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A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL
MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty.
Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their
acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-
evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the
1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited
the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one
bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this year"
(Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner
himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein
stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other
subjects also underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that
this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned.
If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they
may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due
process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their
grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford
sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide
the matter of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and
found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile
Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent
some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner
concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one
Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar
examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed
in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D.
Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with
which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for
re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was done and his
reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-
checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant
Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in
a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.).
Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the
Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice
why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five
examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why
no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while
respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case
No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent
Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and
complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-
evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public
International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in
Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination
notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24,
Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in
Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered
that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-
checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful
candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-
evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the
grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful
candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were
summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the
1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias
Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8,
1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on
Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the
hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not
remember having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60,
rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact
which he is required under the rules to do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2,
1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo,
Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where he
is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral
testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence
the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their
cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the
investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which
they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals)
Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the
examination notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is
the practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a
review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds that candidate
obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in
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another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation
and change of grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me
an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him
the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to
75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered
the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-
evaluation and upon verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were
based on the same standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others;
thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5
with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis
supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with
following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is
no longer to make the reconsideration of these answers because of the same
evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and
9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I
did not know the identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the
Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I
am authorized to do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo,
based on the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about
October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty. Lanuevo
and myself had developed to the point that with respect
to the correction of the examination booklets of bar
candidates I have always followed him and considered
his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same;
that I have no alternative but to take his words;
b) That considering this relationship and considering his
misrepresentation to me as reflecting the real and policy
of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any
more to get the consent and permission of the Chairman
of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I was
isolating myself from all members of the Supreme Court
and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear
that I might be identified as a bar examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such
recorrection, and as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who made the original
correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public
International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me
the last bag of two hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200
to 1400) which according to my record was on February 5, 1972, he came to my
residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court,
with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's
notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested
me if it was possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because it
appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar
Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the
highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook
as I had submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to
do so because the same was still within my control and authority as long as the
particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the code number
decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that
the name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not
been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given
a particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me,
and as it was humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said
notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in
accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the
entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an increased grade
of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the
grades, and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in
question had not been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the
total grade in the notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properly
initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item
No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar
Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-
59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P.
Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in
additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international
law, code numbered 661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to
know his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5, 1973; now
knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and that I
have never met him even up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such
review, and had repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to
make such revision and was so assured of my authority as the name of the
examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's
assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of
express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the
Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I
refrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman
lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the
evening at my residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the
Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations were unauthorized or
suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the
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Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which
was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was
about the same hour that he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as
when I submitted the same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code
numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the correction, not to
make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible to
have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971,
considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was
84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual
that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know
and that there was nothing irregular in that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee
with notebook code numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9
points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did not pass the
subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee pass,
notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee
consensus was that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the
rest, the examiner in said subject would review the notebook. Nobody objected
to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not
know the names of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no
knowledge of the motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and
did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract with him
before or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination
books to my residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in
Criminal Law and was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another
subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law
saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by only a
fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few
points to 75% then he would make the general passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if
I remember correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also
the mark and revised also the mark in the general list.
5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar
Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who
up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972,
Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at
No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to him.
He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the
said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and possibly
reconsider the grade that I had previously given. He explained that the examine
concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively
low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was short of
passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I
might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can
recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the
examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo
however informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had previously
given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to
address such a request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the
presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each and every
item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I
increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other items, and
maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr.
Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation,
the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of
75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn
statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total
grade of the examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein
respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he could be faulted for not
having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners the
legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however,
pleads in attenuation of such omission, that —
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time,
he was not aware, not having been apprised otherwise,
that it was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant
of the Supreme Court to request or suggest that the
grade of a particular examination notebook be revised
or reconsidered. He had every right to presume, owing
to the highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar
Confidant, that the request was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee
concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each
and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and
giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of
Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that
particular subject that the said examine failed, herein
respondent became convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that previously given to
him, but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's
honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%.
It should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the
answers, herein respondent downgraded a previous
rating of an answer written by the examinee, from
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9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the
Bar Examinations were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all
other subjects except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-
evaluate the paper of this particular Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook
(No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this
particular Bar candidate I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the
grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn statement
of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-
evaluated the examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
in absolute good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement made during
one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that where a candidate
fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of
the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the
aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law
pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have
never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets
and the posting on the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the
answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks.
Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the memorandum
circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight
should then be given to clarify of language and
soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-
evaluation and/or re-checking.
It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the
results of the examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the
examinees that they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy their
answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of them
would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now,
we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for
submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to
be denied because the result of the examinations when released is final and
irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to
bring those notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his
hotest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as bar confidant but on the
contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was
inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he
does not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he
remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the meeting
a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average
but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to
remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject,
respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who
thereby raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he
remembers right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de
la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such
serious charges as would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all
good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into
believing that the examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the
fact of the matter being that the notebooks in question were submitted to the
respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they so
merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as
Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was
circulated to all the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of
whether or not re-evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in
question:
Sometime during the latter part of January and the early
part of February, 1972, on my way back to the office
(Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a
sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point that the
moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any
object and the first number that comes into my sight
becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that
moment, the first number that I saw was "954" boldly
printed on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging
to the MERALCO) attached to a post standing along the
right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme
Court building from San Marcelino street and almost
adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the
Araullo High School(photograph of the number '954', the
contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the
post to which it is attached is identified and marked as
Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-
Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza
Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain such
number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then
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bought, whose last three digits corresponded to "954".
This number became doubly impressive to me because
the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was
"27", a number that is so significant to me that
everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to link or
connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus
even in assigning code numbers on the Master List of
examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the
examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either
started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said
number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as
Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of
the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master List as Exh. 6-
Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list,
as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo
and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh.
7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo
and the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-
Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27) was born out
of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On November 27,
1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with
pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija
Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the
last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I
was still confined at the hospital, our camp was bombed
and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941
resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded
November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me
having been saved from the possibility of being among
the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get
out of the army byway of honorable discharge; and (c)
on February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we
begot children the youngest of whom was born on
February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying
the ticket, I resumed my work which at the time was on
the checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I
came upon the notebooks bearing the office code
number "954". As the number was still fresh in my mind,
it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the
contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of
the writing and language and the apparent soundness of
the answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on
the basis of the aforementioned Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)
that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and
later on took them back to the respective examiners for
possible review recalling to them the said Confidential
Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their
discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either
of the two cases which I brought to the attention of the committee during the
meeting and which the Committee agreed to refer back to the respective
examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general
average but with a grade below 50% (47%) in Mercantile
Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office
Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo
and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4%
increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-
Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline
general average of 73.15% with a grade below 60%
(57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not
pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the data
thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and
International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo
Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office
Code No. 1622 identified and marked as Exh. 10-
Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and International
Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with the
original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-
evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in
Political and International Law is precisely the same
notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only
one (1) subject or notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only
Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and International Law in the
latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and
pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks
involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or
re-check some 19, or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee
that there was very little time left and that the increase in grade after re-
evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the
subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid
of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of
respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he
"was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record
of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked
him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio
Lanuevo and never met him before except once when, as required by the latter
respondent submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider
"failure" cases; after the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a
"passing" case, especially in a situation where the respondent and the bar
confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary
course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a
reasonable doubt to which respondent is richly entitled?
6
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution
dated March 5, 1973, had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant
Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the resolution. In
fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein
respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in
the Resolution, which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to
the benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First, was the re-
evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination
Committee done only or especially for him and not done generally as regards the
paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-
evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among those of others, then it must
have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase the
percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the insinuation
that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact
that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit
an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant
Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in
effect because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination
Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of
their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are
deductible from the narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to
show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this
Respondent Account or answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as
well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of some
conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is denied
and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their
duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade due
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly
initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of
respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the
desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been
submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and
in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before Christmas
day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of
correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he
makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate
obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to
the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner
Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who
owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject could be
reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took
respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme
Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the
paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook
belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This
examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of
the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law.
After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of
75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an
examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded.
Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to
reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and
that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low
grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee
was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that
if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee deserving of being
admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to
the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English. Furthermore,
respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memorandum that read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal
fundamentals, and ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of
memory; in the correction of papers, substantial weight should be given to clarify
of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration
was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as
Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further believing that such request was in
order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an
increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the
grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by
him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to
respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and
Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law
bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing
respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other
subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-
evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After
satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that
this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondent
Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook.
Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the
grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the
corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook
with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46,
rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the passing
grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who
was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already
7
finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee
who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if
his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing
grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not
want to be the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to
75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise
initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This
examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65,
66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the
latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that
where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy
of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls,
however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-
evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination
period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing grade
because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee
Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious
scheme — by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile
Law tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned
would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion
(Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by
respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information
was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely seated together.
Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day,
respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code
Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-
evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter
officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee
failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation
of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one
instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the grade of
an examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp.
34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-
examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of
respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two
companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after
the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an
examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities,
requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to
respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority
to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting
in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office code number. It
belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-
24, 29-30, rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E.
GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners
concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually
resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of
eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a
resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination without any grade
below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond
dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said
re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only in
their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his
actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and
1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to
the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his
honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or
betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee
concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not
re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum was
intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers and
never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of
the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also
offensive to the norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose
declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo,
are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and
clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases show
how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too
undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his
position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his
relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and
induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the
increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and
well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to
the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To
repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects
and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25% — which under no circumstances
or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline
of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-
evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor
subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized
re-evaluation are as follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
8
BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
evaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5)
subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to
74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar
examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee
Galang, with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one
notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter who — Political Law and Public International Law for
Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or
reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by
the Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and
thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the
percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to
the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73,
etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the
functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner.
He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by
the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar
Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as
well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of betraying
the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of
the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of
more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully
aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact
further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to
the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of
Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees
were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent
Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the
said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court
or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-
evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg
and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a
semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang
would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela
Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when
the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3)
subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled
for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case
No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of
Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the
wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27,
1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo,
Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.
B
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE
OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S
NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE
INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on
Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners
concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg
were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were
officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and
the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case
of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.).
Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper
which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a
record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28,
rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the meeting of
the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them inadvertently
in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp.
28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in the
Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No.
1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in
Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record
(Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35,
rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade
of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of
said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present
when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code
number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the
figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-
Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did
not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee
presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee
agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed
(Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p.
16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the
borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee
(Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to
Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner
9
concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was
taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This
particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up
by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.).
Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved
Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation
made by respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the
Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in
whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-
Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to
Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are
as follows:
BA
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————
Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to
remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
Political Law 70%
Taxation 72%
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:
BA
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————
Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile
Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due
to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can
hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time
of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang
had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was
considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in
Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and
undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from
the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding
investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5)
major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile
Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether
these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for Admission to
the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required
passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a
member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the
eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the
Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is
the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of
the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the
final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as
the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined
and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5)
subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from
the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant.
Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to
be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with
respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine
whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's
appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a
privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the
candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the
character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission
as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,
and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both
rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case,
10
pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral
character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine.
Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record — whether he was
criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more
compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court
beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or
pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of
course true that the application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in
1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already
intimated, implicit in his task to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his
obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider
them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's
criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character;
for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or
terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness
for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third
time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the
applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against
him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared
by the Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving
moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that
"he has not been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of,
indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a
pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to
intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then
and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of
the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and
withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967,
1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that
he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case
pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7)
times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had
been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law
is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in
withholding from the board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to
whom he applied for admission, information respecting so serious a matter as an
indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom
he applied for admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the
certificate of the board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming (State ex
rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the clerk of
court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the
Appellate Division.' In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed
truthfully and frankly of matters tending to show the character of the applicant
and his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding of
indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his
motion, were facts which should have been submitted to the court, with such
explanations as were available. Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as
tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been
apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of
the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called
to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case
up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor.
He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to
explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as
August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer
any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to
take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other
alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the
Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who
demands it, but is a privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound
discretion. The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct
which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law. It would be
a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an
officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then
to permit him to hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing
American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not
without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the admission
of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of
(a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from
the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and
recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character
[In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs.
Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and Doe,
54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of Mabunay
and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge
Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G.
Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of
the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however,
professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without
knowing the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without
any consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion
and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good
faith and without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the Bar,
the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution
and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant
Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have
referred the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required
respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average of the examinee
represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or
11
was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was really so
circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been
avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the
answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent
Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to
respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their
respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of
respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had
almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average
and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I did
not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-
Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this
particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-
evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass
the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used
to be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his
request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was
to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which
were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete
I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet
accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades
they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the
misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo —
Q And by reason of that information you made the re-
evaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own
accord in the absence of such information?
A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report
at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-
Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19,
1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41,
and 72, rec.).
Pamatian —
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me
an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him
the owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to
75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice
and policy of the Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered
the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I
am authorized to do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio
Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the
benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in
that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became
convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously
given him, but he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be
given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected
that particular notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher
grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein
examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-
evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded integrity,
honesty and competence notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the said re-
evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which were
earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in
five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their
explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that
their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration
of public interest — absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or
utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that
respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or
support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into
helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner
named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's
memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon
Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in his words is
"essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when
Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly
also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been
terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of
this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not
impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed
that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective
subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho,
who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of
seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see
the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to
Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said
bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after
the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the
Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of
delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to impair public
faith in the Supreme Court.
12
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to
enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.
A and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the
1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant
and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF
Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for
the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was
notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent Lanuevo
and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor
of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage —
P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of
inscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914:
date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to
D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only
P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the
purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the
P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his
sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before
Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from
his sister; are not fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971
Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in
the amount of only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed
under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the
P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only the
amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable
listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because the
transaction therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and
Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married
sister in Okinawa is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000
(P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed
on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received from
his sister at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent
during the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he
considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no
mode or time of payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator the
address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the
records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of
her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give
to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was
either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing
circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes
house and lot to the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August
14, 1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of inscription). On
February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914,
was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973,
Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of
BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and
thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only
the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house
mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay
the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in
connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the
house and lot declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed,
however, as an item in his liabilities in the same statement was the GSIS real
estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW
car valued at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January,
1972 and November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any
car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971 or in the years
previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding
receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of
November, 1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot
was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar
examinations and the acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to
link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed by
respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers or
to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the
above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing
the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the
serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in
fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered
by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the
end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5,
1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations,
respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining
the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation
that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.),
which he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act
constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or
allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation
or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge
of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to
officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the
grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is
determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer
13
or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec.
2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and
Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are
part of the records of this Court.
B German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or
his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the
Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the
MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent
Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency
entrusted with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From
1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims
Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm.
Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with
applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on
March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol.
IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the
availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at
MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and
from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80,
86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of
Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated
June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the
transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first
semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang
at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans
to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the said
office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are
required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.).
But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists
that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and
imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court
building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated
claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he
does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across
the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr.
Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales
and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the
guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine
Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the
Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications with
other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not
remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine
Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva
Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed
by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27,
1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and
was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C
US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division,
US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date
of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22,
1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar
Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the
Court. Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar
examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.
WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY
DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE
DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.
IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.
FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.
Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.
REGALA, J.:
On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a
member of the Bar, with gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the
material allegations of the complaint, and as a special defense averred that the allegations therein do not
constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of the former Rules of Court.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Hearings were held by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the
complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and documentary. The respondent, as
well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise testified. He
denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed
the handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa
Puno, Jr. to be his child.
After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with immorality.
The complaint recites:
That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando
Puno were engaged to be married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a
movie but on their way the respondent told the complainant that they take refreshment
before going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at R. Hidalgo,
Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel,
respondent proposed to complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her
that 'anyway we are getting married; that with reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered
by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage, complainant acquiesced, and
before they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as
'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant
inside the room; that as soon as they were inside the room, someone locked the door from
outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed himself; that complainant
begged respondent not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have
promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his
14
overtures of love, again assured complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that
I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled complainant to the bed, removed her
panty, and then placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on the bed;
that when respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but
to submit to respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock
until 7:00 o'clock that same evening when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday
party together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1, 1958, respondent
repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they had better
wait until they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling
that she was already on the family way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to
comply with his promise of marriage but respondent refused to comply; that on February 20,
1959, complainant gave birth to a child.
That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a
promise of marriage which he did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present
constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the highest degree of morality
and integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the
Philippine Bar.
The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.
A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the
complaint on June 9, 1962, again denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on
the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual intercourse with her. He, however, admitted
that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until November, 1955, when
they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without
stating in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence, respondent prayed that
the complaint be dismissed.
This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E.
Gaddi who appeared for the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There
was no appearance for the respondents.
Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional evidence in
his behalf is deemed a waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266,
April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before the Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent
had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the witnesses, may now be considered by
this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.
After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.
Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She
testified that respondent took her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as
"Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her on the promise of marriage.
The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno"
arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.
Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to
Zamboanga City. When she learned that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram
sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in
September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant and she
requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in November,
1958, where she met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry her.1äwphï1.ñët
Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in
Zamboanga City in November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was
likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which was
duly identified by the respondent to be his.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This
is supported by a certified true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the
medical records clerk of the hospital.
To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter
testified that she gave money to the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by
the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant. Even respondent's letter dated November 3,
1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.
The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to
discredit complainant's testimony.
In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and complainant
were sweethearts up to November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958
is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.);
respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and respondent's own testimony
(pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of
marriage and not because of a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf.
Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966) .
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old
Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or
privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance of the practice and the
exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil.
567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him;
he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p.
93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is
expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual
intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on that date.
In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet
the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is
hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the State
voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly
so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very
means by which it may assist him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the
complainant that the allegations in the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section 25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is
already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or suspension is not to
be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers
of the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an
attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and
the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73 Kan 743; Balinon vs. de
Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145, December
28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for
suspension or disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and
has, thus disregarded and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that
members of this ancient and learned profession of law must conform themselves in accordance with the
highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics:
... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of
candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He
should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and
to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered
stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.
15
A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989
NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint1 dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez
charged Reynerio I. Decena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with malpractice and breach of trust. The
complainant spouses alleged, among others, that respondent had, by means of fraud and deceit, taken
advantage of their precarious financial situation and his knowledge of the law to their prejudice, succeeded
in divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian City; that respondent, who was their counsel in an
estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda, had compromised that case without their authority.
In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges levelled against him and prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint.
By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City, Jorge T. Almonte, to
conduct the necessary investigation, with instructions to submit thereafter this report and
recommendation thereon. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on the administrative case until 15 July
1982, when he requested the Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the case.
On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in his stead appointed
the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983.
Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing the
case followed by an urgent motion for indefinite postponement of the investigation. Both motions were
denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21 September 1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to
complete the investigation of the administrative case and to render his report and recommendation
thereon within thirty (30) days from notice.
On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. In
as Report, after setting out the facts and proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor General
presented the following:
FINDINGS
Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from respondent a
loan of P 4,000.00. This loan was secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex C,
Complainants' Complaint, p. 16, records).lâwphî1.ñèt In the said Real Estate
Mortgage document, however, it was made to appear that the amount borrowed
by complainants was P5,000.00. Confronted by this discrepancy, respondent
assured complainants that said document was a mere formality, and upon such
assurance, complainants signed the same. The document was brought by
complainant Narciso Melendres to a Notary Public for notarization. After the
same was notarized, he gave the document to respondent. Despite the assurance,
respondent exacted from complainants P500.00 a month as payment for what is
beyond dispute usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan. Complainants religiously
paid the obviously usurious interest for three months: September, October and
November, 1975. Then they stopped paying due to financial reverses. In view of
their failure to pay said amounts as interest, respondent prepared a new
document on May 7, 1976, a Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint, p. 18,
records) over the same lot 3125-C, replacing the former real estate mortgage
dated August 5, 1975, but this time the sum indicated in said new contract of
mortgage is P 10,000.00, purportedly with interest at 19% per annum. In this new
Real Estate Mortgage, a special power of attorney in favor of respondent was
inserted, authorizing him to sell the mortgaged property at public auction in the
event complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May 30, 1976.
Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to complainants,
respondent insisted that complainants sign the same, again upon the assurance
that the document was a mere formality. Unsuspecting of the motive of
respondent, complainants signed the document. Complainants Narciso Melendres
again brought the same document to a Notary Public for notarization. After the
document was notarized, he brought the same to respondent without getting a
copy of it.
Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second Real
Estate Mortgage was but a formality, neither bothered to ask from respondent
the status of their lot nor tried to pay their obligation. For their failure to pay the
obligation, the respondent on October 12, 1976, applied for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16, Respondent's Position
Paper). All the requirements of Act No. 3135, as amended, re extrajudicial sale of
mortgage were ostensibly complied with by respondent. Hence, finally, title was
transferred to him, and on June 20, 1979, respondent sold the involved property
to Trinidad Ylanan for P12,000.00.
When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March
1979 (see Sworn Statement of complainant Narciso Melendres, p. 6, Folder No. 2
of case), and not having known the legal implications of the provisions of the
second Real Estate Mortgage which they had executed, complainants could not
believe that title to their lot had already been transferred to respondent and that
respondent had already sold the same to a third person.
Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to raise the amount
of P10,000.00 and went to respondent's house on May 30, 1979 to pay their
obligation, hoping that they could redeem their property, although three years
had already lapsed from the date of the mortgage.
Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead gave
complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B, Complainants' Position Paper), which
indicated that the total indebtedness had soared to P20,400.00. The computation
was made in respondent's own handwriting. Complainants went home with
shattered hopes and with grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant competent for
disbarment against respondent filed on October 5, 1979.
Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He maintains that what
appears on the two documents allegedly executed by complainants, i.e., that they
obtained a loan of P5,000.00 on August 5, 1975 and another P10,000.00 on May
7,1976, is allegedly the truth, and claims that he in truth delivered the alleged
amount of P5,000.00 to complainants and not P4,000.00. With respect to the
second loan, respondent claims that he delivered to complainants P8,000.00, plus
the P2,000.00 loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one Regino
Villanueva, which loan had been indorsed to respondent for collection, thus
making a total of P10,000.00, as appearing on said document. Respondent denies
that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a month or P500.00 from complainants.
He asserts that the fact that complainants were able to secure a loan from the
Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation
that the title of the property, at the time complainants obtained a loan from IBAA
on April 1976, was clear of any encumbrance, since complainants had already
paid the original loan of P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that complainants
knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage; and that his acquisition of the
property in question was in accordance with their contract and the law on the
matter. Thus, he denies that he has violated any right of the complainants.
After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent, we find
against respondent.
While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual
cash of P4,000.00, they are only partly correct in the claim that out of the
P10,000.00 appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage, P6,000.00 was applied
to interest considering that not all the P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was applied
16
to interest, computed as follows: the first loan of P5,000.00 was supposedly due
on August 31, 1975. Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or P500.00 on
September 30, 1975, October 31, 1975 and November 30, 1975. Consequently,
beginning December 31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976 (the date of the execution of
the second Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed. Six (6) months
at P500.00 equals P 3,000.00, which amount plus the P2,000.00 complainants'
loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for collection) totals
P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the previous P5,000.00 indicated loan secured
by the first mortgage results in P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the second
Real Estate Mortgage. Section 7, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. — When the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is to be considered as complaining all such terms, and,
therefore, there can be, as between the parties and their successors in interest,
no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing,
except in the following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the
true intent and agreement of the parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in
issue by the pleadings;
(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement"
includes wills.
There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate Mortgages
covering the supposed original loan of P5,000.00 and the inflated P10,000.00,
respectively, were voluntarily signed by the complainants. The general rule is that
when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing, it is presumed that
they have made the writing the only repository and memorial of the truth, and
whatever is not found in the writing must be understood to have been waived
and abandoned.
However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions, as aforequoted.
One of the exceptions, that is, failure to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties, applies in this case. From the facts obtaining in the case, it is clear
that the complainants were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents
by the false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the
successive documents was a are formality.
While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being
a lawyer, should have at least explained to complainants the legal implications of
the provisions of the real estate mortgage, particularly the provision appointing
him as the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments on
the part of complainants. While it may be conceded that it is presumed that in
practice the notary public apprises complainants of the legal implications of the
contract, it is of common knowledge that most notaries public do not go through
the desired practice. Respondent at least could have informed the complainants
by sending a demand letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he would
proceed to sell the lot at public auction as per their contract. This respondent
failed to do, despite the fact that he knew fully wen that complainants were
trying their best to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to him, as
shown by the loan obtained by complainants from the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In
this connection, it may be stated that complainants, per advice of respondent
himself, returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April
30, 1976, considering that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was only
P4,300.00 and not enough to pay the indicated loan from respondent of
P5,000.00, which per computation of respondent would already have earned
interest of P2,500.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to April, 1976).
Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of P5,000.00,
and that this was the reason why complainants were able to mortgage the lot to
the bank free from any encumbrance. This claim is incorrect. The reason why the
title (T-2684) was free from any encumbrance was simply because of the fact that
the first Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5,000.00 (the actual
amount was only P 4,000.00) had not been annotated at the back of the title (see
Annex B, p. 14, rec.).
Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of Pl0,000.
00 as payment of the loan, alleging that if the offer were true, he could have
readily accepted the same since he sold the lot for almost the same amount, for
only P12,000.00, a difference of a few thousand pesos. Respondent's denial is
spacious.
Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the same for the
simple reason that the offer was made on May 30,1979, three (3) years after the
execution of the mortgage on May 31, 1976. With its lapse of time, respondent
demanded obviously the payment of the accumulated substantial interest for
three years, as shown by his own computation in as own handwriting on a sheet
of paper (Annex C, Complainants' Position Paper, Folder No. 2).lâwphî1.ñèt
In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing Officer is worth
quoting:
In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to this
particular charge is whose version is to be believed. Is it the version of the
complainants or the version of the respondent.
In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in filing
the present complaint against the respondent must be carefully examined and
considered. At the beginning there was a harmonious relationship between the
complainants and the respondent so much so that respondent was even engaged
as counsel of the complainants and it is but human nature that when respondent
extended a loan to the complainants the latter would be grateful to the former.
However, in the case at bar, complainants filed a complaint against the
respondent in spite of the great disparity between the status of the complainants
and the respondent. Admittedly, respondent is in a better position financially,
socially and intellectually. To the mind of the undersigned, complainants were
only compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the respondent
because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the respondent has done to
them. It is for this reason therefore that the undersigned is inclined to believe the
version of the complainants rather than of the respondent. In addition thereto,
the respondent as a lawyer could really see to it that the transaction between the
complainants and himself on papers appear legal and in order. Besides, there is
ample evidence in the records of its case that respondent is actually engaged in
lending money at least in a limited way and that the interest at the rate of ten per
cent a month is but common among money lenders during the time of the
transactions in question'
Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that respondent, who
was their counsel (private prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734, for estafa, against
accused Reynaldo Pineda, compromised the case with the accused without their
consent and received the amount of P500.00 as advance payment for the
amicable settlement, without however, giving to the complainants the Id amount
nor informing them of said settlement and payment.
Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable settlement
was with the consent of complainant wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z].
We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.
It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused
Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in merely recovering their money of P2,000.00.
At this stage, relationship between complainants and respondent was not yet
strained, and respondent, as counsel of the complainants in this case, knew that
17
complainants were merely interested in said recovery. Knowing this, respondent
on his own volition talked to accused and tried to settle the case amicably for
P2,000.00. He accepted the amount of P500.00 as advance payment, being then
the only amount carried by the accused Pineda. A receipt was signed by both
respondent and accused Pineda (Annex M, p. 34, record). However, respondent
did not inform complainants about this advance payment, perhaps because he
was still waiting for the completion of the payment of P2,000.00 before turning
over the whole amount to complainants.
At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned P500.00
to respondent, but they were ashamed then to ask directly of respondent what
the money was all about.
On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the complainants had
already lost their trust and respect and/or confidence in respondent upon
knowing what happened to their lot and, more so, upon respondent's refusal to
accept the Pl0,000.00 offered by complainants to redeem the same, Narciso
Melendre[z] saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted him on the
P500.00 that had been given to respondent. Accused then showed complainant
Melendres the receipt (Annex M, Id.) showing that the P500.00 was an advance
payment for the supposed settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants
against him.
Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants then filed a
motion before the court which was trying the criminal case and relieved
respondent as their counsel.
The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the
witnesses in testifying, had this to say:
With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received P500.00
from Reynaldo Pineda is duly established. Both the complainants and the
respondent agreed that the said amount was given to the respondent in
connection with a criminal case wherein the complainants were the private
offended parties: that Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is
the private prosecutor of the said case. The pivotal issue in this particular charge
is whether the respondent received the amount of P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda
as an advance payment of an amicable settlement entered into by the
complainants and the accused or the respondent received said amount from the
accused without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. If it is true as
alleged by the respondent that he only received it for and in behalf of the
complainants as advance payment of an amicable settlement why is it that the
same was questioned by the complainants? Why is it that it was not the
complainants who signed the receipt for the said amount? How come that as
soon as complainants knew that the said amount was given to the respondent,
the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent as their counsel on the
ground that they have lost faith and confidence on him? If it is really true that
complainants have knowledge and have consented to this amicable settlement
they should be grateful to the efforts of their private prosecutor yet the fact is
that they resented the same and went to the extent of disqualifying the
respondent as their private prosecutor. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an
affidavit belying the claim of the respondent.'
Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent Decena
are contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals for which he may be
suspended. The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may
consist of misconduct in either his professional or non- professional attitude
(Royong v. Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts of respondent imply
something immoral in themselves, regardless of the fact whether they are
punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute,
fixes the moral turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S. Dist. Court for District of Nebraska C.C.C.
Neb] 19 F [2d] 722).
A parting comment.
All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless.
Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too much.
They did not bother to keep a copy of the documents they executed and
considering that they admitted they did not understand the contents of the
documents, they did not bother to have them explained by another lawyer or by
any knowledgeable person in their locality. Likewise, for a period of three years,
they did not bother to ask for respondent the status of their lot and/or their
obligation to him. Their complacency or apathy amounting almost to negligence
contributed to the expedient loss of their property thru the legal manuevers
employed by respondent. Hence, respondent's liability merits mitigation.
(Emphasis supplied)
and made the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I. Decena be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of five (5) years. 3
The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero, held several hearings during the
investigation of the present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual
hearings out of twenty-five (25) resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings, out of forty (40) resettings
5 were held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In those hearings, the complainants presented a
number of witnesses who, after their direct testimony, were cross-examined by the counsel for
respondent; complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly cross-examined.
Considering the long delay incurred in the investigation of the administrative case and having been pressed
by the Solicitor General immediately to complete the investigation, Fiscal Jamero posed a change of
procedure, from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to submit their respective position papers.
The complainants immediately filed their position paper which consisted of their separate sworn
statements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer form), their documentary exhibits
and an affidavit of one Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent also filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his
witnesses, with several annexes in support thereof In the healing of 28 October 1987, which had been set
for the cross examination of the complainants and their witnesses by respondent, the complainants
refused to submit themselves to cross-examination on the ground that the order of the hearing officer
dated 17 December 1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination as having been waived, had
become final and executory. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the complainants' position
paper, not having passed through any cross-examination and argues that the non-submission of the
complainants and their witnesses to cross-examination constitutes a denial of his right to due process.
We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has been
violated, Respondent in fact cross-examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses
which complainants had presented earlier. As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the record of the
proceedings shows that respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine the other witnesses of the
complainants (those whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) had he wanted to,
but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous continuances which indicated a clear attempt
on his part to delay the investigation proceedings. Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty
three (23) resettings during the investigation proceedings: he had eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and
fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There were also instances where respondent asked for postponement and
at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his choice on which neither he nor as counsel would
appear. That attitude of respondent eventually led the hearing officer to declare his (respondent's) right to
cross-examine the complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17 December
1986. Respondent can not now claim that he had been deprived below of the opportunity to confront the
complainants and their witnesses.
After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both
parties, we agree with the findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General.
The following acts of respondent:
18
1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount
loaned to complainants was P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;
2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;
3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the
loan extended to complainants had escalated to P10,000.00;
4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents
and inducing them to sign those documents with assurances that they were
merely for purposes of "formality";
5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants
before effecting extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property; and
6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate
mortgage had already been foreclosed and that complainants had a right to
redeem the foreclosed property within a certain period of time.
constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the acts of respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of
whether they are punishable by law" and that these acts constitute moral turpitude, being "contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty or good morals." The standard required from members of the Bar is not, of
course, satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so, respondent's
conduct, in fact, may be penalizable under at least one penal statute — the anti-usury law.
The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a
time when he was counsel for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo
Pineda. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the first is that respondent Decena effected a compromise
agreement concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without the consent and approval of
the complainants; the second is that, having received the amount of P500.00 as an advance payment on
this "settlement," he failed to inform complainants of that advance payment and moreover, did not turn
over the P500.00 to the complainants. The facts show that respondent "settled" the estafa case amicably
for P2,000.00 without the knowledge and consent of complainants. Respondent informed complainants of
the amicable "settlement" and of the P500.00 advance payment only after petitioner Narciso Melendrez
had confronted him about these matters. And respondent never did turn over to complainants the
P500.00. Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special authority,
compromise their clients' litigation or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim, but the full amount
in cash.6 Respondent's failure to turn over to complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as partial
"settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and candor in dealing with his clients.
Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or
non-professional capacity. Where however, misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so
patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to remain in the legal profession, the Court must
suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. 7 The nature of the office of an
attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a
condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law, in the exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on
the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of professional duties as a member of the Bar,
which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. 8
In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the complainants in
his private transactions with them, and the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest, considered
together with the acts of professional misconduct committed by respondent attorney, compel this Court to
the conviction that he has lost that good moral character which is indispensable for continued membership
in the Bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken from the
Rollo of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the
personal records of respondent attorney, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
A.C. No. 376 April 30, 1963
JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the
respondent Ariston J. Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her
person in the manner described therein. Upon requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer
denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this
Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that the
respondent "be permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of
attorneys". The pertinent part of the report reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster
mother, left her alone in their house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about
1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on the second floor of the house the
respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth with
one hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and
forced her to lie down on the floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and
her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on the floor, then had sexual intercourse
with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his fist to
subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her
foster parents, otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed
ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock that afternoon when she joined her foster
mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she became
pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of
Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that
she did not report the outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that
she still frequented the respondent's house after August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was
alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him. Once, on
November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his
house while her aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n.,
hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n.,
hearing of March 25 1960). He testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the
Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as technical assistant in the office of
the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case against
Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from
January, 1957 to December, 1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the
complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for seduction, according to him, he
limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she completed her
eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had
reached eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place
before Christmas in December, 1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty times,
mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they had the opportunity. He
intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster parents'
intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for
her foster parents will object and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery
of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he confessed the affair to Briccia,
explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp. 14-
16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).
xxx xxx xxx
FINDINGS AND COMMENT
There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The
complainant claims she surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation,
but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual intercourse was performed not once but
19
repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged rape, she
appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor
....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience
recommend respondent's exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live
maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted, and it is not improbable that the
spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after
more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that
she, Briccia Angeles, could not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of
age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was
accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of marriage which he
knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so
that he, respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over
her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle),
undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she
was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated
May 22, 1954 alleging "that he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that
the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar examinations to be given on the first Saturday
of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From
1942 to the present, he has continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose
husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a married woman and that her marriage
still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar examinations, and had
it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the
bar examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was
then permanently disqualified from admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous
relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same misconduct should be sufficient
ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of morality, one
for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
xxx xxx xxx
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent
Ariston J. Oblena be permanently removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be
stricken from the roll of attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the
alleged rape nevertheless he was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another
complaint which he appended to his report, charging the respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in
his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character; of living adulterously
with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong,
niece of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the
legal business of others, and praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of
the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint does not
merit action", since the causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original
cause of action for rape and that "the complaint lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule
128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and hearing for additional evidence,
the complaint be dismissed.
On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional evidence.
Accordingly the case was set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961,
respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same
was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been proven; 2) That no act of
seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was
committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the
respondent is not morally unfit to be a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who
testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December
16, 1941 at Cavinti, Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were
evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23). She was already married (to Teodoro Arines)
at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n. 24). Respondent and
one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her
status she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay
at respondent's house, respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was
married and she told him 'we will talk about that later on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she
was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already living together as 'husband
and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as
husband and wife (t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat,
but she did not go with her because she and respondent 'had already a good
understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her hometown
in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told
her it was better for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate
husband (Arines), who told her he had already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29).
She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived with respondent (t.s.n. 29).
Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently
living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request was also
granted. The affidavit was filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the
following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because
the latter was born on February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place
on May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18 years of age; that he had been living with his
common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he began courting
her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime
of adultery; that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted
by her; that on February 21, 1942, he found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her
sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees; that from said date (February
21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-law husband and wife;
that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already
married, and maybe her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive
Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the place, nor could he urge her to join her sister
Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to separate from him and
to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations,
Briccia returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him
again, telling him that she cannot separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that
Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed not to molest them as in
fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with
her' (Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he
'did not have the slightest intention to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation
with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state said fact in his petition, because
he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated; and
that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good moral character, and it was
only from the Solicitor General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit
20
perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in
1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his
knowledge of the law to take advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that
by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed
gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he became a lawyer in 1955
to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take
the 1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife,
Briccia Angeles, a married woman. The investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred
or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of
record, the case was set for hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his
memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly
filed.
It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the complainant
several times, and as a consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise
continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the
open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's
disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with
the complainant and his open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not
been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been
convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds upon which the disbarment
proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court for
which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and
that the power of the courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a
necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory
authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute; and the power may be exercised
in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1
Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule
that the legislature (or the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts
or conduct shall require disbarment, the accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the
power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or rules) do not restrict the general powers of
the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other than statutory
grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the
continued possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite
condition for the rightful continuance in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss
requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do not specify that as a ground of
disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in
either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this
Court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office
as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover
practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In the case at bar, the moral depravity of
the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her eighteenth
birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he
himself declared — and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her
tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of,
for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his
common-law wife and that he enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As
the Solicitor General observed: "He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood,
Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is
the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), her
inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him."
Furthermore, the blunt admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a
person who would suffer no moral compunction for his acts if the same could be done without fear of
criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the moral integrity expected of a
member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for
disbarment. This is a principle we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this
Court quoted with approval the following portion of the decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the
case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys,
uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good moral character. If that qualification is
a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law, it would
seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty
in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties,
which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and
the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has
nevertheless rendered him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his
acts. For us to do so would be — as the Solicitor General puts it — recognizing "a double standard of
morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment from the office of the
lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his
paramour's niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court
would in effect be requiring moral integrity as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to
later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character degeneration of the members of
the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed
fornication, this is no ground for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in this case, as to shock common sense of decency,
certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the noble profession of the
law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia
Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and
Christian charity" did not allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of
cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order
to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by courting the complainant and
maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify
another immoral act. The noblest means he could have employed was to have married the complainant as
he was then free to do so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and
simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not
be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy for the privileges of the
legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he
may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present
complaint against him for seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different
from those originally charged in the complaint of January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections
4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General.— Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if
the Solicitor General finds no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall
submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his findings of fact and conclusion,
whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. — If the Solicitor General
finds sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding
complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced in his investigation, with the
21
Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a
copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor
General to charge in his complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the
complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides that should the Solicitor General find sufficient
grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied by the
evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against
the respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954 since
according to his own opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral
character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his
moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which corresponds to objective reality.
Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former Chief
Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character,
or what he really is, as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of
him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante
the standard of personal and professional integrity which should be applied to persons admitted to
practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of criminal
law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court,
[1957 ed.] 626, citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del
Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v. Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good
moral character at the time he applied for admission to the bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia
Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his status, did not render
him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or
now as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from
the roll of attorneys.
March 3, 1923
In re suspension of VICENTE PELAEZ, attorney,
Juan Sumulong for respondent.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
Following the suspension of Attorney Vicente Pelaez by Judge of First Instance Wislizenus for a period of
one year, the case has been elevated to this court as provided by law, for full investigation of the facts
involved, and for the rendition of the appropriate order.
The respondent Vicente Pelaez is a member of the Philippine Bar, residing at Cebu, Cebu. On March 20,
1918, he was appointed guardian of the minor Gracia Cabrera. As such guardian, he came into possession
of certain property, including twenty shares of the E. Michael & Co., Inc., and ten shares of the Philippine
Engineering Co. While Pelaez was still the guardian of the minor, he borrowed P2,800 from the Cebu
branch of the Philippine National bank. Shortly thereafter, to guarantee the loan, Pelaez, without the
knowledge or consent of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, deposited with the Cebu branch of the
Philippine National Bank the shares of stock corresponding to the guardianship. On April 13, 1921, Pelaez
executed a written agreement in favor of the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank, pledging,
without the authority of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the shares of stock in question, to guarantee
the payment of the loan above referred to.
These are the facts, taken principally from the memorandum filed in this court on behalf of the respondent,
which caused the judge of First Instance to suspend him from the legal profession. To quote counsel for the
respondent, "the misconduct of which the respondent in this case is guilty consist of having pledged the
shares belonging to his ward, to guarantee the payment of his personal debt."
Two questions present themselves for the resolution. The first question is this: Are the courts in the
Philippines authorized to suspend or disbar a lawyer for causes other than those enumerated in the
statute? The second questions is this: May a lawyer be suspended or disbarred for non-professional
misconduct?
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from this office as lawyer by the Supreme Court for any of the causes therein enumerated. It will be
noticed that our statute merely provides that certain cause shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or
suspension of an attorney's license. It does not provide that these shall constitute the only causes for
disbarment, or that an attorney may not be disbarred or suspended for other reasons.
It is a well-settled rule that a statutory enumeration of the grounds of disbarment is not to be taken as a
limitation of the general power of the court in this respect. Even where the Legislature has specified the
grounds for disbarment, the inherent power of the court over its officer is not restricted.
The prior tendency of the decisions of this court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the
statute is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer.
Passing now to the second point — as a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one
of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general
rule with many exceptions. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown, through
misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of such professional honesty as render him
unworthy of public confidence, and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal business of others. The
reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar,
and the court requires for such admission the possession of good moral character.
The principal authority for the respondent is the case of People ex rel. vs. Appleton ([1883], 105 Ill., 474).
Here it was held, by a divided court, that where property is conveyed to an attorney in trust, without his
professional advice, and he mortgages the same, for the purpose of raising a sum of money which he
claims is due him from the cestui que trust, and the trustee afterwards sells the property and appropriates
the proceeds of the sale to his own use, the relation of client and attorney not being created by such trust,
his conduct, however censurable as an individual occupying the position of a trustee, is not such as to
warrant the summary disbarring of him on motion to the court to strike his name from the roll of
attorneys, but the injured party must be left to his proper remedy by suit. The Illinois court, however,
admits that although the general rule is, that an attorney-at-law will not be disbarred for misconduct not in
his professional capacity, but as an individual, there are cases forming an exception where his misconduct
in his private capacity may be of so gross a character as to require his disbarment.
The Attorney-General relies principally on the case of In re Smith ([1906], 73 Kan., 743). In the opinion
written by Mr. Chief Justice Johnston, it was said:
It is next contended that some of the charges against Smith do not fall within the cause for
disbarment named in the statute. As will be observed, the statute does not provide that the
only cause for which the license of an attorney may be revoked or suspended are those
specified in it, nor does it undertake to limit the common-law power of the courts to protect
themselves and the public by excluding those who are unfit to assist in the administration of
the law. It merely provides that certain causes shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or
suspension of an attorney's license. (Gen. Stat., 1901, sec. 398.) In the early case of Peyton's
Appeal (12 Kan., 398, 404), it was held that this statute is not an enabling act, but that the
power of the court to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; that
"it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; that it may be exercised
without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases, unless positively prohibited by
statute; and that it may be exercised in any manner that will give the party to be disbarred a
fair trial and a full opportunity to be heard.' If there is authority in the Legislature to restrict
the discretion of the courts as to what shall constitute causes for disbarment, or to limit the
inherent power which they have exercised from time immemorial, it should not be deemed to
have done so unless its purpose is clearly expressed. It is generally held that the enumeration
of the grounds for disbarment in the statute is not to be taken as a limitation on the general
power of the court, but that attorneys may be removed for common-law causes when the
exercise of the privileges and functions of their high office is inimical to the due administration
of justice . . . .
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as
between court and attorney, and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorney,
uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good moral character. If that
22

qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982, denying the further allegations of complainant, and stating
law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the that he (respondent) had merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35.00 by way of financial
exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice assistance during her confinement in the hospital.
and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982, the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges report and recommendation. The Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings which took place
which his license and the law confer upon him. from 21 October 1982 until 1986, at which hearings complainant and respondent presented evidence both
We are of the opinion that the doctrines announced by the Supreme Court of Kansas are sound. testimonial and documentary.
The relation of guardian and ward requires of the guardian the continual maintenance of the utmost good The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms:
faith in his dealings with the estate of the ward. The bond and the oath of the guardian require him to 1. That respondent had been courting his wife, Priscilla
manage the estate of the ward according to law for the best interests of the ward, and faithfully to (tsn, May 12, 1982, p. 9).
discharge his trust in relation thereto. Moreover, it has not escaped our attention that in the petition by 2. That he actually saw them together holding hands in
Vicente Pelaez, asking the court to appoint him the guardian of Gracia Cabrera, he begins his petition in this l980 in Cubao and Sto. Domingo, Quezon City (tsn, pp.
manner: "El abogado que subscribe, nombrado tutor testamentario, etc." (The undersigned attorney, 13-15, May 12, 1983).
appointed testamentary guardian, etc.) which indicates that petitioner might not have been named the 3. That sometime in June, 1982, his wife left their
guardian in this particular case had he not at the same time been a lawyer. conjugal house at No. 1 Lopez Jaena Street, Galas,
Counsel argues that the misconduct for which the respondent has been suspended by the lower court is Quezon City, to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa
single and isolated. "It forms," he says, "the only blot upon the escutcheon." We feel, however, that the Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn,
trial court has been extremely considerate of the respondent, and that were we sitting in first instance, we pp. 16- 17, May 12, 1983).
would probably incline to a more severe sentence. 4. That while Priscilla was staying there, she acquired
Judgment affirmed. So ordered. household appliances which she could not afford to buy
A.M. No. 2385 March 8, 1989 as she has no source of income (tsn, pp. 10-11, Sept. 10,
JOSE TOLOSA, complainant, 1985, Exh. 'M', N' and 'Q').
vs. 5. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May, 1982, at
ALFREDO CARGO, respondent. the FEU Hospital, respondent paid for her expenses and
RESOLUTION took care of her (tsn, pp. 18-20, June 15, 1983). In fact,
an incident between respondent and complainant took
FELICIANO, J.: place in said hospital (tsn, pp. 5-8, Sept. 20, 1983,
On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint dated 7 March 1982 Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l').
seeking the disbarment of respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. Complainant 6. That an incident which was subject of a complaint
claimed that respondent had been seeing his (complainant's) wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in his house and took place involving respondent and complainant at No.
elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981, his wife left his conjugal home and went to live 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila
with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and that since then has (tsn, pp. 8- 10, July 29, 1983; Exh. 'B', 'B-l' and 'K').
been living with respondent at that address. 7. That again in Quezon City, incidents involving
Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982 respondent and complainant were brought to the
denying the allegations of complainant. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had been attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and 'G').
seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in view of the 8. That Complainant filed an administrative case for
continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her), much as immorality against respondent with the CLAO and that
complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and respondent was suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and
mother as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings and 'E'). (Rollo, pp. 33-35).
physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained from the former." (Rollo, p. 8). Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner:
Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made a a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice
number of further allegations, to wit: regarding her difficult relationship with complainant;
(a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that Priscilla left complainant because she suffered
that respondent had taken; maltreatment, physical injuries and public humiliation
(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and inflicted or caused by complainant;
medical bills of complainant's wife last May 1981, and b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla, nor lived
visited her at the hospital everyday; with her at No. 45 Sisa St., Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro
(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop Manila; that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived
seeing respondent but that she had refused to do so; in Malabon was a friend and former client whom
(d) That she had acquired new household and electrical respondent visited now and then;
appliances where she was living although she had no c) That respondent only gave P35.00 to Priscilla in the
means of livelihood; and FEU Hospital, as assistance in her medical expenses; that
(e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent. he reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of
23
Priscilla in the hospital which led to their being
investigated by the security guards of the hospital;
d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding
hands with her in Cubao or Sto. Domingo Church in
1980;
e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her
apartment at 45 Sisa Street, Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro
Manila from her earnings;
f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and
tried to stab him at No. 1 Galas St., Quezon City; that
said incident was between Priscilla's brother and
complainant;
g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St.,
Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and/or he had a
quarrel with complainant at 45 Sisa St., Malabon; that
the quarrel was between Priscilla's brother, Edgardo
Miclat, and complainant; that respondent went there
only to intervene upon request of complainant's wife
(see tsn, June 21, 1984). (Rollo, pp. 35-37).
The Solicitor General then submitted the following
FINDINGS
1. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at
No.1 Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City.
2. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their
marriage, and they (complainant and Priscilla)
considered respondent also their 'ninong'.
3. That respondent and complainant are neighbors, their
residences being one house away from each other.
4. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see
him for advice, because of her differences with
complainant.
5. That Priscilla, in fact, left their conjugal house and
lived at No. 45 Sisa St., Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon,
Metro Manila; that the owner of the house where
Priscilla lived in Malabon is a friend and former client of
respondent.
6. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she
was staying in Malabon.
7. That incidents involving respondent and complainant
had indeed happened.
8. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in
1983 at No. 1 Lopez Jaena St., Galas, Quezon City; but
complainant was staying two or three houses away in his
mother's house.
9. That complainant filed an administrative case for
immorality against respondent in CLAO, where
respondent was found guilty and suspended for one
year. (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been sustained by
sufficient evidence. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General found that the respondent had not
been able to explain satisfactorily the following:
1. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite
of complainant's suspicion and/or jealousy that he was
having an affair with his wife.
2. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon
whose owner is admittedly a friend and former client of
respondent.
3. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to
visit his friend, in spite of his differences with
complainant.
4. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved
invarious incidents involving complainant and Priscilla's
brothers (Exhs. 'B', B-1', 'F', 'G', ['G-1'] and ['I'])
5. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening
when she was confined in the FEU Hospital, in spite
again of his differences with complainant. (Rollo, pp. 39-
40).
Thus, the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by avoiding
any possible action or behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant, thereby causing possible
trouble in the complainant's family," which behavior was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the
court." (Rollo, p. 40). The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty. Alfredo Cargo be
suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that
respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of
immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of suspension from the practice of law
may be properly imposed upon respondent.
At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with the
rigorous standards of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of the
court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be
seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the
community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain
from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a member
of the Bar and an officer of the court, and to WARN him that continuation of the same or similar conduct
will be dealt with more severely in the future.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman ombudsman under the
1987 Constitution, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against
public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R.
Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring
respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or
subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.
I
The pertinent facts are as follows:
24
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before
the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the
criminal informations in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987 Resolution 1 of the
"Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-
accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying his Motion to Quash the criminal
informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent
Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with
power and authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption
against public officials and employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and
Honorable Raul M. Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as Tanodbayan-
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).—Acting on the special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
with urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved,
without giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to
COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and
trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as
petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving the
Special Prosecutor's motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578)
on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That Petition assailed
the 24 September 1987 Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304 recommending that
additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other
individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the
1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the same. Petitioner also moved for the
consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the second petition: (1)
required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining order
"ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-
01394 ... and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting
preliminary investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and
G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this Court of a
temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No.
12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for petitioner
Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court
issued the following Resolution on 8 December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and
Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by the Solicitor General for respondents for an
extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period within
which to file comment on the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-
respondent, the Court Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as
party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of and supplementing the Temporary
Restraining Order of November 24, 1987 "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304
entitled, "Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly,
from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting
preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court,
ordering respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and
DESIST from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the
Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order of arrest
issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the petitioner
to submit a Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at
respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the
filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2)
issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No.
80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article, reproduced
here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order
stopping him from investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique
Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that affluent persons "an prevent the progress
of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while
rich and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is
difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course. Gonzalez
told the Daily Globe in an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension over
the justice system in this country, especially because the people have been
thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar
petitioned the court to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed
against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the
latter wanted to help promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique,
lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a
graft charge against the governor, and from instituting any complaint with the
Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if
they involve the high and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining me.
Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases
against two "very powerful" officials of the Aquino government-Commissioner
Quintin Doromal of the Presidential Commission on Good Government and
Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs and Cultural
Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme
Court, I am a little bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of
some people that affluent persons can prevent the progress of a trial, he said.
25
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and
that while she symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during
election time, 'She said that it might be a disservice to the people and the voters
who are entitled to know their candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election
time could be mere harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every
citizen to be informed of the character of tile candidate, who should be subject to
scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required respondent
Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the
Court rendered its Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof
read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby
NULLIFY the criminal informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting
investigations and filing criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise
exercising the powers and functions of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his
Motion, respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the following
statements totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and
he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA
report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass
the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the
phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases
against (two Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed were sent by "some
members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e., the Tanodbayan)."
He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated to
the press the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next several days carried long
reports on those statements and variations and embellishments thereof On 2 May 1988, the Court issued
the following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No.
80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under
date of April 28, 1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to
COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to
the media which not only deal with matters subjudice but also appear offensive to
and disrespectful of the Court and its individual members and calculated, directly
or indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and ridicule and to
denigrate and degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved to
require respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice
hereof, why he should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to
administrative sanctions for making such public statements reported in the
media, among others, in the issues of the "Daily Inquirer," the "Journal," the
"Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila Chronicle" the "Daily Globe"
and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position he
had taken that the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by
government prosecutors or motivated by a desire to stop him 'from investigating
cases against some of their proteges or friends;"
(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on
behalf of persons with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to
pressure him to render decisions favorable to their colleagues and friends;"
(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not to
be too hard on him and to refrain from investigating the Commission on Audit
report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme Court because it will embarass the
Court;
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two
Associate Justices; and
(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and disbarred
lawyers 'without due process.
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and
circumstances attendant upon the notes written to said public respondent by
three (3) members of the Court have since been submitted to the Court and now
form part of its official records, the Court further Resolved to require the Clerk of
Court to ATTACH to this Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the
annexes thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to comment
thereon within the same period of ten (10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988
addressed to respondent Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served on
him, the Court Resolved to require the Clerk of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said
Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply therewith.
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion for Extension
and Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court
"appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him:" and that "he gravely doubts
whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4
members of this Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and neutrality."
Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of the Court
Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the Motion
to Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18 this Court
in an extended per curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.
That denial was made "final and immediately executory.
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition 20 dated 23 May 1988;
2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines 21 dated 20 May 1988
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex
Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated 26 May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time
(b) For Inhibition and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23
dated 4 June 1988 (with Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988
from the alleged Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court and addressed to
respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez submitted
on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal arguments and
defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before this Court. Attached to
26
that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal Explanation/Compliance 29 second
explanation called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was also submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and
members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to
regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over
members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to
an orderly discharge of judicial functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish
for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court
including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. 33 The
power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against an improper interference with
the due administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant.
34
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here;
the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of
the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court
may be committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the
contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which calls into
play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 35 Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the
Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the misconduct
with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for
contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The
disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power
of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such,
he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in
society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the
administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of disciplinary
action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and
arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get some
members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice
against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon the issues
involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the Court
has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature
of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members of the Court in such proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief) Justice
Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the
premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the Court
are the 'complainants, prosecutors and judges' all rolled up into one in this
instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the
nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are
sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not—and
does not involve—a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the
Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is
in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is
its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the
attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the property and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their
misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture,
there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties.
Any tirade against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so
against the individual members thereof But in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate
court, the individual members act not as such individuals but only as a duly
constituted court. The distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office.
So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can
only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof—as well as the people
themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be
placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the
retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of
membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary
incident of the power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept,
this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as
much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. So
that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the
exercise of the power because public policy demands that they, acting as a Court,
exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is
such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the
personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx. 38
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice against
the respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting requirements of their
oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit themselves from sitting on
this case is to abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them. Reference of
complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not
mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the
Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules
of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court. There is no need for
further investigation of facts in the present case for it is not substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez
that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest
opportunity to present his defense; his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him
but that those statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his
freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and
the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his statements set out
above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the
newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an
erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act of retaliation
27
by the Court against him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim
immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop respondent from
investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court Justices)." The Court
cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution
dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar
cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to
accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated
Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by
respondent against the Court and the appalling implications of such assault for the integrity of the system
of administration of justice in our country. Respondent has said that the Court rendered its Decision and
Resolution without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used the judicial process to
impose private punishment upon respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in
carrying out his duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon,
the honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's statement is also totally baseless.
Respondent's statements were made in complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act
as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before
this Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus filed
against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more than seven (7) months before the Court
rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the
criminal cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact
that on 24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr.
Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and
desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this Court in April
1988 on the constitutional law issue pending before the Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could
scarcely have been invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that they have
improperly Id pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends," including
dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable charge too is
entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three (3)
members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win show. It is
clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes had
no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have been made in
order to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation made by
respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with respondent who
had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once again, in total effect,
the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross disrepute, and to cause
among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and, more generally, the judicial
institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and
powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one
hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to
go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This
accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be
seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics of
revolutionary class war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme or reason'
and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to
the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly was
trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly
erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously
denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack against the
Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent
undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the attorney he later Identified in one of his
Explanations, he would have discovered that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample
opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence in support thereof. 41 He would have also found that
there were both strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered
by the Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It
is appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a constitutional precept does not, always and
in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the essence of due process is to be found in the
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense.
43 "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should not be punished
for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the statements adverted to above. In
his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative
proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following
allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt
and administrative charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest
prejudice and anger they hold against respondent as shown in the language of the
resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality
of an impartial judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the
contempt citation as well as in the possible administrative charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it is,
respondent has no china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and
possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion
and obfuscation running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire
Court in its decision denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have
confidence in the impartiality of the entire Court" and that he "funds it extremely
difficult to believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act with unbiased
demeanor towards him;" and
(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process"
and that a specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or
at least prepare the decision." (Underscoring in the original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought to heap
still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and statements
justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable of acting without
regard to due process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public scorn
and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent, emerges once
more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez could suppose
that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to violate their most solemn oath
of office merely to gratify any imagined private feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of the Court
revolves around the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not around respondent nor any other
person or group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by this Court as
contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over members of the Bar,
may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements which have been held in our
jurisdiction as constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the Court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in a slander
case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled
threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his Motion for
Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an
28
unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals had
allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the Court of Appeals.
He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages before the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the appealed slander case. This suit was terminated,
however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals and the justices
concerned and agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time later filed with this
Court a Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander case. This Court
denied the Petition for Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and addressed a
letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names of the justices of this Court who had voted in
favor of and those who had voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After his Motion for
Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with
certified true copies of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming
the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs.
Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil
and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding
the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions
of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to
obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the
people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know
them and work for their extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making the above
statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government.
It is this state of things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or
reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I
have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving
to God the filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:
... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and
injustice allegedly rampant in and outside of the government as justification for
his contemptuous statements. In other words, he already assumed by his own
contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence of rampant
corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in
G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly
committing injustice. We are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's
logic ...
xxx xxx xxx
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second
only to the duty of maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to
support the Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all
attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of
said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A
lawyer must always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high
privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.
xxx xxx xxx.
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R
was based on its evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn
denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the decision
because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and
conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised
judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate
and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make
both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the resolution
that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for aid
tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Court
of the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he
proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they
knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted
with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the
case of his client.
xxx xxx xxx
... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose
to enter this profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to
imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the
courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic
institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247: emphasis supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting as counsel for
MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by this Court to explain certain statements
made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the mis-
representation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1,
Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick
(referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or
just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and
schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable
Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a
most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21 September 1968
asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit
themselves from considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or
aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967. The motion charges "It that the
brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the
favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal
decision dated January 31, 1968" and the ex-parte preliminary injunction
rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect prejudging and
predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief
Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by
the President a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in
this case. The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created
Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics,
and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the
patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents"
which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief
that unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and that there was 'unjudicial
favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party
directly benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for
Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the following paragraphs:
29
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of
the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case—
which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and
we quote: "Justices; who may take part—... . Only those members present when
any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication ... ." This requirement is especially significant in the present instance
because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was
absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the
Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons
its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably
either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the
bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of
the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of
justice and confiscation of property and/or to the United States Government,
either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of
respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without
either compensation or due process of law and invoking the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty
million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three (3)
attorneys guilty of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for
reconsideration, we, indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer
of the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous executives.' He speaks of this
Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest that it is
not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31,
1968 as 'false, erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then charges
that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and
predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a
reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of
this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice
president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the
newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant appointment in the Philippine
Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968
was rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the
principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any
judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself.' He
puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have been known
to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the
conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro would be
less likely to engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a particular cause or
party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are
insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it
plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free
from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their
relationship did affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above
suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the
Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country,
'although the process has already begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and
in law. The slur made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It
sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we
repeated any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly or
indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or
their agents or principals, including the president.' The absurdity of this posture is
at once apparent. For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the
President and in that sense may be considered to have each received a favor from
the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving
the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained.
The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We
would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government
operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the
unfounded charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort on the part of a
losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to
discern. Such disrespect detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice.
Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words are intended to create an
atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to
lawyers. and yet, this Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that
undermines and degrades the administration of justice. The stricture in Section 3
(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt
of court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court
and/or the United States government. It must be remembered that respondent
MacArthur at that time was still trying to overturn the decision of this Court of
July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were in ejected. More
specifically, the motion announced that McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the graft
and corruption of the Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12,
1965 ... to the World Court' and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment
requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government,
including the sugar price premium, amount to more than fifty million dollars
annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide the
case' in its favor. A notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied
in Meads return. There is a gross inconsistency between the appeal and the move
to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that a party
has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would
appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a
change of the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where
infraction of ethics meets with complacency rather than punishment. The people
should not be given cause to break faith with the belief that a judge is the epitome
of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not yield
to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of
30
behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice. (31
SCRA at 13-23; emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted was "a great
injustice committed against his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," and
had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and dumb."
Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the people may know
of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that
were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the press the contents of his Petition
and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published statements attributed to him as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the
tribunal's 'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions
or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where
our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of justice,
who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied resolutions. (31 SCRA at
565566; emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against
him. His explanation, which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is
also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever
heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and for
justice; dumb in the sense, that inspire of our beggings, supplications, and
pleadings to give us reasons why our appeals has been DENIED, not one word was
spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only described the impersonal state of Things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As
the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as
to when we must end our self- sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard
our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the
members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at
572; emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely suspended
Almacen from the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had
exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this Court, made the
following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:
The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this
Honorable Court dated April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a violation
of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of Court promulgated by this very Hon.
Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is likewise a violation of the
most important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a
culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all
means, because the rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and gives
satisfaction and contentment to all concerned. But when the laws and the rules
are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed force and to the ways of the
cavemen We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in
the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila.
Educated people should keep their temper under control at all times! But justice
should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the very life of Democracy on the
face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and required counsel
to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel later explained that he
had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid
repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations unsatisfactory
and the above statements contumacious.
... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly
contemptuous and disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two
employees is but a covert threat upon the members of the Court. ... That such
threats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in courts are
constitutive of direct contempt has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs.
Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs.
Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785,
September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs. Albert,
57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty party
is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580-
Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that
courtesy all have a right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so, for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation
or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at 811-
812; emphasis supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to
divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty.
Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the publication of the following item in a number of
daily newspapers in Manila:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the
Supreme Court in the case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has
to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the source of a news
published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake
of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years,
I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much evil, is to change the
members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first
measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as
31
its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now
constituted, the Supreme Court of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and
democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf may hear:
The Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice
of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo
and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine
Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his
invocation of the constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring him to
show cause why he should not be disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria,
said-
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in
many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine
the coincidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this
Court, and consequently to lower and degrade the administration of justice by this
Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last
bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their
grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the
people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this
Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven
to take the law into their hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the
result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like
any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to
which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and
not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would
be resting on a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis supplied)
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme Court which
contained the following paragraph (in translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of
this court, denying our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and
constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery
of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas.
We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this error may
be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not
want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the
judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it
is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each
and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we
wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected
party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the
proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the administration
of justice. (61 Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco
responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the statements made above, the
Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the
authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court
is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the
laws, the rights of the parties, and of the untoward consequences, or with having
abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and mocking from which the
words 'outrage' and mockery' used therein are derived, means exactly the same
as all these, according to the Dictionary of the Spanish Language published by the
Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, for many years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified
nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a
special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize
the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and
the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and
justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and
good practice can ever sanction them by reason of their natural tendency to
disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment,
particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for
resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion
contains a more or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein,
after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong should follow in
case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of
denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been
the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of
predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an
atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye,
that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion to promote distrust
in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism a
movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as
is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean
otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority
thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the
court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it
would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with
good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend
its integrity, not only because it had conferred upon him the high privilege, not a
right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of
justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing,
he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and
prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many
cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which
rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for
protection and relief (61 Phil. at 727-728; emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on this matter. In the
following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively disciplined
lawyers who had made statements not very different from those made in the cases discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907
(1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
32
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29
April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio
Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939); and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past penalized
as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that
the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of
the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the
Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily
implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the
respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly
debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of
justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact outside the internal world
of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13)
out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a
repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an
act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right of
free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair criticism
in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him
that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of
expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests.
One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system
of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured
only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in
other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an
independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both
are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the press in itself presupposes
an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary be
vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their independence
is a free press. 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This
constitutional right must be protected in its fullest extent. The Court has
heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges under the Libel Law
which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen
path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But
license or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused
with liberty ill its true sense. As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled
press and the free exercise of the rights of the citizens is the maintenance of the
independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be had if persons
are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if
such persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate
accounts of confidential proceedings to the embarassment of the parties and the
courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent
and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable
participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to
us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a
Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the
embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility
of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice 53 is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to point
out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism is not
unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and
shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists
between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the
judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to
the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights,
lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their
tempers.
xxx xxx xxx 54
(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is addressed
rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the
respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not,
however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is upon the other
hand, not irrelevant to point out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and
exhibited no repentance. 56
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been shown, and
points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27
April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first place,
proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of
contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the Consolidated
Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988 Decision, denied
respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon
this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for which he is here being
required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only
species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of
this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme Court in
particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage
there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not effectively stopped and countered.
The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts, including the court of last resort, is not
easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is critical for the
stability of democratic government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this case
and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of
libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such is
by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the individual
members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot
be an adequate remedy. 57
33
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of
gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely
and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In
L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his
client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who
are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and
commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of
this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only
blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so
that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes,
wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer
that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any
time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may
retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September
26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying
petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where
our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice,
who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of
[sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967.
In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses
so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional bases for
impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H.
Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered
judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days
later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse counsel a copy of the
motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July
18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court
denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for
reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he
attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered
withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who,
earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no
objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-
appellee praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed
by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses,
the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966
(pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place
of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965),
which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently,
the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive.
At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion
for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this
Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case
and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R.
No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8,
1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-
20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question
raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in
the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to
dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on
November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of the
decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the
resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court
issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the
main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon
the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the
resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and
Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in
issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute
resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his
34
petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment
was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said
date was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he
shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No
word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously
offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he
has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now
final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a
positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct,
this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he
asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him ...
in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state,
within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be
deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court
is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person
and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and candor. He also asked
for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person." To give
him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was
heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being
contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with
abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
— finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with
what judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with
what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you.
But why dost thou see the speck in thy brother's eye,
and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or
how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the
speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy
own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from
thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out
the speck from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to
do you also to them: for this is the Law and the
Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his
petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with
his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements
contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the
entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct
unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has
been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly
motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our
client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our
pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest
interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED, with
all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our
pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular
case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this
Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict
punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE,
CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their
stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your respondent
is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with
emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even
our own President, said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it
is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is used to
be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that
justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We
attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We
were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the
never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end,
after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our
client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God
given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations
we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam
Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy
name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more
appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but
who would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A
strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts
and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also
deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever heard
our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice;
35
dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to
give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or
given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only
describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As
the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as
to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard
our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the
members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied
disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms 2
expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to
do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this
suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the
facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed
with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly
frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all. 3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but
fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to
petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we
would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of
the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only
those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the
particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in
Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same
petition different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons
for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that
the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In
order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties,
Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the
Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224
cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court denied,
respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the
Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for
refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart
from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move
different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular
time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court,
through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the
petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the
Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised
before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should
not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and
even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in
alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S.
Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals
have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions
if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested
upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party another hearing. This
axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling
nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which
will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower
court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his
appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the
"accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court in a
number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought to
have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the
movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify the
adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was unequivocally
articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by
Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall
state the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties
concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same
Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice.
Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless
piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing
Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of
Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is
obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would
have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion,
and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not
fix any period within which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only
himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is
not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a
"whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to surrender
his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor
36
on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and
scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We
know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely
believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their
disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This
right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated
by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation, 6
because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption. 7 "Our decisions and all our
official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people
have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers,
like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and
honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath
to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations. 9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as
this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For
courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence,
as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13
For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society,
nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize
in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is
that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him
in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of
the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as
well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F
Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the
prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with
detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and
inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood
in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or
publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming
a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that
an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to
account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or
judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too
monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to
consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to
abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the preservation
of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W.
212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in
the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a
rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits
there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls
of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and
slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him "to
observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal
ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not
merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times
the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court,
but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive
conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20
Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration
of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted with superior
intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than
the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he
regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the orderly
administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions
of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and
the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In
Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is
his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it.
That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed
to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to
jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per
Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time
and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring
into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his
conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless
declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice
demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is
beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of
decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence
37
in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the
administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations
then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet
entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of
being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group
of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal
Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet
went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle
and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an
attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a
judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that
the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the
criticism members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or
integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the
attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the
intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116
N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac.
220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous
publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial
officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify
the disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character
than those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that
which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law
the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and
fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public
confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and
usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had
been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a
threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The
letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is
protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall
be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case
warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins
or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper
ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to
submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the
administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and
respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct
toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which
tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge
was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial
functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in
the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute
with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by
corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that
the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with
unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of
the court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into
contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right,
and interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of
disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which
he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in
cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest
comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of
legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of
speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent
court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an
appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was
taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice,
notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the affidavit was
the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession
of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their
duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the
impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every
attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his
duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove
judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a
violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or
has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to
the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the
person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case
decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions
of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the
motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the
proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends
to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the
administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the
courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the
attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible
temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as
my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a
decision in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima
facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license
38
from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to
the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in
which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having
arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court
suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive
of the public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the
requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...
The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of
prime importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking
man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as
well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise,
would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such
right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act
honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is
administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the
public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth
and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary.
The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply
than is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy
wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the
public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the
affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his
strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands retribution — not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a
pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,,"
"criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality,"
"a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and
the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude
should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote
a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence
and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain appeals in which he
had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters
contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than
the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with
the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no
undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable,
short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of
morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee
chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the
researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the
court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the
decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine
after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its
opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct
in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we
have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this
court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of
acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a
communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect
in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the
officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard
to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney,
uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No
judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult
otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can
have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous
communication or libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an
actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects
the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different
from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly
different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he
exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by
considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was
immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent
his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as
an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief
Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on
the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts
and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for
their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there
appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the
indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and
a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge
in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct
wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The
distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by authority. It
was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has
been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in
actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily punished for
assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court, for his
rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the
court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the
assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the
judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame
submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of
punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly
man would hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes
professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed,
has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a case,
wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and
reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be
disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87
The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In
39
the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed
letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in
reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I
have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a
contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the
Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court,
"counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of
judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery,
either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public
may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus
the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of
justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much
the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a
letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of mail, at his
home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the
conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the
attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having
"willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and
thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and
in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149;
Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3
Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's
Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained
as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him
and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a
gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official
acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising
not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his
decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising
the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to
breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason
the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a
period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such
gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even
though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their
judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public
confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the
Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the
morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel
such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally
been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on different
bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal abhorrence of such
condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe
Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation
or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability
of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a
very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional
contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than
having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of
the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and
flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the
imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a
news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his
regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in
evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In
the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only
remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he
denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of
justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned
jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced that one of the
first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the
complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith
and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in
the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of
the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this Court
upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of
this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one
of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of
Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court which decided
the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow
minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus
embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also
attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of
bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered,
in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine
the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this
Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this
Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last
bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their
40
grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the
people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this
Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven
to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be
the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this
Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such
attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to
the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such
guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful
in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed from office
or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17
L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where
counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its
previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial
Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the sentiments of the
Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It
speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is
the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the
law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court,
blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference to and
analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court.
The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in
determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and
continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this
Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this
Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those
statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They
bring into question the capability of the members — and some former members
of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of
sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of
jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity,
need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious
statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the
protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious
innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen
would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for
which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This
is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For
sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however,
came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of
the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete
disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding,
where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which
asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the
validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of
the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be
contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts
in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal
contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to
degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends
to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt,
and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt,
to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important
duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the
second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the
courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to
destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is
no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced
by the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without
a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity.
Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations
now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He
could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said
appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such
post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November
17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's
professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in the exercise of
the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal
profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the
noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no
consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by
removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty,
amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is
the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who have proved
themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent
and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration
that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to
restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot
be tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this
state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of
their confidence and respect. So much so that —
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy
of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only
the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave
him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege.
Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of
attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his
41
functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned
on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or
incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of
whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of
disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part.
Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer,
however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle
for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all
calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client
as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this
Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this
Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and
"short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true
to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused the publication
in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public
indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret,
offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative
attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as
inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions
upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for
itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible
bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate
attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its members
into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of
justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any
pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross
misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As
such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus laid
clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government
entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court
must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than
this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and requires detachment and
disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of
the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by
philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty.
Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all
rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the
nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to.
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member
of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession
of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no
occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the
Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual
members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are
lost in the majesty of their office. 30 So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at
bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof — as well as the people themselves
whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn
responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to
admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This
duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it.
31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that
fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public policy
demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The
present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of
complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty.
Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere
suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the
imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being
neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled
by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the
dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized.
However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction
would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober
light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an
advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is
our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his
misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of
determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the
same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence grants us
discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is
obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no
reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of
the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to
Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time
after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the
practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended
from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
G.R. No. L-27072 January 9, 1970
SURIGAO MINERAL RESERVATION BOARD, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL ETC., ET AL., respondents, In Re: Contempt Proceedings Against Attorneys
Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto, Graciano C. Regala and Associates, Erlito R. Uy, Juanito M. Caling;
and Morton F. Meads.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
42
After the July 31, 1968 decision of this Court adverse to respondent MacArthur International Minerals Co.,
the Solicitor General brought to our attention statements of record purportedly made by Vicente L.
Santiago, Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala, and Jose Beltran Sotto, members of the Bar, with the suggestion
that disciplinary action be taken against them. On November 21, 1968, this Court issued a show-cause
order.
The following statements, so the Solicitor General avers, are set forth in the memoranda personally signed
by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto:
a. They (petitioners, including the Executive Secretary) have made these false,
ridiculous and wild statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts
against MacArthur International. Such efforts could be accurately called
"scattershot desperation" (Memorandum for Respondents dated March 27, 1968,
pp. 13-14, three lines from the bottom of page 13 and first line page 14).
b. Such a proposition is corrupt on its face and it lays bare the immoral and
arrogant attitude of the petitioners. (Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum
and Reply to Petitioner's Memorandum Brief, dated April 13, 1968, p. 16, last two
lines on bottom of the page).
c. The herein petitioners ... opportunistically change their claims and stories not
only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same case.
(Respondents' Supplemental Memorandum, Ibid., p.17, sixth, seventh and eighth
lines from bottom of the page).
MacArthur's third motion for reconsideration signed by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, on his behalf and
purportedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, Graciano Regala and Associates, and Jose B. Sotto, the Solicitor General
points out, contain the following statements:
d. ... ; and [the Supreme Court] has overlooked the applicable law due to the
misrepresentation and obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence,
par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized, democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick
(referring to the "right to reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous
executives to cover up and excuse losses to the public, a government agency or
just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing and
schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable
Supreme Court intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a
most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for
Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968).
The motion to inhibit filed on September 21, 1968 — after judgment herein was rendered — and signed by
Vicente L. Santiago for himself and allegedly for Attys. Erlito R. Uy, and Graciano Regala and Associates,
asked Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from
considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11, 1967.
The motion charges "[t]hat the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-president of the
favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision dated January 31,
1968" and the ex parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the latter in effect
prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the Chief Justice, the
motion states "[t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was given a significant
appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the decision of July 31,
1968 was rendered in this case." The appointment referred to was as secretary of the newly-created Board
of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and makes a number of side
comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It
enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that
"unjudicial prejudice" had been caused it and that there was "unjudicial favoritism" in favor of "petitioners,
their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said decision." The "incidents" cited
are as follows:
(a) said decision is in violation of the law, which law has not been declared
unconstitutional.
(b) said decision ignores totally the applicable law in the above-entitled case.
(c) said decision deprives respondent of due process of law and the right to
adduce evidence as is the procedure in all previous cases of this nature.
(d) due course was given to the unfounded certiorari in the first place when the
appeal from a denial of a motion to dismiss was and is neither new nor novel nor
capable of leading to a wholesome development of the law but — only served to
delay respondent for the benefit of the favored party.
(e) the preliminary injunction issued herein did not maintain the status quo but
destroyed it, and the conclusion cannot be avoided that it was destroyed for a
reason, not for no reason at all.
(f) there are misstatements and misrepresentations in the said decision which the
Honorable Supreme Court has refused to correct.
(g) the two main issues in the said decision were decided otherwise in previous
decisions, and the main issue "right to reject any or all bids" is being treated on a
double standard basis by the Honorable Supreme Court.
(h) the fact that respondent believes that the Honorable Supreme Court knows
better and has greater understanding than the said decision manifests.
(i) the public losses (sic) one hundred and fifty to two hundred million dollars by
said decision — without an effort by the Honorable Supreme Court to learn all the
facts through presentation through the trial court, which is elementary.
On November 21, 1968, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, again for himself and Attys. Erlito R. Uy and Graciano
Regala and Associates, in writing pointed out to this Court that the statements specified by the Solicitor
General were either quoted out of context, could be defended, or were comments legitimate and
justifiable. Concern he expressed for the fullest defense of the interests of his clients. It was stressed that if
MacArthur's attorney could not plead such thoughts, his client would be deprived of due process of law.
However, counsel sought to change the words "Chief Justice" to "Supreme Court" appearing on line 7,
paragraph 2 of the motion to inhibit. Atty. Santiago also voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 of the said motion,
which in full reads:
6. Unfortunately for our people, it seems that many of our judicial authorities
believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come
before them, and that no matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is
truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity. Some seem to be constitutionally
incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be the
product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or
an issue. Witness the recent absurdity of Judge Alikpala daring to proceed to
judge a motion to hold himself in contempt of court — seemingly totally oblivious
or uncomprehending of the violation of moral principle involved — and also of
Judge Geraldez who refuses to inhibit himself in judging a criminal case against an
accused who is also his correspondent in two other cases. What is the explanation
for such mentality? Is it outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious
deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of our government officials
are just amoral?
And, in addition, he attempted to explain further subparagraphs (f) and (h) of paragraph 7 thereof.
It was on December 2, 1968 that Atty. Vicente L. Santiago filed his compliance with this Court's resolution
of November 21, 1968. He there stated that the motion to inhibit and third motion for reconsideration
were of his exclusive making and that he alone should be held responsible therefor. He further elaborated
on his explanations made on November 21, 1968.
On December 5, 1968, he supplemented his explanations by saying that he already deleted paragraph 6 of
the Motion to Inhibit heretofore quoted from his rough draft but that it was still included through
inadvertence.
On March 1, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, as counsel for MacArthur, registered an amended motion to
inhibit. While it repeats the prayer that Mr. Chief Justice Concepcion and Mr. Justice Castro inhibit
themselves, it left but three paragraphs of the original motion to inhibit, taking out the dissertation on
judicial ethics and most of the comments attacking the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968.
43
On the part of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto, it must be stated that as early as October 7, 1968, he insisted in
withdrawing his appearance in this case as one of the lawyers of MacArthur. His ground was that he did not
agree with the filing of the motion to inhibit the two justices. According to him, "[t]he present steps (sic)
now being taken is against counsel's upbringing and judicial conscience."
In Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto's return of November 29, 1968, he took pains to say that the questioned
statements he made were also taken out of context and were necessary for the defense of his client
MacArthur. He made the admission, though, that those statements lifted out of context would indeed be
sufficient basis for a finding that Section 20(f), Rule 138, had been violated.
On January 8, 1969, additional arguments were filed by Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. He there averred that the
Supreme Court had no original jurisdiction over the charge against him because it is one of civil contempt
against a party and the charge is originally cognizable by the Court of First Instance under Sections 4 and
10, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. He also stressed that said charge was not signed by an "offended party or
witness", as required by law; and that the Solicitor General and his assistants could not stand in the stead
of an "offended Party or witness."
We now come to Atty. Graciano C. Regala. In his explanation of December 2, 1968, as further clarified by a
supplemental motion of December 27, 1968, he manifested that the use of or reference to his law firm in
this case was neither authorized nor consented to by him or any of his associates; that on July 14, 1967,
one Morton F. Meads, in MacArthur's behalf, offered to retain his services, which was accepted; that
Meads inquired from him whether he could appear in this case; that he advised Meads that this case was
outside his professional competence and referred Meads to another lawyer who later on likewise turned
down the offer; that in view of the rejection, Meads and he agreed to terminate their previous retainer
agreement; that he had not participated in any manner in the preparation or authorship of any pleading or
any other document in connection with this case.
On February 4, 1969, Atty. Erlito R. Uy explained his side of the case. In brief, he denied participation in any
of the court papers subject of our November 21, 1968 order; claimed that he was on six months' leave of
absence from July 1, 1968 to December 31, 1968 as one of the attorneys for MacArthur but that he gave
his permission to have his name included as counsel in all of MacArthur's pleadings in this case (L-27072),
even while he was on leave of absence.
Hearing on this contempt incident was had on March 3, 1969.
A second contempt proceeding arose when, on July 14, 1969, respondent MacArthur, through new
counsel, Atty. Juanito M. Caling who entered a special appearance for the purpose, lodged a fourth motion
for reconsideration without express leave of court. Said motion reiterated previous grounds raised, and
contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of
the Philippines at the time of the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case —
which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court — Section 1, Rule 51, and
we quote: "Justices; who may take part. — ... . only those members present when
any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication ..." This requirement is especially significant in the present instance
because the member who penned the decision was the very member who was
absent for approximately four months or more. This provision also applies to the
Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons
its quest for justice in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably
either raise the graft and corruption of Philippine Government officials in the
bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine the operator of
the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of
justice and confiscation of property and /or to the United States Government,
either its executive or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of
respondent's proprietary vested rights by the Philippine Government without
either compensation or due process of law — and invoking the Hickenlooper
Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty
million dollars annually, until restitution or compensation is made.
This elicited another resolution from this Court on July 18, 1969, requiring Atty. Juanito M. Caling "to show
cause within five (5) days from receipt of notice hereof why he should not be dealt with for contempt of
court."
On July 30, 1969, Atty. Juanita M. Caling filed his return. He there alleged that the said fourth motion for
reconsideration was already finalized when Atty. Vicente L. Santiago came to his office and requested him
to accommodate MacArthur by signing the motion; that he turned down said request twice on the ground
that he did not know anything about the case, much less the truth of the allegations stated in the motion;
that "the allegations in said motion were subsequently explained to the undersigned counsel together with
the background of the case involved by Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and by one Morton F. Meads"; that upon
assurance that there was nothing wrong with the motion he was persuaded in good faith to sign the same;
that he was misled in so signing and the true facts of the allegations were not revealed to him especially
the oral argument allegedly made in the case.
Because of the foregoing explanation by Atty. Caling, this Court, on August 4, 1969, resolved "to require
Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads to file in writing their answer to the said return [of Atty.
Caling] and at the same time to show cause why they, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Morton Meads, should
not be dealt with for contempt of court, on or before August 16, 1969; and ... to direct that the three, Atty.
Juanita M. Caling, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, and Morton Meads, personally appear Before this Court on
Thursday, August 27, 1969, at 9:30 a.m., on which date the contempt proceedings against all of them will
be heard by this Court."
On August 13, 1969, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago gave his explanation. He disavowed the truth of Atty. Caling's
statement that he (Santiago) convinced Caling to sign the motion. The truth, according to Santiago, is that
one day Morton Meads went to his office and asked him if he knew of a lawyer nearby who could help him
file another motion for reconsideration, and he (Santiago) mentioned Atty. Caling; he there upon
accompanied Meads to Caling, told Caling of Meads' desire and left Meads with Caling. Santiago insists that
he never prepared the motion and that he never even read it.
On August 15, 1969, Morton Meads answered. Meads' version is as follows: On July 14, 1969, he went to
Atty. Santiago's office with the fourth motion for reconsideration which he himself prepared. Santiago
started to read the motion and in fact began to make some changes in Pencil in the first or second
paragraph when Meads told him that MacArthur wanted a new lawyer, not Santiago, to file the same.
Meads asked Santiago if he could recommend one. They then went to Caling whose office was on the same
floor. Santiago introduced Meads to Caling at the same time handing the fourth motion to Caling. While
Caling was reading the document, Santiago left. After reading the motion, Caling gave his go-signal. He
signed the same after his name was typed therein. The motion was then filed. According to Meads, from
the time he entered the office of Santiago to the time the motion was filed, the period that elapsed was
approximately one hour and a half. Santiago was with Caling for about three minutes and Meads was with
Caling for about fifteen minutes.
In defending himself from the contempt charge, Meads asserts that the quotation from the Rules of Court
set forth in the fourth motion for reconsideration has not been taken out of context because said quotation
is precisely accurate; that the "xs" indicate that it is not a complete quotation and that it is a common
practice in court pleadings to submit partial quotations. Meads further contends that the announced plan
to bring the case to the World Court is not a threat. In fact, his answer also included a notice of appeal to
the World Court.
On August 27, 1969, this Court heard Attys. Vicente L. Santiago and Juanito Caling and Morton Meads in
oral argument with respect to the second contempt incident. We shall now discuss the first and second
contempt incidents seriatim.
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed,
find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as "vulturous
executives". He speaks of this Court as a "civilized, democratic tribunal", but by innuendo would suggest
that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as "false, erroneous
and illegal" in a presumptuous manner. He there charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we issued
in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He accuses in a
44
reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case: Associate Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary
of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was appointed secretary of the newly-
created Board of Investments, "a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President, a
short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered." In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that
"it would seem that the principles thus established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any
judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court should first apply to itself." He puts forth the claim that
lesser and further removed conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is
no reason for a belief that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro
"would be less likely to engender favoritism or prejudice for or against a particular cause or party." Implicit
in this at least is that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make
their actuation suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only
were not free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did
affect their judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Caesar's wife,
warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our
country, "although the process has already begun."
It is true that Santiago voluntarily deleted paragraph 6 which contained language that is as disrespectful.
But we cannot erase the fact that it has been made. He explained that, he deleted this paragraph in his
rough draft, which paragraph was included in the motion filed in this Court only because of mere
inadvertence. This explanation does not make much of a distinguishing difference; it erects no shield. Not
only because it was belatedly made but also because his signature appeared on the motion to inhibit which
included paragraph 6. And this paragraph 6 describes with derision "many of our judicial authorities" who
"believe that they are the chosen messengers of God in all matters that come before them, and that no
matter what the circumstances are, their judgment is truly ordained by the Almighty unto eternity." It
depicts them as seemingly "incapable of considering that any emanation from their mind or pen could be
the product of unjudicial prejudice or unjudicial sympathy or favoritism for a party or an issue." After citing
acts of two judges of first instance, he paused to ask: "What is the explanation for such mentality? Is it
outright dishonesty? Lack of intelligence? Serious deficiency in moral comprehension? Or is it that many of
our government officials are just amoral?"
Paragraph 7 also of the motion to inhibit repeated mention of "unjudicial prejudice" against respondent
MacArthur and spoke of "unjudicial favoritism" for petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored
party directly benefited by the decision. Paragraph 8 is a lecture on judicial ethics. Paragraph 9 is a warning
to this Court about loss of confidence, and paragraph 10 makes a sweeping statement that "any other
justices who have received favors or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or members
of any board-petitioner, or their agents or principals, including the President", should also inhibit
themselves.
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur made is
not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the whole court.
For, inhibition is also asked of, we repeat, "any other justices who have received favors or benefits directly
or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their agents or
principals, including the president." The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one thing, the
justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to have each
received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a case involving
the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The consequence thereof
would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite
system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded
charge? There is the not-too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade
this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect
detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's words
are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief. We are thus called upon to repeat what we
have said in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (1967), 20 SCRA 441, 444, as follows: "By now, a lawyer's
duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in
the observance thereof. Section 20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one
such duty: 'To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As explicit
is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that '[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards
the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for
the maintenance of its supreme importance.' That same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly
incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more. The
attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good fidelity ... to the courts.'
Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no
service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.' "
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends
of justice."1 His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice."2 Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For,
to undermine the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the attainment of
the liberties of the people."3 Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his
sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."4
It ill behooves Santiago to justify his language with the statement that it was necessary for the defense of
his client. A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and license.
Lawyers must always keep in perspective the thought that "[s]ince lawyers are administrators of justice,
oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not to their clients, as many suppose, but to the
administration of justice; to this, their clients' success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to
and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics."5 As rightly observed by Mr. Justice Malcolm in his
well-known treatise, a judge from the very nature of his position, lacks the power to defend himself and it
is the attorney, and no other, who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the
incumbent of the judicial position.6 From this, Mr. Justice Malcolm continued to say: "It will of course be a
trying ordeal for attorneys under certain conditions to maintain respectful obedience to the court. It may
happen that counsel possesses greater knowledge of the law than the justice of the peace or judge who
presides over the court. It may also happen that since no court claims infallibility, judges may grossly err in
their decisions. Nevertheless, discipline and self-restraint on the part of the bar even under adverse
conditions are necessary for the orderly administration of
justice."7
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. And yet, this Court
finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration of justice.
The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules — against improper conduct tending to degrade the
administration of justice8 — is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
2. We next take the case of Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto. We analyze the statements pointed out to us by the
Solicitor General hereinbefore quoted. Sotto accuses petitioners of having made "false, ridiculous and wild
statements in a desperate attempt to prejudice the courts against MacArthur." He brands such efforts as
"scattershot desperation". He describes a proposition of petitioners as "corrupt on its face", laying bare
"the immoral and arrogant attitude of the petitioners." He charges petitioners with opportunistically
changing their claims and stories not only from case to case but from pleading to pleading in the same
case. Such language is not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of contempt towards a litigant;
it offends the court before which it is made. It is no excuse to say that these statements were taken out of
context. We have analyzed the lines surrounding said statements. They do not in any manner justify the
inclusion of offensive language in the pleadings. It has been said that "[a] lawyer's language should be
dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession." 9 It is Sotto's duty as a member of the Bar "[t]o
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a
party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged." 10
Not far from the case of Atty. Sotto is People vs. Young, 83 Phil. 702, 708, where counsel for the accused
convicted of murder made use of the following raw language in his brief : "The accused since birth was a
poor man and a son of a poor farmer, that since his boyhood he has never owned a thousand pesos in his
own name. Now, here comes a chance for him. A cold fifty thousand bucks in exchange of a man's life. A
simple job. Perhaps a question of seconds' work and that would transform him into a new man. Once in a
small nipa shack, now in a palatial mansion! This poor ignorant man blinded by the promise of wealth,
45
protection and stability was given to do the forbidden deed." We there held that "[s]uch a plea is a disgrace
to the bar and an affront to the court."
It will not avail Sotto any to say that the Solicitor General or his assistants may not be considered offended
parties in this case. This Court may motu proprio start proceedings of this nature. There should be no doubt
about the power of this Court to punish him for contempt under the circumstances. For, inherent in courts
is the power "[t]o control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other
persons in any manner connected with a case before it, in every manner appertaining thereto." 11
We, accordingly, hold that Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto has misbehaved, under Section 3 (a), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, as an officer of the court in the performance of his official duties; and that he too has
committed, under Section 3 (d) of the same rule, improper conduct tending to degrade the administration
of justice. He is, therefore, guilty of contempt.
3. Not much need be said of the case of Atty. Graciano C. Regala. It was improper for Atty. Santiago to have
included the name of the firm of Atty. Regala without the latter's knowledge and consent. Correctly did
Regala insist — and this is confirmed by the other lawyers of respondents — that he had not participated in
any way in the pleadings of the above-entitled case. Regala did not even know that his name was included
as co-counsel in this case. He is exonerated.
4. Last to be considered with respect to the first contempt incident is the case of Atty. Erlito R. Uy. Borne
out by the record is the fact that Atty. Uy was not also involved in the preparation of any of the pleadings
subject of the contempt citation. He should be held exempt from contempt.
5. We now turn our attention to the second contempt incident. The fourth motion for reconsideration is,
indeed, an act of contumacy.
First. It was filed without express leave of court. No explanation has been made why this has been done.
Second. It lifted Section 1. Rule 51, Rules of Court, out of context. Said Section 1 was quoted as follows:
"Justices; who may take part. — ... only those members present when any matter is submitted for oral
argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ..." However, the provision in its entire
thought should be read thus —
SECTION 1. Justices; who may take part. — All matters submitted to the court for
its consideration and adjudication will be deemed to be submitted for
consideration and adjudication by any and all of the Justices who are members of
the division of the court at the time when such matters are taken up for
consideration and adjudication, whether such Justices were or were not present
at the date of submission; however, only those members present when any
matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication, if the parties or either of them, express a desire to that effect in
writing filed with the clerk at the date of
submission. 12
Atty. Caling, who was admitted to the Bar in 1966, did not attempt to explain this point.
Meads, however, for his part tried to reason out why such a distorted quotation came about — the portion
left out was anyway marked by "XS" which is a common practice among lawyers. Canon 22 of the Canons
of Legal Ethics reminds the lawyer to characterize his conduct with candor and fairness, and specifically
states that "it is not candid nor fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote." While Morton Meads is
admittedly not a lawyer, it does not take a lawyer to see the deliberate deception that is being foisted
upon this Court. There was a qualification to the rule quoted and that qualification was intentionally
omitted.
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United
States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to
overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were injected.
More specifically, the motion announced that MacArthur "will inevitably ... raise the graft and corruption of
[the] Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court" and would
invoke "the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually ... ."
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the mind of this Court to decide the case in its favor. A notice of
appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads' return. There is a gross inconsistency
between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision presupposes that
a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it would appear that the
appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the decision of this Court. Such
act has no aboveboard explanation.
6. Atty. Caling has not shown to the satisfaction of this Court that he should be exempted from the
contempt charge against him. He knows that he is an officer of this Court. He admits that he has read the
fourth motion for reconsideration before he signed it. While he has been dragged in only at the last
minute, still it was plainly his duty to have taken care that his name should not be attached to pleadings
contemptuous in character.
7. As for Morton F. Meads, he had admitted having prepared the fourth motion for reconsideration. He
cannot beg off from the contempt charge against him even though he is not a lawyer. He is guilty of
contempt.
8. We go back to Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. His insistence that he had nothing to do with the fourth motion
for reconsideration and that he had not even read the same is too transparent to survive fair appraisal. It
goes against the grain of circumstances. Caling represents before us that it was Santiago who convinced
him to sign the motion, who with Meads explained to him the allegations thereof and the background of
the case. Caling says that if not for his friendship with Santiago, he would not have signed the motion. On
the other hand, Meads states that Santiago began to read the fourth motion for reconsideration and even
started to make changes thereon in pencil. We must not forget, too, that according to Meads himself, he
spent, on July 14, 1969, quite some time with Santiago before they proceeded to Caling. It is highly
improbable that Santiago did not read the fourth motion for reconsideration during all that time.
Furthermore, Santiago is a lawyer of record for respondent MacArthur in this case. He has not resigned
from his position as such lawyer. He has control of the proceedings. Whatever steps his client takes should
be within his knowledge and responsibility. Indeed, Canon 16 of the Canons of Legal Ethics should have
reminded him that "[a] lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and to prevent his clients from doing
those things which the lawyer himself ought not to do, particularly with reference to their conduct towards
courts, judicial officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors. If a client persists in such wrongdoing the lawyer
should terminate their relation."
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets with
complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the belief
that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice should not
yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of behavior so
desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice.
9. One last word. It would seem apropos to say again that, if only for one reason, this Court had really no
alternative but to decide the main case against respondent MacArthur. As we held in our decision of July
31, 1968, MacArthur did not even adhere to the terms and conditions of the invitation to bid. For, this
invitation to bid explicitly warned that "bids not accompanied by bid bonds will be rejected. And We
repeat, "[a]dmittedly, the bid of the Company [MacArthur] had been submitted without the requisite
bond." 13 It would not require the adroit mind of a lawyer to say that a bid unaccompanied by a bond.,
contrary to the instructions to bidders, is not entitled to any consideration.
It should be emphasized, too, that because the decision herein was by a unanimous Court, even if the Chief
Justice and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro had not taken part in the decision on the merits of this case, the
result would have been the same: MacArthur's cause would just the same have failed.
For the reasons given, this Court hereby finds:
1. On the first contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago and Atty. Jose Beltran Sotto guilty of contempt of
court, and fines Atty. Santiago in the sum of P1,000, and Atty. Sotto, P100; and holds Attys. Graciano C.
Regala and Associates and Atty. Erlito R. Uy not guilty of contempt of court; and
2. On the second contempt charge, Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, Morton F. Meads and Atty. Juanita M. Caling
guilty of contempt of court, and fines Atty. Vicente L. Santiago, an additional P1,000, Morton F. Meads,
P1,000, and Atty. Juanito M. Caling, P200.
Let a copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, for whatever action
he may deem proper to take in the premises against Morton F. Meads who is an alien.
Let another copy of this resolution be forwarded to the Honorable, the Solicitor General, for such action as
he may deem proper in relation to the disbarment or suspension of Attys. Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran
Sotto and Juanito M. Caling.
46
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to append a copy of this decision to the personal records of
Attorneys Vicente L. Santiago, Jose Beltran Sotto and Juanito M. Caling. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-22979 June 26, 1967
RHEEM OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
ZOILO R. FERRER, ET AL., respondents.
IN RE PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ALFONSO PONCE ENRILE, LEONARDO SIGUION REYNA, MANUEL G.
MONTECILLO, ENRIQUE M. BELO, OSCAR R. ONGSIAKO, and JOSE S. ARMONIO, members of the
Philippine Bar.
Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for petitioners.
Jose T. Valmonte for respondents.
RESOLUTION
SANCHEZ, J.:
Contempt proceedings. The following from the motion to reconsider the decision herein, filed by counsel
for petitioners —
One pitfall into which this Honorable Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the question as to
whether or not a particular subject matter is within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations is the tendency of this Honorable Court to rely upon its own pronouncement without
due regard to the statutes which delineate the jurisdiction of the industrial court. Quite often,
it is overlooked that no court, not even this Honorable Court, is empowered to expand or
contract through its decision the scope of its jurisdictional authority as conferred by law. This
error is manifested by the decisions of this Honorable Court citing earlier rulings but without
making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the
Court of Industrial Relations. This manifestation appears in this Honorable Court's decision in
the instant case. As a result, the errors committed in earlier cases dealing with the jurisdiction
of the industrial court are perpetuated in subsequent cases involving the same issue . . . .
It may also be mentioned in passing that this Honorable Court contravened Rule 2, Section 5 of
the Rules of Court when it applied the so-called "rule against splitting of jurisdiction" in its
Decision in the present case. As applied by this Honorable Court, the rule means that when an
employee files with the Court of Industrial Relations numerous claims relative to his
employment but only one [of] which is cognizable by said court under the law, while the
others pertain to other tribunals, that court has authority to entertain all the claims to avoid
multiplicity, of suits. . . . .
drew from the Court an order directing counsel to show cause why they should not be dealt with for
contempt of court.
In respondent attorneys' verified return, they offered "their most sincere apologies for the language used"
and stated that "[i]t was not and it has never been their intention to be disrespectful." They manifested
that the language "was the result of overenthusiasm on the part of Atty. [Jose S.] Armonio, who thought
best to focus the attention of this Honorable Court to the issue in the case, as not in any way meant to
slight or offend this Honorable Court. They also said that the unfortunate Motion for Reconsideration was
prepared and filed by Atty. Armonio who had been personally handling the case since its inception at the
Court of Industrial Relations, and who had, perhaps, become too emotionally involved in the case."
Respondent members of the law firm, namely, Attys. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion Reyna,
Manuel G. Montecillo, Enrique M. Belo and Oscar R. Ongsiako assumed "full responsibility" for what
appears in the motion for reconsideration. They submitted, not as an excuse, but as fact, that not one of
the partners was able to pass upon the draft or final form of the said motion, and that Atty. Armonio, an
associate, prepared, signed and filed the motion "without clearing it with any of the partners of the firm."
The return winds up with an expression of deep regret about the incident, coupled with an earnest pledge
that it "shall never happen again."
Subsequent to the return, respondent attorneys appeared in court. Attys. Ponce Enrile and Armonio were
orally heard.1äwphï1.ñët
1. As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration,
implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has
repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That
pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court blindly adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making "any reference to and analysis of" the pertinent statute governing the
jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in
determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated that
error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by
the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this
Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those statements detract much
from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question the capability of the members and
— some former members — of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of
sarcasm when counsel labelled as "so-called" the "rule against splitting of jurisdiction."1
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become common place. Really, there could hardly be any valid
excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical
terms, spells out one such duty: "To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers." As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that "[i]t is the duty of the
lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent
of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary,
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust criticism and clamor."
And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be "with all good fidelity . . . to
the courts." Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts "can only be maintained by
rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which he is bound to uphold." 2
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his privilege. And, he may
suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind,
however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words
calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due
allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and again, this Court has admonished and
punished, in varying degrees, members of the Bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent, acrimonious
or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts. 3 Resort by an attorney — in a motion for reconsideration
— to words which may drag this Court down into disrepute, is frowned upon as "neither justified nor in the
least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points
relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in the motion"
are "sufficient," and such words "superfluous." 4 It is in this context that we must say that just because Atty.
Armonio "thought best to focus the attention" of this Court "to the issue in the case" does not give him in
bridled license in language. To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more
effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language vehicle does not run short of
expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates
or promotes distrust in judicial administration, or which could have the effect of "harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation
upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection
and relief." 5 Stability of judicial institutions suggests that the Bar stand firm on this precept.
The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the result of overenthusiasm." It is but to repeat an
old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the one or the other is
no less a virtue, if channelled in the right direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of
propriety and with due regard for the proper place of courts in our system of government. 6
We are not unmindful of counsel's statement that the language used "was not in any way meant to slight
or offend" this Court. Want of intention, we feel constrained to say, is no excuse for the language
employed. For, counsel cannot escape responsibility "by claiming that his words did not mean what any
reader must have understood them as meaning." 7 At best, it extenuates liability.
3. We now turn to the partners of the law firm. They explained that not one of them cleared the motion in
which the questionable portion appears. Their reason is that they were not in the office at the time said
motion was filed — which was the last day. They added that "it is the policy of the firm known to all its
members and associates that only the partners can sign court pleadings except in rare cases where, for
47
want of time or due to unexpected circumstances, an associate has to sign the same." We understood Atty.
Alfonso Ponce Enrile to have said in open court that in his long years of practice, he knows that it serves no
useful purpose to downgrade the dignity of the Court. We may overlook the shortcomings of the members
of the law firm; except that, as we see it, partners are duty bound to provide for efficacious control of court
pleadings and other court papers that carry their names or the name of their law firm. Seemingly, such
control was absent here.
In the end, we admonish Atty. Jose S. Antonio, with the warning that repetition of this incident will be dealt
with accordingly. Let a copy of this resolution be attached to his record.
Attention of Attys. Alfonso Ponce Enrile, Leonardo Siguion Reyna, Manuel G. Montecillo, Enrique M. Belo
and Oscar R. Ongsiako is invited to the necessity of exercising adequete supervision and control of the
pleadings and other documents submitted by their law firm to the courts of justice of this country.
So ordered.
G.R. No. L-24114 June 30, 1970
IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. CLEMENTE M. SORIANO IN
L-24114, People's Homesite and Housing Corporation and University of the Philippines,
vs.
HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS, ELPIDIO TIBURCIO, MARCELINO TIBURCIO, ET AL.
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, J.:
By virtue of a pleading entitled "Appearance" filed with this Court on October 10, 1969, Clemente M.
Soriano, a member of the Philippine Bar since January 19, 1954, entered his appearance in the present case
(L-24114, PHHC and U.P. vs. Mencias, Tiburcio, et al.) as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents
Marcelino Tiburcio, et al. This act in itself would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it was
done one year and eight months after the decision in this case became final. Wittingly or unwittingly,
therefore, Atty. Soriano was in effect asking this Court to exhume this case from the archives. We thus
considered it needful that he explain in full and in writing his unprecedented, if not altogether bizzare
behavior.
His subsequent explanation did not, however, serve to dissuade this Court from requiring him to show
cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for entering an appearance at such a late
date. He forthwith came with a recital of the circumstances under which he had agreed to have his services
retained by the respondents Tiburcio, et al.
He alleged that sometime during the first week of October 1969, the respondent Marcelino Tiburcio, in his
own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to him to engage his professional
services in two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-24114), and the case entitled "Varsity Hills vs. Hon.
Herminio C. Mariano, etc., et al." (L-30546). At their conference, Marcelino Tiburcio supposedly informed
Atty. Soriano of the precise status of each of the two cases, thus: that the Varsity Hills case was set for
hearing by this Court on October 27, 1969, while the present case was still pending and the date of hearing
thereof was yet undetermined. In addition to Marcelino Tiburcio's representations, Atty. Soriano allegedly
relied upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance, Atty. Antonio J. Dalangpan — that indeed these two
cases were pending in this Court. And so Atty. Soriano prepared a letter-contract dated October 8, 1969, by
virtue of which he agreed to render professional services in the two cases in consideration of a contingent
fee of 143.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares (more or less) involved in the two cases. It was on
the same date, October 8, 1969, that he then caused the preparation of his written appearance in the
present case.
Parenthetically, it is interesting to note that the contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land would find no
justification if Atty. Soriano were to render his professional services solely in the Varsity Hills case, for in
this latter case, the records of which we are in a position to take judicial notice, an area of only about 19
hectares is involved, 1 the bulk of the property claimed by the respondents having been litigated in the
present case.
The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case which has long been sealed and terminated by a final
judgment, besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted annoyance to the court
which pronounced the judgment, is a sore deviation from normal judicial processes. It detracts heavily
from the faith which should be accorded final judgments of courts of justice, generating as it does in the
minds of the litigants, as well as of the public, an illusory belief that something more can be done toward
overturning a final judicial mandate.
In the incident before us, we find Atty. Soriano grossly remiss and inexcusably precipitate in putting an
officious finger into the vortex of the case. He was wanting in the reasonable care which every member of
the Bar must needs exercise before rushing into the midst of a case already litigated or under litigation.
Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain the conformity of the
counsel whom he would substitute. And if this cannot be had, then he should, at the very least, give notice
to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution.2 Atty. Soriano's entry of appearance in the present case
as "chief counsel of record" for the respondents in effect sought to preempt the former counsel, Atty.
Nemesio Diaz, of the premier control over the case. Although at the hearing of the present incident he
averred that he exerted efforts to communicate with Atty. Diaz to no avail, we are far from being
convinced that he really did so. Nowhere in his written manifestations to this Court did he make mention of
such efforts on his part. His subsequent assertions to the contrary are plainly mere after thoughts.
Furthermore, we note that Atty. Soriano has joined one Atty. Bonifacio T. Doria as counsel for the
respondents in the Varsity Hills case now pending before this Court. Atty. Doria, who was counsel of record
in that case even prior to October 10, 1969, certainly knew the status of the present case since the scope of
our decision in the latter is a prime issue raised in the Varsity Hills case. Clearly, therefore, when Atty.
Soriano accepted the two cases for the respondents, especially the Varsity Hills case, he had not bothered
at all to communicate with Atty. Doria, as is the befitting thing to do when a lawyer associates with another
in a pending cause.3 He did not bother either to comprehend the substance of the Varsity Hills case before
accepting the said case, something which is elementary in the lawyer's trade. Had he been less precipitate
in his actions, he would have surely detected the existence of a final judgment in the present case. Further
still, if it were true, as claimed by Atty. Soriano at the hearing of this incident, that his clients complained to
him about having been left out in the cold by their former lawyer, then that circumstance of itself should
have indicated to him the imperative need for verification of the true status of the present case. Atty.
Soriano cannot lean on the supposed assurance of Atty. Dalangpan that the case was still pending with his
Court — which assurance Atty. Dalangpan, at the hearing of this incident, categorically denied having given.
What Atty. Soriano should have done, in keeping with the reasonable vigilance exacted of members of the
legal profession, was to pay a verification visit to the records section of this Court, which is easily and
quickly accessible by car or public conveyance from his office (May Building, Rizal Avenue, Manila). If this
office were situated in the province and he did not have the time to come to the Supreme Court building in
Manila, he could have posed the proper query to the Clerk of Court by registered mail or by telegram.
We find Atty. Clemente M. Soriano guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer
and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from
the practice of the law profession, were it not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his
mistake and the apology he made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be as he
is hereby severely censured. Atty. Soriano is further likewise warned that any future similar act will be met
with heavier disciplinary sanction.
Atty. Soriano is hereby ordered, in the present case, to forthwith withdraw the appearance that he has
entered as chief counsel of record for the respondents Marcelino Tiburcio, et al.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Clemente M. Soriano on file in the
Bar Division of this Court.
G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS
petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING
respondents.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered? This is the issue presented in this
petition for review of an order, dated 12 May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of
48
the Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting respondent Quintin Muning a non-
lawyer, attorney's fees for professional services in the said case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs.
Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29
March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino
Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for
the winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages. On 22
November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants
Entila and Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of
attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and, on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the
Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings petition was opposed by
Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by Cipriano Cid & Associates through
Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the
complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by respondent Quintin Muning.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for
professional services rendered in the case, apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates ............................................. 10%
Quintin Muning ......................................................................... 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis ................................................................. 5%
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the order, is sought to be voided in
the present petition.
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition on the ground of late filing but his
motion was overruled on 20 January 1965.1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion
contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court admitted and considered the motion for
reconsideration for all purposes as respondent's answer to the petitioner for review.2 The case was
considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief.3
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs.
Court of Industrial Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,4 that an agreement providing for the division
of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is
condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of
attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —
In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties shall
not be required to be represented by legal counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial
Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —
it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and
cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly
presentation of evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of
the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of
a party-litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For
Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
compensation for his services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of attorney's fees.
Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent
Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino
Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands
that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested
qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being
subject to judicial disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive. There, it is stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been enacted prohibiting
persons not licensed or admitted to the bar from practising law, and under
statutes of this kind, the great weight of authority is to the effect that
compensation for legal services cannot be recovered by one who has not been
admitted to practice before the court or in the jurisdiction the services were
rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as an attorney at law
unless he has been duly admitted to practice ... and is an attorney in good
standing at the time.6
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be violated;7 that acting as an attorney
with authority constitutes contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,8 and
the law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act done in violation of law;9 and
that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to
consult in case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-
lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-recovery of attorney's fees by
non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by
seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney. 11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees should
suffice to refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial
Relations should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special
jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of some of its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU,
alone, that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review; union members Entila
and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the present petition that
was subsequently filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their inclusion in the
petition as co-petitioners was belated.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of its members because such union or labor organization is permitted to
institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and the union was organized "for
the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is
disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Section
6, Republic Act 875, which provides:
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any person aggrieved by any
order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme Court of the Philippines ...,
since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial burden of
litigations.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of
Industrial Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their
appearances as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious
situation demanding corrective action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by positive
action to that purpose. But since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be
taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper action against the persons alleged to be
illegally engaged in the practice of law.
WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages
as attorney's fees for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs
against respondent Muning.
G.R. No. 113591 February 6, 1995
49
AGUIDO LACSON, JR., ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE R. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In the resolution of 13 July 1994, this Court (a) denied with finality the motion to reconsider the resolution
of 11 May 1994 which denied the instant petition for the failure of the petitioners to sufficiently show that
the respondent court committed any reversible error in rendering the challenged decision, and (b) directed
the counsel for the petitioners, Atty. Mario G. Fortes, to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of court and declared liable for misconduct for his "apparently malicious and unfounded
accusation that this Court did not read the petition and for craftily suppressing from the body of the
petition the final decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 11465.
In his compliance dated 6 August 1994, Atty. Fortes admitted the charge but tried to explain that:
2 — This is the first time that counsel filed a petition of this kind and nature. The
latest resolution has greatly enlightened counsel and broaden its (sic) outlook on
the kind and nature of a petition that counsel might file in the future.
and justified his outbursts and offered his apology thus:
6 — In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, considering counsel was
only motivated with his enthusiasm to protect the interest if his clients, verily
those statements were made without malice. Counsel was grateful to the Highest
Tribunal for its enlightening Resolution. It is with deep regret that this things
happened. Counsel sincerely offers his apologies for the wrong done to the
Supreme Court. Counsel assures this Honorable Court that this incident will not
be repeated. Counsel also promises to be more discreet in his statements in his
pleadings.
In the resolution of 12 September 1994, the Court required Atty. Fortes to manifest whether he was willing
to submit the matter on the basis of the pleadings already filed. He asserted in the affirmative in a
manifestation dated 15 October 1994.
The contempt aspect of this case arose from the motion for reconsideration of 6 June 1994 which Atty.
Fortes filed. He sought therein the reconsideration of the resolution of 11 May 1994 which he denied the
instant petition. He contends that "the petition was denied wholly on the basis of technicality"; that the
"denial did not consider the fraud sought to be stopped"; and that in peremptorily denying the petition,
this Court disregarded the purpose of judicial proceedings, i.e., "to seek the truth," even as it is "unusual
that the Resolution failed on this aspect," and upheld" the fake and falsified OCT No. 730 of the Tuazons."
He further stated therein that:
[i]t pained the petitioners and their counsel to surmise that nobody cared to read
the Petition. If they did they refused to understand the arguments in order not to
blur the preconceived resolution of this case.
In the aforementioned resolution of 13 July 1994, this Court said:
While the motion could be easily treated as mere scrap of paper for lack of proof
of proper service thereof on the adverse parties, in view of the aforesaid charges,
however, this Court chose to take action thereon.
The petition was not dismissed on the basis of technicality and it is completely
untrue that it was not read by the Court. The petition, including its annexes, was
carefully read, and this Court took pains to consider the allegations, issues, and
arguments adduced therein. It reached the conclusion that the petitioners have
failed to sufficiently show that the respondent Court had committed any
reversible error in rendering the challenged decision. The petitioners' counsel
should know, or ought to know, the nature, character, and scope of a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. He should have, moreover, been
candid enough in the petition for review to disclose in its body the fact that CA-
G.R. SP No. 30319, which is the subject of the instant petition, is actually a
petition to annul the same decision of Branch 158 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Metro Manila, in Criminal Case No. 81736 which petitioner Aguido Lacson,
Jr. appealed to the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11465 and which the latter
(Thirteenth Division) affirmed in toto in its decision of 11 November 1992. This
decision became final on 27 November 1992. Entry of judgment was then made
on 11 January 1993 [Rollo, 23]. In Criminal Case No. 81736, petitioner Aguido
Lacson, Jr., was found guilty of the violation of Section 1 of P.D. No. 772 (Anti-
Squatting Law) and was sentenced to pay a fine of P5,000.00; however, his wife,
Loreta Quitalig, now his co-petitioner, and two other accused were acquitted. We
gathered these facts only from Annex "A" of the instant petition, which is the
challenged decision of the Court of Appeals (Fourteenth Division) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 30319, wherein the Court of Appeals stated:
One Last point. It bears reiterating that the decision in
Criminal Case No. 81736, which petitioners sought to
annul, is the very same decision which was affirmed in
toto by this Court, through its Thirteenth Division, on
November 11, 1992 in CA-G.R. CR No. 11465. Therefore,
this Division, the Fourteenth Division, to which the
instant petition was raffled, is in no position to nullify a
final judgment issued by a co-equal and coordinate
Division, the former Thirteenth Division. On this ground
alone, the petitioner must fail. (Rollo, 28).
The suppression of the antecedents must have been deliberate since counsel for
the petitioners must have known that a voluntary disclosure thereof in the body
of the instant petition would be fatal to the petitioner's cause.
This Court further observed that petitioner Loreta Quitalig, having not joined, for
obvious reason, the appeal therefrom by her husband, was not a party in CA-G. R.
CR No. 11465. Clearly then, she could not join her husband to challenge the said
decision in this case.
Finally, the instant petition concentrates its fire on the alleged fake PCT No. 730.
unfortunately, CA-G. R. SP No. 30319 is hardly the proper remedy to nullify it.
Counsel for petitioners should know, or ought to know, what the proper remedy
is.
Indisputably then, Atty. Fortes' assertions in the motion for reconsideration that the petition was denied
wholly on technically; that the Court's peremptory denial disregarded the purpose of judicial proceedings,
which is to seek the truth; that the Court upheld the fake and falsified OCT No. 730 of the Tuazons; and,
worse, that the Members of the Court did not read the petition or that if they did, they simply refused to
understand the arguments "in order not to blur [their] preconceived resolution of this case," are patently
unfounded and malicious. His sole purpose was to show and prove his clients that he was all the time
correct and this Court dismally wrong not only for veering away from the true purpose of judicial
proceedings and suppressing the truth and upholding and illegal title, but, worse, for not even reading the
petition or if it did, for not understanding it in order to hide its prejudgment of the case. In so doing upon a
matrix of false and unfounded premises, Atty. Fortes did an immeasurable disservice to this Court by
putting it into dishonor, disrespect, and public contempt, diminishing public confidence or promoting
distrust in the Court, and assailing the integrity of its Members and even charging them without violating
their duty to render justice.
Thus, Atty. Fortes deliberately disregarded or ignored his solemn oath to conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts and his duties to
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers (Section 20, Rule 138,
Rules of Court; Canon 11, Code of Professional Responsibility), observe candor, fairness and good faith to
the courts (Canon 10, Code of Professional Responsibility), and to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its
supreme importance (Canon 1, Canons of Professional Ethics).
In Salcedo vs. Hernandez (61 Phil. 724, 728-729 [1935]), this Court had already the occasion to state:
50
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco,
as any attorney, is in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend
its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high privilege, not a
right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is: a priest of
justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he
neither created nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and
prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many
cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which
rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for
protection and relief.
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so for him to exercise by resorting to intimidation or
proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
require. The reason for this is that respect of the courts require respect. The
reason for this is that respect of the courts guarantee the stability of their
institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.
and in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel (31 SCRA 1, 16-17 [1970]), this Court said:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrusts in the
administration of justice. Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For,
to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and
to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it had been said of a
lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build
and not destroy unecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice. (citations omitted)
His explanation that this is the first petition he has filed with this Court and his justification that he was
only motivated by his enthusiasm to protect the interests of his clients are unacceptable. On the contrary,
if this was indeed the first petition he has filed with this Court, he should have striven for the best and
demonstrated utmost candor to and respect for the Court. Instead, he tried to hide the futility of his clients
cause by suppressing vital facts in the petition. As to his enthusiasm to protect his clients' interest , he
should be reminded of what this Court had said in Surigao Mineral reservation Board:
A client's cause does not permit an attorney to cross the line between liberty and
license. lawyers must always keep in perspective the though that [s]ince lawyers
are administrators of justice, oath-bound servants of society, their first duty is not
to their clients as many suppose, but to the administration of justice; to this, their
client's success is wholly subordinate; and their conduct ought to and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics' [5 Martin, Rules of Court in the
Philippines, 1966 ed., p. 69, citing In re Kelly, 243 F. 696, 706].
WHEREFORE, for his violations of his oath of office, Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics, ATTY. MARIO G. FORTES is hereby
ORDERED to pay a FINE of Two Thousand Pesos(P2,000.00) and WARNED that the commission of the same
or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be attached to the records of Atty. Mario G. Fortes in this Court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33672 September 28, 1973
VICENTE MUÑOZ, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents,
DELIA T. SUTTON, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
FERNANDO, J.:
We have before us a task far from pleasant. Respondent, Delia T. Sutton, a member of the Philippine Bar,
connected with the law firm of Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Parlade, and Associates, must be held accountable
for failure to live up to that exacting standard expected of counsel, more specifically with reference to a
duty owing this Tribunal. She failed to meet the test of candor and honesty required of pleaders when, in a
petition for certiorari prepared by her to review a Court of Appeals decision, she attributed to it a finding of
facts in reckless disregard, to say the least, of what in truth was its version as to what transpired. When
given an opportunity to make proper amends, both in her appearance before us and thereafter in her
memorandum, there was lacking any showing of regret for a misconduct so obvious and so inexcusable.
Such an attitude of intransigence hardly commends itself. Her liability is clear. Only her relative
inexperience in the ways of the law did save her from a penalty graver than severe censure. So we rule.
The background of the incident before us was set forth in our resolution of July 12, 1971. It reads as
follows: "Acting upon the petition for review in G.R. No. L-33672, Vicente Muñoz v. People of the Philippines
and the Court of Appeals, and considering that the main issue therein is whether petitioner Muñoz is guilty
of homicide through reckless negligence, as charged in the information; that - in the language of the
decision of the Court of Appeals - "the prosecution and the defense offered two conflicting versions of the
incident that gave rise to the case"; that, upon examination of the evidence, the Court of Appeals found, as
did the trial court, that the version of the prosecution is the true one and that of the defense is
unbelievable; that this finding of the Court of Appeals is borne out by substantial evidence, whereas the
version of the defense is inconsistent with some established facts, for: (a) petitioner's theory, to the effect
that his boat had been rammed by that of the complainant, is refuted by the fact that after hitting the left
frontal outrigger of the latter's boat, the prow and front outrigger of petitioner's motorboat hit also the left
front portion of complainant's boat - where the complainant was seated, thereby hitting him on the back
and inflicting the injury that cause his death - so that, immediately after the collision - part of petitioner's
boat was on top of that of the complainant; (b) these circumstances, likewise, indicate the considerable
speed at which petitioner's motorboat was cruising, (c) petitioner's motorboat had suffered very little
damage, which would have been considerable had it been rammed by the offended party's boat, the latter
being bigger than, as well as provided with an engine twice as powerful as, that of the petitioner; and (d)
although appellant's boat carried several passengers, including children, and was, in fact, overloaded,
appellant acted as pilot and, at the same time, as its machinist, thereby rendering it difficult for him to
manuever it properly; the Court resolved to [deny] the petition upon the ground that it is mainly factual
and for lack of merit. Considering further, that the petition quotes, on page 5 thereof a portion of the
decision appealed from, summing up evidence for the defense, and makes reference thereto "findings" of
the Court of Appeals, which is not true; that, on page 6 of the petition, petitioner states, referring to a
portion of the same quotation, that the same "are the established uncontroverted facts recognized by the
Court of Appeals," which is, likewise, untrue; that, on page 8 of the petition, it is averred - "It being
conceded that the two versions recounted above are by themselves credible, although they are conflicting
the same cannot be binding on, and is therefore, reviewable by the Honorable Supreme Court. Where the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals [are conflicting], the same [are not binding] on the Supreme Court.
(Cesica v. Villaseca, G.R. L-9590, April 30, 1957)" although, in fact, no conflicting findings of fact are made in
the decision appealed from; and that, on page 9 of the petition, it is alleged that the Court of Appeals
had"affirmed the minimum penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day imposed by the lower court," although,
in fact, minimum penalty imposed by the trial court was "four(4) months of arresto mayor"; the Court
resolved to require counsel for the petitioner to show cause, within ten (10) days from notice, why they
should not be dealt with for contempt of court [or] otherwise subjected to disciplinary action for making
aforementioned misrepresentations." " 1chanrobles virtual law library
A pleading entitled "Compliance with Resolution" by the aforesaid law firm was filed on August 14, 1971.
There was no attempt at justification, because in law there is none, but it did offer what was hoped to be a
satisfactory explanation. If so, such optimism was misplaced. It betrayed on its face more than just a hint of
lack of candor, of minimizing the effects of grave inaccuracies in the attribution to the Court of Appeals
certain alleged facts not so considered as such. It was then to say that the least a far from meticulous
appraisal of the matter in issue. Much of what was therein contained did not ring true.
Under the circumstances, we set the matter for hearing on September 14 of the same year, requiring all
lawyers-partners in said firm to be present. At such a hearing, respondent Delia T. Sutton appeared. While
her demeanor was respectful, it was obvious that she was far from contrite. On the contrary, the
impression she gave the Court was that what was done by her was hardly deserving of any reproach. Even
when subjected to intensive questioning by several members of the Court, she was not to be budged from
51
such an untenable position. It was as if she was serenely unconcerned, oblivious of the unfavorable
reaction to, which her evasive answers gave rise. There certainly was lack of awareness of the serious
character of her misdeed. The act of unruffled assurance under the circumstances was hard to understand.
Perhaps realizing that the Court was not disposed to look at the matter as a minor peccadillo, Attorney
Sedfrey A. Ordoñez of the law firm expressly acknowledged that what appeared in its petition for certiorari
prepared by respondent Delia T. Sutton insofar as it did misrepresent what is set forth in the Court of
Appeals decision sought to be reviewed was reprehensible, and did make with the proper spirit of humility
the necessary expression of regret.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
What is more, the law firm in a pleading entitled "Joint Apology to the Supreme Court" filed on December
1, 1971, signed jointly by Sedfrey A. Ordoñez and Delia Sutton, did seek to make amends thus: "1. That
undersigned attorney, Delia T. Sutton, together with Messrs. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, Pedro L. Yap and
Custodio O. Parlade, partners in the firm of Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Parlade & Associates, appeared before
this Honorable Court on November 22, 1971, pursuant to an order dated October 18, 1971; 2. That with all
the sincerity and candor at the command of undersigned attorney, the circumstances surrounding her
preparation of the pleading which gave rise to the instant citation to show cause why she should not be
punished for contempt of court were explained by her, with the assistance of Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez; 3.
That the undersigned Delia T. Sutton had no intention to misrepresent any question of fact before this
Honorable Court for her personal gain or benefit, and that it was her lack of adequate extensive experience
in preparing petitions for certiorari which may have caused the inaccurate statements in the said petition
which were enumerated in the order of this Honorable Court; 4. That undersigned Delia T. Sutton contritely
realizes the errors which she committed in the preparation of the said petition for certiorari and that the
same will not recur in the future as she will always abide by the provisions on candor and fairness in the
Canons of Professional Ethics, which reads: "22. [Candor and Fairness]. - The conduct of the lawyer before
the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. It is not candid or fair for
the lawyer knowingly to misquote the contents of a paper, the testimony of a witness, the language or the
argument of opposing counsel, or the language of a decision or a textbook or; with knowledge of its
invalidity, to cite as authority a decision that has been overruled, or a statute that has been repealed; or in
argument to assert as fact that which has not been proved, or in those jurisdictions where a side has the
opening and closing arguments to mislead his opponent by concealing or withholding positions in his
opening argument upon which his side then intends to rely. ..." 5. That undersigned Atty. Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez joins Atty. Delia T. Sutton in expressing his own apologies to the Honorable Court for not having
thoroughly supervised the preparation by Atty. Delia T. Sutton of a type of pleading with which she was not
thoroughly familiar." 2chanrobles virtual law library
The "Joint Apology" thus offered did mitigate to some extent the liability of respondent Sutton. Some
members of the Court feel, however, that it does not go far enough. While expressing regret and offering
apology, there was lacking that free admission that what was done by her should not characterized merely
as "errors" consisting as they do of "inaccurate statements." If there were a greater sincerity on her part,
the offense should have been acknowledged as the submission of deliberate misstatements. There ought
to be, for the apology to gain significance, no further attempt at minimizing the enormity of the misdeed. It
is then as if there was hardly any retreat from the untenable stand originally taken. The mood, even at this
stage, seems to be that she could brazen it out as long as the words indicative of an apology were offered.
This Court does not view matters thus. To purge herself of the contempt, she ought to have displayed the
proper spirit of contrition and humility. The burden cast on the judiciary would be intolerable if it could not
take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The time that will have to be devoted just to the task of
verification of allegations submitted could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel
is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of a client's cause, it must never be at the expense of
deviation from the truth. As set forth in the applicable Canon of Legal Ethics: "Nothing operates more
certainly to create or to foster popular prejudice against lawyers as a class, and to deprive the profession of
that full measure of public esteem and confidence which belongs to the proper discharge of its duties than
does the false claim, often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transactions, that it is the
duty of the lawyer to do whatever may enable him to succeed in winning his client's cause." 3 What is more,
the obligation to the bench, especially to this Court, for candor and honesty takes precedence. It is by
virtue of such considerations that punishment that must fit the offense has to be meted out to respondent
Delia T. Sutton.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
At the same time, the attitude displayed by one of the senior partners, Attorney Sedfrey A. Ordoñez, both
in the appearances before the Court and in the pleadings submitted, must be commended. He has made
manifest that his awareness of the role properly incumbent on counsel, especially in his relationship to this
Court, is deep-seated. It must be stated, however, that in the future he, as well as the other senior
partners, should exercise greater care in the supervision of the attorneys connected with their law firm,
perhaps inexperienced as yet but nonetheless called upon to comply with the peremptory tenets of ethical
conduct.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, respondent Delia T. Sutton is severely censured. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on
her record.
G.R. No. 115932 January 25, 1995
THE SPOUSES JOSE B. TIONGCO and LETICIA M. TIONGCO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SEVERIANO C. AGUILAR, Judge, RTC, Branch 35, Iloilo City, and the Spouses WILFREDO and LORENA
AGUIRRE, respondents.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, J.:
In the resolution of 26 September 1994, this Court required ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO, as counsel for the
petitioners, to show cause why he should not be dealt with administratively for the violation of Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility considering:
. . . the insinuation of counsel for the petitioners that this Court did not read the
petition as borne out by the following statement:
". . . Truly, it is hard to imagine that this Honorable Court
had read the petition and the annexes attached thereto
and hold that the same has "failed to sufficiently show
that the respondent Court had committed a grave abuse
of discretion in rendering the questioned judgment". . .
which, as earlier noted, is unfounded and malicious, and considering further his
use of intemperate language in the petition, as exemplified by his characterization
of the decision of the respondent Judge as having been "crafted in order to fool
the winning party"; as a "hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor"; one "you
could have sworn it was the Devil who dictated it"; or one with "perfidious
character," although the petitioners as plaintiffs therein and who were the
prevailing party in the decision did not appeal therefrom; and by his charge that
the respondent Judge was "a bit confused — with that confusion which is the
natural product of having been born, nurtured and brought up amongst the
crowded surroundings of the non-propertied class; In fact, His Honor, Respondent
Judge, the Honorable Severino O. Aguilar had not owned any real property until
March 5, 1974 when his Honor was already either Public-Prosecutor or RTC Judge;
— in one scale of the balance, a 311 square meter lot, 6 houses from the
Provincial Road, about 6 kilometers from the Iloilo City Hall of Justice, and, in the
other scale, His Honor's brand-new car, impeccable attire, and dignified "mien";
and his charge that the respondent Judge has "joined the defendants and their
counsel in a scheme to unlawfully deprive petitioners of the possession and fruits
of their property for the duration of appeal"; and with respect to the Order of 30
May 1994, by describing the respondent Judge as a "liar," "perjurer," or
"blasphemer."
In his 2-page Compliance, dated 11 October 1994, he alleges that:
If the undersigned has called anyone a "liar" "thief" "perfidious" and
"blasphemer" it is because he is in fact a liar, thief, perfidious and blasphemer;
"this Honorable [sic] First Division, however, forget, that the undersigned alsp [sic]
called him a "robber" (Petition, pp. 13 bottom; 14 bottom), a "rotten
manipulator" (Petition, p. 11 line 26) and "abetter" of graft and shady deals
(Petition, p. 12 bottom, p. 13 top); On the other hand, if the undersigned called
52
anybody "cross-eyed," it must be because he is indeed cross-eyed — particularly
when he sees but five (5) letters in an eight (8) letter-word; Indeed, it must be a
lousy Code of Professional Responsibility and therefore stands in dire need of
amendment which punishes lawyer who truthfully expose incompetent and
corrupt judges before this Honorable Supreme Court; It is therefore, respectfully
submitted, that for all his pains, the undersigned does not deserve or is entitled to
the honors of being dealt with administratively or otherwise.
and prays:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the undersigned respectfully prays of this
Honorable Supreme Court, that it forebear from turning the undersigned into a
martyr to his principles.
Yet, he added the following:
WITH THE UNDERSIGNED'S RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES — AND UNDYING LOVE
(Constitution, Preamble, 66 word).
It must at once be noted that Atty. Tiongco did not at all show cause why he should not be dealt with
administratively for violation of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in view of his
unfounded and malicious insinuation that this Court did not at all read the petition in this case before it
concluded that the petition failed to sufficiently show that the respondent court had committed a grave
abuse of discretion. Moreover, while he tried to justify as true his descriptions of the respondent judge as a
"liar," "thief." perfidious," and "blasphemer" he did not offer any excuse for his use of the rest of the
intemperate words enumerated in the resolution. Worse, feeling obviously frustrated at the
incompleteness of the Court's enumeration of the intemperate words or phrases, he volunteered to point
out that in addition to those so enumerated, he also called the respondent judge a "robber," "rotten
manipulator," "abettor" of graft and corruption, and "cross-eyed."
Atty. Tiongco's Compliance is unsatisfactory and is entirely unacceptable for the following reasons: first, he
impliedly admitted the falsity of his insinuation that this Court did not read the petition' second, except as
to the words "liar," "thief," "perfidious'" and "blasphemer," he failed to address squarely the other
intemperate words and phrases enumerated in the resolution of 26 September 1994, which failure
amounts to an admission of their intemperateness; third, he did not indicate the circumstances upon which
his defense of truth lies; and, fourth, he miserably failed to show the relevance of the harsh words and
phrase to his petition.
We do not then hesitate to rule that by falsely and maliciously insinuating that this Court did not at all read
the petition in this case, Atty. Tiongco not only exhibited his gross disrespect to and contempt for this Court
and exposed his plot to discredit the Members of the First Division of the Court and put them to public
contempt or ridicule; he, as well, charged them with the violation of their solemn duty to render justice,
thereby creating or promoting distrust in judicial administration which could have the effect of
"encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation
on which rests the bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and
relief" (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724 [1953]).
In using in the petition in this case intemperate and scurrilous words and phrases against the respondent
judge which are obviously uncalled for and entirely irrelevant to the petition and whose glaring falsity is
easily demonstrated by the respondent judge's decision if favor of Atty. Tiongco and his wife in their case
for recovery of possession and damages, and by the dismissal of the instant petition for failure of the
petitioners to sufficiently show that the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion, Atty.
Tiongco has equally shown his disrespect to and contempt for the respondent judge, thereby diminishing
public confidence in the latter and eventually, in the judiciary, or sowing mistrust in the administration of
justice.
Consequently, Atty. Tiongco has made a strong case for a serious violation of Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which reads as follows:
CANON 11 — A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO
THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
This duty is closely entwined with his vow in the lawyer's oath "to conduct himself as a lawyer with all good
fidelity to the courts"; his duty under Section 20 (b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court "[t]o observe and
maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers"; and his duty under the first canon of
the Canons Professional Ethics "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its incumbent of the judicial office,
but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer (20 SCRA 441, 444 [1967]), this Court said:
By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court had become commonplace. Really, there
could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section
20(b), Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such
duty: "To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and
judicial officers." As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces
that "[i]t is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but
for the maintenance of its supreme importance." That same canon, as a corollary,
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against "unjust
criticism and clamor." And more. The attorney's oath solemnly binds him to
conduct that should be "with all good fidelity . . . to the courts." Worth
remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the courts "can only be
maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to the judicial office
which he is bound to uphold." [Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86, 92].
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is
his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it.
That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed
to harden into a belief that he may attack court's decision in words calculated to
jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He
should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are
encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
Expounding further on the lawyer's duty to the courts, this Court, in Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs.
Cloribel (31 SCRA 1, 16-17 [1970]), stated:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice." [People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R.
851, 855]. His duty is to uphold the dignity and the authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration in the
administration of justice." [In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602]. faith in the courts a
lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice "is
disastrous to the continuity of the government and to the attainment of the
liberties of the people." [Malcolm legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p. 160]. Thus
has it been said of a lawyer that "[a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of justice."
[People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 572, 580]. (See also In re: Rafael C. Climaco, 55 SCRA
107 [1974]).
It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the
courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right.
Thus, In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to
exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law
may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the
official conduct of the judge, which would not expose him to legal animadversion
as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am dec. 657, 665).
"Above all others, the members of the bar have the best
opportunity to become conversant with the character
and efficiency of out judges. No class is less likely to
abuse the privilege, or no other class has as great an
interest in the preservation of an able and upright
53
bench." (State Board of Examiners in Law vs. Hart, 116
N.W. 212, 216).
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is
to seal the lips of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider
it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is
concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits
there must be profound silence. (State vs. Circuit Court (72 N.W. 196)).
Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:
But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between
fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges
thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the
duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
xxx xxx xxx
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to
the orderly administration of justice. hence, in the assertion of their client's rights,
lawyers — even those gifted with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up
their tempers.
Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a
corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with responsibility. In
Zaldivar vs. Gonzales (166 SCRA 316, 353-354 [1988]), it was held:
Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free spe ech.
No one seeks to deny him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent
seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs an
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration justice.
There is no antimony between free expression and the integrity of the system of
administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of
expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and
orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable
independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general
community.
Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts,
creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to undermine
the confidence of the people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the
administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive
language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs.
Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]); or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious
statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macando, 158 SCRA 391 [1988],
citing the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R.
No. 76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-
for remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).
That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in making the false and malicious
insinuation against this Court, particularly the Members of the First Division, and the scurrilous
characterizations of the respondent judge is, indeed, all too obvious. Such could only come from anger, if
not hate, after he was not given what he wanted. Anger or hate could only come from one who "seems to
be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he believes
to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his views"
(Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234, 238 [1974]). When such anger or hate is coupled with haughtiness or
arrogance as when he even pointed out other intemperate words in his petition which this Court failed to
incorporate in the resolution of 26 September 1994, and with seething sarcasm as when he prays that this
Court "forebear[s] from turning . . . [him] into a martyr to his principles" and ends up his Compliance with
the "RESPECTFUL APOLOGIES — AND UNDYING LOVE" (Constitution — Preamble, 66th word), "nothing
more can extenuate his liability for gross violation of Canon 11 of the Code of professional Responsibility
and his other duties entwined therewith as earlier adverted to.
WHEREFORE, for such violation, ATTY. JOSE B. TIONGCO is hereby ordered to pay a Fine of FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P5,000.00) and WARNED that the commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt
with more money.
G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974
JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR, petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO M. GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G. GAVIOLA, Justices of
the Court of Appeals, respondents. In Re Quirico del Mar, For Disciplinary action as member of the
Philippine Bar, respondent.
ESGUERRA, J.:p
Petitioner Atty. Quirico del Mar of Cebu City in G. R. No. L-36800, and as respondent in contempt
proceedings both in the Court of Appeals and in this Court, virtually focused the limelight on himself and
relegated to insignificance the limelight on himself and relegated to insignificance the principal issue raised
in the petition for certiorari to review the entitled "Francisco M. Gica vs. Hon. Santiago O. Tañada, et al"
which was denied due course by this Court's resolution dated May 14, 1973, for lack of merit.
Although the petition for certiorari has been denied, it becomes imperatively necessary to elucidate upon
the antecedents of this case even if Our only justification in so doing is to seek a reason or motive for the
acts of contempt perpetrated by respondent Quirico del Mar that might serve to lighten the enormity of his
wrongdoing as a member of the Bar.
As a result of an alleged slander committed by Jorge Montecillo on Francisco M. Gica (the former allegedly
calling the latter "stupid" or a "fool'), Mr. Gica filed a criminal complaint for oral defamation against
Montecillo (Criminal Case No. R-28782 in Branch VII of the Cebu City Court) and a case for damages arising
from the same incident (Civil Case No. R-13075 in Branch VI of the Cebu City Court). Montecillo was
acquitted in Criminal Case No. R-28782, and in Civil Case No. R-13075, the Cebu City Court found that
Montecillo did not call Gica "stupid". Finding the counter-claim of Montecillo meritorious, the City Court
rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred pesos as moral damages, two
hundred pesos as compensatory damages and three hundred pesos as attorney's fees, plus costs.
Francisco Gica appealed from the decision of the City Court of Cebu in Civil Case No. R-13075 to the Court
of First Instance of Cebu presided by Hon. Santiago O. Tañada but the Court of First Instance upheld the
decision of the City Court. The case was then elevated to the Court of Appeals by petition for review by
petitioner Francisco M. Gica and it was docketed therein as CA-G.R. No. 46504-R.
The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals in a decision penned by the Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan and
concurred in by Associate Justices Jose N. Leuterio and Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr. (promulgated on Sept. 27,
1972), reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu; ruled in favor of petitioner Gica on the
ground that the preponderance of evidence favored petitioner Francisco M. Gica on the principle that
positive must prevail over the negative evidence, and that "some words must have come from Montecillo's
lips that were insulting to Gica". The appellate court concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and
instead, awarded him five hundred pesos as damages.
It is from this point that trouble began for respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar when, as counsel for
Montecillo, he moved for a reconsideration of the Appellate Court's decision with a veiled threat by
mentioning the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "Knowingly rendering unjust judgment" and
"judgment rendered through negligence", and the innuendo that the Court of Appeals allowed itself to be
deceived. When the Appellate Court denied the motion for reconsideration in its Resolution of October 24,
1972, it observed that the terminology of the motion insinuated that the Appellate Court rendered an
unjust judgment, that it abetted a falsification and it permitted itself to be deceived. It admonished Atty.
del Mar to remember that threats and abusive language cannot compel any court of justice to grant
reconsideration. Respondent del Mar persisted and in his second motion for reconsideration, filed without
leave of court, made another threat by stating that "with almost all penal violations placed under the
54
jurisdiction of the President of the Philippines, particularly Articles 171, 204 and 205 of the Revised Penal
Code, as Commander in Chief of the AFP, by virtue of the proclamation of martial law, the next appeal that
will he interposed, will be to His Excellency, the President of the Philippines."
The Appellate Court in its resolution of Nov. 27, 1972, noticed that notwithstanding its admonition in its
resolution of Oct. 24, 1972, for Atty. del Mar to refrain from abusive language and threats, he reiterated his
threats, and that the Appellate Court, impelled to assert its authority, ordered respondent del Mar to
explain within 10 days (and to appear on January 10, 1973) why he should not be punished for contempt of
court.
On December 5, 1972, respondent del Mar made a written explanation wherein he said that the Appellate
Court could not be threatened and he was not making any threat but only informing the Appellate Court of
the course of action he would follow. On the same date, respondent sent a letter to the Justices of the 4th
Division of the Court of Appeals informing them that he sent a letter to the President of the Philippines,
furnishing them a copy thereof, and requesting the Justices to take into consideration the contents of said
letter during the hearing of the case scheduled for January 10, 1973. Not content with that move, on
December 8, 1972, respondent sent another letter to the same Justices of the Court of Appeals wherein he
reminded them of a civil case he instituted against Justices of the Supreme Court for damages in the
amount of P200,000 for a decision rendered not in accordance with law and justice, stating that he would
not like to do it again but would do so if provoked. We pause here to observe that respondent del Mar
seems to be of that frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever he
believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice whatever does not accord with his
views. In other words, he would like to assume the role of this Court, personally and individually, in the
interpretation and construction of the laws, evaluation of evidence and determination of what is in
accordance with law and justice.
The documented incidents as narrated in the Appellate Court's Resolution of March 5, 1973, cannot more
eloquently depict the very manifest and repeated threats of respondent del Mar to bludgeon the Justices
of the Fourth Davison into reconsidering its decision which happened to be adverse to respondent's client.
Respondent del Mar, instead of presenting lucid and forceful arguments on the merits of his plea for a
reconsideration to convince the Justices of the Fourth Division of the alleged error in their decision,
resorted to innuendos and veiled threats, even casting downright aspersion on the Justices concerned by
insinuating that for their decision they could be criminally and civilly liable for knowingly rendering unjust
judgment, or doing it through ignorance.
We quote with approval this portion of the Appellate Court's Resolution (March 5, 1973):
A just man can never be threatened, p. 145, rollo, is not at all true; any man, just
or unjust, can be threatened; if he is unjust, he will succumb, if he is just, he will
not, but the offense is committed, whether the threats do or do not succeed. As
to his (respondent del Mar's reference to the New Society, p. 150, in his letter to
his Excellency, complaining against those justices, let it be said that precisely it
was under the Former Society that there had been so much disrespect for the
constituted authorities, there was abuse, worse than abuse, there was arrogant
abuse, of the so-called civil liberties, against the authorities, including the courts,
not excluding even the President; it is this anarchy that is the program to cure in
the New.
This Resolution of the Appellate Court of March 5, 1973, fittingly concluded that "counsel del Mar is found
guilty of contempt and condemned to pay a fine of P200.00 and ordered suspended from the practice of
law and pursuant to Sec. 9 of Rule 139, let certified copies of these papers be elevated to the Honorable
Supreme Court". We upheld the Court of Appeals and gave full force and effect to this order of suspension
from the practice of law when in Our resolution dated Nov. 19, 1973, the Judicial Consultant of this Court
was directed to circularize all courts about the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del
Mar from the practice of law.
Not satisfied with the wrong that he had already done against Associate Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose
N. Leuterio and Ramon Gaviola, Jr., respondent del Mar sued the three Justices for damages in Civil Case
No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, trying to hold them liable for their decision in CA-G.R.
No. 46504-R; that the case for damages (R-13277)was terminated by compromise agreement after Mr. del
Mar himself moved for the dismissal of his complaint apologized to the Court of Appeals and the Justices
concerned, and agreed to pay nominal moral damages in favor of the defendants-justices. This is the
undeniable indication that respondent del Mar did not only threaten the three Justices of the Appellate
Court but he actually carried out his threat, although he did not succeed in making them change their
minds in the case they decided in accordance with the exercise of their judicial discretion emanating from
pure conviction.
To add insult to injury, respondent del Mar had the temerity to file his motion on October 10, 1973, before
Us, asking that his suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals be ignored
because of the amicable settlement reached in Civil Case No. R-13277 of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
which was the action for damages filed against the three Justices of the Appellate Court.
Respondent del Mar's ire at the Appellate Court, fanned by the wind of frustration, turned against Us when
We denied on May 14, 1973, his petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Appellate Court, G.
R. No. L-36800, for on May 25, 1973, he filed his motion for reconsideration and wrote a letter addressed
to the Clerk of this Court requesting the names of the Justices of this Court who supported the resolution
denying his petition, together with the names of the Justices favoring his motion for reconsideration. This
motion for reconsideration We denied for lack of merit in Our resolution dated June 15, 1973. He, then,
filed a manifestation dated July 1, 1973, before Us, stating brazenly, among other things, "I can at this time
reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of the last two
Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case entitled
Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting the same, civil and
criminal suit as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the abhorent falsification
committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the purpose of exposing to the
people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well know them and work for their
extermination" (Emphasis supplied. In one breath and in a language certainly not complimentary to the
Appellate Court and to Us, respondent del Mar again made his veiled threat of retribution aimed at the
Appellate Court and at Us for Our judicial acts in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and G. R. No. L-36800.
Our immediate reaction to this manifestation, dictated by the impulse of placing on a pedestal beyond
suspicion the integrity and honor of this Court and that of any of our other courts of justice, was to require
by Resolution of July 16, 1973, respondent del Mar to show cause why disciplinary action should not be
taken against him for the contemptuous statements contained in his manifestation.
At this juncture, We pause to reexamine the act of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R and our
own in G. R. No. L-36800 to determine what error we might have committed to generate such a vengeful
wrath of respondent del Mar which drove him to make his contemptuous statements.
The crucial issue in the case of oral defamation filed by Francisco M. Gica against Jorge Montecillo is as to
what was the statement really uttered by Montecillo on the occasion in question — "binuang man gud na"
(That act is senseless or done without thinking) or "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid). If the
statement uttered was the former, Montecillo should be exonerated; if the latter, he would be liable. The
Appellate Court on evaluating the evidence ruled that the preponderance thereof favored Gica "on the
principle that the positive evidence must prevail over the negative" and, therefore, what was really uttered
by Montecillo on that occasion was "buang man gud na siya" (He is foolish or stupid), thus making him
liable for oral defamation. When We denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on certiorari of the
Appellate Court's decision in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, We did so because We could find no reason for
disturbing the Appellate Court's finding and conclusion on the aforementioned lone question of fact which
would warrant overturning its decision.
On July 13, 1973, Our resolution of May 14, 1973, denying the petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of the Appellate Court in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R, became final and executory and the Court of
Appeals was so informed.
To Our resolution of July 16, 1973, requiring respondent del Mar to show cause why he should not be
disciplined for his statements contained in his manifestation of July 1, 1973, he submitted an explanation
dated August 1, 1973, wherein he stated that "..., he is attaching hereto the criminal case he filed with the
President of the Philippines (copy marked as Annex "A") and the civil case he instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu (copy marked as Annex "B") against Justices Magno S. Gatmaitan, Jose N. Leuterio and
Ramon G. Gaviola, Jr., which embody the corroding evils he complained of as extant in the Government
needing correction. He would have followed suit were it not for the fact that he is firmly convinced that
55
human efforts in this direction will be fruitless. As manifested, he, therefore, decided to retire from a life of
militancy to a life of seclusion leaving to God the filling-up of human deficiencies" (Emphasis supplied).
This so-called explanation is more, in its tenor, of a defiant justification of his contemptuous statements
contained in the manifestation of July 1, 1973. Its contents reveal a continued veiled threat against the
Justices of this Court who voted to deny del Mar's petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Court Appeals in CA-G R. No. 46504-R.
Our resolution of September 4, 1973, required respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar to appear personally at
the hearing of his explanation on November 5, 1973. On September 26, 1973, respondent filed an
additional explanation with this Court, wherein he stated, among other things: "Graft, corruption and
injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things that convinced me that all
human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as stated in my manifestation to
you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling-
up of human deficiencies."
Again We noticed that the tenor of this additional explanation is a toned-down justification(as compared to
his explanation of August 1, 1973) of his previous contemptuous statements without even a hint of apology
or regret. Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly
rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other
words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged existence
of rampant corruption, graft, and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in G. R. No. L-
36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are at a complete
loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic and We certainly should, with understanding condescension,
commiserate in the pitiable state of mind of a brother in the legal profession who seems to have his
reasoning and sense of proportion blurred or warped by an all-consuming obsession emanating from a
one-track mind that only his views are absolutely correct and those of others are all wrong.
When this Court in the resolution dated November 19, 1973, directed the Judicial Consultant to circularize
to all courts concerning the order of the Court of Appeals suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the
practice of law, respondent del Mar filed a motion for reconsideration on December 12, 1973, requesting
Us to reconsider said directive. In Our resolution dated December 17, 1973, respondent del Mar, after he
had been interpellated by the Court, was given a period of five days to submit a memorandum in support
of his explanation. In view of respondent's manifestation that there was no need for further investigation
of the facts involved, in accordance with Section 29 of Rule 138, We resolved that the matter be deemed
submitted for decision.
In the memorandum entitled "Explanation" dated December 20, 1973, respondent del Mar stated that he
suffered repeated strokes of high blood pressure which rendered him dizzy and unstable mentally and
physically; that his sight is blurred and his reasoning is faulty; he easily forgets things and cannot readily
correlate them; that for any and all mistakes he might have committed he asked for forgiveness; he
reiterated that "blunders" were committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision and that the Justices
thereof knowingly rendered the same in violation of Article 204 of the Penal Code; he persisted in his view
that the Court of Appeals committed an error in its decision; justified his act of invoking Article 204 of the
Penal Code in trying to make the Appellate Justices liable; that he was high in his academic and scholastic
standing during his school days; that "with all the confusion prevailing nowadays, the undersigned has
decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the practice of law. He hopes and expects that,
with the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, he could have himself released from the obligation he has
contracted with his clients as regards all his pending cases."
It is Our observation that the tenor of this explanation although pleading mental and physical ailment as a
mitigation of the contemptuous acts, is still that of arrogant justification for respondent's previous
statements. We quote:
The undersigned was asked if he had not filed against the Justices of the Supreme
Court a case for damages against them. He answered in the affirmative, but the
case was dismissed by Judge Villasor, of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
because of an American ruling that a justice of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines cannot be civilly held liable. The ruling cited was rendered during the
American regime in the Philippines which was still subject to the jurisdiction of
the American laws. But the Philippines is now independent and Article 204 of the
Penal Code still remains incorporated therein for observance and fulfillment. Up
to now, there is not yet any definite ruling of the Supreme Court thereon
While still persistently justifying his contemptuous statements and at the same time pleading that his
physical and mental ailment be considered so that We may forgive respondent del Mar he shrewdly stated
at the end of his explanation that he has decided for reasons of sickness and old age to retire from the
practice of law, in practical anticipation of whatever penalty We may decide to impose on him and thus
making it appear that he has voluntarily done so with honor and in complete evasion of whatever this
Court may decide to do in this case.
With full realization that a practicing lawyer and officer of the court facing contempt proceedings cannot
just be allowed to voluntarily retire from the practice of law, an act which would negate the inherent
power of the court to punish him for contempt in defense of its integrity and honor, We resolve, by
resolution of January 10, 1974, to deny said prayer of Atty. del Mar without prejudice to his making
arrangement directly with his clients.
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of
maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the laws
of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of said duty to
emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always remember that he is
an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission of administering justice.
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude (People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil.
572). As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he
owes fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our
democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (In re
Sotto 82 Phil. 595).
As We stated before:
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is
his privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it.
This is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed
to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to
jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He
should give due allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are
encompassed by error, fettered by fallibility.
... To be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much more
effective, in calling the Court's attention to the issues involved. The language
vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but respectful, convincing but
not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive (Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer
G. R. No. L-22979, June 26, 1967; 20 SCRA 441, 444-445)
Criminal contempt has been defined as a conduct that is directed against the dignity and authority of the
court or a judge acting judicially. It is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring
the court into disrepute or disrespect (17 C. J. S. 7).
We have held that statements contained in a motion to disqualify a judge, imputing to the latter conspiracy
or connivance with the prosecutors or concocting a plan with a view to securing the conviction of the
accused, and implicating said judge in a supposed attempt to extort money from the accused on a promise
or assurance of the latter's acquittal, all without basis, were highly derogatory and serve nothing but to
discredit the judge presiding the court in an attempt to secure his disqualification. Statements of that
nature have no place in a court pleading and if uttered by a member of the bar, constitute a serious
disrespect. We said:
As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential
to the proper administration of justice (Emphasis supplied). (People vs. Carillo, 43
O.G. No. 12, p. 5021; De Joya et al vs. C. F. I. of Rizal and Rilloraza 52 0. G. 6150).
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 46504-R was based on its evaluation
of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G. R. No. L-36800 the petition for review on
certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's finding and
56

conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial discretion in a Respondent. VELASCO, JR.,
case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of respondent del Mar in NACHURA,
resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand in the decision and the LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure contumely for said tribunals. BRION,
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land when on the PERALTA, and
flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by BERSAMIN, JJ.
claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with
intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
We note with wonder and amazement the brazen effrontery of respondent in assuming that his personal Promulgated:
knowledge of the law and his concept of justice are superior to that of both the Supreme Court and the July 22, 2009
Court of Appeals. His pretense cannot but tend to erode the people's faith in the integrity of the courts of x--------------------------------------------------x
justice and in the administration of justice. He repeatedly invoked his supposed quest for law and justice as
justification for his contemptuous statements without realizing that, in seeking both abstract elusive terms, DECISION
he is merely pursuing his own personal concept of law and justice. He seems not to comprehend that what
to him may be lawful or just may not be so in the minds of others. He could not accept that what to him CARPIO MORALES, J.:
may appear to be right or correct may be wrong or erroneous from the viewpoint of another. We
understand that respondent's mind delves into the absolute without considering the universal law of
change. It is with deep concern that We view such a state of mind of a practicing lawyer since what We Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and
expect as a paramount qualification for those in the practice of law is broadmindedness and tolerance,
manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name CDO, filed a
coupled with keen perception and a sound sense of proportion in evaluating events and circumstances.
For a lawyer in the twilight of his life, with supposed physical and mental ailments at that, who dares to Verified Complaint1[1] for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
challenge the integrity and honor of both the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, We have nothing but
the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as Batas Mauricio (respondent), a
commiseration and sympathy for his choosing to close the book of his long years of law practice not by
voluntary retirement with honor but in disciplinary action with ignominy and dishonor. To those who are in writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host
the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this profession, We wish to point to
of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS
this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds that an attorney owes it to himself to
respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the stability of our democratic institutions. NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyers oath and (3) disrespect
WHEREFORE, the resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 46504-R, dated March 5, 1973,
to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
suspending Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law, as implemented by Our resolution of November
19, 1973, is hereby affirmed.
Respondent Atty. Quirico del Mar for his misconduct towards the Supreme Court, shall be, as he is hereby,
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
suspended from the practice of law until further orders of this Court, such suspension to take effect
immediately. (In re Almacen, No. L-27654, Feb. 18, 1970, 31 SCRA, p. 562.)
The Judicial Consultant of this Court is directed to circularize all courts and the Integrated Bar of the On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in
Philippines regarding the indefinite suspension of Atty. Quirico del Mar from the practice of law.
Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero and his
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered
a colony of worms inside the can.
FOODSPHERE, INC., A.C. No. 7199
Complainant, [Formerly CBD 04-1386]
Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD).
Present:
Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
PUNO, C.J.
- versus - QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD conducted a
CARPIO,
conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages from
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR., CHICO-NAZARIO
57
complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand, however, as being in contravention of company policy
and, in any event, outrageous.
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by the
Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the Corderos
threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the meantime
or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page of the would-be August
10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 122[2] which complainant found to contain
articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its products. Respondent threatened
to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant
thereupon reiterated its counter-offer earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to the
Corderos and P35,000 to his BATAS Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to place paid
advertisements in the tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN3[3] seeking the withdrawal of their complaint
before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint.4[4] Respondent, who affixed his signature to the
KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the
document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract5[5] asking
complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at P15,000 per issue
or a total amount of P360,000, and a Program Profile6[6] of the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS
also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with the following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second
TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second
TVC for P130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the tabloid
amounting to P45,000 at P15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in the television
program at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on complainants offer, respondent relayed to it that he
and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and threatened to proceed with the publication
of the articles/columns.7[7]
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- BATAS NG BAYAN at radio station
DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program, which announcement was
transcribed as follows:
OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-
contest si Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan
ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo
babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang contest, o, aling liver spread
ang may uod? Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan
ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong companya
ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g]
contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama
58
ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? 8[8]
(Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad light.
Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article captioned KADIRI
ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD! In another article, he wrote IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!9[9] which
appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its
September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another article entitled DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO.10[10]
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA published in
another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles:11[11] (a) Uod sa liver spread, Setyembre 6, 2004
(Taon 7, Blg.276);12[12] (b) Uod, itinanggi ng CDO, Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277);13[13] (c)
Pagpapatigil sa CDO, Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278);14[14] (d) Uod sa liver spread kumpirmado,
Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279);15[15] (e) Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod, Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.280);16[16] (f) Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy, Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.281);17[17] (g) Kasong Kidnapping
laban sa CDO guards, Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.284);18[18] (h) Brutalidad ng CDO guards, Setyembre
15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285);19[19] (i) CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP, Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.287);20[20] (j) May uod na CDO liver spread sa Puregold binili, Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288);21[21]
59
(k) Desperado na ang CDO, Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290);22[22] (l) Atty. Rufus Rodriguez pumadrino
sa CDO, Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);23[23] (m) Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero, Setyembre
22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292);24[24] (n) Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO, Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg.
293).25[25]
In his September 8, 2004 column Anggulo ng Batas published in Hataw!, respondent wrote an
article Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread.26[26]
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi Mo
ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be the same baseless and
malicious allegations/issues against it.27[27]
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and
Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at he time of the filing of the
present administrative complaint.28[28]
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City,
docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to
Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice,29[29] alleging:
xxxx
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???)
Prosecutors of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
xxxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around,
waiting for miracles to happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this
Office would ever act on his complaint?
xxxx
8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by
Villarez, and with an investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of
his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can Respondents expect justice to be meted to
them?
9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that
justice would elude them in this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City,
not because of the injustice of their cause, but, more importantly, because of the
injustice of the system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in
Valenzuela City had been the willing recipient of too many generosities in the past
of the Complainant, and also with reports that a top official of the City had
campaigned for his much coveted position in the past distributing products of the
Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior
displayed even by mere staff and underlings of this Office to people who dare
complain against the Complainant in their respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of
60
this Office should investigate and ask their associates and relatives incognito to file,
even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the Complainant, and they
would surely be given the same rough and insulting treatment that Respondent
Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge here;30[30]
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction31[31] which respondent filed, as counsel for his
therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
xxxx
5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of
whatever is inside their thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this
Office has no jurisdiction over this action.32[32] (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and several
others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04,33[33] before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and raffled
to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding,
respondent continued to publish articles against complainant34[34] and to malign complainant through his
television shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report and
Recommendation:35[35]
I.
xxxx
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio]
Mauricio, et al., the Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint)
was issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads:
Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order included in the instant
plaintiffs motion, this Court, inasmuch as the defendants
failed to appear in court or file an opposition thereto, is
constrained to GRANT the said plaintiffs prater, as it is
GRANTED, in order to maintain STATUS QUO, and that all
the defendants, their agents, representatives or any
person acting for and in behalf are hereby
restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising
and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint
in the instant case more specifically the imputation of
vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products.
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on
respondent by the Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not
denied the issuance of the Order dated 10 December 2004 or his receipt of a copy
thereof on 13 December 2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the
clear directive therein addressed to him to desists [sic] from further publishing,
televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant
case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its
products, respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out with articles on the
prohibited subject matter in his column Atty. Batas, 2004 in the December 16 and
17, 2004 issues of the tabloid Balitang Bayan Toro (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the
Complaint).
61
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03
of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: A lawyer shall not make
public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party.
II.
xxxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly
Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases To the Department of Justice. In said
pleading, respondent made the following statements:
xxxx
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts
aspersions on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the
Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the
impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it and did
not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The
use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly
violative of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A
lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd
[t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers.
III.
The Kasunduan entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein
complainant (Annex C of the Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and
signed by herein respondent.
xxxx
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs
recognized that the said Kasunduan was not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order and policy, and this accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the
Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.
However, even after the execution of the Kasunduan and the
consequent dismissal of the complaint of his clients against herein complainant,
respondent inexplicably launched a media offensive intended to disparage and put
to ridicule herein complainant. On record are the numerous articles of respondent
published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17 December 2004 (Annexes
G to Q-1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to come out with these
articles against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary restraining
order issued against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not
deny that he indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication in the
tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public
service, that is, to expose the defects of complainants products to the consuming
public. Complainant claims that there is a baser motive to the actions of
respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for complainants failure
to give in to respondents request that complainant advertise in the tabloids and
television programs of respondent. Complainants explanation is more credible.
Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles
against complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent consciously
violated the spirit behind the Kasunduan which he himself prepared and signed and
submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was less than forthright when he
prepared said Kasunduan and then turned around and proceeded to lambaste
complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said agreement.
Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as it could
have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was
helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media personality. The actuations of
respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct contemplated under
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.36[36]
(Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006, adopted
the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend respondent from the practice
of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act and
comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession,37[37]
which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the
complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for his BATAS Foundation and seek sponsorships
and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.
62
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates:
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order
restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint
of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products. At the same time,
respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. For he
defied said status quo order, despite his (respondents) oath as a member of the legal profession to obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which mandate, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and
candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language
which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper,
by using intemperate language.
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38[38]
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted
members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the
interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to
abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the
cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession,
a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified.39[39] (Underscoring
supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession,
respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to at all
times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession.40[40]
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay
v. Mauricio, Jr.,41[41] the therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondents services as she was
impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media personality,42[42] only to later
find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor
any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.
On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and
watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have affected the
sales of complainant.
63
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondents motion for reconsideration,
took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges
against the therein complainant.43[43]
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the
premises, sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyers oath and breach of ethics of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for three years effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-10236-48. January 31, 1958.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EUSTACIO DE LUNA, ET AL., Defendants-
Appellees.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for Appellant.
Luis F. Gabinete for appellee Eustacio de Luna.
Pedro B. Ayuda for appellee Estela R. Gordo.
Alejandro P. CapÃtulo for appellees Angelo T. Lopez and Alawadin I. Bandon.
Francisco de la Fuente for appellee Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez.
Bienvenido Peralta for appellee Abraham C. Calaguas.
Santos L. Parina, Generosa H. Hubilla, Maria Velez y Estrellas, Jaime P. Marco, Roque J. Briones, Balbino
P. Fajardo and Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr., in their own behalf.
SYLLABUS
1. BAR FLUNKERS; OATH AS LAWYERS BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC CONSTITUTES CONTEMPT OF COURT. —
Although know that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they sought admission to the Bar
under the Bar Flunkers Act, they were subsequently notified of the resolution of the Supreme Court
denying their petitions. This notwithstanding, they took their oaths as lawyers before a notary public and
formally advised the Court, not only of such fact, but, also that they will practice in all courts of the
Philippines. Held: The oath as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may taken only before the
Supreme Court by those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice. The resolution of the Supreme
Court denying appellees’ petition for admission to the Bar implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to take
said oath, as well as prohibition of the taking thereof. By taking oaths before a notary public, appellees
expressed clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenge and defy the authority of the Supreme Court to
pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue whether or not they should be admitted to
the bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration of justice and impair the respect due
to the courts of justice and the Supreme Court, in particular, in violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of Rule
64 of the Rules of Court. Such acts, therefore, constitute contempt of court.
2. CONTEMPT OF COURT; MEANS BY WHICH CONTEMPT MAY BE COMMITTED: "HOLDING OUT TO THE
PUBLIC AS ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW" ; CASE AT BAR. — The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression
that appellees could not be guilty of contempt of court unless they actually engaged in the practice of law
or "held out to the public" as lawyers "by means of circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for "assuming to be
an attorney . . . and acting as such without authority," is, only one of the means by which contempt of
court may be contempt of court may be committed, under said Rule 64, section 3, of the Rules of Court.
Besides by taking "the oath of office 3, of the Rules of Court. Besides by taking "the oath of office as
attorney-at-law" and notifying the Supreme Court that they had done so and would "practice law in all
courts of the Philippines that they had done so and would "practice law in all courts of the Philippines", the
appellees had, for all intents and purposes, held out to the public" as such attorney-at-law (U.S. v. Ney and
Bosque, 8 Phil. 146).
3. id.; id.; jurisdiction OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE TO TRY AND PUNISH THE CONTEMPTS AT BAR. —
If the contemptuous acts were committed not against the Court of First Instance where the amended
informations for contempts were filed, but against the Supreme Court, does the former court have
jurisdiction to try and punish said contempts? In the first place, according to said information, the act
charged were committed in contempt of the Supreme Court, as well as of all other courts of the
Philippines, including the Court of First Instance of Manila. In the second place, pursuant to Section 44 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, courts instance have original jurisdiction over criminal cases, in which the penalty
provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two thousand pesos.
Inasmuch as a fine not exceeding P1,000 may be imposed in the cases of contempt under consideration, it
follows that the same is within the original jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the Supreme Court, in
view of the inherent power of the latter to punish those guilty of contempt against the same.
4. ID.; ID.; CONCURRENT JURISDICTION OF LOWER COURT AND SUPREME COURT; COURT AGAINST WHOM
THE ACT WAS COMMITTED HAS PREFERENTIAL RIGHT. — In the vent of concurrent jurisdiction over the
cases of contempt of court, the court against whom the act of contempt was committed has the
preferential right to try and punish the guilty party. However, the court concerned (the Supreme Court in
the present case) may elect not to exercise its concurrent jurisdiction over the acts of contempt in
question, as it did in the present case, when the said court referred the case to the City Fiscal of Manila for
investigation and appropriate action. In such a case the Court of First Instance of Manila may not refuse to
exercise its jurisdiction over the case.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an appeal, taken by the prosecution, from an order, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, granting
a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant in each one of the above entitled cases, for lack of jurisdiction
and, also, upon the ground that the facts alleged in the amended informations, filed in said cases, do not
constitute the crime of contempt of court with which said defendants (Eustacio de Luna, Jaime P. Marco,
Santos L. Pariña, Estela R. Gordo, Angelo T. Lopez, Generosa H. Hubilla, Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez,
Abraham C. Calaguas, Roque J. Briones, Alawadin I. Bandon, Balbino P. Fajardo, Maria Velez y Estrellas and
Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr.) are charged. It is alleged in said amended informations that, on or about the 22nd
day of December, 1954, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the person accused in each one of these cases
64

Again, section 236 of Act No. 190 and section 6 of Rule 64 of the Rules of Court provide that a person guilty
". . . well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way authorized to take of any of the acts of contempt defined, respectively, in section 232 of said Act and section 3 of said Rule 64,
his oath as a lawyer and after having been duly informed and notified that certain portions of Republic Act "may be fined not exceeding one thousand pesos, or imprisoned not more than six months." Pursuant to
No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and therefore void and without force section 44 of the Revised Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296), courts of first instance have original
and effect, and that all the petitions of the candidates including the accused who failed in the examinations jurisdiction over criminal cases "in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six
of 1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission to the bar were refused and denied by the Resolution of the months, or a fine of more than two thousand pesos." Inasmuch as a fine not exceeding P1,000 may be
Honorable, the Supreme Court, promulgated on March 18, 1954, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully imposed in the cases of contempt under consideration, it follows that the same are within the original
and contemptuously disobey and resist in an insolent and defiant manner the said Resolution of the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila, although such jurisdiction is concurrent with that of the
Supreme Court directed to him and each and everyone of the petitioners, and perform acts constituting Supreme Court, in view of the inherent power of the latter to punish those guilty of contempt against the
improper conduct and manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the same.
administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack the authority
and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all other inferior courts by then and there, without It may not be amiss to add that, in the event of such concurrent jurisdiction over cases of contempt of
being lawfully authorized to do so, taking an oath as a lawyer before a notary public and making court, it would be a good practice to acknowledge the preferential right of the court against which the act
manifestations to that effect before the Honorable, the Supreme Court."cralaw virtua1aw library of contempt was committed to try and punish the guilty party. However, insofar as appellees herein are
concerned, on February 3, 1955, this Court passed and promulgated a resolution of the following
After quoting from Rule 64, section 4, of the Rules of Court, the pertinent part of which tenor:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Court received from Pedro B. Ayuda a communication of the following tenor:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
"Where the contempt . . . has been committed against a superior court or judge, or against an officer library
appointed by it, the charge may be filed with such superior court . . . ." (Italics our.)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
and from the Corpus Juris Secundum, the rule to the effect that
SUPREME COURT
"It is a well-established rule that the power to judge a contempt rest exlusively with the court contemned
and that no court is authorized to punish a contempt against another. Accordingly, disobedience of the MANILA
order of a state court is not punishable as for contempt by a court of another state or by a federal
court."cralaw virtua1aw library "IN-RE ATTORNEYS WHO TOOK THE OATH BEFORE A NOTARY PUBLIC UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF
REPUBLIC ACT No. 972.
the lower court concluded that the contemptuous act allegedly committed by appellees herein "was
committed not against" said court "but against the Supreme Court of the Philippines" and that, accordingly, "Oreste Arellano y Rodriguez
the Court of First Instance of Manila "has no jurisdiction to try and punish" the appellees herein.
"Pedro B. Ayuda
This conclusion is untenable. The above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court is permissive in nature. It is
merely declaratory of the inherent power of courts to punish those guilty of contempt against the same. It "Alawadin I. Bandon
does not declare that jurisdiction of the court concerned to so punish the guilty party is exclusive. Indeed,
in promulgating said Rules of Court, this Court could not have validly denied to other Courts, to which the "Abraham C. Calaguas
jurisdiction may have been vested by statute, the right to exercise said authority, for the rule-making
power of the Supreme Court, under Article VIII, section 13, of the Constitution, is limited to the "Balbino P. Fajardo
promulgation of "rules concerning pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law," and does not extend to the determination of the jurisdiction of the courts of justice in the "Claro C. Gofredo
Philippines. In fact, section 2 of said Article VIII of the Constitution explicitly ordains that "Congress shall
have the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts," thereby implying, "Estela R. Gordo
necessarily, that such power is withheld from the Supreme Court. Needless to say, the aforesaid view,
quoted from Corpus Juris Secundum, is good law only "unless otherwise provided by statute" (17 C.J.S., 81), "Generoso H. Hubilla
and such statute, providing "otherwise", exists in the Philippines.
"Emilio P. Jardinico, Jr.
Moreover, the amended informations specifically allege that the defendants herein did "perform acts
constituting improper conduct and manifestations that tend directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or "Angelo T. Lopez
degrade the administration of justice in all courts of the Philippines and impair the respect to and attack
the authority and dignity of the Honorable, the Supreme Court and all other inferior courts." To put it "Eustacio de Luna
differently the acts charged were committed, according to said amended informations, in contempt of the
Supreme Court, as well as of "all other courts of the Philippines," including the Court of First Instance of "Jaime P. Marco
Manila. Thus, the very authorities cited in the order appealed from do not justify the same.
"Santos L. Pariña
65
"Florencio P. Sugarol, and
"Maria Velez y Estrellas. Attorneys.
x x x contempt of court. After quoting the allegation of said amended informations to the effect that the
"MANIFESTATION
"COMES NOW the undersigned for and in representation of the above-named attorneys and to this
Honorable Court, hereby respectfully makes manifestation that they have taken the oath of office as
Attorneys-at-Law on December 22, 1954 before Mr. Anatolio A. Alcova, a Notary Public in and for the City
of Manila, with office at R-201 Regina Building, Escolta, Manila, in pursuance of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 972;
"There are attached to this manifestation seventeen (17) copies of the oath of office as Annexes ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’,
‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘I’, ‘K’, ‘L’, ‘M’, ‘N’, ‘O’, ‘P’, and ‘Q’.
"Messrs, Alejandro P. Capitulo, Claro C. Gofredo, and Florencio P. Sugarol of the group took the bar
examinations in August, 1954. They also had taken their oath before this Honorable Tribunal, January 20,
1955.
"This manifestation is made for all legal effects as they will practice law in all the Courts of the Philippines.
"Manila, Philippines, January 28, 1955.
(Sgd.) PEDRO B. AYUDA
In his own behalf and on behalf of the others in his capacity as president of the 1946 - 1952 BAR
EXAMINEES ASSOCIATION, 2034 Azcarraga, Manila.
"It appearing that the persons mentioned, except Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, have not passed the Bar
Examinations, it was resolved:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A. To refer the matter to the Fiscal, City of Manila for investigation and appropriate action in connection
with Section 3 (e), Rule 64;
"B. As Pedro Ayuda has assumed to be an attorney without authority, he is given 10 days from notice
hereof, within which to explain why he should not be dealt with for contempt of this Court;
"C. The notary public Anatolio A. Alcoba, member of the Bar, who has illegally administered the oath to the
said persons in disregard of this Court’s resolution denying them admission to the Bar (except Capitulo,
Gofredo and Sugarol), is hereby given ten days to show cause why he should not be disbarred or
suspended from the practice of law;
"D. The clerk of Court is directed to furnish copy of this resolution to the Court of Appeals and to all courts
of first instance, the Court of Industrial Relations, the Public Service Commission, and the Department of
Justice;
"E. As to Capitulo, Gofredo and Sugarol, proper action will be taken later in their respective cases." (pp. 36-
37, rec., G. R. No. L- 10245.)
It is clear, from the foregoing resolution, that this Court did not intend to exercise its concurrent
jurisdiction over the acts of alleged contempt committed by appellees herein and that we preferred that
the corresponding action be taken by the City Fiscal of Manila in the Court of First Instance of Manila. In
fine, the latter had no justification whatsoever in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction over the cases at bar.
The next question for determination is whether the acts charged in the amended informations constitute
defendant in each one of the instant cases
". . . did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and contamptuously disobey and resist in an insolent and
defiant manner the said Resolution of the Supreme Court directed to him, and each and everyone of the
petitioners and perform acts constituting improper conduct and manifestations that tend directly and
indirectly to impede obstruct or degrade the administration of justice . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
the lower court had the following to say:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From this allegation, there is no hint whatsoever that any command, order or notification from the judicial
court or any non- judicial person, committee or body clothed by law with power to punish for contempt
has been disobeyed or violated by the herein accused. Moreover, there is nothing shown in the resolution
of the Honorable Supreme Court of March 18, 1974 directing the accused not to take their oath as lawyers.
The mere fact of taking an oath by any person as a lawyer does not make him automatically a lawyer
without having completed the requirements prescribed by the Supreme Court for the admission to the
practice of law. It is necessary before his admission to the Bar that he passes the required bar examinations
and is admitted by the Supreme Court to practice law as attorney. Our statutes punish as criminal
contempt one ‘assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court and acting as such without authority.’
(par. F. Rule 64, Rules of Court.) The mere taking of oath as lawyers by herein accused, in the humble
opinion of this Court, is not tantamount to practice law. However, if this had taken one step further, as for
example, after taking their oaths, they have held out themselves as lawyers to the public, received cases
for litigants, appeared before any court of justice personally or by filing pleadings therewith, would be
considered that they are really engaged in the practice of law. These accused have not committed any of
these acts as enunciated by our Supreme Tribunal in the case of Bosque and Ney, 8 Phil., 146, nor have
they disobeyed or defied any command, order or notification of this Court or of the Honorable Supreme
Court. What they have done only was the taking of their oath as lawyers before a notary public who was
not authorized by law to take their oath as lawyers, as the latter can only aware as such before the
Supreme Court or any member thereof.
"Pursuant to the above stated reasons, this Court is of the opinion and so holds that no criminal contempt
has been committed by the herein accused before this Court and neither before the highest Tribunal of this
land."cralaw virtua1aw library
The aforementioned quotation from the amended informations is, however, incomplete. It did not include
the allegation to the effect that the defendant in each one of the cases at bar took his "oath as a lawyer
before a notary public" and filed the manifestation transcribed in the resolution above quoted,
"well knowing that he has not passed the bar examination and was not in any way authorized to take his
oath as a lawyer and after having been duly informed and notified that certain portions of Republic Act No.
972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953, are unconstitutional and therefore void and without force and
effect, and that all the petitions of the candidates including the accused who failed in the examinations of
1946 to 1952, inclusive, for admission to the bar were refused and denied by the resolution of the
Honorable Supreme Court, on March 18, 1954, . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
In other words, appellees knew that they did not pass the bar examination. Although they, likewise, sought
admission to the Bar under the provisions of Republic Act No. 972, known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953,
they were subsequently notified of the resolution of this Court denying said petition. Inasmuch as the oath
as lawyer is a prerequisite to the practice of law and may be taken only, before the Supreme Court, by
those authorized by the latter to engage in such practice, the resolution denying the aforementioned
66
petition of appellees herein, implied, necessarily, a denial of the right to take said oath, as well as a
prohibition of or injunction against the taking thereof. When, this notwithstanding, appellees took the oath
before a notary public, and formally advised this Court, not only of such fact, but also, that "they will
practice in all the courts of the Philippines," they, accordingly, disobeyed the order implied, and resisted
the injunction implicit, in said resolution, thus violating section 232 of Act No. 190, which declares in
part:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"A person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished as for contempt:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, judgment, or command of a court, or
injunction granted by a court or judge."cralaw virtua1aw library
and section 3, subdivision (b), Rule 64, of the Rules of Court, which is identical.
This case is, in principle, analogous to that of U.S. v. Ney and Bosque (8 Phil., 146), which involved two
lawyers, an American, C.W. Ney, and a Spaniard, Juan Garcia Bosque, who sent out a circular, signed "Ney
and Bosque", stating that they had established an office for the general practice of law in all courts of the
Islands and that Bosque would devote himself especially to consultation and office work relating to Spanish
Law. Accused of contempt of court, both were convicted as charged, although upon different grounds. As
regards the Spaniard, it was held that a former order of this Court denying his admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines, on account of alienage, "was directly binding upon him;" that the aforementioned
circular "amounted to an assertation of his right and purpose" to engage in such practice of law; and that
"consequently the conduct of the defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience of an order made in a
proceeding to which he was a party." As regards Ney, he was found guilty of "misbehaviour" committed by
"an officer of the court."cralaw virtua1aw library
Likewise, by their aforementioned acts, as set forth in the amended informations, appellees herein
expressed clearly their intent to, and did, in fact, challenged and defy the authority of this Court to pass
upon and settle, in a final and conclusive manner, the issue whether or not they should be admitted to the
bar, as well as, embarrass, hinder and obstruct the administration of justice and impair the respect due to
the courts of justice in general, and the Supreme Court, in particular. Thus, they performed acts
constituting an "improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice," in violation of section 3, subdivision (b) of said Rule 64.
". . . Acts which bring the court into disrepute or disrespect or which offend its dignity, affront its majesty,
or challenge its authority constitute contempt of court.." . . . (12 Am. Jur. 395.)
The lower court is, seemingly, under the impression that appellees could not be guilty of contempt of court
unless they actually engaged in the practice of law or "held out to the public" as lawyers "by means of
circulars." Such view is inaccurate, for "assuming to be an attorney . . . and acting as such without
authority," is, only one of the means by which contempt of court may be committed, under said Rule 64,
section 3, of the Rules of Court. At any rate, by taking "the oath of office as attorney-at-law" and notifying
the Supreme Court that they had done so and would "practice law in all courts of the Philippines", the
appellees had, for all intents and purposes, "held out to the public" as such attorneys-at-law (U.S. v. Ney
and Bosque, supra).
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed, and let the records of these cases be remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. It is so ordered.
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to
the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for
such Bar examination, that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course
referred to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report
recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations
in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law subjects, the
required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following
particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom
— which contradicts the credentials he had submitted in support of his application for
examination, and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the "required pre-legal
education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he
claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army,
passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is equivalent to a high school
diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the
equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any
certification to that effect (the equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to
dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing
College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such
college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949, he says he
was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved
by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own
making. Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have
disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of
1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been
permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar examination must
affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on
"previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false
representations, he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such
admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he
hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally
essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the
latter is required to return his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.