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DNC Response To Carter Page PDF
DNC Response To Carter Page PDF
CARTER PAGE,
Plaintiff,
v.
DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL Case No. CIV-18-1019-HE
COMMITTEE; PERKINS COIE LLP;
MARC ELIAS; AND MICHAEL
SUSSMANN,
Defendants.
Page’s Complaint on January 31, 2019 based on his failure to establish personal jurisdiction
over any of the Defendants. Order (Doc. No. 29). Further, although the Court did not
allegations, the Court observed that the existence of either diversity or federal-question
jurisdiction was—at best—“doubtful.” Id. at 5 n.1 (noting that Plaintiff disclaims any
present state citizenship, and deeming it “doubtful whether [Plaintiff] ha[d] stated a
This Court’s ruling was correct and final, and there is no reason to revisit it. In his
Motion to Amend, filed four weeks after this Court’s dismissal Order, Plaintiff asserts that
“alteration and amendment” of the Court’s Order “is appropriate given the clarification of
supplemental authorities provided by the Plaintiff that help to confirm this Court’s specific
personal jurisdiction.” Pl.’s Mot. to Alter Judgment Granting Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (Doc.
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No. 33) (“Mot.”) at 1. But Plaintiff has not identified any error—let alone “clear error”—
in the Court’s prior analysis, nor cited any new law or evidence undermining the Court’s
decision. Rather, Plaintiff regurgitates the same flawed assertions that this Court already
comprising extrinsic fact materials outside his now-dismissed Complaint—to suggest the
Plaintiff purports to invoke Rules 52(b) and 59(e) in support of his request for
reconsideration of the Court’s January 31 Order. As an initial matter, Rule 52(b) “applies
only to cases in which a district court issues factual findings following a trial on the merits,”
Trentadue v. Integrity Comm., 501 F.3d 1215, 1237 (10th Cir. 2007), and therefore is
permit relief in extraordinary circumstances and not to offer a second bite at the proverbial
apple.” Syntroleum Corp. v. Fletcher Int’l, Ltd., 2009 WL 761322, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Mar.
19, 2009) (citation omitted). Specifically, the narrow “[g]rounds for granting a Rule 59(e)
motion include (1) an intervening change in the controlling law, (2) new evidence
previously unavailable, and (3) the need to correct clear error or prevent manifest
injustice.” Monge v. RG Petro-Mach. (Grp.) Co., 701 F.3d 598, 611 (10th Cir. 2012).
previously addressed by the court when the reargument merely advances new arguments
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or supporting facts which were available for presentation at the time of the original
argument.” FDIC v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 152 F.3d 1266, 1272 (10th Cir. 1998) (citation
omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s Motion is nothing more than a last-ditch effort to re-litigate the
same jurisdictional arguments this Court considered and rejected in its Order. Plaintiff
asserts, for example, that Defendants’ vaguely-defined “offenses allegedly led to abuse of
process in the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court,” and that “[t]he brunt of these
injuries were felt in Oklahoma.” Mot. at 8. But Plaintiff advanced the exact same argument
before. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. No. 22) at 12-15 (arguing that
Defendants’ direct role in initiating the primary basis for Abuse of Process in the U.S.
the Plaintiff at his principal place of business in Oklahoma”). And this Court properly
rejected that argument the first time around. Concluding that Plaintiff had failed to “make
even a prima facie showing of a basis for specific jurisdiction over” any Defendant, the
Court observed:
Plaintiff does not offer any facts which suggest that defendants’ alleged acts
were purposefully directed at the State of Oklahoma or that their suit-related
conduct had a substantial connection with Oklahoma. Rather, the complaint
and plaintiff’s related submissions indicate the alleged conduct took place
elsewhere. Plaintiff alleges that he owns a corporation based in Oklahoma,
but there is no plausible basis alleged for concluding that defendants alleged
actions were somehow directed at that corporation or plaintiff’s interest in it,
or that defendants even knew of its existence.
Order at 4.
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In short, Plaintiff comes nowhere close—and indeed does not even attempt—to
identify the sort of “clear error” or “change in the controlling law” that would justify
reconsideration of the Court’s decision. See Mot. at 5 (arguing merely that “facts
previously presented by the Plaintiff to the Court” should have been sufficient to support
personal jurisdiction).1
By the same token, this Court should disregard Plaintiff’s second and third
purported “Notice[s] of Supplemental Authority” (Doc. Nos. 31 & 34). Plaintiff’s attempt
decided is flatly improper. See LCvR 7.1(m) (noting that submissions of supplemental
authority serve a narrow purpose, and are permissible only to alert the Court to “authority
for the reasons explained in Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s first supplemental
1
To the extent Plaintiff is accusing the Court of not addressing each and every one of his
scattershot arguments and submissions in its ruling, see Mot. at 4 (suggesting that
Plaintiff’s so-called “Supplemental Authorities Part 1” was “apparently not considered in”
the Court’s dismissal decision), he is misguided. “Typically, a court’s order recites only
those facts and arguments deemed relevant to the issues placed before it and necessary to
the analysis of those issues. It is not . . . logical to infer that simply where the court did not
outline all the exhibits and arguments set forth by plaintiff that such exhibits and arguments
were disregarded by the court.” Hatten v. White, 2001 WL 476063, at *4 (D. Kan. Apr.
27, 2001). There is no reason here to doubt that this Court properly considered all of the
arguments presented in rendering its dismissal decision.
2
Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s first supplemental filing was mooted by the
Court’s dismissal of the case. Cf. Pemberton v. Patton, 2015 WL 1638638, at *8 (W.D.
Okla. Apr. 13, 2015) (denying pending motions “as moot” upon “dismissal of th[e]
action”). Nonetheless, Plaintiff proceeded to file a “reply in opposition” to the motion to
strike on February 13, 2019 (Doc. No. 32)—two weeks after the Court dismissed his case.
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filing (Doc. No. 28), the extrinsic fact materials Plaintiff relies upon are irrelevant to his
CONCLUSION
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Kathryn H. Ruemmler
George S. Corbyn, Jr. (OBA number 1910)
CORBYN HAMPTON BARGHOLS
PIERCE, PLLC
211 North Robinson, Suite 1910
One Leadership Square
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102
Telephone: (405) 239-7055
gcorbyn@corbynhampton.com
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on March 20, 2019, I authorized the electronic filing of the
foregoing with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send