to acquire
two parcels of land by right of accretion. Cuevas applied the lot in his name and while
pending approval of the application with the Bureau of Lands he assigned his rights to
the respondent. An order from the Director of Lands was issued transferring rights from
Cuevas to Tanjuatco. During the preliminary hearing, respondent filed a motion for
demurrer of evidence after the petitioner presented their evidence. The RTC dismissed
the case for insufficiencies of evidence and ruled that respondent is an innocent purchaser
hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent is an innocent purchaser of the property in
dispute?
RULING: The court held that to warrant a reconveyance of land where the mode of
acquiring a property is by accretion, the following requisites should be met: (1) that the
deposition of soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible;
(2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. It is not enough to be a riparian
owner in order to enjoy the benefits of accretion. One who claims the right of accretion
must show by preponderant evidence that he has met all the conditions provided by law.
Petitioner has notably failed in this regard as it did not offer any evidence to prove that it
has satisfied the foregoing requisites. Respondent derived his title to the lands from
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 245 registered in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines. A certification was issued confirming that said lands were verified to be
Alienable and Disposable property of the State entitling it to transfer ownership to the
respondent. Moreover, petitioners failed to establish fraudulent registration of ownership
of the title to respondent since they did not provide evidence that Cuevas is empowered
by the petitioner to apply a registration of the property in their behalf. The respondent
may safely rely on what appears on the face of the registered title hence he is a buyer in
good faith. Petitioner was not able to substantiate its claim for ownership of the property
therefore their claim for reconveyance should be denied.
c. Donation
Republic v. Silim, G.R. No. 140487, Apr. 2, 2001, 356 SCRA 1
FACTS: Spouses Mangubat, donated a 5,600 square meter parcel of land in favor of the
Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur (BPS). In the
Deed of Donation, respondents imposed the condition that the said property should be
used exclusively and forever for school purposes only. This donation was accepted by
District Supervisor of BPS. Through a fund raising campaign, a school building was
constructed on the donated land. However, the Bagong Lipunan school building that was
supposed to be allocated for the donated parcel of land in Barangay Kauswagan could not
be released since the government required that it be built upon a one (1) hectare parcel of
land. To remedy this predicament, Assistant School Division Superintendent of the
Province of authorized District Supervisor Buendia to officially transact for the exchange
of the one-half (1/2) hectare old school site of Kauswagan Elementary School to a new
and suitable location which would fit the specifications of the government. Pursuant to
this, District Supervisor Buendia and Teresita Palma entered into a Deed of Exchange
whereby the donated lot was exchanged with the bigger lot owned by the latter.
Consequently, the Bagong Lipunan school buildings were constructed on the new school
site and the school building previously erected on the donated lot was dismantled and
transferred to the new location. When respondent Leon Silim saw, to his surprise, that
Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a house on the donated land, he asked the
latter why he was building a house on the property he donated to BPS. Vice Mayor
Wilfredo Palma replied that he is already the owner of the said property. Respondents
filed a Complaint for Revocation and Cancellation of Conditional Donation, Annulment
of Deed of Exchange and Recovery of Possession and Ownership of Real Property with
damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the exchange is proper since
it is still for the exclusive use for school purposes and for the expansion and improvement
of the school facilities within the community. The Deed of Exchange is but a continuity
of the desired purpose of the donation made by plaintiff Leon Silim.
ISSUE: Whether the legal requirement in the acceptance of the donation was fulfilled.
RULING: In the case at bar, a school building was immediately constructed after the
donation was executed. Respondents had knowledge of the existence of the school
building put up on the donated lot through the efforts of the Parents-Teachers Association
of Barangay Kauswagan. It was when the school building was being dismantled and
transferred to the new site and when Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma was constructing a
house on the donated property that respondents came to know of the Deed of Exchange.
The actual knowledge by respondents of the construction and existence of the school
building fulfilled the legal requirement that the acceptance of the donation by the donee
be communicated to the donor.
d. Sale
Heirs of Cecilio Claudel v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85240, Jul. 12, 1991
FACTS: As early as Dec 28, 1922, Cecilio Claudel acquired from the Bureau of Lands
Lot No. 1230. He dutifully paid real estate taxes until his death. His widow Basilia, and
later her son José, thereafter paid the taxes. However, this parcel of land would later
become the subject of protracted litigation 39 years after his death. In 1972, the Heirs of
Cecilio partitioned the lot among themselves and obtained TCTs on their shares. Four
years later, the Siblings of Cecilio filed a “complaint for cancellation of titles and
reconveyance with damages”. They alleged that 46 years earlier, their parents had
purchased from Cecilio several portions of Lot 1230 for P30. They admitted that the
transaction was verbal. However, as proof of sale, the Siblings of Cecilio presented a
subdivision plan of the said land indicating the portions allegedly sold to the Siblings of
Cecilio. CFI Ruling Dismissed the complaint ruling that plaintiffs failed to present any
document evidencing the alleged sale of the property to their predecessors in interest by
the father of the defendants. Since the subject matter of the supposed sale is a real
property, the absence of any document evidencing the sale would preclude the admission
of oral testimony (Statute of Frauds). The action has also prescribed cause it has been
more than 30 years since the cause of action has accrued.
ISSUE: Whether the prescriptive period for filing an action for cancellation of titles and
reconveyance with damages should be counted from the alleged sale upon which they
claim their ownership (1930) or from the date of the issuance of the titles sought to be
cancelled in favor of the HEIRS OF CECILIO.
RULING: The belated claim of the SIBLINGS OF CECILIO who filed a complaint in
court only in 1976 to enforce a light acquired allegedly as early as 1930, is difficult to
comprehend. Above all, the torrens title in the possession of the HEIRS OF CECILIO
carries more weight as proof of ownership than the survey or subdivision plan of a parcel
of land in the name of SIBLINGS OF CECILIO. The Court has invariably upheld the
indefeasibility of the torrens title. No possession by any person of any portion of the land
could defeat the title of the registered owners thereof. A torrens title, once registered,
cannot be defeated, even by adverse, open and notorious possession. A registered title
under the torrens system cannot be defeated by prescription. The title, once registered, is
notice to the world. All persons must take notice. No one can plead ignorance of the
registration.
e. Prescription -Ordinary
Spouses Aguirre v. Heirs of Lucas Villanueva, G.R. No. 169898,
FACTS: A complaint for annulment or declaration of nullity of deed of exchange, tax
declarations and recovery of ownership and possession with damages was filed by private
respondents against petitioners alleging that they are the legitimate children and grandson
of the late spouses Lucas Villanueva and Regina Tupas Villanueva; that during the
lifetime of Lucas Villanueva, he owned the subject parcel of residential land; that spouses
Villanueva possessed the subject parcel of land during their lifetime openly, publicly and
continuously in the concept of an owner and after their death, they were succeeded by
their children; that sometime in August 1997, petitioners and their hired laborers fenced
the whole land in question without the knowledge and consent of private respondents;
that when confronted by private respondents concerning the fencing of the land,
petitioners alleged that they acquired the same through inheritance from their father,
Eutiquiano Salazar, who in turn purchased the land from the late Ciriaco H. Tirol by
virtue of a Deed of Exchange of Real Property. In their Answer, petitioners claimed that
petitioner Anita S. Aguirre is the lawful owner and actual possessor of the land in
question, it being a portion of a bigger parcel of land she inherited from her deceased
parents Eutiquiano Salazar and Regina Supetran Salazar who bought the land from
Ciriaco H. Tirol per Deed of Exchange of Real Property; and that the action is barred by
prescription and private respondents are guilty of laches in failing to assert their alleged
right of ownership after the lapse of more than fifty (50) years since it was possessed by
the heirs of the late Trinidad vda. de Tirol. The trial court rendered judgment declaring
the plaintiffs the lawful owners of the land.
RTC: The trial court noted that the tax declarations in the name of Trinidad vda. de Tirol
and the survey plan did not establish the fact that Ciriaco Tirol is the owner and possessor
of the land in question, thus, he has no right to transfer ownership of the same to
Eutiquiano Salazar; that petitioners were not possessors in good faith since they knew as
early as 1954 that private respondents were in possession of the land; that petitioners did
not acquire the land via extraordinary acquisitive prescription considering that their
possession only lasted for 26 years from 1971 up to 1997 when private respondents first
instituted the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether the action filed is barred by laches.
RULING: Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring (or losing) ownership and
other real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down
by law; Possession is “in good faith” when there is a reasonable belief that the person
from whom the thing is received has been the owner thereof and could thereby transmit
his ownership; There is “just title” when the adverse claimant comes into possession of
the property through any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership
or other real rights, but the grantor is neither the owner nor in a position to transmit the
right. The action is barred by laches which is defined as the failure to assert a right for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined to assert it.
This equitable defense is based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the
discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society. In the instant case, private
respondents knew as early as 1981 that petitioners are building fences in the perimeter of
the disputed land but did not take action to assert their rights over the subject parcel of
land. They waited 16 long years to oust petitioners from the possession of the land.
Definitely, laches had already set in.
ii. Extraordinary
Heirs of Arzadon-Crisologo v. Rañon, G.R. No. 171068, Sep. 5, 2007
According to Agrifina Rañon, her family had enjoyed continuous, peaceful and
uninterrupted possession and ownership over the subject property since 1962, and had
religiously paid the taxes thereon. They had built a house on the subject property where
she and her family had resided. Unfortunately, in 1986, when her family was already
residing in Metro Manila, fire razed and destroyed the said house. Nonetheless, they
continued to visit the subject property, as well as pay the real estate taxes thereon.
However, in August of 1986, her daughter, Zosie Rañon, discovered that the subject
property was already in the name of the spouses Montemayor under Tax Declaration No.
0010563 which was purportedly issued in their favor by virtue of an Affidavit of
Ownership and Possession which the spouses Montemayor executed themselves. The
Affidavit was alleged to have created a cloud of doubt over Rañon's title and ownership
over the subject property.
Hence, Agrifina Rañon sought a Writ of Preliminary Injunction 8against the spouses
Montemayor commanding them to cease and desist from further exercising any right of
ownership or possession over the subject property. She further prayed that she be finally
declared the true and lawful owner of the subject property.
The spouses Montemayor, for their part, alleged that they acquired the subject lot by
purchase from Leticia del Rosario and Bernardo Arzadon who are the heirs of its previous
owners for a consideration of P100,000.00.9
On 22 July 1996, the Heirs of Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo, (represented by Leticia A.
Crisologo del Rosario), Mauricia Arzadon, and Bernardo Arzadon (petitioners) filed an
Answer in Intervention10claiming, inter alia, that they are the rightful owners of the
subject property, having acquired the same from their predecessors-in-interest. They
averred that there existed no liens or encumbrances on the subject property in favor of
Agrifina Rañon; and that no person, other than they and the spouses Montemayor, has an
interest in the property as owner or otherwise.
Per petitioners' allegations, their predecessors-in-interest, spouses Timoteo and Modesta
Alcantara (spouses Alcantara) bought the subject property from its owner, Rafael Ladera,
on 2 May 1936. The spouses Alcantara then built a house of strong materials on the
subject property which served as their conjugal home. Residing with them was Timoteo
Alcantara's sister, Augustina Alcantara-Arzadon. As the spouses Alcantara died without
issue, their properties were left to Timoteo Alcantara's nearest of kin, Augustina
Alcantara-Arzadon and Tiburcio Alcantara, sister and brother, respectively, of Timoteo
Alcantara. Tiburcio Alcantara also died without any known heir; thus, leaving the subject
property in Augustina Alcantara-Arzadon's sole favor. Augustina Alcantara-Arzadon is
the mother of petitioners Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo (now deceased and whose heirs
are represented by Leticia del Rosario) and Mauricia Arzadon. Bernardo Arzadon is the
son of Mauricia Arzadon.
Petitioners asseverated further that Bernardo Arzadon had lived in the house constructed
on the subject property until 1985 when it was gutted by fire. To further support their
claims, petitioners averred that they had religiously paid the real estate taxes on the
subject property. Finally, by way of a counterclaim, petitioners sought compensation for
the damages which they allegedly suffered by reason of the baseless filing of the instant
suit.
On 22 October 1999, the MCTC issued an Order 11 dropping the name of the spouses
Montemayor from the caption of the case on the ground that sometime in 1996, Leticia
del Rosario and Bernardo Arzadon had repurchased the subject property from the spouses
Montemayor for the consideration of P100,000.00. As a result, the spouses Montemayor
had no more interest or claim whatsoever on the property in litigation.
On 11 December 2001, the MCTC rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioners. The
decretal portion thereof reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the [petitioners] to be the true and lawful owners of one-half (1/2) portion of
the undivided whole of the lot-in-suit by mode of succession pursuant to [A]rticle 1001 of
the [C]ivil [C]ode of the Philippines;
2. Declaring the [petitioners] to have the better right over the other half of the undivided
whole of the lot-in-suit by mode of prescription pursuant to [A]rticle 1137 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines;
3. Dismissing the counter-claim of the [petitioners] against the [respondents];
4. Ordering [petitioners] to pay the cost of the suit.12
First, the MCTC ruled that while the adverse claims of Agrifina Rañon on the subject lot
against the spouses Alcantara may have started in 1962, this adverse possession was
interrupted in the year 1977 due to the filing of an adverse claim by petitioner Marcelina
Arzadon-Crisologo with the Office of the Assessor. In 1977, the tax declaration in the
name of Valentin Rañon, Agrifina Rañon's husband, was cancelled and a new tax
declaration was issued in Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo's name. The MCTC said that the
period of possession of the spouses Rañon in the concept of an owner from 1962 to 1977
did not ripen into ownership because their occupation was in bad faith. The Civil Code
requires, for acquisitive prescription of real property, 30 years of uninterrupted
possession if the same is wanting in good faith and without a just title.
Second, the MCTC held that by virtue of succession, petitioners are entitled to one-half
of the subject property. This is because according to Article 1001 13 of the Civil Code,
should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or the widower (who
are without issue), the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the
brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. The spouses Alcantara died without
issue. As between Timoteo Alcantara and Modesta Alcantara, the former predeceased the
latter. Timoteo Alcantara was survived by (1) his brother Tiburcio Alcantara, who also
died without any known heir; and (2) his sister Augustina Alcantara. Thus, following the
death of the spouses Alcantara, only the children of Augustina Alcantara, namely
Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo and Mauricia Arzadon, stand to inherit Timoteo Alcantara's
share in the subject property.
Moreover, the MCTC declared that for the part of Modesta Alcantara, there was no legal
heir who claimed the other half of the property which she 14 inherited from her husband,
Timoteo Alcantara who predeceased her. On this portion, the MCTC held that petitioners
exercised rights of ownership and dominion over the same by periodically visiting the lot
and cleaning it.15 It also held that from 31 August 1977, when petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo filed an adverse claim for herself and for her
brothers and sisters which led to the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 44120 in her name,
to 11 December 2001,16 there is a total of 33 years, three months and 10 days which is
sufficient to claim ownership over the subject property by adverse possession under
Article 113717 of the Civil Code.
On appeal, the RTC reversed and set aside the Decision of the MCTC.
The RTC declared that the respondent Rañons who are heirs of the original plaintiff had
acquired the subject property by virtue of acquisitive prescription, and therefore adjudged
respondents to be the absolute owners thereof; thus, in the 8 August 2002 Decision of the
RTC, it held:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the trial [c]ourt is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the [respondents] as the absolute owners of the parcel of land in suit, having
acquired the same through extraordinary acquisitive prescription.
No costs.18
In its findings, the RTC declared that a more circumspect scrutiny of the evidence
showed that for a long time from the death of the spouses Alcantara, no one adjudicated
the subject property unto themselves. Although petitioners and their predecessors-in-
interest claimed to have successional rights over the subject property, they did not take
action to have the same adjudicated to themselves or, at least, to have the same declared
for taxation purposes. The RTC ruled that petitioners had slept on their rights. On the part
of the respondent Rañons, in 1962, Valentin Rañon, respondents' father, declared the
subject property in his name for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding taxes
thereon. In the years that followed, his wife, Agrifina Rañon, declared the same in her
name for taxation purposes, as well as paid the real estate taxes on the subject property. In
1977, the latter even mortgaged the subject property with the Philippine National Bank. It
was only in 1977 when petitioners' predecessor-in-interest Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo
executed an Adverse Claim and Notice of Ownership and declared the subject property in
her name and paid its taxes.
The RTC elucidated in this wise, to wit:
It bears to note that since the death of Timoteo Alcantara until the year 1977,
[petitioners], as well as their predecessors-in-interests (sic) had not taken any concrete
step in exercising their supposed successional rights over the parcel of land in suit, or at
least, the Intervenors should have always [stayed] on their guard or especially vigilant
against anyone who would secure a claim to the said parcel of land, more so that Valentin
Rañon and plaintiff Agrifina Rañon were then living with them. It is very unfortunate that
it was only in 1977 that the Intervenors made known to others of their supposed
successional rights over the parcel of land in suit. Relief is denied to a claimant whose
right has become stale for a long time, considering that some other persons like
[respondents] had wayback (sic) taken the necessary action in claiming the parcel of land
in suit. It is the vigilant and not the sleepy that is being assisted by the laws. (Ledita
Burce Jacob v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 92159, July 1, 1993).
It stands to reason, therefore, to hold that because of the claim of the [respondents] to
have acquired the parcel of land in suit by acquisitive prescription, the Intervenors who
belatedly claimed to be the legal and compulsory heirs of the late Timoteo Alcantara, as
ruled by the trial court, had regrettably forfeited their such (sic) successional rights,
simply due to their inaction for a long period of time. Hence, contrary to the findings of
the trial court, the [petitioners] are not entitled to the one-half (1/2) portion of the parcel
of land in suit.19
Likewise, the RTC reasoned that the Notice of Adverse Claim executed by petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo against the Rañons in 1977 implied
that respondents have been in possession of the subject property. On this matter, the RTC
said, viz:
Evidently, the trial court considered by implication that the execution by Marcelina
Arzadon Crisologo of said Adverse Claim and Notice of Ownership in 1977 to have
interrupted the running of the prescriptive period on the possession by the [respondents]
of the parcel of land in suit. It bears to stress on (sic) this point, that the Adverse Claim
and Notice of Ownership executed by Marcelina Arzadon Crisologo is nothing but a
notice of a claim adverse to the [respondents]. By its nature, its implication is that the
[respondents] have been in possession of the parcel of land in suit in some concept. But
definitely, said Adverse Claim does not, upon its execution, operate to toll or interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period because there is a necessity to determine the validity of
the same. And this could only be done by the filing of the necessary action in court such
[as] contemplated in the provisions of Article 1123 of the Civil Code. It is only on (sic)
such instance that the prescriptive period should be deemed interrupted. And
undisputedly, nothing had been done by the Intervenors after the execution of said
Adverse Claim by Marcelina Crisologo, except of course as they claimed, and as held by
the trial court, they started to possess the parcel of land in suit. Regretably (sic), however,
such possession by the Intervenors of the parcel of land in suit does not benefit them for
purposes of prescription.20
The RTC also declared that the Rañons have been in possession of the parcel of land in
the concept of an owner since 1962. Even as they had gone to live in Manila following
the burning of the house on the subject property, they continued to exercise acts of
dominion over the same by visiting and looking after the property. The RTC also
considered in favor of the respondents, the admission of petitioner Bernardo Arzadon and
the petitioners' witnesses that Valentin Rañon and Agrifina Rañon had been staying in the
house on the subject lot since 1947, which shows that they had been in possession of the
subject property for a period of more than 50 years.
On review before the Court of Appeals, the Decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto.
The Court of Appeals held that when Valentin Rañon executed the affidavit declaring
himself to be the true and lawful owner of the subject property in 1962, the same was a
repudiation of petitioners' legal title over it. The repudiation, coupled with the payment of
realty taxes, was made with the knowledge of petitioners, who failed to act against it.
Thus, from 1962 up to the filing of the action in 1995, respondents continued to adversely
occupy the property. In the assailed 10 November 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals,
it ruled:
Moreover, respondents' payment of realty taxes made with the knowledge and consent of
petitioners and went unchallenged for a number of years, indubitably show their positive
claim as owners of the property. While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of
ownership, they become strong evidence of ownership acquired by prescription when
accompanied by proof of actual possession of the property. It is only where payment of
taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the land covered by the tax declaration that
such circumstance may be material in supporting a claim of ownership.
Needless to state, from 1962 onwards, prescription begun to run against petitioners and
was not in any way interrupted from their mere execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim
since the notice of adverse claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which
produces the civil interruption provided for under the law. And even if We are to
eliminate the question of good faith in determining the prescriptive period, evidence are
(sic) still abundant to substantiate respondents' thirty years of possession in the concept of
owner commencing from 1962 until 1995 when the complaint below was filed. 21
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon which was denied by the Court of
Appeals in the following manner, to wit:
After a careful study of the grounds relied upon by petitioners We find no new matters
raised to justify a modification much less, a reversal of the Decision sought to be
reconsidered. To reiterate, even assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner merely
tolerated the Rañons (sic) occupancy of the subject property, it must be stressed that the
execution in 1962 of Valentin Rañon's Affidavit, the corresponding payment of realty
taxes and other acts of dominion which went unchallenged by the petitioners, had
effectively severed their alleged juridical relation. Suffice it to state that these acts, taken
as a whole, vest upon the Rañons the right to claim ownership over the subject property
irrespective of whether the nature of their occupation was rooted from the mere tolerance
of the Arzadons or from a bona fide sale between Agrifina Rañon and Rafael Ladera. 22
Hence, the instant Petition.
The primordial issue in the case at bar is whether the Court of Appeals erred in declaring
that respondents had acquired ownership over the subject property through uninterrupted
and adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
Petitioners dispute the findings of the Court of Appeals and the RTC in declaring that
acquisitive prescription has set in against them and in favor of the respondents. They
claim that the evidence does not support respondents' contention that they have been in
public, notorious, and uninterrupted possession over the subject property in the concept
of an owner since 1962 as alleged in their Complaint. Instead, petitioners rely on the
finding of the MCTC that respondents were not able to prove their adverse claim for an
uninterrupted period of thirty years.
At this juncture, we take an opportune look at the applicable rules on the acquisition of
ownership through prescription.
Prescription is another mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over
immovable property.23 It is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under
conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an
owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. 24 Possession is open when it is patent,
visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. 25 It is continuous when uninterrupted,
unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; 26 exclusive when the adverse possessor can
show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and
benefit;27 and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of
by the public or the people in the neighborhood. 28 The party who asserts ownership by
adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive
prescription.
Article 1117 of the Civil Code is instructive:
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary.
Articles 1134 and 1137 of the Civil Code fix the periods of possession, 29 which provide:
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good
faith.
From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that acquisitive prescription of real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary.30 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of
things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law; without good faith and
just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character. 31Regarding real
or immovable property, ordinary acquisitive prescription requires a period of possession
of ten years, while extraordinary acquisitive prescription requires an uninterrupted
adverse possession of thirty years.32
Were respondents able to sufficiently satisfy the legal requirements to prove prescription?
cra lawlibrary
To recapitulate, respondents traced their claim of ownership from the year 1962 until the
filing of their Complaint for Ownership before the MCTC on 18 October 1995. To
support their possession, they rely on an Affidavit executed on 19 October 1962 by
Valentin Rañon claiming ownership over the subject property by virtue of an alleged sale.
The MCTC, the RTC and the Court of Appeals were unanimous in declaring that the
execution by Valentin Rañon of the Affidavit in 1962 was an express repudiation of
petitioners' claim over the property. By virtue of such Affidavit, respondents were able to
cancel Tax Declaration No. 02853 in the name of petitioners' predecessor-in-interest
Timoteo Alcantara who was shown to have paid taxes on the subject property in 1950.
Hence, in 1962, Tax Declaration No. 033062 was issued in the name of Valentin Rañon.
The same was subsequently cancelled by Tax Declaration No. 033106, which was in the
name of his wife, Agrifina Rañon. The same was likewise cancelled in 1967 by Tax
Declaration No. 420809, similarly under the name of Agrifina Rañon. In 1977, however,
petitioners' predecessor-in-interest Marcelina Arzadon-Crisologo filed an Adverse Claim
and a Notice of Ownership claiming that the subject property which is not yet registered
in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Laoag City is declared under Tax Declaration
No. 420809 in the name of Valentin Rañon for taxation purposes only; but that they have
been in possession of the said land publicly, peacefully and continuously without any
intervention or interruption for more than 15 years.
However, a question must be asked: did the Notice of Adverse Claim filed by petitioners
constitute an effective interruption since 1962 of respondents' possession of the subject
property?cra lawlibrary
The answer is in the negative.
Article 112333 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is produced by judicial
summons to the possessor. Moreover, even with the presence of judicial summons,
Article 112434 sets limitations as to when such summons shall not be deemed to have
been issued and shall not give rise to interruption, to wit: 1) if it should be void for lack
of legal solemnities; 2) if the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow
the proceedings to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be absolved from the complaint.
Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of
civil interruption. For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have received
judicial summons. None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which
was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim which did not
effectively interrupt respondents' possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil
interruption. We agree in the conclusion of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, that the execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period because there remains, as yet, a necessity
for a judicial determination of its judicial validity. What existed was merely a notice.
There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is that no
action was, in fact, filed by petitioners against respondents. As a consequence, no judicial
summons was received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its
affirmance of the RTC's ruling, the Notice of Adverse Claim cannot take the place of
judicial summons which produces the civil interruption provided for under the law. 35 In
the instant case, petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents' adverse possession
since 1962. The period of acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in
respondents' favor despite the Notice of Adverse Claim.
From another angle, we find that, quite clearly, questions of fact exist before us. There
is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of specific surrounding
circumstances as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the probability
of the situation.36
Thus, we find proper the application of the doctrine that findings of facts of the Court of
Appeals upholding those of the trial court are binding upon this Court. 37 Even though the
rule is subject to exceptions,38 we do not find them applicable in the instant case.
As found by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, nothing was done by
petitioners to claim possession over the subject property from the time their predecessors-
in-interest had lost possession of the property due to their deaths. Plainly, petitioners slept
on their rights. Vigilantibus sed non dormientibus jura subveniunt. The law comes to the
succor only to aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights. It was only in 1977
when they attempted to call the attention of respondents, which as earlier discussed, did
not even operate as an interruption on the latter's possession. The RTC and the Court of
Appeals held that from 1962 to the time they filed their Complaint before the MCTC and
until the present time, respondents occupied without interruption the subject property in
the concept of an owner, thereby acquiring ownership via extraordinary acquisitive
prescription. To reiterate, the RTC's factual findings based on the evidence on record
were manifestly in favor of respondents, to wit:
Thus, by preponderance of evidence, it has been established preponderantly that the
[respondents] have been in possession of the parcel of land in suit continuously,
peacefully, publicly, notoriously, uninterrupted and in the concept of an owner since 1962
to the present. The fact that the [respondents] have gone to live in Manila right after the
house built in the parcel of land in suit was burned in 1988, they, however, then and
thereafter intermittently come to Badoc, Ilocos Norte purposely to look after and to visit
the parcel of land in suit. Actual possession of land consists in the manifestation of acts of
dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own
property. One needs (sic) not to (sic) stay on it. The acts exercised by the [respondents]
over the parcel of land in suit are consistent with ownership. Possession in the eyes of the
law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground
before it can be said that he is in possession [thereof]. (Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39
Phil. 175, cited in the case of Somodio v. Court of Appeals, et al., 235 SCRA 307). It is
sufficient that the [respondents] were able to subject the parcel of land to the action of
their will.
Furthermore, the Court finds it (sic) significant the testimonies of [petitioner] Bernardo
Arzadon and his witnesses Leonila Arzadon and Elpidio Evangelista who categorically
testified to the effect that Valentin Rañon and [respondent] Agrifina Rañon had been
staying in the house standing on the parcel of land in suit since 1947. Basically, the
defendants are bound by their admissions and also bound by the testimonies of the
witnesses they presented. And going along with their respective testimonies, from 1947 to
1977 or for [a] period of thirty (30) years the [respondents] have been in possession of the
parcel of land in suit enough to invoke extraordinary acquisitive prescription, pursuant to
the provisions of Article 1134 39(sic) of the New (sic) Civil Code. However, as earlier
stated, the [respondents], contrary to the claim of the [petitioners] and findings of the trial
court, have been in possession of the parcel of land in suit continuously and uninterrupted
from 1962 to the present but because of the admissions of the [petitioners], the
[respondents] have been in possession of the same from 1947 to the present or for more
than fifty (50) years now.40
The open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by respondents of the subject
property for a period of more than 30 years in repudiation of petitioners' ownership had
been established. During such length of time, respondents had exercised acts of dominion
over the subject property, and paid taxes in their name. Jurisprudence is clear that
although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence
of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual
or at least constructive possession. 41 They constitute at least proof that the holder has a
claim of title over the property. 42 As is well known, the payment of taxes coupled with
actual possession of the land covered by the tax declaration strongly supports a claim of
ownership.43 The Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the factual findings of the RTC
that respondents had validly established their claim of ownership over the subject
property through acquisitive prescription.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10
November 2005 and the Resolution dated 12 January 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 72552
are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Escheat-Definition
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143483, Jan. 31, 2002, 375 SCRA 484.
b. Public use defined
Apo Fruits Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, Feb. 6, 2007
c. Just compensation defined
Apo Fruits Corp. v. Court of Appeals, supra.
i. Basis-
Romonafe Corp. v. National Power Corporation, G.R. No. 168122, 2007
ii. Period for payment
Republic v. Lim, G.R. No. 161656, Jan. 29, 2005
iii. Manner of payment
Assoc. of Small Landowners v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 78742, Jul.
14, 1989, 175 SCRA 343.