***************

1. CARLITO C. ENCINAS V PO1 ALFREDO AGUSTIN, JR AND PO1 JOEL

CAUBANG
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings,
and not to the exercise of administrative powers as opposed to administrative
proceedings that take on a quasi-judicial character.

FACTS: Encinas, Provincial Fire Marshall of Nueva Ecija required respondents to pay
him P5,000 so they won’t be relieved and re-assign to far flung areas. They paid in
fear of the re-assignment but were only able to pay P2,000. Encinas still re-assigned
them so they filed a complaint for illegal transfer before the BFP which then filed a
complaint before the CSC for administrative case of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service (Admin. Code of 1987). Encinas was
dismissed so he filed a petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 assailing the
decision of the CA affirming the decision of the CSC dismissing him from the service.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents committed forum-shopping.

HELD: No. There is no Forum-shopping, it only exists when the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another.
The dismissal of the BFP Complaint which is purely administrative in nature and
constituted a fact-finding investigation for purposes of determining whether a formal
charge for an administrative offense should be filed against petitioner does not
constitute res judicata in relation to the CSCRO Complaint. Thus, there is no forum-
shopping on the part of respondents.

***************
2. VILLANUEVA V PALAWAN COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
(PCSD) AND PATRICIA LOUISE MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
(PLMDC)
An enabling law must expressly confer quasi-judicial powers to an administrative body
before it may exercise the same.
FACTS:
1. PCSD issued a Strategic Environment Plan (SEP) Clearance to PLMDC for its
nickel mining project to be conducted in Barangay Catelagas.
2. Petitioners, the farmers and residents of said barangay, sought to recall the
clearance. They filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus against PCSD with
the RTC.
3. PCSD and PLMDC sought the dismissal of the petition arguing that it (PCSD) did
not exercise quasi-judicial functions. When its motion to dismiss was denied, it
filed another on the ground of lack of jurisdiction arguing that only the CA can
take cognizance of petition for certiorari or mandamus against a quasi-judicial
body.
4. The trial court agreed (on the last ground) and issued the assailed order.
ISSUE: Whether or not PCSD was exercising quasi-judicial functions

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla

RULING:
1. NO. There must be an enabling statute or legislative act conferring quasi-judicial
power upon the administrative body. RA 7611, which created the PCSD, does
not confer quasi-judicial powers on the said body.
2. PCSD AO 6, cited by the trial court and the parties, cannot confer quasi-judicial
power on PCSD that its enabling statute clearly withheld. An agency’s power to
formulate rules for the proper discharge of its functions is always circumscribed
by the enabling statute. (see note)
3. Furthermore, the procedure outlined in PCSD AO 6 does not involve
adjudication. A government agency performs adjudicatory functions when it
renders decisions or awards that determine the rights of adversarial parties,
which decisions or awards have the same effect as a judgment of the court.
4. Lastly, that PCSD conducts public consultations or hearings does not mean it is
performing quasi-judicial functions. AO 6 defines public hearing/public
consultation simply as an "activity undertaken by PCSD to gather facts and
thresh out all issues, concerns and apprehensions and provide the project
proponent with the opportunity to present the project to the affected community."
Its purpose is not to adjudicate.
NOTE: for clarity, included with this digest are the relevant portions of RA 7611 and
PCSD AO 6
RA 7611:
SEC. 19. Powers and Functions. – In order to successfully implement the provisions of
this Act, the Council is hereby vested with the following powers and functions:
(1) Formulate plans and policies as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this
Act.
(2) Coordinate with the local governments to ensure that the latter’s plans, programs
and projects are aligned with the plans, programs and policies of the SEP.
(3) Call on any department, bureau, office, agency or instrumentality of the Government,
and on private entities and organizations for cooperation and assistance in the
performance of its functions.
(4) Arrange, negotiate for, accept donations, grants, gifts, loans, and other fundings
from domestic and foreign sources to carry out the activities and purposes of the SEP.
(5) Recommend to the Congress of the Philippines such matters that may require
legislation in support of the objectives of the SEP.
(6) Delegate any or all of its powers and functions to its support staff, as hereinafter
provided, except those which by provisions of law cannot be delegated;
(7) Establish policies and guidelines for employment on the basis of merit, technical
competence and moral character and prescribe a compensation and staffing pattern;
(8) Adopt, amend and rescind such rules and regulations and impose penalties therefor
for the effective implementation of the SEP and the other provisions of this Act.
(9) Enforce the provisions of this Act and other existing laws, rules and regulations
similar to or complementary with this Act;
(10) Perform related functions which shall promote the development, conservation,
management, protection, and utilization of the natural resources of Palawan; and

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla

(11) Perform such other powers and functions as may be necessary in carrying out its
functions, powers, and the provisions of this Act.
PCSD AO 6:
1. The project proponent submits a brief description of the processes it seeks to
undertake and the location and description of the proposed project site.
2. The PCSD staff reviews the sufficiency and accuracy of these documents, and
conducts a field validation.
3. The PCSD staff may conduct public consultations or public hearings to determine the
acceptability of the project in the community.
4. The evaluation of the project shall be based on the ECAN Zoning of Palawan,
ecological sustainability, social acceptability, and economic viability of the project.
5. The staff makes an evaluation report, stating therein his recommended action, for the
consideration of the PCSD.
6. The PCSD may issue or deny the SEP clearance.
7. In case of approval, the SEP clearance, together with the evaluation reports, shall be
transmitted to the DENR as bases for the latter’s subsequent processing of the required
permits.
8. In case of denial, the project proponent may seek reconsideration. PCSD’s action on
the reconsideration is considered final and executory.
9. The DENR will undertake an independent evaluation of the project and shall not in
any way be prejudiced by the PCSD’s actions.
***************
3. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. MERLE RAMONEDA-PITA, Clerk III, Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Danao City

It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s
administrative compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers. (Note: Although the SC had declared that it had administrative
jurisdiction over the petitioner, nevertheless upheld the ruling of the CSC based on the
principle of estoppel – as in this case, petitioner actively participated in the proceedings
before the CSC and was given due process)

FACTS: In this administrative case, the SC en banc found Ramoneda-Pita, Clerk III of
MTCC Danao City, guilty of dishonesty for falsifying her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) in
support of her appointment to the judiciary. Ramoneda-Pita was administratively
charged before the CSC, it was found out that someone else took the civil service
examinations in her stead. The CSC issued a Resolution finding her guilty for
dishonesty and ordered her removal from office. However, despite such judgment by
the CSC, Ramoneda-Pita continued to state in her PDS that she is civil service eligible
and even answered “no” to the questions of whether she had any pending
administrative case or had been convicted thereof.

ISSUE: Whether Ramoneda-Pita, a Clerk III, may be removed from office by reason of
the CSC Resolution finding her guilty for dishonesty

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla

RULING: We deem that we cannot just implement CSC Resolution No. 01-0263 and
dismiss the respondent outright. The Court still maintains its administrative jurisdiction
over the respondent and should therefore have the final determination of her
administrative liability.

We have always maintained that it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the
judges’ and court personnel’s administrative compliance with all laws, rules and
regulations. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running
afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers. However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA,
Ramoneda-Pita was afforded the full protection of the law, that is, afforded due process.
She was able to file several affidavits and pleadings before the CSC with counsel. It
may also be noted that the case had been elevated to the Court of Appeals and this
Court, where the Resolution of the CSC was upheld in both instances.

In this case, Ramoneda-Pita’s length of service in the judiciary is inconsequential. The

CSC’s discovery of the perfidy in her acquisition of her civil service eligibility and her
insistence in stating that she is civil service eligible in her PDS when she had been
already found guilty of an administrative charge even after the finality of the CSC
Resolution and even after her seeking clemency tell this Court that Ramoneda-Pita has
not and does not live up to the high standards demanded of a court employee. As the
Court has previously stated it will not hesitate to rid the ranks of undesirables.

***************
4. OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS MACUSI JR.
“Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither
warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still
in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot or academic”.

Facts: An administrative case is filed against Macusi, a former sheriff of the RTC of
Kalinga for Simple Neglect of Duty. He alleged that he was resigned from government
service by operation of law when he filed his COC for City Councilor of Kalinga in 2010.
He prayed that his petition be dismissed for being moot and academic.
Issue: W/N Macusi’s resignation would render the case moot and academic and bar
subsequent administrative sanctions.
Ruling: No. Macusi’s constructive resignation from service through the 2010elections
does not render the case moot. Resignation is not a way out to evade administrative
liability when a court employee is facing administrative sanctions.

***************
5. MENDOZA vs. COA

“The filing of a Motion for Reconsideration means the person was afforded due process
despite not having personally received the notices”

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla

Facts: Mendoza is the general manager of Talisay Water District in Talisay City, Negros
Occidental. The Commission on Audit disallowed a total amount of P380,208.00 which
Mendoza received as part of his salary as the Water District’s general manager from 2005
to 2006. The Commission found that Mendoza’s salary as general manager “was not in
consonance with the rate prescribed under the Salary Standardization Law. The
Commission on Audit then issued a “Notice of Finality of COA Decision”. Mendoza filed
his Motion for Reconsideration of the “Notice of Finality of COA Decision.” He assailed
the finality of the Notice of Disallowance/s, arguing that he had not personally received a
copy of this. Thus, it deprived him of the opportunity to answer the Notice immediately.

Issue: Whether the Petitioner was afforded due process even if he did not receive the
notice of Disallowance.

Ruling: The Notice of Disallowance/s became final and executory. Mendoza was
afforded due process despite his claim that he had never personally received a copy of
the Notice of Disallowance/s. He was able to file the Motion for Reconsideration.
Mendoza, therefore, has been duly afforded an opportunity to explain his side and seek
a reconsideration of the ruling he assails, which is the “essence of administrative due
process.”

***************
6. MAGLALANG vs. PAGCOR

“Administrative remedies must be exhausted first before one can go to courts, subject to
certain exceptions”

Facts: Maglalang was a teller at the Casino Filipino which was operated by Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). Maglalang received a Memorandum
stating that the Board of Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards
a casino customer and imposed on him a 30-day suspension for this first offense. He
filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Subsequently, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum
practically reiterating the contents of the previous Memorandum. Maglalang filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. Justifying his recourse to the CA,
petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC)
because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30- day suspension which is not within
the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. The CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari
for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before
seeking recourse from the CA.

Issue: Whether or not the CA is correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari
filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

Ruling: No. Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party
is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or
herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort
to a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the
administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within
his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's
judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is
fatal to ones cause of action.

However, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute as

it admits of the following exceptions:
(1) when there is a violation of due process;
(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question;

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla

 (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction;
(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
(5) when there is irreparable injury;
(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the
President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter;
(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy,
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention, and
unreasonable delay would greatly prejudice the complainant;
(12) where no administrative review is provided by law;
(13) where the rule of qualified political agency applies; and
(14) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered
moot.

This case falls under exception number 12 since the law per se provides no
administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee, like Maglalang, is
covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a suspension for
not more than 30 days.
Therefore can directly appeal to CA.

***************
7. OFFICE OF OMBUDSMAN VS MAPOY AND REGALARIO

“In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only
substantial evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion and not proof beyond reasonable doubt”

Facts: Respondents (Special Investigators of the NBI) were charged for Dishonesty,
Grave Misconduct and Corrupt Practices after they were captured in an entrapment
operation conducted by the Counter Intelligence Special Unit of the NCR police office.
The respondents alleged that they were threatened to accept the money and that they
themselves are in the process of an entrapment operation. They were however
apprehended before they were able to follow the person (Matias-the person offering
them the bribe). The Ombudsman ruled against the respondents but the order was
however reversed by the Court of Appeals applying the equipoise rule.
Issue: W/N the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the Office of the Ombudsman’s
review or recommendation.
Ruling: Petition is with merit. The court finds substantial evidence to support the
charges against respondent for grave misconduct and dishonesty.
CA committed reversible error in applying the equipoise rule.
*Cannot apply equipoise rule because proof needed is only substantial evidence and
not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla

 ***************
8. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. JOSE T. CAPULONG

While it is an established rule in administrative law that the courts of justice should
respect the findings of fact of said administrative agencies, the courts may not be bound
by such findings of fact when there is absolutely no evidence in support thereof or such
evidence is clearly, manifestly and patently insubstantial; and when there is a clear
showing that the administrative agency acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion or in a capricious and whimsical manner, such that its action may amount to
an excess or lack of jurisdiction.

FACTS: A complaint was filed against Capulong, Customs Operation Officer V of the
Bureau of Customs (BOC), before the Office of the Ombudsman for perjury and serious
dishonesty and grave misconduct. These charges were based on two particular acts: for
failure to file the required SALN, and for failure to disclose in his SALNs for calendar
years 1999 to 2004 his wife’s business interest in two corporations.

Capulong was placed under preventive suspension. He filed petition for certiorari
with the CA and the latter issued TRO. Ombudsman thereafter lifted the order of
suspension and prayed that the petition be dismissed for being moot and academic.
The CA granted petition and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether the CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter and can grant reliefs,
whether primary or incidental, after the Ombudsman has lifted the subject order of
preventive suspension.

RULING: In the instant case, the subsequent lifting of the preventive suspension order
against Capulong does not render the petition moot and academic.

Undoubtedly, in this case, the CA aptly ruled that the Ombudsman abused its
discretion because it failed to sufficiently establish any basis to issue the order of
preventive suspension. Capulong’s non-disclosure of his wife’s business interest does
not constitute serious dishonesty or grave misconduct. Nothing in the records reveals
that Capulong deliberately placed "N/A" in his SALN despite knowledge about his wife’s
business interest. As explained by Capulong, the SEC already revoked the registration
of the corporations where his wife was an incorporator; hence, he deemed it not
necessary to indicate it in his SALN.

Therefore, with the dismissal of Capulong's administrative case, the CA correctly

dismissed its criminal counterpart since the crime of perjury which stemmed from
misrepresentations in his SALNs will no longer have a leg to stand on.

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla

 ***************
9. VILLAFUERTE vs ROBREDO
The Constitution commands strict adherence to full disclosure of information on all
matters relating to official transactions and those involving public interest.
FACTS:
1. Villafuerte filed a petition assailing the three memorandum circulars issued by
Robredo. The circulars pertain to full disclosure of local budget and finances and
other guidelines regarding budget.
2. Villafuerte argued that the circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal
autonomy of the LGU.
ISSUE: Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of
local and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC
RULING:
1. The circulars merely reiterated what was already provided in the law and that the
order on public disclosure is consistent with the policy of promoting good
governance through transparency, accountability and participation.
2. Fiscal autonomy does not leave LGUs with unbridled discretion in the
disbursement of public funds. They remain accountable to their constituency.
3. The assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the policy of promoting good
governance through transparency, accountability and participation. The action of
the respondent is certainly within the constitutional bounds of his power as alter
ego of the President.

***************
10. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YATCO AGRICULTURAL
ENTERPRISES
LBP is primarily charged with determining land valuation and compensation for all
private lands acquired for agrarian reform but this determination is only preliminary.
FACTS: Yatco owns an agricultural land in Laguna covered by TCT. In 1999, the
government placed it under CARP. Land Bank apprised the land with a value which
was not accepted by Yatco. The latter elevated the matter to the PARAD of San
Pablo City which computed the value of the property at a higher price. The LBP filed
with the RTC-SAC a petition for the judicial determination of just compensation.The
RTC-SAC fixed the just compensation for the property at P200.00 per square meter.
SAC did not give weight to the LBP’s evidence in justifying its valuation, pointing out
that the LBP failed to prove that it complied with the prescribed procedure and
likewise failed to consider the valuation factors provided in Section 17 of the CARL.

ISSUE: Whether or not LBP has jurisdiction in determining land valuation and
compensation for agrarian reform cases.

HELD: Yes. Citing LBP v. Honeycomb Farms Corp., there’s a need to apply Section
17 of R.A. No. 6657 and DAR AO 5-98 in just compensation cases. The CA and the
RTC is in grave error when they disregarded the DAR formula. The need to apply the
law cannot be doubted; the DAR’s administrative issuances, also partake of the
nature of statutes and have in their favor a presumption of legality. Unless admin.
orders are declared invalid the courts must apply them. LBP is primarily charged with
determining land valuation and compensation for all private lands acquired for

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla

agrarian reform but this determination is only preliminary.Landowners may resort to
the courts for final determination of just compensation. Thus, we clarify and reiterate:
the original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation under R.A. No. 6657 rests with the RTC-SAC. But, in its determination
the RTC-SAC must take into consideration the factors laid down by law and the
pertinent DAR regulations.

***
11. REPUBLIC vs. DRUGMAKER'S LAB., INC. and TERRAMEDIC, INC.

An administrative regulation may be classified as a legislative rule, an interpretative

rule, or a contingent rule. Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation
and designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof.

FACTS: FDA was created pursuant to RA 3720, otherwise known as the "Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act," to establish safety or efficacy standards and quality measures for
foods, drugs and devices, and cosmetic products. DOH, thru Sec. Bengzon, issued
AO 67, s. 1989 (Revised Rules and Regulations on Registration of Pharmaceutical
Products) requiring drug manufacturers to register certain drug and medicine products
with the FDA before release to the market. BA/BE test is needed to secure a CPR for
these products but the test requirement was put on hold for lack of local facilities.
Circular No. 1, s. 1997 resumed the FDA’s implementation of the BA/BE test and Circ.
No. 8, s. 1997 provided additional implementation details on BA/BE testing on drug
products.Respondents manufacture and trade rifampicin – branded as "Refam
200mg/5mL Suspension" (Refam) – for the treatment of pulmonary and extra-
pulmonary tuberculosis. They were issued a CPR valid for 5 years. However Refam
did not undergo BA/BE testing. Respondents were granted numerous yearly renewals
of their CPR for Refam, which lasted until November 15, 2006,conditioned to submit
BA/BE test results for said drug. However, respondents filed a petition for prohibition
and annulment of Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 before the RTC, alleging that it is the
DOH, and not the FDA, which was granted the authority to issue and implement rules
concerning RA 3720. As such, the issuance of the aforesaid circulars and the manner
of their promulgation contravened the law and the Constitution. They further averred
that that the non-renewal of the CPR due to failure to submit satisfactory BA/BE test
results would not only affect Refam, but their other products as well.

ISSUE: Whether or not the FDA has the authority to issue and implement Circular
Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997.

HELD: Yes. Admin. agencies can exercise quasi-legislative powers only if there
exists a law which delegates these powers to them. Accordingly, the rules so
promulgated must be within the confines of the granting statute and must involve no
discretion as to what the law shall be, but merely the authority to fix the details in the
execution or enforcement of the policy set out in the law itself, so as to conform with
the doctrine of separation of powers and, as an adjunct, the doctrine of non-
delegability of legislative power.In the case at bar, it is undisputed that RA 3720, as
amended by Executive Order No. 175, s. 1987 prohibits, inter alia, the manufacture
and sale of pharmaceutical products without obtaining the proper CPR from the FDA.
In this regard, the FDA has been deputized by the same law to accept applications for
registration of pharmaceuticals and, after due course, grant or reject such
applications. To this end, the said law expressly authorized the Secretary of Health,
upon the recommendation of the FDA Director, to issue rules and regulations that
pertain to the registration of pharmaceutical products.

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla

 ***************
12. CERAFICA vs COMELEC
The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate is beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of the Comelec.
FACTS:
1. Kimberly filed her COC for Councilor, City of Taguig, for the 2013 elections.
Since she was not qualified (she would only be 20 on the day of the elections
and not 23 as required by law) a clarificatory hearing was scheduled.
2. Instead of attending, Kimberly filed a Motion of Withdrawal of COC.
Simultaneously, Olivia filed her own COC as substitute of Kimberly.
3. However, Director Amora-Ladra of the COMELEC Law Department
recommended the cancellation of Kimberly’s COC and the denial of the
substitution of Kimberly by Olivia; that Olivia cannot substitute Kimberly as the
latter was never an official candidate because she was not eligible; and that the
COC Kimberly filed was invalid because it contained a material
misrepresentation relating to her eligibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid substitution.

RULING:
1. NO. In declaring that Kimberly, being under age, could not be considered to have
filed a valid COC and thus could not be validly substituted by Olivia, the Comelec
gravely abused its discretion.
2. Comelec has no discretion to give or not to give due couse to COCs. The duty of
the Comelec to give due course to COCs filed in due form is ministerial in
character, and that while the Comelec may look into patent defects in the COCs,
it may not go into matters not appearing on their face.
3. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. When a
candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty
to receive and acknowledge its receipt pursuant to Section 76 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
4. If a candidate made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in
his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified
petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under
Section 78 of the Election Code.
Note: There is also lack of due process in this case. When COMELEC exercises
quasi-judicial functions, it must be done so in division before done en banc. In this
case, the cancellation proceedings originated not from a petition but from a report of
the election officer. The COMELEC en banc cannot circumvent the proceedings by
acting on the case without a prior action by a division because it denies due process
to the candidate.
***************
13. RALPH P. TUA vs. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla

Since time is of essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented, the
court is authorized to issue ex parte Temporary Protection Order after raffle but before
notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is
reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the
immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to
recur.

FACTS: Respondent Rosanna Tua filed before RTC a petition for the issuance of TPO
pursuant to RA 9262 against her husband Ralph Tua. Respondent claimed that she and
her children had suffered from petitioner’s abusive conduct; that petitioner had
threatened to cause her and the children physical harm for the purpose of controlling
her actions or decisions; that she was actually deprived of custody and access to her
minor children; and, that she was threatened to be deprived of her and her children’s
financial support. RTC issued ex parte TPO. Petitioner opposed the TPO contending
that it was unconstitutional. He claimed that his right to due process was violated as he
was prevented from presenting his side and that RA 9262 invalidly delegates the
authority to issue TPO to the courts and barangay officials.

ISSUES:
1. Whether Section 15 RA 9262 violates due process clause
2. Whether there is undue delegation

RULING:

1. NO. The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of

the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued
without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could
be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, in the
same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and
hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must
yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, among which is
protection of women and children from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.

1. There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an
ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the
petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.

2. NO. The primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and
expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. The act of
Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in pursuance of
our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes involving rights that are
enforceable and demandable before the courts of justice or the redress of
wrongs for violations of such rights.

The issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any
available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla

 causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause
the woman or her child physical harm.

Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and
ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."

***************

14. CUDIA vs THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE PMA ET.AL.

PMA, as an academic institution, has the right to remove erring cadets under the
principle of academic freedom.
But PMA must still observe due process in removing cadets.

PMA cadets are entitled to due process.

PMA cannot be compelled by mandamus to reinstate cadets separated therefrom

if due process was observed.

The essential freedoms of academic freedom on the part of schools are as follows;
a. the right to determine who may teach;
b. the right to determine what may be taught;
c. the right to determine how it shall be taught;
d. the right to determine who may be admitted to study.

FACTS: Cudia was a member of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Siklab
Diwa Class of 2014. On November 14, 2013, Cudia’s class had a lesson examination in
their Operations Research (OR) subject the schedule of which was from 1:30pm to 3pm.
However, after he submitted his exam paper, Cudia made a query to their OR
teacher. Said teacher, then asked Cudia to wait for her. Cudia complied and as a result,
he was late for his next class (English). Later, the English teacher reported Cudia for
being late.
In his explanation, Cudia averred that he was late because his OR class was
dismissed a bit late. The tactical officer (TO) tasked to look upon the matter concluded
that Cudia lied when he said that their OR class was dismissed late because the OR
teacher said she never dismissed her class late. Thus, Cudia was meted with demerits
and touring hours because of said infraction.
Cudia did not agree with the penalty hence he asked the TO about it. Not content
with the explanation of the TO, Cudia said he will be appealing the penalty he incurred to
the senior tactical officer (STO). The TO then asked Cudia to write his appeal.
In his appeal, Cudia stated that his being late was out of his control because his
OR class was dismissed at 3pm while his English class started at 3pm also. To that the
TO replied: that on record, and based on the interview with the teachers concerned, the
OR teacher did not dismiss them (the class) beyond 3pm and the English class started at
3:05pm, not 3pm; that besides, under PMA rules, once a student submitted his
examination paper, he is dismissed from said class and may be excused to leave the
classroom, hence, Cudia was in fact dismissed well before 3pm; that it was a lie for Cudia
to state that the class was dismissed late because again, on that day in the OR class,
each student was dismissed as they submit their examination, and were not dismissed

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla

as a class; that if Cudia was ordered by the teacher to stay, it was not because such
transaction was initiated by the teacher, rather, it was initiated by Cudia (because of his
query to the teacher), although there were at least two students with Cudia at that time
querying the teacher, the three of them cannot be considered a “class”; Cudia could just
have stated all that instead of saying that his class was dismissed a bit late, hence he
lied. The STO sustained the decision of the TO.
Later, the TO reported Cudia to the PMA’s Honor Committee (HC) for allegedly
violating the Honor Code. Allegedly, Cudia lied in his written appeal when he said his
class was dismissed late hence, as a result, he was late for his next class.
The Honor Code is PMA’s basis for the minimum standard of behavior required of
their cadets. Any violation thereof may be a ground to separate a cadet from PMA.
Cudia submitted an explanation to the HC. Thereafter, the HC, which is composed
of nine (9) cadets, conducted an investigation. After two hearings and after the parties
involved were heard and with their witnesses presented, the HC reconvened and the
members cast their vote. The initial vote was 8-1: 8 found Cudia guilty and 1 acquitted
Cudia. Under PMA rules (Honor System), a dissenting vote means the acquittal of Cudia.
However, they also have a practice of chambering where the members, particularly the
dissenter, are made to explain their vote. This is to avoid the “tyranny of the minority”.
After the chambering, the dissenter was convinced that his initial “not guilty vote” was
improper, hence he changed the same and the final vote became 9-0. Thus, Cudia was
immediately placed inside PMA’s holding center.
Cudia appealed to the HC chairman but his appeal was denied. Eventually, the
Superintendent of the PMA ordered the dismissal of Cudia from the PMA.
Cudia and several members of his family then sent letters to various military
officers requesting for a re-investigation. It was their claim that there were irregularities in
the investigation done by the HC. As a result of such pleas, the case of Cudia was referred
to the Cadet Review and Appeals Board of PMA (CRAB).
Meanwhile, Cudia’s family brought the case to the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) where it was alleged that PMA’s “sham” investigation violated Cudia’s rights to due
process, education, and privacy of communication.
Eventually, the CRAB ruled against Cudia. This ruling was affirmed by the AFP
Chief of Staff. But on the other hand, the CHR found in favor of Cudia.
PMA averred that CHR’s findings are at best recommendatory. Cudia filed a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the Supreme Court. PMA
opposed the said petition as it argued that the same is not proper as a matter of policy
and that the court should avoid interfering with military matters.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the PMA can validly dismiss Cudia based on its findings.
RULING:
Yes. It is within PMA’s right to academic freedom to decide whether or not a cadet
is still worthy to be part of the institution. Thus, PMA did not act with grave abuse
of discretion when it dismissed Cudia. In fact, Cudia was accorded due process. In
this case, the investigation of Cudia’s Honor Code violation followed the prescribed
procedure and existing practices in the PMA. He was notified of the Honor Report
submitted by his TO. He was then given the opportunity to explain the report
against him. He was informed about his options and the entire process that the
case would undergo. The preliminary investigation immediately followed after he
replied and submitted a written explanation. Upon its completion, the investigating
team submitted a written report together with its recommendation to the HC
Chairman. The HC thereafter reviewed the findings and recommendations. When
the honor case was submitted for formal investigation, a new team was assigned
to conduct the hearing. During the formal investigation/hearing, he was informed

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla

 of the charge against him and given the right to enter his plea. He had the chance
to explain his side, confront the witnesses against him, and present evidence in
his behalf. After a thorough discussion of the HC voting members, he was found
to have violated the Honor Code. Thereafter, the guilty verdict underwent the
review process at the Academy level – from the OIC of the HC, to the SJA (Staff
Judge Advocate), to the Commandant of Cadets, and to the PMA Superintendent.
A separate investigation was also conducted by the HTG (Headquarters Tactics
Group). Then, upon the directive of the AFP-GHQ (AFP-General Headquarters) to
reinvestigate the case, a review was conducted by the CRAB. Further, a Fact-
Finding Board/Investigation Body composed of the CRAB members and the PMA
senior officers was constituted to conduct a deliberate investigation of the case.
Finally, he had the opportunity to appeal to the President. Sadly for him, all had
issued unfavorable rulings. And there is no reason for the SC to disturb the findings
of facts by these bodies.
***************
15. LAW FIRM OF LAGUESMA MAGSALIN CONSULTA AND GASTARDO VS. CA

“When a government entity engages the legal services of private counsel, it must do so
with the necessary authorization required by law; otherwise, its officials bind themselves
to be personally liable for compensating private counsels services.”

FACTS: Clark Development Corporation (CDC) engaged the services of the Laguesma
Magsalin Consulta and Gastardo (law firm) without first securing the necessary
authorization from the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC). Only a pro-
forma retainership contract containing the suggested terms and conditions of the
retainership was obtained. The law firm commenced rendering legal services to Clark
Development Corporation even without the concurrence of the Commission on Audit of
the retainership contract. Consequently, COA denied CDC’s request for clearance in
engaging the law firm. It likewise ruled that the law firm is not entitled to be paid on the
basis of quantum meruit.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not COA erred in denying CDC’s request for clearance in engaging
petitioner as private counsel; and
2. Whether or not the law firm is entitled to be paid based on quantum meruit.

RULING:

1. No. The general rule is that government-owned and controlled corporations must
refer all their legal matters to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel. It
is only in extraordinary or exceptional circumstances or exceptional cases that it
is allowed to engage the services of private counsels. Before the hiring or
employment of private counsel, the written conformity and acquiescence of the
Government Corporate Counsel and the written concurrence of the Commission
on Audit shall first be secured.

2. No. Quantum meruit- “as much as he deserves”; is used as basis for determining
an attorney’s professional fees in the absence of an express agreement. In this
case, however, the Board of Directors of CDC contracted the services of the law
firm without authority. Thus, even granting that petitioner ought to be paid for
services rendered, it should not be the government’s liability, but that of the
officials who engaged the services of petitioner without the required authorization.

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla

 ***************
16. MIA vs. COA

“All allowances and benefits are incorporated in the standardized salary, UNLESS
EXCLUDED by law or an issuance by the Department of Budget and Management. If
other allowance or benefit NOT EXCLUDED is given, it is tantamount to double
compensation”

FACTS: Republic Act No. 6758 deems all allowances and benefits received by
government officials and employees as incorporated in the standardized salary, unless
excluded by law or an issuance by the Department of Budget and Management.

The Administrator of Maritime Industry Authority recommended to then President

Joseph Ejercito Estrada the approval and/or restoration of financial incentives, benefits,
or allowances to the officers and employees of MIA. Estrada approved the same.
However, the Resident Auditor disallowed the grant of the allowances on the ground that
it constituted double compensation to public officers and employees. The Commission on
Audit held that the disallowed allowances are integrated in the standardized salary rates
under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758. Further, the Presidents approval of the
memorandum was not the law contemplated by the Constitution as an exception to the
prohibition on double compensation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the allowance or incentives granted to the officers and employees
of Maritime Industry Authority constituted double compensation.

RULING: YES. The disallowed benefits and allowances of petitioner Maritime Industry
Authority’s officials and employees were not excluded by law or an issuance by the
Department of Budget and Management. Thus, these were deemed already given to the
officials and employees when they received their basic salaries. Their receipt of the
disallowed benefits and allowances was tantamount to double compensation proscribed
by Article IX(B), Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution.

***************
17. Philippine Amusement Gaming Corporation vs De Guzman
“After finding a prima facie case, the DISCIPLINING AUTHORITY SHALL
FORMALLY CHARGE the person complained of (Sec. 16,Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service).”
“If on appeal, the Commission finds that the disciplining authority violated
respondent- appellants right to due process such as the failure to issue a formal
charge,the Commission shall dismiss the appealed case and order the immediate
reinstatement of the respondent withpayment of backwages and other benefits.
However, the dismissal of the case shall be without prejudice on the part of the
discipling authority to refile it in accordance with law (Sec. 48 of URACC).”

FACTS: De Guzman was charged for Deception or Fraud in Securing Employees

Appointment or promotion for her failure to allege in two occasions that she has a
relative who works with PAGCOR in her Personal History Statement. Upon discovery of
the deceit, Atty. Sordan issued her a Notice of Charges. In her reply, De Guzman
maintained that she updated her PHS with all honesty and to the best of her knowledge.
Bailey thereafter issued a memorandum against De Guzman stating that she is
administratively liable for the charges and thus dismissed. CSC ruled that the formal

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla

charge and memorandum was not issued by proper authorities and ordered her
reinstatement. CA affirmed CSC’s decision
ISSUE:
W/N CA correctly affirmed CSC’s dismissal of the administrative disciplinary case
against De Guzman on the ground that she was deprived of her right to due process.
RULING:
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that PAGCOR was the one that appointed De
Guzman to her position. Adhering to the well- settled principle that the power to remove
or discipline is lodged in the same authority on which the power to appoint is vested,
only PAGCOR has the power to discipline or remove De Guzman for aby transgression
she committed. PAGCOR is the proper disciplinary authority of its employees, and as
such, formal charges against its employees in administrative proceedings should
emanate from it, through its Board of Directors.
However, in the instant case, the Formal Charge did not come from the
PAGCOR Board of Directors but from Atty. Sordan and HRDD-OIC Bailey. Records are
bereft of showing that latter were authorized by the Directors to issue such documents.
Hence, the formal charge and the assailed memorandum are null and void. De
Guzman’s removal from PAGCOR without a valid formal charge was done in violation of
her right against due process, warranting the dismissal of the instant disciplinary charge
against her.

Finding love is not the hardest

Keeping it hardly so
The hardest thing about love
Is that you must let go

Umm… What I meant to say was:

Fight for every inch of the scrimmage!

Let’s go guys!

By: Fernandez, Granada, Gonzales, Panes, Soldevilla