GERBERT R. CORPUZ VS DAISYLYN TIROL STO.

TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL,

FACTS: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a
Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover
that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce
on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his
new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree,
an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still
subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted
instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in
fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the
proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code,in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.

ISSUE: whether or not the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was correct in registering the decree prior to any judicial
order as yet recognizing the foreign divorce decree.

HELD: NO

As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.[34] We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and
the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce
legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being
legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that
must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of
divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be
entered:

(a) births;
(b) deaths;
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
(e) divorces;
(f) legitimations;
(g) adoptions;
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
(i) naturalization; and
(j) changes of name.

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in
which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and
dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the
decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with
the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree
presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] both of which
required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be
registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law,
the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot
produce any legal effect.

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian
divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for
recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the
cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial
order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others,
that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located;[38] that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot
consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings
for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and
another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the
foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as
that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding [41] by which the
applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of
the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision
be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

REPUBLIC vs COSETENG-MAGPAYO

FACTS: Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son
of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth
shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.

Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng.
The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEOF JULIAN
EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG."

In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his
mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage.” Respondent also submitted his
academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth
certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent
ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."

On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his petition by alleging therein compliance
with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court.

The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside in its
issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the
notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court which
then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte

By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted respondent’s petition and directed the Civil Registrar of
Makati City to:

1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein
respondent’s Certificate of live Birth];

2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to "COSETENG";

3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and

4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]… (emphasis and
underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original)

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by
Order of July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question
of law.
ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should be made through
appropriate adversarial proceedings OR WHETHER OR NOT RULE 103 OR RULE 108 SHALL APPLY

HELD: RULE 108

The petition is impressed with merit. (in favor of the Republic)

RULING:

1. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds
including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one
has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage;
(e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

*** Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized
grounds, however.

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court allowed
the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid
confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of her mother which
she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her
mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the
present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.

The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents.
It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s
supplication.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that "changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings . . ."

******** Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108
applies. It reads:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located.

SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.
The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

2. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in
which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was
registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC
shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.

Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry are separate and distinct.

Aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as
respondents in the case."A petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have
as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be
affected thereby."

Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given to
the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons
who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as
creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent
Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within
which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).

The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the
petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3,
Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out

The Court then laid down the rule that “when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil
register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those of citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or
filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is
mandated.”

REPUBLIC VS NISHINA

FACTS:

Nisaida Sumera Nishina (respondent), represented by her mother Zenaida Sumera Watanabe (Zenaida), filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth record and
change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 106-M-2007.

In her petition, respondent alleged the following:

She was born on October 31, 1987 in Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mother Zenaida and Japanese father Koichi
Nishina who were married on February 18, 1987. Her father later died. On July 19, 1989, her mother married
another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada.

As they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry, respondents mother caused the late
registration of her birth in 1993 under the surname of her mothers second husband, Hakamada. Her mother and
Hakamada eventually divorced.

On May 29, 1996, her mother married another Japanese, Takayuki Watanabe, who later adopted her by a decree
issued by the Tokyo Family Court of Japan on January 25, 2001. The adoption decree was filed and recorded in the
civil registry of Manila in 2006.
In 2007, it surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the Malolos Civil Registry under the name
Nisaida Sumera Nishina, hence, her filing before the RTC of her petition praying that her second birth certificate
bearing the surname Hakamada, issued through late registration in 1993, be cancelled; and that in light of the
decree of adoption, her surname Nishina in the original birth certificate be changed to Watanabe.

After hearing the petition, Branch 83 of the RTC, by Order of October 8, 2007, granted respondents petition and
directed the Local Civil Registry of Malolos to cancel the second birth record of Nisaida Sumera Hakamada issued in
1993 [bearing] Registry No. 93-06684 and to change it [in its stead] Registry No. 87-04983, particularly the
surname of [respondent] from NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA to NISAIDA SUMERA WATANABE.

OSG filed, on behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal.

Before the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that petitioner adopted a
wrong mode of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 (appeal
from the RTCs) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reading:

SEC. 2. Modes of appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or
final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these
Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

xxxx

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. However, an appeal
in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order
appealed from. (A.M. No. 01-1-03- SC, June 19, 2001)

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis, underscoring and
italics supplied)

SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. x x x.

A partys appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof
upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.

xxxx

Opposing the motion, petitioner countered that a record on appeal is required only in proceedings
where multiple appeals may arise, a situation not obtaining in the present case.

By Resolution of September 2, 2008, the appellate court dismissed petitioners appeal, holding that since
respondents petition before the RTC is classified as a special proceeding, petitioner should have filed both notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within 30 days from receipt of the October 8, 2007 Order granting respondents
petition, and by not filing a record on appeal, petitioner never perfected its appeal.

Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of December 22, 2008, petitioner filed the
present petition for review on certiorari.

The petition is meritorious.

Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or judgments in special proceedings
which may be the subject of an appeal, viz:

SECTION 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, where such order or judgment:

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such
person is entitled;

(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;

(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration
of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that
no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and

(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing
unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.

The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the pendency of special proceedings. A record on
appeal in addition to the notice of appeal is thus required to be filed as the original records of the case should
remain with the trial court[21] to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct
issue is resolved by said court and held to be final.[22]

In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter remained to be heard
and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting respondents petition for cancellation
of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry.

The appellate courts reliance on Zayco v. Hinlo, Jr.[23] in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration is
misplaced. In Zayco which was a petition for letters of administration of a deceased persons estate, the decedents
children appealed the trial courts order appointing the grandson of the decedent as administrator of the
estate. Their notice of appeal and record on appeal were denied due course by the trial court on the ground that
the appealed order is interlocutory and not subject to appeal. But even if the appeal were proper, it was belatedly
filed. On certiorari by the decedents children, the appellate court sustained the trial court. On petition for review,
this Court reversed the appellate court, holding that [a]n order appointing an administrator of a deceased persons
estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the administration, management and
settlement of the decedents estate, hence, the order is final and appealable.[24] The Court also held that the appeal
was filed on time.

In Zayco, unlike in the present case, a record on appeal was obviously necessary as the proceedings before the trial
court involved the administration, management and settlement of the decedents estate matters covered by
Section 1 of Rule 109 wherein multiple appeals could, and did in that case, call for them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions of September 2, 2008 and December 22,
2008 in CA G.R. CV No. 90346 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The appeal of petitioners before the appellate court
is REINSTATED.
Facts: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres Braza is the wife of Pablo Sicad Braza Jr., the latter died in a vehicular accident
in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia.

During the wake following the repatriation of his (Pablo’s) remains in the Philippines, Respondent Lucille Titular
and her son, Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and introduced themselves as the wife and son respectively, of the
deceased. Petitioner Cristina thereupon made inquiries and in the course of which she obtained Patrick Alvin’s
birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which had states that:

1. Pablo S. Braza as the father of Patrick Alvin; the latter was acknowledged by the father on January 13,
1997;

2. Patrick Alvin was legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents. Therefore, his name is
changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza.

Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing Pablo and Lucille were married.

Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate children with Pablo) filed before the RTC of Negros a petition
to correct the entries in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They contended that
Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because
said marriage is bigamous on account of a valid and subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo.
Petitioner prayed for the:

 Correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father
and his acknowledgment and the use of the last name “BRAZA”;

 A directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit
Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation;

 The declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this
purpose, the declaration of the marriage between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

RTC: Trial Court dismissed the petition without prejudice, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of
entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of
Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the
controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

MR: denied.

Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: May the court pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action to correct entries
in the civil registrar?

Held: No.

RULING: In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the
Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiations.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the
civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to
correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which
is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in
copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a
misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in
adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.
The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being
bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively; hence, the
petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that,
doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a
quo.

Petition to correct the entries (Rule 108) is a wrong remedy in this case because the trial court herein has no
jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation.

The allegations of the petition filed before the TC clearly show that petitioners’ seek to nullify the marriage
between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with
which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test.

It is well settled doctrine that validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned in a direct
action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as the petition filed before the
court a quo.

RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT (vis a vis Art. 412 of the Civil Code)

 It charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The
proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used ONLY TO CORRECT CLERICAL, SPELLING,
TYPOGRAPHICAL AND OTHER INNOCUOUS ERRORS IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY.

CLERICAL ERROR/SUBSTANTIAL ERROR

 A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a
clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing; or a harmless change such as a correction of name
that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.

 Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all
interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.