Political Law Session 1 D igest Page |1
El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Palanca
G.R. No. L-11390, March 26, 1918
* JURISDICTION, HOW ACQUIRED:
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result
from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court
over the property is recognized and made effective.
* The action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed the
idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially
such.
* DUE PROCESS IN FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS:
Property is always assumed to be in the possession of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be
safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected with knowledge that proceedings have been
instituted for its condemnation and sale.
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco mortgaged various parcels of real property in Manila to El
Banco Espanol-Filipino. Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and there he died on January 29, 1810
without returning again to the Philippines. The mortgagor then instituted foreclosure proceeding but
since defendant is a non-resident, it was necessary to give notice by publication. The Clerk of Court was
also directed to send copy of the summons to the defendant’s last known address, which is in Amoy,
China. It is not shown whether the Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, after publication
in a newspaper of the City of Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by default was rendered. The
decision was likewise published and afterwards sale by public auction was held with the bank as the
highest bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court. However, about seven years
after the confirmation of this sale, a motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate
of the original defendant, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside the order of default and
the judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application was
that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had never
acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject matter of the
action
* Whether or not due process of law was observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word “jurisdiction” is used in several different, though related, senses since it may have reference
(1) to the authority of the court to entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of
relief, or it may refer to the power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the
subject to the litigation. The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and
extent of its powers in general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions
which it may entertain and the relief it may grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the
person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may result
from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power of the court
over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property, though at all times
within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody at all. An illustration of
the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment proceedings, where the property is
seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage of its progress, and held to abide the
final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in
the proceeding to register the title of land under our system for the registration of land. Here the court,
without taking actual physical control over the property assumes, at the instance of some person
claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in
favor of the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding quasi
in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem yet it
partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its narrow
application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein the property
alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings are based. The
action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the former an individual is
named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his interest therein to the
obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their sole object the sale or other
disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other form of
remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered in these proceedings is conclusive
only between the parties. It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom
publication is made appears, the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such.
This, however, does not affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is
quasi in rem; and it should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in
rem.
G.R. 93891
Pollution Adjudication board vs. Court of Appeal and Solar Textile Finishing
Corp.
March 11, 1991
Respondent, Solar Textile Finishing Corporation is involved in bleaching, rinsing and dyeing textiles with
untreated wastewater which were being discharged directly into a canal leading to the adjacent
Tullahan-Tinejeros River. On September 22, 1988, petitioner Pollution Adjudication Board issued an ex
parte Order based on 2 findings made on Solar Textile Finishing Corportion’s plant, directing Solar
immediately to cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations as they were
clearly in violation of Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 984 (Pollution Control Law) and Section 103
of its Implementing Rules and Regulations and the 1982 Effluent Regulations. Solar then filed a motion
for reconsideration which was granted by the Pollution Adjudication Board for a temporary operation.
However, Solar went to the RTC for certiorari and preliminary injunction against the Board but the same
was dismissed. On appeal, the CA reversed the Order of dismissal of the trial court and remanded the
case for further proceedings.
Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue

ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie
evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which
exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Solar, on the other
hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte
order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety
or welfare, or to animal and plant life" and argued that there were no findings that Solar's wastewater
discharged posed such a threat.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Pollution Adjudication Board has legal authority to issue the Order and Writ of
Execution against Solar Textile Finishing Corporation.
RULING:
Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984 authorized petitioner Board to issue ex parte cease and desist orders
under the following circumstances:
(a) Public Hearing
Provided, That whenever the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the discharged
sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal
or plant life, or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission, the Commissioner
may issue an ex-parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary
suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage
or wastes without the necessity of a prior public hearing.
The said ex-parte order shall be immediately executory and shall remain in force until said
establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified
or nullified by a competent court. The Court found that the Order and Writ of Execution issued by
petitioner Board were entirely within its lawful authority Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted
by law and regulations in situations like in this case. The relevant pollution control statute and
implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign
power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the
protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of
protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. Hence,
the trial court did not err when it dismissed Solar's petition for certiorari. It follows that the proper remedy
was an appeal from the trial court to the Court of Appeals, as Solar did in fact appeal. The Court gave
due course on the Petition for Review and the Decision of the Court of Appeals and its Resolution were
set aside. The Order of petitioner Board and the Writ of Execution, as well as the decision of the trial
court were reinstated, without prejudice to the right of Solar to contest the correctness of the basis of the
Board's Order and Writ of Execution at a public hearing before the Board.
Respondent Solar assailed the Ex parte Cease and Desist Order by petitioner Pollution Adjudication
Board on the ground that the former was denied due process and that the degree of threat required for
the said Order is remiss. Petitioner reasoned that under PD No.984 Section 7(a), the Board has the
legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is
prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level
of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC.
The Court ruled in favor of petitioner. The Court held that the Board may issue the ex parte cease and
desist order upon prima facie evidence that the respondent corporation has waste discharge beyond the
allowable standards set by the NPCC (Sec5, Effluent Regulations of 1982 and Sec7(a),PD 984). If it
has not yet been subject to the allowable standard, the Board may still issue ex parte cease and desist
Political Law Session 1 D igest Page |2
order upon prima facie evidence that the effluent pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety
or welfare, or to animal or plant life. The court held that the Board, as the government entity tasked to
determine whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable
anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions, has the authority to issue the order as it may see fit.
This is, after all, allowed by law to address relevant pollution issues as an immediate recourse.
Vertudes vs Bureau of Immigration
Facts:
Before us is a petition for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to review and
set aside the decision[2] and resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the decision of
the Civil Service Commission (CSC) finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and dismissing her
from government service.
Private respondent Buenaflor complained of having been convinced by petitioner into paying the total
amount of P79,000.00 in exchange for the processing of her visa, passport and other travel documents
for Japan. Private respondent delivered to petitioner Security Bank (SB) Check Nos. 0014797 and
0014798 in the amounts of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively, and cash worth P29,000.00.
However, no visa was delivered. Private respondent insisted that petitioner return her money, to no
avail.
Special Prosecutor dela Cruz found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and recommended her
dismissal from the service. Petitioner filed a Motion to Re-open with the BI, wherein Commissioner
Rodriguez issued an order, adopting the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz. Subsequently, the
assailed order of dismissal was affirmed by then Department of Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas.
Petitioner appealed to the CSC,[32] raising the issues of lack of due process and lack of substantial
evidence, which dismissed the petitioner’s appeal. Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review
before the CA, raising the issue: whether or not the BI and CSC violated petitioner's right to due
process. the CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was accorded due process
Held:
The petition is denied. She contends that she was denied of her right to a full hearing when she was
not accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against her. The argument is
unmeritorious. The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial
litigation is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which
may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-
examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail
himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine.
The right to cross-examination being a personal right, petitioner must be deemed to have waived this
right by agreeing to submit the case for resolution and not questioning the lack of it in the proceedings
before the BI. More importantly, it is well-settled that the essence of due process in administrative
proceedings is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. This was clearly satisfied in t he case at bar.

G.R. No. 127980
DLSU INC vs CA
Facts of the case
PRIVATE respondents Alvin Aguilar, James Paul Bungubung, Richard Reverente and Roberto Valdes,
Jr. are members of Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity who were expelled by the De La Salle University (DLSU)
and College of Saint Benilde (CSB) Joint Discipline Board because of their involvement in an offensive
action causing injuries to petitioner James Yap and three other student members of Domino Lux
Fraternity. March 29, 1995, Mr. James Yap was eating his dinner alone in Manang’s Restaurant near
La Salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at Domino Lux. When he
arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other brods. The three, together with
four other persons went back to Manang’s and confronted the two who were still in the restaurant. By
admission of respondent Bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a member of the Tau Gamma
Phi Fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then. After this incident, a meeting was
conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the intercession of the Student Council. The
Tau Gamma Phi Fraternity was asking for an apology. But no apology was made.
On March 29,1995, before James Yap’s class at 6:00 pm he went out of the campus using the
Engineering Gate to buy candies across Taft Avenue. As he was about to re-cross Taft Avenue, he
heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running towards him. Then, respondent
Bungubung punched him in the head with something heavy in his hands which he assumed to be
knuckles. Respondents Reverente and Lee were behind Yap, punching him. Respondents Bungubung
and Valdes who were in front of him, were also punching him. As he was lying on the street,
respondent Aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers left. Mr. Yap
could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him. Three other students who are
members of Domino Lux Fraternity was also assaulted by the same group. The mauling incidents were
a result of a fraternity war.
The next day, James Yap filed a complaint with the Disciplinary Board of DLSU charging private
respondents with Direct Assault. The other members who were assaulted filed a similar complaint. The
Director of the DLSU Discipline Office sent separate notices to private respondents Aguilar, Bungubung
and Valdes, Jr. and Reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer. Private
respondents filed their respective answers. During the proceedings before the Board on April 19 and 28,
1995, private respondents interposed the common defense of alibi. No full-blown hearing was
conducted nor the students allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them.
Issue
Whether or not private respondents were accorded due process by the reason that there was no full
blown hearing that was conducted nor were they allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them?
Held
Private respondents were accorded due process of law. The Due Process Clause in Article III, Section 1
of the Constitution embodies a system of rights based on moral principles so deeply imbedded in the
traditions and feelings of our people as to be deemed fundamental to a civilized society as conceived by
our entire history. The constitutional behest that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law is solemn and inflexible.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline, there are
withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due process
and these are:
Political Law Session 1 D igest Page |3
a. that the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation
against them;
b. that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the assistance if
counsel, if desired;
c. that they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
d. that they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
e. that the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot complain of deprivation of due process. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to
be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an
opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. So long as the party is given
the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there
was denial of due process.
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process – it is enough
that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. “To be heard”
does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court – one may also be heard through
pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of
due process.
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the DLSU-CSB Joint
Discipline Board through petitioner Sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges
against them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the
evidence presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the Board. Moreover, private
respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the Discipline
Board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its
resolution. Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not
allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them. The Supreme Court once held that “x x x the
imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due process. And it bears
stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail proceedings and
hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in
student discipline cases may be summary; and cross examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof.”
Rural Bank of Buhi vs CA
GR 61689 ; June 20, 1988 ; 162 SCRA 288
FACTS:
Constitutional Law
a) Due process
Due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be
heard may be subsequent to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a
prior hearing: bank runs would be the order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the
process, fortunes may be wiped out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking
community
Buhi Bank was a rural bank. Its books were examined by the Rural Banks' Division of the Central Bank.
However, it refused to be examined. As a consequence, its financial assistance was suspended. Later,
a general examination of the bank’s affairs and operations were again conducted. The rural bank’s

division found out massive irregularities in the operations, giving out loans to unknown and fictitious
borrowers, and sums amounting to millions past due to the Central Bank. There were also promissory
notes rediscounted with the Central Bank for cash.
As a result, the Buhi Bank became insolvent. The division chief, Odra, recommended that Buhi be
placed under receivership. Thus, the Monetary Board adopted a Resolution # 583, placing the bank
under receivership. Odra, the division chief, was made the receiver. Odra thus implemented the
resolution, authorizing deputies to take control and possession of Buhi’s assets and liabilities.
Del Rosario, the Buhi Bank Manager, filed an injunction against the receiver, arguing that the resolution
violated the Rural Banks Act and constitutes gadalej. The bank claims that there was a violation of due
process. They claim that the bank was not given the chance to deny and disprove the claim of
insolvency or the other grounds and that it was hastily put under receivership.
Later on, the Central Bank Monetary Board ordered the liquidation of the Bank. The judge ruled in favor
of the Bank and issued a writ of execution. The CA however restrained the enforcement of execution,
citing that the Judge did not follow the orders, and thus required the Bank to yield to the CB.
FACTS:
Short version:
The bank was placed under receivership by the Monetary Board. The Bank claims that what the
Monetary Board has done was a violation of due process since they did not receive any notice prior to
the Bank being placed under receivership.
Long version:
The Rural Bank of Buhi (Bank) was placed under receivership and designated respondent Odra as
Receiver pursuant to the provisions of Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265 as amended. Odra
implemented and carried out said Monetary Board Resolution No. 583 by authorizing deputies of the
receiver to take control, possession and charge of the Bank, its assets and liabilities. The Bank filed a
petition for injunction with Restraining Order against respondent Odra and DRBSLA assailing the action
of herein respondent Odra in recommending the receivership over the Bank as a violation of the
provisions of Sections 28 and 29 of Republic Act No. 265 as amended, and Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 720 (The Rural Banks Act) and as being ultra vires and done with grave abuse of discretion and in
excess of jurisdiction. Respondents filed their motion to dismiss alleging that the petition did not allege a
cause of action and is not sufficient in form and substance. Petitioners filed an opposition to the motion
to dismiss averring that the petition alleged a valid cause of action and that respondents have violated
the due process clause of the Constitution. Thereafter the Central Bank Monetary Board issued a
Resolution ordering the liquidation of the Bank. The RTC ruled in favor of the Bank and issued a writ of
execution. The CA however restrained the enforcement of the execution.
ISSUE/S: WON due process was violated.
HELD:
NO. Republic Act No. 265 does not require that a hearing be first conducted before a banking institution
may be placed under receivership. Rather it provides the conditions prerequisite to the action of the
Monetary Board to forbid the institution to do business in the Philippines and to appoint a receiver to
immediately take charge of the bank's assets and liabilities. They are: (a) an examination made by the
examining department of the Central Bank; (b) report by said department to the Monetary Board; and (c)
prima facie showing that the bank is in a condition of insolvency or so situated that its continuance in
business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors.
The petitioner’s contention that no property shall be taken without due process of law is guaranteed
under the consitution is without merit. It has long been established that the closure and liquidation of a
bank may be considered as an exercise of police power. Such exercise may, however, be subject to
Political Law Session 1 D igest Page |4
judicial inquiry and could be set aside if found to be capricious, discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary,
unjust or a denial of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution (Central Bank vs.
Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 155 [1981]). Hence, Appointment of a receiver may be made by the
Monetary Board without notice and hearing but its action is subject to judicial inquiry. Due process does
not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent to
the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would be the
order of the day, resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped out and
disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking community.
Furthermore, a banking institution's claim that a resolution of the Monetary Board under Section 29 of
the Central Bank Act should be set aside as plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith, may be asserted as
an affirmative defense (Sections 1 and 4[b], Rule 6, Rules of Court) or a counterclaim (Section 6, Rule
6; Section 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court) in the proceedings for assistance in liquidation or as a
cause of action in a separate and distinct action where the latter was filed ahead of the petition for
assistance in liquidation (ibid; Central Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 143 [1981]).
AFFIRMATIVE. CLOSURE VALID.
Under Sec 29 of the RA 265, on proceedings regarding insolvency, there is NO REQUIREMENT that a
hearing be first conducted before a bank may be placed under receivership. The law explicitly provides
that the Monetary Board can IMMEDIATELY forbid a banking institution from doing business and
IMMEDIATELY appoint a receiver when: 1) there has been an examination by CB, b) a report to the CB,
and c) prima facie showing that the bank is insolvent.
As to the claim that the RA 265 violates due process, the claim is untenable. The law could not have
intended to disregard the constitutional requirement of due process when it conferred power to place
rural banks under receivership.
The closure and liquidation of the bank is considered an exercise of POLICE POWER. It maybe subject
to judicial inquiry and could be set aside if found to be capricious, discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary,
etc. The appointment of a receiver may be made by the Monetary Board, WITHOUT NOTICE AND
HEARING, but subject to the JUDICIAL INQUIRY, to insure protection of the banking institution.
Due process does NOT necessarily require a PRIOR HEARING. A hearing or an OPPORTUNITY TO
BE HEARD may be made SUBSEQUENT to the closure. One could just imagine the dire consequences
of a prior hearing: bank runs would happen, resulting in panic and hysteria. In that way, fortunes will be
wiped out, and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire banking industry.
There is no question that the action of the MB may be subject to judicial review. Courts may interfere
with the MB’s exercise of discretion. Here, the RTC has jurisdiction to adjudicate the question of
whether the MB acted in bad faith when it directed the dissolution of Buhi Bank.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA
(G.R. No. L-24693)
Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative of the due
process clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but
also vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the right to privacy and the
guaranty against self-incrimination.
Ordinance No. 4760 was promulgated by the Municipal Board of the City of Manila. However, Ermita-
Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association (pet) and Go Chiu (pet) files a petition forprohibition
 Political Law Session 1 D igest Page |5
against such ordinance on the ground that it is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and City of Manila vs. Judge Laguio
violative of due process because it increases the license fee for the first and second-class motels, (G.R. No. 118127)
guests need to fill up personal information before having an accommodation, the premises and facilities
of the hotel will be open for inspection by the Mayor or Chief of Police which are also violative of the
Facts:
right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination, classifying motels into two classes, persons
The private respondent, Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTOC) is a corporation engaged in
below 18 yrs of age are not allowed to be accommodated in such hotels, and the owners are not
the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels, and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court
allowed to lease or rent any room for more than twice every 24 hours.
in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with the Department of Tourism as a
Any violation of the said ordinance would cause for the automatic cancellation of license of the hotel.
hotel.The lower court issued a preliminary injunction to prevent the promulgation of the said
March 30, 1993 - City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved an ordinance enacted which prohibited certain
ordinance.The Mayor of the City of Manila (res) prays for the dismissal of such petition because such
forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in
petition fails to state its cause of action, the said ordinance is a valid exercise of the police power, and
entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the
only the guests or customers have the right to complain regarding on the invasion of privacy and the
social and moral welfare of the community. The Ordinance prohibited the establishment of sauna
guaranty against self-incrimination.
parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, cabarets, motels, inns.
However, the lower court declared that such prohibition is proper due to lack of authority of theCity of Owners and operators of the enumerated establishments are given three months to wind up business
Manila to regulate motels and that the said ordinance is unconstitutional, therefore it is null and void.The operations or transfer to any place outside Ermita-Malate or convert said businesses to other kinds
respondents appeal to the SC allowable within the area. The Ordinance also provided that in case of violation and conviction, the
premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:
1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in June 28, 1993 - MTOC filed a Petition with the lower court, praying that the Ordinance, insofar as it
the lobby in open view; included motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
2. prohibiting admission o less than 18 years old; unconstitutional for several reasons but mainly because it is not a valid exercise of police power and it
3. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also); constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law.
4. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and Judge Laguio ruled for the petitioners. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
5. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.
Issue:
The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the appeal. WON the Ordinance is constitutional.
ISSUE:
Held:
Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.
SC held that the ordinance is unconstitutional for several reasons.
HELD:
First, it did not meet the valid exercise of police power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police
The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this
power, not only must it appear that (1)the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of
case Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As
a particular class, require an interference with private rights, but (2)the means employed must be
in this case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further,
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive. The object of
the ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged
the ordinance was the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. The
ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to
closing down and transfer of businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the
minimize prostitution. The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business
ordinance have no reasonable relation to its purpose. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the
other than legal but also increases the revenue of the LGU concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise
enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote social and moral welfare of the
of police power as well.
community. It will not itself eradicate prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of
The due process contention is likewise untenable, There is no controlling and precise definition of due sexual disease in Manila.
process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of
Second. The modality employed constitutes unlawful taking. The ordinance is unreasonable and
life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process
oppressive as it substantially divests the respondent of the beneficial use of its property. The ordinance
which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from
forbids running of the enumerated businesses in Ermita-Malate area and instructs owners/operators to
legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
wind up their business operations or to transfer outside the area or convert said business into allowed
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. Nothing in the petition is sufficient to
business. An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any
prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. On the
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without
impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not violative
just compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals. There are two
of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.'
types of taking: A “possessory” taking and a “regulatory” taking. The latter occurs when the
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace
government’s regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property, as in this case.
and order of society and the general well-being. The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and
lifted the injuction on the Ordinance in question

Third. The ordinance violates the equal protection clause. Equal protection requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to the rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to
some. Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation provided the classification is
reasonable. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements: (1)It must be based on
substantial distinction; (2)It must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3)It must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4)It must apply equally to all members of the class. In the Court’s view,
there are no substantial distinction between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or
other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and
usually meals and other services for the public. No reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not
pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The Court likewise cannot see
the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside
this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.
Fourth. The ordinance is repugnant to general laws, thus it is ultra vires. The ordinance is in
contravention of the Revised Administrative Code as the Code merely empowers the local government
units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated. Not only that, it likewise runs counter
to the provisions of P.D. 499. The P.D. Had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a
commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and operation of all kinds of commercial
establishments.
Wherefore, the petition was DENIED and the decision of the RTC was AFFIRMED.
White Light Corporation vs City of Manila
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into a law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774
entitled “An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up
Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in
the City of Manila.” On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC)
filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order (TRO) impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila represented by
Mayor Lim with the prayer that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta.
Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached
complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as
operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease
and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of
police power. On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void.
On a petition for review on certiorari, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and
affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance.
Issue:
Whether Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power
Ruling:
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and
flexible response as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the
State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as
Political Law Session 1 D igest Page |6
justification for numerous and varied actions by the State. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to
minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and
alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police
power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of
its guarantees to the people.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the
petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the
Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means
must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of
private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose
less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of
protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be
permitted to be arbitrarily invaded. Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall
be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of
police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. However, this is not in
any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the
presumption of validity. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Beltran v. Secretary of Health
G.R. No. 133640, November 25, 2005
Fact:
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2,
1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation
and by regulating blood banks in the country. Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the
Department of Health (DOH). Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks –
All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years after the effectivity of this
Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary.” Section 23 of Administrative
Order No. 9 provides Process of Phasing Out. — The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all
commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2)
years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful
study and review of the blood supply and demand and public safety.” On August 23, 1994, the National
Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of commercial blood banks took effect. On April 28,
1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of said law was promulgated by DOH. The phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH.
Hence, petitioners were granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses to open and operate a blood
bank only until May 27, 1998. On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to
petitioners, they filed a petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the
constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Issue:
Whether the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal protection clause
enshrined in the Constitution because it unduly discriminates against commercial or free standing blood
banks in a manner that is not germane to the purpose of the law.

Held:
No, the court deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons:
One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and
as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages
voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity.
Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the
purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting
voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than
a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the fact that
they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood donors who
are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-sponsored study on
the Philippine blood banking system.
Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to
address the peculiar circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing
conditions. Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION vs. PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC.
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in front
of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a
meeting with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed
by the union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration was not a strike against the company but
was in fact an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression, freedom
of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances. The company asked them to cancel the
demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course of their business which may result in the loss of
revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if
they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be
allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular shifts should not absent themselves to participate,
otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the
officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for a violation of the ‘No Strike and No Lockout’
clause of their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of
bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations for being filed two days late.
Issue:
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike violated the CBA?
Held:
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive," permitting government
Political Law Session 1 D igest Page |7
regulation only "with narrow specificity." Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but
human rights are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights to freedom of expression
and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our
civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public officials or "when exercised in relation to our right
to choose the men and women by whom we shall be governed.”
Issue:
Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.
Held:
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to
the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks
enhance its productivity as well as profits.
Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its employees with the local police. In
seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition
against alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private
respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the
Constitution — the untrammeled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their
employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock
in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights.
The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and persecuted as they
believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which
the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected
their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or
adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in
spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights
— freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances — over
property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against police officers, not against the
employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue
raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised
of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a
substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued
alleged police persecution.
ISSUE: WON the case dismissal as a consequence of a procedural fault violates due process.
HELD: Yes. The decision of the CIR to dismiss the petition based on technicality (being 2 days late) was
rendered null and void. (The constitutional rights have dominance over procedural rules.) And, the
company was directed to reinstate the eight officers with full backpay from date of separation minus the
one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other sources during their
 Political Law Session 1 D igest Page |8
separation from service. (The removal from employment of the officers were deemed too harsh a
punishment for their actions)

Yes. Due process is satisfied in the following conditions, namely;

1. There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and
determine the matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or
over the property which is the subject of the proceeding;
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and
4. Judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
In the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that there is a presumption “that official
duty has been regularly performed” and a presumption “that the ordinary course of
business has been followed.”
The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and that the court made its decree
with the knowledge that the requirements of law had been complied with appear to be
amply sufficient to support the conclusion that the notice was sent by the clerk as
required by the order.

SC ruled in favor of El Banco Espanol.