WAS MAHARBAL RIGHT?

Author(s): JOHN LAZENBY

Source: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement, No. 67, THE SECOND
PUNIC WAR A REAPPRAISAL (1996), pp. 39-48
Published by: Wiley
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 WAS MAHARBAL RIGHT?

JOHN LAZENBY

According to Livy,1 after Cannae, as Hannibal's officers crowded round to congratula

his victory, his cavalry commander, Maharbal, told him that the best measure of his
that in five days {die quinto) he could be dining, victorious, on the Capitol: 'You
cried, 'I'll go ahead with the cavalry - they'll know I've come, before they know I
Hannibal, who allegedly could not quite take in what had happened, said t
congratulating Maharbal on his keenness, he needed time to consider his advice,
Maharbal burst out, 'So the gods haven't given everything to one man: you know h
Hannibal, but you don't know how to use a victory.' It is generally agreed, Livy se
concludes, that this day's delay was responsible for the salvation of the city and the
Like most good stories, this one is probably apocryphal - apart from anything else
does not mention Maharbal in his account of Cannae, and makes Hasdrubal and Hanno
Hannibal's cavalry commanders. But it may still be ben trovato , and no less an authority than
Montgomery has declared unequivocally that 'Maharbal was right'.2
In one respect, of course, he was obviously right: Hannibal did know how to win a victory. As
Montgomery says,3 'his tactical genius at Cannae can compare with the conduct of any battle in
the history of warfare.' The Prussian General Staff seems to have become obsessed with the
battle, and the 1914 'Schlieffen Plan' was allegedly inspired by it, though the scale was
altogether different. Lack of manpower forced the substitution of a 'right hook' for Hannibal's
'double envelopment', but Schlieffen himself apparently never quite gave up the dream of a
'colossal Cannae'.4 Even General Schwarzkopf of Gulf War fame is said to be an admirer of
Hannibal.
The latter' s qualities as a general have been described and admired since at least Polybius'
time5 - his ability to inspire men of different races, for example, his care for his troops and
knowledge of what they could and could not do - one thinks of the way he used his Numidian
cavalry, for instance - his psychological insight into the minds of his enemies and his apparently
never-failing capacity for finding a solution to any military problem. But if there is a single key
to his success, it is perhaps the subtle mixture of bluff and double bluff he used, or, to put it
another way, what might be called his 'variations on a trap'.
Simple bluff was used by him all the time, for example at the crossing of the Rhône, in the
fight with the Allobroges in the gorge and perhaps most famously in the escape from Campania

1 Livy 22.51.1-4.
2 For Hannibal's cavalry commanders at Cannae see Polybius 3.1 14.7 and 116.6-8; for Montgomery's
comment sec A History of Warfare (London: Collins, 1968) 97.
3 History of Warfare, 96.
4 Barbara W. Tuchman, August 1914 (London 1962) 32-33.
5 Compare 11.19.1-2; 15.15-16.

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40 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR - A REAPPRAISAL

at the end of 2 17. 6 Double bluff is, perhaps, best exemplifi

Tarentum, early in 212, when, instead of trying completely to
would probably have been impossible, he ordered a party of N
countryside on either side of the route, so that anyone who spo
prisoner, or would merely report yet another Numidian raid.7
Of the battles, the Trebbia is an example of simple bluff. As Po
have suspected Mago' s ambush if the terrain had been wooded, b
woods for their ambushes. But none of them thought an ambush
flat and treeless terrain.8 Trasimene, on the other hand, was per
As Livy remarks,9 the place was 'born for ambush' ( loca nata in
thought this was too obvious - in any case, what general in com
expects to be ambushed ?
At Cannae, Hannibal ostensibly laid all his cards on the table,
constituted a gigantic trap. The extraordinary 'reverse-refusal' o
centre invited the Romans to attack them. But the placing of tw
either wing of the infantry line meant that not only would the e
centre, but that, if things went badly wrong, fugitives from th
would also be funnelled into the centre where at least they woul
slow the Roman advance. Finally, the unusual placing of the m
the confined flank near the river, with the Numidians occupying t
numerous Roman allied cavalry, meant that the latter would b
cavalry, having disposed of the weaker Roman citizen cavalry, wo
Zama, finally, shows that the master had lost none of his old c
that he was weaker in cavalry than his opponent, and so could
using his cavalry to destroy the enemy's and then attack his flank
deliberately sacrificed his own in order to lure the Roman cavalr
remembering what had happened to Antigonus Monophthalm
Poliorcetes, went off in pursuit of Seleucus' cavalry at Ipsus. H
all about the strengths and weaknesses of elephants. He may have
do their stuff- after all, he deployed no fewer than eighty of them
he may secretly have thought that most of them would do prec
out to the flanks and disrupt his cavalry, thus aiding the decepti
His infantry dispositions were also unusual, probably becau
equally weak here, since at least a third of his foot consisted
Carthaginian territory itself. He could have tried to repeat Cann
centre, perhaps strengthened by an admixture of the mercenari
first line, and leaving his veterans to fill the rôle of the African
he may well have known that Scipio had served at Cannae, and
may even have known that he, too, favoured flank attacks with
So, for the first time, instead of his usual single-line formation
triple-line, but with yet another variation. He not only placed
veterans of his 'Army of Italy', about 200 yards behind the seco

6 Compare Polybius 3.42-3; 3.50-1; 3.93-94.6.

7 Polybius 8.28.
8 3.71.1-4.
9 22.4.2.

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 JOHN LAZENBY: WAS MAHARBAL RIGHT? 41

advanced, evidently ordered the veterans to stand fast.10 This l

- possibly the very first - of a 'true reserve'. But in additio
reserve, the plan was, presumably, that the first two lines would
of the Roman advance, and hopefully disrupt and weaken cert
principes as well. The 'Army of Italy' would then deliver th
emerged triumphant but bloodied from its expected victory o
words, Hannibal may once again having been planning to use
him, as he had done at Cannae, but with the difference that no
on, not on the flanks and rear. Of course it was not to be - Sci
well-organized. But who knows what might have happened
returned in the nick of time?
So much for Hannibal's ability to win victories, but what o
have marched on Rome after Cannae? Here, on the short-term
I advanced in my book.11 In the first place, whatever his c
himself, with the main army, could hardly have reached R
quinto '. Armies have achieved marches of fifty miles a d
marched from the Metaurus to his previous camp within six
Canusium, where Hannibal had been last reported, the distance
Davout marched nearly 90 miles in 48 hours before Austerlit
marched at a much slower rate - less than 9 miles a day, fo
perhaps 10 to 15 miles a day on the ten-day march from Trasi
on which route he took.14
Secondly, once he had got to Rome, he is very unlikely to ha
a coup de main , for despite Roman scaremongering, it by n
There were the two legiones urbanae raised at the beginning
at Ostia and the marines he sent to Teanum Sidicinum, to s
civilians in the city, many of whom would already have seen m
whom some were in fact armed.15 Thus he would almost certa
protracted siege, since treachery in Rome's case was inconceiva
open to the serious risk of being trapped in the vicinity of the c
forces Rome could rapidly have raised. He might, of course,
victory, but this kind of 'trench warfare' was never his forte,
Capua in 212/1 1 showed.
Finally, an attack on Rome probably never formed part of
even Polybius sometimes imply - it is significant that the onl
city, in 21 1, it was for the purely strategic purpose of drawi
Capua. By marching on the city in 216 he would have been ma
Roman confederacy, away from the areas in which he could
Apulians, Samnites and, above all, the Campanians, who as ev
defection, have viewed the prospect of the Carthaginian gener

10 Polybius 15.11.2; 15.12.7.

11 Hannibal's War (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1978) 85-6.
12 Livy 27.50.1. For the problem of where Hannibal was see Hanni
13 David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon (London 1966) 1
14 For the march up the Rhône valley see Polybius 3.50. 1 ; for the m
Polybius 3.86.9.
15 Livy 23.14.2; 22.57.7-8 and 11.

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42 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR - A REAPPRAISAL

again? Would they not have decided on a further policy of 'w

the Trebbia and Trasimene? In short, far from Hannibal's not
was it not Maharbal?
Nevertheless, it might be argued that Maharbal was right in a more fundamental sense.
Hannibal's strategy was evidently based on the assumption that by winning victories, he could
win the support, or at least the neutrality of Rome's allies, as his repeated declarations to his non-
Roman prisoners make clear.16 Presumably he hoped thereby, not to destroy Rome, but to force
her to accept his terms. Thus Livy says that he told his prisoners after Cannae that 'his war with
the Romans was not to the death - he was fighting for honour and power',17 and although this
may not be very good evidence, the terms of his treaty with Philip V of Macedonia, as recorded
by Polybius,18 clearly are, and they envisage the continued existence of Rome, even if victory is
secured. But could Rome be defeated without being destroyed? Her brusque rejection of
Carthalo's embassy after Cannae,19 and indeed her whole history, suggest otherwise: Rome
hardly ever, if ever, negotiated with an enemy from a position of defeat. If so, perhaps Hannibal's
subtleties were wasted on a people like the Romans.
In particular, he may, in retrospect, seem naive to have expected the Latins and Italians to have
received him as a 'liberator'. Brought up, as he presumably was, on the somewhat uneasy
relations which prevailed between Carthage and her allies, perhaps reinforced by a knowledge
of Greek history, he may completely have failed to understand just how complex the relations
between Rome and her allies were. Though many of the allies no doubt hated the Romans, and
even more resented their position of greater or less subservience, there was no universal feeling
of 'us' and 'them': what had a Latin from Praeneste, for example, in common with a Samnite,
or a Picene with a Greek from Tarentum or Locri? Thus we can well believe Livy, for instance,
when he has Roman generals question why disaffected allies should choose to side with
'Numidians and Moors' or 'foreigners and barbarians' against a people of Italy like themselves.20
However, seductive as this argument is, it really only amounts to saying that Hannibal should
not have gone to war in the first place. But although it is arguable that Rome was bound to defeat
Carthage in the end, was peace a viable alternative? Only those naive enough to think that the
Hannibalic War was just a war of revenge, can seriously imagine that it could have been avoided
in the long term. In the short term, of course, Hannibal could have climbed down over Saguntum,
but the whole history of Roman diplomacy, and especially of her relations with Carthage after
the war, suggests that Roman demands would not have ceased with Saguntum. This would
merely have been the thin end of the wedge. One is reminded of the scene in Yes, Prime Minister ,
in which the strategic expert quizzes Jim Hacker about when he would 'press the button' - when
the Russians reached Piccadilly? In this case, when were the Carthaginians to fight? When
ordered to move their city ten miles from the sea?
In any case, what was the alternative? The obvious one was simply to stand on the defensive
in Spain and Africa and hope to defeat any forces Rome might send. That Hannibal did anticipate
the possibility of attacks on both Spain and Africa is indicated by the steps he took to safeguard
them, before he set out on the march to Italy. Polybius derives his account of these from
Hannibal's own statement on the bronze tablet he set up on the Lacinian promontory.21 But

16 Compare Polybius 3.77.3-7 and 85.1-4; Livy 22.58.1-2.

17 22.58.3.
18 7.9.

19 Livy 22.58.7-9.
20 Compare Livy 23.5.1 1-13; 24.47.5.
21 3.33.6ff.

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 JOHN LAZENBY: WAS MAHARBAL RIGHT? 43

Hannibal clearly never intended to remain in Spain himself, n

army had arrived there and hopefully been destroyed, as Brian
good reason to believe that had Hannibal stood on the defen
have been any different. What had happened in the first war,
of disasters, particularly at sea, suggests that if Hannibal had
sent to Spain, the Romans would simply have sent more. After
later in the second war, when, despite Hannibal's continue
decided not to cut their losses after the defeat of the eld
reinforcements, first under Claudius Nero, and then under th
The most that Hannibal could have hoped to achieve was s
similar to the Peace of Phoinike concluded with Philip V, which
position in Spain temporarily intact. But for how long would
really believe that Rome would have acquiesced in such a com
peace with Philip was probably only concluded because Rome
and did not wish to be distracted by problems in Greece. Let u
peace with Carthage was scarcely dry before the Republic ag
More importantly, because we know what happened, we tend
point of Hannibal's campaign - Montgomery, for example,
apparently ran out of ideas'.23 But although even I called th
'Blitzkrieg', as though Hannibal had to win his war quickly, or
In the two World Wars Germany thought she had to win the w
could not fight a war on two fronts, but Hannibal's situation w
assume that he was thinking in terms of a quick victory? After a
his father, it would have been that Rome was a power of imm
lasted twenty-three years, before it ended in the defeat of Carth
it would take less time to defeat Rome? He knew that he could
but why should he have assumed that a few quick victories wou
he planning a 'blitzkrieg' or a 'war of attrition'?
Perhaps he was not so naive as to imagine that a few quick
that held the Roman confederacy together; perhaps he unders
the ties binding Rome and her allies. After all, if Philip V of
part of the secret of Rome's success was her ability to absorb o
indicates,24 why should Hannibal not have been equally astute
not be so much the lightning strike which would crack the mo
out misery of constant war-service and devastated fields and f
losses in battle. The crucial difference between this and the first
war would be on the dòorstep.
Recently a student argued in an essay that 'in a war of attrit
and that set me thinking. It is true that Polybius himself, in com
Trasimene, stresses that 'the advantages of the Romans were i
and of men'.25 But this is to miss the point: Hannibal was not
on Carthage's resources, and the Romans on theirs. Having got
pay off, he would increasingly be fighting the war with R

22 The Punic Wars (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980) 93ff.

23 History of Warfare, 97.
24 SIG3 no. 543.
25 3.89.9.

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44 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR - A REAPPRAISAL

summarising Hannibal's alleged advice to Antiochus of Syri

always been one and the same - that the war should be waged
supplies and troops to an external enemy' ( Italiam et commeat
hosti). In that sense, time was on Hannibal's side.
Nor was he wholly mistaken, if he thought like this. If w
Rome's resources in manpower in 225 with livy's list of defec
to calculate that by 212 over 40% of the allies were no lon
majority of the Campanians, whom Polybius classes as citize
the situation improve much in 21 1, despite the fall of Capua,
Campanian troops, and there are hints that disaffection w
unaffected. Thus from 212 to 207 Etruria was placed under
propraetor, and in 206/5 under a proconsul with two legions.2
there in 209, which grew worse in the following year,29 and
was ordered to make enquiries into which Etruscan and U
planning to join Hasdrubal or had already given him help?0
Even the loyalty of the Latins was not unquestionable. A
Brundisium who had betrayed Clastidium before the Treb
opportunity to try to drive a wedge between Rome and her alli
to be the last defection by Latins throughout the war, there a
Romans had their doubts about Latin attitudes after Cannae. T
his brother's successes to Carthage, the historian has Hanno as
of the Latin name had defected,'32 shortly afterwards he has
supplement the Senate by granting the citizenship to Latin se
when the minds of the allies were in a state of such suspense,
Even the refiisal of the Latin garrison of Casilinum of Rome's
indicates the equivocal attitude of the Latins to Rome as much
communities.
But the most important indication of just how far Hannibal's strategy may have been
succeeding even as late as 209, is, of course, the refusal in that year of twelve of the thirty Latin
colonies to supply their contingents of men. There is no reason to doubt the fact, and although
we only have Livy's account of the reasons for it,35 it is worth noting that - according to him -

26 34.60.3. The whole passage is worth quoting, since, curiously enough, it is the best summary of
Hannibal's strategy to be found in any ancient source: ' sententia eius una atque eadem semper erat, ut in
Italia bellum gereretur; Italiam et commeatus et militem praebituram externo hosti; si nihil ibi moveatur,
liceatque populo Romano viribus et copiis ltaliae extra Italiam bellum gerere, ñeque regem ñeque gentem
ullam parem Romanis esse.'
27 Polybius 2.24, Livy 22.61.1 1-15 (compare Polybius 3.1 18). Though there are problems with Polybius'
figures - see F. W. Walbank, A Historical Commentary on Polybius , 3 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1957-79) I, 196ff. - that the allies provided 50% of both the infantry and the cavalry in Roman armies is
confirmed by figures for particular armies elsewhere.
28 Compare T. S. R.Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic (New York 1951) 267ff.
29 Livy 27.21.6ff.; 27.24.
30 Livy 28.10.4-5.
31 Polybius 3.69.1-4.
32 23.12.16.
33 23.22.8
34 Livy 23.20.2.
35 27.9-10.

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 JOHN LAZENBY: WAS MAHARBAL RIGHT? 45

others of the allies were equally disgruntled, and that their co

continued to serve in the Roman army were worse off than tho
Carthaginians, since the latter at least came home. He also clai
the Romans became aware that all their allies felt like this, th
peace - which is just what Hannibal had wanted all along.
Nor should we underestimate the strain on manpower of th
battle, even if the Latins and Italians he took prisoner eventua
let us remember, something like 120,000 men had been killed
in 215, Livy says,37 it was decided not to try to avenge Pos
because there was 'not even any way of bringing the two co
required for so great a struggle'. Again the situation does not
records further problems with the levy in 212 and 207, and cl
only 137,108 citizens were recorded, 'considerably fewer t
possible that at some point in the war, the wealth-qualification
citizens had to be lowered by over 60%, presumably because
But could Hannibal have done more to attack the morale o
example, criticizes his failure to raise 'a proper siege-train,
reduce the fortresses upon which the Fabian strategy of the Ro
the question what 'a proper siege-train' means in the context o
at least believed that Hannibal used mantlets ( vineae ), sieg
4 machinationes ' in attacks on various places, and implies, sure
could construct what they needed on the spot41 - to talk like t
of the war Hannibal was fighting. If, as he claimed,42 he ha
behalf of the Latins and Italians, he could hardly set about
strategic Latin fortresses like Beneventum and Brundisium. In
assault on Cartagena is not a valid comparison.
Even if Hannibal had managed to capture Latin and Italian to
have had to garrison them, which he could ill afford to do, as
at least mainly on voluntary defection, and it is noticeable tha
towns for strategic reasons - for example, to acquire a port
command routes (Nuceria, Acerrae, Nola, Casilinum). His o
create a coherent pro-Carthaginian bloc southeast of a line r
After his assault on Cumae in 215, he seems always to hav
attempting to capture a town, but even when communities did
to him, he could not necessarily rely on their whole-hearted s
true of those who were potentially his most important allie
have livy' s word for it, but he says that the conditions upon w

36 Roman losses at the Trebbia were not many less than 30,000; at
the annihilation of Centenius' 4000 cavalry; at Cannae, if Livy' s fi
37 23.25.6.
38 25.22.2-4; 27.38.1-5; 27.36.6-7.
39 Compare P. A. Brunt, Italian Manpower 225 BC-AD 14 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) 66,
75, 403ff.
40 History of Warfare, 91.
41 23.18.8; 37.2; 25.11.10; 29.7.4ff.
42 Polybius 3.77.4.
43 26.38.1-2.

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46 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR - A REAPPRAISAL

included a clause that 'no Carthaginian general or official shou

Campanian citizen, and that no Campanian citizen should have
against his will'.44 In the end, far from being an asset, the Camp
round Hannibal's neck, even if we discount Livy 's tales of the
Capua had on his army - at one point he even has Marcellus de
Cannae!45 In 212, for example, the Capuans' failure properly
general, Hanno, in his attempt to provision the city, led to a disa
near Beneventum, and although a year later the Capuans did sorti
as Hannibal attempted to break through the Roman lines from ou
beaten back with far less difficulty than his.46
Montgomery also claims that Hannibal 'clearly ... never under
seapower',47 but, on the contrary, it is arguable that he understo
to undertake the long and laborious march to Italy, when, other
gone much more quickly and easily by sea, and once in souther
to capture a port in Campania. But what could any amount of
of the almost total incompetence displayed by the Carthaginian
Nor, finally, was Hannibal probably as baffled by Fabian strate
Admittedly he was not able to inflict any more disasters on t
Trasimene or Cannae, but, as Polybius implies in connection
Falernus in 217, there were two edges to his ability to defeat th
would compel them to fight or would make it clear to all that he
the Romans were abandoning the countryside to him and his arm
to forget that he did continue to win victories in the field a
Herdonea, which, if historical - and it is difficult to account for
brought against the Roman commander, if it is not - cost the Ro
came Second Herdonea, which cost the Roman commander an
tribunes their lives, as well as those of either 13,000 or 7000 of
Numistro, which livy regards as a Roman victory but Frontinus
was twice defeated near Canusium, and, finally, in 208, alth
importance, both consuls, Marcellus and Crispinus, received mor
first time such a thing had happened in Roman history, accordin
Livy may exaggerate the alarm felt at Rome when Hasdrubal
almost hysterical joy which greeted the Metaurus. But the fact
granted in the war was for that victory, and what might have h
able to open his second front in 215, when, if we are to believe
from marching to Italy by his defeat at Ibera? What, for that matt

44 23.7.1.
45 23.45.4; compare 23.18.10ff. and 35.1.
46 Livy 25.13-14; 26.5-6.
47 History of Warfare, 97.
48 3.90.11.
49 For the battle see Livy 25.21 ; for the charge of perduellio 26.2.7 ff.
50 Livy 27.1.4-15: he says that one of his sources said the casualties were 13,000, another 7000.
51 Livy 27.2; Front., Strat. 2.2.6.
52 Canusium: Livy 27.33.7; the ambush: Polybius 10.32. Iff; Livy 27.33.7.
53 23.27.9ff.

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 JOHN LAZENBY: WAS MAHARBAL RIGHT? 47

some of those 77,800 men sent elsewhere by the Carthaginian

Hannibal instead?54
So, in the end, though the overall purpose of this confe
'reappraise' the second Punic War, I still think that Hannibal
been fought. I see no point in declaring, as Montgomery does5
complete failure'. That it was a 'failure' there is no doubt, but
has resulted in the defection of the two largest cities iii the e
itself, along with over 40% of the enemy's allies, and whe
comprehensively defeated three times, on the last occasion pe
in a single day's fighting, than any other army in European hi
as a 4 complete failure'.
Analysing Hannibal's strategy in fact tends to conceal rat
boldness. It is easy enough to see that Rome could only be def
that;57 it is equally easy to see that Hannibal dared not go by
in any case bring him to an area of Italy where he could hope t
one suspects, the idea would have remained an idle dream. It t
be done, and - let's face it - genius so nearly to pull it off.

University of Newcastle

54 Compare Caven, Punic Wars , 258.

55 History of Warfare, 97.
56 John Terraine, The Smoke and the Fire (London 1980) 45, says of t
1916 - that the losses of the British Army 'were probably greater than
single day,' and gives the total as 57,470. But this includes 35,493 l
total of 'Killed (or died of wounds)', 'Missing' and 'Prisoners' onl
were in the first category. The figures for the Roman losses at C
unfortunately Polybius' (3.1 17.2-4 & 7-12) do not make sense as they
andiieed not be doubted: he says that 45,500 infantry and 2,700 cav
various passages (22.49.13 & 18, 50.1 1, 52.3-4) it emerges that 19
comparable losses were more than three times as high as those of the
57 Compare the passage quoted in n.26 above.

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48 THE SECOND PUNIC WAR - A REAPPRAISAL

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