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Personal construct psychology and social constructionism are not

incompatible: Implications of a reframing
Jelena Pavlovic
Theory Psychology 2011 21: 396 originally published online 11 May 2011
DOI: 10.1177/0959354310380302

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Article

Theory & Psychology

Personal construct psychology 21(3) 396­–411
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not incompatible: Implications DOI: 10.1177/0959354310380302

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of a reframing

Jelena Pavlović
Institute for Educational Research, Belgrade

Abstract
A usual way of thinking about the relationship between personal construct psychology (PCP)
and social constructionism (SC) is treating them as two separate entities that are similar
in some aspects, but also very different in others. This paper aims at exploring some of the
possible implications of reframing the relationship between PCP and SC. I point to two important
implications: treating PCP as a discourse and adding a new metaphor of the person. Finally, I argue
that the invitation to reframe the relationship between PCP and SC extends both approaches and
offers more than each of them alone. On one hand, it extends and enriches SC theory and points
to benefits of applying the PCP “toolkit” to constructionist therapy and research. On the other
hand, proposed reframing contributes to PCP theory and points to new ways of addressing social
construction in therapeutic conversations.

Keywords
discourse analysis, personal construct psychology, positioning, psychotherapy, social
constructionism

Since its appearance in the 1950s, personal construct psychology (PCP) has mainly
developed as a constructivist theory of personality and a system of transforming indi-
vidual meaning-making processes, largely in therapeutic contexts (Bannister & Mair,
1968; Kelly, 1955; Landfield, 1971; Mair, 1977; Neimeyer & Levitt, 2000; Procter,
1981; Stojnov & Butt, 2002). It was based around the notion of persons as scientists
who form and test theories about their worlds. Therefore, it represented one of the first
attempts to appreciate the constructive nature of experience and the meaning persons
give to their experience (Harré & Gillett, 1994). Social constructionism (SC), on the

Corresponding author:
Jelena Pavlović, Institute for Educational Research, Dobrinjska 11/III, Belgrade, Serbia.
Email: pavlovich.jelena@gmail.com
Pavlović 397

other hand, mainly developed as a form of a critique (Shotter & Lannamann, 2002),
aimed to transform the oppressing effects of the social meaning-making processes.
Over the years, it has grown into a cluster of different approaches (Harré, 2002), with
no single SC position (Stam, 2001). However, different approaches under the generic
term of SC are loosely linked by some shared assumptions about language, knowledge,
and reality (Burr, 1995).
A usual way of thinking about the relationship between PCP and SC is treating them
as two separate entities that are similar in some aspects, but also very different in others.
This way of conceptualizing this relationship is a logical result of the circumstantial dif-
ferences of their emergence. In subsequent analyses these differences between PCP and
SC were framed around several points of tension, formulated as binary oppositions: per-
sonal/social; individualist/relational; agency/structure; constructivist/constructionist
(Botella, 1995; Burkitt, 1996; Burr, 1992; Butt, 2001; Mancuso, 1998; Raskin, 2002;
Stam, 1998). Although some of the most important issues in contemporary psychology
are elaborated in these contributions, the polarized positioning also sustained the idea of
a separation between PCP and SC, paving the way for only limited opportunities for
dialogue between them.
This paper aims at exploring some of the possible implications of reframing the rela-
tionship between PCP and SC on the basis of aligning the strengths of both approaches.
I point to two important implications: one is treating PCP as a discourse, and the other is
adding a new metaphor of the person. I argue that these implications may be of use in both
the PCP and the SC communities. The paper adds new conceptual “tools” for elaborating
not only personal, but also social construction. On one hand, it extends and enriches SC
theory and points to benefits of applying the PCP “toolkit” in constructionist therapy and
research. On the other hand, the proposed reframing contributes to PCP theory and points
to new ways of addressing social construction in therapeutic conversations.

Loosening boundaries between PCP and

SC: Still a heretical act?
Previous elaborations of the relationship between PCP and SC pointed to a number of
distinctions. From the SC viewpoint, Kelly’s initial formulations (Kelly, 1955) were clas-
sified as cognitivistic and individualistic (Burkitt, 1996; Mancuso, 1998; Stam, 1998) and
the agentic view of persons in PCP was seen as a way of promoting the status quo and
voicing a “healthy respect for the world as it is” (Gergen, 1997, p. 67). Representatives of
the SC community pointed to the limitations of the idea of the individual origin of con-
struction and saw in it a failure to acknowledge the social and discursive forces that shape
our sense of ourselves (Gergen, 1997). At the same time, the PCP community perceived
the idea of the social origin of construction either as too far removed from therapeutic
practice or as a possible sign that the “person” and agency were left behind, with poten-
tially deeply pessimistic consequences (Burr, 1992, 2008; Butt, 2001).
However, I argue that perceptions of these differences between the two communities
have often been polarized, allowing us only simplistic choices between the two alterna-
tives: to absorb one of them into the other, or to postulate interaction between the two
(Chiari & Nuzzo, 2006). Following this line of argument, the relationship between PCP
398 Theory & Psychology 21(3)

and SC may be one of an interaction or an absorption—they may be potential “allies” or

one may become included within the other. In my opinion, this conceptualization of the
relationship between PCP and SC has restricted new and creative ways of aligning the
strengths of both approaches.

Reframing: On what basis?

Together with elaborations of distinctions between PCP and SC, important similarities
have been noted. It has been pointed out that they share superordinate metatheoretical
assumptions (Botella, 1995), which are also summarized as four shared “points of sup-
port”: relativism, anti-essentialism, potentialism, and participativism (Stojnov, 2005,
p. 64). According to this view, while pointing to the participative nature of human knowl-
edge, both PCP and SC reject epistemological realism, an essentialist and static view of
persons. Another way to frame their similarities is to point to the shared metaphor of
construction, which implies that we always impose meaning upon the world and by
doing so we give shape to it. In the PCP version, we look at the world through patterns
we create in order to make sense of the undifferentiated homogeneity that would other-
wise overwhelm us (Kelly, 1955). Since all our interpretations of the universe are subject
to revision, a person can change his or her constructions of self if they do not suit him or
her. In the SC version, however, the metaphor of construction refers to the idea of dis-
courses as socially available resources, some of which are more dominant than others
because they reproduce power relations and give support to institutions.
Apart from noting the similarities, efforts have been made towards extending SC as a
psychology of personal agency (Harré & Gillett, 1994) and extending PCP as discursive
social psychology (Butt, 2001). For example, Harré and Gillett (1994) introduced an
agentive view of SC in which persons are seen not only as users of discourses, but also
as constituted by them. Similarly, more recent versions of PCP show that it has become
more permeable towards developments in SC and embraced some constructionist ideas.
Examples of these developments in PCP include calls within the PCP community for a
psychology as a discipline of discourse (Mair, 2000), relational reformulation of the
fundamental postulate (Kalekin-Fishman, 2003), constructivist versions of narrative
therapy (Mair, 1989; Neimeyer & Levitt, 2000), and personal and relational construct
psychology (Procter & Stojnov, 2009). A few other contributions also aimed to address
the personal/social dimension in new and less dichotomizing ways (Chiari & Nuzzo,
2006; Norton, 2006; Paris & Epting, 2002; Raskin, 2002). It may be argued that Kelly
never denounced the idea of the social meaning systems in the first place. What he
referred to as the public construction system (Kelly, 1955, p. 9) implies a circulation of
shared meanings and resembles the notion of discourse. However, this idea of public
constructs was not further developed by Kelly, but was slowly (and cautiously) devel-
oped within PCP, first as an elaboration of family constructs (Procter, 1981, 1996). This
shift from personal to the family meaning-making systems represents one of the first
explicit efforts to “socialize” PCP and base it on more relational grounds. Recent defini-
tions of public constructs (Scheer, 2003, p. 5) have many similarities with the way dis-
cursive psychologists speak of discourses and seem to be a translation of some of
discursive psychology’s ideas (Potter & Wetherell, 1987) into PCP vocabulary:
Pavlović 399

Public constructs may be called constructs that are shared by large proportions of a society or
by society as a whole, constructs that guide political action. Such constructs and construct
systems may change as part of a historical process. (Scheer, 2003, p. 5)

Though these examples indicate that PCP has become more permeable to developments
in discursive psychology, it seems that elements from SC have often been added as a
means of showing that PCP has not “lagged behind” SC and that it has implicitly
embraced a relational view of the person from the very beginning. Consequently, readi-
ness to look at PCP from new angles has been limited. It also seems that the full potential
of loosening boundaries and reframing the relationship between PCP and SC has not yet
been exhausted.
I argue that we may look at PCP and SC more on the basis of aligning the strengths
of both approaches (Chiari & Nuzzo, 2006). Bateson’s metaphor of “binocular vision”
(Bateson, 1979, p. 21) may be a useful epistemological tool for conceptualizing and
clarifying this relationship. We may think of PCP and SC as two “eyes,” each of which
gives a monocular view of what goes on and together giving a binocular view in depth.
For example, personal construction and social construction may be seen both as two
poles of the same construct that governs our actions and as two socially available lin-
guistic resources that constitute certain social practices. What is gained is a “double
description” or an extra dimension of seeing, which provides different information from
what was in either source separately (Bateson, 1979, p. 86). In my opinion, this meta-
phor represents more than an invitation for interaction between PCP and SC or for
absorption of one within the other. This “double view” is a possible relationship between
SC and PCP. In other words, it may be a way to loosen boundaries and reframe the rela-
tionship between the two approaches. Now, let us look at some of the implications of
this reframing—what is new that can be added to our “vision.”

Reflexive move: PCP as a discourse

The first implication of loosening the boundaries between PCP and SC to which I am
pointing in this paper is to treat PCP as discourse. Among many other things, personal
construct psychology may be construed as a discourse: that is, a system of statements
which constructs objects and produces subjects (Stojnov, Dzinović, & Pavlović, 2008).
In my view, treating PCP as discourse may not only advance theory, but may also equip
PCP practitioners with new tools with which they can reflect on their practice.
Kelly’s elaboration of the image of the person in his theory represents a reflexive
account which explicates some important assumptions. Kelly referred to his consider-
ation of these issues as “uncovering philosophical roots” (Kelly, 1955, p. 3) concerning
perspectives of the person and the universe. This sort of reflexion was (and to some
extent still is) a rare move in psychology of personality and it represents an important
aspect of his theory. However, developments in the discursive approach provide some
additional ways of reflecting on PCP as a discourse. The “double view” I am pointing
to in this paper invites us to examine what kind of subject positions PCP discourse
produces, as well as what discursive practices it supports. We may ask ourselves what
form of subjectivity it produces, what institutions it supports, and in what ways it
reproduces power relations (Parker, 1992). In other words, we may explore how PCP
400 Theory & Psychology 21(3)

makes individuals subjects by categorizing them and attaching to them their personal
identity (Foucault, 1982). These may be strange questions to ask about PCP because its
invitational mood and constructive alternativism seem to have successfully resisted
imposing laws on persons and categorizing them. Still, we may reflect upon what sorts
of subjects we produce by accepting Kelly’s invitation. I will exemplify this line of
thought with the idea of personal agency.
It is widely acknowledged that PCP invites us to adopt the agentive view of persons
(Burr, 1992; Butt, 2001). The choice corollary is the clearest expression of this view of
the person, as well as Kelly’s elaboration of the issues of determinism and free will:

man [sic], to the extent that he is able to construe his circumstances, can find for himself
freedom from their domination. It implies also that man can enslave himself with his own ideas
and then win his freedom again by reconstruing his life. That is, in a measure, the theme upon
which this book is based. (Kelly, 1955, p. 21)

Kelly’s idea of the person as an agent who is capable of winning freedom from circum-
stances by reconstruing his or her life may be construed as a “mental technology” (Rose,
2001, p. 4) for acting on one’s life. In other words, the discourse of personal agency in
PCP may be considered as a technique of dealing with the self (Rose, 1995). As a tech-
nique of engaging with the self, the discourse of personal agency in PCP invites thera-
pists to search for ways in which we become victims of our own constructions. It connects
our actions and complaints with our “personal” outlooks and fixes our attention on
aspects of our own meaning systems: their capability to accept whatever the “circum-
stances,” to “translate” our feelings and sensations into the linguistic domain, and so on.
Hence, particular repertoires of engaging with the self are disseminated in the therapy
room. The discourse of personal agency is also embedded in the techniques of disclosing
the self. We are invited to “pack” our understanding of the world into bipolar, hierarchi-
cally organized “units” of meaning and to treat them as our own products. Furthermore,
the discourse of personal agency in PCP provides specific techniques of evaluating the
self: we are invited to formulate testable hypotheses about the world and see if they “fit”
with reality on the basis of our own criteria. In contrast to psychoanalysis or cognitive-
behavioral psychotherapies, which require unconscious “dynamics” or behavior moni-
toring, PCP invites us to monitor our predictive efforts. It produces a new norm of
becoming able to constantly “move on,” instead of dreaming of fixed states of well-
being. To accomplish this norm, techniques of reforming the self call for our readiness to
give up on our “invalidated” constructions and to replace them with new axes of mean-
ing. This technology of reforming the self attaches to us a particular feeling of personal
agency. We may not have been agents in our past, but we become agents in our future.
Future is out there waiting for us to grasp it in whatever constructions we may place upon
it. Being engineers of our future, we are positioned as proactive and responsible for
inventing the most convenient ways of seeing the world.
It may be argued that through these “mental technologies” PCP discourse produces
“responsibilized” persons. “Responsibilization” as a form of subjectification represents
a political achievement and imposes obligations upon persons (Rabinow & Rose, 2006,
p. 209). This form of subjectification is closely linked to neo-liberalism as a political
rationality that reduces welfare state services through increased “personal responsibility”
Pavlović 401

and “self-care” (Lemke, 2001, p. 201). In this view, the PCP discourse of personal agency
is an outcome of particular technologies of subjectification that invoke human beings as
subjects of freedom and supply the norms and techniques by which that freedom is to be
recognized and performed.

“Responsibilization” refers to modern forms of self-government that require individuals to

make choices about lifestyles, their bodies, their education, and their health at critical points
in the life cycle, such as giving birth, starting school, going to university, taking a first job,
getting married, and retiring. “Choice” assumes a much wider role under neoliberalism: it is
not simply “consumer sovereignty” but rather a moralization and responsibilization, a
regulated transfer of choice-making responsibility from the state to the individual in the social
market. (Peters, 2005, p. 131)

Though the personal agency discourse in PCP provides us with a sense of power to
choose from the options we perceive available and with a vision of change (Burr, 1992),
it is also likely to serve as a means to produce “responsibilized” persons who are well
suited to serve neo-liberal economic interests. The discourse of personal agency and
ethic of self-constitution may be seen as particular technologies that support new forms
of governence. If we look at the discourse of personal agency in PCP, we may conceive
of it not only as a liberating project, but also as a project with disciplinary effects, though
the idea of ultimate truth and expert knowledge are abandoned.
Invitation to PCP as a discourse adds some extra reflexivity and sensitivity to ways
power is exercised in psychotherapeutic conversations (Rose, 1998). It equips PCP ther-
apists with some new ways of being reflective practitioners. These new “tools” allow a
therapist to reflect on the sort of persons he or she implicitly invites the client to be.
Furthermore, it invites the therapist to consider whether these client positions are suitable
in all contexts. In other words, it points to limitations of the idea of personal agency and
to cases in which it may be useful to consider how persons become not only “victims of
their own constructions,” but also victims of certain social constructions. Typical exam-
ples of these situations are the cases of human rights violations, abuse, strong cultural
stereotypes and prejudice, and many others. A subtle shift of a PCP therapist’s outlook in
terms of embracing this “double view” may open new and interesting directions in thera-
peutic conversations. I will exemplify this line of thought with a brief story from my own
therapeutic practice.
Ana, a 32-year-old unemployed woman, came to therapy because of her problems
with her parents, with whom she was living. She was a mother of a 1-year-old child and
had divorced her husband because of his violent behavior during her pregnacy. However,
her parents supported him, in line with the traditional image that “marriage should be
preserved” by all means. They stayed in contact with him and kept criticizing Ana for
being selfish and implied she was guilty of the whole situation. For me as a therapist, it
was somewhat threatening to think of Ana’s life story as a product of her own construc-
tion. I felt uneasy viewing Ana in terms of the principle that she could find freedom from
the domination of her circumstances by reconstruing them. Too many troubling issues
were framed around the social constructions. I shared with Ana my feeling of the deep
injustice to which she was subjected, as well as my view that a specific cultural image
was oppressing her. In an apologetic way, I told Ana that even though I felt she was not
402 Theory & Psychology 21(3)

the one who should change, I could try to help her see the situation in a different light.
This awareness of the oppressing effect of discourses helped me position Ana not only as
an agent responsible for her constructions, but also as a victim of certain cultural and
discursive practices. A sense of this “double vision” introduced some new topics in con-
versations between Ana and me that reached beyond the usual PCP topics, such as cul-
tural images, their power and influence, and ways to resist them.
This new type of reflexivity alerts the therapist to the idea of oppressive social con-
structions as situations in which responsibility for our future prospects is not limited only
by our “mobility of mind.” By questioning the issue of individualization of responsibility
for our own future, therapists become more open to considering agency as a discursive
and interpersonal accomplishment, not as a new “norm” they must reproduce. Being a
discursive “product,” agency may be seen as negotiable. The task of the therapist may be
to elaborate on contexts in which we feel we do not have agency and to comment on its
discursive and political consequences. Now we may raise a question: How do we pro-
duce therapeutic change in this discursive view of agency? The answer to this question
is likely to be another set of questions: Do we always have to individualize agency and
thus set limits on social change, and in whose best interest would that be?

From person-as-scientist to person-as-discourse-analyst

Another implication of loosening boundaries and reframing the relationship between SC
and PCP is adding a new metaphor of the person. According to Kelly (1955), there is a
fundamental similarity between psychotherapy and scientific research. The discoveries
made in therapy are similar to discoveries one makes in a laboratory or in the field and the
client is a similar to a scientist. Kelly thought the major difference was that the client had
no technical vocabulary, nor were her or his problems always easily formulated.
Furthermore, he thought it was appropriate to make the means by which the scientist
learns available to the client. That is how he came to the metaphor of person-as-scientist.

Let us see what it would mean to construe man [sic] in his science-like aspects. What is it that
is supposed to characterize the motivation of the scientist? It is customary to say that the
scientist’s ultimate aim is to predict and control. ... Yet, curiously enough, psychologists rarely
credit human subjects in their experiments with having similar aspirations. ... Might not the
individual man, each in his own personal way, assume more of the stature of a scientist, ever
seeking to predict and control the course of events with which he is involved? Would he not
have his theories, test his hypotheses and weigh his experimental evidence? (Kelly, 1955, p. 5)

The only sort of science Kelly had available back in the 1950s was “old-school” experi-
mental social science, aimed at prediction and control. This sort of discourse represented
an alternative to the metaphors of person-the-biological-organism or person-as-lucky-guy.
However, meanwhile, experimental social science was heavily criticized for its concep-
tual, methodological, and political implications. Out of this critique, new ways of “doing”
social science emerged (Smith, Harré, & Van Langenhove, 1995). One of the alternatives
to experimental science was discursive psychology, built around the notion of the person
being at the same time user of discourse and used by it (Burr, 1995; Davies & Harré,
1990). The main task this version of “science” proposed was to analyze our everyday life
Pavlović 403

discourses. This sort of analysis can be useful for “showing how powerful images of the
self and the world circulate in society, and for opening up a way in which to resist and
question those images” (Parker, 2005, p. 88).
These developments in psychological methodology bring us to a question whether
experimental social science is still the only “scientific” model PCP therapists can offer
their clients to learn from. In other words, it may also seem appropriate to make available
to the client means by which discourse analysts learn, too. This brings us to a new read-
ing of Kelly’s metaphor and to proposing an additional one—person-as-discourse-
analyst. Following Kelly, let us see what it would mean to construe a person in these aspects.
We may think of therapy as a venture in which the client and the therapist explore not
only personal constructions, but also the discursive resources and practices that are cul-
turally available. That way therapy incorporates a sort of discourse analysis in which
both client and therapist participate as co-researchers. It is interesting that the idea of
discursive positioning has already been recognized as implicit but often underconceptu-
alized (Harré & Gillett, 1994, p. 138) in Kelly’s theoretical writing, as well as particu-
larly useful for understanding contructs. As Harré and Gillett (1994) point out, in the
discursive type of account, self-location within discourse is the key to understanding
constructs and through them the personality. Also, in this type of account the person is
not always responsible for his or her own position.

There can be interactive positioning in which what one person says positions another. And there
can be reflexive positioning in which one positions oneself. However it would be a mistake to
assume that, in either case, positioning is necessarily intentional. One lives one’s life in terms
of one’s ongoingly produced self, whoever might be responsible for its production. (Davies &
Harré, 1990, p. 48)

Person-as-discourse-analyst would not test hypotheses, but explore ways of interactive

and reflexive positioning, the worldviews produced by various discourses as well as the
types of relationships provided. Being a good discourse analyst is not evaluated upon our
readiness to straightforwardly test hypotheses, try them out in test-tube proportions, and
accept alternative outcomes instead of rebelling against them. A discourse analyst would
not monitor his or her predictive efficacy, but try to increase the understanding of our
discursive positioning in the network of power relations and explore ways to negotiate
new subject positions. In other words, the metaphor of person-as-discourse-analyst puts
emphasis on exploring the ways our subjectivity is produced conversationally. Both the
therapist and the client, being invited to this discourse analytic venture as co-researchers,
engage themselves with questions such as: What sort of positions are open within differ-
ent discourses? What positions are closed? How does the world look from the perspec-
tive of discourses? What relationships are possible within discourses? What relationships
are not possible? How come we find ourselves positioned within particular discourses?
How do these discourses reproduce power relations? How can new discursive positions
be negotiated? And so on.
To achieve these goals, the person-as-discourse-analyst may use a PCP conceptual
and methodological framework for exploring both constructs and discourses. Harré
and Gillett (1994) noted that Kelly’s role construct repertory grid “tends to locate the
subject in discourse” (p. 138). It may be argued that other PCP “tools” are also
404 Theory & Psychology 21(3)

Classic shoes Weird shoes

Make you look serious Leave an impression of a

weird person

Control over self- Loss of control over self-

presentation in social context presentation

Being accepted Anxiety and worry about

others’ perception

Figure 1.  Example of laddering

suitable for the task of person-as-discourse-analyst. For example, laddering (Hinkle

as cited in Bannister & Mair, 1968) and pyramiding (Landfield, 1971) may be used to
explore the interplay between personal and social constructions. One of the assump-
tions underlying PCP is that personal meanings are hierarchically ordered. This means
that any behavior that may seem unimportant or trivial is linked into some personal
philosophies. For example, wearing a certain type of shoes may be seen as an impor-
tant “window” into women’s identity construction (Burr, 2009). We may ladder a
construct classic shoes vs. crazy shoes by asking why it is important for a person to
wear classic shoes. We may find out that classic shoes make a person look serious,
while crazy shoes leave an impression of a weird person. If we ask why it is important
to look serious, we may find out that it is a way of having control over one’s self-
presentation in a social context. If we further ladder up, we may reach a level where
having control over self-presentation is important because a person feels accepted
that way, while not having control leads to anxiety and worry about others’ percep-
tions (Figure 1). This relatively simple procedure maps personal meanings in hierar-
chical ways and provides insight into how certain behaviors are linked to personal
worldviews. The opposite procedure, pyramiding, asks how certain worldviews are
put into practice or behavior.
The metaphor of person-as-discourse-analyst invites us to use laddering and pyra-
miding for exploring both personal and social meanings. In the case of shoes, we may
explore what discursive positions are opened for this person and how other positions
became closed. Furthermore, we may explore how discursive practices of fashion nor-
malize persons in everyday contexts. The therapist and the client, as discourse analysts,
may together explore and reflect on these personal and social meaning-making pro-
cesses. The insights which they gain as co-researchers may be used as a material for
finding ways of resisting the normalizing effects of certain discourses. What is gained
is more than an insight into how persons become slaves of their personal choices. It is
also more than insight into discursive positioning that is deprived of the personal per-
spective. The metaphor of person-as-discourse-analyst allows us to explore personal
identity from both viewpoints. We gain an insight into how personal choices are situated
within socially available discursive positions. Moreover, we are invited to explore new
Pavlović 405

discursive positions that may be negotiated in the process of both personal and social
meaning-making production.
PCP “tools” that are perhaps most aligned with the metaphor of person-the-discourse-
analyst are Mair’s “community of self” (1977) and Procter’s qualitative grids (Procter &
Procter, 2008; Procter & Stojnov, 2009). The metaphor of person-as-discourse-analyst in
some aspects resembles Mair’s invitation to a metaphorical view of PCP in the 1970s
(Mair, 1977). Mair pointed to the metaphor of “community of selves” as a means of
overcoming exactly the problems of individualization of responsibility:1

The cultures of the West have been for hundreds of years oriented towards individuality. Within
Christianity generally, and especially since the Reformation, there has been great emphasis on
individual responsibility and the notion that each man [sic] must work out his own salvation ....
Instead of viewing any particular person as an individual unit, I would like you to entertain, for
the time being, the “mistaken” view of any person as if he or she were a “community of selves.”
(Mair, 1977, p. 129)

Underlying the idea of community of selves was a concern for exploring our personal
experience in the world in the same sorts of terms which were normally reserved for
social events, such as policy, control, power, and so on. In other words, Mair was inviting
us to “read” PCP as a way of engaging with issues of “government and administration,
diplomacy and negotiation, production and destruction of experience” (p. 143). From
this invitation it takes only one step further to look at “voices” of different “members of
the community” as different discourses. In other words, we may look at our “communi-
ties of selves” as communal products that regulate our behavior. Mair’s invitation to a
“communal” view of self seems compatible with the idea of reflexive positioning, which
also implies the multiplicity of selves:

Human beings are characterized both by continuous personal identity and by discontinuous
personal diversity. It is one and the same person who is variously positioned in a conversation.
Yet as variously positioned we may want to say that that very same person experiences and
displays that aspect of self that is involved in the continuity of a multiplicity of selves ... we are
not concerned with personal identity. However we believe that selfhood in this sense is as much
the product of discursive practices as the multiple selfhood we wish to investigate. (Davies &
Harré, 1990, p. 47)

Exploring our “community of self” may lead us to undertake a version of discourse

analysis. We may be interested in worldviews of different “members,” their relation-
ships as well as the social context within which our “communities of selves” emerge.
Each self within the “community” may be analyzed not only in terms of our fragmenta-
tion within our construct systems, but also as a metaphorical framing of certain dis-
courses that shape our sense of ourselves. A useful technique for elaborating on
relationships between these discourses is PEG (Perceiver Element Grid), which was
initially developed as a tool for capturing interpersonal construing (Procter & Procter,
2008). However, PEG may also be a useful technique for analyzing reflexive and inter-
active positioning. Furthermore, a combination of “community of self” and PEG allows
406 Theory & Psychology 21(3)

Table 1.  Perceiver element grid within a community of self

ELEMENTS
“Hardworker” “Negotiator” “Children”

P “Hardworker” I am the boss. I do She is useful They are lazy.They

E all the work. Others sometimes, but I am need constant
R should obey. the one who knows monitoring.
C best.
E
I “Negotiator” He is workaholic. He I am nice and gentle. Poor them, they should
V should slow down. I know how to make have more attention.
E He is silencing me myself and others
R too often. happy.
S “Children” He is terrorizing us. She is not always We are curious, playful,
there for us. and like relaxing, but
we are being silenced
all the time.

us to explore how different “members” of the “community” perceive each other and
how that reflects wider discursive practices.
For example, a community of self of a young woman (aged 28) may consist of the
following elements: “Hardworker,” “Negotiator,” and “Children” (see Table 1). The
“leader” in this community of self may be the “Hardworker.” This person has a male
identity, works a lot, puts his obligations always in first place, and silences other
members of the community. From the perspective of person-as-discourse-analyst we
may ask ourselves several questions: How come this person became so powerful?
What wider social practices and institutions support this person? And so on. One
sketchy answer may be that this person is a product of the discourse of “Work as
ethic,” which links economic productivity with moral norms. By individualizing
responsibility for personal and social economic growth, this discourse prescribes dili-
gence as a moral norm. We may also explore how different members of the commu-
nity of self perceive each other. Thus, we may “map” the dominant and subjugated
discourses of the self, as well as reflect on the relations between them. For example,
“Negotiator” and “Children” may be seen as products of psychoanalytic discourse
where “urges” are treated as “lower” and “younger” than rationality. “Negotiator”
may be seen as a carrier of “integrative functions” and resembles the notion of ego.
Also, it reflects some commonsense assumptions of “psychological balance” that may
be found in many proverbs which prescribe being moderate as a state of ultimate
“goodness.” It is interesting to reflect on sexes of different members of the commu-
nity. The person with the most power is male, while children have least power. Bearing
in mind that this is a community of self of a young woman, the example seems to
point to the dominance of masculine models of power and to some personal implica-
tions of living in a gendered world.
Pavlović 407

The metaphor of person-as-discourse-analyst allows us to explore some new avenues

in both PCP and SC. It invites us to situate personal constructions within wider discursive
practices, but also to stay open to personal contributions to meaning-making production.
For SC therapists, it points to a set of new techniques for exploring discursive
positioning and renegotiating identity in therapeutic conversations, such as laddering,
pyramiding, PEG, and community of self. This metaphor also introduces scientific
methodology that is more aligned with PCP in comparison to experimental science.
As a result, the traditional boundaries between research and therapy become loos-
ened. Both in therapy and in discourse analytic research we try to explore and trans-
form the meaning systems in order to open up space for alternative subjectivities
(Pavlović, 2008). This view allows us to use “therapeutic” techniques in discourse
analytic research, as well as discourse analytic “research” techniques in psychother-
apy. Thus, both the researcher and the therapist may be seen as involved in a sort of
an action research project with a common goal—to struggle against forms of subjec-
tion. These struggles

question the status of the individual: on one hand, they assert the right to be different and they
underline everything which makes individuals truly individual. On the other hand, they attack
everything which separates the individual, break his links with others, splits up comunity life,
forces the individual back on himself and ties him to his own identity in a constraining way.
These struggles are not exactly against the “individual,” but rather they are struggles against the
“government of individualization”. (Foucault, 1982, pp. 211–212)

In other words, this metaphor points out that the therapeutic project may not be suffi-
cient. It may be seen as just one of the strategies for resisting forms of subjection and
therefore it should be “orchestrated“ with other strategies available, such as transforming
social meaning systems through discourse analytic research.

Conclusion: What is gained by “double vision”?

The “double vision” provided by this reframing invites us to look at the interplay
between personal and social construction. It allows us to look at meaning-making as a
personal affair, but also as a discursive process that reflect issues of power and ideol-
ogy. In this “double view” both reconstruction and resistance become struggles against
the constraining ways of identity construction. Finally, this view allows us to tackle
some new and important questions: how powerful cultural images are incorporated in
personal constructions; how personal constructions may vary within the same discur-
sive practices; how agency may both empower and enslave; how persons became
enslaved not only by personal but also by social constructions; and how persons may
win a piece of their freedom both by reconstruing and by resisting. In my view, the
invitation to reframe the relationship between PCP and SC extends both approaches
and offers more than each of them alone.
The “double view” I am referring to in this paper extends previous efforts to concep-
tualize the person as both the user of discourse and used by it (Harré & Gillett, 1994). It
also elaborates Parker’s proposal to perform discourse analysis of therapy, as well as to
408 Theory & Psychology 21(3)

use discourse analysis as therapy (Parker, 1999). Furthermore, it contributes to previous

SC efforts to conceptualize person as composed of multiple “voices” (Gergen, 1991;
Hermans & Dimaggio, 2004). This “double view” invites SC therapists and reseachers to
use PCP “tools” as a technology both for exploring discursive positioning and for pro-
ducing agency. In this sense, the paper extends previous SC approaches to therapy and
research (Anderson & Gehart, 2006; Freedman & Combs, 1996; McNamee & Gergen,
1992; White & Epston, 1990).
If we refer to the idea that Kelly wrote “in two voices” (Butt, 2004, p. 25), we may
argue that this approach reinforces the “voice” which moves PCP away from the camp of
the natural sciences. It adds new theoretical tools to PCP and proposes new ways of
being reflective in therapeutic conversations. PCP therapists are invited to look not only
at liberating effects of PCP discourse, but also at issues of “responsibilization” and other
ways that PCP discourse shapes identities of persons. As a result, the range of conve-
nience of PCP is expanded to include issues of power, ideology, and resistance.
Paradoxically, in this way the idea of resistance is encouraged and put back into PCP, not
as clients’ resistance to therapy, but as their resistance to discourses that determine their
form of subjectivity. Finally, reframing and changing the metaphor are offered with
Mair’s (1977, p. 148) words of caution that alternative metaphors provide us with differ-
ent perspectives on events, but also involve different kinds of “mistakes.”

Funding
This article is the result of the projects "From encouraging initiative, cooperation and creativity
in education to new roles and identities in society" (No. 179034) and "Improving the quality
and accessibility of education in modernization processes in Serbia" (No. 47008), financially
supported by the Ministry of Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia
(2011-2014).

Note
1. It is worth recalling that Mair’s “communal view of the self” was implicit in the work of Soviet
psychologists, such as Vygotsky, Leontiev, etc.

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Jelena Pavlović is a PhD student in the Psychology Department at the University of Belgrade and a
research assistant at the Institute for Educational Research, Belgrade. She also works as a personal
construct therapist and student-teacher at the Serbian Constructivist Society. Address: Institute for
Educational Research, Dobrinjska 11/III, Belgrade, Serbia. [email: pavlovich.jelena@gmail.com]