SSS Employee Asso.

v CA 175 SCRA 686 (July 28, 1989)

Facts: The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning
the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary
restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction while petitioners
filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Petitioners
contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the subject matter since the
jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission as the case involves a labor
dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules
and regulation thus have no right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the
court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.

Issue: Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike

Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Held: The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as strikes. On
one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted
activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed,

subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s.
1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass
leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or disruption
of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees to strike they are
prohibited from doing so.

In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as “government employees”
and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public Sector
Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of injunction in labor
disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court for the issuance of a writ
of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.

G. Capitol Medical Center vs NLRC GR No. 147080, Apr 26, 2005

[G.R. No. 147080. April 26, 2005] CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION, JAIME IBABAO, JOSE BALLESTEROS, RONALD CENTENO, NARCISO
SARMIENTO, EDUARDO CANAVERAL, SHERLITO DELA CRUZ, SOFRONIO COMANDAO, MARIANO GALICIA,
RAMON MOLOD, CARMENCITA SARMIENTO, HELEN MOLOD, ROSA COMANDAO, ANGELITO CUIZON,
ALEX MARASIGAN, JESUS CEDRO, ENRICO ROQUE, JAY PERILLA, HELEN MENDOZA, MARY GLADYS
GEMPEROSO, NINI BAUTISTA, ELENA MACARUBBO, MUSTIOLA SALVACION DAPITO, ALEXANDER
MANABE, MICHAEL EUSTAQUIO, ROSE AZARES, FERNANDO MANZANO, HENRY VERA CRUZ, CHITO
MENDOZA, FREDELITA TOMAYAO, ISABEL BRUCAL, MAHALKO LAYACAN, RAINIER MANACSA, KAREN
VILLARENTE, FRANCES ACACIO, LAMBERTO CONTI, LORENA BEACH, JUDILAH RAVALO, DEBORAH NAVE,
MARILEN CABALQUINTO, EMILIANA RIVERA, MA. ROSARIO URBANO, ROWENA ARILLA, CAPITOL
MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-AFW, GREGORIO DEL PRADO, ARIEL ARAJA, and JESUS STA.
BARBARA, JR., respondents. CALLEJO, SR., J.:

FACTS: The Union filed a Notice of Strike with the (NCMB), The Union alleged as grounds for the
projected strike the following acts of the petitioner: (a) refusal to bargain; (b) coercion on employees;
and (c) interference/ restraint to self-organization.[7] A series of conferences was conducted before the
NCMB but no agreement was reached. the petitioner even filed a Letter with the Board requesting that
the notice of strike be dismissed;[8] the Union had apparently failed to furnish the Regional Branch of
the NCMB with a copy of a notice of the meeting where the strike vote was conducted. On November
20, 1997, the Union submitted to the NCMB the minutes[9] of the alleged strike vote purportedly held
on November 10, 1997 at the parking lot in front of the petitioner’s premises. It appears that 178 out of
the 300 union members participated therein, and the results were as follows: 156 members voted to
strike; 14 members cast negative votes; and eight votes were spoiled.[10] On November 28, 1997, the
officers and members of the Union staged a strike. Subsequently, the Union filed an ex parte motion
with the DOLE, praying for its assumption of jurisdiction over the dispute. The SOLE assumed jurisdiction
over the labor disputes, Consequently, all striking workers are directed to return to work within twenty-
four (24) hours from the receipt of this Order and the management to resume normal operations and
accept back all striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike. In
obedience to the order of the SOLE, the officers and members of the Union stopped their strike and
returned to work. The Regional Director of the DOLE rendered a Decision denying the petition for the
cancellation of the respondent Union’s certiftcate of registration. In a parallel development, Labor
Arbiter Leda rendered a Decision in favor of the petitioner, and declared the strike staged by the
respondents illegal. The Labor Arbiter ruled that no voting had taken place on November 10, 1997;
moreover, no notice of such voting was furnished to the NCMB at least twentyfour (24) hours prior to
the intended holding of the strike vote. According to the Labor Arbiter, the affidavits of the petitioner’s
17 employees who alleged that no strike vote was taken, and supported by the affidavit of the overseer
of the parking lot and the security guards, must prevail as against the minutes of the strike vote
presented by the respondents. The Labor Arbiter also held that in light of Article 263(9) of the Labor
Code, the respondent Union should have filed a motion for a writ of execution of the resolution of
Undersecretary Laguesma which was affirmed by this Court instead of staging a strike. The respondents
appealed the decision to the NLRC which granted their appeal and reversing the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. The NLRC also denied the petitioner’s petition to declare the strike illegal. In resolving the issue
of whether the union members held a strike vote on November 10, 1997, the NLRC ruled as follows: We
find untenable the Labor Arbiter’s finding that no actual strike voting took place on November 10, 1997,
claiming that thi s is supported by the affidavit of Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the parking lot
across the hospital, and the sworn statements of nineteen (19) (sic) union members. While it is true that
no strike voting took place in the parking lot which he is overseeing, it does not mean that no strike
voting ever took place at all because the same was conducted in the parking lot immediately/directly
fronting, not across, the hospital building. Further, it is apparent that the nineteen (19) (sic) hospital
employees, who recanted their participation in the strike voting, did so involuntarily for fear of loss of
employment, considering that their Affidavits are uniform and pro forma. The NLRC ruled that under
Section 7, Rule XXII of DOLE Order No. 9, Series of 1997, absent a showing that the NCMB decided to
supervise the conduct of a secret balloting and informed the union of the said decision, or that any such
request was made by any of the parties who would be affected by the secret balloting and to which the
NCMB agreed, the respondents were not mandated to furnish the NCMB with such notice before the
strike vote was conducted.

ISSUE: WHETHER RESPONDENTS COMPLIED WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR STAGING THE
SUBJECT STRIKE.

HELD: No. We agree with the petitioner that the respondent Union failed to comply with the second
paragraph of Section 10, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules of the NLRC which reads: Section 10. Strike or
lockout vote. – A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called
for the purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a majority of the Board of
Directors of the employer, corporation or association or the partners obtained by a secret ballot in a
meeting called for the purpose. The regional branch of the Board may, at its own initiative or upon the
request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union or
the employer shall furnish the regional branch of the Board and notice of meetings referred to in the
preceding paragraph at least twenty-four (24) hours before such meetings as well as the results of the
voting at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period
provided in this Rule. Although the second paragraph of Section 10 of the said Rule is not provided in
the Labor Code of the Philippines, nevertheless, the same was incorporated in the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code and has the force and effect of law.[24] Aside from the mandatory notices
embedded in Article 263, paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code, a union intending to stage a strike is
mandated to notify the NCMB of the meeting for the conduct of strike vote, at least twenty-four (24)
hours prior to such meeting. Unless the NCMB is notified of the date, place and time of the meeting of
the union members for the conduct of a strike vote, the NCMB would be unable to supervise the holding
of the same, if and when it decides to exercise its power of supervision. In National Federation of Labor
v. NLRC,[25] the Court enumerated the notices required by Article 263 of the Labor Code and the
Implementing Rules, which include the 24-hour prior notice to the NCMB: 1) A notice of strike, with the
required contents, should be filed with the DOLE, specifically the Regional Branch of the NCMB, copy
furnished the employer of the union; 2) A cooling-off period must be observed between the filing of
notice and the actual execution of the strike thirty (30) days in case of bargaining deadlock and fifteen
(15) days in case of unfair labor practice. However, in the case of union busting where the union’s
existence is threatened, the cooling-off period need not be observed. … 4) Before a strike is actually
commenced, a strike vote should be taken by secret balloting, with a 24-hour prior notice to NCMB. The
decision to declare a strike requires the secret-ballot approval of majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned.5)The result of the strike vote should be reported to the
NCMB at least seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period. In
this case, the respondent Union failed to comply with the 24-hour prior notice requirement to the
NCMB before it conducted the alleged strike vote meeting on November 10, 1997. As a result, the
petitioner complained that no strike vote meeting ever took place and averred that the strike staged by
the respondent union was illegal. Conformably to Article 264 of the Labor Code of the Philippines[30]
and Section 7, Rule XXII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, [31] no labor organization
shall declare a strike unless supported by a majority vote of the members of the union obtained by
secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose. The requirement is mandatory and the failure of a
union to comply therewith renders the strike illegal. [32] The union is thus mandated to allege and
prove compliance with the requirements of the law. In the present case, there is a divergence between
the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter, on the one hand, and the NLRC and the CA, on the other, in
that the Labor Arbiter found and declared in his decision that no secret voting ever took place in the
parking lot fronting the hospital on November 10, 1997 by and among the 300 members of the
respondent Union. Erwin Barbacena, the overseer of the only parking lot fronting the hospital, and
security guards Simon Tingzon and Reggie Barawid, declared in their respective affidavits that no secret
voting ever took place on November 10, 1997; 17 employees of the petitioner also denied in their
respective statements that they were not members of the respondent Union, and were asked to merely
sign attendance papers and unnumbered votes. The NLRC and the CA declared in their respective
decisions that the affidavits of the petitioner’s 17 employees had no probative weight because the said
employees merely executed their affidavits out of fear of losing their jobs. The allegations in the
affidavits belie the claim of the respondents and the finding of the NLRC that a secret balloting took
place on November 10, 1997 in front of the hospital at the corner of Scout Magbanua Street and Panay
Avenue, Quezon City.

H. G.R. No. L-59743 May 31 1982 NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGAR WORKERS (NFSW), petitioner,
vs.ETHELWOLDO R. OVEJERA, CENTRAL AZUCARERA DE LA CARLOTA (CAC), COL. ROGELIO DEINLA, as
Provincial Commander, 3311st P.C. Command, Negros Occidental, respondents.

FACTS: In 1981, NFSW struck allegedly to compel the payment of the 13th month pay under PD 851, in
addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers. The decision
having become final and executory entry of judgment was made. After the Marcopper decision had
become final, NFSW renewed its demand that CAC give the 13th month pay. CAC refused, NFSW filed
with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) Regional Office in Bacolod City a notice to strike
based on non-payment of the 13th month pay. Six days after, NFSW struck.

ISSUE: Whether or not under Presidential Decree 851 (13th Month Pay Law), CAC is obliged to give its
workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration bonuses, the aggregate
of which admittedly exceeds by far the disputed 13th month pay?

HELD: CAC is obliged to give its workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and
amelioration bonuses stipulated in a collective bargaining agreement amounting to more than a month's
pay. When this agreement was forged on November 30,1981, the original decision dismissing the
petition in the aforecited Marcopper case had already been promulgated by this Court. On the votes of
only 7 Justices, including the distinguished Chief Justice, the petition of Marcopper Mining Corp. seeking
to annul the decision of Labor Deputy Minister Amado Inciong granting a 13th month pay to Marcopper
employees (in addition to mid- year and Christmas bonuses under a CBA) had been dismissed. But a
motion for reconsideration filed by Marcopper was pending as of November 30, 1981. In December
1981, the original decision was affirmed when this Court finally denied the motion for reconsideration.
But the resolution of denial was supported by the votes of only 5 Justices. The Marcopper decision is
therefore a Court decision but without the necessary eight votes to be doctrinal. This being so, it cannot
be said that the Marcopper decision "clearly held" that "the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay
separate and distinct from the bonuses already given," within the meaning of the NFSW-CAC
compromise agreement. At any rate, in view of the rulings made herein, NFSW cannot insist on its claim
that its members are entitled to a 13th month pay in addition to the bonuses already paid by CAC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
I. Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc (INPORT) vs. NLRC

GR No. 103560

July 6, 1995

Facts: Petitioner’s employees stopped working and gathered in a mass action to express their grievances
regarding wages, thirteenth month pay and hazard pay. Said employees were all members of the
Macajalar Labor Union — Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW) with whom petitioner had an existing
collective bargaining agreement.

Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services at the port of Cagayan de Oro. The strike
paralyzed operations at said port.

The strikers filed individual notices of strike (“Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa Pag-Welga”) with the
then Ministry of Labor and Employment.

With the failure of conciliation conferences between petitioner and the strikers, INPORT filed a
complaint before the Labor Arbiter for Illegal Strike with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary
injunction.

The National Labor Relations Commission issued a temporary restraining order. Thereafter, majority of
the strikers returned to work, leaving herein private respondents who continued their protest.

For not having complied with the formal requirements in Article 264 of the Labor Code, 3 the strike
staged by petitioner’s workers on April 30, 1985 was found by the Labor Arbiter to be illegal. 4 The
workers who participated in the illegal strike did not, however, lose their employment, since there was
no evidence that they participated in illegal acts. After noting that petitioner accepted the other striking
employees back to work, the Labor Arbiter held that the private respondents should similarly be allowed
to return to work without having to undergo the required screening to be undertaken by their union
(MLU-FFW).

As regards the six private respondents who were union officers, the Labor Arbiter ruled that they could
not have possibly been “duped or tricked” into signing the strike notice for they were active participants
in the conciliation meetings and were thus fully aware of what was going on. Hence, said union officers
should be accepted back to work after seeking reconsideration from herein petitioner. 5

The NLRC affirmed with modification 8 the Arbiter’s decision. It held that the concerted action by the
workers was more of a “protest action” than a strike. Private respondents, including the six union
officers, should also be allowed to work unconditionally to avoid discrimination. However, in view of the
strained relations between the parties, separation pay was awarded in lieu of reinstatement.

Upon petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, public respondent modified the above resolution.
The Commission ruled that since private respondents were not actually terminated from service, there
was no basis for reinstatement. However, it awarded six months’ salary as separation pay or financial
assistance in the nature of “equitable relief.” The award for backwages was also deleted for lack of
factual and legal basis. In lieu of backwages, compensation equivalent to P1,000.00 was given.

Issue: Whether separation pay and backwages be awarded by public respondent NLRC to participants of
an illegal strike?

Held: Reinstatement and backwages or, if no longer feasible, separation pay, can only be granted if
sufficient bases exist under the law, particularly after a showing of illegal dismissal. However, while the
union members may thus be entitled under the law to be reinstated or to receive separation pay, their
expulsion from the union in accordance with the collective bargaining agreement renders the same
impossible.

Ratio: A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of labor, 13 is defined as any temporary
stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute. 14 A
labor dispute includes any controversy or matter concerning terms or conditions of employment or the
association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the
terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employers and employees. 15

Private respondents and their co-workers stopped working and held the mass action on April 30, 1985 to
press for their wages and other benefits. What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of
work by concerted action resulted from a labor dispute.

The complaint before the Labor Arbiter involved the legality of said strike. The Arbiter correctly ruled
that the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 264 (now Article 263)
paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code. 16

The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not conform to the notice required by the law to
be filed since they were represented by a union (MLU-FFW) which even had an existing collective
bargaining agreement with INPORT.

Neither did the striking workers observe the strike vote by secret ballot, cooling-off period and reporting
requirements.

A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who
knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost their
employment status. 20 An ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an
illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the
other hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like
other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike.
In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the majority of the striking workers, including union officers,
back to work. Private respondents were left to continue with the strike after they refused to submit to
the “screening” required by the company.

Under Article 264 of the Labor Code, a worker merely participating in an illegal strike may not be
terminated from his employment. It is only when he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be
declared to have lost his employment status. Since there appears no proof that these union members
committed illegal acts during the strike, they cannot be dismissed. The striking union members among
private respondents are thus entitled to reinstatement, there being no just cause for their dismissal.

However, considering that a decade has already lapsed from the time the disputed strike occurred, we
find that to award separation pay in lieu of reinstatement would be more practical and appropriate.

No backwages will be awarded to private respondent-union members as a penalty for their participation
in the illegal strike. Their continued participation in said strike, even after most of their co-workers had
returned to work, can hardly be rewarded by such an award.

The fate of private respondent-union officers is different. Their insistence on unconditional

reinstatement or separation pay and backwages is unwarranted and unjustified. For knowingly
participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates that a union officer may be terminated from
employment. 34

Notwithstanding the fact that INPORT previously accepted other union officers and that the screening
required by it was uncalled for, still it cannot be gainsaid that it possessed the right and prerogative to
terminate the union officers from service. The law, in using the word may, grants the employer the
option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment. 35

Moreover, an illegal strike which, more often than not, brings about unnecessary economic disruption
and chaos in the workplace should not be countenanced by a relaxation of the sanctions prescribed by
law.

The union officers are, therefore, not entitled to any relief.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, from the foregoing premises, the petition in G.R. No. 103560 (“Gold City
Integrated Port Service Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.”) is GRANTED. One month
salary for each year of service until 1985 is awarded to private respondents who were not union officers
as separation pay. The petition in G.R. No. 103599 (“Adelo Ebuna, et al. v. National Labor Relations
Commission, et al.”) is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No costs.