GAME THEORY 2018-2019

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6 Cooperative games: Shapley value and semivalues

Exercise 74. Compute the Shapley and the Banzhaf values of the following game (N, v), where N =
{1, 2, 3} and v:

1.
v({1}) = 0 v({2}) = v({3}) = 1 v({1, 2}) = 4
v({1, 3}) = 4 v({2, 3}) = 2 v(N ) = 8

2. v({1}) = 0, v({2}) = v({3}) = 1, v({1, 2}) = 4, v({1, 3}) = 4, v({2, 3}) = 2, v(N ) = 9

Solution

1. The Shapley and the Banzhaf values are given by

5 5
σ = β = (3, , )
2 2

2. The Shapley value is given by

20 17 17
σ=( , , )
6 6 6
and the Banzhaf value is given by
13 11 11
β=( , , )
4 4 4
Exercise 75. Given the TU game (N, v) with N = {1, 2, 3} and v({i}) = 0, v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = 1,
v({2, 3}) = 0, v(N ) = a, with a ≥ 1:

1. find the Shapley value,

2. find the Banzhaf value,

Solution

1. We notice that players 2 and 3 are symmetric, then σ2 = σ3 = 61 + 13 (a − 1) = 13 a −
16 . As the

Shapley value is an imputation, σ1 = a − σ2 − σ3 , then σ = 13 a + 26 , 13 a − 16 , 13 a − 16

2. β = 14 a + 12 , 41 a. 14 a

1
Exercise 76. Given the TU game (N, v) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and

1 |A| ≥ 3, {1, 2} ⊂ A
v(A) =
0 otherwise

1. say how many non empty coalitions there are s.t. v(A) = 0

2. find the Shapley value

3. find the core

Solution This is a simple game, with 1 and 2 as veto players. Moreover also 3 and 4 are symmetric
players.

1. The coalitions with value 1 are: {1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4} and {1, 2, 3, 4}. Then the non empty coalitions
with value zero are 24 − 3 − 1 = 12
1 1 1 5
2. it is enough to evaluate the index for one player, for example player 1. σ1 = 12 + 12 + 4 = 12 .
5 5 1 1


Then the Shapley value is σ = 12 , 12 , 12 , 12

3. since 1 and 2 are veto players the core is given by C(v) = co{(1, 0, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0, 0)}

Exercise 77. Given the TU game (N, v) with v(S) = s2 where s = |S|, for each S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅:

1. Prove that the Shapley value is always equal to n for each player and for each n

2. Is the core empty when n = 3?

Solution

1. For each n, v(N ) = n2 and, due to the symmetry of the players and efficiency, since σ i = n2 ,
P
σ = (n, . . . , n).

2. When n = 3, the core is non empty and it coincides with the set

C(v) = {(x1 , x2 , x3 ) such that x1 + x2 + x3 = 9, 1 ≤ xi ≤ 5}

Exercise 78. Let (N, v) be the cooperative game such that N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and

v(S) = s(s + 1)

for all S ⊆ N , with s = |S|.

Find the Shapley and Banzhaf values of this game. Is there any value of n such that the core is empty?

2
 Solution All players are symmetric. The Shapley value satisfies symmetry and efficiency, so for every
i ∈ N it is
v(N )
νi (v) = σi (v) = = n + 1.
n
The Banzhaf value is given by
n−1
X  n−1  
1 n−1 1 X n−1
βi (v) = [v(S ∪ i) − v(S)] = n−1 [(s + 1)(s + 2) − s(s + 1)]
2n−1 s 2 s
s=0 s=0
n−1  
1 X n−1
= n−1 (2s + 2) = n + 1
2 s
s=0

The core is non empty for any value of n: it is easy to check that the nucleolus (and the Shapley and
Banzhaf values) belongs to the core.
Exercise 79. Exam 24 February 2015 Consider the following game. There are 4 parties: 1,2,3,4. 1
has the 40% of votes, 2 the 23%, 3 the 19% and 4 the 18%. In order to take a decision, the majority
of at least 51% of votes is needed.
1. Enumerate the winning coalitions.

2. Find the Shapley and Banzhaf values.

3. Find the core of the game.

P Solution This is a weighted majority game with four players: [51; 40, 23, 19, 18]. Then v(S) = 1 iff
i∈S xi ≥ 51.

1. The winning coalitions are:

{1, 2}, {1, 3}, {1, 4}

{1, 2, 3}, {1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4}
{2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 4}.

2. First of all notice that player 2,3 and 4 are symmetric. Then to compute the Shapley and the
Banzhaf value we just have to consider when the marginal contribution is equal to 1:
2! 2!
σ1 = [v({1, 2}) + v({1, 3}) + v({1, 4})] + [v({1, 2, 3}) + v({1, 2, 4}) + v({1, 3, 4})]
4! 4!
2! 2! 1
= (1 + 1 + 1) + (1 + 1 + 1) = .
4! 4! 2
Using symmetry and efficiency:
1
σ2 = σ3 = σ4 = .
6

3
 Instead the Banzhaf value is:
1
β1 = [v({1, 2}) + v({1, 3}) + v({1, 4}) + v({1, 2, 3}) + v({1, 2, 4}) + v({1, 3, 4})]
23
1 3
= 6=
8 4
1 1
β2 = [v({1, 2}) + v({2, 3, 4})] =
8 4
= β3 = β4 .

3. This is a simple game with no veto player, so the core is empty.

Exercise 80. Exam 29 September 2016 In a committee of 7 people there are two veto players, and
the majority is obtained with at least other two joining the veto players.

1. show that the situation can be described as a weighted majority game;

2. find the Shapley value of the players;

3. find the Banzhaf value of the players.

Solution Suppose that the veto players are players 1 and 2.

1. The situation can be described, for example, as the weighted majority game [10; 4, 4, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1].

2. The Shapley value is 73 , 73 , 35

1 1 1 1 1


, 35 , 35 , 35 , 35
13 13 1 1 1 1 1


3. The Banzhaf value is 32 , 32 , 16 , 16 , 16 , 16 , 16

Exercise 81. Consider the weighted majority game v = [51; 50, 49, 1], compute the Banzhaf value and
the 1/3-binomial value.

Exercise 82. Let v be an additive game. Prove that all semivalues coincide.