THE YEARS OF AYUB KHAN AND THE PROBLEM OF BNATIONAL INTEGRATION

It is interesting to learn the performance of the military regime in Pakistan on the basis of the political
and institutional works.

Though the Ayub Khan regime was a mixed civil-military administration but the 1st part was a military
one.

He came to power through a military coup. In spite of his later efforts to seek other sources of legitimacy
his main support came from the military.

There should be a comparison between the performance of the military regime with the previous
civilian regime.

There are 2 phases in Ayub Khan’s regime: during 1958-’62 it was military and after that military
remained in the background.

The military elite was more political elite and was capable of creating national unity because:

1. It was more broadly recruited across different ethnic-groups or had more mid-class representation.

2. It had uniform and national training than the political elite.

3. It had less factious and more cohesive.

Pakistan inherited its military from the British Indian military and one was to recruit from the ‘martial
races.’ That made Pakistan’s military overwhelmingly W. Pakistani-Panjabi and some of the N-W frontier
provinces.

No Bengal Officer held a rank above a colonel.

Though 1 Bengali regiment was there in 1948-mostly from the 2 Bengal Muslim Pioneer companies and
from Bihar regiment-to lessen the Bengal sense of non-participation.

The Civil Service of Pakistan reserved a quota of 40% for E. Pakistan candidates.

In the military no such quota was there.

‘Y’ cadet policy was taken to encourage from military family to join the Pakistan Military Academy.

No mid-class boys were encouraged to join the army

As in the British Indian Army, training in England was needed for commissioned ranks, the wealthy
families could afford the expenses of foreign training.

Thus the military officers were often from landed aristocracy.

The British Indian tradition was regimental rather than national. Pakistan military faced external and
internal aggression, so it should be developed as a national one.

The American military aid in the 1950s made it possible to form the military into a modern professional
one. Roughly $400-$500 million between was by the US.

70% of the central government’s revenue budget and 3% of the GNP was annually allocated for defense.

Such policy boosted the Pakistan military’s morale and gave the military elite a new sense of pride in
and identity with the organization.

The military had like the civilians had factionalism-regimental, sectarian, regional, generational etc.

The military regime brought some changes in the training program, de-emphasis on foreign training and
home training was given priority.

The factional patters also there in his regime as Ayub constantly survived shuffling his potential rivals
especially the generals.

The junior officers were disillusioned with the cease-fire and the Tashkent Agree after the war of 1965.

In civilian period the military elite developed a close working relationship with the bureaucracy.

The war also boosted the Air Force prestige but could not compete the Army.

Factionalism in the Pak military was manageable as even after 10 years Ayub was succeeded by the next
man in line-the Chief of the Army.

The military elite swept the political elite out of power and made the civil-military bureaucracy as the
policy-making elite.

They brought change in the political support groups.

In the civ period the urban groups were the dominant one representing East and West Pakistan, the
military regime depended upon the ‘surplus farmers’ and private entrepreneurs with very little
participation from East Pakistan in entrepreneurial class.

The landed elite (mostly W. Pakistani) and Ulemas suffered a set-back, political groups also lost ground.
The pol elite were reintroduced in 1962 served as a marginal support group.

U.S remained a strong force during both the periods.

THE AYUB REGIME AND THE NATIONAL COMMUNITY

Basic Democracy (BD) was the backbone of his new pol sys a 4-tier of local govt. the lowest were 80,000
BD-40,000 from each wing and the1st Institution.
No built-in mechanism in the BD to develop a national consensus on issues. Separate pyramidal
structures in 2 wings were united at the top in Ayub’s wish.

The urban participation was restrict but also had limited rural participation by the dominion of the
government officials. And rural mobilize was economic not politicl.

It was also to create legitimacy for Ayub’s regime as the military was sent back to the barracks within
weeks after the coup.

The BD helped him to survive 1 presidential and 2 assembly elections but created enemies
outnumbering the friends. The rich farmers were the BDs and were the target of the rural poor.

The 2nd was 1962 constitution-a highly centralized political structure was to him to maintain national
integrity.

Under the civilian regime the National Assembly, Cabinet and the Provincial political institutions had
wider scope of participation while the 1962 constitution had limited participation.

It evoked widespread opposition in the urban areas as the Bengal members joined the opposition ranks.

The election of 1964-65 further legitimized the constitution as the opposing political groups contested
the election.

Ayub’s constitution were eroded after the 1965 election and the continuation of emergency rule from
1965-69 was an indicator of the loss of legitimacy.

Ayub’s constitution by creating a strong institution at the cost of participation by other groups which
limited their stake in the system.

Ayub was first took the leadership and then left to his supporters to organize it who managed to capture
a section of the Muslim League.

He finally joined the ML in May 1963, elected its President but he did not try to organize the party, he
still regarded the BD and the bureaucrats the main support base.

Pakistan ML (PML) had centralization of power, all top offices were non-elective, nominated by the
President like the BD and the Constitution.

He and the PML did not seriously mobilized the masses. By joining the ML Ayub inherited the
unpopularity which was overwhelmingly rejected in the election of 1954.

The other existing parties took steps as in Ayub’s sys participation seemed remote after the 1965
election. They took radical stand on autonomy for public support.

In the civilian period there was a desire to form national alliances which became impossible during the
military regime. The process of disintegration started as there was a growing inability to form a national
alliance.
Ayub’s system led to personal centralization rather than institutional centralization of power.

His 10 years of personal centralized rule did not help the growth of national institutions or leadership
which could hold the 2 wings together.

AYUB’S DECADE OF ECONOMIC GROWTH

Ayub’s decade had remarkable economic growth. Per capita gross income rose from Rupees 311 in
1949-50 to 312 in 1959-60 and to Rupees 372 in 1965-66.

In manufacturing gross national product rose from 5.9% in 1949-50 to 9.3% in 1958-59 and to 11.7% in
1965-66. The annual growth rate increased from 0.5% in 1949-50 to 1954-55 to 3.5% during 1959-60 to
1964-65.

Export earnings rose from 717 million Rupees in1947-48 to 1325 million in 1958-59 to 3006 million
in1966-67.

In agriculture also the growth was faster in the 1960s.

Enrollment in secondary schools and universities showed increase in military regime. Development in
health, transportation and communication was not so significant as GNP growth.

We should remember there are reasons for the growth rate. 1. Foreign assistance increased from $51
million in 1954-55 to $241 mil in 1959-60 to $657 in 1964-5.

2. Actually manufacturing increased at a faster rate during the civilian period. Agricultural growth was
partly due to the availability of seeds, fertilizers, water etc that led to so called green revolution of the
regime.

Still the military regime did make economic growth their national goal. But the growth was not equitably
distributed. It tried to remove the disparity between East and W, Pakistan but investment policies were
not adequate to attain that.

Increased School enrollment meant increased mobilization but the inability of the regime’s political
system to accommodate the mobilized groups led to their alienation from the system.

It was indicated in the increased riot rates in E. Pakistan while the rates decreased in W. Pakistan which
signifies the dissatisfaction of the wing.

THE AYUB REGIME AND NATIONAL UNITY

An analysis led to some tentative conclusion. 1. Pakistan military was not national in recruitment, failed
to give the elite of different regions a sense of participation in the system and also could not
accommodate the counter elite.

2. The regime refused to share the even limited available power thus alienating various groups from the
system.
3. It was successful in generating high economic growth but neglecting equal distribution between the 2
wings created additional integration problems.

4. It also faced the political integration problems, the regime thought economic growth would unite the
different groups.