Philippe Eberhard

The Middle Voice

in Gadamer's Hermeneutics
A Basic Interpretation
with Some Theological Implications

Mohr Siebeck
PHILTPPB EBERHARD, born 1964; 1989 Licence en tMologie (University of Neuch�tel);
1990 Master of Sacred Theology (Chicago Theological Seminary); 19?0-1_9 91Clin� cal
Pastoral Education (University of Chicago Hospitals); 2002 Ph D. (UruvefSlty
. of Chtca­
go Divinity School); Adjunct Professor at William Paterson University, NJ, Department
of Languages and Cultures.
Preface

The tenor of this study dates back to my work as a hospital chaplain in the
early nineties, although at the time I did not realize it. Wandering the wards,
sitting in on meetings between the doctors and the nurses, and above all listening
to patients, I learned the hard way something I had known all along without being
aware of it: the mediality of being. My experience as a chaplain taught me to go
beyond the active and the passive, beyond the bustling activity of the doctors and
the nurses and the unea.Sy passivity of the patients and their families. Even though
I looked active- I was hospital staff and wore a white coat- I could not actively
do anything for the patients and their families. In fact, those patients for whom
healing was more than being cured were more active than I was. My task was to
be. Not to do. That is when it began to dawn on me that the subject/object,
agent/patient, active/passive outlook misfits our condition. Since my work as a
hospital chaplain, philosophical hermeneutics and the middle voice have allowed
me to hear things differently: the question is not "Who does what?" but "Where
are we ?" Location, not identity, is key.
The present text is a revised version of my doctoral dissertation, which I
completed in June of 2002 at the University of Chicago Divinity School. I am
deeply grateful to my advisor, Professor William Schweiker, for his perceptive
and articulate corrunents and his encouragement to publish my dissertation, and
to my readers Professor David Tracy and Professor Jean Grondin. Concerning the
revisions, I am particularly indebted to Professor Margaret Mitchell. Her
thorough reading of my manuscript proved to be of invaluable help to me. I
would also like to express my appreciation to Mohr Siebec� particularly to Mr.
Matthias Spitzner and Dr. Henning Ziebritzki for their forthcoming and efficient
way of working with me. Furthermore, I could never have undertaken this study
ISBN 3-16-148157-7 and completed it without the indispensable assistance I received from Jackie
ISSN 0440-7180 (Hermeneutische Untersuchungen
zurTbeologie)
Hanson and the· staff of the library ofNorthem State University in Aberdeen, SD,
Die Deutsche Bibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; and from Ruth Paul, Zay Green, Amy Monahan, and the staff of the library of the
derailed bibliographic data is available in the Internet at http://dnb.ddb.de.
Maryknoll Society in Maryknoll, NY. They put up with my many requests for
interlibrary loans without a sigh or a frown. I also would like to give credit to
© 2004 by Mohr Siebeck, Ttibingen, Germany. Union Theological Seminary, NY for having granted me access to their library
This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in a� y for� (beyo�d that permitted while I was revising my manuscript. Finally, I wish to express my gratitude to all
by copyright law) without the publisher's wntten perrmsswn. Tius apphes par� tcularly to my friends who tried to understand the middle voice and to rephrase it in their
.

reproductions, translations, microfilms and storage and processmg m electroruc systems. own words. Above all, I tl1ank my wife, Xiao-lei, for her patience and support,
The book was printed by Gulde-Druck in TUbingen on non-aging paper and bound b y and my two sons, Leandre and Dominique, who in their way have made me even
GroBbuchbinderei Josef Spinner i n Ottersweier. more attentive t o the mediality of being. Thank you.

Printed in Germany.
 Table of Contents

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . V

Introduction . . .. ... . . ... .. .. . .. ... . . .. .. . .. .. . .. ... .. .. . .. . . . . 1

Chapter I: The Middle Voice as Hermeneutic Key . .. . . ... . ..... . . ... 7

The Middle Voice from a Linguistic Perspective . . . ... . . . ... . . . .. ... ... . .. . . 8
Philosophical Perspectives on the Middle Voice . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

Chapter 2: The Middle Voice in the Literature on Gadamer:

Conspicuous by Its Absence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

Philosophical Texts on Gadamer's Hermeneutics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Theological Texts on Gadamer's Hermeneutics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Chapter 3: Gadamer's Triple Account of the Event of Understanding:

Consciousness Is More Being Than Consciousness . . . . . . . . . 62

The Process of Play . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

Fusion ofHorizon(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
The Speculation of Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Chapter 4: The Performance of the Subject within the Event of

Understanding: Consciousness after All . .. .. . .. .. . .. . . . . 109

Sub-ject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . .. ... .. .. 112

Characteristics and Performance of the Sub-ject . . . • . . . .. . . . . . .. . .. ... . . .. 125
Hermeneutics in Operation . . . .. ... ... . . . . .. .. . ... .. .. . .. .. .... . ... 150

Chapter 5: Hermeneutics and Theology . .. . .. ... . . ... . . . . .. . . .. . . 172

Theological and Religious Themes in Gadamer's Hermeneutics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177

Gadamer's Explicit Theology and the Tension It Entails withHenneneutics . . . . . . . 189
VIII Table ofConte11ts

The Mediality of Faith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 204

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . · . . . . . · . · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 216 Introduction

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . · . · · 223 This study proposes a medial interpretation of Hans-Georg Gadamer's

philosophical hermeneutics and draws theological implications concerning faith
and our human condition from a Christian humanist standpoint. It develops a
Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 twofold thesis.First, the hermeneutic event is medial throughout. The core of the
mediality of hermeneutics is the subtle balance between the event of
Scriptures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
understanding which happens to the subject and the subject who understands
Index of Names . . . . . . . . . . · · · · . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . 243
within it. Second, the mediality of understanding is the primary reason why
Index of Subjects . . . . . . . . . · · · . . . . · . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
hermeneutics is theologically pregnant. Both understanding as well as faith and
theology are medial experiences leading to an always renewed understanding of
what it is to be a human being in the world.
To put it succinctly, the following text brings into focus the middle voice as
way to articulate what it means to listen to language and the Word. First, it
introduces the notion of the middle voice. Second, it establishes that the middle
voice is conspicuous by its absence in most commentaries about Gadamer. Third,
it describes the event character of understanding. Fourth, it considers the sub-jed
within this event. Fifth, it proposes a way of listening to the Word based on a
medial interpretation of faith and our condition before God.
The argument proceeds in five steps corresponding to the five chapters of this
study. The first chapter describes the middle voice from a linguistic and a
philosophical perspective. The argument being somewhat circular - Gadamer
mentions the middle voice in the context of play, play is the hallmark of the event
of understanding, understanding is structured like religious and theological
thinking, theology and faith should claim back the insights hermeneutics gained
from them, that is, mediality - I could have picked it up at any place. I chose,
however, to begin with the middle voice for the sake of clarity. To present this
notion at the outset facilitates the understanding of the medial interpretation of
hermeneutics and its theological implications because it provides the hermeneutic
key to the whole project- not the master key opening all locks, not the answer
to all questions but rather a key like those old forgotten ones one finds from time
to time in the back of a drawer, a key in search of a lock, an answer asking for a
question. The middle voice is a grammatical notion. It refers to a third voice

1 I write "subject" with a hyphen in order to underscore its etymology. Although I am quite
fond of etymologies, I do not seek to prove anything by separating words and pointing out their
origin. My intention is simply to try to listen differently- and most often medially- to the words
I use. This applies also to "BewujJt-sein," "cor-respond," "pro.vocative," "sub-sistence," "under­
standing," etc.
2 Introduction
beside the active and the passive. Based on Emile Benveniste's characterization
of the medium as internal diathesis, I argue that the force of the middle voice is
to usher in an innovative way ofthinking in tune with philosophical hermeneutics
and Christian theology. Instead of focusing on the subject and the object, on the
agent and the patient, on who affects what/is affected b y what, etc., the middle
voice brings to language the subject in his or her relation to the process the verb
expresses. In the middle voice, as opposed to the active, the subject is within the
action which happens to him or her and of which be or she is subject. The subject
does not control the action from outside. He or she is not in charge of the event.
The key ofthe middle voice is that it allows one t o conceive of a nonexclusive
subject: the event happens, and I am its subject. The paradigmatic verb for this
kind of involving action is the Greek middle "(cXJ.liOJ.LCU, "to get married." To get
married is more than actively taking a spouse. It suggests the medial involvement
in the process of marriage which happens to the bride and the groom who marry
each other.
Chapter tv•o examines a series of philosophical and theological texts about
Gadamer. The aim is not to be exhaustive but to establish a pattern. All but two
of the reviewed commentaries write around the middle voice. In the selected
texts, the mediality of understanding is clearly audible between the lines, but it
usually does not come to language explicitly. In the most flagrant instances, the
commentaries blot out even the explicit references to the middle voice in the
passage where Gadamer argues that the original meaning of play is medial.2 One
commentator quotes from the section where Gadamer mentions the middle voice
explicitly, but he replaces the sentences about play's primordial medial meaning
with ellipsis points! Moreover, even those commentators who acknowledge the
middle voice remain at the level of the Greek grammar manuals and consider the
middle to be a hybrid between the active and the passive. Although they stress the
event character of understanding, they do not take full advantage of the middle
voice as internal diathesis. For them, the middle voice expresses a back and forth
movement whereas its force is to articulate the location of h
t e subject with
respect to the process the verb expresses.
Chapters three and four extend the primordial medial meaning of play to
Gadamer's hermeneutics as whole. They ponder the ambiguity of Bewufit-sein
Gadamer points to when he argues in the context of historically effec ted
consciousness that consciousness is more being than being conscious.3 The
2 See G WJ 109-115. (All t he references to Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gesammelte Werke, 10
,
vols. (l'iibingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Sicbeck), 1985-1995), follow the same fonnat GWJ andthe
page number for Wahrheitrmd Methode (the I" vol. of the collected works) and the name of the
article in quotation marks plus GW2, or GW3, etc. until G W JO and the page number for the
articles in the vols. 2 to 10.)
3 See, for instance, "Zwischen Phiinomenologie und Dialektik,"GWZ, I I , "Rhetorik,
Henneneutik und ldeologiekritik," GWZ, 247, and "Selbstdarstellung Hans·Georg Gadamer,"
GW2,49Sf.
Introduction 3
middle voice as internal diathesis brings into focus the subtle balance between
the event of understanding and the subject within it. Although event and subject
go hand in hand, I concentrate first on the process and then on subject's
performance. This artificial yet necessary separation entails a few repetitions.
Chapters three and four address once in a while the same elements. It is important
to note, however, that the standpoint is different. Both chapters are about
understanding, but chapter three focuses on "under" whereas chapter four stresses
"standing." Chapter three describes the event of understanding which befalls the
subject. It underscores a key notion in each part of Truth andMethod and brings
forth its encompassing aspect. In the first part, it dwells on play, in the second on
fusion of horizon(s), and in the third on linguistic speculation. Chapter four, by
contrast, discusses the subject's performance within the hermen eutic event.
Consciousness is still being conscious. The opposition subject/object may have
collapsed, but the subject is not dead. The middle voice as internal diathesis
portrays the subject as sub-ject: the subject is thrown under the event o f
understanding, yet he or she is encompassed, not overwhelmed. As the
paradigmatic yaJ.LCOf.ICXl indicates, the person getting married is not passive: the
bride and the groom still marry. In the same way the subject involved in the
hermeneutic event still understands. It is here that the middle voice reveals itself
in full actuality. The question is not: "Who understands what?" or "Who does the
understanding, the event or the subject?" The question becomes: "Where is the
understanding subject with respect to the event of understanding?" In the middle
voice, the subject understands within the event of understanding. The question
of the subject is not a matter of either/or but of both-and. The event happens and
the subject understands. The middle voice does not ask about an ultimate subject
because it knows that there is no exclusive subject reducing everything else to
objects.
Chapter five starts by examining Gadamer's use of theological and religious
motives and the explicit theology which surfaces in a few of his texts. These
motives, in particular the Trinitarian speculation and the Greek notion of piety,
constitute modes of thinking Gadamer imports into phil osophical. hermeneutics.
He is only interested in these structures of thought he finds in theology and
religion and not in the dogmatic contents. This segregation between structure and
content yields to a tension between the universality of hermeneutics and
Gadamer's explicit theology: at times it appears that Christian theology,
particularly in its Protestant form, excepts itself from hermeneutics. Gadamer
does not apply back to theology and religion the insights he gains from them. The
event character and ultimately the mediality of understanding owe a lot to
religious thinking. Gadamer, however, turns Protestant theology and faith into
something passive, a revelation of what we, as humans, cannot do. The kerygma
is nothing we can recognize. It is God's active initiative, and it reduces the
believer to a passive entity. Even the Barthian ambiguity of Rede von Gott­
God's Word to us and our word about God- is lost when Gadamer, for example,
4 Introduction
4
appears to argue that a sermon is effective ex opere operato. It is by the power
of the Word alone and not within an event of understanding involving the Word,
the preacher, the audience, etc., that the proclamation becomes true.
After listening to Gadamer's hermeneutics and to the theological and religious
themes that permeate it, I argue that the insights in to the structure of
understanding Gadamer gained from religious and theological modes o f thinking
and being can be applied back to theology. It is not only, for instance, the positive
appraisal of tradition, the emphasis on dialogue, or the importance of logos in the
sense of language, that make hermeneutics valuable for theology. Theology must
reclaim what it has given to hermeneutics: its medial structure which
encompasses the subject and lets him or her be subject within itself.
I contend that the volume of understanding is also the volume of a Christian
faith, that is, of a Christian understanding of oneself in this world. Volume
gravitates in three semantic fields that bring into focus the mediality of
understanding in the context of theology: volume as text, as space, and as sound.
Theology and faith depend on S criptures . These texts keep speaking to people
who belong to them and make them speak differently in a variety of situations.
We hear them and listen to them within the event of understanding them.This is
the volume of the Sache we under-stand: the voice that resounds in the space of
the hermeneutic experience encompassing the understanding subject.
The volume of Christian faith seen as a hermeneutic experience llllderlines that
faith is a form of understanding. Based on Hebrews 1 1 : 1 , I argue that we believe
and that faith happens to us. It is a quest for understanding that yields a
knowledge that grasps us and that we grasp. Jean-Claude Petit perfec tly describes
the event of faith asfides quaerens intellectum:.
D ne faut pas comprendre cette «quete d'intelligence» conune une activite particuliere de Ia foi,
a oote d'autres activires, peut-etre importante mais dont elle pourrait peut-etre aussi s e passer. La
foi est «quaerens inteUectum» au scns le plus fort du tenne: sans cotte quete, elle n'est plus foi.
Mais l'intellcctum, en revanche, ne doit pas etre compris non plus comme ce qu'enfin on peut
trouver: il demeure toujours ce qui se laisse chercber, il n'advient meme que daiiS la quete qu'en
fait Ia foi. C'est d'ai lleurs sa seule <<methode» dont I 'unique traduction, en theologie, devrait ctrc
precisement Ia «recherche», c'est-a-dirc Ia queste, ce qui,justemcnt, nous garde en chemin ou
encore, Ia question. «Apres oela, il se manifesta sous d'autres traits a deux d 'entre eux qui etaient
en chemin . ..>> (Me 16:12).5
Faith is no object we can possess but a hermeneutic experience, an ongoing
medial quest involving the believer in its volume. This journey means for the
Christian to be in Christ. To be in Christ answers the question: "Where am I?" In
4 See Karl Barth, Die kirchlich � Dogmatik: Ei11feitung. Das Wort Goues als Kriterium der
DogmaJik, Studienausgabe in 30 vols., vol. I (Zurich: Theologischcr Verlag Ziirich, 1986), 42f.
and GWJ, 33.
5 Jean-Claude Petit, ..Hermeneutique philosophique et tbeologie," Laval theologtque eJ
philosophique 41, no. 2 (1985): 170.
Introduction 5
hem1eneutic terms, it means to be within the Sache we attempt to understand and
to follow the direction of meaning it discloses t o us in our efforts.
Finally, the conclusion sums up the interpretation of understanding and faith
as medial experiences and goes a step further. It points to the amazing proximity
between Gadamcr's philosophical concem6 and Paul's injunction in Philippians,
chapter 2, verses 12 and 13: Gadamer describes llllderstanding as something that
happens beyond our doing and wi lling, and Paul calls the Philippians to act
because God acts in and among them without their willing and acting. Proximity,
however, does not mean identity. There is a new tension that emerges from the
medial interpretation of hermeneutics and its theological implications. Theology
and faith are not special cases of hermeneutics or exceptions to it. They are
medial experiences like understanding. H ermeneutics is the ongoing attempt t o
b e a t home in the world by letting it b e told to oneself in the house o f being, that
is, in language. Just as we have to let the world be told to ours elv es, we have t o
let the Christian kerygma b e told to ourselves. Faith as a hermeneutic experience
underscores that the kerygma happens to us in lan guage, like everything else we
can Wlderstand. The tension is elsewhere. Peter's hermeneutic experience which
universalized his faith as it is told in Acts 10 points to the specificity of faith and
theology. Faith's renewed effort to be at home in the world does not take the
world for granted precisely because it takes it to be granted by God. The
believers, like everybody else, know the world by having it told to them. For the
believers, however, to be at home in the world does not go without saying
because to be in the world is not necessarily the same as to be of the world. Faith
and theology are linguistic like understanding, but instead of only telling us a
world they also make us question it. The question becomes: "Where are we at
home?'' Sometimes one has to move to be truly at home!
6 See "Vorwort zur 2. Auflage," GWl, 438.
 Chapter 1

The Middle Voice as Hermeneutic Key

With reference to remarks by Zeus about the nature of human suffering at the
beginning of the Odyssey, John Peradotto asks in Man in the Middle Voice:
Are mortals fully developed agents who must be held responsible for their actions, or are they for
the most part passive objects of divine activity, or, what may be closer to the tonalities of the
whole text when all its contending voices are averaged out, do they feel themselves immersed in
the action in such a way that, at least at times, "doer" and "done to" become inadequate
categories, drawing a sharp line, legislating a boundary, where none is felt?'

The distinction between "doer" and "done to" subsides, and the verb as
encompassing event emerges when one attempts to think i n terms of the middle
voice. The process that happens is the locality of our actions. This is the core of
the middle voice. This chapter discusses the grammatical notion of the middle
voice first linguistically and then philosophically. It sets the stage for a medial
reading of Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics and some
theological implications concerning faith and the human condition from a
Christian perspective.
I begin with the middle voice because it functions as the hermeneutic key of
the whole project. "Hermeneutic key" must not be taken too actively. It does not
mean that the middle voice unlocks everything. It rather points to a way of
questioning and thinking and not to the solution. It is not a tool, a means, or a
catalyst that one makes use o£ It is no master key one pulls out of one's pocket
to open every lock one encounters. It resembles a vade mecum, a booklet that
accompanies me wherever I go for reference, for notes, for thoughts, etc. The
further I go, the richer it becomes because it encapsulates my past encounters and
orients me in my new ones. Although I start with the middle voice, I could have
started with philosophical hermeneutics, with Gadamer's notion of play since he
explicitly calls it medial, or even with the experience o f faith. The circularity of
my argument makes any starting point contingent, but not arbitrary. I introduce
the middle voice at the outset in order not to mention it without having discussed
it. There is no logical necessity for the argument to start there. It is only a matter
of clarity.
My purpose is not to define the middle voice and to confine it to a particular
mold even though I heavily rely on Benveniste's interpretation. My point is not

1 John Peradotto, Man in the Middle Voice (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1990), 133.
8 Chap. 1: The Middle Voice as Hermeneutic Key
to try to establish the defmitive meaning of the middle voice but to map out some
of its consequences for understanding ourselves. I want to underline a particular
aspect of this grammatical notion that invites a new way of thinking in tune with
fundamental hermeneutics. The middle voice, particularly according to
Benveniste's account, points to a medium in the chemical sense: a medium in
which and not only by which something takes place. It directs one's attention
away from the subject/object distinction between "doer" and "done to" and shifts
it toward the relation between the process of the verb and the subject. The
question is not what the subject actively effects and how he or she is passively
affected, but where he or she is situated. In the middle voice, the emphasis lies
on the locality of the subject with respect to the verb. Let us first tum to the
middle voice from a linguistic perspective.
The Middle Voice from a Linguistic Perspective
Most modem languages do not have an actual morphological middle voice.
Middle-voiced expressions, however, are common- provided that one listens for
them. To be able to hear them, one has to be aware that the middle voice exists.
One way to reach this awareness is to tum to ancient Greek which had a middle
voice. The point is not to glorify ancient Greek or to be nostalgic about it In its
variety, it represents but a stage or stages in the history of a specific language.
The Kaine, the Greek of the Septuagint and the New Testament, is also a stage
in the development of Greek. Concerning the voices, there has been a trend in
Greek to merge the middle voice and the passive into a single voice. Although
there is already evidence in the New Testament that the middle voice is
retreating, the "system of voices in general remained the same in the Hellenistic
period (including the NT) as in the classical period of the language."2 It is
important to note, however, that the state of the middle voice in a particular
language at a particular time is not crucial for the argument of this study. Just as
with the etymology of words, the reference to the middle voice as henneneutic
key is not intended to be a foundational proof of the way things are; it is rather
an attempt to listen differently to the world we have to let be told to ourselves.
Moreover, neither the middle voice nor its study are limited to Greek. Early
Sanskrit grammarians, Panini (ca. 500 BC) in particular, described the middle
voice in terms of actions that affect their sources, actions done for oneself,
2 F. Blass and A. Debrunner, A Greek Grammar of the New Testament and Other Early
Christian Literature, trans. Robert W. Funk (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1961), 161 [§ 307]. See also A. T. Robertson, A Grammar ofthe GreekNew Testament in
the Light ofHistorical Research (Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman Press, 1934), 333-335, 814f.
The Middle Voicefrom a Linguistic Perspective 9
contrasting it to the active which denotes an action done for another;3 and today,
the study of the middle voice extends even to languages beyond the Indo­
European family.4 Thus, this is not the place for value judgments about
languages. As a linguist wrote: "I have met language speakers I did not like, but
never a language." Ancient Greek is not better, only different. The aim in
exploring the middle voice is to sharpen one's ears for medial structures and
middle-voiced expressions, even in our language(s). That I fmd the paradigmatic
examp.Je of the middle voice in ancient Greek does not exalt this particular
language. The different way of thinking the middle voice implies is medial before
it is Greek.
Although Western linguistics has been using it for centuries, the notion of the
middle voice remains elusive. Paul Kent Andersen notes that there are almost as
many definitions of voice or diathesis as there are theoretical frameworks in the
relevant literature.5 Likewise, Suzanne Kemmer writes that there is no generally
accepted defmition of the middle voice.6 It is safe to say, however, that the
middle voice is most commonly known from the gr ammar of ancient Greek. In
Greek, it represents the third voice or diathesis between the active and the
passive.
A few indications about the complicated history of grammar and of the notion
of voice from the Greeks and the Romans to the present are in order. According
to Hermann Koller, the origin of Greek grammar lies in musical theories. The
reflections about music concerned the relation between mental dispositions
(especially the soul's pathos and praxis, its passivity and activity) and musical
expressions (�t).ll)<nc;;) , that is, music, rhythm, dancing, poetry, and songs. Koller
writes: "Die 'Bewegungen der Seele' Pathos und Praxis fehlen in keiner
Defmition der musikalischen Mimesis."7 The categories that grew out of these
theories found their way into the description of a different form of expression:
language. The musical origin of Greek grammatical terms and the focus on the
active and passive disposition of the soul might explain why the early Greek
grammarians described Greek first in terms of the active and the passive. They
did not recognize the primary and actually older distinction between active and
3 M. H. Klaiman, "Affectedness and Control: A Typology of Voice Systems," in Passive and
Voice, ed. Masayoshi Shibataoi (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing
Company, 1988), 33.
4 See, for example, the discussion whether to speak of a Chinese middle voice is pertinent
in Charles N. Li and Sandra A. Thompson, "On 'Middle Voice' Verbs in Mandarin," in Voice:
Form and Function, ed. Barbara Fox and Paul J. Hopper (Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John
Ben amins Publishing Company: 1994), 231-246.
�
Paul Kent Andersen, Empirical Studies in Diathesis (Mtinster: Nodus Publikationen, 1994),
10.
6 Suzanne Kemmer, The Middle Voice, Typological Studies in Language, vol. 23
(Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1993), 1.
7 Hermann Koller, "Die Anfange der griechischen Grammatik," Glotta 37 (1958): 32.
10 Chap. 1: The Middle Voice as Hemzeneutc
i Key
middle voice, even though in fact Greek knows only this opposition.8 According
to Koller, the use of a vocabulary that had arisen independently from linguistic
considerations explains the djscrepancy between the Greek language and its
grammatical description. The basis of Koller's argument is that language and
music are different. If it is true, however, that grammar originated in the
reflection about the effects of the Muses, this kinship may in fact hint at a deep
affinity between music, art in general, and language seen as hermeneutic
experiences. The possibility that the reflection about music and its effects
influenced granunar is of course particularly interesting in the context of
Gadamer's re-evaluation of aesthetics based on the medial notion of play. Beyond
grammatical terminology, it points perhaps to the pervasiveness of mediality.
The frrst grammar to use the categories of active, passive, and middle voice
is a work attributed t o Dionysios Thrax.91t proposes eight characteristics of the
verb, diathesis being one of them. There are three diatheses: evepye-..cx, 1ttt8o<;,
and 11ea6't1K Energeia means performance; it designates verbs where the subject
performs the action, and it is characterized by an active set of endings. Pathos,
"experience," concerns verbs where the action is done to the subject who
experiences it, and it exhibits a medial set of endings. In between, there is a grey
zone of verbs whose form and meaning do not cqrrespond: they either have active
endings and a pathos or medial endings and an energeia meaning. If Koller's
explanation of Greek grammatical terminology is true, it is no wonder that in
Dionysios's classification the stress lies on the binary opposition between
performance and experience. The middle voice's only function is to
accommodate the verbs that do not fit the two major categories.
Andersen argues that Dionysios's formal definition has been corrupted by later
Greek and especially by Roman grammarians. Instead of following Dionysios and
distinguishing two basic morphological categories of verbs whose form and
meaning coincide and a middle zone of exceptions, they divided the verbs into
distinct lex.ical classes. The Roman grammarians, for example, devised five
genera of verbs with their particular meanings. Based on this model, Dionysios 's
three dispositions became three distinct classes of verbs. The terms introduced
by Dionysios - evepyelcx, 1tCi8o<;, and J.leOOt'fl<; - were translated into Latin
activum, passivum, and medium, where the English terms come from. This
glimpse at the history of the middle voice shows that language was thought about
in categories that originated in a field that had little to do with granunar and that,
apparently because of that origin, grammatical reflection bas revolved arotmd the
cleavage between active and passive.
8 See Jolm Lyons, Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics (Cambridge, London, New York,
and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1968), 373 and also Andrew L. Sihler, New
Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1995), 448 (§ 414].
9 See Andersen, 149-183.
The Middle Voicefrom a Linguistic Perspective 11
The division into three voices needs qualifications: what the grammar manuals
tell us i � not necessarily the way the Greeks themselves regarded their lang{mge.
Accordmg to Andersen, Dionysios's notions of performance and experience have
a wider meaning than what we call active and passive. It so happens that a Greek
introduced the three voices that are so ingrained in Western linguistics, but this
'd oes not mean that for the Greeks the middle voice was necessarily considered
a hybrid voice between the active and the passive. Interestingly enough, it seems
that the impulse to the systematic study of Greek began with Stoicism, in
pa1iicular with Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic School. Zeno learned
Greek as a second language and, therefore, looked at it in a way no native speaker
of Greek would have;10 and as Andersen argued, the strict tripartition between
active, passive, and the hybrid middle-voice is mainly the work of Roman, not
Greek, grammarians. The Latin term deponens illustrates how the Romans
thought about the grammatical voices. It suggests that for them the opposition
active/passive took precedence over the opposition active/middle voice.
Deponens is one of the five classes of verbs distinguished by Roman
grammarians. It applies to Latitl verbs that have an active meaning yet a passive
form, for example, patior, "to suffer," sequor, "to follow," and fateor, "to
confess." They are called "deponent" because the grammarians thought that these
verbs had"laid down" (deponere) their original passive meaning and taken on an
active meaning.11 The grammatical fixation on subject and object, active and
passive, appears to be the result of studying Greek rather than speaking and
writing it. What is obvious t o thinking about Greek is not necessarily obvious to
thinking in G-reek, and vice versa. It is important to note, however, that neither
is better or worse; they are differ ent
A constant in the description of the middle voice is the active/passive frame
of reference. The opposition active/passive determines the reflection about voice
in general, even though modem linguistics has detem1ined that the passive is a
later development based on the middle voice which is a characteristic of Indo­
European languages. For example, the definition of"voice" in Webster's New
Tw_�ntieth Century Dictionary of the English Language, unabridged second
edition, confums that one generally considers the active and the passive to be
basic. "Voice" is among other things"one of the forms of a verb showing the
connec �i �n between the subject and the verb, either as perfonning (active voice)
or rece1vmg (passive voice) the action." Most descriptions of the middle voice,
older ones and more recent ones, are founded on this opposition. For instance
Antoine Meillet writes in 1921 that the difference between the active and th �
middle voice is that in the middle the subject has some interest in the action of
the verb. He notes that the priest who performs a sacrifice for someone who
commissioned it, sacrifices in the active voice. The person, however, who asks
10
See Koller, 24, n. 2.
11 See Klaiman, 97.
12 Chap. 1: The Middle Voice as Hermeneutic Key
for a sacrifice and yet is an agent in it, sacrifices in the middle voice.12 In this
example, the middle voice suggests a back and forth motion. The subject
performs something and the performance affects rum or her in return. The
emphasis on the subject and how it is affected is characteristic of a mode of
thinking focused on active and passive and, ultimately, on subject and object An
article by Manuel Arce-Arenales, Melissa Axelrod, and Barbara A. Fox is a more
recent example of the same frame of mind. Although they deal not only with
verbs but with sentences as did the oldest Greek grammatical attempts!3 their
criterion to distinguish between active and middle sentences is whether or not the
action of the verb affects the syntactically active subject.14 What is at stake is
whether or nor the subject is affected.
The grammar manuals of ancient Greek exhibit the same opposition between
active and passive in their presentation of the meanings of the middle voice.
Herbert Weir Smyth, for example, writes that the "middle usually denotes that the
subject acts on himselforfor himself, as J.ouop az wash myself,tip. tfvop az defend
myself (lit. ward offfor myselj)."15 In general, the middle voice shows that the
action is performed with special reference to the subject.16 Smyth distinguishes
several connotations of the middle voice. 17 First, the direct reflexive middle
indicates that the subject is his or her own direct object as in "I wash myself."
Smyth, however, adds that the active with a reflexive pronoun is more usual to
convey this type of meaning. Second, in the indirect reflexive middle, the subject
is often his or her indirect object whereas something else is the direct object; for
example, "to give one's vote (in one's interest)" or the difference between the
active 1t6.i..e!lov 1toeiv, "to bring about war," and the middle 1tOAe).lOV
1toteio8o:�. "to wage war." The distinction between 7tOetv and 1tO\e'io8at in this
kind ofperiphrases is an instance where the Koine can be different from ancient
Greek: in the New Testament, the active tends to occur where ancient Greek
would prefer the middle voice, although this is not always the case as, for
8
instance, in Acts I : 1 (A6yov i:1tOtTJOUIJ.TJV).1 Third, the middle voice (but also
the active) can denote that the subject has something done for him or herself
12
Antoine Meillet, Linguistique M
storique etlinguistique generate (Paris: Librairie ancienne
Honore Champion, editeur Edouard Champion, 1921), 195.
13 See Koller, 3Jf.
14 See Manuel Arce-Arenales, Melissa Axelrod, and Barbara A. Fox, "Active Voice and
Middle Diathesis," in Voice:Fonnand Function, ed. Barabara Fox and Paul J. Hopper, I.
15 Herbert Weir Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1956J, § 356a.
1 This general meaning of the middle voice does not apply to the so-called middle deponent
verbs, which have an active meaning. These verbs tend to express bodi l y or mental action and
sometimes stress the agent's involvement. Besides the middle deponents (only middle fonns
including the aorist) there are also lhe passive deponents: their meaning is active but !heir aorist
has the passive instead of the middle fonn. Sec i bid., §§ 356c, 81 Of., and 1729-1734.
17 See ibid.,§§ 1713-1734.
18 See Blass and Debrunner, 163 [§ 3 10].
The Middle Voicefrom a Linguistic Perspective 13
through the agency of someone else: this use is called the causative middle.
Fourth, when there is more than one subject, the middle voice may indicate a
reciprocal relation as in dialoguing, for instance. It is obvious that Smyth's
description strongly focuses on the subject in an active/passive mold. In the
active, the subject performs the action of the verb and often acts directly or
indirectly on an object; in the passive, the subject is acted upon; in the middle,
which Smyth describes between his discussion of the active and his account of
the passive, the subject appears to be his or her own direct or indirect object. The
specificity of the middle voice seems to be reflexivity. The difference between
the active and the middle voice, Smyth argues, is that "the middle Jays stress on
the conscious activity, bodily or mental participation, of the agent."19
Participation in what, of what? Smyth does not say.
Even John Lyons, who points out that the opposition active/middle antedates
the opposition active/passive, describes the middle in terms of the subject being
affected by the action of the verb. He argues that most commonly one considers
the middle voice to be reflexive:20 an agent does something to him or herself, as
in AOUOJ.La�. "I am washing myself," or causes something to happen to him or
herself, as in AOUO!-LO:t )(t.-<:>vo:, "I am washing myself a shirt." In the last
example, the verb is transitive, and the object is distinct from the subject. In this
case, the middle voice is called benefactive. The action performed by the subject
benefits the subject although he or she is not the object of the sentence. Instead
of agentive, the subject of a middle voice can also be nonagentive: he or she
benefits from the action without being its agent. In English we find this nuance
in sentences like I am getting shaved which can mean that I shave myself
(agentive subject) or that [ have someone shave me (nonagentive subject). It is
interesting to not e that the nonagentive subject of middle verbs is the likely origin
ofthe passive voice. What is important for us in this brief discussion is the stress
on the reflexive meaning of the middle voice because it indicates that for the
majority the middle voice is about how the subject is affected.
Jan Gonda concurs that generally the middle voice is considered to be
retlexive.21 Yet, as he points out, the fact that modern languages generally have
to resort to reflexive forms to render the middle voice does not mean that the
middle voice is indeed reflexive.12 Gonda has his own view about the original
meaning of the middle voice:
On the strength of thepreceding considerations lhe hypothesis seems thereforejustified that the
'original' or 'essential' function of the medial voice was not exactly to signify that lhe subject
"performs aprocess that is perfom1ed in himself', but to denote that a process is taking place with
regard to, or is affecting, happening to, a person or a thing; this definition includes also !hose
cases in which we are under the impression that in the eyes of those who once used this category
19 Smyth, § 1728.
20
See Lyons, 373f.
21
See also Robertson, 806.
Jan Gonda, "Reflections on the Indo-European Medium I," Lingua IX (1960): 43.
22
 14 Chap. I: The Middle Voice as Hermeneutic Key
in its original function some power or something powerful was at work in or throug� the �bject,
or manifested itself in or by means of the subject on the one hand and those cases, m wh
tch the
process whilst properly performed by, or originating with, the subject, obviously was limited to
the 'sphere' of the subject (LaL omari to adorn oneself'; dedi "to surrender one's self,
"
capitulate") on the other.11
Gonda's definition moves away from the subject's performance affecting him or
her in return. The emphasis lies on the process affecting the subject. This
definition, however, does not step out ofthe active/passive mode. It is only a shift
toward the passive: the performing subject recedes, and the affected subject
moves to the fore. As John Llewelyn notes, "Gonda comes within an ace of
reducing the middle voice to the passive."24 Even though Gonda's nterpretation
i second. In ilie opposition active/passive, the active means that the subject is the
presents a rather passive subject. it is interesting because it contrasts the subject
with the process of the verb, not with an object.
Kemmer distances herself even more from the subject being affected either by
bjs or her own action or by the process taking place in the middle voice. The
subject, however, comes back with a vengeance. She speaks of the "relative
elaboration of events," arguing that this notion subsumes subject-affectedness.25
The middle voice appears to be an "expressive strategy" at U1e disposal of the
speaker: he
t subject can choose this voice when he or she decides to adjust the
"granularity" or resolution ofthe event he or she is talking about. Kenuner argues
fuat the middle voice has a low degree of elaboration, that is, that it allows the
speaker to refer to events as wholes instead of referring to their components. In
.
Kemmer's description, ilie subject appears to be in total control: the speaking
subject is in charge of the play of the voices. He or she seems to be fully aware
ofthe semantic strategies available in his or her language and to be able to use
them consciously like tools. The notion iliat the middle voice expresses events as
.- wholes instead of partitioning iliem is helpful, but the Miinchhausen-type
speaker, pulling him or herselfup with his grammatical suspenders, appears to
be too active.
In all the descriptions of the middle voice we have encountered so far, the
subject is in the center in one way or another. The subject is tlle entity that is
affected by him or herself, by an object, or by ilie action ofilie verb, or he or she
is the one who masters consciously his or her language's tools. The linguist
Emile Benveniste, however, offers a different avenue to the understanrung oftbc
middle voice. He describes it from a perspective close to E. J. W. Barber's
"catalytic" function ofthe middle voice according to which the subject catalyzes
.
23 Ibid., 66f.
24 John Llewelyn, "Heidegger's Kant and the Middle Voice," in Time and Metaphysics:
A Meeting ofthe Berkeley Linguistics Society, February 15-17, 1975 (Berkeley: The Berkeley
Collection ofOriginal Papers, ed
. David Wood and Robert Bernasconi (Coventry, England:
. Lin istics Society, 1975), 22f.
Parousia Press, I 982), 113.
25 See Kemmer, 3, 121, 209f., 243.
The Middle Voicefrom a Lingustic
i Perspective 15
the action of another agent.26 Benveniste considers the middle voice a medium
in which something takes place. He steers clear ofthe distinction ofperformance
versus experience focused on the subject. His account prompts a new question.
Instead of"Who is the agent and who is the patient?" the question that arises is
"Where is the subject in relation to the process of the verb?" With Benveniste, a
shift takes place away from subjectivity toward locality. Although the subject
does not disappear, he or she is situated with respect to the verbal process. The
key is the location of fue subject.
Benveniste rustinguishes two oppositions: active/passive and active/middle.
The meaning of ilie active in ilie first opposition is different from that n
i the
agent, not ilie patient. In the opposition active/middle, the active means that the
subject is outside or separated from fue action, not inside it. In order to set apart
the active in the opposition active/middle from the active as opposed to the
passive and in order to underline the focus of the middle voice on locality,
Benveniste proposes a different terminology: "external diathesis" for the active
and "internal diathesis" for the middle voice. This second set ofnames underlines
that the middle voice is not a hybrid between the active and the passive but its
own voice. Benveniste describes the internal diathesis as follows:
Dans l'actif, les verbes denotent un proces qui s'accomplit a partir du sujet et hors de lui. Dans
le moyen, qui est Ia diathese a definir par opposition, le verbe indique un proces dont le sujet est
le siege; le sujet est interieur au proces . . . . lei le sujet est le lieu du proces, meme si ce proces
. . . demande un objet; il accomplit quelque chose qui s'accomplit en lui, na.!tre, dormir, gesir,
imaginer, croitre;etc. II est bien interieur au proces dont il est l'agent.27
The force ofilie distinction between external and internal diathesis is that it opens
a different way of thinking. The prime distinction is not anymore between active
and passive or even performance and experience, and the focus is no longer on
the subject's interest. Benveniste' s distinction keeps the subject but in a different
relation: it situates him or her inside or outside the process ofthe verb. The point
is not a back and forth motion of a subject doing something affecting him or
herself in some way or between a subject and an object where the subject does
something to the object and is affected in return. The focus is on the subject's
location n
i relation to tlle verb. In the internal
diathesis as opposed to the external
diathesis, the subject is inside the process that takes place. This account of the
middle voice allows one to emphasize locality and to move away from the
exclusive subject who is either active or passive. The process happens to the
subject who is within it. The internal diathesis does not shortchange the subject
by emphasizing the verb. It puts ilie subject in the sphere of the verb: he or she
26 E. J. W. Barber, "Voice -- Beyond the Passive," in Proceedings of the First Annual
�
7 Emile Benveniste, "Actif et moyen dans le verbe," chap. in Problemes de linguistique
genera/e. 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 172.
16 Chap. 1: The Middle Voice as Hermeneutic Key
is inside his or her action, and he or she is subject of the process happening to
him or her. What changes is the question that puts itself to the subject, and the
key is the medial balance between subject and event.
Some examples ofthe meaning ofthe middle voice are in order to clarify the
shift from subjectivity to locality. I will first indicate some Greek middle verbs
before turning to middle-voiced expressions in English. One of the most telling
instances of the middle voice is "to marry" in Greek. This verb is paradigmatic:
it not only exemplifies the meaning of the middle voice, but it especially
underscores that the middle voice is more thanjust a concept. It is a way of being.
"To marry" is either in the active, Y<XJ.Le<.U, or n
i the middle voice, Y<XJ.LfOJ.L<Xl. In
general, when a man marries a woman, he is the subject of "to marry" in the
active voice, taking a woman as his object expressed in the accusative. By
contrast, when a woman marries a man, she gets married in the middle voice to
a man grammatically considered an indirect object expressed in the dative. Some
texts use the middle voice for a man or the active for a woman, but in these
instances the effect is ironic: the groom is very docile or he is poor and he
marries money, and, in the case ofthe bride, she expresses her contempt for her
husband. Gender issues and feminist interpretations of the paradigmatic meaning
of getting married are not the point here. My concern is the location of the
subject, male or female: in the active (external diathesis), he or she believes
himself or herself to be in control of the process and directs it from outside,
taking possession of an object. In the middle voice, the subject gives him or
herself to someone within the process ofmarriage happening to him or her. In the
middle voice, the focus is on the process that takes place around the subject
acting within it and not on the extent to which the subject is affected. The locality
and not the itffectedness of the subject is at stake. As Gonda argues, the middle
yaJ.LeOJ.L(U has an eventive meaning: it does not mean "to let oneself be taken as
wife," but it expresses the idea that the process of marriage befalls the subject. 28
It is important to note that the catalytic function of the middle voice prevents one
from overemphasizing the process and losing sight of the subject. Althoughthe
process of marriage takes place around the woman, she remains subject because
she is still getting married. The point is that the middle voice opens a different
way of thinking about the subject: the subject is not subject alone. He or she is
part ofa process that encompasses himself or herself.
The stress on the encompassing character ofthe event ofthe verb comes also
to the fore in an example Charles E. Scott mentions:29 yCyVOf.l<Xl. It means "to be
born", "to become," "to happen to be." The middle voice intimates that the
activity ofbecoming yields itselfand that it happens to the subject. Interestingly
enough, y(yvoJ..L<Xl/yivof.l<Xl is the verb that usually translates "amen" in the
28
See Gonda, 53, 59.
29
See Charles B. Scott, "The Middle Voice of Metaphysics," Review ofMetaphysics 42
(1989): 747.
The Middle Voicefrom a Linguistic Perspective 17
Septuagint.30 If amen resonates in the middle voice at the end of a prayer, a
doxology, or a malediction (for example, Deut. 27: 15-26) as a response
confirming or acknowledging the steadfastness and binding character of the
uttered words, it points to an encompassing space of shared action.
D.ta/.eyoJ.L<Xl, "to dialogue," is another example. This medial verb is telling
in the context of hermeneutics. Its medial form denotes that the dialoguing
partners dialogue. within the dialogue happening to them. They are not in charge
of it, they do not actively master it, but they are medially involved in it. The
internal diathesis suggests that the subject remains subject while being part of the
process that happens to him or her. The innovation s i that by stressing the locality
of the subject within the process, the middle voice allows one to think of the
subject in nonexclusive terms: the issue is not the division of labor between the
doer and the done to. The question is not who the subject is but where he or she
is. The emphasis is on locality, not the identity of the subject.
A verb equally interesting in the present context is the middle <paivojl<Xl, "to
appear." "Phenomenon" comes from it. Martin Heidegger notes in § 7 ofSein und
Zeit that this verb is etymologically related to <pwc;, "light." The self-showing
indicates not what something is but the way something comes to the light, how
it is there by itself. A phenomenon is something that shows itself in itself.
Heidegger used this verb and (Xlto<pa(VOJ.L<Xl to express the self-showing not only
of that which is spoken about but also of the self-showing itself.31 In the next
section I will develop the philosophical implications of this verb in particular.
Further, there is the middle 11<Xl£UOJ.LCXl, "to be a midwife," "to attend to the
labors of others," as opposed to the active yevv<Xw, "to generate," "to h � !---
offspring oneself." Socrates says in Plato's Theaetetus l50c:
en· zu�
f� �
� OJ'
,.. CIJ HI!IC
But I have this feature in common with midwives -I myselfam barren of wisdom. The
that's often made of me- that it's lack of wisdom that makes me ask others questions, but say
nothing positive myself- is perfectly true. Why do I behave like this? Because the god compels
me to attend to the labours of others, but prohibit'S me from having any offspring myself.32
30 See Theologisches Worterbuch zum Neuen Testament, s.v. "!XJ.Lt)V." The form usually
rendering "amen" n i the Septuagint is yevo\'to, "so be it" (3"' person singular, aorist 2 middle,
optative). The aorist tense or Aktionsart expresses a punctiliar action (as opposed to linear and
i regarded as whole with sometimes an emphasis on its beginning
perfected), that is, the action s
or its conclusion (see Roberston, 821-864 and Smyth §§ 1923-1944). The optative mood or
mode is close to the subjunctive and has three values: futuristic, volitive, and deliberative (see
Robertson, 935-940). The volitive is its most common use (it is the reason why the grammarians
called it "optative"). Smyth, § I 814, writes: "In independent sentences the optative without av
is used to express a wish referring to the future (negative ILrJ)." It is also interesting to note that
the negative expression ).1ft y&vo\to, absit in the Vulgate, "let it not be", "far be it from," or "God
forbid," occurs fifteen times in the New Testament (once in Luke and fourteen times in Paul 's
epistles) whereas "amen" is usually transliterated a11�v.
31 See Charles E. Scott, "The Middle Voice i.n Being and Time," in The Collegium
Phaenomeno/ogicum: The First Ten Years, ed. John C. Sallis, Giuseppina Moneta, and Jacques
Taminiaux (Dordrecht, Boston, andLondon: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988) 162.
32
,
Plato, Theaetetus, trans. Robin A. H. Waterfield (London: Penguin Books, 1987), 27f.
18 Chap. 1: The Middle Voice as Hermeneutic Key
The god prohibits Socrates from engaging in an active imparting ofknowledge.
He forces him to be merely involved and to assist in the birth of the truth in
dialogues. The middle voice in this case suggests that maieutic is a medial
process where the process is as much subject as the dialoguing partners.
Last but not least, there is avepwrceuo�ttxt, "to be a human being as opposed
to a god or an animaL" Aristotle uses this verb, for instance, in theNicomachean
Ethics (bk. 10.8.6) where he says that one cannot be virtuous without having the
resources to carry out one's virtue. The generous person needs money, the
courageous person needs strength, etc. The onlyexception is theoria: the exercise
of theoria requires no extra things. Since we are humans, however, we live with
others andchoose to act virtuously. Therefore, even ifwe are involved n
i theoria,
we will need the external things the virtuous person needs for our being human
(1tpo<: 'tO av6pwm:ueoe<u). To be human is medial. As we will see, this does
not only mean that we are halfway between divine activity and animal passivity.
It points rather to our embedded.ness and our capacity of making sense of it.
To grasp the meaning of the middle voice further, it is interesting to look at
English although it does not have a morphological middlevoice. From a semantic
perspective, however, English and other modem languages, usually described in
terms of active and passive, are full o f middle-voiced expressions, if only we
sharpen our ears and listen to them. For example, "I am sorry" has two meanings,
suggesting an external and an internal diathesis. It can mean "I am sorry that
something happened." In this case I am saddened by some adverse event and I
voice my feelings about it. In this usage, the focus is on the encompassing event.
I may, however, use this expression to apologize for something I did. In this case,
I admit that something is my fault. The focus is on me as the subject of something
I should not have done. In this context, Deborah Tannen speaks ofthe "difference
between ritual and literal uses of language."33 She of course exploits the double
meaning of"I am sorry" to show how women and men miscommunicate. In one
ofher examples, a woman uses "I am sorry" ritually to express regret concerning
some mistakes in a document. She gets angry at her male division head because
he replies "I'm not blaming anyone." Just by understanding "I am sorry" literally
in the sense of"I apologize," he in fact blamed the woman. As in the case of the
paradigmatic yo:J.LEOJ.Un, the middle voice appears to be closer to women's
concern. The point, however, is not to underline the cleavage between the sexes
but to indicate that "I am sorry" can be middle-voiced. Things happen, and I can
be sorry without turning myself into their active and exclusive subject.
Another example is the difference between "I dream that I go to Paris" and "I
dream of going to Paris." The former sentence suggests a night dream. It has a
medial twist to it because a dream is something that happens to me although I am
the dreamer. When I say the latter sentence, however, I mean that it is a dear wish
33 Deborah Tannen, You Just Don't Understcmd: Women and Men in ConversaJion (New
York: Ballantine Books, 1990), 233.
The Middle Voicefrom a Linguistic Perspective 19
ofmine to go to Paris, and I imply that I can act on it ifI want to. Grammatically
speaking, the subject of a subordinate clause has to be explicitly expressed when
· it is different from that of the main clause. In "I dream that I go to Paris" the
repetition of"I" signals a difference between the subjects. "I dream that I go to
Paris" distinguishes between the dreamer and the dream, although both are I. In
the other sentence, the subject is not repeated because I have more control over
my daydreams than over my night dreams.
Further, "to partake in" something is different from "to partake of' something.
"To partake in" is synonymous to taking part in something. It means that one
actively participates in something by engaging in some activity with others. The
same verb, however, constructed with the preposition "of' parallels the double
meaning of"being involved in something": the subject not only participates in
something but is rolled or wrapped up in it. It n
i dicates an involvement that
touches the being of the subject. It also means to eat or drink something
especially in company with others. Partaking in the sense of eating involves more
than Ludwig Feuerbach's "der Mensch ist, was er iBt."34 Its conviviality feeds
more than the body. This is particularly true in the Christian communion where
the Christians partake of the body of Christ. Eating the bread and drinking the
cup in remembrance of Jesus Christ, partaking in a religious rite, they are
involved in a process that affects their whole being. The medial meaning of"to
partake" comes really to the fore when one hears "to partake in" and "to partake
of' together.
Finally, English knows a grammatical form very close to an actual middle
voice: the so-called "get-passive." Barber argues that the development of this
feature in the English language announces a shift back from an active/passive to
an active/middle system?' Following R. Lakoff, T. Giv6n and Lynne Yang note
that the difference between the be-passive and the get-passive is a matter of
control or purpose. They write: "In the BE-passive, the demoted agent retains
control, while in the GET-passive the promoted patient remains in control."36 They
also quote R . Quirk et al. who argue that the get-passive stresses the subject
ratherthan the agent Although these authors focus on the subject rather than the
process expressed by the verb, their remarks about the get-passive suggest that
the middle voice is not as outlandish as it seems at first. The paradigmatic
YO:J..IEOJ.lO:l is all the more interesting when one is aware of the get-passive. "To
marry" in the be-passive makes perfect sense. A couple can be married by a
particular minister, and figuratively two ideas, for instance, can be married by a
particular author. In these examples, one wants to know who performed the
34 Quoted in Hans KUng, Existiert Gott? Antwort aufdie Gottesfrage der Neuzeit, 2•d ed.
(Munich and Zurich: R.. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1984), 245.
35 Barber, 23.
36 T. Giv6n and Lynne Yang, "The Rise ofthe English GET-Passive," n
i Voice: Fonn and
Function, ed. Barbara Fox and Paul J. Hopper, 119.
20 Chap. 1: The Middle Voice as Hermeneutic Key
marriage. The stress is on the agent. "To get married," however, poses as
different question. One is not prompted to ask about some agent because the
subject keeps some responsibility in the action. As I noted earlier, the person who
gets married in the middle voice is still subject. The get-passive is interesting
because it confirms that the middle voice does not devalue the subject. Just as
Benveniste' s internal diathesis, it points to the subtle balance between the process
and the subject within it. It is this balance that we will pursue in philosophical
benneneutics and consider in a theological context.
To sum up, the middle voice as internal diathess
i introduces a different way
of thinking about the subject and the verb. The subject/object dichotomy and the
focus on the subject fade. The middle voice underscores the location of the
subject with respect to the verbal process. Locality not identity is key. The
subject is deconstructed or destroyed in a Heideggerian sense. He or she is not
jettisoned but remains subject within the process that happens to him or her.
French has a telling prepositional phrase to say "within": au sein de, literally "in
the bosom of," or even "in the womb of." This phrase suggests the nurturing role
and the matrixlike character of the process embracing the subject but by no
means passivity. Even a foetus is not passive. Language confim1s that: we do not
say a foetus is grown (except in test tube), but we say it grows in the womb. In
the following section, I examine a few uses of the middle voice in philosophy.
This notion plays its major role in the context of the deconstruction of the subject
.in contemporary philosophy.
Philosophical Perspectives on the Middle Voice
The middle voice resists a clear defmition. As Andersen and others have noted,
the phenomenon of voice is elusive. There are almost as many defmitions of
voice as there are people who have thought about it It is something that one can
point out and write around. One recognizes it if one listens for it in language.
Although what I am listening for is the subject acting within the process befalling
him or her, there is no defmitive knowledge of it especially in languages that do
not have an actual middle fonn. In all the examples given above, the middle voice
is not identical. It seems fair to say that in the philosophical texts that concern
themselves with the middle voice, it is equally as polyvalent or "plurivocal."
The middle voice appears in the context of the end of the metaphysics of
presence and ofthe collapse of the dichotomy between the subject and the object.
It has however a hard time asserting itself beyond being a negative foil. It sheds
a critical light on ways of thinking caught in the active/passive mode, but it does
not show itself, it does not bare itself. The aspect I want to stress is locality.
Locality does not define or confine the middle voice. It rather points to a question
that reorients self-knowledge: "Where am I?" From a Christian perspective, this
question is "crucial" in the double sense ofplacing at a crossroad and under the
Philosophical Perspectives on the Middle Voice 21
cross. In the phi
l osophical use of the middle voice, the local aspect is not always
explicit. This section gives an overview of some philosophical uses ofthe middle
voice. It shows that the middle voice has a negative heuristic or apophatic
f�ction: it shows things only to say what they are not.
Heidegger is fond of the middle voice although he deals with middle-voiced
terms rather than the voice itself. Theodore Kisiel, for example, shows the
prominence of the middle voice in the genesis of Being and Time. He points to
the middle-voiced meaning ofHeidegger's factic life. He writes that the factic
life experience "means at once the experiencing activity and that which is
experienced. Both the active and the passive sense must be maintained."37 The
problem with Kisiel's interpretation is that it remains in the active/passive mold.
He stresses "middle" in middle voice. This emphasis is obvious, for example,
when he notes the shift in Heidegger's work from Beldimmerung to Sorge. Both
translate the Latin cura, "care," "concern" and refer back to curare, "to care." As
the basic characteristic of factic life, curare is a middle-voiced phenomenon.38
Heidegger rendered it at first by BekUmmerung and BekUrnmertsein and gave it
the middle-voiced meaning of"being troubled" and "troubling oneself." Kisiel
notes, however, that in the last occurrence of BekUmmerung "the emphasis
abruptly falls on the active side of the vox media."39 For him, the middle voice is
clearly between the active and the passive. The emphasis on the intennediary
position of the middle voice obscures its value as internal diathesis. The middle
voice appears solely as a back and forth motion which lets the subject be subject
and object at the same time. It does not highlight the verbal aspect of the process
and the location of the subject with reference to it. This is too bad because the
middle voice as internal diathesis rather than as a hybrid between active and
passive illuminates the temporal aspect of being. The provisional etymological
inquiry into the origin of Sein that launches further questioning manifests the
pertinence of the middle voice to the question of being. Heidegger notes that the
forms that make up the conjugation of the verb sein have three roots pointing to
three semantic fields: "Ieben, aufgehen, verweilen.'>40 The first one means "life,"
"living," even "self-reliance," the second one combines "to spring" with "light"
and thus means ''to spring into light," ''to appear," "to glow," and the third one
means "to dwell," "to remain," "to stay somewhere." This ascendence points to
being in the sense of the process ofliving as a medial inhabiting of the event of
self-manifesting. Although etymology is only a point of departure for further
questioning, it unsettles the substantive meaning of being and points to Sein as
37 Theod�rc Kisiel, The Genesis ofHeidegger's Bein�andTjme (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and
London: University of California Press, 1993), 153.
38 See ibid., 20 I.
39 Ibid., 493.
40 Martin Heidegger, Einftihrung in die Metaphysik (Tllbingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953;
reprint, Gesamtausgabe. Vol. 40, Einflihrung in die Metaphysik. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1983), 75-78 (§ 22) (page references are to the reprint edition).
22 Chap. 1: The Middle Voice asHermeneutic Key
seyn, a Zeitwort, that is, a verb not a noun (in chapter four, we will return to the
significance ofthe verbal meaning of being). Kisiel is right about the importance
of the middle voice in this context, but is not the middle voice as internal
diathesis even more germane?
Aoyor, in Sein und Zeit, § 7B, for instance, also makes evident the importance
of the process befalling the subject beyond the opposition of active and passive
and the relation of subject and object. Heidegger notes that Aristotle spoke of
A.6yoc; in terms of the middle cbto<pttivo�cn, "to show itself." He rejects A.6yoc;
as activejudgment or stance. A6yoc; means primarily sehen/assen, "to let see."
That which is talked about shows itself to the interlocutors in their talking about
it. That A6yor, is not active but medial comes also to the fore in the interpretation
of the structure of synthesis: synthesis is not the active putting together of
representations but the medial process of letting see something as something, in
its being with something else. Gadamer corroborates the mediality of A.6yoc; as
sehenlassen. He notes that Heidegger's predilection for the notion of play and
middle-voiced expressions in general is the natural counterpart of his criticism
of modernity's subjectivism and science's objectivity. Gadamer's example of
what he means by Heidegger's middle-voiced expressions is "in sicb wirksam
werden lassen."41 We will see later that Gadamer himself makes frequent use of
lassen, notably in middle-voiced expressions of the type "sich lassen +
infutitive."
Llewelyn also stresses lassen in the context ofHeidegger. He argues that for
Heidegger lassen as in Sein/assen or Gelassenheit bas the middle-voiced function
of enabling.42 In his view, lassen and its composites have a "Janus structure"43
because they convey an action that sets itself up while we are doing it. This
structure comes to language in Heidegger's retrieval ofthe Alemannic-Swabian
wi!gen, "to clear a path."44 With this dialectal meaning in mind, Bewegung means
moving along a way by clearing it at the same time. Llewelyn's interpretation of
Heidegger's lassen parallels the English get-passive: it is a passive that makes
itself happen, that bears some responsibility in what befalls it. It implies a certain
responsibility of the subject in what happens to him or her. This responsibility,
as in the medial "I am sorry," means the subject's response to the situation rather
than his or her accountability or fault. Unfortunately, Llewelyn does not seem to
be aware of the get-passive. He writes that ". . . lassen is neither quite as
intrusively forward as actively to get nor quite as reserved as passively to let,'>45
and he translates ich lasse mich schlagen "I get myselfhit" or "I let myself be
bit." He could have said "I gel hit" without the reflexive pronoun.
41 See "Spiel und Welt," GW4, 99.
42 See John Llewelyn, The Middle Voice ofEcological Conscience (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1991), 86f.
43 Llewelyn, "Heidegger's Kant and the Middle Voice," 109.
4� Uncerwegs zur Sprache (Pfullingen: Neske, 1959), 261.
See Martin Heidegger,
4s Llewelyn, The Middle Voice ofEcologi
cal Conscience, 86.
Philosophical Perspectives on the Middle Voice 23
If Llewelyn stresses the enabling function of the middle voice, he does not
address the locality or the "within" implied in the middle voice as internal
diathesis, even, for instance, in reference to Heidegger's Letter on Humanism. In
this famous text, Heidegger explicitly deals with locality, with the "within" of
thinking. He dwells on (medial) thinking before it got out of its element - Being
as the silent power, as the enabling element46 - and became an instrument. The
enabling aspect of the middle voice Llewelyn underscores shows that the subject
has his or her share in what he or she gets into. The subject is there. "There"
answers the question "Where?" but Llewelyn does not pose it.
Llewelyn's interpretation of the middle voice as such says nothing about the
locality and the embeddedness of the subject in the process of the verb. Llewelyn
agrees with both Gonda and Benveniste who reject the traditional view that ''the
middle voice indicates an interest that the subject has in the action.'>47 He finds
this view too vague because, for instance, it does not distinguish someone taking
an interest in something from someone having an interest in something whether
or not he or she is aware of being affected. Simply the subject's interest in the
action cannot be the hallmark of the middle voice since the active expresses it
already. The nuance Llewelyn sees in the middle voice is thatthe subject does not
necessarily know that he or she is affected and that he or she can be affected
without an act of the will on his or her part.
It seems that Llewelyn reads into Benveniste's internal diathesis the
possibility of an action not necessarily actively willed that affects the subject,
somewhere between the active and the passive. Overall he finds Benveniste's
distinction between external and internal diathesis puzzling. "Ifthe subject is the
seat of the process, bow can he be n
i terior to it? Is it not rather interior to him?'>'�8
For slightly more clarity, Llewelyn points to Benveniste's examples that suggest
actions the subject performs without willing them: to be born, to lie, to die, to
grow, to speak, and to imagine. Unfortunately, he does not further explore
Benveniste's distinction. He states that the opposition active/middle is less
satisfying than the one between external and internal diathesis, but he does
indicate any reasons in favor of Benveniste's "puzzling" distinction. He does not
examine Benveniste's reason for introducing this terminology. As noted, in my
reading Benveniste's innovation lies in "internal." It ushers in a new way of
thinking about the middle voice severed from the opposition active/passive and
subject/object. "Internal" means that the subject though the seat or locus of the
action - think of a dream - is inside the process going on.
46 See Martin Heidegger, Leure sur l'humanisme, trans. Roger Munier (Paris: Aubier,
Editions Montaigne, 1964), 36.
47 Llewelyn, "Heidegger's Kant and the Middle Voice," I l l .
48 Ibid. See also John Llewelyn, Derrida on the 17rreshold ofSense (New Yorlc St. Martin's
Press, 1986), 90 and Gonda, 41.
24 Chap. I: The Middle Voice asHermeneutic Key
Reading Benveniste based on Gonda, Llewelyn quickly passes over
Benveniste's notion of internal diathesis. Instead he stresses two words he finds
in Gonda's account. In Derrida on the Threshold of Sense he underscores
"reserve", and in The Middle Voice of Ecological Conscience he highlights
"power." Gonda writes with respect to the medial future of certain verbs49 that
this allows "the speaker to observe a certain reserve with regard to the part ofthe
subject in a process which belongs to the future."50 "Reserve" marks a lesser
degree of involvement on the part ofthe subject Llewelyn points out that Jacques
Derrida also uses "reserve" when the middle-voiced dif]'erance exceeds the
contrast between active and passive. The middle of the middle voice, its milieu,
is not a static mean between active and passive but a dynamic and timed medium.
Llewelyn says that it "is space timed and time spaced."51 Although he mentions
the middle voice as a medium, he does not connect it with Benveniste's internal
i The "where" of the subject remains implicit all along.
diathess.
The second term Llewelyn stresses is "power" which he finds in Gonda's
definition of the middle voi.ce. He writes:
We need a notion of power which does not merely pass through the subject, and a notion of
subject which is neither merely a conduit or passage (the 'through' ofpure passivity) nor the
conducort entirely in charge of a performance (the 'by' of pure agency) but is performed by as
much as it performs the process . . . .12
Llewelyn adds that Heidegger's problem and his own is to avoid two extremes:
the domination of self-interest (an active subject) and the absorption of the self
in a totalizing Self (a passive subject). In this passage, Llewelyn defines the
middle voice as between the active and the passive. Any allusion to space, even
timed, bas disappeared, and Benveniste is not even mentioned. The power in
question parallels the notion of enabling Llewelyn emphasizes in Heidegger's
Letter on Humanism, and the location of the subject is completely absent.
Even though Llewelyn ignores the internal diathesis, the emphasis on reserve
and on power - two terms that seem incompatible- underscores that the middle
voice can be beard differently. The middle voice comes to the fore as an
ambiguous januarial catachretic quasi-concept that resists definition.53 This
elusiveness and openness of the middle voice conesponds to the place where
Llewelyn first realized the "utility" of the middle voice: Derrida's lvfarges de Ia
philosophie.54 Derrida looks for "quelque chose comme Ia voix moyenne" to say
dif!erance. Derrida points to the middle-voiced meaning of the -ance ending, as
in mouvance or resonnance that prompts a way of thinking neither based on nor
49 See also Smyth, §§ 805-809.
·
50 Gonda, 64.
51 Llewelyn, Derrida on the Threshold ofSense, 94.
52 Llewelyn, The Middle Voice ofEcological Conscience, x.
i (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1997), 8.
53 See ibid., I 00, 238.
54 See ibid., 209.
Philosophical Perspectives on the Middle Voice 25
aimed at an agent's action and a patient's being acted upon.55 Llewelyn's
emphasis on the elusive nature of the middle voice is important because it can
quickly become an instrument, "a stable nominal unity" as John D. Caputo notes
with reference to differance.56 The middle voice allows itself to be talked about
in various ways. As a hermeneutic key it is neither as limited as the key that
opens one door nor as nondescript and vague as the master key that fits ali locks.
It is more like those forgotten keys somewhere in a drawer that open doors one
first has to find. The question is the question.
The most interesting aspect ofLlewelyn's elusive and changingtake on the
middle voice is the notion of"cnabling": it conveys an action that sets itself up
while we are doing it. Llewelyn, however, does not try to connect it with
Benveniste' s internal diathesis. Consequently, his view of the middle voice
remains middle, that is, caught between the active and the passive. Scott,
however, is able to leave behind this distinction. He focuses on the middle
voice's ability to speak reflexively without reflexive pronouns. Unfortunately, in
Scott's account the process becomes so "occuning" that the subject dwindles.
Scott examines the middle voice in relation to Heidegger and the end of
metaphysics. He argues that Hcidegger sought a language speaking not in terms
of the power relation between subject and object showing one another but in
terms of a showing that is "release, opening up, disclosing."57 The middle-voiced
language of Being and Time not only talks and thinks about rupture but has had
a rupturing effect in our culture. Thinking itself has become a process of
destructuring, and a different language has emerged that disrupts the assumptions
of a language based on the distinction of active and passive. The middle voice in
Being and Time has destructured customary ways of thinking because it is able
to say things differently. It has a recoiling effect. With reference to the context
of the end of metaphysics, Scott argues that it is middle-voiced: end means not
conclusion but reaching the limit and thinking beyond it. Metaphysical thinking
is not simply finished but recoils away from itself and opens new ways of
thinking. Unlike Kisiel and Llewelyn to some extent, Scott moves definitely
beyond the customary active/passive mode. The middle voice is outlandish to us
because it is almost lost and because it foils the active/passive - metaphysical -
way of thinking. Its power is "to bring to expression a nonreflexive enactment
that is expressed by the verb forms alone."58 It is obscure, yet it promises a clarity
different from what we usually call clear. Referring to the middle voice in
Heidegger's Being and Time, Scott writes:
55 See Jacques Derrida, Marges de Ia pltilosophie (Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1972), 9.
56 John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears ofJacques Derrida: Religion without Religion
57 Scott, "The Middle Voice in Being and Time," 162.
58 Scott, "The Middle Voice of Metaphysics," 744.
26 Chap. 1: The Middle Voice as Hermeneutic Key
It is embedded in his language, recalled vaguely by reflexivity and also by the language of
. .
think�
happening, e.g., Dascin is its own self-disclosure; but it is also a voice that is hard to �d
with. In both its possibilities and its lapses in our western grammars 1t speaks With an ant1qu1ty
that exceeds that of our oldest philosophers. rt is prephllosopbical in our traditions, and its recall
puts in question those ways of thought that think as though there were n o middle voice."
The middle voice has been lost in most Western languages, and the active and the
passive have overshadowed Western thought. Neither our l�guage n�r our
thought are therefore well equipped to think medially. It reqmres a part1cular
effort of listening.
The problem with our languages, Sc-Ott argues, is that they generally have
recourse to reflexive forms to render middle verbs. Scott particularly stresses the
intransitive uses of the middle voice because it is a form that "is difficult to
retrieve in our languages now, but one that plays a significant role in
contemporary efforts to think outside of the domain of subjectivity."60 The
difficulty with verbs like <j>a{veo8at lies in that our languages usually force us
to fall back on reflexive forms while the middle voice speaks without self-posing
or reflexive moment. What we have to say resorting to reflexive pronouns, the
middle voice says it in one verbal form without the subject's self-positing implied
in the pronoun. Since we automatically use reflexive forms to express actions that
happen by themselves, we introduce willy-nilly a subject-relation in the action
of the verb. Scott writes:
We need to bracket the implication "of itself," when we speak of becoming becomes, for
�
example, because there is no distance of self-relation or self-objectification. There is nei er an
active subject nor a passive object, and the peculiarity of that struct�re for our grammar lo t�� �
by the reflexive form. We are inclined by our structures of expression to sp�ak of a� a ?
c on s
�1
doing something in relation to itself and thereby to m cate an mctpt.ent �ubJect-relanon m the
verb's action. We are inclined to say appearing shows 1 tself or beconung 1tselfbecomes. In that
way we intuitively put into the whole occurrence a positing formation, whe � the middle �oice
.
in these instances can indicate a whole occurrence's occurring as a whole w1thout self-posllmg
or reflexive movement in the whole event. . . . The reflexivity bas to be overcome to give voice
in tbis middle form.61
With regard to the Heideggerian qJafveo8at, Scott adds that we usually say
"showing itself from itself." Our languages force us to use reflexive forms
whereas "the middle voice mutes the 'it' and does not need the reflective 'self."'62
ln the middle voice the focus is on the occurrence and not on the subject or the
object in an active/passive relation.
The middle voice speaks differently: it can bring to language an occurrence
without resorting to reflexive pronouns. It does without agency: no subject on the
acting end, no object on the receiving end. The questions "What?" or "�o?" do
not apply to the middle-voiced event. The process happens. The emphasts LS not
59 Scott, "The Middle Voice in Being and Time," 160.
60 ScotL, "The Middle Voice of Metaphysics," 746.
61
Ibid., 747.
62
Scott, ''The Middle Voice n
i Being and Time," 161.
Philosophical Perspectives on theMiddle Voice 27
on what brings what to light, on apparent subjects and objects. It lies on the
bringing and coming to light as such. This event is not presencing something but
presencing, or differencing as Scott prefers to say.63 Consequently, there are no
more foundations. Nothing is brought to light but the occurrence itself. Any
foundation is itself a medial process.64
Scott's argument that the middle voice allows one to think without the self­
positing moment of reflexive forms captures an important aspect of the middle
voice. It underlines the occurrence, the process, bracketing the subject in relation
to the object. Somethingjust happens. This is, for instance, what the medial "I am
sorry" conveys. The middle voice directs one's attention away from the subject
toward the process expressed by the verb. The other side of the coin, however,
is that Scott's account shortchanges the subject. Scott's middle voice is mute, so
to speak. It has no volume because it is void. The middle voice is a voice without
lungs, it speaks but without sound, without echo. The recoiling effect of Scott's
voice occurs without ever hitting something. It has no volume because nothing
is there to fill the occurrenc.e. Occurring only occurs. It is like a marriage without
bride and groom, without the institution of marriage altogether. Scott stresses the
occurrence to such an extent that the relation between the process and the subject
falls together with the subject.
Although Scott emphasizes the occurring of the occurrence, he cannot get rid
of the subject. In fact he comes close to Benveniste's internal diathess i in a
passage, for instance, where he argues that the performance of Oedipus the King
ni ancient Athens shows the value of the middle voice. The issue of ambiguous
justice in the tragedy spoke to the Athenians, who were deeply involved in policy
and law related innovations at the time, beyond the limits of action and passion.
The action of the play did not simply unfold before passive spectators. The play
involved them in the transfonnation of their whole reality beyond "the reflexivity
ofthe play's showing to the Athenians their own perplexity and quandary.'>6s The
play did not show something that the Athenians could actively grasp. With
Gadamer we could say that play played. In Scott's account, however, the
occurrence is all there is:
Oedipusthe King comes to pass in the diathesis of the play of forces that structures it. Like a
middle-voiced verb, the play as an event in its middle-voiced function states its own event in its
occurrence. It voices itself without the intervention of regard foritself.66
Scott speaks of "diathesis," of the disposition of the play of forces. His interest
in the middle voice is that it brings to language an occurrence without the
reflexive positing of the subject. Something just happens. But that something is
void. The occurrence occults tbe subject. [n my reading, Scott overlooks the
63 Scott, "The Middle Voice of Metaphysics," 764.
64 See Scott, "The Middle Voice inBeing and Time," 168.
65 Scott, "The Middle Voice of Metaphysics," 751.
66 Ibid.
28 Chap. I: The Middle Voice as Hermeneutic Key
Athenians who take part in and of that diathesis. The play of th.e representation
involves them and needs them to take place. The Athenians are within the
occurrence that happens around them.
In another instance, Scott comments on the middle-voiced process Heidegger
put into motion when he wrote Being and Time: "He [Heidegger] is in [italics
mine] a question that is not his, one that he knows to have made possible his own
work and the continuing work of the book that he has brought to a close,"67 This
question is the question of Being, and its location is Dasein. Although be places
Heidegger and others in that question, Scott puts all the stress on the occurring
ofthe event and jettisons the subjecttogether with the distinction between subject
and object. The occurring question, its volume, appears empty, even void, more
like an empty space than a volume. Similarly, Scott argues that the opening
paragraph of Heidegger's Letter on Humanism is strongly middle-voiced. He
underscores being's Bezug (Scott says "appeal"), which thinking carries out
medially with regard to human beings.68 He does not, however, highlight the
notion of language as the Haus des Seins where we live and where being and
thinking meet under our watch. The expression "the house of being" brings to the
fore the lqcus of thinking as a medial event. Thinking is the bringing/coming to
language of Being. The subject is by no means done away with: the thinker and
the poet are the guards oftheir linguistic dwelling. Their "sagacity" (wachen, "to
guard," "to watch," implies being awake, thus attentive) is part of the medial
process.
The same voice without lungs occurs in a series ofexpressions that Scott finds
particularly middle-voiced. These expressions eclipse the subject and betray the
same unilateral emphasis on the occurrence: das Ereignis ereignet, "the event
events," thinking thinks, being is, clearing clears, being happens in regard to
itself, temporality temporalizes.69 The voice voices, that is iL The speaking
subject is bypassed. In the same vein. Scott writes about thinking:
OiojL<Xl, "to think," is also a middle form and suggests an activity that speaks in its own sphere
and reverts to itself of itself prior to a subject's taking charge of it. Thinking in this case would
be an activity that enacts itself out of its own processes.70
Thinking thinks. Thinking fcrst happens. It is a medial process in the sense that
the occurrence happens. The subject is separated from the process. At fcrst, he or
she is not involved in it. Strangely enough, when the subject comes back, be or
she appears to be active: the subject takes charge of thinking. Unlike Gadamer,
Scott does not balance the medial occurrence with the subject involved in it. He
67 Scott, "The Middle Voice in Being and Time," 17l.
68
See Charles E. Scott, On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Ethics and Politics
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), 91 f.
69 See Scott, "The Middle Voice in Being and Time," 167 and Scott, On the Advantages and
Disadvantages ofEthics andPolitics, 32, 92.
70 Scott, "The Middle Voice of Metaphysics," 747f.
Philosophical Perspectives on the Middle Voice 29
does not leave any room to the subject in the occurrence. Instead he separates the
initial occurring ofthe occurrence from the subject's subsequent activity: first the
occurrence takes place, then the subject takes charge of it.
Calvin 0. Schrag also mentions the middle voice, but unlike Scott he affirms
the subject from the outset In his account, the subject does not come back with
a vengeance. Schrag argues that "the postmodern announcement of the death of
the subject, like the news release of the death of Mark Twain, was a bit of an
exaggeration."71 In The Self after Postmodernity he ponders the subject and
rephrases the question about the self in a new grammar. Instead of "what"
questions he asks "who" questions about the self. Following "who" questions, he
offers a fourfold portrait ofthe self: the selfin discourse, in action, in community,
and in transcendence. These titles suggest that Schrag focuses on the subject
within contexts. Following Derrida, Schrag does not destroy the subject, but he
situates it He writes:
The result of these delineations at the crossroads ofthe modem and the postmodem is a revised
narrative on self-understanding and a redesigned portrait of self-formation that sets forth a who
ofdiscourse, engaged in action, communally situated, and tempered by transcendence.72
Although many of his claims about the subject would answer the question
"Vlhere?" Schrag only asks who this self after Postrnodernity is. Postmodernity
has overreacted against the modern self-identical and unified selfand left us with
a subject that is too thin. Schrag agrees with the postmodern critique against the
subject as metaphysical substance and as epistemological ultimate instance. He
stresses, however, that the postmodern emphasis on difference and diversity does
not mean that the subject is to be jettisoned altogether.
Schrag introduces the middle voice in the portrait of the self in action. He
argues that the grammatical voice ofaction is the middle voice. He writes about
human action:
From this dialectic ofacting and suffering we derive a twofold truth, namely, that the human self
called into being as a coupling of discourse and action is neither a sovereign and autonomous self,
whose self-constitution remains impervious to any and all forces of alterity, nor a self caught
within the constraints of heteronomy, determined by forces acting upon it. The self as the who
of action lives between autonomy and heteronomy, active and reactive force, pure activity and
pure passivity. The grammatical voice of action is the middle voice, neither a sovereign active
voice nor a subordinated passive voice.13
Although Schrag explicitly remains between the active and the passive poles,
although the locality of the self is not his prime concern, he mplicitly
i addresses
the middle voice in the sense of internal diathesis. He localizes the selfin action
"between" the poles of activity and passivity. This "between" is the "defining
71 Calvin 0. Schrag, The Selfafter Postmodernity (NewHaven and London: Yale University
Press, 1997), 6 1 .
72 Ibid., 148.
73 Ibid., 59.
30 Chap. 1: The Middle Voice as Hermeneutic Key

feature oftbe finitude that is characteristic ofthe self as mortal" and it maps the
"topography of action." He adds, ''The who of action exercises a g�nu �e fr�om
as she or he is implicated as a seat and source of empowerment within the Wlder
economy of prior and contemporary co-actors."74 This passage resembles Chapter 2
Benveniste's line "Je verbe n
i dique un proces dont le sujet est le siege." To read
Schrag with Benveniste n
i mind suggests that "between" does not necessarily The Middle Voice in the Literature on Gadamer:
mean between two things. The prepositions "between," zwi
schen, and oui are all Conspicuous by Its Absence
etymologically connected with the number two. The French entre, bowever, from
_
the Latin inter does not bear this connotation. Between is not necessanly a dual
matter, an either/or situation. The point is that the middle voice is not a halfway
In the previous chapter, we examined the middle voice from a linguistic and
bouse between the active and the passive rendered by the reflexive like, for
from a philosophical perspective. We noted that it is an elusive and "plurivocal"
instance, Paul Ricreur's je me decide referred to by Schrag. The middle voice
notion that escapes a confming defmition. If, however, defining means to talk
does not just meet halfway. It is another way of thinking that does not focus on
about something in a certain way and to try to stick to it until a different way
who or what the subject is, but on where he or she is with respect to the process
seems to impose itself, then the middle voice lends itself to being defined. The
of the verb. The internal diathesis indicates a location. It points to a topography
definition we followed is Benveniste's: the middle voice is not a hybrid voice
_ a mapping - and to an economy - a housekeepin g - the subject gets himself
between the active and the passive expressing a back and forth relation between
involved in. The middle voice indicates a volwne that is not empty. No voice can
the subject and the object but a voice that is opposed to the active and that brings
make itself heard in the void.
to language the subject's relation to the verb. As noted, Benveniste calls it
The picture of the middle voice I have drawn matches Gadamer's
internal diathesis. The stress is on internal: the middle voice points to the location
philosophical hermeneutics and the subtle balance of the hermeneutic event nd
_ � of the subject of the verb within the process of the verb. The issue is not the
the understanding subject within it: understandmg happens and the subject
extent to which the subject is affected by the verb or the subject/object relation
understands. The focus is not on the two poles of the balancing act but on an
but the location ofthe subject with respect to the verb. In the middle voice, he or
action within another. Before we examine this subtle balance of the subject and
she is within the process the verb expresses. Moreover, the question "Where is
the process, let us tum to the literature on Gadamer's hermeneutics. In the next
the subject?" is not asking about a dying or even dead subject after the demise of
chapter we will see that the middle voice is conspicuous by absence. Most
the subject/object dichotomy, but it situates the subject, who is alive and well,
commentators and most thinkers inspired by Gadamer write around the mediality
within to the action of the verb without reducing him or her to a passive entity.
of philosophical henneneutics, but they do not mention the middle voice
The innovation of the medial way oft hinking lies in the possibility to conceive
explicitly.
of actions without an exclusive subject: events happen to the subject and the
subject acts within them.
In this chapter we examine some corrunentaries on Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics. The aim is not to be exhaustive but to point out a pattern in the
literature about Gadamer: in most accounts of Gadamer's henneneutics the
middle voice is conspicuous by its absence. The emphasis is on texts that write
around the middle-voiced aspect of Gadamer's hermeneutics, reach the point
where the middle voice is about to break open, but then abort their motion or
divert it. With a few exceptions, commentators stop abruptly when they arrive at
the point in their exegesis of Gadamer where mediality shines between the lines.
Most strikingly, the middle voice is even silenced in the discussions of
Gadamer's explicitly medial notion of play. Moreover, the many medial
expressions that punctuate Gadamer's texts like refrains go for the most part
unnoticed. We will review first philosophkal texts on Gadamer, then theological
texts.
74 Ibid., 60.
32 Chap. 2: The Middle Voice in the Literature 011 Gadamer Philosophical Texts on Gad.amer 's Hermeneutics 33

Philosophical Texts on Gadamer's Hermeneutics discusses the middle voice. Llewelyn clearly notes that Gadamer compares
language to playing a game. One would assume that an author interested in the
John Llewelyn is a good startingpoint. We have already encountered this author middle voice would at least mention the middle voice of play, but Llewelyn does

in the previous chapter. He has reflected extensively on the middle voice, as not. He quotes passages from Gadamer to the effect that every playing is a being

noted. A whole section of his

Beyond Metaphysics? The Hermeneutic Circle in played and that it is more adequate to say that language speaks us mther than we
speak it, but he keeps silent about Gadamer's explicit explanation of the
Contemporary Continental Philosophy addresses Gadamer's hermeneutics.
Although he mentions the middle voice in passing in other chapters ofthe book, mediality of play. What is more, Llewelyn even throws in Heidegger's phmse

he does not bring it up in his extensive discussion of Gadamer. He focuses on that language is the house of being. He argues that for Gadamer language is

four key elements: the "triunity" understanding/interpretation/application, the neither the speaker's object nor is it independent ofhim or her. Just as someone

notion of Wirkungsgeschichte, linguisticality, and prescience. Llewelyn speaks who is playing is within the game, so someone who is speaking is dwelling in the

twice of Gadamer's position as a "middle way" or a "middle path."1 In both house of being. All the pieces ofthe middle voice are in place, but, even so close
instances, he refers to Gadamer's being between the extremes of the to the only explicit mention of the middle voice in Truth and Method, Llewelyn
Enlightenment and Romanticism on the issue of meaning and tradition. For passes over it!

Gadamer there is neither one meaning nor an infinity of meanings, and one's Other commentators may not have pondered the middle voice as Llewelyn has,
relation to tradition is neither emancipatory nor slavish. "Middle way" or "middle but in their commentaries on Gadamer's hermeneutics they are often immersed
path" is interesting because it intimates a homophony in French between voix in mediality, so to speak, yet they, too, stop short of explicitly discussing it.

moyenne, "middle voice," and voie moyenne, "middle way." This French James S. Hans's "Hermeneutics, Play, Deconstruction," for instance, focuses on

homophony and the adjective "middle" in middle path hint at the middle voice play but totally ignores that Gadamer calls it medial and that Derrida mentions

or even at ·a middle-voiced path, especially in a text by an author who knows the Ia voix moyenne in •<La differance."3 Hans compares Derrida's freeplay with

middle voice. The danger, however, with Llewelyn's account is that it leads to Gadarner's notions of play arguing that ultimately Gadamer's view is "more

a halfway position, an "in-between" rather than an internal diathesis, a "within." accurate" because it is open enough to incorporate Derrida's.4 Hans clearly

In the same text, Llewelyn emphasizes the theological influences on Gadamer. indicates the ambiguity contained in Gadamer's thought that allows it to have

He notes that Gadamer dmws many of his illustrations from theology. Llewelyn's · room for Derrida's position: play is never-ending like Derrida's freeplay, yet it

own interpretation of Gadamer's positive appmisal of prejudgments has a also yields understanding. On several occasions, Hans approximates the middle
theological flavor to it: voice but without actually mentioning it. With reference to play and
understanding, Hans asks how it is possible to learn anything and to understand
Our prejudgments are not prejudicial to our understanding, according to Gadamer. Notonly is
i possible to discountthem, since we are inevitably finite, children though not prisoners ofour
it m
ifone loses oneself in play, if one is "totally absorbed in the play ofthings."s This
place and time, our prejudgments have a positive part o
t play in facilitating our understanding.2 question addresses the medial balance in Gadamer's hermeneutics between the
hermeneutic event and the subject. Hans, however, does not introduce the middle
The distinction between prisoners and children is reminiscent of the difference
voice. Instead he shifts the discussion to what be calls the question of presence
Paul makes between being children of God and slaves of sin (Romans 8) or
as self-absence. Understanding while being absorbed means self-forgetfulness
between slaves and sons in Galatians 4. To be a child or a son nvolves
i freedom
that arises from total attention to tbe object. Hans writes: "Being outside of
within something. As Llewelyn says, it is through our prejudgments that we are
oneself, being caught up in the play, is not simply a negation of one's being­
"agents in history and inheritors of a tradition." Such a passage calls not only for
present but it is being-present in a different way, through the attention to
the middle voice between the active and the passive but also for the middle voice
something not oneself."6 This being-present in a different way is what the middle
as internal diathesis or even for Llewelyn's own notion of enabling.
voice is all about: though caught in the event ofunderstanding, the subject is not
Unfortunately, however, the middle voice shines only between the lines.
negated; he or she still understands. Further, Hans comes very close to middle
The absence of the middle voice is even more blatant in the context of play.
As we will see in the next chapter, the section on play is where Gadamer actually

3 Derrida, Marges de Ia philosoph1:e, 9.

1 John Llewelyn, Beyond Metaphysics? The Hermeneutic Circle in Contemporary 4 See James S. Hans, "Henneneutics, Play, Deconstruction," Philosophy Today 24 (1980):
Continental Philosophy (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press International, INC., 1985; 317.
London: The Macmillan Press LTD., 1985), 104, 122. s Ibid.' 305.
2 Ibid., I 04. 6 Ibid.
34 Chap. 2: The Middle Voice in the Literature on Gadamer
voice in his attention to middle-voiced expressions in Gadamer. He quotes, for
example, the famous phrase that language speaks us, rather than we speak it. He
also cites Gadamer on conversation: a conversation is not something we conduct
but something we fall into. Even his own critical appropriation ofplay has medial
overtones. He criticizes Gadamer for drawing play into linguisticality and
ultimately anthropomorphizing play. In Hans's view one must "decenter language
itself, making it only one of the kinds of play in the world, though obviously the
most important one in human terms."7 He stresses the natural aspect of play
which Gadamer notes in passing without fully developing it. Human play is part
of the all-encompassing play of nature. Hans focuses on play, and he clearly
points out hat
t the subject is not jettisoned in the process that happens. He
constantly writes around the middle voice, but he never mentions it.
Richard Palmer's Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher,
Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer is another example of the conspicuous absence
of the middle voice. This book is a deservedly well-known introduction to
hermeneutics.8 Though written from the perspective of literary criticism, it is a
solid introduction to the field and its major theorists. Concerning Gadamer,
Palmer gives a clear review of the three parts of Truth and Method, discussing in
tum the · experience of art, historicism, and linguisticality. He stresses the
phenomenological aspect, in the Heideggerian sense, ofGadamer's hermeneutics:
through the saying power of language, the thing or being encountered in the '
dialectic of understanding reveals or discloses itself to the interpreter. The
interpreter is not the subject ofthis event nor the master of an object, but it is the
Sache that questions him or her. This disclosure of understanding corresponds to
the middle verb q>cdvoi!CU, where "phenomenology'' comes from. Gadamer,
however, does not simply adopt Heidegger's position. Palmer argues that
Gadamer's affinity with Hegel is an improvement over Heidegger. He notes that
the later Heidegger in particular tended to describe understanding in passive
terms and therefore to disqualify the subject. Palmer goes on:
There emerges a danger that man will be seen as a passive speck in the stream of language and
tradition. Gadamer does not go to the other extreme oftaking man's subjectivity as the starting
point for all thinking about understanding, but he does take a position that allows a greater degree
of dynamic interaction when he speaks of"experience" and of"fusion ofhorizons." . . . he allows
for conceiving understanding as a personal act and not simply an event that "takes place." ...I
believe that here again the dialectical character ofGadamer's hermeneutics as over against that
1
Ibid., 315
8
Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutic.5: lnterpreUltion Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey,
Heidegger, and Gadamer(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969). Even though Palmer
states on page four that for him the context of his book is the project "of moving toward a more
adequate approach to literary interpretation," I think that it is justified to put it under the heading
"philosophy" for at least two reasons. First, this book constitutes the examination of a
philosophical basis of literary interpretation. Second, if Richard Rorty is right, literary criticism
and philosophy are not far apart; see Richard Rorty, "Nineteenth-Century Idealism and
Twentieth-Century Textualism, " The Mons
i t 64, no. 2 (1981 ).
Philosophical Texts on. Gadamer 's Hermeneutics 35
ofHeideggerwould more adequately provide for the contribution made by the persondoing the
understanding to the hermeneutical experience.9
The specificity of Gadamer's henneneutics is to give some latitude to the
understanding subject. The subject is not passive. This passage clearly brings to
language the mediality ofunderstanding, but never by name. Further, Palmer also
notes that Gadamer situates or places the understanding subject in the "medium"
of tradition and in the "medium" oflanguage. We stand in these media and we
exist through them. Palmer even makes the connection between Gadamer's
localization of the subject and Heidegger's Letter on Humanism where being, as
the house of language, is the element in which we live. That Palmer does not
connect these two media with the middle voice is not all that swprising, since the
grammar manuals usually define the middle voice in terms of the subject being
affected by his or her action and not in the sense of Benveniste's internal
diathesis. What is more astonishing, however, is that Palmer does not mention the
middle voice when he examines Gadamer's notion of play. "Game" as Palmer
prefers to say refers to the way of being of the work of art. He notes that
Gadamer's notion of play has nothing to do with the subjectivist point of view
that a game is an activity the subject engages in at will for his or her pleasure.
Instead play bas its own autonomy; it is the true subject ofplaying. It masters the
players who nevertheless play. Palmer clearly spells out the way Gadamer
introduces Spiel against subjectivized aesthetics and the way it serves as the
comer stone of his hermeneutics. He even quotes Gadamer on several occasions,
yet there is not a single word about the mediality of play!
Joel Weinsheimer also comes within a hair's breadth of the middle voice
without naming it. In Gadamer 's Hermeneutics: A Reading ofTruthandM etho d.,
he stresses that understanding is an encompassing event that happens to us.
Concerning method and Gadamer' s demarcation from it, Weinsheimer introduces
"hap," a notion that comes close to mediality. "Hap" is that which escapes
methodological control. He writes:
It [hap] makes its presence felt when one happens onto something, in the haphazard guess, the
happenstance situation, in happiness and haplessness. . . . Hap . . . is what occurs to us "beyond
our willing and doing."1 0
The quote in this passage by Weinsheimer is from Gadamer's preface to the
second edition of Truth and Method where Gadamer states his strongly medial
sounding philosophical intention. Weinsheimer's emphasis on hap portends that
his interpretation of play does not skirt the middle voice; but it does. It keeps
·writing around the mediality of play. It expounds it but fails to name it. It clearly
shows that play takes over and overcomes the dichotomy between subject and
object in the experience of art and in understanding in general. Leaving behind
9 Palmer, 2 16f.
10
i A Reading ofTruth a11d Method (New
Joel C. Weinsheimer, Gadamer's Hermeneutc.5:
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), 8.
36 Chap. 2: The Middle Voice in the Literature on Gadamer
the mode of thinking fiXated on the opposition active/passive, Weinsheimer
notes:
To say that the game takes over, or plays, the player is not to imply that an object takes over
where the subjectleaves off. Quite the contrary, the subject loses itselfpreciselywhen itdoes not
stand over against an object in itself, when it no longer treats the game as an object but as
something itjoins, gets caught up in, and fmally belongs to. 11
Weinsheimer even captures the locality, the volume, of middle-voiced play when
he repeatedly illustrates the notion of Spielraurn, play room, with examples
drawn from various sports. He moves beyond the common to and fro motion by
addjng two dimensions that bring depth and space to his understandlng ofplay.
In the context of the freedom within play he writes:
i the freedom of movement to and fro, back and forth, up and down ihe field
Essential to play s
- the repeated circular movement of excursion and return that is under control of neither the
individual players nor referees but belongs to the playing ofthe game.ll
These quotes show that Weinsheimer comes close to the middle voice -
implicitly. Had he treated it explicitly, he could have prevented a mishap.
Gadamer can say that the subject of a game is the game itself. Weinsheimer
cannot. He argues that for Gadamer the game is no object. In his view, when the
distinction between subject and object collapses in play, they "coalesce." In other
words, Weinsheimer introduces a fusion of subject and object. He does not see
the shift in the meaning of the subject when the perspective moves from an
active/passive relation between subject and object to a medial relation of subject
and process. Weinshcimer's text has strong medial overtones, but it does not fully
do justice to the middle voice. Despite Weinsheimer's excellent rendering of the
being of play, his account fuses the subject and the object, whereas a medial
outlook would show the subject encompassed in the process of the verb taking
place around him or her.
Hans-Herbert Kogler also passes over the explicit mediality ofplay. Unlke i all powerful tradition.1 6 Kogler's merit is to try to uphold the subject's
Weinsheimer, though, he reads into Gadamer's hermeneutics a passive subject.
In Die Macht des Dialogs he develops a critical hermeneutics based on the power
of dialogue and the power (due to the social practices embedding the interpreter)
limiting dialogue. His reflection draws on Gadamer, Michel Foucault, and
Richard Rorty. Against Gadamer, Kogler wants to replace the
wirkungsgeschichtliches BewujJtsein with a dialogical-critical consciousness,
because in his view Gadamer's notion lets the subject be all too dependent on the
hermeneutic event of language. He argues that Gadamer's project of the
understanding subject's hermeneutic enlightenment makes no sense if the subject
completely depends on the event of language. Without denying that a successful
dialogue is an event no one fully controls, he proposes a less dependent subject
who seeks to lay an active and reflexive claim on the possibilities of
II
lbid., 103.
12
Ibid., 104.
Philosophical Texts 011 Gadamer 's Hermeneutics 37
understanding foreign meaning. The anticipation of perfection or the logic of
question and answer, for instance, which in Gadamer are structures encompassing
the subject, become the interpreter's mental attitude in Kogler. His point is to
strengthen and clarify the methodological elements in Gadamer's hermeneutics.
He shows that in Gadamer's hermeneutics the subject remains active despite the
linguistic-ontological foundation ofunderstandingY Kogler is right to ward off
a passive subject. Yet, because he does not consider the mediality of
understanding, the event of language and the hermeneutic consciousness exclude
each other: he draws an either/or picture, whereas the middle voice precisely
leaves room for the subject witllin the event of understanding. For instance, he
totally overlooks the mediality involved in sentences like sich etwas sagen
lassen. The task of letting something be told to one does not open a space where
the subject is not subject alone but leads in Gadamer, according to Kogler, to the
appropriation by the subject of the other in a common truth. 14 Kogler remains
totally in the active/passive frame of thought. Regardlng play, he contends that
the Gadamerian use of play to depict the event of dialogue leaves too little room
for t�e reflexive subject. Gadamer's view draws too much on a tragic, that is,
pass1ve, conception of the human in the event of understanding. Kogler's way of
quoting Gadamer is symptomatic of his ignoring the middle voice: be cites
passages from Truth and Method about play, but he does not comment on the
qualification "medial"; he even skips altogether the sentences that explicitly
characterize play as medial. Instead of the mediality of play Kogler emphasizes
its characteristics that seem to reduce the player to a passive entity: play is a
supersubjective process, it is an autonomous unit of meaning, and it is not
represented but represents itself in and through the players.15 Not seeing the
mediality of play, be downplays the role of the players. He even argues that
Gadamer's hermeneutics reduces the understanding subject to the medium of the
participation in the event of understanding. The subject is not passive vis-a-vis
an all-encompassing event of language. He ignores, however, the middle voice:
the subject takes part not only in but also of understanding. The consequence of
Kogler's omission is that his efforts go into restoring a balance he has overlooked
in Gadamer.
Brice R. Wachterhauser does not overlook the balance intrinsic in
hermeneutics. In Beyond Being: Gadamer 's Post-Platonic Hermeneutical
Ontology, he shows that Gadamer's hermeneutics is best understood in the light
ofhis studies of Plato. Beyond being means that Gadamer is able to move beyond
13 See Hans-Herbert Kogler, Die Macht des Dialogs: Kritisclze Hermerzeutik nach Gadamer,
Fo��ault rmdRorty (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzlersehe Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1992), 98-101.
See ibid., 124-126.
IS
See ibid., 40.
16 See ibid., 1 13.
38 Chap. 2: The Middle Voice in the Literature 011 Gadamer
Heidegger's fixation on Being and the forgetfulness thereof in the Western
tradition by showing that metaphysics is not necessarily the dead end it is
commonly assumed to be. Wachterhauser comes close to the mediality of
philosophical hermeneutics several times. For example, be notes that we
participate in history whether we like or not. Yet history is no straitjacket since
we have the possibility o t innovate within its continuity. He also mentions that
for Gadamer language is the necessary medium of all thought, a medium that we
do not master. By "medium", he argues, Gadamer means "that language is an
indispensable place where the intelligibility ofthe real makes itself manifest to
us.'m This interpretation clearly brings to language the locality ofunderstanding:
understanding takes place within language. Further, Wachterhauser notes in the
context of theater plays that the audience makes the play what it is. The play
needs the audience to represent itself. Here, too, the middle voice speaks without
being named. Even in his discussion of play as such it goes unnamed. He starts
with the notion ofthe increase of being. When animals, children, and even adults
play, their being increases in the sense that they become what they are in play and
the self-presentation it implies. Talking about a child's play, Wachterhauser notes
with strong medial overtones:
She must allow herself to be swept up, as itwere, by her circumstances and to thereby put herself
in a position to explore its many possibilities forher. Play is only play where it is spontaneous
in this way. All such play is beyond deliberation. In this sense, the child does not make herself
through self-conscious choices, but in playing she nevertheless "increases" herself by realizing
i herent to her in unique ways.18
possibilities n
Play is not something we master although we are stiU the players and make
decisions within the game. Wachterhauser argues that play is not only an account
of the relation of historicity and our development. There is more to it: play is a
basic ontological insight that informs Gadamer's whole project. To underscore
the scope ofplay, Wachterhauser keeps varying the subjects ofplay. He says that
for Gadamer it is not only animals, children, and adults who play. In fact reality
or the world play and become what they are through playful self-presentation.
"One might say that for Gadamcr Being itselfis play."19 This play happens in the
medium oflanguage; language is the play ofthe world."20 Here, too, the middle
"
voice shines between the lines, yet it is clouded by the variety of subjects
Wachterbauser imposes on it: animals, children, reality, the world. What is
missing is Gadamer' s pointthat play itselfis subject. Even though Wachterhauser
stresses that play is close to Heidegger's Ereignis, that as self-presentation of
reality it can cany us off in many directions without definitive rest, as in Hegel's
17 Brice R. Wachterhauser, Beyond Being: Gadamer's Post-Plcuonic Hermeneutical Ontology
(Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1999), 9.
18
Ibid., 154.
19 Ibid., 155.
20 Ibid., 156.
Philosophical Texts on Gadamer's Hel'meneuti
cs 39
Aujhebung,21 he does not underline the fact that play plays. Wachterhauser misses
the mediality of play. He does not spell out that play happens to us who play
within it, that it and we are subjects.
In Paul Ricreur's interpretation of Gadamer the mediality of hermeneutics
reveals itself in the context of play, but, again, without explicit mention of the
middle voice. It is well known that Ricreur asked if the title ofGadamer's major
work should not have been "Truth or Method."22 Gadarner unlike Heidegger
moves away from ontology toward epistemology. He not only deals with the
Heideggerian truth but also with the Diltheyan method. Ricreur, however,
criticizes Gadamer for not having fully re-emerged from ontology to method and
epistemology. Reflecting on the critical aspects of hermeneutics, Ricreur
develops the notion of the referential moment of reading a text: understanding
does not pursue the author's intentions behind the text, but it is involved in the
mode ofbeing or the world unfolding in front of the text. Ricreur is elaborating
and pressing to the end "a theme sketched by Gadamer himself, particularly in his
magnificent pages onplay."23 Although Ricreur mentions the "magnificent pages
on play" - the pages where Gadamer addresses the middle voice explicitly- he
does not refer to the middle voice. He notes that understanding s i not a
constitution of which the subject si in charge: the reading subject does not project
him or herself into the text but receives from the text an enlarged self. The reader
of a text enters a play where he or she "unrealizes" him or herself. Ricreur calls
this the imaginative variations ofthe ego. Thus, a theme Gadamer sketched "in
his magnificent pages on play" constitutes for Ricreur the potential basis for a
hermeneutics critical of the illusions ofthe subject. Ricreur thinks that the critical
moment within hermeneutics is a ''vague desire constantly reiterated but
constantly aborted."24 Nevertheless Ricreur sees the potential for critique
particularly in play, and this indicates that the subject is by no means jettisoned
and that there is room for method in hermeneutics. Therefore it seems, against
Ricoeur, that the title Truth and Method is justified after all. Precisely the
conjunction rather than tbe alternative of truth and method suggests the mediality
of understanding and the subject's involvement in it.
The title of James Risser's Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other: Re­
reading Gadamer's Philosophical Hemzeneutics sounds promising to someone
attentive to the middle voice. Risser rereads philosophical hermeneutics in the
21 See ibid., 159.
22
See Paul Rica:ur, "La tache de l'hermeneutique," in Exegesis: Problemes de methode et
exercices de lecure
t (Genese 22 et Luc 15), ed. Fran90is Bovon and Gregoire Rouiller (Neuchatel
and Paris: Delachaux & Niestle Editeurs, 1975), 197.
23 Paul Ricoour, "Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology," in Herme11eutics and the
Human Sciences, ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1981; reprint,
in Henneneutics and Modern Philosophy, ed. Brice R. Wacbterhauser (Albany, N.Y.: State
University of New York Press, 1986)), 331 (page references are to the reprint edition).
24 Rica:ur, "Hermeneutics and the Oitique ofldeology," 325.
40 Chap. 2: The Middle Voice in the Literature on Gadamer
light of Gadamer's lifelong interest in poetry and of the complexity of his
hermeneutic project due to its expansion since Truth and Method. He points to
i Gadarner's thought from the hermeneutic optimism still present in Truth
a shift n
and Method to the more modest view of understanding as being attentive to the
voice of the other in tradition and poetry. Risser focuses on Gadamer's
"hetmeneutics ofthevoice" that lets speak in a clearer voice that which s i far and
alienated, that is, the other.25 He places philosophical henneneutics within the
horizon of the voice of the other. Understanding does not originate in the subject
but in the voice of the other that addresses me with its truth claim and awakens
me to vigilance. "Voice" underscores that understanding is conversational. This
voice, Risser stresses, is the voice ofthe other. Understanding does not absorb the
other in the self It means openness to the other so as to understand oneselfbetter.
Risser writes:
In the end a philosophical hermeneutics is about self.understanding; but this, as Gadamer insists,
has little to do with a philosophy of subjectivity. Rather, it has to do with our being at home in
the world that we are awakened to in the voice of the other.'6
Although Risser's language is sometimes reminiscent of the internal diathesis,
his noti9n of voice is not the middle voice. He only refers to the middle voice in
passing: in a note about the appearance of the beautiful he mentions that
appearance comes from the mi.ddle cpaiVOIJCXt.27 In the section on play, however,
he completely passes over the middle voice. Instead he stresses the "decentering
of the player in play for the sake of play's self-presentation."28 Being decentered,
the self loses his or herself. This loss of the self is not literal because the self is
still "present" but outside him or herself. The players subject themselves to play
which is a circle, "a back-and-forth self-renewing movement, like the KLV110t�
of living being."29 Risser highlights play's movement of self-presentation, not its
encompassing character. Similarly the voice of the other seems to call me out of
myself, but it does not call somewhere. Risser does not articulate that in which
understanding happens, the locality of understanding, the Sache. Although he
talks about the "poetic dwelling"30 common to the self-presentation characteristic
ofphilosophy and art, he only implicitly localizes the understanding subject in
the hermeneutic event. He argues that the tanying, the participating absorption
in the encounter ofthe voice ofthe other is the nature of the event of truth where
we become more at home in the world. The merit of Risser's reading is that voice
resounds. It has volume, it does not speak in the void since Risser does not do
away with the understanding subject. The call ofthis voice, however, does not
25 See James Risser, Hermeneutics and the Voice of the Other: Re-reading Gadamer's
Philosophical Hermeneutics (Albany, N.Y.: State University ofNew York Press, 1997), 14, 172f.
2 6 Ibid., 17.
27 Ibid., 244, n. 15.
28
Ibid., 140.
29 Ibid., 141.
30 See ibid., 199-206.
Philosophical Texts on Gadamer's Hermeneutics 41
tell me where I am, although Risser notes that Gadamer's question is not so much
the question of being but that oflanguage in the sense of becoming at home ill the
world?1
Robin Schott, by contrast, raises the question oflocality explicitly, although
she also skirts the middle voice. In the thought provoking article "Whose Home
Is It Anyway? A Feminist Response to Gadamer's Hermeneutics," she argues that
Gadamer's thought is based on unacknowledged social relations between men
and women. She explicitly asks where home is because historically to be home
has meant different things for men and women. For women, being confmed to the
home, it meant everyday life and the sustenance of it. For men, however, home
has had a different meaning since they tend to leave it and to build a new and
different home to fmd themselves. Since men have dominated philosophy, the
issue of "being at home" is set in the masculine pattern of detachment and
alienation from the particular natural home and the reappropriation of a purified
home in the quest of universality. Based on this observation, Schott raises critical
questions about Gadamer's hermeneutics. The problem is that they are set in
active terms for men and passive terms for women. Men act on home whereas
women seem acted upon by it. Schott does not see the mediality involved in
being home and even of making a home for oneself That she ignores the middle
voice is obvious in her examination of play. She writes that for Gadamer the
mode of being of play is "a to and fro without goal, to which the subjects
surrender themselves." She notes some gender-related psychological differences
in play: for example, girls would rather stop a game than jeopardize the relation
with the coplayers, whereas boys characteristically play in larger groups, longer,
and more competitively. Then she goes on to say:
By defrning play in terms of the game rather than the players, in order to transcend the attitude
of subjectivity, Gadamerarticulates an attitude towards play which typifies masculine rather that
feminine psychology.32
She contends that Gadamer imports this biased notion of play into his thought
and thus inscribes gender differences in his hermeneutics that is supposed to be
universal. The problem with her interpretation of play is that she turns it into
something at the disposal of boys and girls, the gender difference being that boys
are more likely to surrender and abandon themselves fully to it than girls.
Although she mentions that Gadamer talks about play from the perspective of
play, she does not stress that play is also subject. She completely ignores its
mediality. Consequently she misses the balance of under-standing. One stands
like a man, or one is under like a woman. Schott is right to address sexist
prejudices critically, but the mediality of hermeneutics she overlooks precisely
31 See ibid., 13.
32 Robin Schott, "Whose Home Is It Anyway? A Feminist Response to Gadamer's
Henneneutics," in Gadamer and Hemzeneutics: Science, Culture, Literature, ed. Hugh J.
Silvennan (New York and London: Routledge, 199 1), 204.
42 Chap. 2: The Middle Voice in the Literature on Gadamer
allows one to face such prejudices and to understand them and oneself
differently. Schott herself is living proof of that.
The issue of critique is the lynchpin of the debate between Jilrgen Habermas
and Gadamer. Schematically, this debate has shown the difference between a
medial thinking that knows its limits in the name of finitude and an active
thinking that claims a position outside of the event ofunderstanding in the name
of reason. Gadamer balances under-standing whereas Habermas focuses on
standing only, criticizing Gadamer for being too passive.33 Seen from the
perspective of the middle voice, Habermas misses the mediality oflanguage and
tradition. Although Gadamer does not say that language (including tradition) is
reality, Habermas accuses him of "idealism of linguisticality." He argues that
language is not the all-encompassing medium Gadamer makes it out to be.
Language and tradition are also relative to labor and dominion. They require a
more active treatment than hermeneutics can provide. Habermas's active way of
thinking prompted him lo devise a "depth hermeneutics" based on psychoanalysis
to deal in a nonhe1meneutic way with systematically distorted communication.l4
Although he has abandoned this model, it still betrays a mode of thinking
characterized by external rather than internal diathesis.
In Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis,
Richard Bernstein also addresses the issue of critique, but unlike Habermas he
offers a sympathetic reading of Gadamer: be notes that one could entitle Truth
and Method and for that matter Gadamer's whole philosophical project "Beyond
Objectivism and Relativism"!35 Bernstein's reading of Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics aims at overcoming the Cartesian anxiety caught in the either/or of
securely grounded lmowledge versus intellectual and moral chaos and at
following the current movement beyond objectivism and relativism toward an
alternative way ofunderstanding our being-in-the-world. Though sympathetic to
Gadamer, however, Bernstein detects a te/os in philosophical hermeneutics that
forces him to move beyond it. He sees n
i philosophical hermeneutics the heir of
practical philosophy, but he finds Gadamer's appropriation of r.ppOVT'}Ol� and his
treatment ofpraxis problematic: Gadamer does not offer clear criteria to judge
what is valid in tradition, and he ignores the issue of power and domination
inherent in contemporary praxis. Gadamer does not face the problem of the fate
of r.pp6VTJOl� in a chaotic situation that lacks "universal" norms concerning
33See Jtlrgen Habennas, "A Review ofGadamer's Truth and Method," in Understanding
and Social Inquiry, ed. Fred R. Dallmayr and Thomas McCarthy (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1977; reprint in Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy, ed. Brice R.
Wachterhauscr), 267f. (page references are to the reprint edition).
34 See JUrgcn Habermas, "Der UniversaliUitsanspruch der Hermeneutik," in Theorie­
Diskussion: Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik, by Karl-Otto Ape! and others (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), 133-150.
3s See Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Scie11ce, Herme��eutics, and
Praxs
i (Philadelprua: University ofPennsylvania Press, 1983), I I 5.
Philosophical Texts on Gadamer 's Hermeneutics 43
conduct. He describes the current situation but offers no theoretical or causal
explanation for it. In short, Bernstein finds in Gadamer a "latent radical strain"
that needs to be developed beyond descriptive hermeneutics.36 Bernstein comes
very close the middle voice. He argues that "for Gadamer, understanding is
misconceived when it is thought ofas an activity of a subject: it is a 'happening,'
an 'event,' a pathos.'m This does not mean that understanding is passive. He
writes, for example, about Gadamer's softening the elitist aspect of Aristotle' s
r.ppOVTJ<nc; with the hermeneutic principle of respect for the other and Hegel' s
principle that all are free: "There is an implicit te/os here, not in the sense ofwhat
will work itself out in the course ofhistory, but rather in the sense of what ought
to be concretely realized."38 Bernstein could have made this telos more explicit
had he considered the medial nature of play. Like many others, however,
Bernstein writes around the middle voice. lie points out that for Gadamer play
is the clue to ontological explanation and an alternative to the Cartesian model
based on the separation of subject and object. Play has "everything" to do with
the event of understanding. He emphasizes the "internal buoyancy, the to-and-fro
movement that belongs to play itself.''39 He notes that play has its own essence
independent of the players' consciousness, a rhythm and a structure of its own
and that it is its own subject reaching presentation through the players. Though
extremely close to the middle voice, Bernstein passes over it For instance, he
quotes Gadamer on play, starting his citation one sentence after an explicit
mention of the medial nature of play. The middle voice, however, is at band in
a note where Bernstein comments on play's affinity with the Greek notion of
theoros and theory. The translation of Gadamer's text says that theory is
something passive. Bernstein adds:
TheEnglish word"passive" fails to caprure Gadamer's nuanced meaning. Wbat Gadamer means
is much closer to the Greekpathos. All paJhos involves undergoing, experiencing, suffering. Just
as the concept ofpathos bas been emasculated in many of its contemporary uses, Gadamer argues
that this is also true of the concept ofpraxis. All genuine praxis involves pathos. The dialectical
interplayofpraxs i and pathos is characteristic ofall experience (Erfahrung).oi!J
W'hy Bernstein chose the word "emasculated" is not clear to me, but this passage
nevertheless shows his proximity to the middle voice, although it remains
unnamed.
Bernstein speaks of the "internal" buoyancy of play. Alasdair Macintyre uses
the same adjective in the distinction between internal and external representation
he introduces in his article "Context of Interpretation: Reflections on Hans-Georg
Gadamer's Truth and Method." He does not mention the mediality of play, but
this distinction and his understanding of conversation approximate the middle
36 See ibid., 163.
37 Ibid., 113.
38 Ibid., 165.
39 Ibid, I 21.
40
Ibid., 248f., n. 15.
44 Chap. 2: The Middle Voice in the Literature on Gadamer
voice. He notes that in general one does ask why one has a conversation.
"Conversation is rather the medium within which purposes are developed,
criticized, modified and abandoned. It is a form of activity which individuals
sustain, but do not create."41 Macintyre draws on mimes s
i or representation to
explain how the truth structures itself in "the free play of conversational
transaction.'>42 Mimesis is internal representation. It has nothing to do with the
external relation between a passport photo and its subject.
i quite otherwise with internal representation; here the key fea.tnresofthatwhich is represented
It s
can only be identified by means of the representation. It is by means ofthe representation that we
learn to see what is represented.'3
Internal representation does not copy but lets appear that which it represents in
a truth that teaches something different about it. Here Macintyre comes close to
the middle voice. The distinction between external and internal representation,
however, refers to the relation between the representation and the represented.
The subject remains outside of both. The only difference is that instead of
comparing A and A' he or she learns something of A by means of A'. Macintyre's
account of conversation is closer to the middle voice than his notion of internal
represe11tation because it places the subject within conversation. He is, however,
closest to middle voice in his criticism of Gadamer. He argues that Gadamer
partially mis1mderstands his own book because he stresses the description of
practice over its transformation. He accuses Gadamer of merely describing
practice without engaging in it, as if description were something external as in
"external representation." In my reading, however, philosophical hermeneutics
is medial, and Gadamer does not exclude himself from it. When h e describes
.
practice, he does not withdraw from it and look at it methodologically from the
outside. In my understanding, Gadamer would have no quarrel with Macintyre's
statement addressed against him: "We inhabit an interpreted world in which
reinterpretation is the most fundamental form of change.'>44 That is precisely what
is going on; there is no need the prescribe it.
IfMacintyre criticizes Gadamer for not acknowledging his activity within the
process of understanding, Richard Rorty gives an intetpretation of Gadamer
which leans toward a new kind of activity diametrically opposed to method
because it is on the other side ofphilosophical hermeneutics, so to speak. He calls
himself a liberal ironist45 taking on contingency and rejecting all metaphysical
foundations in favor of a conversation grounded only in its own continuance.
This ideal applies to the strong poet that paves her own way by constantly
41 Alasdair Macintyre, "Contexts oflnterpretation: Reflections on Hans-Georg Gadamer's
Truth. and Method," Boston UniversityJourna/24, no. I (1976): 42.
42
Ibid., 43.
43 Ibid.' 44.
44 Ibid., 46.
45 See Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge, New York, and
Victoria: Cambridge University Press, 1989), xv.
Philosophical Texts on Gadamer 's Hermeneutics 45
changing vocabulaties and making new ones to reinvent herself. Rorty notes that
.
she isursprii.ng/ich rather than a passive recipient of the gifts of Being.46 The
active aspect ofthe ironist is that she does not find truth: she makes it. There is,
however, a double limit to this activity: the acknowledgment of the benefit of
democracy and the avoidance ofcruelty to others, especially humiliation. This s
i
the liberal side of the ironist. Rorty's notion oflanguage is symptomatic of this
poetic activity. He rejects language as medium. It is important to note, however,
that medium for him means "medium through which" and not "medium in
which." Languages are not like the pieces of a jigsaw puzzle through which we
reach a grand picture. He prefers the image of a tool, hough
t a special one:
language is a causal tool. It causes unheard-of possibilities. Unlike the worker
who knows what he wants to do before he picks a tool, the ironist makes tools
first and then uses them for things she could not have thought ofbefore.47
With reference to hermeneutics, Rorty does not see it as the successor of
epistemology. He argues that foundational epistemology (and its assumption of
a grand whole made up of commensurable pieces like a jigsaw puzzle) has had
its day. Hermeneutics is the hope that the space it left open will not be filled. It
is not another way ofknowing, but "another way of coping. "48 Rorty claims to
take from Gadamer his use of hermeneutics as a polemical term against what he
calls "normal," "systematic," or "mainstream" philosophy.49 Truth and Method,
he argues, could be called "a tract against the very idea ofmethod, where this is
conceived of as an attempt at commensuration."50 He underlines Gadamer' s
notion ofBildung, which he translates "edification," arguing that this remaking
ofourselves in conversation is the goal of thinking for Gadamer. The same active
tone shows in Rorty's understanding of Gadamer's wirkungsgeschichtliches
Bewuj3tsein. Although he translates it "the sort ofconsciousness ofthe past which
changes us," he holds that Gadamer means "an attitude interested not so much in
what is out there in the world, or in what happened in history, as in what we can
get out of nature and history for our own uses."51 This interpretation, which
emphasizes self-creation, announces already the strong poet and the ironist: all
that counts is the way we say things and not the things we talk about. The
emphasis is not on the Sache buton making connections between the familiar and
the unfamiliar, and especially on the poetic activity of inventing new
vocabularies. Rorty calls this activity "edifying without being constructive . . . .
For edifying discourse is supposed to be abnormal, to take us out of our old
46 See ibid., 123, n. 4.
47 See ibid., 9-22 and 55.
48 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 1979), 356.
49 See ibid., I I and 366f.
50 Ibid., 358, n.l.
51 Ibid., 359.
46 Chap. 2: The Middle Voice in the Literature on Gadamer
selves by the power of strangeness, to aid us in becoming new beings."52 Rorty
is not talking about medially experiencing the unfamiliar by losing oneself to fmd
oneself, but about actively devising new ways ofspeaking in order to shed one's
old self. He turns hermeneutics into a new kind of activity. Instead of medially
belonging to language he actively longs for new languages. Rorty's amethodical
activity is interesting in our context because it is a branded maverick, so to speak:
it rejects any permanent foundations, it wants to make itself, but its longing never
ceases to be a belonging. It does not escape its own process of becoming, no
matter how active it is.
Before turning to theologically oriented accounts ofGadamer's hermeneutics,
it is important to mention two commentators who do not skirt the middle voice:
Theodore Kisiel and Jean Grondin. We encountered Kisiel already in the previous
chapter. Unlike Llewelyn who dwells on the middle voice but ignores it in the
context of Gadamer, Kisiel brings it to bear on his interpretation of Truth and
Method. As noted above, however, his to-and-fro notion of the middle voice
remains caught between the active and the passive. In "The Happening of
Tradition: the Hermeneutics of Gadamer and Heidegger," Kisiel examines bow
the lin�istic tradition delivers meaning to human understanding, and he contrasts
the more concrete Gadamer with the more elusive Heidegger. He argues that
Gadamer's hermeneutics, with its focus on understanding through language
within a tradition, is an antidote to Heidegger's elusive and cryptic
pronouncements. "Instead of regressing into the birthplace of language, Gadamer
prefers to situate the 'horizon of a hermeneutical ontology' in language itself, the
familiar language of the world and not the silent 'language' ofBeing."53 Kisiel
clearly indicates the balance between the event character of understanding and
the subject within it. He emphasizes that Gadamer's project is beyond
methodology in the sense that he is concerned with understanding as something
that happens beyond our willing and doing. Understanding is not a subjective
action: it is an entering into an Uberlieferungsgeschehen, an "event oftradition,"
yet in such a fashion that the subject is not done away with. The hermeneutic
experience is characterized by opetmess to the question o£ the other and by the
willingness not to impose one's point of view but to strengthen that of the other.
In a conversation, discourse takes its course, but our task is to let it happen for the
sake of the Sache. Kisiel notes that the understanding subject undergoes rather
than controls the hermeneutic experience. "Understanding is an undergoing.
IIa8et !l<i8oc;."54 Gadamer shows that the hermeneutic experience takes place in
language as its invisible background. This is so prevalent in Gadamer that Kisiel
writes: "One is almost tempted to summarize Gadamer's most original thesis
52 Ibid., 360.
s3 Theodore Kisiel, "The Happening of Tradition: The Hermeneutics of Gadamer and
Heidegger," Man and World 2, no. 3 (1969): 378f.
54 Ibid., 364.
Philosophical Texts on Gadamer's Hermeneutics 47
simply by asserting that: the medium mediates."55 This linguistic mediation is like
play. If Heidegger refers only briefly to play, Gadamer develops a
phenomenology of play to depict understanding. Unlike most commentators,
Kisiel does not pass over the middle voice. He writes:
But the most original meaning ofplay is neither the object northesubject ofplay, but the medial
meaning, the play as such, i.e., the spontaneous to-and-fro movement accomplished by play. The
heart ofthe matter i n play is the to-and-fro movement as such, which goes itself, notonly without
aim or purpose but also without effort. The players are drawn into the play in such a way that they
are unburdened, released from the strain of takingthe initiative, and "it takes over", as a pure self­
display. But eve n though "the play's the thing", it still needs the players as those to whom it
displays itself, who begin by playing only to become played in the process.56
The problem with this rendition of the medial aspect of play is that it remains
between the active and the passive. The players either play or are played. The
stress is on the to-and-fro movement. It is either the players who play or play that
plays. By contrast, the advantage of understanding the middle voice as internal
diathesis is that it allows one to overcome the exclusivity of the subject. The
internal diathesis makes it possible to conceive of an action with more than one
subject. The players keep playing although play plays.
In Hermeneutische Wahrheit? Grondin emphasizes the mediality of play in
two occurrences. Although phrased in terms ofthe distinction between active and
passive, his interpretation of the middle voice points beyond this distinction
toward the possibility of the subject acting within the self-occurrence of the
verbal process. Grondin first concentrates on the middle voice in the context of
the event of truth seen as play. After noingt that Gadamer underscores the fact
that play is itself the subject of play and that it is not under the control of the
playing subjects, he turns to the medial meaning of play:
Gadamer weist aufden ,medialen' Sinn des Spieles hin. E r den.kt hier, ohne es ausdrticklich zu
sagen, an das griechische Genus des Mediums, das in unseren modemen Sprachen, die
Reflexivformen ausgenonunen, nicht vorliegt. Dieses ,zwischen' dem Aktiv und dem Passiv zu
lokalisierende Genus ist filr uns schwer zu fassen. Es meint, daB das Subjekt am Verbalinhalt
beteiligt ist, indem es eine Handlung fur sich selbst oder an sich selbst vollzieht. Das Medium
iibemimmt vom Aktiv den Tiitigkeitsgedan.ken und betont daB es sicb urn eine Selbstbewegrmg
,
des Verbgeschehens handelt. Dieser Zusammenhang ist besonders aufschlu6reich, da, wie spiiter
in dieser Arbeit dargestellt wire!, der hermeneutische Wahrheitsbegriff als ein Zusammenfallen
von actio und passio zu verstehen ist.57
Grondin first describes the middle voice as a mode between active and passive
in which the subject affects him or herself in the verbal process. In the next
sentence, however, he moves a step closer to the internal diathesis, stressing that
the middle voice intimates that the verbal process happens by itself. If we
55 Ibid. , 365.
56 Ibid. , 371.
57 Jean Grondin, Hermeneutische Wahrheit? Zum WahrheitsbegriffHans-Georg Gadarners
(Konigstein!fs.: Forum Academicum in der Verlagsgruppe Athenaum, Rain, Scriptor, Hanstein,
1982), 104.
48 Chap. 2: The Middle Voice in the Literature on Gadamer
combine these two statements, we have the internal diathesis which
accommodates the subject ofan action within the verbal process happening to the
subject. It becomes possible to say that the players play and that play plays. The
force ofthe middle voice is that the subject is there within the verb while his or
her exclusivity is done away with.
Grondin dwells on the middle voice again in a passage where he shows the
balance between the subject and the event of understanding. He notes that
Gadamer oscillates between accounts that stress the objective and others that
stress the subjective side of understanding. This oscillation is no vacillation.
Gadamer is not hesitating between the ego and some supersubjcct. Instead, he is
working toward a new kind of subjectivity: a medial one.
Es soli das lneinanderspiel eines passiven und eines aktiven Elements :zum Vorschein gebracht
werden. Die ,Tlitigkeit', die bier ein Wahrheitsgeschehen hervorbringt, laBt sich weder in einer
aktivennoch in einerpassiven Verbfonn angemessen schildern. Gadamer schlagt sozusagen eine
,mittlere' Linie ein, ndem
i er beide Momente in das mediale Genus ein:zubringen versucht. . . .
Wahrheit ist dann ein wirk.ungsgcschichtliches Geschehen, an dem wir teilhabcn. . . . Es macht
. . . die positive Moglichkcit und den Eigenstand der philosophischen He1meneutik aus, die zwei
Momente auseinanderzuhalten und deren unabdingbares Zusammenspiel au:fzuwes i en. Die
Brschlossenheit oder das Sein-zur-Wahrheit bleibt stiindig auf die Wirkungsgeschichte
angewiesen wie diese auf jenes. Das henneneutische Wahrheitsereignis liegt im medialen
Ineinanderspiel beider Komponenten.s•
This passage clearly shows that the middle voice permits one to conceive ofmore
than one subject of understanding. The discussion, however, is set in
active/passive terms. lmrnediately after the just quoted passage, Grondin focuses
on n:o{fJm<; and n:a8oc; to further explain what the mediality ofthe event oftruth
implies. The activity of history is encountered b y a passive subject. The
Jneinanderspiel, the playing into each other, recedes in favor of an active/passive
relation where the components appear to be external to each other. Grondin
illustrates the dialectic between n:o(fJo�c; and n:a8oc; by comparing it to the
Pauline notion of faith which comes across as something passive. "Glaube und
Wahrheit miissen dem Glaubenden, der ,nichts tut' (J..lf! epya(6).levoc;, Rom 4,
5), offenbart werden, denn sie beriihren eine Wirklichkeit, iiber die er selbst nicht
verfiigt."59 Grondin by no means renders the understanding subject passive. The
notion ofSein-zur-Wahrheit clearly shows that60 The subject is not passive but
puts him or herself on the line. Grondin speaks of a passivity that is wirksam,
"effective." It is here that Benveniste's internal diathesis becomes significant,
because it allows one to go beyond the active/passive distinction. It shows that
mediality is more than something between the active and the passive. The
emphasis on the locality of tbe subject within the process of the verb helps
articulate the hermeneutic subjectivity and its being conscious of the linguistic
SS Ibid., 168f.
59 Ibid., 1 70.
60 See ibid, 140.
1heologcal
i Texts on Gadamer's Hermeneutics 49
belongingness to the world as the basis of its being. It brings into focus what it
means to catch the ball thrown at us by the ewige Mitspielerin in Rilke's pOem
that Gadamer chose to usc as the epigraph of Truth and Method: we are catching
the ball, but our being able to catch is not ours but that ofa world in and ofwhich
we always already partakc.61
Grondin's reference to Paul's notion offaith brings us to theology. In the next
section, I am going to examine some theological writings that draw on Gadarner's
hermeneutics. We will see that the middle voice is no less conspicuous by its
absence in theology.
Theological Texts on Gadamer's Hermeneutics
The aim in this section is again to show a pattern, not to be exhaustive. Most
interpretations ofGadamer's philosophical hermeneutics approximate the middle
voice but stop short of actually dealing with it. This pattern applies also to
theology. Let us start with Wolfllart Pannenberg. He does not concern himself
with the notion ofplay or the middle voice, but his criticism of Gadamer leads to
a conception of history that puts into focus the locality inherent in the middle
voice seen as internal diathesis. He discusses the Gadamerian notions oflanguage
and of fusion of horizons in "Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte." The general
thrust of this article is Pannenberg's claim that the task of a philosophy or
theology ofuniversal history must not be abandoned just because Hegel's model
has failed. Hegel's solution of universal history is not the only one. Gadamer
dodges the issue of universal history and replaces it with a hermeneutic ontology
in the horizon of language.62 Pannenberg, however, develops it. He notes that
universal history has its roots in Christianity, and he rel'ommlates it based on the
eschatological message of Jesus. Unlike Hegel, he does not import an alien
ontology and impose it on the history ofJesus, but he interprets this story on its
own terms.63 He argues that to think of the universal historical frame in terms of
its Christian eschatological origins allows him to realize a quasi squaring ofthe
circle: it makes possible a provisional knowledge of the whole ofhistory which
is necessary to be able to bridge past and present in a common context in light of
the future, yet without erasing their differences. The problem with the whole of
history is that we can represent it to ourselves only from its end. Pannenberg
takes the story of Jesus in order to think the end of history in a provisional
61
See ibid, 192f.
62 See Wolfhart Pannenberg, "Henncneutik und Universalgeschichle," chap. in Grundfragen
systematischer Theologie: Gesamme/te A.ufstitze (Gottingen: Vandenhocck and Ruprecht, 1967),
120f.
63 See Merold Westphal, "Hegel, Pannenberg, andHcnncneutics," Man and World 4 (1971):
282,290.
50 Chap. 2: The Middle Voice in the LiJerature on Gadamer
fashion. Through the story of Jesus interpreted in its eschatological context,
through the resurrection of Jesus as a foretaste of what s
i to come at the end, we
know the end and thus the whole of history - but only proleptically. Through
God's revelation in Christ, God is the ultimate frame of history and of
henneneutics. God's revelation constitutes the theme and the engine of history.
This frame is not an unquestionable limit but a limit no question will ever
exceed.64 The eschatological interpretation of Jesus allows Pannenberg to
introduce a notion ofuniversal history that is not closed but takes into account the
finitude ofhuman experience, the openness of the future, and individuality.
Pannenberg considers Truth and Method in the context of the meaning of
Scripture for today. The interpretation of the Bible presents a historical and a
hetmeneutic problem. The former concerns the relation between the texts and the
events it relates to; the latter has to do with the distance between the texts and the
current situation. Although there is a certain competition between these two sets
of problems, Pannenberg argues that one does not go without the other. His
universal-historical method i
ncludes both: "Die universalhistorische
Betrachtungsweise macht also cinen Umweg, den Umweg des Rilckgangs hinter
den Text auf das ihm zugrunde liegende, von ihm bezeugte Geschehen, urn auf
diesem Umweg die B rilcke zur Gegenwart des Auslegers (bzw. Historikers) zu
schlagen.'>65 Pannenberg argues that Truth and Method has promoted this
connection between the historical issue and the hermeneutic one.
Pannenberg first points out the positive elements in Gadamer's hermeneutics.
The notion of fusion of horizons is a real progress over Rudolf Bultmann's
existential limitation of the meaning of the text. Pannenberg argues that
Bultmannian hermeneutics has an anthropological bias that does not do justice
to Scripture. Yes, there are anthropological concerns in Scripture, but they are
secondaty to the fundamental relations to the world, to society, and to God. It is
only through these relations that the human comes to a self-understanding. For
Pannenberg it is crucial that one expose oneself to the whole past of the text
instead of limiting oneself to existential issues. This full exposure requires a
universal-historical perspective that provides the interpreter with a frame that
includes both the past and the present, bridging the gap between them while
keeping intact their differences. Pannenberg summarizes Gadamer's
improvement over Bultrnann in three points. First, Gadamer stresses the distance
between the horizon of the interpreter and that of the text. Two, the horizon of
understanding encompassing the interpreter and the text arises in the process of
understanding; it is not assumed in advance. Three, the horizon that the
interpreter brings to text is not rigid, but it changes in the process of
understanding. Pannenberg sums it up like this:
64 See Wolfhart Pannenberg, ''Vorwort," chap. in Grondfragen systematischer Theologie, 8.
Gs
Pannenberg, "Hermeneutik. und Universalgeschichte," 93.
TheologicarTexts on Gadamer's Hermeneutics 51
S o kommt dcr lnterpret, nachdern er zuniichst den Abstand des Textcs von seinem eigcnen,
_
nutgebrachten Hom�ont s1ch bewuJ3t macht (1), zur Ausbildung eines neuen, umfassenden
Horizontes (2) und gelangt so Ober die Grenzen seiner urspliinglichen Fragestellung und
Vormeinung hinaus (3).66
Interestingly enough, Pannenberg implicitly hints at the mediality of
understanding. Gadamer's triple improvement over Bultmann emphasizes that he
t
subject understands within the hermeneutic event. Explicitly, however,
Pannenberg underscores hermeneutics as a method. Expressions like bridging
past and present, making a detour behind the text to find out what it is about, and
applying (anwenden) Gadamer' s hermeneutics to biblical interpretation, are
evidence of his methodological bias. He argues that Gadamer is too much caught
in Heidegger's hermeneutic circle to be able fully to recognize the objectifying
consequences of his own notion of fusion of horizons and that his view of
language gets in the way of the methodological application of his hermeneutic
insights. For Pannenberg, Gadamer is wrong to downplay statements and to make
conversation the model of interpretation. This model obscures the nature of
interpretation . In Pannenberg's view, interpretation is not only a coming to
language but a matter of maldng statements explicit. The interpreter mustbe clear
about what the text states, and this can only be done by stating every said and
unsaid content of the text's original horizon. Since the text does not speak by
itself, the interpreter must creatively come up with a language able to comprise
the content ofthe text and the current horizon. Thus interpretation is no dialogue,
and understanding a text means to objectify it. Pannenberg grants Gadamer that
understanding is linguisti c, but thinks Gadamer is wrong to call it the actual
performance of language. Pannenberg clearly sees the eventlike character of
hermeneutics, but he objects to it and therefore passes over mediality.
Even though there is no mention of the middle voice in Pannenberg, his
discussion of Gadamer puts into perspective the notion of locality the internal
diathesis conveys. There is an interesting shift between Gadamer and Pannenberg
that bears on the "within" of understanding. For Gadarner, language is the
medium of understanding. Pannenberg quotes Gadamer to this effect, but he
argues that this medium is not language but the Christian notion of universal
history. He says that in fact Gadamer's text leads to the same conclusion, and he
finds it amazing to see how hard a deep thinker like Gadamer attempts - in vain
- to resist the motion of his own text and to steer clear of the Hegelian total
synthesis of present truth and history. The only thing that allows Gadamer to
dodge the issue ofuniversal history is his ontology oflanguage. For Pannenberg,
however, Gadamer's ontology of language does not hold because: "Ohne
Aussagen findet gar keine Sprache statt.'>67 The priority of Aussage is an
expression of the human relation to Umwelt: it is through statements that we can
66 Ibid., I 08.
67 Ibid., 115.
52 Chap. 2: The Middle Voice in tlte Literature on Gadamer
put the world at a distance and be sachlich about it. Even Gadamer cannot fully
deny the m
i portance of statements since he holds that one understands the Sache.
Gadamer's reflection on the linguisticality of understanding points to the
historicity ofthe interpreter and the Sache. The problem is that he downplays the
predicative function of language, focusing only on the linguisticality of
understanding. Gadamer's hermeneutics is therefore unable to bridge the gap
between the horizons of interpreter and Sache. To overcome the differences of
horizons is only possible on the level ofthe stated Sache and an examination of
its historicity. Such historical examination ofthe stated Sache requires more than
the development of specific historical aspects. Because of any Sache's multiple
ramifications for a multitude of issues, only a universal historical frame is able
to bridge the horizons of the interpreter and the Sache while upholding their
differences.
Whereas Gadamer describes something that takes place in the medium of
language fully aware that he himself is within it, Pannenberg uses hermeneutics
to devise a universal frame of history that fits past texts and the present situation
in the light of possible futures. Hermeneutics becomes a methodological vade
mecum. Pannenberg appears to be in charge of the frame he puts on
interpretation, although he knows that this frame has to be re-evaluated
periodically. Based on the presupposition that humans can only make sense and
become sure of the totality of their lives in relation to the totality of reality, he
articulates the whole truth in Christian-eschatological terms. In my reading, the
problem ofPannenberg's position is not that it is Christian. A Christian view is
not necessarily exclusive. The problem is rather the apparent domination over
understanding. Pannenberg draws up the enormous domain ofuniversal history
that according to him must be the frame of reference of interpretation and
understanding. Gadamcr is more modest and more intimate. He describes what
happens to the subject beyond his doing and willing. Although he does not put
the subject in charge, he remains closer to him or her because instead of
unfolding a universal historical panorama in front of the subject's eyes and
pointing at the frame he or she should have, he lets him or her listen to one of the
most intimate things: language.
Pannenberg underscores the universal historical frame based on the
eschatological context of the story of Jesus. His interpretation and use of
Gadamer's hermeneutics is methodological. David Tracy's appropriation of
hermeneutics also leans toward method, but Tracy is more aware than
Pannenberg of the encompassing nature of understanding itself. He offers an
existential, methodological, and critical interpretation ofGadamer in the service
of theology in general and systematic theology in particular: existential because
it stresses conversation as the frame oftheology and its examination ofthe modes
of being in the world; methodological because of the method of correlation
focusing on the interpretations of our common human experience and of the
Christian Scriptures; and critical because Tracy does not take over Gadamer's
Theological Texts 011 Gadamer's Hermeneutics 53
thought without reservations. He complements it especially with insights of
Ricreur.
Tracy's use of Gadamerian hermeneutics opens theology to a pluralistic
conversation with other religions, other sciences, and also with everyday life.
Werner Jeanrond expresses this well. He counts Tracy among the theologians
"who favor an open-ended dialogue on method between Christian interpreters and
other thinkers interested in hermeneutics. Generally speaking, they wish to assess
the particular Christian vision for this world in the context ofa great conversation
with all other groups ofhuman thinkers who care for the people ofthis world and
for the universe in which we livc.'>68 In order not to get diluted in an all too open­
ended pluralism, Tracy emphasizes that one's inquiry into the symbols and texts
needs method. His emphasis on method is no methodologism, however, because
be distinguishes method and content without separating them. The search for
method and the search for truth are not separate.69 In this way Tracy can make
sure that the pluralistic attitude does not tum into a "passive response"70 that is
open to all kinds of possibilities yet never practices any of them.
The strategy Tracy proposes to implement, tbe pluralistic attitude he
advocates, is the analogical m
i agination: "My fundamental aim . . . is to suggest
how the strategy of an analogical imagination may serve as a horizon for the
genuine conversation open to all in our pluralistic present."71 It is a hermeneutic
activity, a dialogue, a conversation, that "appeals primarily to the imagination (by
disclosing a possible way of being-in-the-world as a project for our imagination
to envision).'.n At first, the active word "strategy" in conjunction with horizon
seems to compromise the mediality of understanding. This is not the case,
however, because the analogical imagination involves the interpreter in a task
beyond his or her control. It entails the hermeneutic risk of being transformed in
conversation, it deals with truths that are relatively adequate at best, and it
implies critique and suspicion. Tracy implicitly hints at the mediality of
understanding when he underscores that "to be human is to be a skilled
interpreter" and that this can be leamed.73 We are interpreters whether we know
it or not, and we can become better at it. The possibility and ability to learn
68 Werner G. Jeanrond, Theological Hermeneutics: Development and Significance (New
York: Crossroad, 1991 ) I 63.
,
69 See David Tracy, Blessed Ragefor Order: The New Pluralism in Theology (New York:
Seaburg/Crossroad, 1975; reprint, San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1986), 15, n. 6
(pa�e references are to the reprint edition).
0 David Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion. Hope (San Francisco:
Ha�er & Row, Publishers, 1987), 90.
1 David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination: Christian Theology and tlte Culture of
Pluralism (New York: Crossroad, 1981), xii.
72 Tracy, Blessed Ragefor Order, 78.
73 See Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity, 9.
54 Chap. 2: ThE Middle Voice in theLiterature on Gadamer
something we are always already involved in shows that we are neither passive
nor active, but truly medial.
Tracy's model of conversation is clearly indebted to Gadarner's hermeneutics.
Tracy, however, notes that his view of interpretation-as-conversation aims at the
interpretation oftexts rather than at an ontology of understanding. He emphasizes
that these two directions are distinct yet not exclusive of each other.74 Tracy
discusses Gadamer's hermeneutics in the context o f a revisionist model for
contemporary Christian theology based on a critical correlation of the two
sources of theology: the common human experience and language and the
Christian texts.75 Hermeneutics intervenes in the investigation of the Christian
sources of theology. In this context, hermeneutics becomes method. It is not a
general theory of interpretation, but it seeks to explain the referent of texts. The
referent of a text is "the mode-of-being-in-the-world referred to by the text."76 In
the Christian Scriptures, this referent is a theological anthropology. Whereas
Gadarner bases his ontological claims about hermeneutics on the universal
medium of language, Tracy emphasizes the methodological aspect of
hermeneutics within the limits of a theistic apprehension ofreality. Ultimately for
the theologian, universality is to be found only in a fundamental understanding
of the reality of God. For Tracy, the reality of God constitutes the central subject
matter of all theology. Without the doctrine of God, theology ceases to be
theology, although it may still be penetrating cultural discourse.17
Tracy also discusses Gadamer's hermeneutics in relation to the notion ofthe
classic. He retrieves the notion ofthe classic in a "nonclassicist"78 yet normative
fashion. The classics are expressions of the human spirit that "so disclose a
compelling truth about our lives that we cannot deny them some kind of
normative status."79 They disclose a reality that we cannot but call the truth. The
classic has the event character and the independence which Gadamer ascribes to
the notion of play. Tracy adopts Gadamer's model of authentic (playlike)
conversation with the subject matter. He agrees with him that in an authentic
conversation the question, the subject matter, as opposed to the participants,
assumes primacy, yet he stresses that this conversation is "disciplined."80 Tracy
uses the notion of fusion of horizons to describe what takes place in such a
conversation, yet he adds an analogical twist to it: he speaks of a fusion of the
horizons "of the identity-in-difference of the text and the identity-in-difference
of the reader into a new identity-in-difference,"81 which leads to a different
74 Ibid., 1 1 5f., n. 6.
?S
See Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order, 43--63.
76 See ibid., 52.
77 See Tracy, The Analogical Imagination, 52.
78 Ibid., 100.
19 Ibid., 108.
. 80
Ibid., 100.
81 Ibid , 136, n. 8.
. 86
Theological Texts on Gadamer's Hermeneutics 55
understanding. Tracy's interpretation of Gadamer has a middle-voiced ring
because it stresses both the dynamic or processlike character of understanding
and the disciplined role of the interpreer.
t The following passage, for instance, is
bursting with the middle voice: -
We consistently frnd that understanding happeru in precisely this deeply subjective yet
intersubjective, shareable, public, indeed historical movement ofauthentic conversation. So much
is this the case that we frnd ourselves obliged to use such transsubjective language as
"understanding happens," "the act ofunderstanding," the "event" ofunderstanding.8�
Though indebted to Gadamer, Tracy's appropriation of philosophical
hermeneutics is critical. As the adjective "disciplined" indicates, Tracy is
apprehensive of a passive subject. He distances himself from Gadamer on three
accounts. First, Tracy rejects Gadarner' s "strained but understandable"83 polemic
against all method and advocates the use of a plurality of methods. Second, he
criticizes Gadamer's too general notion of application.84 According to Tracy,
Gadamer's model of application based on the judge and the preacher does not do
justice to the various levels of applications one finds in the different fields of
theology. Application is not always as concrete as it is for the judge and the
preacher. It also depends on the aims of the interpretation and the methods used.85
Third, Tracy thinks that Gadamer is not sufficiently attentive to the radical
ambiguity pervasive in all traditions. He points out that Gadamer is in danger of
developing a "retrospective Utopia. "86 Tracy agrees with the critique of ideology
stance inherited from the masters of suspicion that any tradition may occasionally
be systematically distorted. Such distortions warrant the methodological use of
ideology critique. Consequently Tracy distances himself from the ontology of
Gadamer' s hermeneutics. Heemphasizes the plurality of methods of explanation
involved in understanding the classic. Hermeneutics is only part ofthe list of the
various criticisms. Its specificity is to know more about the vision of reality
disclosed in a text. Tracy's recourse to method, however, is b y no means an
ahistorical use ofmethod that opposes the event of truth by trying to master the
production of truth. His critical interpretation ofGadamer only underscores that
one should be willing to learn from other methods and their various foci (text,
author, world disclosed) for the sake of understanding. Appealing to Ricreur,
Tracy writes:
In sum, understanding and explanation are not enemies but uneasy, wary allies. To reject
explanation in favor of some often vague and i mpressionistic notion of "pure understanding," of
Verstehen, seems pointless in any valid defense ofthe pri ority of understanding. Rather one may
accept a formulation like Paul Ricreur s wherein understanding "envelops" the entire process of
'
interpretation, whereas explanation "develops" the initial understanding and illumi nates the final
82
Ibid., 10 I.
83 Ibid., 136, n. 8.
84 See ibid.
ss
See Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity, 140, n. 5 I.
Tracy, The Analogicatlmagination, 137, n. 16.
56 Chap. 2: The Middle Voice in the Literature on Gadamer
understanding of appropriation. Formalist, structuralist, semiotic and deconstructionist methods,
on this reading, are enrichments, not denials, of the hermeneutical process.17
Tracy notes that being hermeneutic does not mean some sort of via media or
aurea mediocritas. It is not a position between subscribing to some atemporal
tradition supposed to have all the answers to all the questions and siding with
technical reason that discards hermeneutic truth. He writes:
The fact si that an insistence upon the hermeneutical understanding ofphilosophy and theology
is not a search for that "middle ground" beloved by "moderates" but an articulation of the only
ground upon which any of us stand: the ground of real fmitude and radical hs i toricity in all
hermeneutical understanding.81
Tracy's vocabulary corroborates my n i terpretation of the middle voice: medial
does not mean median. It refers to the internal diathesis rather than to the hybrid
voice half active and half passive. As noted, in French there is an interesting
homophony between voie moyenne for the Latin via media and voix moyenne,
"middle voice," suggesting a middle-voiced path. The point is not a halfway
solution between passive submissiveness to tradition and active method, but a
renewed attention to the horizon that encompasses our path. Without actually
addressing the middle voice, Tracy's vocabulary puts it into focus. His
attentiveness to the role of the interpreter within the event of understanding
brings to language the mediality of understanding.
Bernd Jocben Hilberath also reflects on philosophical hermeneutics: he
discusses the relevance of Gadamer's rehabilitation ofauthority and tradition for
fundamen alt theology. The overall issue he addresses is the skeptical and
incomprehensive attitude ofpeople today toward a historical basis ofthe meaning
of life because of the dominating ideal of scientific knowledge. It is in this
context that be examines Gadamer's hermeneutics, considering it a challenge for
theology. He argues that there are no comprehensive studies of Truth and
Method. Too often this work becomes a quarry that supplies ad hoc materials or
concepts for thinkers interested in hermeneutics. Hilberath wants to remedy this
situation by offering a complete and detailed discussion ofGadamer. Despite his
claim to be exhaustive, however, he passes over the middle voice. Although be
quotes the passage where Gadamer writes that the original meaning of play is
medial, he does not explain it with reference to the middle voice.89 He examines
the paradigmatic function of play in Gadamer's henneneutics, but keeps writing
around the middle voice. Play means that we are always already involved in
meaning when we understand. It shows that language is not a tool but a medium
as essential to us as the air that surrounds us and that we breathe.
87 Ibid., 118.
88
Ibid., 103.
89 Bernd Jochen Hilberath, Theo/ogie zwischen Tradition und Kritik: Die philosophsche
l
Hermerreutik Hans-Georg Gadamers als Herausfordenmg des thttologisclrerr
Selbstverstlindnisses (Dusseldorf: Patmos Verlag, 19'78), 121.
Theological Texts on Gadamer's Hermeneutics 57
Further, the middle voice surfaces in the text without being named when
Hilberath notes that the event of understanding is the "Tun der Sache," that
language speaks us, that the power of tradition by no means cancels the subject,
that the hermeneutic circle is not only limiting but especially enabling, and when
he underlines the ambiguity ofGadamer's wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewufitsein
(the effect of history and the consciousness of this effect). Hilberath even argues
that the thesis of philosophical hermeneutics is that understanding is not so much
a subjective action as one's entering into an event oftradition!90 The rniddle voice
is obviously there!
Hilberath, however, moves in a more methodological direction. Although his
reading of Gadamer is sympathetic in general, he is critical of the notion of
linguisticality. He argues that Gadamer overemphasizes language and that this
affects his notion of historicity. Linguisticality leads Gadamer to identify the
constitution ofunderstanding with the constitution of history. Hilberath therefore
nuances Gadamer's claim that everything that can be understood is language. He
agrees with Gadamer that understanding is linguistic, but he questions the notion
that language mediates everything. He rejects what he considers to be a reduction
of everything to language and word. Action (Handlung) remains important
especially for Christian theology which holds that the Word of God is also God's
action. The reference to the Word of God implies concrete traditions, unlike
Gadamer's rehabilitation of tradition as such. Only concrete traditions can
provide the critical stance Gadamer's retrospective positions lacks. These
concrete traditions contain their own criterion: Jesus of Nazareth who is their
ultimate yardstick. In my reading, the medial aspect of philosophical
hermeneutics is lost in Hilberath's discussion. Although the mediality of
understanding shines between the lines, methodology takes overwhen Hilberath
applies hermeneutics. Take, for example, his thesis:
Fundamentale lbeologje ist ,Herrneneutik' in dem Sinn, daB sie ausgebend von der
Gottesoffenbarung n
i Jesus Christus ( Beansprucbung konkreter Traditionen) im
=
hermeneutischen Briickenschlag :zu den ,Zcicben der Zeit' die theologischen Grundstrukturen und
-aussagen gewinnt (= Bewlihrung ,im Heute'), wobei das Ursprungsgeschehen letzter
hermeneutischerMaBstab bleibt (= Bewiihru.ng im Schicksal Jesu von Nazareth).9'
The Sache of theology becomes Gegenstand. Theology turns out to be
methodological: the question is not where we are but how to bridge the past and
the present. The emphasis on Jesus as a fixed point, as hermeneutic measuring
rod, turns hermeneutics and theology into a method to go about this point.
From a more biblical and exegetical side, there is Anthony Thiselton's book
The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and Philosophical Description
90 See respectively ibid., 52, 1 14, 154, 181, I 50-152, and 212.
91 Ibid., 328.
58 Chap. 2: The Middle Voice in the Literature on Gadamer
with Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, Gadamer, and Wittgenstein. 92
Its title refers directly to Gadamer and his notion of fusion ofhorizons: the two
horizons, the one of the text and the one of the reader, are fused in the act of
understanding, yet without being blurred The claim of the book is that
philosophical description does not qualify the truth ofthe New Testament but that
it provides tools that help biblical interpretation. Thiselton argues that Gadamer's
rehabilitation ofprejudices as well as his perhaps all too optimistic filtering effect
of temporal distance elucidate the relation between exegesis and systematic
theology. Exegesis is neither Christian propaganda nor historical work severed
from the Christian tradition. Gadamer's hermeneutics puts into focus that the
biblical interpreter "places himself 'under' the word of God"93 preserving the
distance between the text and him or herself while being involved in a fusion of
horizons that lets come to language the matter at stake without merely mirroring
the interpreter's agenda. The middle voice and the locality it implies are at hand.
Thiselton emphasizes Gadamer's notion of truth in art and its disclosure in play;
he parallels interpreting parables with the experience of truth in play; yet he
completely passes over the middle voice. In the quotes referring to play, he
system(ltically replaces with ellipsis points the explicit passages about the
middle-voiced meaning of play!94 The same is true of a more recent book by
Thiselton where the references to mediality are omitted as well.95 Further,
Thiselton quotes from the Preface to the 2nd edition of Truth and Method the
section that states Gadamer' s philosophical rather than methodological or ethical
concern, but here, too, he uses ellipsis points to skip the crucial passage for a
medial reading of philosophical hermeneutics: Thiselton leaves out that Gadamer
writes that he was concerned with what happens to us beyond our willing and
doing!96 Although Thiselton places the interpreter under the text he or she reads,
he seems to miss the mediality of the event of understanding as when he writes
that the "goal ofbiblical hermeneutics is to bring about an active and meaningful
92 Anthony C. Thiselton, The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and
Philosophical Description with Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultrrumn, Gadamer, and
i (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1980). As
Wittgensten
Thiselton himself says, the most original part of the book i s perhaps the appropriation of
Wittgenstein concerning henneneutics and exegesis (see p. xx). Thiselton interprets, for example,
the apparent paradox of simuljustus etpeccalOr n i terms of systems, contexiS, or language games
thatdetermine our way of seeing things. Since our way ofinterpreting things is dependent upon
the context within which we see things (see the famousexample ofduck-rabbit), Thiselton argues
that there is no contradiction between being just and sinful at the same time because they are seen
from twodifferent contexts, frames ofreference, or language games: eschatology and history (see
pp. 415-422).
93 Ibid ' 319.
94 Ibid., 297.
95 See Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1992), 320.
i ons, 294.
96 See Thiselton, The Two Horz
Theological Texts on Gada.mer's Hermeneutics 59
engagement between the interpreter and the text, in such a way that the
interpreter's own horizon is re-shaped and enlarged.'m
James Robinson's article "Hermeneutic since Barth"98 also confirms the
pattern I am trying to establish. It shows Gadamer's hermeneutics in medial light
without being explicit about it. Thiselton criticizes the so-called New
henneneutic for bordering on "word-magic."99 Robinson, however, claims that
the new hermeneutic is a new theology: in this theology, hermeneutics becomes
a total theological enterprise engaged in the translation of the Bible for today.
Robinson quotes Gerhard Ebeling who emphasizes the distinction between
traditum, "something transmitt-ed," and traditio, "the process oftradition open
to the future and calling for responsibility.'' In traditio, the text remains central
not only as objective genitive but especially as subjective genitive in
"interpretation of text." The text is not just the object of a subject's interpretation,
1
but it interprets the interpreter by letting emerge the "word event." 00 The interest
ofRobinson's article in our context is that it associates the new hermeneutic with
Gadamer. It begins with Karl Barth's intuitive insights and ends with Gadamer's
11
explicit hermeneutic formulations. 0 Robinson quotes Barth writing to Adolfvon
Harnack that the object of theology was first subject and that one must let it
become subject again and again. The object of Christian theology, Jesus Christ,
is subject. This ambiguity of the subject suggests the nonexclusivity of the
subject characteristic of the middle voice. For Robinson, the philosophy of
Gadamer, who knew Bultrnann well, is in fact closer to Barth than to Bultmann.
Unlike other commentators, Robinson does not deplore a lack of method in
Gadamer. He argues that Bultmann's Sachkritik and the view of language it
implies separate Gadamer from Bultmann. Sachkritik involves the claim that the
text's actual subject matter can be isolated and then used as a criterion to
understand the text and demythologize it. Demythologization implies that
language "is envisaged as an objectification inappropriate to the subject matter,
a source of distortion."102 In this perspective, language is not a medium in which
but only a medium - a distorted medium - through which something is said.
Robinson also points out that the location of understanding is between language
and the subject matter that comes to language and not between mythological
language and existential self-understanding.'03 Robinson's article strongly alludes
97 Ibid., xix.
98 James M. Robinson, "Hermeneutic Since Barth," in The New Hermeneutic, ed. James M.
Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr. (New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row, Publishers,
!96�, 1-77.
Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 337, 443.
100
See Robinson, 65-69.
101
See ibid., 27.
102
Ibid., 32.
103
See ibid., 77.
60 Chap. 2: The Middle Voice in the Literature on Gadamer Theological Texts on Gadamer's Hermeneutics 61

to the mediality of understanding in a theological context, but unfortunately it render explicit what most commentators leave implicit: I will bring into focus the
does not draw explicit medial conclusions. mediality of hermeneutics. Gadamer's hermeneutics subtly balances the
ln Mimetic Reflections: A Study in Hermeneutics, Theology, and Ethics, hermeneutic event happening to the subject and the understanding subject's
William Schweiker uses mimesis as his hermeneutic key to read Gadamer performance within it. This balance is what I call the mediality ofunderstanding.
(understanding), Ricceur (narrative), and Kierkegaard (self). At the end of his In chapter three, I will look at the event surrounding the subject. In chapter four,
reflections he offers a proposal for theology and ethics based on a mimetic my attention will go to the role of the subject standing under the event of
practice that is not imitating an image and transcending it toward the "real" but understanding. It is important to note, however, that the event is not separated
a figuration of our world and our Lives, a presentation in structured form of from the subject. The middle voice precisely holds them together. I only separate
human being and doing. His basic claim is that "mimesis helps us talk about the event and subject to be able to talk about them since our frnitude forces our
way human beings participate in the generative power of their world to render it intellect to be "discursive"109 and does not allow us to hold everything in our
and human existence meaningful."104 Concerning Gadamer, he argues that mind at once and since most modern languages speak n i terms of subject and
philosophical hem1eneutics presents a mimetic strategy. Schweiker follows this object and therefore make it difficult to think of a nonexclusive medial subject.
strategy through the three parts of Truth and Method, writing that "human
understanding is the mimesis of world as Judie, temporal, and symbolic."105 His
reading ofGadamer is not far from the notion of the middle voice. He shows the
role of play in Gadamer's rethinking of mimess,
i and he notes the cultie and
theatrical origin of mimesis. He writes: "In the cultic art there was an 'epiphany'
ofthe go9 throughthe action and the actors. I contend that Gadamer is attempting
to grasp his
t epiphanic element as crucial to understanding experiences of
"1
meaning, the Sache, of a text, event, or conversation. 06 The same medial
interplay between the henneneutie action and the understanding subject comes
to the fore in what Schweiker calls the "double mimesis" at the heart of
Gadamer's hermeneutics. By "double mimesis" he means "that there is a
performative transformation into figuration ofboth the being ofthe work and the
being of the one understanding."107 The performative aspect of play shows that
the subject is clearly involved in the event of understanding which happens to
him and her and affects subject and Sache. From this it is clear that Schweiker
does not the ignore that the subject is within the process of truth disclosure.
Though never explicit, the middle voice shines brightest between the lines in a
passage where Schweiker quotes Grondin's Hermeneutische Wahrheit? with
reference to the participation ofthe player in the play that takes place in itself and
where he calls play "participatory action" and "dynamic participatory
interaction."103
As noted, this chapter does not claim to be exhaustive. It only intends to show
a pattern: in most commentaries on Gadamer's hem1eneutics the middle voice is
conspicuous by its absence. Commentators keep circum-scribing - writing
around - it without explicitly mentioning it. In the next two chapters, I will

104 William Schweiker, Mimetic Reflections: A Study in Hermeneutics, Theology. and Ethics
(New York.: Fordham University Press, 1990), 2.
105 Ibid., 78.
106 Ibid., 43.
0
1 7 Ibid., 84, n. 25.
08
1 See ibid., 46f. 109 See, for instance, Thomas Aquinas Summa theologiae, Ia, q. 14, a.7.

Chapter 3
Gadamer's Triple Account of the Event of Understanding:
Consciousness Is More Being Than Consciousness
This chapter and the following belong together. Chapter three concentrates on the
hermeneutic event Chapter four focuses on the performance oftheunderstanding
subject. Together they bring to language the mediality of understanding by
showing the subtle balance inherent in philosophical hermeneutics between the
event of understanding and the subject within it. 1
These two chapters render explicit the mediality of the event ofunderstanding
implicitly evoked in the many middle-voiced expressions that punctuate
Gadamer;s texts. As it is the case with the middle voice, these expressions often
go unnoticed. By far the most frequent expression suggesting the middle voice
is the refrainlike sich etwas sagen lassen or sich etwas gesagt sein lassen,2 "to let
1 It is important to note at the outset that the following medial interpretation of Gadamer's
hermeneutics aims at a Christian humanst
i reading of faith seen as an event of understanding and
at a Christian medial anthropology. The humanism in question is different from the one
Heidegger and also Derrida reject. It has nothing to do with an unquestioned standard, a fixed
ideal ofhcmumitas which according to Heidegger contributed to the forgetfulness ofBeing. Just
as Gadamer does not reject metaphysics (see next chapter) so he docs not disavow humanism
i a solid ground to stand on or in something to hold on to like a buoy
Gadamer is not interested n
attached to some kind of ultimate seabed. As we will see, metaphysics does not have its own
language but uses language in acertain way. It is part of the ongoing effort of philosophy to find
the right word. Finding the right word is the stammering characteristic of hermeneutics and, as
Grondin notes, ''hermeneutics is a humanism" (Jean Grondin, "Gadamer on Humanism," in Tlze
Philosophy o
f H ans-Gecrg Gadamer, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn (Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: Open
Court, 1997), 167). This does not mean that hermeneutics knows what man is. For Gadamer
humanism is part ofBildung, culture, education, self-formation, or edification as Rorty renders
it in Philosophy and the Mirror ofNature, 360. Bildung is a self-building, not a building that
stands but a building in process, a building that understands, so to speak. It is "building" in a
verbal, not substantival, sense. Humanism, like metaphysic s is underway, always open to the
,
other who might be right even in wbat it means to be human. At the end ofnext chapter, in the
section "Hermeneutics in Operation," the meaning of reading for Gadamer, the humanist
philologist, will show that humanism s
i not a given but a direction, an orientation within the event
ofunderstanding.
2 See, for example, GWJ, 273, 367, 446, "Yom Zirkel des Verstehcns," GW2, 60, "Mensch
und Sprache," GW2, 154, Sprache und Verstehen," GW2, 192, "Wie weit schreibt Sprache das
"
Dcnken vor?," GW2, 206, Die Unf
" ahigkeit :z;um Gespriich," GW2, 209, and "Vorwort zur 2.
Aufl age," GW2, 445.
Chap. 3: Gadamer's TripleAccount ofthe Event ofUnderstanding 63
something be told to oneself." As mentioned in chapter one, Gadamer himself
calls the structure "sich lassen + infinitive" medial. There are also expressions
like "history does not so much belong to us as we belong to it," "in conversation
we are more led than leading," or "language speaks us rather than we speak it."3
In a similar vein, Gadamer writes that we belong to tradition and that it belongs
to us4 and that myths interpret us more than we interpret them.5 Further, the
famous expression Gadamer adopts from Hegel, the "Tun der Sache," points to
the same medial balance between subjectand event: the activity ofthe thing itself
is "ein Tun, das . . . ein Erleiden, ein Verstehen, das ein Geschehen ist,"6 a doing
one endures, an understanding that happens. The same is patent in the model
Gadamer advocates to prepare for the future. [nstead of planing and making he
proposes steering, steuern:
Denn steuem ist nicht Machen - eher ein Sich Anpassen an Gegebenheiten. Es sind darin
-
offenbar zwei Momente in inniger Einheit verknupft, die das Wcsen des Steuerns ausmachen: die
Aufrechterhaltung eines Gleicbgewichts, das in einem genau umgrenzten Spielraum scbwanlct,
und die Lenkung, d.b. die Bestimmung einer Richtung der Fortbewegung, die unter Wahrung
dieses schwankenden Glcicbgewichts moglich ist. Es leuchtet ein, daB sich all unser Planen und
Tun innerhalb einer labilen Gleichgewichtslage vo llzieht, die unsere Lebensbedingungen
darstellen .7
Steering evokes the balance between the subject's action and what is going on
around him or her. The subject does the steering: he or she maintains an
equilibrium and determines a course, not actively or from outside, but always
within a given situation and according to it.
All these examples have a middle-voiced ring: they all situate the subject
within the event that befalls the subject without subjugating him or her. They
stress the eventlike character of understanding, its Vollzug, and the subject's
location within it. Philosophical hermeneutics does not simply reverse the
. polarity of subject and object and tum the subject into the object or vice versa.
It relinquishes the active/passive mode of thinking. Its locus is the relation
between the subject and the verb, as when Gadamer writes that the self that we
are does not possess itself but happens to itself.8
The focus of this chapter is the event that happens to the understanding
subject. Its topic is the "within" ofunderstanding according to Gadamer's explicit
i tention. In the Preface to the 2nd edition of Truth and Method, he
philosophical n
writes: ''Nicht, was wir tun, nicht, was wir tun sollten, sondem was iiber unser
Wollen und Tun hinaus mit uns geschieht, steht in Frage."9 The stress is on the
3 See GW1,281, 387,467.
4 See "Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideo1ogiekritik," GW2, 237.
5 See "Das Problem der Geschichte," GW2, 36.
6 GWJ, 469.
7 "(fber die Planung der Zukunft," GW2, 165.
8 See "Zur Problematik des Selbstverstandnisses," GW2, 130.
9 Vorwort zur 2. Auflage," GW2, 438.
..
64 Chap. 3: Gadamer 's Triple Account o
fthe Event of Understanding
event that befalls the subject. Gadarner intends to describe the hermeneutic event
as it happens to the subject and not to set up guidelines for a subject in charge of
his or her action. The question is what happens to us when we understand.
Although the emphasis is on the event, we must keep n
i mind, however, that
Gadamer focuses on the event ofunderstanding with regard to the subject within
it. He docs not engage in the description of understanding for its own sake, but
he thinks about it in so far as it happens to us, the understandi ng subject.
The avenue I propose to examine the hermeneutic event is to follow the triple
account of understanding in Truth and Method centered around play, fusion of
horizon(s), and linguistic speculation. The warrant for the accentuation of this
triple depiction of understanding is given in Truth and Method itself. For
instance, Gadamer combines play and fusion ofhorizon(s) in a passage about the
dialogical process of understanding a text, in the section entitled "Language as
the Medium of Hermeneutic Experience," at the beginning of part three of Truth
and Method:
lnsofem ist der eigene Horizont des Interpreten inuner schon bestimmend, abcr auch er nicht wie
ein eigener Standpunkt, den man festh!ilt oder durchsetzt, sondem mehr wie eine Meinung und
Moglichkeit, die man ins Spiel bringt und aufs Spiel setzt und die mit dazu hilft, sich wahrhaft
anzueigncri, was in dem Texte gesagt ist. Wir haben das oben als Horizontverschmelzung
beschriebcn. Wir erkennen darinjetztdie Vollzugsform des Gesprachs, in welchem eine Sache
zum Ausdruck kommt, die nicht nur meine oder die meines Autors, sondem eine gemeinsame
Sache ist.'0
This quote ties together play and fusion ofhorizon(s) in the context of language
as the medium of undcrstanding, and it underlines the connection of these three
central accounts of the event of understanding.
Moreover, this passage italicizes Vollzug: this term stresses the process of
understanding without overshadowing the subject within it. In the revised English
translation of Wahrheit und Methode, a periphrastic expression is necessary to
render this one word: ''what takes place in."11 In fact, Vollzug seems particularly
i to the fore the inadequacy of the dichotomy between subject and object. Gadarner
difficult to translate. To give only a few examples, in the same revsed translation
of Truth and Method, it is also translated "act," [ix] "occurrence," [103]
"process," (307] "to bring about," [307] and "to be practiced. " [473] Interestingly
enough, the meanings of "event" and "performance" are equally present. This one
word means happening and doing at once. It is middle voiced.
Vo/lzug is important because it is the notion that joins together the play ofart
and the play of language. Without Vollzug and its middle-voiced meaning, the
play of art and the play of language would be in tension: language happens within
the dialogical play of question and answer within the Sache; art, by contrast,
appears to foil this dialectic and to turn it into a one-way or external operation
since there seems to be no actual interlocutor. Literary works, in particular, are
10 OWl, 392. Tbere is a similar passage on page 40I .
1 1 Hans-Gcorg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. W. Glen-Doepel and rev. Joel C.
Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2d, rev. ed. {New York: Continuum, 1989), 388.
The Process ofPlay 65
so independent that the reader, monologuing at best, asks and answers alone
questions on the work and about him or herself. The opposite is true. Literature
is where the relation between the play of art and the play of language is most
2
easily grasped. Literature is where language is art, where texts are "erninent." 1
The relation to eminent texts - reading- is the way we experience both language
and art. Reading literary texts reveals the Vollzug of hermeneutics in its full
mediality as it applies to everything we understand. At the end of the next
chapter, we will examine reading. For now suffice it to note that Gadarnerentitles
volume nine of the collected works "Hermeneutik im Vollzug," that is,
hermeneutics in act and the act of hermeneutics. In that volume, he seeks to
partake in and of poetry. He does not want to make literature his object. His
intention is different: ''Hier ist meine Absicht aUein, dem Vollzug zu dienen,
durch den Dichtung nun Partner eines nachdeo.klichen Gespriichs zu werden
vermag."13 Without denying the role ofthe subject in the Vollzug, Gadamer draws
one's attention to the process of understanding he intends to serve.
In this chapter, I will first examine the mediality ofplay. Then I will discuss
the notions offusion ofhorizon(s) and of the speculation ofthe linguistic medium
from a medial standpoint. To follow Gadamer's triple account oftbe event of
understanding and to interpret it medially will provide us with a picture of the
locality of the understanding subject within the event of truth. Let us first turn to
play.
The Process of Play
Gadarner's notion ofplay is indebted to the Heideggerian critique of modernity's
subjectivism and ofthe concept of scientific objectivity.14 It is a continuation of
Heidegger's thought but in a more accessible and concrete form. It helps bring
writes:
DieberuhigteDistanz, n i der ein bllrgerliches Bildungsbewufitseinseinen Bildungsbesitz geno13,
verkannte, wie sehr wir dabei seiher im Spiclc sind und auf dem Spiele stehen. So versuchte ich
vom Begriff des Spieles aus die Illusionen des SelbstbewuBtseins und die Vorurteile des
Bewufitseinsidealismus zu iiberwinden. Spiel istja niemals ein blo�s Objekt, sondem hat sein
Dasein fUr den, der es mitspielt, und sei es auch our in der Weise des Zuschauers. Die
Uoangemessenheit der Begriffe Subjekt und Objekt, die Heidegger schon in seiner Exposition
der Seinsfrage in >Sein und Zeit< crwiesen hatte, lief3 sich hicr in concreto demonstrieren.'5
12
See, for instance, "Nachwort ztu 3. Auflagc," OW2, 475.
13 "Vorwort," OW9, V.
14 Concerning the notion of play, see, for instance, Grondin, Hermeneutische Wahrheit?,
I 03-108, Hans, 299-3 17, Kogler, 43-48, Rico:ur, "Hermeneutics and the Critique ofldeology,"
33lf., Risser, 140-142, Palmer, 171-175, and Wachterbauser, 153-160.
15 "Selbstdarstellung," GW2, 495.
66 Chap. 3: Gadamer's Triple Account ofthe Event ofUnderstanding
Gadamer uses Spiel to counter the modem emphasis of subjectivity in general and
aesthetic consciousness in particular. He moves against Kant's legacy and the
subjectivation of art. Art is not the object of the a so-called aesthetic
consciousness: this consciousness is more than it thinks it is because art involves
it in its play. In the vein of the famous "consciousness is more being than
consciousness," Gadamer formulates his thesis:
Die These si t also, daB das Sein der Kunst nicht als Gcgenstand eines iisthetiscben BewuBtseins
bestinunt werden kann, wei! umgekehrt das !isthetische Verhalten mehr ist, als es von sich weiB.
Es ist ein Teil des Seinsvorganges der Darstellung und gehort dem Spiel als Spiel wesenhaft zu.16
Play brings to language Gadamer's own "Unbegriff'11 of "aesthetic non­
differentiation": it bespeaks the reversal ofthe excessive tum to the subject that
resulted in the aesthetic differentiation. Play has nothing to do with the subject's
freedom in the presence of objets d'art. Play is the way of being of art not the
subject's state of mind. The enjoyment of art is not a matter of subjective and
blissful floating in spheres that separate art from the world. Art is rather part of
the world: it mediates aspects of the world we have to let be told to ourselves.
Play gives evidence of the fact that the experience of art is not a subjective and
immediate representation without cognitive significance. Though not
conversational in the same way as a dialogue, the experience of art nevertheless
takes time; it is not a matter ofmmediate
i insight, but it plays itself out between
the onlooker and his or her world.18 It constitutes the medium of a different
understanding. It may mediate a different understanding, but it is above all the
medium, the locality, in which this different understanding takes place. "Kunst
ist Erkenntnis und die Erfahrung des Kunstwerkes macht dieser Erkenntnis
teilhaftig"19 writes Gadamer. There is knowledge and truth in the experience of
art, though not scientific and rational in an active sense. To have part n
i the
knowledge the experience of art conveys means to partake n i and ofknowledge.
This knowing is medial. We do not actively gather and amass knowledge.
Knowing and understanding happen to us as much as we are their subjects. As
noted in the first chapter, "to partake in" signifies the subject's activity whereas
"to partake of' underlines the ontological bond between the subject and whatever
be or she is involved in. The experience of art and the cognition it yields
underline the bond between the subject and the process ofknowing. Play, as the
way of being of the work of art, precisely conveys that to be n
i volved in
something means also to be wrapped up in it.
16
GWI, 12lf.
17 See "Zwischen Phanomenologie und Dialektik," GW2, 14.
18
See Robert J. Dostal, ''The Experience ofTruth for Ga
damer and Heidegger: Taking Time
and Sudden Lighting," in Henneneutics and Truth, ed. Brice R. Wacbterhauser (Evanston, Ill.:
Northwestern University Press, 1994), 234, n. 32.
19 GWJ, 103.
The Process ofPlay 67
The cognitive significance of art does not tum art into the object of the
subject's cognition. Gadamer does not model the aesthetic experience ori the
scientific method, but he listens to the experience of art and hears in it an
experience that happens in all knowing. When he stresses the conversation that
we are, the point is not that we are constantly talking but that we are taken by the
Sache about which we concern ourselves together with others. It is the mediality
of knowing, preceding any use of method, that comes to the fore in Gadamer's
reformulation of the experience of art. (In the next chapter, which concerns the
understanding subject, we will examine the notion of experience in more details.)
The experience of art is crucial in Gadamer's project and play is the linchpin
of the aesthetic experience. Gadamer caJls play in art "der hermeneutische
Paradefall."20 By opening Truth and Method with this experience, Gadamer
widens from the outset the scope of philosophical hermeneutics beyond the
methodological concerns of the human sciences. By the same token, he extends
the notion of play beyond the confines of art to the hermeneutic experience as a
whole. Developed in the tirst part as a clue to the ontological explication, play
resonates like a seventh chord throughout the work It is only the metaphysics of
beauty in the last pages of Truth and Method that resolves it and puts something
like a musical pause above it. Unlike a musical rest, a pause lets the interpreter
decide its duration. Play does not define art and beauty but suggests what takes
place in the event of understanding by putting aesthetics in a medial light. Play
is the way of coming about and taking place of true meaning and of beauty. The
truth of beauty glows in the same way as meaning appears. The verb Gadamer
uses is einleuchten, to become clear like light that suddenly inundates a space.
Unlike the good which may not be found in something that appears to be good,
beauty is straight forward: it always fills the beautiful. Beauty glows like light.
It has the same being as light. It shows itself in the beautiful without reservation.
The becoming clear of the understandable and the glowing of beauty both
underline the event character of understanding as a whole. The metaphysics of
beauty at the end is a counterpart of the experience of art at the outset of Truth
and Method. In both instances, the truth that represents itself happens like play.
The circularity of Truthand Method highlights the cardinal importance ofplay
as the way of being of the event of truth.
Grondin underlines the centrality of play by stressing its encompassing
character that relocates the subject instead ofjettisoning him or her:
Die Entwertung der Machtstellung der menschlichen Subjektivitiit gewiihrt einen neuen Zugang
zur Wahrheit und somit eine urspriinglicbere ,Gelassenheit' und ,Zuverllissigkeit'. Um es
heideggerisch auszudriicken: Es wird dem Menschen sein originelles ,Wohnen' zurOckgegeben.
Diese Griinde motivicrcn Gadamcrs Ausdchnung des Spielbegriffs auf das Wahrheitsgeschehcn
20 "Zwischen Phanomenologie und Dialektik," GW2, 5.
68 Chap. 3: Gadamer 's Triple Account ofthe Event ofUnderstanding
schlechthin. Dies scbeint eine der wich tigsten Konsequenzen - wenn rucbt die wichtigste - zu
sein, die ,Wahrheit und Methode" zieht.21
Grondin puts play in the context of expressions built on lassen whose middle­
voiced meaning I noted above. As in a musical pause, lassen implies letting be,
letting things play themselves out as opposed to trying to be the master of the
game. 22 Moreover, be hints at the locality of understanding, referring to the
Heideggerian image oforiginal dwelling. Play is not the activity of a subject but
points to the "within" of the subject's understanding. Play is medial.
Play is the only context in Truth and Method where Gadamer explicitly
mentions the middle voice. The middle voice's association with the crucial notion
of play puts it automatically in a prominent place. The middle voice is the
primordial sense of play, Gadamer argues. In view of the centrality of play and
its primordial medial meaning, it is worth listening to a few passages to grasp and
be grasped by the middle-voiced meaning of play. In the first passage, Gadamer
mentions the middle voice by name. In the others, he paraphrases it.
Die Seinsweise des Spieles ist also nicht von der Art, daB ein Subjekt da sein muB, das sich
i t der ursprilnglichste Sinn von Spielen
spielend verhli.lt, so daB das Spiel gespielt wird. Vielmehr s
der mediale Sinn. So reden wir etwa davon, daB etwas dort und dort oder dann und dann >spielt<,
daJl etwas sich abspielt, daB etwas im Spiele ist.23
Das Hin und Her ei.oer Bewegung, die innerbalb eines gegebenen Spielraums ablauft, ist so wenig
von demmenschlichen Spiel und von dem spielenden Verhalten der Subjektivitiitabgeleitet, daB
ganz im Gegenteil auch filr die menschliche Subjektivitiit die eigentliche Erfahrung des Spieles
darin bestebt, daB hier etwas zur Herrschaft kommt, was ganz seiner eigenen Gesetzlicbkeit
gehorcbt. . . . Es geht wie von selber . . . . 24
Die Spielbewegung als solche ist gleichsam ohne Substrat Es ist das Spiel, das gespielt wird oder
sich abspielt- es ist kein Subjekt dabei festgehalten, das da spielt. Das Spiel ist Vollzug der
Bewegung als solcher.15
Das Kunstwerk hat vielmehr sein eigentliches Sein darin, daB es zur Erfahrung wird, die den
Erfahrenden verwandelt. Das Subjekt der Erfabrung der Kunst, das was bleibt und bebarrt, ist
nicht die Subjektivitiit dessen, der sie erflihrt, sondem das Kunstwerk selbst. Eben das ist der
21
Grondin, Hermeneutische Wahrheit?, 105. But Grondin s
i also critical ofthe notion play:
he argues that play is a mere phenomenological expedient to describe the advent of truth and that
it does not allow us to say what the truth is for us. It makes truth an event over which we have
no hold. See Jean Grondin, "La conscience du travail de I'histoire et le probleme de ia verite en
hermeneutique," chap.in L 'horizon ltermeneutique de la pensee contemporaine (Paris: Librairie
Philosophique J. Vrin, 1993), 227.
22
See John D. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the
HermeneuticProject (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), 264-267.
23 GWI, 109.
24 "Zur Problernatik des Selbstverstaudnisses," GW2, 128.
25 GWI, 109.
The Process ofPlay 69
Punkt, an dem die Seinsweise des Spieles bedeutsam wird. Denn das Spiel bat ein eigenes Wesen,
i derer,
unabhangig von dem BewuBtsen die spielen.26
Spiel ist in Wahrheit aber ein Bewegungsvorgang, der die Spielenden oder das Spielende
umgreift. So ist es keineswegs nur eine Metapher, wenn wir vondem Spiel der Wellen oder den
spielenden Macken oder dcm freien Spiel der Glieder sprecben. Vielmehr beruht selbst die
Faszination des Spieles fllr das spielende Be\\'UJ3tsein eben in einer solcben Entriickung seiner
selbst in einen Bewegungszusammenhang, der seine eigene Dynamik entfaltet. Ein Spiel ist im
Gange, wenn der einzelne Spieler in voUem Spielernst dabei ist, d.b. sich nicbt mehr zurtickbehtilt
als ein nurSpielender, dcm es nicht ernst ist27
Overall, these passages suggest that play happens by itself. It is a process or a
motion. A game isnot an object that a subject does. Game means playing. The
emphasis is on the verbal process that befalls the player. The verb is first. The
verbal prominence unsettles the modern subject. It sheds a different light on what
it means to be a subject because it situates him or her inside the process of the
verb. The "within" ofthe event ofunderstanding is not a static frame but dynamic
and sui generis. It is a motion that is self-moving. Gadamer refers to Johan
Huizinga's remark that one says "to play a game" and not "to do a game." Play
does not require a subject who actively plays. To play a game happens to one as
much as one is playing it. To play chess does not mean to manipulate pawns.
Even a puppeteer is not the master of the game as the derogatory uses of pawn
and puppet suggest when applied to people or countries that seem controlled by
superpowers. Play has the character of Vollzug whose mediality I noted above.
It generates its own rules. Although the players choose to submit to them and
only play seriously ifthey submit to them, once the game s
i underway the players
are not in charge. They are taken up by play and its rules. The emphasis is not on
the rules or the game as some thing opposed to active players. The emphasis is
on the playing, on the process that follows certain rules and that encompasses the
players. Gadamer uses a telling image that reveals the mediality of playing. He
28
compares it to two men sawing - perhaps himself and Heidegger. He writes:
Man fugt sicb in das Spiel ein oder unterwirft sicb ihm, d.h. man verzichtet auf die Autonomic
der eigenen Willensmacht. Zwei Mlinner z. B., die miteinandereine Baumsage fiihren, lassen das
freie Spiel der Sage dadurch moglich werden, daB sie, wie es schcint, sicb wechselseitig
aneinander anpassen, so daB der Bewegungsimpuls des einen genau dann einsetzt, wenn der des
anderen bis zu Ende ausgespielt war. Es sieht also so aus, als wl!re das eine Art Verstandigung
zwischen beideo, ein willentlicbes Verhalten des ei.oen so gut wie des andcren. Aber das ist noch
nicht das SpieL Was das Spiel ausmacht, ist nicht so sehr das subjektive Verhalten der heiden,
die einander gegenUberstehen, als vielmehr die Formation der Bewegung selbst, die wie in einer
unbewuBten Teleologic das Verhalten des ei.ozelnen sich uoterordnet.19
26 GWJ, 108.
27 "Mensch und Sprache," GW2, 152.
28
See the picture of Gadamer and Heidegger sawing together in August of 1923 in Hans­
Georg Gadamer, Philosophcal
i Apprenticeships, trans. Robert R. Sullivan (Cambridge, Mass. and
London, England: The MIT Press, 1985).
29 "Zur Problemarikdes Selbstverstiindnisses,"GW2, 128f.
70 Chap. 3: Gadamer 's Triple Account ofthe Event of Understanding
This passage and its context hold also a lot of information about the playing
subject. It is somewhat artificial to separate the process from the subj ect within
it; in this chapter, however, we are concerned with the process ofplay. This quote
shows that play is not the result of the players' conscious attitudes and choices,
although it is neither totally independent of them. Gadamer stresses the self­
moving aspect ofplay, this kind ofunconscious teleology that submits the players
to itself.
The same comes to the fore when Gadamer emphasizes that play is so natural;
its structure is so much part of who and what we are that the analogy between
human play and the play of nature should be reversed. It is not nature, the waves,
light, etc., that play as we do, but we play like the rest of nature. The movement
of play is so close to the movement of nature that the analogy between human
play and natural play (arumals, water, etc.) should go from nature to human and
not vice versa. This shows the encompassing nature of play and underscores that
it s
i something that happens to us although we are playing.
Although the series of passages about play Ijust quoted suggest in general that
play happens by itself, they can be somewhat ambiguous in a negative sense. It
is not always clear what the "primordial medial meaning" ofplay amounts to.
Gadamer's descriptions of the mediality of play seem to oscillate between the
Greek middle voice squeezed between the active and the passive and the middle
voice in the sense of internal diathesis. On the one hand Gadamer emphasizes
that every play is a being played30 and that it is a back and forth motion.31 On the
other, he says that play plays,32 that it encompasses the players, that it takes the
place of the subject,33 and even that there is no subject in play.34 From the
perspective of the active/passive mode of thinking, Gadamer' s oscillating
accounts passivize the subject or substitute play for him or her: the subject is
played or it is play that plays.
The alternatives of either active or passive do not do justice to the subtle
balance inherent in hermeneutics. Despite the hesitations in his account, Gadamer
definitely moves beyond the active/passive mode of thinking. Play replaces the
subject. "To replace" here means to place again, to displace and not to substitute
or to supersede. The middle voice as internal diathesis points to the volume of the
hermeneutic event: the verb speaks and encompasses the subject. Play's replacing
the subject highlights "under" in understanding. It does not submerge the under­
standing subject because it does not erase "standing" in understanding. The
middle voice leads to a different way of thinking. The replacement or relocation
ofthe subject inside the process entails a shift not a switch. The subject and the
30 GWJ, 112.
31 See "Zur Problematik des Selbstverst.lindnisses," GW2, 128.
32 GWJ, 112.
33 See, for example, "Mensch und Sprache," GW2, 152.
34 See GWI, 109.
The Process ofPlay 71
object do not simply trade places. The middle voice does more than reverse the
polarity of the current active/passive mode. When Gadamer says that play takes
precedence over the players' subjectivity and that it has a certain independence
vis-a-vis them, he does not demote the subject as such but only the modern
subject and above all his or her claim to be the master of the game and to be in
charge of the process. He moves against the modem external diathesis, not
against the subject. The emphasis is not on the subject and the object but on the
relation between the process expressed by the verb and the subject of this verb.
The middle-voiced play s
i related to several key notions. A brief examination
of some of them will further clarify the primordial medial meaning of play by
showing that, despite Gadamer' s oscillation, medial play definitely steps beyond
the active/passive frame of mind. Perhaps the most important notion connected
with play is DarstellWig, "representation."35 It underscores the medial meaning
of play and fine-tunes Gadamer's claim that play is subject. This claim is
problematic because the active/passive frame is so prevalent. From an
active/passive perspective, it indeed seems to cancel the understanding subject
and unilaterally to stress the process. Darstellung, however, corrects this
impression. It makes evident that the players still play although play is subject.
Representation is a rendition of the Heideggerian motive of self-showing, of the
phenomenality, oftruth and being. It encapsulates what the middle voice makes
possible to conceive: an action with several subjects. Play as representation
dispels the exclusive subject and encompasses the question "Who does what?"
within the question "Where does 'who does what' happen?"
Darstellung is the culmination of play. Representation is central because it is
the way of being of play. The actual purpose of the game is not the content of
game, that which the rules specify. This is only Scheinzweck, "illusory purpose."
The aim of a game are the rules themselves or, better, the players' involvement
in representing the game according to rules which it provides them when they
choose to play it. Consequently, play does not represent a content. It represents
nothing but itself. The true nature ofplay is self-representation, but not without
the players.
The presentation of play is most acute in theater play. When Spiel becomes
Schauspiel play does not leak, so to speak, because of the openness toward the
spectators. On the contrary, the spectators are part ofthe play's space or volume
and fulfill the way ofbeing ofplay. Gadamer's argument leading to the truth of
art hinges on the notion ofplay's representation where play becomes artistic play.
It is here that the full mediality of play really appears. Gadamer writes:
Das ist der Punlct, an demsich die Bestimmung des Spieles als cines medialen Vorgangs in seiner
Wichtigkeit erwei.st. Wir batten gesehen, dal3 das Spiel nicbt im Bewulltsein oder Verhalten des
35 On Darstellung, see, for n
i stance, Georgia Warnke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition,
and Reason (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1987), 57-64 and Weinsheimcr,
101-128 passim.
72 Chap. 3: Gadamer 's Triple Account ofthe Event ofUnderstanding The Process ofPlay 73
Spielenden sein Sein hat, sondem diesen im Gegenteil in seinen Bereich ti�ht und �it seine�
. 1 that is different from the external relation to an object. He writes with strong
Geiste erfullt. Der Spielende erabrt
f das Spiel als eine ihn ilbertreffende Wrrkhchke1t Das gilt ·

medial overtones:
erst recht dort wo es als eine solche Wirklichkeit seiher >gemeint< wird -und das ist dort der
�
Fall, wo das S iel als Darstel/ungfilr den Zuschauererscheint, d.h. >Schauspiel< ist. 36 Es (das Gebilde] verlangt von dem Betrachter, vor dem es sich darbietet, aufgebaut zu werden.
Es istja nicht, was es ist Es ist etwas, was es nicht ist, kein b1oBes Zweckbestimmtes, das man
Theater plays and works of art in general involve spectators, speak to a public. in Gebrauch nimmt, oder gar materielles Ding, aus dem man etwas anderes rnachen kann, sondem
They are plays that represent for someone else. As such, they turn up the volume, etwas, das sich im Betrachtenden erst zu dem erbaut, als das es erscheint und sich ausspieltl9
so to speak. It is here that the nuance between "to partake in" and "to part �e �f' It is clear from this passage, that structure, Gebilde, is abiding in the sense of
becomes obvious. The performers act, the actors play roles. They pnmanly
making its abode. It is not the result of a production, of a making. It is the
participate in a production, although it is true that good actors partake of their
building itself. The English is more telling than the German in this case. The
role to such an extent that they fade behind their characters. They are also played
double meaning of"building" combines abode and the process ofbuilding in one
by the play they play. The true medial players, however, are the spectators
term.
because play represents itselfto them. The truth it shows is meant for them, not
Verwandlung gives Gadamer's expression the verbal texture that the English
the actors. As an event fraught with meaning and not as a production, play
"building" has by itself. Transformation signifies the autonomy of play from the
incorporates the spectators and becomes true through them. Thus, when play
players. The Gebilde relies on the performance. This reliance, however, is
plays it does not become the exclusive subject. The French word assistance
different from the relation between product and producer. Play is not detennined
nicely conveys play's dependence on the players: the same word means
by the players. Neither the author nor the spectator set the meaning of the work
"audience" and "assistance" and intimates that the audience assists the play. Thus
of art. Verwandlung precisely indicates the autonomy of this process. Unlike
Darstellung underlines that play does not happen alo�e. Play repr�sents itself
. alteration, which indicates a change in the accidents of a permanent substance,
through the spectators by involving them, by wrappmg them m 1ts volume.
transformation means the process of change itself. Gadamer stresses the totality
Representation shows that the medial meaning of play does not exclude the
of transformation. Transformation is more than a progressive qualitative
subject. It relocates him or her.
modification. "So meint Verwandlung ins Gebilde, dal3 das, was vorher ist, nicht
Another key expression is Verwandlung ins Gebilde, "transformation into
mehr ist. Aber auch daB das, was nun ist, was sich im Spiel der Kunst darstellt,
structure.'m When presentation becomes a play played for others it transforms
das bleibende Wahre ist.'>40 Interestingly enough, these two sentences are in the
itself into structure. Taken as whole, this expression also underlines the mediality
present tense. The text says "that which is before is no longer," not "that which
of play. Gebilde, "structure," intimates that play reaches ideality. Though
was before is no longer." It opposes "that which is before" to "that which is
dependent on the representation, play distinguishes itself from the actual
now." The present tense suggests that transformation is different from
performance of the players. It becomes repeatable. One can mean it as the same.
metamorphosis. The butterfly is not the caterpillar that it was, though the change
It becomes permanent, "bleibend."3s This permanence, however, does not mean
is only apparent and based on a hidden continuity. The caterpillar's
that the structure becomes objective. Gebilde is permanent in the same way as the
transformation is closer to what Gadamer calls disguise. After all in the chrysalis
Sache of a text or a dialogue. It lets itself be understood as a Sache, not taken
state, the caterpillar only sheds the muscular envelope that contains the adult
over as an object. Permanent, here, is different from changeless. It is closer to
insect. The key is that transformation into structure bas to do with meaning not
abiding. Like bleibend, abiding refers to the space where something is. Abiding
demeanor. Unlike the caterpillar, play does not grant us wings that propel us from
means "to stay in place.'' From a medial perspective the stress falls on "in place"
one medium into another. The trd.USformation is immanent. We do not move from
rather than on "to stay.'' Again, it is the locality or the volume ofthe process that
A to B but within the truth. That which is before and that which is now are both
manifests itself. As structure, play leaves room for the subject's performance.
the world, the traditions, the language(s) we live in. The transformation into truth
Gadamer argues that Werk as opposed to Gebilde refers directly to its production.
is total because play is a whole that does not rest on something outside itself. Its
It suggests an object made for some purpose, something tha� is �lainly �h�t it. is. reality does not seek points of comparison with any other realities or with some
Gebilde, however, intimates something that involves the subJeCt m a parttctpatlon
"real" nonplay world. That which is before is no more because in the event of
truth we recognize it differently. That which is now is the same as that which is
36 GWJ, 115. before, yet it is different. The present tense in these two sentences bespeaks not
37 See for instance, Thomas K. Carr, Newman and Gadamer: Toward a Hermeneutics of
Religious Knowledge (Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, !996), 36-41 and Jean Grondin, Introduction
a Hans-Georg Gadamer (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1999), 68-73. 39 "Das Spiel der Kunst," GW8, 89.
38 GWI, 116. 40 GWI, 116f.
74 Chap. 3: Gadamer's Triple Account ofthe EvenJ ofUnderstanding
permanence and accidental alteration but the process of a verbal abode that we
inhabit by understanding it always anew.
Mimesis is also related to play.41 It suggests the same identity in difference as
the medial transformation into stmcture. More specifically, it brings to language
the kind of knowledge there is in the transformation into truth. Mimesi
s is close
to children's pretend play. It means imitation that does not try to hide that it
imitates and yet that does not rely on some original that it copies. Children who
wear costumes are not in disguise: they imitate but do not simply copy. They are
who they are - differently. The transformation is total. There is no distinction
between play and the playing child; a child is one with his or her play. Children
at play aim at nothing beyond the play. Play represents itself in the children's
playing. Only what they represent exists. Mimesis means that something
meaningful in itself is present. This meaning does not rely on something or
someone we seek behind the mimetic action. When we see children play, we
know that they are children and what their pretend play is about, but that is not
what we recognize. When we find them cute, childish, or even stupid, we do not
understand their play and its truth because the mediation is not total, because the
mediator gets in the way ofthe event of truth. Ifwe see only the children or their
costumes, it is as if we focused on the technique of an artist instead of letting
ourselves be told something. Gadamer writes with reference to works of art:
"Was man eigentlich an einem Kunstwerk erf
abrt und woraufman gerichtet ist,
ist vielmehr, wie wahr es ist, d.h. wie sehr man etwas und sich selbst darin
erkennt und wiedererkennt."42 The point is that mimess
i lets that which is before
be now differently. Mimesis lets something known be recognized in its essence.
It does not simply repeat it but pulls it out of the contingencies that surround it.
Mimesis is middle-voiced in the sellSe that it lets come to the fore what it
represents for those who imitate it and for those who recognize it, as long as they
let themselves be carried by the process in total mediation and recognize
themselves differently in it. The play of mimesis and representation is not about
an object that the subject possesses and proct;sses - that would be aesthetic
differentiation - but about an event that befalls and encompasses the subject who
is within it. The middle voice articulates the subject's location when he or she s
i The emphasis lies on the process of which one partakes by being encompassed
overtaken in total mediation so as to understand even children at play.
The temporality of festivals is another avenue to the primordial medial sellSe
of play.43 This temporality clarifies the meaning of repetition in play,
presentation, and mimesis. Mimesis imitates but does not simply copy;
presentation bas the odd feature that it is not a copy of an original, yet it is still
41 Concerning mimesis, see in particular Macintyre, 41-46 and Schweiker, 40-87.
�2 GW/,119.
43 On temporality and festival, see, for instance, Schweiker, 49-52 and Joan Stambaugh,
"Gadamer on the Beautiful," in The Philosophy ofHans-Georg Gadamer, eel. Lewis Edwin Hahn,
133f.
TheProcess ofPlay 75
selfsame. Similarly a festival's recurrence is not just the repetition ofthe same.
Here, too, Gadamerstresses identity in difference and focuses on the process. The
characteristic of festival is that it has its being in becoming and recurring. The
usual view of time as moments succeeding each other does not do justice to the
temporality of festival. What makes a festival is not its relation to its past. Its
origin, its variations in the past, are not as important as its recurring celebration.
The event counts. "Das Fest ist nur, indem es gefeiert wird. . . . Vielmehr feiert
man das Fest, wei! es da ist."44 This sounds trivial. But applied to play and
understanding in general, it underscores the mediality of the process Gadamer
describes. Like play, a festival does not depend on the subjectivities of those
celebrating. A festival is what it is in its being celebrated, and one celebrates it
because it recurs. Begehung, "celebration," is not active. It does not rely on the
subject but implies a participation not so much in as ofitself. Gadamer calls this
participation Dabeisein, "to be present at the occurrence of something,"
Dabeisein that is Teilhabe. He describes it in terms analogous to Benveniste's
internal diathesis: "Dabeisein is mehr als bloJ3e Mitanwesenheit mit etwas
anderem, das zugleich da ist. Dabeisein beillt Teilhabe."45 To celebrate is to be
within the process that goes on, to partake of it, to share in it so as to be and
understand oneself differently. It does not mean to be beside, outside, or
alongside the process. Mitanwesenheit as opposed to Teilhabe would correspond
to Benveniste' s external diathesis where the subject is first and seeks to control
the action from outside.
Gadamer compares the ontological bond between the Fest and those
celebrating to the sacred communion that lies behind theoria. The theoros is a
religious observer taking part in religious festivities by being rather than doing.
Similarly, for Greek metaphysics, theory means participation of the real. The
mediality is obvious when Gadamer writes:
Theoria ist aber nicht primlir als ein Verhalten der SubjektivitlU zu denken, als eine
Selbstbestinunung des Subjekts, sondem von dem her, was es anschaul Theoria ist wirkliche
Teilnahme, kein Tun, sondem ein Erleiden (pathos), namlich das hingerissene Eingenommensen
i
vom Anblick.<6
in it rather than by being active alongside it. In the next chapter it will become
clear that the subject is by no means passive in this process. The medial process
does not exclude the subject. The play of art puts a clai m on him or her. It
involves the subject: it wraps up in its "volume" the subject who becomes
involved in it and takes part in and of it. The middle-voiced meaning of play
highlights the process, yet it does not suppress the subject. The subject is
44 GWJ, 129.
4S Ibid.
46 GWJ, l29f.
76 Chap. 3: Gadamer's Triple Account ofthe Event of Understanding
immersed and immerses him or herself in the process, but he or she is not
drowned.
The transition to the second part of Truth and Method brings to language the
encompassing volume of play based on a form of art marginalized and even
despised by the proponents of the aesthetic differentiation: architecture. Baukunst
is evidence that art has an inherent relation to the world. A work of architecture
is a solution to two problems: it fulfills a particular purpose- it is built for a
reason - and it blends into its surroundings- it is built to fit a particular space.
More than any form of art, architecture shows that art is real because it belongs
to the world and to life, not to an aesthetic consciousness; it is never purely an
object ofart. Architecture underscores that belongingness to the world and to life
is so inherent in art that a work of art loses its reality and becomes
incomprehensible to us when we no longer perceive this connection. This relation
of the work of art to its context constitutes the transition to the second part of
Truth and Method. The relation to the world leads to the interpretation of
historical works to which Gadamer turns in the second part of Truth and Method.
Works of art keep their reality for us in so far as they mediate past and present.
Like buildings, which are not just remnants from a lost past but keep "building"
hemselves
t in this mediation, works of art in general come from a past context,
but they do not stay there. They move along with history, holding on to their
relation to life and to the world, that is, staying real, by mediaing
t their past with
every new present. Gadamer's reflections on architecture point to the notions of
fusion ofhorizon(s) and of consciousness ofthe effect of history be develops in
Part Two of Truth and Method.
What is so interesting about architecture in the context of the middle voice is
that it shapes volume and frees volume. It has the characteristic of decoration: it
is Raum gestaltend and Raum freilassend.41 Architecture encompasses all other
forms ofart. It is much more than just an exterior appendage, a roof so to speak,
for independent works ofart. It is has a matrixlike meaning that goes far beyond
the meaning an envelope has regarding the content of a letter. The relation
between the architectural volume and what is inside is twofold: architecture
enhances other forms of art by encompassing them, and the works that find and
make their place in it determine it because they call for a design suitable to their
representation. Gadamer mentions the acoustics ofa concert hall: architecture and
music work together and fulfill each other. The architectural design gives to the
music the volume it calls for to be able to resound at its best. The concert hall and
the music are both part of the representation that takes place in a concert.
Moreover, like any decoration, the volume shaping and volume freeing
character of architecture must be tasteful, that is, it must not be out of place.
Decoration must be visible, yet it must not take one's attention away from that
which it decorates. Too much decoration suffocates that which it accompanies
47 See GWJ, 162£.
Fusion ofHorizon(s) 77
and becomes boring. Its effectiveness is similar to that of ornaments or jewelry.
They are effective only ifthey suit the wearer and the context, ifthey are where
they belong. Fitting architectural designs have a comparable copresence: as the
double meaning of building shows, buildings are structures that are part of the
playful ontological event of representation.
The rehabilitation of architecture and in particular the emphasis on the space
shaping and space freeing character of a building highlight the volume of the
medial experience of art and corroborate the interpretation of the mediality of
play in terms of Benveniste's internal diathesis. The middle voice is not only a
back and forth relation between the subject and the object. Above all it situates
the subject within the volume of the encompassing process of the verb in and of
which the subject partakes. Ultimately Gadamer's interpretation of BauJ...:unst
points to language as the medium of all understanding. But before making the
ontological shift guided by language, Gadamer turns to the understanding of
history and texts from the past. The core of his account of historical
understanding is the notion of fusion ofhorizon(s).
Fusion ofHorizon(s)
With play Gadamer debunked the aesthetic differentiation and the active
consciousness that goes with it. With fusion of horizon(s) he exposes the
historical consciousness.48 The historical consciousness is an attitude that
consciously knows that it is historically determined, or, in Vico's terms which
Wilhelm Dilthey made his own, that claims "mit Bewu13tsein ein Bedingtes zu
sein,"49 to be consciously determined. This appeal to consciousness puts the
subject in a position of cognitive self-transparency that stands outside historical
determinedness. Gadamer asks:
Ist Vicos oft genannte Formel denn iiberhaupt richtig? Obertriigt sie nicht eine Erfahrung des
menschlichen Kunstgeistes auf die geschichtliche Welt, in der man von >Machen<, d.h. von
Plan en und Ausfiihren angesichts des Laufs der Dinge iiberhaupt nicht reden kann. . . Ist also
.
das geschichtliche Bev.'Ul3tsein am Ende ein utopisches Ideal und enthiilt einen Widerspruch in
0
sich?5
48 About the notion of fusion ofhorizon(s), see, for instance, Ting-Kuo Chang, Geschichte,
Verstehen und Praxis: Eine Untersuchung zur philosophischen Hermeneutik Hans-Georg
Gadamers unter besonderer Beriicksichligung ihrerAnniiherung an die Tradition derpraktischen
Philosophie (Marburg: Tectum Verlag, 1994), 67-76, Kogler, 109-113, Helmut Kuhn, "The
Phenomenological Concept of "Horizon"," in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund
Husser/, ed. Marvin Farber (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1940), 106-123, and M.
Renaud, "Reflexions theologiques sur l'hermeneutique de Gadamer," Revue theologique de
Louvain 3 (1972): 37.
49 GWJ, 241.
50 GWI,235.
78 Chap. 3: G
a mer's Triple Account ofthe Event of Understanding
da
The notion of fusion of horizon(s) underlines that historical consciousness's
being historical and to some extent determined makes it mpossible
i for it to reach
a perfect fulfilment in historical knowledge. Fusion ofhorizon(s) counters the
active stance ofhistorical consciousness and exposes the self-contradiction of this
consciousness. History is encompassing and constantly moving and, therefore,
prevents an objective historical knowledge.
The notion of fusion of horizon(s) is the core of the second part of Truth and
Method. My contention is that it bas a medial meaning like play, even though
Gadamer himself does not explicitly connect it with the middle voice.
Benveniste's internal diathess
i goes to the core of fusion of borizon(s) because
it highlights the balance between subject and event that Gadamer's notion brings
to language. Fusion of horizon(s) conveys an encompassing process that to a
certain extent determines the subject who, far from being passive, can participate
in the process that makes him or her what be or she is. It is not, as one
commentator put it, "a matter ofdrawing the product itself, as a manifestation of
the mind of another, into active question-and-answer dialogue with one's own
uSI
understanding.
The most striking affinities between horizon and the middle voice are that both
describe an encompassing space, a locality, and a process that takes place only
in so far as the subject, who is within it, is also its subject. With reference to
thought, Gadamer describes horizon as follows:
Horizont ist der Gesichtskreis, der all das umfaBt und umscblie13t, was von einem Punkt aus
sichtbar ist. In der Anwendung auf das denkende Bewufitsen i reden wir dann von Enge des
Horizontes, von moglicher Erweiterung des Horizontes, von ErschlieBung neuer Horizonte usw.
Insbesondere hat der philosophische Sprachgebrauch seit Nietzsche und Husser! das Wort
verwendet, urn die Gebundenheit des Denkens an seine endliche Bestimmtheit und das
Schrittgesetz der Erweiterung des Gesichtskreises dadurcb zu charakterisieren.52
The horizon encompasses the subject. Its changeable nature suggests that the
horizon is encompassing rather than an encompassment. Far from being a static
limitation of the subject, the horizon is a dynamic process that involves the
subject. Gadamer's combining horizon with the word fusion into
Horizontverschmelzung even more underscores the event character already
inherent in the notion of horizon.
Before I examine the mediality of fusion of horizon(s), however, I want to take
a closer look precisely at the combination of horizon and fusion in order to justify
why l write "fusion of horizon(s)." What does the "s" in brackets mean? It
renders a fruitful ambiguity contained in Horizontverschmelzung. Literally this
compound means "fusion of the horizon." Horizon is singular. The English
translation, however, reads "fusion of horizons" and the French fusion des
51 Bjam T. Ramberg, "The Sourc-e of the Subjective," in The Philosophy ofHans-Georg
Gadamer, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn, 462.
s2
GWJ, 307.
Fusion ofHorizon(s) 79
horizons. In English and in French, horizon is plural. The plural is justified, but
the problem with the plural is that it unilaterally resolves the productive
ambiguity of the German expression and, therefore, limits the meaning of
Horizontverschmelzung. The translations impose a choice on the reader and force
a plurality ofhorizons on him or her. The German, however, does not decide for
the reader. It says one horizon, yet it implies several. Horizont is singular, yet
Verschmelzung denotes a melting into one another of more than one element.
In German one could say Horizonte.verschmelzung or Horizontschmelze. The
former expression contains the plural fotm ofHorizon!. It assumes many horizons
fusing into each other and corresponds exactly to the English and French
translations. The latter expression is modeled on Schneeschmelze, the melting of
the snow. Snow does not fuse together with something else. It only melts. The
second expression shrinks the meaning to a single horizon. It suggests something
like one of Salvador Dali's melting watches. Gadamer's expression. however,
holds together singular and plural.
The double meaning inherent n
i Horizontverschmelzung corresponds to the
apparent hesitation in Gadamer's description ofthe event ofthis fusion. Gadamer
appears to oscillate between accounts where there seems to be only one horizon53
and accounts where he assumes more than one.54 He explicitly asks:
Gibt es denn bier zwei voneinander verschledene Horizonte, den Horizont, in dem der
i den ersichversetzt? Ist die Kunst
Verstehende lebt, und denjeweiligen historischen Horizon!, n
des historischen Verstebens dadurch richtig und zureichend beschrieben, daB man Ierne, sich in
fremde Horizonte zu versetzen? Gibt es Uberbaupt in diesem Sinne geschlossene Horizonte?5s
These questions are rhetorical. The ambiguity of Gadamer's account is not a
weakness but a way of saying that there is one and many horizon(s) at the same
time.
On the one hand, there is no doubt that there is a multiplicity of horizons. The
understanding subject encounters a multiplicity of other horizons that fuse
together with his or her own. Gadamer's hermeneutic premise already suggests
this encounter of many horizons. He says that to understand is always to reach an
understanding with each other about a Sache. Understanding is underway no
matter what Henneneutics is notjust a method that one utilizes when one reaches
a dead end of understanding. It is not something one does alone, at will when one
deems it necessary. Gadamer's proposition is: "Verstehen beil3t zunilcbst, sich
miteinander verstehen."56 It happens with others, and it is about something. Their
horizons and ours meet and adjust to each other about a Sache. Gadamer rejects
the Robinsonade of isolated horizons separated and closed off from each other.
53 See, for example, "Text uod Inteq>retation," Gl¥2, 351 and "Henneneutik," GW2, 436.
54 See, for example, "Kiassische und pbilosophische Henneneutik," GW2, 109 and
"Hcnneneutik und Historismus," GW2, 416f.
55 GWJ, 309.
56 GWJ, 183.
80 Chap. 3: Gadamer's Triple Account ofthe Event ofUnderstanding
This illusion of individuality and separateness of horizons concerns not only the
individual but also the historical situation: 'Wie der Einzelne nie ein Einzelner
ist, wei! er sich immer schon mit anderen versteht, so ist auch der geschlossene
Horizont, der eine Kultur einschlieJ3en soil, eine Abstraktion."s7 Horizons are
many, and they interact with each other. This interaction implies motion and
change. Horizons are historical and evolve: all of them, including the horizons
of the past move with us as we move into and within them.
On the other hand, Gadamer's premise seems to imply that there is a single
horizon encompassing understanding. After stating his proposition, he goes on:
Sich verstehen ist Sichverstehen in etwas. Die Sprache sagt es scbon, daJl das Woruber und
Worin nicht nur ein an sich beliebiger Gegenstand der Rede s i t, von dem unabblingig das
wechselseitige Sichverstehen seinen Weg suchte, sondern vielmehr Weg und Ziel des
Sichverstehens selber.53
The Woriiber and the Worin, the "about wlllch" and the "within which" of
understanding imply a unique context ofunderstanding. They are the path and the
aim ofunderstanding. Mutual understanding is not some activity that subjects do
to know a subject matter as if they tried to hook together horizons and tap into
them. As with play, the subject matter encompasses the fusion ofhorizon(s).
lf one remains within an active/passive mode of thinking, multiplicity and
unicity ofhorizon(s) appear to be contradictory. It is either or. The middle voice,
however, thinks without an exclusive subject and, therefore, permits one to
conceive without contradiction of a plurality of horizons in the process of fusing
and of a single horizon that encompasses and makes up the fusion.
Two analogies are in order: a weather map and a glacier. Imagine a weather
map forecasting a sunny day: it is always astounding to see how many suns light
up the United States or even a small country like Switzerland. Yet the many suns
of the weather map are but the one sun that allows us all to live. As long as one
thinks in terms of subject and object, weather maps seem ridiculous because there
is only one sun. But a weather map is not about the sun. It forecasts the weather.
It says something about a process that encompasses us. Though logically
ridiculous, weather maps and their many suns shock as little as the fact that one
still says the sun rises and the sun sets. In everyday life one sun and many suns
go hand in hand because we all live under the same yet different sun. This
analogy shows that holding together one and many is something we do every day.
As every analogy, the analogy ofthe sunny weather map is limited. Its danger
is that it might suggest that the one encompassing horizon is something out there.
Especially in the context of a theological interpretation of Gadamer's
hermeneutics, such an analogy is dangerous because some form of transcendence
lurks in the vicinity. To counter this limitation, one has to remember that fusion
ofhorizon(s) describes a historical phenomenon. The emphasis is not on the sun
57 GWJ, 309.
sa GWJ, !83f.
Fusion ofHorizon{s) 81
or any object but on the process. Gadamer does notjust speak ofhorizons but of
their fusion. The event is what counts, and it involves one and many horizon(s)
at the same time, immanent yet encompassing. Gadamer writes:
Wetu1 sich unser historiscbes BewuJltsein in historische Horizonte versetzt, so bedeutetdas nicht
eine Entruckung i n fremde Welten, die nichts mit unsercr eigenen verbindet, sondem sie
insgesamtbilden den einen grol3en, von innen her beweglichen Horizont, der ilber die Grenzen
des Gegenwartigen hinaus die Geschichtstiefe unseres Selbstbewul3tseins umfaJlt. In Wahrheit
ist es also ein einziger Horizont, der all das umschlie/3t, was das geschichtliche Bewul3tsein in
sich enthiilt. Die eigene und fremde Vergangenheit, der unser historisches Bewu/3tsein
zugewendet ist, bildetmit an diesem beweglicben Horizont, aus dem menschliches Leben imrner
lebt und der es als Herkunft wtd Oberlieferung bestimmt. . . Der Horizont der Gegenwart bildet
.
sicb also gar nicht ohne die Vergangenheit Es gibt so wenig einen Gegenwartshorizont fiir sich,
wie es historiscbe Horizonte gibt, die man zu gewitu1en h!!tte. Vie/mehr ist Verstehen immer der
Vorgang der Verschmelzung solcher venneinilichfiir sc i h seiender Horizonte.S9
Gadamer is notjust talking about the horizon butabout fusion ofhorizon(s). The
topic is the process, encompassing yet movable from the inside! One and many
horizon(s) without an exclusive subject intimate that the primordial medial sense
ofplay applies here as well.
The analogy ofthe weather map illustrates how common it is to hold together
the one and the many. Being an analogy only to horizon(s), it leaves the fusion
in the dark. It shows the sun as a thing out there without highlighting its course
- our course! - and the encompassing nature of its energy. It only says how the
one sun looks in various places. Another analogy clarifies the process of fusion
ofhorizon(s). At the spot where a glacier melts and becomes a stream of water,
past and present fuse together in an unusual manner. Normally, years, eras, etc.,
seem to pile up like sediment. The most recent is always at the top and the closest
to us. There seems to be a steady settling. A glacier is different. When one is at
the bottom of a glacier where the ice breaks off and melts, one contemplates its
oldest parts. The perspective is inverted. Unlike sediment where the most recent
layer is the most visible because it is at the surface, the glacier bears its oldest
parts where it breaks off and turns into a stream. The oldest ice is the source of
a river. Within the one process from the neve of the glacier to the ocean, present
and past meet where the ice melts. The stream is not the glacier, and yet they are
not different. The glacier flows, too. The picture of a present horizon separate
from the past horizons vanishes because the present is where the ice melts but
also at the fim high up where the glacier is fueled. Like the past, the glacier is not
immobile. It preserves and reveals the past differently from sediment that
fossilizes it. The past is not only something to dig into; it also surfaces at the
source of the stream. Past horizons, pushed by the present horizon itself, push
into the present horizon. Present and past grow together, together in the sense of
in the same direction and of closer to each other. There is no partition between
59 GWJ, 309-311.
82 Cltap. 3: Gadamer's Triple Account ofthe Event ofUnderstanding
the present and the past horizons. Yet they are not the same. The glacier and the
river are one yet they are different.
The analogies of the sunny weather map and of the glacier taken together
clarify the ambiguity contained in Horizontverschmelzung and its translation as
"fusion of borizon(s)." Fusion of horizon(s) is a process that implies one and
many horizon(s) at the same time. The medial interpretation makes the ambiguity
fruitfu I instead of contradictory because it articulates the event, the process, the
verb, the action, and locates the subject within it instead of setting him or her
outside it in an exclusive position.
Although Gadamer does not mention the middle voice by name, in the context
ofDilthey and the epistemological problem of history he poses a question in a
way that encapsulates the mediality of understanding history. With reference to
Dilthey's argument that the condition of possibiity
l of understanding history is
to be part of it and to make it, that is, that the subject and the object are of the
same kind, Gadamer asks pointedly and medially in a note added to the edition
of Truthand Method for the collected works: "Aber wer macht eigentlich die
Geschichte?"� Who makes history? This question concerns the subject and his
or her object, but it italicizes the verb! Itpoints beyond the epistemological mode
of thinking centered on the subject and the object to the medial event of
understanding. A medial reading of philosophical hermeneutics sees in this
"macht" a middle voice which stresses the process yet does not erase the
subject's action within it.
The question "Who makes history?" calls for two remarks: first, it makes
evident that understanding is sachlich; second, by italicizing the verb, it brings
to language that understanding is not the consciousness's prerogative. First,
understanding is understanding something, as the epigraph of the second part of
Truth and Method clearly says. Gadamer quotes from Luther's Table Talk: "Qui
non intellegit res, non potest ex verbis sensum elicere.'>61 One bas to understand
the matter at stake to make sense of what a text says. "History" is the object of
"makes." Though grammatically correct, this statement is misleading unless one
distinguishes between sachlich (matter offactual) and objective.62 The question
is not: "Who makes history?" History is not the subject's object but the Sache the
subject under-stands in the medial making ofhistory. The point is not that subject
and object must be homogeneous as Dilthey argued. The point is that res, tbe
Sache, is itself the process that carries the subject. The way Gadamer's question
presents itself underlines the mediality of fusion ofhorizon(s). The middle voice
situates the subject's action within the action the verb expresses. It does not,
however, exclude that the subject does something. Fusion of horizon(s) is the
event of understanding that happens to the subjects who are making efforts to
60 GWJ, 226, n. 92.
61
GWJ, 177.
62 See Palmer, 2 1 2.
Fusion o[Horizon(s) 83
understand the Sache: they are not primarily amalgamating historical objects in
an active manner; they are fusing horizons within the present horizon (in the next
chapter, we will see that that which the subject understands is ultimately him or
herselfwithin the Sache).
Second, neither does Gadamer's question read " Who makes history." Fusion
of horizon(s) is not an interpersonal matter. The factualness (Sachlichkeit) of
understanding indicates that understanding someone is not a matter of
connivance. No matter how much a wink means between two people, their
complicity is always about something that carries the meaning of their winks. Jan
Edward Garrett points out that E. D. Hirsch63 and also Paul Ricceur and Richard
Palmer read fusion of horizon(s) as a process between the standpoints of two
persons.64 Ricceur, for instance, speaks of"conununication a distance entre deux
consciences differenunent situees" and of "recoupement de leurs visees."65
Garrett argues that this is a mistake: fusion ofhorizon(s) is not the fusion of the
interpreter with the author's intended meaning. Following Gadamer, he argues
that fusion ofhorizon(s) does not mean to gain access to the author�s original
meaning in order to fuse it with one's own perspective. This interpretation of
"horizon-fusion" as the fusion of two people's standpoints is wrong.
Garrett offers his own account of "horizon-fusion." He finds Gadamer's
account ofthe process of fusion of h.orizon(s) abbreviated and obscure.66 In order
to clarifY it, he divides it into a tacit and a nontacit "horizon-fusion."67 The tacit
fusion happens without the explicit awareness of the interpreter and largely
beyond his or her control. It precedes the nontacit fusion. rn the second type, the
interpreter, on the basis of tacit "horizon-fusion," changes his or her
prejudgments about the text in order to eliminate incoherences, and he or she may
then modify his or her personal convictions based on the coherent message ofthe
text. In short, Garrett divides the process of fusion ofhorizon(s) into two distinct
steps, the first tacit and unconscious, the second nontacit and conscious. He is
right about the usual interpretation of fusion of borizon(s): there is no need to
track down the mens auctoris to understand a text. His account, however, remains
in the active/passive mode of thinking: first the process is subject and the
interpreter is its object; then the polarity switches, and the passive interpreter
becomes active and takes charge of the process of fusion.
Garrett's more or less tacit operations do not capture the notion of fusion of
horizon(s). That in Gadamer's texts some passages on fusion of horizon(s)
highlight the process and others the understanding subject does not mean that
fusion ofhorizon(s) is twofold. The merit of the middle voice is precisely to k eep
63 Jan E. Garrett, "Hans-Georg Gadamer on 'f'usion of Horizons,'" Man and World (11'
1978), 392.
6 Ibid., 400, n. 2.
65 Paul Ricceur, "La tache de l'hermcncutique," 200.
66 Garrett, 394.
67 Ibid., 397.
84 Chap. 3: Gadamer 's TripleAccount ofthe Event of Understanding
together both emphases without contradiction. Instead ofpartitioni�g the ev�nt
of fusion of horizori.(s) into a passive and an active stage, the rruddle vo1ce
considers the subject in relation to a horizon seen as a process and not as an
object. Fusion ofhorizon(s) is a medial event that happens to the subject who is
.
partaking in and of it. Gadamer's account is not that obscure when one re�ds 1t
in the light of Gadamer's medial interpretation of play and of B�nvemste's
internal diathesis. There are two oppositions: one between the act1ve and the
passive and the other between the active and the rniddl� voice. In the �rst, the
mode of thinking focuses on the relation between the subJect and the obJect. The
second examines the relation between the subject and the process. Both concern
the subject, but differently. The internal and external diatheses look at the locality
of the subject with respect to the process of the verb, instead of focusing on how
subject and object affect each other. We will examine the understanding subject
and his or her performance in the next chapter. The focus at this point is on the
encompassing nature of the event of understanding.
Gadamer asks "Aber wer macht eigentlich die Geschichte?" The verb is
italicized. This focus on the verb in a question addressing history brings to
language the way Gadamer rereads in a historical context Heidegger' s emphasis
on the circularity of understanding and its ontological implications. The making
of history is not the prerogative of the subject but an ongoing process in and of
which the subject partakes. With reference to history, Gadamer writes:
In Wahrl::teit gehort die Geschichte nicht uns, sondem wir gehOren ihr. L M:
ge bevo� w� uns in. er
Rilckbesinnung selber verstehen, verstehen wir uns auf s
elbstvet
rsandlicbe Weise
Gesellschaft und Staat, in denen wir Ieben. Der Fokus der Subjektivitat ist ein Zerrspiegel. Die
Selbstbesinnung des Individuums ist nur ein Flackem im geschlossenen Stromkreis des
geschichtlichen Lebens. Darum sinddie Vorurteile des einzelnen weit mehr als seine Urteile die
geschcht/iche
i Wirklichkeit seines Seitls.68
Gadamer's open question about who makes history does not mean that the subject
and the object must be of the same kind. If one hears a middle voice in this
question, the making ofhistory becomes a process encompassing the subject who
belongs to history because of the historicity of his or her prejudgments.
The emphasis on prejudgments as opposed to judgments and the criticism of
subjectivism parallels Gadamer's famous claim that consciousness is more being
than consciousness.69 Prejudgments do not defme the subject in his or her relation
to objects. They do not say how the subject relates to objects. Gadamer
rehabilitates prejudgments as he rehabilitates architecture and its decorative
nature. The import is each time the encompassing make-up of understanding.
Prejudgments denote not so much the basis of understanding as its locality. They
68 GWI, 28!.
69 See, for instance, "Zwischen Phanomenologie und Dialektik," GW2, 1 1, "Rhetorik,
Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik," GW2, 247, and "Selbstdarstellung Hans-Georg Gadamer,"
GW2, 496. See also Jean Grondin, L'u11iversalite de l'hemzeneutique (Paris: Presses Universitaires
de France, 1993), 173.
Fusion ofHorizon(s) 85
are always there, ushering in understanding. The biggest prejudgment of all is
perhaps language itself. The point is that understanding is not so much a
subjective matter as the subject's moving within the present horizon, in a
dimension fraught with meaning, in a "Dimension von Sinnhaftem."7° For the
historian this means that be or she encounters the tradition as an event that
encompasses him or her. Gadamer writes with medial overtones:
Das Verstehen ist selber nicht so sehr als eine Handlungder Subjektivitiit zu denken. sondem als
Einn'icken in ein Oberlieforungsgeschehen, in dem sich Vergangenheit und Gegenwart bestandig
vem1itteln.7 1
Prejudgments make up the horizon of the present. What is important is that they
are not the subject's prerogative, nor are they his or her mistake. Gadamer is not
judging them. They have to be, and they are constantly reviewed and amended.
They are the horizon we bring along and, therefore, they are the condition and
limits of our understanding. W e are within this horizon and not in charge of it.
Like the horizon, our prejudgments are constantly changing as we change. Unlike
Garrett's division of "horizon-fusion," the middle voice intimates that the
prejudgments do not first carry the subject who then actively modifies them.
Prejudgments do not simply precede judgments. They are not something
immature or premature waiting to be completed by more facts. The medial
interpretation of fusion ofhorizon(s) underlines that prejudgments make us what
we are without totally determining us. In fact, we do not have prejudgments. We
�
are our prejudgments.
rn Famllie,
The rehabilitation of prejudgment does not have the subject as such in view
but in so far as he or she is within a horizon. It aims at the process that happens
to him or her. Gadamer's preference of Abhebung over Sichversetzen points in
the same direction. He rejects as too active the notion that one has to penetrate
past horizons, to carry oneself into them. Such a view conesponds to what
Benveniste calls external diathesis: the subject is in charge of his or her action.
He or she manipulates it from outside. To use the paradigmatic verb "to get
married," to understand the past is different from marrying it. It means to get
married with it, a middle voice in Greek, a get-passive in English. The past is no
object opposed to the subject. It is an illusion to want to know it by abstracting
oneself from it in order to grasp it objectively. To marry i s not just to bring home
a spouse. It means the whole process of marriage including its ramifications far
beyond the actual wedding. To understand the past is a process that precludes the
active self-relocation of the subject. It does not allow the subject simply to
penetrate it, to b e in it. It implies a kind ofintimacy that does not stop at "in."
Intimate means most interior. It is a superlative. It is different from Sichversetzen,
from the active uprooting of oneself in order to gain insight into another horizon
by penetrating it without being involved in it. We will see in the next chapter that
70 GWJ, 297.
71 GWJ, 295.
86 Chap. 3: Gadamer 's 1'rip/e Account ofthe Event ofUnderstanding
understanding entails the task for the subject to be open. For now, however, we
concern ourselves with the process.
Gadamer contrasts Sichversetzen with Abhebung. Instead of a reflexive
expression that focuses on the subject, Gadamer prefers a term that describes a
process without direct reference to a subject, although he stresses that it directly
involves him or her. The revised translation of Wahrheit und Method translates
Abhebung "foregrounding." Gadamer puts it this way:
Beachtenwir, was im Begriffder Abhebung liegt. Abhebung ist immer cine Wecb.selbeziehung.
Was zur Abhebung kom.men soli, mull sich von etwas abbeben, das umgekebrt sich selber von
ibm abheben mull. Aile Abbebung liiJ3t daher das, wovon etwas sicb abhebt, mit sichtbar sein. Wr
i of horizon(s) as Abhebung suggests implies the same differentiation. The
baben das oben als das Ins-Spiel-bringen der Vorurteile beschrieben.12
Although Gadamer calls Abhebung a reciprocal relation, the focus is on the
process rather than the subject. The English translation ofAbhebung implies the
same focus. "Foregrounding" means the process ofsomething coming to or being
i the foreground. It has a meaning close to "contrasting" or "standing out"
put n
but with less emphasis on the subject. "Contrasting" is perhaps the closest to
Abhebung in a literal sense: it implies two things opposed to each other.
"Standing out" puts the emphasis on the thing that stands out and not on the
process. "Foregrounding," however, intimates that something becomes more
manifest. It captures Gadarner's way ofholding on to the subject by talkingabout
the process that involves him or her. It perfectly renders the mediality of
Abheburrg. The mention of play in the passage just quoted even further
corroborates the medial interpretation of Abhebung. It underlines the
encompassing character of the event.
The relation ofAbhebung intimates that the medial fusion ofhorizon(s) keeps
the differences between the horizon(s) it fuses together. Abhebung, unlike
contrasting, for instance, is difTerent from the conflict between two subjects
struggling for the limelight. Coming to the foreground, in fact, means the
elevation to a higher level of universality or commonality that encompasses the
particularities ofthe other and of oneself. Horizons are fusing, yet they do not
melt together all differences. On the contrary, Abh.ebung implies a differentiation
in the fusion of horizon(s). Although fusion evokes heat, understanding is
different from heat. Hot things go up yet heat flows "downhill." It propagates
from the hotter to the colder until both are at the same temperature - a state called
entropy, where the total energy is the same but diffused and less available. Fusion
of horizon(s) is different from this kind of diffusion of energy. As Abhebung
indicates, fusion of horizon(s) implies a differentiation, not a leveling. Fusion
does not imply that the subject melts with another subject. It is different from the
romantic transsubjective empathy. It does not mean that the subject amalgamates
the other's position into his or her own by taking it over and that he or she molds
the other by imposing his or her standards. Fusion ofhorizon(s) is not a melting
n GWJ, 3 J l .
Fusion ofHorizon(s) 87
�roc� but � involving one. In�olvement, from the Latin involvere, "to roll up,"
_
tmphes motion, a wrappmg motion. This process encompasses the understanding
subject, and, being in motion, it constantly changes. As Gadamer stresses, the
horizon of the present is constantly taking shape. Things do not remain the same.
They differentiate themselves. Though more general, their understanding
becomes more lucid. The light oflucidity does not mean that everything is clear.
It i� �
ather like a painting where darkness and brightness play together. This
luc tdity does not dazzle although it n
i volves light. It means above all a different
picture, not necessarily a clearer or brighter one. The breadth of vision that fusion
characteristic of this breadth of vision is that it does not lose sight of details. It
is different from simply zooming out. The higher level of generality does not
co �fli�t with attention to particularity. Gadamer writes: "Horizont gewinnen
memt IIDmer, daB man uber das Nahe und Allzunahe hinaussehen lemt, nicht urn
von ibm wegzusehen, sondem urn es in einem groBeren Ganzen und in
richtigeren MaBen besser zu sehen.'m Fusion ofhorizon(s) is not the subject's
putting him or herself at a distance by catapulting him or herself n
i to another
horizon while attempting to leave him or herself behind. It is a process that
situa�es him or her within itself. Fusion of horizon(s) is not engulfing and
levelmg but encompassing and involving.
The higher level of generality and the increased lucidity implied by the
process offusion ofhorizon(s) prompt the question ofthe potential growth ofthe
horizons. Do horizons merely change or do they actually grow? The discussion
of this question underlines the middle-voiced meaning of fusion of horizon(s)
because the horizons seem to do both.
Gadamer's texts oscillate between change and growth. As on many s
i sues,
they engage the reader in a fruitful ambiguity. On the one hand, Gadamer's texts
let the horizon only shift. For instance, in a Jetter to Grondin, Gadamer is hesitant
about the expansion of the horizon:
Aberich wilrde nicht einmal so sebr geme von der Erweiterung unseres Horizontes sprechen, die
_ _
durch Verstehen gehngt, sondem heber our von Verschiebung. Das leistetja das Bild auch in
Wahrheit: \Venn man einen neuen Blick auf den Horizont gewinnt, also einen neuen Horizont hat,
bat man auch etwas hinter sich gelassen. Brwerb und Verlust scbeinen ineinander geflochten Wld
gcrade daraufberuht die Geschicbtlichkeit der Wirkungsgeschichte.74
�
In this le er Gadamer prefers to speak of a shift rather than an actual expansion
of the honzon b ecause ofthe dialectic of gain and loss. As the image of horizon
�
�ugg�sts, motion an change, not accumulation, seem to be the key. Change
1mpl!es that some thmgs are left behind, become past, pushed away by new
presents. The notion that horizons shift rather than expand corresponds to
Gadamer's famous phrase that to understand is to understand differently, not
73 GWJ, 310.
74 Grondin, Hermeneutische Wahrheit?, 160.
88 Chap. 3: Gadamer's Triple Account ofthe Event ofUnderstanding
necessarily better or more.75 The image of sedimentation does not apply.
Sediment keeps becoming more. As I showed with the analogy of the melting of
a glacier, the process in question is in constant motion without necessarily
growing.
On the other hand, however, Gadamer's texts also allow for horizonal
expansion. For example, in a passage dealing with the risk of w1derstanding,
Gadamer argues that understanding is an adventure and that it expands our hun1an
experience and our world bori:wn.76 Similarly in the context of the contrast
between written and oral tradition, Gadamer argues that the relation to the past
gained in texts yields a real possibility for the understanding consciousness to
move (verschieben) and to expand (enveitem) its horizon.n Gadamer's texts have
it both ways. Just as there is one and many horizon(s), so the horizon(s) shift(s)
and expand(s).
The ambiguity between actual expansion and mere displacement is a sign of
the mediality of understanding. The horizon shifts as we move in it, but we can
climb a mountain to see farther. The subject is not passively submitted to the
horizon but medially subjected to it. He or she can make efforts to see farther, to
get a clearer picture, to know more and, therefore, to broaden his or her horizon.
Fusion ofhorizon(s) does not preclude an increase o fknowlcdge. This increase
of knowledge enriches the fusion of horizon(s), yet it does not actually expand
the present horizon. The "nonincrease" that happens is like the increase of being
due to an image. The original, the Urbild, does not actually grow in the proce-ss
of its increase ofbeing due to the "emanation" of the picture's own being from
the original. The picture adds to the understanding of the depicted so that the
depicted must live up to the picture, so to speak. The important thing to realize
is that the increase in being means the ontological process of Darstellung. It is a
henneneutic event, a matter ofw1derstanding, not some substantial or essential
enlargement. The horizonal shift and increase amount to a similar increase in
being in the sense of a different understanding of something - ultimately of
oneself in the world, as we will see in the next chapter.
The passage from Gadamer's letter to Grondin mentions that ifthere is gain
in fusion ofborizon(s) there is also loss. Horizons do not pile up when we move
on; we do not simply file previous horizons; we do not collect horizons like
snapshots. Understanding is no active collecting of bits and pieces to be fitted
together like a jigsaw puzzle. The analogy of a jigsaw does not do justice to
fusion ofhorizon(s) because it intimates that a series ofsmall horizons constitute
the one complete horizon. The horizon of understanding is not a jigsaw we can
piece together. It is not an object we make but a "within" we inhabit. It is a
15 See GWJ, 302.
76 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Hermeneutik als pra1:tische Philosophie," chap. in Vernunft
im Zeira/terder Wlssenschaft (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976), 106.
77 See GWI, 393.
Fusion ofHorizon(s) 89
playlike process. Even with a jigsaw, it is not the puzzle as object but its puzzling
effect that engages us and makes us put it together; the actual puzzle is
assembling it, not having it fully assembled; otherwise we would not take it apart
as soon as we are done with it! The verb, not the object, involves us. Locality, not
objectivity, s
i key. The present horizon is the locality where the subject partakes
in and of fusion ofhorizon(s). He or she may broaden his or her horizon which
is an image of the present horizon: it emanates from the present horizon and adds
g
to its understanding - to its bein - without substantially increasing it.
The fruitful ambiguity between change and growth of the horizon(s) shows
that fusion ofhorizon(s) is not an external activity controlled by the subject but
a medial process involving him or her in the present horizon. This leads to the
key notion "application."78 Just as play culminates in Darstellung as play's
involving way ofbeing, so fusion ofhorizon(s) culminates in Anwendung as the
involving way of being of understanding history. Gadamer calls it the central
problem of hermeneutics:
Im Vollzug des Verstchcns gescbieht eine wirklicbe Horizontversclunelzung, die mit dem
Entwurf des historischen Hori.zontcs zugleich dessen Aufhebung vollbringt. Wir bezeichnen den
kontrollierten Vollzug solcher Versehmelzung als die Wacbheit des wirkungsgesehichtlichen
BewuBtseins. Wlhrend von dem iisthetisch-historischen Positivismus im Gefolge der
romantischen Henneneutik diese Aufgabe verdeckt worden war, liegt bier in Wabrheit das
zentrale Problem der Henneneutik ilberhaupt. Es ist das Problem der A.nwendung, die in allem
Verstehen gelegen ist79
This passage addresses the mediality of the hermeneutic event. It does justice to
the balance between the event of understanding and the subject within it. At first,
the term application sounds active. When one applies something, one is in charge
of it and uses it in a certain way. In philosophical hermeneutics, however,
application is more subtle: it is a process that happens to the subject.
Gadamer retrieves application from the pietistic hermeneutics that
distinguished three "subtleties": subtilitas intellegendi, subtilitas explicandi, and
subtilitas applicandi. Gadamer's retrieval of subtilitates is telling. He writes:
"Alle drei heiBen bezeichnenderweise >subtilitas<, d.h. sie sind nicht so sehr als
Methoden verstanden, ilber die man verftigt, wie als ein Konnen, das besondere
Feinheit des Geistes verlangt."80 "Subtlety" has a senselike character. Like
common sense or tact, it is a knowledge that is unable to provide reasons for
itself. It is something we do without mastering it because it comes to us as we
practice it. Moreover, although Gadamer refers to the three elements ofpietistic
78 On the notion ofapplication, see, for instance, Bernstein, 141-150, Chang, 1 13-123, Hans,
309-31 1, Grondin, L'universa/ite de l'hermeneutique, 175-180, Grondin, Introduction a Hans­
Georg Gadamer, 150-166, Heinz Kimmerle, "Metahermeneutik, Applikation, hem1eneutische
Sprachbildung: Zu den Grundlagen der bermeneutischen Diskussion," Zeitschrififor Theo/ogie
und Kirche 61, no. 2 (1964): 221-235, and Palmer, 186-191.
79 GW/, 312.
80 GWJ, 312.
90 Chap. 3: Gadamer 's Triple Account ofthe Event of Unclerstanding
hem1eneutics, he is adamant about the unity of understanding, interpreting, and
applying. They are one process. Understanding is always interpretation, which
is the explicit form of understanding, and application is no subsequent appendix
to it. Both the term "subtlety" and the unity of the three pietistic subtleties
suggest that application is middle-voiced although it sounds active at first.
The mediality of application comes to the fore in Gadarner's favorite
illustrations of application: legal and theological hermeneutics. The interpretation
of the law and of the Bible indicate that understanding always implies applying
to one's hori.zon that which one interprets. Application, as an intrinsic part of the
hermeneutic process, listens to what a Sache has to say in and to the present
horizon. It is not a masterful use of meaning but a service to the meaning that
claims validity in the present situation. Service means medial involvement in the
unfolding meaning, as exemplified by simultaneous translation. Good translators
are so invested in what is going on that they are able to translate meaning in total
mediation. The application of the unfolding meaning to their particular location
at the junction of two fusing horizons within the common horizon of the
interlocutors' Sache, lets them shine by serving the Sache so well as to go
unnoticed. Even in the extreme example of translators, application is not
something we command. As noted, it is a subtlety, a skill, that applies itself,
rather than a method that we apply. The following summary by Gadamer brings
home the point that application, which is inherent in any understanding, happens
to the subject:
Applikationist keine nachtriigliche Anwendung von etwas gegebenem Allgemeinen, das :runachst
in sicb verstanden wiirde, aufeinen konkreteo Fall, sondem ist erst das wirkliche Verstfuldnis des
Allgemeinen selbst, das dergegebeneText filr uns i�"t. Das Verstehcn erweist sich als eine Weise
von Wirkung und weiB sich als eine solche Wirkuog 81 .
Application entails that understanding is an effect: it effects something that
encompasses the understanding subject. Application is the opposite of what
Gadamer calls Dahingestelltseinlassen. Understanding is an event: it does not
leave the subject standing out there but involves him or her within his or her
horizon. Gadamer calls this "under-standing'' effect Wirkungsgeschichte.82
Wirkungseschichte is a second key notion related to fusion ofhorizon(s). In
the next chapter we will be concerned with the consciousness of
Wirkungsgeschichte. For now I want to stress the process that makes up the event
of understanding. The effect of history indicates that understanding is an event
beyond subjectivity. In Gadamer's usage, this expression has nothing to do with
81 GWJ, 346.
82 On Wirkungsgeschichte, see, for instance, Jean Greisch, Hermeneutique etgrammatologie
(Paris: Editions du Centre National de Ia Recherche Scientifique, 1977), 54-59, Grondin,
Hermeneutische Wahrhett?, 143-149, Jean Grondin, "Jenseits der Wirkungsgesehichte:
Gadamers sokratische Destruktion der griechischen Philosophic," Tnternationale Zeitschriflftir
Philosophie I (1992): 42, Grondin, "La conscience du travail de 1'histoire et le probleme de Ia
verite en henn�neutique," 213-233, and Weinsheimer, 180-182.
Fusion ofHorizon(s) 91
a new method, but it qualifies the horizon of the historian. It intimates the
�
encompassing na re of the hermeneutic event. It is different, for instance, from
the study of the Wr
zkungsgeschichte of biblical texts that reviews the reception
_
and effect of a gtven text through the ages. Gadamer's point is that the effect of
history constitutes a horizon that precedes any effort to understand something. To
understand Gadamer's expression, it is helpful to remember that Geschichte
history, is related to geschehen, "to happen." Gadamer is not talking about th �
f
�
stud� of he e f�ct �f histo� but about the happening of the effect of history.
Takmg atm at histoncal objectivity, he writes:
Wenn wir aus der fur unsere hermeneutische Situation im ganzen bestimmenden historiscben
Di�tanz einc histo�sche Erscheinung zu verstehen suchen, unterlicgcn wiT immcr bereits den
W�rkuogen der Wukungsgeschichte. Sie bestimmt im voraus, was sich uos als fragwllrdig und
at� G_e
genst�d der Erforsc�ung zeigt, und wir vergessen gleichsam die Hl!Jfte dessen, was
W irk� lch 1st, J8 mehr _noch, wtr vcrgessendie ganze Wahrheit dieser Erscheinung, wenn wir die
ururuttelbare Erschemung selber als die ganze Wahrheit nehm.en.83
?adaJ?er writes against the naivety of an understanding that separates itself from
tts Object, that seeks to overcome the historical distance, and that overlooks the
tradition, which has not only given to the present horizon any historical
phenomenon but has �!so kindled the interest one has n
i it. Fusion ofhorizon(s),
by contrast, makes evtdent that the alleged demarcation between what is from me
and what is from the other melts. This melting does not blur the picture but
broadens and changes it so as to include in it tbe studied object as well as the
understanding subject. The point is to caiJ to the attention of the historian and
anyone understanding that he or she is within the power of the effect ofhistory
whether or not he or she acknowledges the "Macht der Geschichte."84
Wirkungsgeschichte, the hermeneutic situation, leads to a further notion
clarify �g fusion ofborizon(s): the notion of situation. Situation is closely related
to honzon. Gadamer talks about it before he introduces horizon' and he
characterizes it like this:
Der Begriffder _ Situati��
ist_ja daU:
d chcharalcterisiert, daB man sich nicht ihr gegeniiber befindet
und �er kem �egenstandhches W1ssen von ihr haben kann. Man steht in ihr, findet sich immer
_
schon 1t_1 e
t �er SttuatJon v�r, deren Er?ellung die nieganz zu vollendende Aufgabe ist. Das gilt
auch fill" d 1e hermeneuttsche S•tuatlon, d.h. die Situation, in der wir uns gegenilber der
_
Oberheferung befmden, die wi r zu versteheo haben.'5
�itua�on �tresses the locality of the understanding subject. He or she is situated
m a sttuatton �at hc ?r she doe not master. To be within a situation implies that
�
_
we cannot Objectify 1t. Followrng Hegel, Gadamer calls the historical situation
�
"substa �e: " Substance has a transcendental meaning. It points to the condition
of posstbtlity of any understanding at all because the historical situation carries
83 GWJ, 305f.
84 GWJ, 306.
85 GWJ, 307.
92 Chap. 3: Gadamer's Triple Account oftheEvent ofUnderstanding
understanding. It is the location of the subject, and it routes understanding
without actually determining it. In Gadamer's usage, substance does not imply
permanence. The historical situation is not a rock we could hold on to. The word
"situation," however, has a static connotation. It does not intimate the medial
interplay between itself and those in it. That is why Gadamer immediately
introduces the notion of horizon. It puts the situation in motion. As noted, the
horizon's motion is inherently medial: it moves when we move, and we change
when it changes. In addition to being static, situation also appears too open-ended
because it only refers to someone's being somewhere. Horizon, by contrast, adds
the idea of limit and transcendence of the limit.
When Gadamer calls situation substance he does not lay down a pem1anent
basis of understanding. Substance is that which stands underneath in the sense
that it renders something else possible. In the context of hermeneutics this
situation means to be addressed by something. It is Anrede. Understanding begins
where something talks to us. Anrede has two implications that underline the
mediality of fusion ofhorizon(s) from a linguistic perspective that armounces the
third part of Truth and Method: first, it encapsulates the dialectic of question and
answer;86 second, it highlights the notion of belongingness, ZugehOrigkeit.
To be addressed by something implies that the one who listens to theAnrede
lets his or her judgments and prejudgments be put at risk in the medial process
of fusion of borizon(s). This openness to the Anrede has the structure of a
question. Any true statement is true based not only on its content but also on its
unspoken motivation. Gadamer argues that the statement's motivation is logically
a question. The question precedes and motivates the statement which, in fact, is
an answer. The logical primacy of the question, however, does not denote a
beginning but a dialectic because the question that prompts an answer s
i itself an
answer to another question. The point is that one cannot objectively have the
truth in statements or reach it by active and external questions. The truth comes
to language in the dialectic of question and answer where both question and
answer are telling us something within the present horizon. They are both
Anrede. The primacy of the question denotes the medial process ofunderstanding
because instead of objectifying truths it lets the subject ask him or herself ilie
questions be or she understands and apply them within and to the present horizon.
It shows that the student of history engages in what we always already are
involved in, in so far as we are: fusion ofhorizon(s).
The primacy of the question intimates a medial process of questioning,
something that happens as much as it is done. It docs not mean that all the
89 See, for instance, Grondin, L'universalire de /'hermeneuzique, 180-185, Palmer, 233 f.,
Charles Richard Ringma, Gadamer's Dialogical Hermeneutic: Tire Hermeneutics ofBultmann.
ofthe New Testametzt Sociologists, and ofthe Social Theologians in Dialogue with Gadamer's
Hermeneutic (Heidelberg: Universitlitsverlag C. Winter, 1999), 44-49, and Weinsheimer,
206-212.
Fusion ofHorizon(s) 93
answers must be actively scrutinized. Ultimately such an active use of questions
is self-defeating because questions are answers and answers are questions: The
medial questioning at issue is different, for instance, from rhetorical and
pedagogical questions which one asks with a particular goal and a ready answer
in mind. It is also different from the perennial questions or "problems" which we
expound methodologically without actual hope of ever answering them Problems
appear to stay the same throughout the ages and to be absolute starting points for
endless arguments. Philosophical hermeneutics, however, suggests that problems
are perennial only if they do not question any longer. If they keep questioning us,
the problems, which we recognize as always the same, in fact arise in always
different horizons and thus are different. Our historicity and the mediality of
questioning denote that the problem we recognize is not the same if we are to
understand it "in einem echten fragenden Vollzug."37 As noted above, Vollzug
means happening and doing at once. Gadamer compares the Vollzug of
questioning to a sudden insight that bits one more than one comes up with it.
Usually, insight bas to do with an answer, but Gadamer relates it to questioning.
An insight is not ex nihilo. There is always a situation, a horizon, a direction, that
spawns it. Gadamer argues that since insights presuppose an orientation they
presuppose questions. In fact every insight has the structure of the question which
opens the way for an answer and poses itself. Gadamer writes:
Auch von der Frage sagen wir daher dall sie einem kommt, daB sie sicb erhebt oder s
, ich stellt
- vie! eher als dall wir sie erheben oder stellen. . . . Auch das Fragen ist daher mehr ein Erleidcn
als ein Tun. Die Frage driingt sich auf. Es lliBt sich ihr nicht !linger ausweichen und bei der
gewohnten Meinung verharren.88
Questions ask fuemselves when we ask them. They are middle-voiced. True
questions pose themselves to us because we belong to the Saclte they question.
They are not exclusively ours. Questioning in fact is the art oftrue conversation
that cannot really be learned. Its point s
i not actively to beat fue other or passively
to bear his or her opinions. It is the art of baring, of placing in tlle open, and of
keeping in suspense - Gadamer uses in die Schwebe bringen&9 - the Sache and
oneself in it, for the sake of the truth of the Sache.
Since questions are also answers to something, the kind of limbo of ignorance
questioning opens is not infinite. Questions and answers tell us something only
within our horizon of meaningfulness. Unlike questions that have strayed off
course and thus remain unanswered, true questions are tuned to their horizon. The
meaningfulness of questions parallels Gadamer's claim that meaning is not
something right or wrong, but an orientation. "Sinn ist Richtungssinn."90
Orientation suggests that the event of meaning is a location, a volume, within
87 GWJ, 381.
88 GWJ, 372.
89 See GWI, 373.
90 "Destruktion und Dekonstruktion," GW2, 369.
94 Chap. 3: Gadamer's Triple Account ofthe Event of Understanding
which one looks for one's way. The same is true of questioning. The medial
process of questioning takes place within the Sache by breaking open the being
of the Sache that is under question. The subject is not in charge of this process
but belongs to it. This leads to the second aspect ofAnrede I want to highlight:
ZugehOrigkeit.9 1
Belongingness refers to the historicity ofour being. Like fusion ofhorizon(s),
it has a middle-voiced structure in the sense that it encompasses the subject yet
also depends on him or her. Belongingness is more than a kind of emotional
dependence that impacts the subject's choosing his or her areas of interest in
history. Like the horizon or the point where the glacier melts and becomes a
stream, belongingness means a relation not only to the past but also to the future.
The process to which the subject belongs carries him or her and opens new
possibilities in front of him or her. Belongingness means a medial encompassing,
not a passivizing encompassment, and it allows itself not only to be partaken of
but also to be partaken in. To underline the participation inherent in
belongingness, Gadamer refers to Heidegger, saying that Heidegger was right to
insist that thrownness and project go hand in hand.
Gadamer finds and retrieves the medial meaning of belongingness from
metaphysics. Metaphysics considered knowing to be a moment within being itself
instead of an activity of the independent subject over objects. In ancient and
medieval thought, belongingness meant the transcendental relation between being
and truth and intimated that knowing consisted not primarily in an activity ofthe
subject. With respect to the interpreter of a text, the inclusion of knowing within
being translates into the interpreter's belonging to the text. Gadamer writes:
Die Zugehorigkeit des Auslegers zu seinem Text ist wie die Zugehorigkeit des Augenpunktes zu
der in einem Bilde gegebenen Perspektive. Es handelt sich nicht darum, daJ3 man diesen
Augenpunkt wie einen Standort suchen und einnehmen sollte, sondem daB der, der versteht, nicht
beliebig seinen Blickpunkt wl!hlt, sondem seinen Platz vorgegeben findet.92
The viewpoint is given to the interpreter who nevertheless understands. There is
always already an orientation that is more than a suggestion but less than
determinism.
The medial and nondetermining encompassing of the subject by the process
comes to the fore in the word Zugehiirigkeit itself. First, Zugehiirigkeit is related
tohoren, "to hear," "to listen." To listen to something, to hear it, rings in
Zugehorigkeit. Listening and bearing imply, more than do seeing and looking, a
medial relation to one's surroundings. Ifit is possible to look the other way if one
does not want to see something, one cannot listen the other way if one does not
Concerning ZugehOrlgkeit, see, for instance, Rioo:ur, "La tache de l'hermeneutique,"
91
196-200, Jerald Wallulis, The Hermeneutics ofLife History: Personal Achievement and H istory
in Gadamer, Hahemras. and Erikson (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1990), 3f.,
and Weinsheimer, 249-251.
92 GWJ, 334.
The Speculation ofLa11guage 95
want to hear something. Sound travels through walls and around comers.
Although "volume" designated originally rolled up sheets of text, it now refers
to the size of something and the amount of space it contains, and it also refers to
sound. Sound fills volume and it is volume. It has an encompassing character that
we cannot circumvent. Second, in addition to hOren, Zugehorigkeit contains
hOrig, "obedient." It intimates also obedience and subjection. In the next chapter,
we will see in more detail what this sub-jection means for the understanding
subject. At this point, the emphasis is on the encompassing nature of the
hermeneutic event seen as a volume within which the understanding subject is
being spoken to.
The notion ofAnrede, the dialectic of question and answer, and ZugehOrigkeit
point to the linguisticality of understanding and to the ontological implication of
language, the topic of the third part of Tntth and Method and the culmination of
the whole work. The next section focuses on linguisticality by taking a closer
look at the medial meaning of the central notion of Iinguistic speculation.
The Speculation of Language
Gadamer writes that "die im Verstehen geschehende Verschmelzung der
Horizonte die eigentliche Leistung der Sprache ist."93 The process of fusion of
horizon(s) is actually the performance of language that takes place in any
successful conversation with a person or with a text within a Sache. Language
and the conversation that we are constitute the theme of the third part of Truth
and Method. Gadamer reflects on the nature of language· and ponders the
uncanny, unheimlich, proximity oflanguage in which we are at home, daheim.
Based on the mysterious closeness of language and its Eigengesetzlichkeit, he
entrusts himself to language and draws from it universal and ontological
implications for philosophical hermeneutics. Language's self-regulation has a
strong middle-voiced overtone. It points to speaking - our speaking! - in the
sense of a process under which we stand, a process that befalls us and that is so
close to us that we are often not even aware of it.94
The central claim of the third part of Truth and Method is the famous phrase
"Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache.'>9s In fact, the epigraph of the
last part of Truth and Method already announces the same prevalence of
language. The quote from Friedrich Schleiermacher reads: "Alles
93 GWJ, 383.
94 On language and linguistic speculation, see, for example, Chang, 53-66, Grondin,
Introduction a Hans-Georg Gadamer, 181-216, Kogler, 27-42, 49-69, Palmer, 201-212, and
Tbiselton, The 1Wo Horizons, 310-314.
95 GWI, 478.
 Chap. 3: Gadamer 's Triple Account ofthe Event of Understanding
96
Vorauszusetzende in der Herrneneutik ist Sprache."96 The temptation is great to
read into these two passages that language grounds understanding and to consider
it the foundation of hermeneutics and our being. Gadamer's point, however, is
not to ground something but to describe a process.
The emphasis on language means something like "linguisticability>' because
the ability to put something into words is the way to understanding it. Gadamer's
i language is tricky. It does not means that being
claim that understandable being s
equals language or that language equals being. Grondin notes that the stress is on
can in "being that can be understood." He adds in a note referring to "can":
Which is already implied in the subtle notion of linguisticality when Gadamer alludes to the
universality of Sprachlichkeit. The universal dimension ofhermeneutics is not so much one of
language itself(which would amount, say, to a inguisticism
l ofsorts), but ofan openness or quest
for understanding in amode which is less actual language itselfthan a striving for words for what
urges to be said and heard.97
Robert J. Dostal also carefully avoids the foundationalist interpretation of
Gadamer's claim. He stresses that it means that all understanding is linguistic, not
all being.98 As Wachterhauser notes, language is not reality, but reality is
"somehow in language."99 The stress is on the process ofunderstanding and on
its locality. The question that lies behind linguisticality is: "Where does
understanding happen?" It is a matter oflocation or volume rather than ultimate
base. Understanding is a far cry from standing on something. Kathleen Wright
argues that Gadamer's claim about language has nothing to do with metaphysics
in the traditional sense. Sbe writes:
It would be mistaken to assume that Gadamer's response remains traditionally metaphysical and
simply substitutes language ni place of the various absolutes that have served to govern our
thinking about ourselves and the world we find ourselves in. For Gadarner, language is a center
i a medium (Mitce), not aground (arche).'
(Mitte), not an end (te/os). It s 00
Wright's passage intimates the medial aspect of language. Language is no
absolute we arise from or strive toward. Language is no object. It is an eventlike
medium that encompasses the speaker.
Gadamer's own explanation of his claim that all understandable being is
language makes clear that he is not pursuing any absolute when he speaks of
linguisticality. He relates language to the understandable totality but in such a
way that totality remains an event. Language does not access being, but being
96 GWJ, 387.
97Jean Grondin, "Gadamer and Augustine: On the Origin of the Hermeneutical Claim to
Universality," in Hermeneutics and Truth, ed. Brice R. Wachterhauser, 244, n. 36.
98 Dostal, 64.
99 Brice R. Wachterhauser, "Gadarner's Realism: The 'Belongingness' of Word and Reality,"
in Hermeneutics and Truth, ed. Brice R. Wachterhauser, 168.
100
Kathleen Wright, "Gadamer: The Speculative Structure of Language," in Hermeneutics
and Modern Philosophy, ed. Brice R. Wacbterhauser, 204.
The Speculation ofLanguage 97
happens in language. Gadamer follows Heidegger's notion of truth as un­
concealment in order to underline tbe limit of understanding:
Wenn ich den Satz schrieb: »Sein, das verstandeo werden kann, ist Sprache«, so lag darin, daB
das, was ist, nie ganzverstanden wcrden kann. Es liegt darin, sofem alles, was eine Sprache fiihrt,
imrner noch uber das hinausweist, was zur Aussage gelangt.101
Gadamer emphasizes that we can never fully understand that which is.
Language's relation to this ever becoming totality underscores its finitude and
thus undermines any ultimate claims about it. Far from transcending this limit,
the pondering o f the ontological and universal significance oflanguage is a way
of becoming aware of it, yet without canceling it.
Gadamer explicitly links the claim that all understandable being is language
to speculation. Speculation means that everything that language says speaks
because it is carried by that which it does not say. Against Habermas and the
accusation of "idealism of linguisticality,"102 Gadamer maintains that
hermeneutics is universal and not limited to he
t realm of meaning as opposed to
the reaLity ofwork and dominion. Gadamer finds it "absurd'' to exclude work and
dominion from the henneneutic dimension. 103 The speculative character of
language denotes language's relation to the whole of being, including work and
dominion. Everything that is understandable reflects itself in the mirror of
language. The linguistic speculation signifies the infinity of the unsaid which
yields volume to the words one seeks in order to say what one means. This
speculative unity between the said and the unsaid is nothing present in a single
word or in a statement corresponding to objects. It is beyond that which can be
formulated in statements. The speculative unity points to the unsaid that is
conjured up in conversation and that carries the interlocutors' speaking.
Speculation does not categorize things but denotes the interplay of mirroring. It
is like the sympathetic sounds that fill a string instrument when the playing of
one string causes all the others to vibrate along. The speculative unity expresses
a relation to the whole of being that comes to language. Gadamer writes:
lnsofem verbalt sich, wer spricht, spekulativ, als seine Worte nicht Seiendes abbilden, sondern
ein Verhliltnis zum Ganzeo des Seins aussprechen und zur Sprache kommen lassen.104
Gadamer does not promote a kind of linguistic idealism because the totality he
is speaking about is the totality of that which lets itself be understood. Totality
is not out there. It is not an object beside tl1e subject. The totality in question has
nothing totalitarian. It does not profess to hold everything once and for all. It is
not exhaustive or complete. The unsaid totality that comes to language when we
say what we mean is rather like the present horizon: closed, limited, yet open to
change in its encompassing relation to the subject.
101
Textund Interpretation," GW2, 334.
"
102 J'ilr en Habcnnas, "A Review ofGadamer's Truth and Method," 273.
g
103
See "Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik," GW2, 242.
1
04 GWI, 473.
 The Speculation ofLanguage 99
98 Chap. 3: Gadamer 's Triple Account ofthe Event of Understanding

not use fusion of upper hand no matter bow hard one studies it. And in the last part, he turns to
In the context of language, however, Gadamer does
is precisely speculation. Speculation something even more encompassing: language and its speculative nature. ·
horizon(s). The key notion in the third part
cality: the mirror of languag e reflects Speculation is an encompassing middle-voiced process. As noted, it means
is at the core of the notion of linguisti
nd. In "Rhetori k, Hermene utik und that everything that comes to language speaks carried by the unspoken. Gadamer
everything that one can understa
: is not interested in the objective mirror or the mirrored object but in the involving
Ideologiekritik," Gadamer writes
was WlSnirgends beg�gn�t,
process that goes on when something is mirrored. Mirroring underscores the fact
In ihm [dem Spiegel der Sprache] und nur in ihm trittuns entgegen, .
that the image in a mirror has no being in itself. Mirroring is a doubling without
von uns W1ssen). Am Ende 1st die
weil wires selber sind (nicht bloB das, was wir rneinen und
Sprache garkein Spiegel, Wld was wir in ihr gewahren, keine Widerspi:gelun�
un�eres und allen actual double because of the ungraspability of the mirrored:
dessen, was es m1t uns 1st, m den realen
Seins sondem die Auslegung und AuslebWlg Spek:ulativ heiJ3t hier das Verhiiltnis des Spiegelns. Sich spiegeln ist eine bestandige
Abh � gigkeiten von Arbeit und Herrschaft so gut wie in allern � deren, das unsere �elt
Vertauschung. Btwas spiegelt sich in einemanderen, etwa das SchloB im Teich, heiJ.lt ja, daBder
gefundene anonyme Subjekt aller gesell�cllaft�tch­
ausrnacht. Sprache ist nicht das endlich . Teich das Bild des Schlosses zuriickwirft. Das Spiegelbild ist durch die Mitte des Betrachters mit
s m r Tat1gk 1ten,
geschichtlichen Prozesse und Handlungen, das sich und d�s . Ganze : � :
dem Anblick selbst wesenhaft verbunden. Es hat kein Sein fiir sich, es ist wie eine >Erscheinung<,
Objektivationen unserem betrachtenden Blick darb<ite, sondem
s1e ISt das Sp1el, m dem w1r aile
die nicht es selbst ist und die dochden Anblick selbst spiegelbildlich erscheinen 11!.6t. Es ist eine
rnitspielen.1�5 Verdoppelung, die doch nur die Existenz von einem ist. Das eigentliche Mysteriurn der
Speculation comes to the fore as a Vollzug in this p�sage. When
Gadamer tes � Spiegelung ist eben die Ungreifbarkeit des Bildes, das Schwebende der reinen Wiedergabe.108

is not a mirror, he sharpens the meanmg of speculatiO n and �ves The medial implications of this passage are compelling. Mirroring happens only
that language
g not about a tn1rror.
it a middle-voiced intonation. Speculation is about mirrorin in so far as it involves an onlooker, yet Gadamer's point is not that the subject
is after the playlike process that happens within language. He does not eyes an object but the ungraspability of what is in the mirror. Earlier, in the
Gadamer
next cha�ter we will see
tum language into an object, a mirror of reality. In the .
context of belongingness, I mentioned the limbo of ignorance opened in the
does not posit a supersub ject above the understa nding subject. For dialectic of question and answer and the suspense that ensues. Schwebe comes
that Gadamer
e as a� entity that is
now the important point is that Gadamer contrasts languag back here in verbal form. Mirroring puts into sharper focus the unsettled
opposed to the understanding subject and language as process
that mvolves al : � � character of understanding. Language is no mirror but a mirroring, and the
reference to Sptel JS
language is the game in and of which we all partake. The "mirrored" is no object to grab and to bold on to. It is intangible and in constant
significant if one remembers the primordial medial meaning
of play. an� �
age interplay with the understanding subject.
mirror. It is mirroring , that is, an event that encompa sses all subjects m so Though a visual image109 in the context oflanguage, it is obvious from the way
is no
objectify it but to
far as we understand. Gadamer focuses on language not to Gadamer uses it that the middle-voiced speculation has nothing to do with
and when we speak it.
describe where we are in relation to it when it speaks us actively turning objects in one's mind to see them in their various aspects. In fact
part of Truth
Palmer corroborates that speculation is the linchpin of the third the visual component is not determining. Jean Greisch notes that what Gadamer
and Method: "Speculativity, if deeply understood, is not only . the ey to � finds interesting in a word is its "capacite de resonance."1 1 0 Gadamer trespasses
of hts clatms to
understanding Gadamer's hermeneutics but the true ground the visual character of speculation. He describes speculation and its relation to
play in the
universality."106 This account of the event of understanding parallels the infinity of the unsaid as a resonating, antonen:
first and fusion ofborizon(s) in the second part. The whole of
Truth and Method
Bin jedes Wort bricht wie aus einer Mitte hervor und hat Bezug auf ein Ganzes, durcb das es
tics based on
works its way to the universal and ontological aspects of hermeneu allein Wort s
i t. Einjedes Wort la.Bt das Ganze der Sprache, der es angehort, antOnen und das
at the speculative
language. Gadamer writes that parts one and two in fact aim Ganze der Weltmsicht, die ihm ZUSfWldeliegt, erscheinen. Einjedes Wort lliBt daher auch, als
toward more
motion of language.107 There is progression in the book
das Geschehen seines Augenblicks, das Ungesagte mit da sein, auf das es sich antwortend Wld
shows that the winkend bezieht. 111
inclusiveness. Gadamer starts out with the experience of art and
of art enrolls,
aesthetic differentiation does not do justice to it. Instead the work
Then Gadamer 8
so to speak, the onlooker in its seriously playful way of being. 10 GWI, 469f.
it. History keeps the 0
1 9 S peculation comes from late Lat. speculatio which is related to Lat. speculari "to view"
turns to history and shows that the historian is always within
and ''to spy." Interestingly enough, speculari is a deponent verb, that is, one ofthose verbs with
a passive form yet an active meaning ancient grammarians thought of as laying aside (deponere
means to lay aside) their original passive quality. Speculum, "mirror," is in the same family of
lOS "R hetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik," GW2, 242f. words.
6 10
1 0 Palmer, 214. 1 Greisch, 89.
Ill
107 See GWI, 479. GWJ' 462.
 Chap. 3: Gadamer's Triple Account ofthe Event ofUnderstanding
100
Gadamer reformulates the speculative nature of language in terms of echoing,
resonating, instead of mirroring. That this is possible indicates that what really
counts is the process that I termed medial and not the visual process. This shift
from the visual to the auditory underlines the universality of the process. With
reference to Aristotle, Gadamer notes that seeing is the sense closest to
knowledge, to the activity of making distinctions, because it presents us with
more variety than any other sense. 112 Hearing, however, is more universal
because it means not only hearing but also bearing words. Only hearing is related
to logos and language. Reading, for instance, implies that one bears what the text
says to one's inner ear. lf it was not primarily an auditory matter, we would
certainly not say that the blind read Braille; they would touch it, feel it, but never
read it The reformulation of speculation in terms o f hearing shows its close
relation to Zugehorigkeit. As mentioned above, one cannot hear the other way in
the same way one can look the other way. Gadalner writes:
Dieser Unterschied von Sehen und Horen ist filr uns deshalb wichtig, wei! der Vorrang des
Hiirens dem hennencutischen Phanomen zugrunde liegt, wie schon Aristoteles erkannt hat. Es
gibt nichts, was oicht filr das Horen mittels dcr Sprache zugang�ich wiird�. Wahrend aile_ anderen
Si011e an der Universalitiit der sprachlichen Welterfahrung kemen uormttelbaren Antell habco,
sondem nur ihre spezifischen Felder erschlieBcn, ist das Horen ein Weg zum Ganzen, weil es auf
den Logos zu horen vermag.m
Hearing underscores the medial meaning of speculation because it suggests a
process that happens to us without giving us the possibility to choose ahead of
time what we want to include in it and what we want to reject from it. Hearing is
less selective than seeing. Speculation is a visual image, but its relation to hearing
shows that understanding has to get down to everything that is brought up. The
primacy of hearing puts into focus the speculative nature of language because it
underscores that it is a medial and all-encompassing process. It shows that
mirroring has nothing to do with mirrors and with subjects actively observing
objects in them. Mirroring is nothing less than the Sache corning to language in
the medial process of understanding.
To qualify Palmer's claim that "speculativity, if deeply understood," is the ey � Second Gadamer argues that language is selfless action: language is beyond
to Gadamer's hermeneutics and its universality, one could say that speculation,
if medially understood, is that key. Mediality refers to an encompassing event
that is subject together with the subject within it. Its hallmark is a focus on the
location of the subject with reference to the process of which he or she is also
subject instead of the active/passive relation between subject and object. A
medial understanding of speculation goes beyond an explanation in terms of
objective and subjective genitive. Wright, for instance, sees two meanings in
1
"reflection ofan object in a mirror."1 4 She speaks of "the double directionality"
112 See uHoren-Sehen-Lesen," GW8, 27lf.
113
GWI, 466.
1 14 See Wright,207.
The Speculation ofLtwguage 101
of the relation between an object andits mirror image. Her point is to explain the
increase in being that happens to the image. Reflection of the object is a
subjective and an objective genitive at once: in the first case, it means that the
object reflects itself in the mirror; in the second, the reflection makes the object
more than it is. Wright separates the reflection of the object into the mirror and
backfrom it Her interpretation remains caught in the active/passive mode of
thinking fixated on the distinction between subject and object. First the mirrored
object is subject, then it becomes object Such an interpretation does not address
mirroring as an event. It only considers bow the object in the mirror is affected.
Three points warrant the move beyond the active/passive mode and the
interpretation of linguistic speculation as a medial process that encompasses the
subject partaking in and of the search for the right word when he or she speaks.
All three of them underscore that language speaks us rather than we speak it, yet
that we still speak. First, Gadamer argues that language is the medium of
1
understanding. It is as vital as the air we breathe. 15 Medium is to be taken in the
chemical sense of a medium in which and through which something takes place.
Language is not just a means by which we understand. It is not an ultimately
disposable catalyst that promotes comprehension while remaining unchanged in
the process. Rather than a catalyst in our control, language is fact and principle:
16
it even encompasses our objectifying iL 1 It is the medium ofunderstanding in
the sense that it is self-giving:1 17 language gives itselfand grants us entry into a
totality of meaning each time a Sache comes to language and becomes
meaningful to us. Language does not merely mediate and promote the Sache as
i - that is, it can be understood- only in so
if it were an object; the Sache rather s
far as it s
i embedded in language. Moreover, unlike a catalyst, which speeds up
a chemical reaction without itself changing, language changes. It is no permanent
ingredient, let alone a permanent basis. It is an encompassing medium that
changes in the conversation that we are. Conversation is a linguistic process
where a common language, a commonmedium, works itself out while the people
involved in it are claimed by the truth of the matter at issue.
the speaking self. When language works, when it is Vollzug, the self is not
conscious of it because the being oflanguage is not the deliberate use ofgrammar
and syntax but that which it says and which makes up our world. "Das eigeotliche
Sein der Sprache ist das, worin wir aufgehen, wenn wir sie horeo, das
Gesagte."1 18 Language is at its best when it happens without the speaker being
aware ofit Since understanding is linguistic it is also selfless. Neither the human
self nor the grasped object ground the event of understanding. Gadamer argues
115
See "Mensch und Sprache," GW2, 154.
116 See GWJ, 408, n. 17 and "Klassische und philos ische Henneneutik," GW2' I l l .
. op h
117 3.
See "Nachwort zur Auflage," GW2, 462.
1 18
"Mensch und Sprache," GW2, 1 5 1 .
 Chap. 3: Gadamer 's Triple Account ofthe Event ofUnderstanding
102
that understanding happens rather in the relation between the two. The important
point is that be clearly extirpates the linguistic process of understanding from the
exclusive active/passive alternative. He writes:
Versteben ist nicht mit jener selbstverstlindlichen Sicherheit Selbstverstiindnis, mit der es der
Idealismus bchauptctc, aber auch nicht mitjener revolutionaren Kritik am Idealismus crsch6pft,
die den Begriff des Selbstverstiindnisses als etwas denkt, das dem Selbst geschieht, und durcb das
es zum eigentlichen Selbst wird. Ich glaube vielmehr, daB im Verstehen ein Moment der Selbst­
i das . . . am Leitfaden der Struktur des Spieles untersucht werden sollte. '19
losigkeit st,
The linguistic process of understanding and the self do not entertain a one-way
relation that makes one the object of the other. Language and understanding are
a process involving the subject, neither subduing him or her nor subdued to him
or her. The reference to play to articulate the selflessness of language and
understanding indicates that Gadamer does not simply reverse the polarity and
tum language or understanding into the exclusive subject. In my reading, he
suggests that language and understanding are.medial like play. A similar middle­
voiced meaning comes to the fore when Gadamer argues that speaking is the most
selfless action that we do as rational beings. "Sprechen ist die am tiefsten
selbstvergessene Handlung, die wir als vemunftige Wesen iiberhaupt
1
ausfuhren." 20 This claim underscores the mediality oflanguage because it shows
that language, though encompassing, is not engulfing. The "within" of language
means coming to an understanding, Verstiindigung. It is where a community lives
itself out. "To live itself out" renders sich dar/eben, a verb reminiscent of sich
darstellen, "to represent itself."121 Language, dialogue, coming to an
understandjng, is an encompassing life process in which we live ourselves out
and receive access to our world. It is not a means by which communication takes
place but the medium within which we understand because it is in the process of
language that our world discloses itself. As the community lives itself out in
language the world represents itself. The Siclularstellen of the world and the
Sichdarleben of humans go hand in hand and take place in language. Language,
our being in language, is thus our passage to the world which we have to let be
told to ourselves.
Gadamer elaborates on the "within" of language using his daughter as an
ex:ample: as a little girl, she told him that spelling the word Erdbeeren,
"strawberries," sounded strange to her. She felt inside this word only when she
forgot how to spell it. Gadamer goes on:
So Drinscin im Worte, daB man ihm nicht als Gegenstand zugewendet ist, ist offenbar der
Grundmodus alles spracblicben Verbaltens. Die Sprache hat eine bcrgende und sich selbst
ihr geschieht, vor dem Zugriff der eigenen Reflexion
verbergende Kraft, so dal.l das, was in
gescblitztist und gleichsam im Unbewufiten geborgen bleibt1z2
119
"Zur Problematik des Selbstverstlindnisses," GW2,
120 "Spracbe und Versteben," GW2, 198.
126.
121 See GWJ, 450.
122
"Sprache und Verstehen," GW2, 198.
The Speculation ofLanguage 103
To be within language, drinsei11 im Worte without being aware of language and
speaking is the original mode of all linguistic behavior. What makes it so medial
is that it is a selfless Vollzug, that is, a happening and a doing at once. The
paradigmatic middle-voiced verb "to get married" points n
i the same direction:
the person getting married is not simply being married off. She is not a passive
object, but she is within a medial process. Similarly, language as selfless action
does not cast offthe subject. It tells where he or she is.
The third element that underlines the mediality of language and speculation
is what one could call the Greek advantage. The Greek advantage parallels and
corroborates Gadarner's claim that consciousness is more being than
consciousness. Greek thought was more adequate to the reality of language than
modem thought because it was not caught in subjectivism. It was a thought that
did not ground itself in the subject. It was aware of its belongingness
(Zugehorigkeit) to being, of the dialectic of logos, of the motion of the Sache, yet
without being aware oflanguage (in fact, the Greeks did not have a word for what
1 3 .
we call "language" when they became aware of the unity of word and Sache) 2
For Gadamer the claim of linguistic awareness in contemporary philosophy is no
progress over the Greeks' linguistic unconsciousness because, in fact, this
unconsciousness has never ceased to be the actual way ofbeing ofspeaking. The
thematization oflanguage (and understanding for that matter) is inadequate to the
life of language which encompasses all understanding, even today. The Greek
advantage does justice to the unity of word and Sache or speaking and thinking.
Speaking and thinking go hand in hand: one does not first think in an intellectual
realm beyond language and then "word" one's thoughts. Speculation s
i medial
not active.
The Greek advantage helps understand the mediality of speculation because
it brings to the fore the Sache. The Sache is no object in the world, a Gegenstand,
an object that stands vis-a-vis the subject who then takes a word like a tool to
render it. The Sache is more Unter-stand than Gegen-stand, more "shelter" than
"objecf': one stands under it when one gets involved in a dialogue about it. This
ideal, or better medial, rather than empirical, meanjng ofSache is the basis of
hermeneutic objectivity. As Palmer notes, Sach/ichkeit is new kind ofobjectivity
"grounded n
i the fact that what is disclosed constitutes not a projection of
subjectivity but something which acts on our understanding in presenting
itself."124 The legal etymology of Sache confirms its medial action on the
understanding subject involved in it by speaking about it: Sache refers to Latin
res but also to causa. Its original meaning is a debated legal cause put on the
table between two arguing parties, an undecided cause that must be safeguarded
from any bias favoring one side only. m The Sache belongs to none of the parties
123
See GWI, 409.
124
See Palmer, 212.
1
25 See "Die Natur der Sache und die Sprache der Dinge," GW2, 67.
104 Chap. 3: Gadamer's Triple Account oftheEvent of Understanding
i
who debate it within the limits it mposes on them. Interestingly enough,
Verstehen has a similar legal etymology underlining the dialogical meaning
characteristic ofdebating a cause by serving and representing it.126 At the core of
this original legal debating of the Sache within the limits of the Sache, there is
Repriisentation. The notion of representation implies a relation between the
represented and the representative that puts the represented in the passive voice
yet at the same time lets the representative be dependent on the cause or the
person he or she represents. He or she represents the Sache in so far as he or she
is fully involved within it and invests him or herself in it so much that the Sache
is itself there. 127 The Sache comes to language by itself, although the
representatives are debating it and talking about it. This encompassing and
medial meaning ofSache brings into focus the mediality oflinguistic speculation:
it underlines that speculation is an eventlike mirroring within the Sache.
These three points -language as medium, language as selfless action, and the
Greek advantage - underscore that linguistic speculation is an encompassing
event that happens to us as we speak and try to find the right word. One cannot
stress enough that speculation refers to the event of understanding. It is beyond
the individual consciousness. To make this point, Gadarner draws on Hegel who
used Plato's portrayal of Socrates' way of dialoguing with malleable youngsters
not yet entrenched in opinions and therefore open to the Sache. For Hegel the true
method of philosophy is not external to the Sache; it is the Tun der Sache, the
action of the Sache itself. Gadamer is quick to point out that Hegel does not
imply passivity on the part of the thinking subject. The effort involved in
thinking, the famous Anstrengung des Begriffs, far from leaving the subject
passive, has a middle-voiced meaning: it involves the subject whose thinking
does not arbitrarily impose itselfon the Sache from outside but devotes itself to
unfolding what follows from the Sache. Although the subject is not passive, the
drive of philosophical speculation is the issue it is about and not the subject and
his or her opinions and insights. As Gadamer writes: "Dieses Tun der Sache
selbst ist die eigentliche spekulativc Bewegung, die den Sprechenden ergreift."128
As is well known, however, Gadamer does not follow Hegel all the way.
Hegel is problematic because he ends the process of understanding in absolute
spirit. Against Hegel, Gadamcr advocates the Hegelian notion of bad infmity.129
Bad infinity does not mean that hermeneutics is a limitless process or a process
that transcends all limits. Had it no limits, the hermeneutic process would not be
a fusion of borizon(s)! In Gadamer's sense, bad infinity has a Heideggerian
linguistic and ontological twist. Linguistic speculation brings forth a totality, yet,
126
See GWJ, 265, n.173.
127 See Gadamer's development of the notion of Reprl:isentation in the context of the
dialectical relation ofBild and Urbi/d, GWJ, 146, n. 250.
128 GW1,478.
129
See Dostal, 58f.
The Speculation ofLanguage 105
as noted, this totality is never complete; it is being that keeps coming to language
without ever reaching systematic completion. It is the horizon of the world that
encompasses us and within and into which we live. 130 This twist is where
Gadamer parts ways with Hegel.
The verb lautwerden, "to become loud," epitomizes the difference between
Gadamer and Hegel: for Hegel it was a problem that speculative thought has to
be expressed. He thought one could overcome this linguistic predicament in
absolute knowledge. Gadamer, however, stresses the unending - not limitless,
though - dynamic of speaking and thinking. Language and speculation, the
volume or locality in which we are, are not to be overcome. Lautwerden precisely
connotes this volume of linguistic speculation. It parallels the hermeneutic task
ofbringing texts to speak again and underscores our ZugehOrigkeit to what comes
to language in it. Notwithstanding volume, Lautwerde11 is not about loud words.
The point is not that yelling yields to understanding. Volume is not a matter of
decibels. It is above all encompassing. Lautwerden denotes that understanding
takes place in the ongoing dialogical process ofa common language coming into
place. It also means that to understand something, one must listen to it again and
again as one brings it to speak again and again, even if it is only a whisper to
one's inner ear. The emphasis is on werden, on becoming hearable, not on being
loud. What is m
i portant is not the physical word out there, loud and clear, but the
process of"wording." Lautwerden is the medial process offinding the right word
that encompasses the speaker in the volume of the unsaid's sympathetic sound.
1
Drawing upon the Christian Trinity, 31 Gadamer intimates that a word that
becomes loud has always already been word because of the dynamic unity
between word and Sache. Just as in the relation between the Father and the Son
a true word says the Sache in various ways, yet it does not claim anything fo ;.
itself. A true word is not the object ofclear thinking but the clearing of thinking
speaking itself out. The mystery is that the word has always been word, and yet
it changes in the process of becoming loud.
Lautwerden and also speculation, which is aural rather than visual, intimate
that the same can be different. The identity and difference of the word becoming
loud leads to the next chapter because it manifests the fact that the subject's
involvement in the dynamic unity between word and Sache is also his or her
performance. Lautwerden implies an interpreter who words the Sache in his or
her own way. The meaning of a text, for instance, refers to the same text, yet it
changes in the various interpretations. This meaningful dissemination comes also
to the fore in the dialectic between the unity of the word we say to each other and
its plurality as it unfolds in discourse. In discourse, the one word we exchange
does not just interpret itself; it interprets itself asunder again and again. Gadamer
130
See uselbstdarstellung Hans·Georg Gadamer " GW2 506
J ' •
131
See "Wort und Bild - >so wahr, so seiend<," GW8, 379.
106 Chap. 3: Gadamer 's Triple Account ofthe Event of Understanding
uses the expression sich auseinanderlegen. 132 It is stronger than sich auslegen, "to
interpret itself," but not as strong as auseinandeifallen, "to fall apart." The force
of this expression is that it maximizes difference yet still keeps unity.
Different meaning comes about in the interpretive effort to understand. The
interpreter uses his or her own words to say the Sache, and, as Gadamer says, this
is like a new creation of understanding:
Eines und dasselbc und doch ein anderes zu sein, dieses Paradox, das von jedem
Oberlieferungsinhalt gilt, erweist alle Auslegung als in Wahrheit spekulativ. . . . Das soU gewli3
nicht heit:len, daB jeder Interpret fUr sein eigenes BewuBtsein spekulativ ist, d.h. daB er ein
BewuBtseiu des Dogmatismus besitzt, der in seiner eigenen Auslegungsintention liegt. Vielmehr
ist gemeint, daB aile Auslegung tlber ihr methodisches Selbstbewulltsein hinaus in ihrem
tatsachlichen Vollzuge spekulativ ist -uod das ist es, was an der SprachUchkeit der Auslegung
heraustritt. Denn das auslegende Wort ist das Wort des Auslegers- es ist nicbt die Spracbe und
das Lexikon des ausgelegten Tcxtes. Darin drtlckt sich aus, daB die Aneignung kein blol3er
Nachvollzug oder gar ein blolles Nachreden des iiberliefertcn Textesist, sondem wie eine neue
SchOpfung des Verstebens.133
The interpreter who words a Sache in his or her own way is involved in a new
creation of understanding. Meaning finds its concretion in the interpretation, but
the interpretation does not set itself aside from understanding. As noted in the
context of application, interpretation and understanding belong together. The
interpretive word, just like any word, is speculative. Altho ugh it unfolds the
meaning of a text, it is like the image in mirror: "ungreifbar seinem eigenen Sein
nach und doch das Bild zuruckwerfend, das sich ihm bietet."134 It says the
meaning of a text in a new way, yet it does not claim to have a being separate
from understanding. In fact, the interpreting concepts are bound to disappear in
the hermeneutic service of the Sache. They are not objects or tools to crack the
Sache, but together with the text they partake in and of the Sache the interpreter
tries to understand. The interpretation fills the volume ofLautwerden where it
brings to language the same Sache differently.
The speculative character ofthe process of"wording" a Sache corresponds to
the medial transformation into structure. The Sache becomes an ideal structure
to which the interpreter belongs. He or she does not possess it but understands
him or herself within it. This Gebilde is not a rigid grid the interpreter can
manipulate. As I noted in the context of play, it rather is an abode, a volume, a
location, where the subject understands; but just as the Darstellung of play
requires the players and even more the spectators' assistance, the new creation
ofunderstanding requires an interpreter. Although understanding is an event, the
words used are the interpreter's. The encompassing nature of the event of
understanding is only one aspect Equally as important is the subject. The point
132
See GWJ, 462.
m GW/, 477.
134 Ibid
The Speculation ofLanguage 107
ofthe medial interpretation ofhermeneutics is precisely to bring forth the balance
between the process of understanding and the understanding subject within it.
In this chapter we have examined the encompassing nature of the event of
understanding. We have focused on the triple account Gadamer gives of
understanding in Truth and Method, emphasizing the core notion in each of the
three parts of the book: play, fusion ofhorizon(s), and linguistic speculation. All
three depictions have one thing in common: they underscore that understanding
is an encompassing event that befalls the subject, yet without engulfrng bim or
her.
To conclude this chapter, I want to draw together two verbs that, taken
together, encapsulate the mediality ofthe process of making sense: einleuchten,
"to make sense by becomjng clear," and the just mentioned /autwerden, "to make
sense by being 'spoken up."' We already encountered einleuchten in the context
i conjunction with lautwerden that its full mediality reveals
ofplay, but it is only n
itself. Together they signify that the truth is verbal, not objective. It is its own
process. Nothing mediates it because the truth is not an object but the medium n
i
which it takes place. Einleuchten. and lautwerden render the hermeneutic event
by combining the way of being of light and the event of the word: meaning and
language are one just as beauty, which has the way of being oflight, is one with
the beautiful in which it glows and represents itself. These two verbs denote that
the glowing ofbeauty is not a mute subjective experience and that voiced words
are not noise pollution clouding the idea. The flash of understanding happens n
i
the painstaking process of searching for the right words for the Sache and
letting/making it speak to someone or to oneself; and the becoming loud and
"voluminous" of the Sache strikes one like glowing beauty.
The Sache is the grammatical subject ofboth einleuchten and /autwerden. The
combination of these two verbs, however, does not eclipse the understanding
subject. In fact, it keeps the balance between the event and the subject.
Einleuchten implies light and seeing; lautwerden refers to sound and hearing.
Both light and sound are encompassing the subject and providing volume to him
or her, but differently. This difference points to the balance between event and
subject, the linchpin of the medial interpretation ofphilosophical hermeneutics.
Hans Blumenberg notes about this difference:
Das Sehen "stellt" die Dinge, das Horen wird gestellt; es gibt den "Zuhorer" nicht in demselben
Sinne des Unbcteiligtseins wie den "Zuscbauer". Entsprechend hat das "Wort" nicht die
kosmische AIJgemeinbeit des "Licbts". Das Wort istwesentlich "gerichtet an", man kann ibm
folg�n und sich ibm unterwerfen, aber man kann nicbt "in" ihrn stehen, wie cs das in luce esse
beze1chnet.IJ.l
Light and its cosmic universality leave the subject passive. The metaphysics of
light is based on the notion that light is visible only in so far as it makes
something else visible. It becomes light by illuminating, it surrounds without
llS Hans Blumenberg, "Licht als Metapher der Wahrheit, Studium Generale 7 (1957): 443.
n
108 Chap. 3: Gadamer 's Triple Account ofthe Event of Understanding

claiming. Einleuchten highlights the event character ofunderstanding that befalls

the subject. Alone, it lets the subject be second, even passive. Lautwerden is
different: unlike light, the word lays a claim on the subject. Its universality is not
cosmic; it is hermeneutic, being related to logos. Blumenberg is right when he Chapter 4

says that one does not stand in the light the same way as one does i n the word.
One does not stand in the word; one stands under it; one understands it. The Performance of the Subject within the Event of
Lautwerden straightens the balance between the event and the subject within it Understanding: Consciousness after All
because it brings to language not only that meaning glows like beauty but also
that it is a call. The word wants to be listened to. Someone who refuses to hear
comes across as being much more stubborn than someone who refuses to see. Not
The person who gets married in the middle voice still marries someone· the
to want to hear is considered a greater offense than not to want to see, notably
person w�o " �d�rgoes" the ermeneutic event still understands. Our eing
� b
because the ears are always open and to shut them requires much more ill will
conversatlon stgrufies the mediUm of language, but it also connotes that we are
than simply closing one's eyes. This difference illustrates that the word, which
conversing. In the previous chapter, we followed Gadamer's triple account of the
implies hearing, involves the subject whereas the light, which implies seeing,
merely surrounds him or her.
�vent_ o� unders �ding in Truth and Method: play, fusion of horizon(s), and
lation. We read it from the angle of the event, focusing on the
ILn��stlc specu
It is the combination of einleuchten and lautwerden that is important. It
�
"wtthm" o �de�tan ing. The ":Vitbin" underscores the limits of understanding.
�
corroborates the universality of linguisticality, not a cosmic but a hermeneutic
Ev�ryone IS _lumted_: m the medtal play of understanding everyone stands in a
universality that involves the subject. The volume of the word, more than the
honzon, w_hich ultimately is one's language telling one one's world. The
irradiating nature oflight, calls for the superlative meaning of intimacy we noted
enc?mpassmg nature of the hermeneutic event, however, does not reduce the
above: word and voice call for a relation that does not stop at the "in" of
?
su Ject to a passive entity. The confrontation with the other and its limits is
intimacy, either in the sense of actively penetrating or ofpassively being shut in
evtdence that the limits of understanding are not a confinement. That the
something. Lautwerden and einleuchten together connote that the subject
hermeneutic event is encompassing also means that it provides us with a
medially belongs (Zugehorigkeit) to the process that happens like the glowing of
compass, so to �peak, f�r the "Dimension von Sinnhaftem"1 we happen to be in.
beauty.
The next chapter examines the understanding subject. Its focus is the
�h�h�rmeneutic conscwusness is not a form of resignation putting up with the
mtts tt becomes aware of in the confrontation with others. Gadamer does not
h
perfonnance of the subject within the event that happens. This chapter and the
promote passivity. He writes: "Es geht mir darum, warum ich meine Begrenztheit
next one together bring forth the middle-voiced me.aning of hermeneutics:
an der Entgegnung des Anderen erfahren und irnmer wieder neu zu erfahren
understanding happens to the subject who understands.
Iemen mui3, wenn ich nur iiberhaupt in die Lage kommen soU meine Grenzen zu
� �
tiber�chreiten.' '2 T�e li ts of understanding not only m e understanding
possible but especially unply our efforts within them to transcend them. In
chapter three, we directed our attention to what the subject s tands under. In the
prese�t chapter, the focus shifts from "under" to "standing." Now we must ask
what tt means for the subject to �tand und� r the experience of u11der-standing
_
because the crux of the med1al mterpretatlon of hermeneutics is the balance
between "unde�" and "stand" at the core of understanding.
Ga da�
er wntes �ore than once that the consciousness of efficient lristory is

�ore bemg than bemg conscious, "mehr Sein als BewuBtsein."3 Everything lies
m the mehr, "more." It is not a matter of either/or, of black and white but of

I GW1, 297.

2 "Subjektivitat und lntersubjektivitat, Subjekt und Person'" GWJ0' 98.

3 "Zwischen Phlinomenologie und Oialektik," GW2, I I .
 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Evellt ofUnderstanding 111
110 Chap. 4: The Performance of the Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding

aspect ofGadamer's "between" is not the duality of two opposed poles it seems
balance of an ambiguous yes and no. We underscored the positive meaning of
ui �
ambig ty already in the context offu�ion ofhorizon(s). "Amb �ous" is p�sitive
to imply but the location that it opens. As we saw in chapter one, "between" also
means "among two," that is, in the company oftwo rather than stretched between
because it is inclusive. Robert R Sulhvan notes that Gadamer s mterpretat10n of
two opposing ends. Sullivan's anthropological duality, Wachterhauser's
Plato in the piece from 1934 Plato und die Dichter4 does not presuppose a
harmonious human personality that waits to be developed. " ather, so a r es � � perspectival realism, and Gadamer's own assessment of his position, all combine

He ts at once willful elements that point to the difference between the Latin duo and ambo, "two" and
Gadamer the human animal is made of conflicting drives.
"both." Ambiguity has an "ambient," an encompassing meaning duality does not
�
and phil sophical, bestial and peaceful, a herd animal and a rapacious wolf, a
have. It underscores the middle voice in the sense of internal as opposed to
slave and a tyrant."5 For Sullivan, these pairings establish Gad�er as a com�l�x
external diathesis. The "ambient" character of hermeneutics does not prompt
dualist. Although ambiguity seems more appropriate than dualism because.tt 1s
Gadamer to jettison the subject. "Ambient" comes from ambire, "to go around."
inclusive and holds together several elements instead of opposing two, Sullivan
In this context, it suggests that the subject walks encompassed within a process
nevertheless brings to the fore the crucial "yes and no" feature of Gadamer's
that carries him or her.
thought. Wachterhauser points in the same direction in his discussion of what he
Another ambiguity in Gadamer's thought indicates that the subject plays
calls Gadamer's "perspectival realism." He writes:
within the play that plays: Gadamer is also between the aesthetic and the ethical.
a
At the risk of oversimplifying we can characterize Gada!ner as a thinker who both accepts
na His option for continuity in hermeneutics is based on the figure of William the
version of the realist account of knowledge and the fact that all thought tak�s place �
assessor in Kierkegaard's Either/Or.10 Gadamer says that he has had a lifetime
historically mediated linguistic context. Gadamer und�rstan� the need for � conststent realism,
�
which maintains that our disputes must be about what 1 s real m some sens� tn pend eotly of �e to learn that the infinite mediation of Hegelian reflection lurks in Kierkegaard's
inquirer's mind and place in history, and, at the same time he de? icates hts thi king to workin opposition between the aesthetic and the ethical stages. The option of yes-and­
•
. � �
t
through the issue of historicity for our understandmg of thiS realist truth. In bnef� I argue that 1 also over either/or shows that the subject is anything but jettisoned: William the
is Gadamer's position that we know the things themselves (die Saclzen selbst) m and through
assessor is the man in charge. He does not drift like the aesthete.
history rather than without or despite history.6
The subtlety of Gadamer's ambiguous thought is that it neither simply
Truth is real and- not yet, not although, not because- it is historically mediated. juxtaposes the process and the subject nor discredits or cancels the subject in
Ambiguity combines without opposition, con�ession or cau�e. It allows one o
:
� favor of the process. Gadamer removes the subject from the opposition to the
hold two or more things together at the same trme unlike, for mstance, Jastrow s object and relocates him or her within the process of which he or she is also
duck-rabbit rendered famous by Ludwig Wittgenstein that lets one see either a subject. This relocation is the core ofthe middle voice. The middle voice holds
duck or a rabbit, not both. Embracing two or more things instead of swinging together the process that happens and the subject who is within it. The focus on
back and forth between only two, ambiguity opens a space between them. the process as the subject's locus underlines the fact that understanding involves
Ambiguity characterizes Gadamer's thought which he himself situates the subject who involves him or herself in it.
precisely between phenomenology and dialectic? Dostal comments on Gadamer's The miracle of understanding, as Gadamer calls it several times,11 takes place
locating his thought between Hegel's dialectic and the phenomenology ofHuss� rl
. in the interplay of entsprechen and sprechen, "cor-responding' and "speaking":
and Heidegger that it is between logos and nous, "between the srud and unsatd
to understand is to open oneself to something that speaks to us (sprechen) so as
that wants saying. . . . in the play of conversation - the play of language and to cor-respond to it (entsprechen).12 Although Gadamer does not explicitly refer
_
insight."8 Unlike Heidegger, Gadamer does not seek to go behind these two to Heidegger, entsprechen caru10t fail to remind one ofHeidegger's ent-fernen.
actualized possibilities ofthought to something more original, but he accepts the Heidegger uses this verb actively and transitively in the sense of de-distancing,
t
location where he finds himself. Although Dostal says hat the "circle for bringing close. 13 In a similar vein, entsprechen suggests that the subject makes
Gadamer is going back and forth between intuition and dialectic,'19 the interesting speak again whatever he or she tries to understand so that it speaks again, and he

4 See GW5, 187-211.
5 Robert R. Sullivan, "Gadamer's Early Hermeneutics," in
Gadamer, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn, 245.
6 Wachterhauser, "Gadamer's Realism," 149f.
1 See "Zwischen Phiinomenologie und Dialektik," GW2, 3-23.
8 Dostal, 66f.
9 Ibid., 66.
10
See Hans-Georg Gadarner, "Letter to Dallmayr," in Dialogue and Deconstruction: The
Gadamer-Derrida Enccunter, ed. Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer (Albany: State
The Philosophy ofHans-Georg
University ofNew York Press, 1989), 97.
11
See, for instance, GWI, 169, 297, 316, 347.
12 SeeGWJ,316.
1 See Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit,
3 16th ed. (Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1986),
104-110 [§ 23].
1 12 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
or she thereby corresponds to it when he or she hears it. When it speaks again to
the subject, he or she changes and thus corresponds to the advent of meaning.
It is important to note what kind of miracle understanding is: it is a miracle
that happens only with the participation of the subject. This chapter addresses
precisely what it means for the subject to partake in the miracle ofunderstanding.
The argument does not propose to rescue or assert the subject since he or she is
not lost in the hermeneutic event or denied by it. He or shestands under it while
he or she understands. The locality, not the subjectivity of the subject, is at stake.
This chapter has three parts. First, it concentrates on the subject. What does
it mean to keep the subject within the process of which he or she is subject
without opposing him or her to an object? Second, it examines the characteristics
and the performance of the subject. Third, it considers hermeneutics in operation,
focusing on reading and Gadamer's own praxis.
Sub-ject
As noted in chapter one, Schrag remarks that the frequent report about the death
of the subject "in the words of Mark Twain's response to the news release of his
death, is a 'gross exaggeration.' The subject is alive and well."14 He argues for
a hermeneutic/descriptive and praxeological ontology to reflect on the subject in
terms of his or her "self-implicature in the space of communicative praxis."
Schrag asks "who?" about the subject within this praxial space. More precisely,
he asks who is speaking, writing, and acting. Schrag questions the being of the
subject in terms of what he or she is doing, that is, in terms of verbal processes.
He does not ask the question "Where?" although he emphasizes the space of
praxis. For my part, I do not try to identify the subject ·with reference to all his or
her social practices. The point is rather to describe the subject within the event
of understanding befalling him or her. The question is not "Who is the subject?"
but "What is the subject?" I address this question from the perspective of the
middle voice by thinking about his or her being located and localizing him or
herself. The aim is to show that the understanding subject is subjected to the
hermeneutic event of which he or she is also subject. The answer to the question
"What is the subject?" is quasi-tautological: "the subject is sub-ject."
The subject's vitality seems to be directly related to language. As long as there
is language there are subjects because one cannot exist without the other.
Benveniste, for instance, writes: "C' est dans et par le langage que 1'homme se
constitue cornme sujet ; parce que le langage seul fonde en realite, dans sa realite
qui est celle de l'etre, le concept d' «ego»"; and: "Une langue sans expression de
14 Calvin 0. Scluag, "Subjectivity andPraxis at the End of Philosophy," in Henneneutics and
Deconstruction, ed. Hugh J. Silverman and Don Ibde (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1985), 24.
Sub-ject 113
la personne ne se con9oit pas."15 There is no language without personal pronouns.
Even social etiquette, which in some cultures prohibits their use, expunges them
only superficially because in fact it underlines the importance of the avoided
forms. Language relies on the subject. Conversely, the subject becomes in
language. Benveniste argues for the linguistic constitution and makeup of the
subject. The subject does not first exist and then say "1." The formation of the
subject happens while the subject speaks. "I" unlike a word like "tree" does not
refer to a general conceptbut to the speech act designating the speaker each time
anew. The point is that the subjectbecomes literally in the exercise of language.
As in Benveniste's definition of the middle voice as internal diathesis, the subject
finds him or herself within a process that happens.
The healthy subject is also characteristic of philosophical hermeneutics. The
subject is alive and well even though Gadamer follows Heidegger's cancellation
of the distinction between subject and object. The collapse of the subject/object
nd
dichotomy did not drag the subject along into its demise. The Preface to the 2
edition of Truth and Method underscores the subject's participation not only of
but also in the event understanding. Two elements it develops are very instructive
about the balance of the hermeneutic event and the subject within it: Gadamer's
philosophical intention and his phenomenological method.
In the previous chapter, I emphasized that Gadamer's philosophical intention
is to describe neither what we do nor what we ought to do but what happens to
us beyond our willing and doing.16 The point was to show that the event of
understanding is encompassing. Understanding is not just a particular behavior
but our way ofbeing; it is the Grundbewegtheit ofour being, and it encompasses
the whole ofour experience ofthe world. Understanding, however, encompasses
us, the understanding subjects. Far from evicting the subject, the hermeneutic
process accommodates him or her. Heidegger, for instance, writes that the
important point is not to exit the hermeneutic circle but to enter it in the right way
and to secure the appropriateness ofone's interpretation following the lead ofthe
Sache instead of the common beliefs about it:
Das Entscheidende ist nicht, aus dem Zirkel heraus-, sondem in ibn nacb der rechten Weise
hineinzukonunen. Dieser Zirkel des Verstehens ist nicht ein Kreis, in dem sich eine beliebige
Erkenntnisart bewegt, sondem er ist der Ausdruck der existenzialen Vor-Struktur des Daseins
selbsl Der Zirkel darf nicht zu einem vitiosum und sei es aucb nur zu einem geduldeten
herabgezogen werden. In ihm verbirgt sich eine positive Moglichkeit urspriinglichsten Erkennens,
die freilich in echter Weise nur dann ergriffen ist, wenn die Auslegung verstanden hat, daB ihre
erste, standige und letzte Aufgabe bleibt, sichjeweils Vorbabe, Vorsicht und Vorgriffnicht durch
Einfiille und Volksbegriffe vorgeben zu lassen, sondem in deren Ausarbeitung aus den Sachen
selbst her das wissenschaftliche Thema zu sichem.'7
15 Emile Benveniste, "De Ia subjectivite dans le Jangage", in Problemes de linguistique
genera/e. 1 (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), 259-261 .
16 See "Vorwort zur 2. Auflage," GW2, 438.
1
7 Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, !53 [§ 32).
1 14 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstandin.g
The understanding subject is not passively subjected to the hermeneutic circle.
This circle is neither a mistake to be avoided nor an unavoidable impediment
rolling on by itself. It requires efforts on the part of the one understanding. The
projection character of understanding, for instance, means that understanding
always already precedes interpretation but not that it determines the subject.
Projection affects the subject but only by involving him or her in itself. While
carried by understanding, he or she always projects a total understanding of the
Sache in question, constantly revising it.
The passage just quoted does not enjoin apraxis, says Gadamer.18 It describes
the way understanding happens. Gadamer's interpretation brings out the medial
location ofthe subject in the hermeneutic circle. Despite the continuing effort the
subject must make to apply him or herself to the Sache and to apply the Sache to
him or herself, he or she does not actively penetrate and invest the hermeneutic
circle. Gadamer underscores that Heidegger's point is not that understanding is
a circular activity but that circularity has a positive ontological meaning.
Circularity is not a metaphysical metaphor but a logical notion based on the
vicious circle.19 In hermeneutics, the logical fault that seeks to prove something
by recurring to the original proposition is no fault at all. It is in fact an accurate
description ofthe hermeneutic event and of the subject within it. The hermeneutic
circle ells
t us something about the way of being of the understanding subject: the
subject is involved, that is, wrapped up in and corrunitted to the Sache. The
hermeneutic circle is a matter of catching the ball an eternal Mitspielerin throws
at us.20 Playing with her reveals our mediality: her arched throw manifests that
our being able to grasp is an ability and an asset, en
i Vennogen, that belongs not
to us but to a world.
Gadamer's philosophical intention leaves room forthe subj ect. What happens
to the subject beyond his or her willing and doing does not disable the subject.
Instead it requires that we keep locating ourselves withinthis process Gadamer
also calls Tun der Sache. Locating or even relocating oneself is different from
emancipating oneself. To toil within one's location s
i not an action directed at
something external, as, for instance, to emancipate oneself from one's station. In
fact, the subject's performance means for the most part to be negative toward
oneself in the sense of following the Sache even against one's own inclinations.
In the context of fusion of horizon(s), for instance, Gadamer writes that the
1
subject who has a horizon must work out the right horizon of inquiry.2 Far from
being something passive, to have a horizon enables one to see beyond the
proximate and to weigh the size and distance of things within this horizon; it
means the elaboration of the adequate horizon for the questions that pose
18
See GWJ, 271.
19 See "Text und Interpretatio11," GW2, 331.
20
See the epigraph of Truth and Method.
21 307f.
See GWJ,
Sub-ject 115
themselves to us regarding the traditions in which we find ourselves. Whatever
we understand moves into the present horizon: it becomes contemporary or
copresent with us. Contemporaneity is not just the way something is given to
consciousness, but it is also the subject's task and performance: he or she has to
hold on to the Sache and involve him or herself in it to such an extent that the
Sache can make sense in total mediation in the present horizon. Copresence does
not just happen to the subject, nor is it just made to happen by him or her. It
means the medial presencing requiring the subject's participation n
i and of the
advent of meaning. Evidently Gadamer's philosophical intention does not
obliterate the subject's willing and doing but brings to language the medial
implications he describes in the context of play: play plays and reaches
presentation through the players. Presentation is not an immediate glitter that
lights up a passive bystander because it relies on the subject's participation.
Besides Gadamer's philosophical intention, the other element addressed in the
Preface to the 2nd edition of Truth and Method that is instructive about the
balance between event and subject is his phenomenological method. It, too,
denotes the health of the subject. Gadamer states that, as far as the method is
concerned, Truth and Method stands on a phenomenological ground.22 This
statement is more complex than it seems because of the many meanings of
phenomenology. Grondin, for instance, points out that the meaning of
phenomenology varies from place to place.23 In the U. S. it appears to be a
generic term used to describe continental philosophy as opposed to the Anglo­
Saxon analytical tradition. In Germany, its meaning is restricted to Husser!. In
France, where phenomenology is the most vital, it has become the most likely
candidate to replace metaphysics. Gadamer's appraisal is even stronger since be
notes that almost every phenomenologist bas his own definition of the field.24
Phenomenologists seem to agree only on one thing: the motto Zu den Sachen
selbst. Unfortunately, the agreement refers mostly to the way ofworking inspired
by Husserl's meticulousness rather than to the meaning of phenomenology.
For Gadamer, Zu den Sachen selbst has a middle-voiced ring. This turn to the
things has nothing to do with a tum to objects. It would be wrong to speak of
phenomenological realism and to see in this motto (and in the eidetic reduction)
a concern with objects and to oppose it to a later concern with the subject (the
transcendental reduction). Zu den Sachen se/bst lies beyond the opposition
between subject and object which in fact thinks objectively about the subject. The
focus is neither the subject nor the object but the correlation between action (Akt)
and object (Gegenstan.d) in a countematural reflection about intentional acts of
22
See "Vorwort zur 2. Auflage," GW2, 446.
23 Jean Grondin, "La pbenomenologie sans hermeneutique," chap. in L 'horizon
hermeneu.tique de Iapensee contemporaine, 81-83.
24 See "Die phli.nomenologische Bewegung," GW3, 116.
1 16 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
consciousness in order to justify the validity of that which is meant to be
existing.25
Phenomenological research focused on the self-givenness, Se/bstgegebenheit,
ofthe Sachen selbst as opposed to the scientific ideal of active mastery of reality.
To examine the process of self-givenness, it investigated the relation between
intentional acts and the Sachen selbst, that is, the things experienced in the
intentional acts, and not only the perceived facts (object) or the perception ofthe
facts (subject, consciousness). The process of self-giving and the intentional acts
together are the focus. Phenomenological reduction, far from reducing everything
to one element, meant the meticulous transcendental reflection about the a priori
correlation of the object of experience (Erfahrung) and its ways of being given
in all its richness. Objects, even subjectivity, are phenomena within a variety of
modes of self-givenness and not posited beings. Husser! placed this correlation
in what he called "Lebenswelt," the unthematic historical medium of our living
characterized by anonymous intentionality. Anonymous intentionality refers to
a performance (Leistung) that claims no exclusive subject: it is the performance
of life. It means the inner coordination (Zuordnung) of subjectivity and
objectivity. The performance ofthe life world's anonymous intentionality leads
to the most arduous problem of phenomenology, which Husserl untiringly
pondered: how does the unthematic yet always assumed Lebenswe/t arise from
subjectivity since it has no objective value, or bow can a subject come up with
its own subject? This paradox is reminiscent of the medial subject who knows
that he or she is not an exclusive subject opposed to an object but that he or she
partakes in and of the life world.
Gadamer stresses the encompassing aspect ofthe life world, but he criticizes
Husserl's phenomenology for its inadequate methodological self-consciousness
that turns philosophy into a strict science. Husserl still pursued the ideal of
philosophy as a rigorous science with the epistemological aim to base our beliefs
about the empirical world. That his method was a method of groundlessness
characterized by constant repetition of the active-passive constitution of the
transcendental ego did not eradicate the metaphysical notion of an
epistemological telos that phenomenology is able to determine. Although he
opposed metaphysics, Husser! still continued the methodological aim of his
predecessors in that be sought completion. Unlike Heidegger he did not focus on
language. He did not see that language is the medium of his phenomenological
pursuit. For him, language led thought astray.
This brief account of phenomenology is only necessary to understand the
phenomenological ground of Gadamcr's method. In my reading, Gadamer's
interpretation of phenomenology has a middle-voiced tone. This tone explains
why he could keep the term hermeneutics despite Heidegger's criticism of
transcendental inquiry. It has allowed him to develop hermeneutics not as a
25 See ibid., 117, 124.
Sub-ject 1 17
methodology but as a theory ofthe real experience that thinking is.26 As Greisch
writes: "La question n'est plus : comment faire pour comprendre ?, mais : qu'est­
ce qui se passe lorsque nous comprenons ?"27 To answer Greisch, one could say
that comprendre, c 'est etre comprs
i , "to comprehend is to be comprehended," to
understand is not only to be understood but especiaUy to be grasped.
Phenomenological analysis in Gadamer's sense is his way of showing that
understanding is more being than being conscious. It means the description of
whatI caUed the subtle balance between event and subject. Playing and speaking,
for instance, are experiences that do not exhaust themselves in the subject's
consciousness; they are more than subjective attitudes although they are the
subject's experiences.
What is more, the phenomenological ground permits Gadamer to think about
the medium oflanguage and the event of understanding without exposing himself
to the criticism of mythology or mystification leveled at the later Heidegger.
Gadamer underlines that phenomenology investigates self-givenness always in
conjunction with intentional acts, that is, the process together with the subject.
On this phenomenological ground, the event character of understanding allows
itself to be accounted for from a perspective that involves the subject. The
Ereignis is not clouded i n mystery but set in linguisticality. It is the subject's
experience whose denial would be as self-contradictory as verbally denying that
we are the beings that have logos. Gadamer agrees with Kant's critique of pure
reason that human experience remains the sole ground ofknowledge. He remains
methodologically on the level of phenomenological immanence. He even says
that immanence is nothing else but the description of what understanding is.28
This immanence is precisely linguisticality. From here the meaning of the
phenomenological ground ofhis method becomes clear: it is a description of the
circle of understanding from within it. It concerns itself with what happens to us
beyond our willing and doing. It leaves behind the subjective point of departure,
but not the subject.
Both Gadamer's philosophical intention and the phenomenological ground of
his method imply the subject even though at first sight they seem to obliterate
him or her. The impression that hermeneutics evicts the subject is only accurate
from an active/passive perspective. Seen medially, it becomes clear that
philosophical hermeneutics is far from discarding the subject. It lays a claim on
the subject. Claim is related to clamor. A call underlines the volume of the
hermeneutic event and the subject's belongingness to it (Zugehiil:.igkeit). As the
description of what happens to us, philosophical hermeneutics yields a
heightened and more sagacious consciousness. It aims at an awakening of the
hermeneutic consciousness aware of its medial situation in tbe process of
26 See "Vorwort zur 2. Auflage," GW2, 446.
27 Jean Greisch,"Laraison hermcneutique," Recherches de science religieuse 64 (1976): 20.
28
See "Text und Interpretation," GW2, 335.
118 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
Wirklichkeit. Neither in opposition to objects nor outside his or her actions, the
subject presses on within the process that is already underway and understands
always anew his or her medial condition.
Gadamer keeps the subject in a subtle balance with the hermeneutic event. The
balance of subject and event undermines the argument of Manfred Frank and
Philippe Forget that Gadamer posits a supersubject. Forget writes that the
individual has no autonomy in Gadamer's hermeneutics, and he agrees with
Frank's critique that Gadamer's hermeneutics introduces a supersubject above a
powerless subject.29 Frank sets Gadamer's subtle balance in the black and white
terms of either/or and points to the constant duality of his hermeneutics:
Einerseits wird (im Namen der Endlichkeit des BewuBtseins: seiner Unflihigkeit, sichje ganz
durchsichtig zu werden) der NarziBmus der spekul1iren und ungeschichtlich gedachten
Selbstvergegenwlirtigung (wie bei Lacan) gedemiitigt und das Subjekt dem
Oberlieferungsgeschehen als seinem historiscben Apriori unterworfen; andererseits muB, urn der
moglichen Reflexivitiit von ,Selbstverstlindnis" willen, entweder die Wirkungsgeschichte selbst
als Subjektivitiit gedacht oder aber behauptet werden, die Tradition komme zu sich erst im Akte
eines verstehenden Selbstbezuges, der alsdann der eines Einzelsubjektes ware. lm ersten Fall wird
das, was Gadamer treffend als ,Sinnkontinuum" (WuM351) kennzeichnet (kein Kontinuum ohne
vorglingige Einheit), ununterscheidbar von jenem iiberindividuellen Subjekt, als welches Hegel
den absoluten Geist dachte; im zweiten Faile wird das Einzelsubjekt zur letzten Instanz der
Bedeutungsbildung, da nur in ibm die Tradition in ein Sinn, Wahrheit oder BewuBtsein
gewiihrendes Selbstverhaltnis treten kann. In beiden Fallen aber findet nicht wirklich eine
,,Horizont-Versch.melzung" statt, sondem die Unterwerfung eines der Relate uuter sein anderes:
entweder wird das Uberlieferungsgeschehen vom zueignenden Subjekt oder es wird das Subjekt
der Interpreten vom Oberlieferungsgeschehen vereinnahml So wird der spekulative Dialog der
Wirkungsgeschichte letztlich zu einer Ahart des spekulativen Monologs der Dialektik, d.h. der
leeren Rede?0
Frank reduces Gadamer's attempt to balance the event of understanding and the
subject to an active/passive issue: either the understanding subject masters his or
her understanding or the event of understanding becomes a supersubject; either
the subject absorbs tradition or he or she is absorbed by it. Frank does not see the
mediality of philosophical hermeneutics. Without mediality, the dialectic of
question and answer becomes aparole vide, a pseudoconversation where words
bounce offthe interlocutors who speak at each other instead of finding answers
together in dialogue. Frank notes that Jacques Lacan introduced the expression
parole vide. Aparole is empty when it does not aim at an answer but turns into
a specular - not speculative - monologue where one sees only oneself in the
other. Aparole vide implies that it does not seek a true answer because a subject
that speaks emptily does not answer to the other but only returns the echo of its
29 See Philippe Forget, "Leitfllden einer unwahrscheinlichen Debatte," in Text und
Interpretation. Deutsch-franzosische Debatte mit Beitriigen von J. Derrida, Ph. Forget, M.
Frank, H.-G. Gadamer, J. Greisch und F. Laruelle, ed. Philippe Forget (Munich: Willielm Fink
Verlag, 1984), 22f.
30 Manfred Frank, "Die Gren7..en der Beherrschbarkeit der Sprache,"in ibid., 189£
Sub-ject 119
voice. Forget and Frank do not consider the possibility of a nonexclusive subject.
Therefore, they reduce Gadamer's balance to one ofits elements: one side is fully
in charge and thus foils any dialogue.
Gadamer strongly contests Forget and Frank's argument. Although he speaks
of the supersubjective powers ofhistory/1 he does not posit a supersubject and
understanding is not a parole vide. The hermeneutic experience is speculative,
not specular. The subject is not coiled around him or herself although
understanding is ultimately self-understanding. He or she is involved in the
linguistic speculation that points beyond language to the unsaid The speculative
unity of said and unsaid in language opens the self-understanding to horizons
different from the self. Gadamer writes:
So bat die philosophische Hermeneutik den Bezug aufdie spekulative Zwei-Einheit, die zwischen
Gesagtem und Ungesagtem spielt, irn Auge, die in Wahrheit der dialektischen Zuspitzung zum
Widersprucb und seiner Aufhebung in einer neuen Aussage vorausliegt. Es scheint mir ganz in
die Irre zu ftlhren, wenn man aus der Rolle, die ich der Uberlieferung irn Stellen von Fragen und
im Vorzeichnen von Antworten zuerkannte, ein Obersubjekt rnacht und dann, wie Manfred Frank
und Forget behaupten, die hermeneutische Erfahrung aufeine parole vide reduzierte. Das findet
in>Wahrheit w1d Methode< keioe Stiitze. Wenn dort von Ober!ieferung und Gesprlich mit ihr die
Rede ist, dann stellt dies kein kollektives Subjekt dar, sondem ist einfach der Sarnmelname fiir
denjeweils einzelnen Text (und aucb dies im weitesten Sinne von Text, so daB ein Bildwerk, ein
Bauwerk, ja selbst ein Naturgescheben darin befaBt ist).32
Gadamer claims that Truth and Method offers no support for the argument of a
supersubject. He defends himself by arguing that tradition and the conversation
with it is not a collective subject but a collective name designating each particular
text (in the most general sense) one happens to be in the process of
understanding. As Merold Westphal says, texts are the "embodiment" of
tradition.33 Gadamer looks at understanding from a perspective that involves the
particularity of experience and at the same time aims at a higher level of
generality. His model is the Socratic dialogue. I noted that Plato's Socrates
opposes the medial f.11XteUof.1CI:l to the active yevvaw. Socrates is not actively
generating but medially eliciting. He is not active. His interlocutor is not passive.
The point is not that the interlocutor's theses are denied and that he is proved
wrong but that he gains an insight into his soul. The interlocutor learns something
about himselfthat lies far beyond the actual uttered words. The dialogue puts in
perspective his particularity. Its process encompasses the subject without
absorbing him or her. Contrary to Frank's interpretation, there is no exclusive or
unique subject but a balance between event and subject.
31 See GWJ, 464.
32 "Destruktion und Dekonstruktion," GW2, 370.
33 See Merold Westphal, "Faith Seeking Understanding," in God and the Philosophers: The
Reconciliation ofFaith and Reason, ed. Thomas V. Morris (New York and Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994), 216.
120 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
So far we have seen that Gadamer keeps the particularity of the subject
involved in the dialogue with the traditions he or she encounters in the texts he
or she attempts to understand. The notion of"subject" in a Gadamcrian context,
however, is slippery, and the question "What is the subject?" is tricky. First, the
subject and the formulation of this question smack of presence; second, Gadamer
himself never defines the subject.
"Subject" and the question "What is the subject?" seem to imply the
metaphysics o f presence that defines Being in terms of beings instead of
pondering its locating itself. Caputo, for example, following Joseph Margo�s,
calls Gadamer a "closet essentialist."34 He argues that for Gadamer meanmg
constitutes an orelike deposit, that is, something present, to be mined in the depth
of history and tradition. A medial interpretation ofGadamer, however, holds that
ifthere is presence in Gadamer's thought, it is nothing static - for example, some
past meaning - but the movement ofplay that keeps repeating and representing
itself. It is not presence but presencing.
Gadamer argues that no metaphysics possesses the philosophical word
"subject" because metaphysics does not have its own language. It only uses
language in a particular way, and it is this use that defines its concepts. The
language of metaphysics remains dialogue, the dialogue ofphilosophy stretching
over centuries.35 Instead of wanting to overcome metaphysics, Gadamer rethinks
it in the light of historicity and language. He wants us to attend to what reveals
itself in this tradition according to Heidegger's notion of truth as revelation and
concealment.36 According to Gadarner, metaphysics is not the branch of
philosophy dealing with ultimate grounds. It mean� an openness to a flui_d
_
dimension encompassing our questioning, speaking, and hopmg. It IS
philosophizing in the hope of finding the right word.37
For Gadamer metaphysics is philosophy. He describes it as Wachheit and
Erwachen, being awake and waking up, a process reminiscent of the dialectic
between sprechen and entsprechen. This medial process encompassing the
subject all the while he or she is performing it brings to lan� ge that
hermeneutics describes a process that is neither groundless nor subj ectless.
Gadamer accepts Plato and Hegel's injunction that truth requires a whole.33 This
whole, however, this structure, this encompassing process, is not centered in
Derrida's sense. Gadamer does not think structure based on ''une presence pleine
14 John D. Caputo, "Gadarner's ClosetEssentialism: A Derridean Critique," in Dialogue and
Deconstruction, ed. Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer, 259.
35 See "Zwischen Pbanomenologie und Dialektik," GW2, 13 and "Phiinomenologie,
Henneneutik, Metaphysik," GWJO, 109.
36 See Dostal, 62.
37 See "Phanomenologie, Henneneutik, Metaphysik," GWJO, 108.
38 See Dostal, 64.
Sub-ject 121
et hors jeu."39 The conversation that we are is a decentered whole. It is neither
full nor out of play, horsjeu, because it is constantly comprised in the medial
play of the Sache and the subject in the speculation of language. Potential
answers to the question "What is the subject?" are not present in the tradition like
ore in a rock nor are they language's present to us. We, the subjects, neither
actively dig for meaning nor passively receive it, as if it were an object.
Regarding the formulation of "What is the subject?" it is interesting to note
that the copulative function and the existential meaning of"is" do not exhaust the
verb "to be." Charles H. Kahn, for instance, argues that this distinction does not
do justice to '<to be" in Greek.40 He points out three values of"to be" that shed a
different light on Greek ontology from that ofthe common distinction between
essence and existence where essence precedes the quasi-accident of existence.
First, the veridical value: Kahn argues that when "is" is used alone its basic
meaning is not "to exist" but "to be so," "to be the case," "to be true." His point
is that whereas we tend to assign existence to particular things, for the Greeks the
relation between reality and language let something be in a true account about it.
Interestingly enough, Kalm's account is reminiscent of Gadamer' s linguisticality'
despite its analytical flavor.
Second,Kahn mentions the durative aspect ofetvcn. This verb lacks the aorist
(punctiliar nondurative action) and the perfect (present state resulting from past
actions) aspects. All the forms ofetvcn derive from the present-imperfect stem.
This stem "represents action as durative, as a state which lasts or a process which
develops in time."41 It is often contrasted with y(yvO!liU, "to become." Here
again, the durative dv1n is different from existence. Existence is the result of
becoming into being; it has a perfect meaning; it is something contingent that
"stands out" for having stepped forth. In our context, the durative aspect of etvat
S\lggests the ongoing process of verweilen as Gadamer describes it.
Third, Kahn underscores the locative value of"to be." For something to be the
case, it has to be somewhere. To be means always to be somewhere. Kahn makes
no reference to the middle voice and the locality it implies. The parallel,
however, between the locative use of"to be" and the localization of the subject
within the process n
i the middle voice is striking. Kahn unfortunately does not
indicate the grammatical reasons for his argument. He simply states that the
locative is a fundamental use of"to be." Kahn's nonexhaustive list of values of
"to be" shows the richness of this evasive verb and suggests that it does not
39 See Derrida's critique about the center ofa structure; it is within and without the structure.
Jacques Derrida, L 'ecriture et Ia difference (Paris; Seuil, 1967), 410. Also Kathleen Wright
"Literature and Philosophy at the Crossroads," in Festivals ofInterpretation: Essays on Hans�
Georg Gadamer's Work, ed. Kathleen Wright (Albany: State University of New York Press •
1992f· 229-24&.
See Charles H. Kahn, "The Greek Verb 'To Be' and the Concept of Being," Foundations
ofLmrguage 2 (1966); 245-265.
41 Ibid., 254.
122 Chap. 4: The Pe1fornumce ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding Sub-ject 123
necessarily imply a static presence. It rather bespeaks a linguistic, tarrying, and das zu reflektieren, was der Sprechende ist und wer diescr Sprechende ist. Die Griecben batten
localized process. kein Wort fur das >Subjekt<. Sie batten auch kein Wort filr >Spracbe<. Der Logos ist das Gesagte,
Concerning the verb "to be," it is also important to remember that Gadamer das Genannte, das Zusammengel�sene und Niedergelegte. Das wird nicht von der Leisrung des
Sprechers aus geseben, sondem vJelmehr von dem aus, worin alles zusammeo ist und worin wir
mentions several times that Heidegger stresses that being is a verb, a Zeitwort.
tibereingekommen sind. Es gibt ein klassiscbes Wort des Sokrates, das Iautet: »es ist nicht mein
The archaic spelling Heidegger revived, seyn instead ofsein, underlines that "to Logos, was imrner ich sage«.•s
be" is conjugated not declined. For Gadamer the verbal meaning of "to be"
The "destruction" of the subject shows that the subject in
corresponds to Hegel's description of speculative t:hinking.42 This thinking does the sense of self­
not limit "to be" to the copulative and the existential meaning that Kahn .
� ,
?
conscious i er �elf pposed to external objects o
.
��
owledge - including the
meamng of subject - has httle to do wtth _
criticizes. In this thinking, "to be'' is a lnguistic
i process that unfolds in time and the ongm of the subject. Gadamer
notes that "subject" comes from the Latin subjectum
describes the "within" of the process of thought. Gadamer writes: which, along with
substantia, served as a translation of U7toKe{J.Levov ("that which lies
at the
Da gibt es keine feste Grundlage des Subjektes, die man als solcbe gar nicht mehr befragt. Man bottom and does not undergo the changes of everything else").46
kommt bier nicht irn Denkeo zu einem Priidikat weiter, das etwas Anderes meint, sondem wird ' YnoKeiJ.Levov
was introduced by Aristotle to designate that which does
durch dasselbe genotigt, aufdas Subjekt selber zuriick:zugehen. Man nimmt nicbt etwas Neues, not change in the
m� �f being. It had nothing to do with what we call subjectivity, the
Anderes als Pradikat auf, denn indcm man das Pradikat denkt, vertieft man sich in Wahrheit in various for
das, was das Subjekt st.
i Das >subjectum< geht also als feste Grundlage gerade dadurch verloren, self, or refleX1vtty. It is only Cartesianism and Kant that turned
this substrate or
da6 das Oenken im Priidikat nicht ein anderes denkt, soodern es sclbst irn Priidikat wiederfiodet. substance into the epistemological foundation. The subject
as the basis of
In den Augen des gewollnlichen Vorstellens ist daber ein philosophischer Satz immer so etwas
knowledge, as that which accompanies the manifold re presentations entailed the
wie cine Tautologie. Der philosopbische Satz ist identischer Satz. In ibm hebt sich der
vermeintliche Uoterschied von Subjekt und Pradikat auf. Be ist iiberbaupt nicht mehr im
opposition between a subjective n
�
i ner sphere and the objective exte al world.47
This mentality, however, did not go unchallenged. The
eigentlicben Sinne Satz. In ibm wird nichts gesetzt, das nun bleiben soli. Denn das >ist<, die phenomenological
Copula des Satzes, hat bier eine ganz andere Funktion. Es sagt nicht mehr das Sein von etwas mit movement led to the criticism of the subject by recogni
zing that consciousness
etwas anderem a.us, sondern beschreibt jene Bewegung, in der das Denkeo voro Subjekt ins is always consciousness of something and debunkedthe oppositi
on of subject and
Pradikat ubergcht, urn in ibm den festen Boden, den es vcrliert, wiederzufmden.•) object. Especially Heidegger made clear that subject and
consciousness are not
"Is" is verbal: it does not state the being of something but the motion ofthinking, substances, that they do not have a substantial way ofbeing
.48
the process ofunderstanding. This process, encompassing subject and predicate, In "Vom Anfang des Denkens," Gadamer mentions that subject
and substance
is also characteristic of philosophical hermeneutics. The one reserve, ofcourse, are the same.49 The combination of these two terms helps
one understand the
is that Gadamer subscribes to bad infmity. The speculative process of reversal of meaning of the subject involved in the hermeneutic event. It puts
into focus the
subject and predicate expressing the truth oftbe subject is never complete. The hermeneutic subject. "Subject" comes from the past
participle of the Latin
copula does not ultimately secure the subject but lets it undergo change always subjicere and means "thrown under." Substance comes from the noun substan
tia
anew in the encounter of alterity. related to the verb substare which means "to stand under."
The combination of
Besides the problem of presence, the other issue concerning the notion of these two Latin verbs lets the subject emerge in full medialit
y: the subject is sub­
"subject" is that Gadamer does not define it. Instead, he lets it come to l anguage ject. The understanding sub-ject is thrown under the hermeneutic event
and
in a conceptual analysis, following Heidegger's Destruktion of the notion of stands under it.
subject. He notes that the Greeks had no word for the subject just as they did not The view of the hermeneutic subject assub-ject surfaces
in Gadamer's use of
have one for language or for consciousness.44 For the Greeks what we call the Hegelian notion ofSubstanz in the sense of what si historically pregiven:
"subject" was comprised in the linguistic process. As Kahn pointed out with Alles Sich�iss�n erhebt sich �us ges:hichtlicber Vorgegc
benheit, die wir mit Hegel >Substanz<
.
reference to dvat, location is crucial. Gadamer finds this medial aspect ofGreek n�nn�n, w�1l s1e all�s subjektJve Memen und Verhalten trligt und damit aucll a lie Moglichk
eit,
e�e .
philosophy particularly appealing: t Oberliefcrung m 1�r ges:bichtlichen Andersbeit zu versteben, vorzeichnet und begrenzt.
Dte Aufgabe der pbtlosophtschen Hermeoeutik HiLlt
sich von bier aus geradezu so
Was an der griechischen Philosophic so bewegend fur uns ist, das ist, daB sie ihren Weg
gegangen ist, der der Weg des gesprocbenen und des antwortenden Wortes war, ohne sofort auf

45 "Vom Anfang des Dcnkens," GW3, 392f.

42 See the Preface to The Phenomenology of Spirit. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 46 See "Begriffsgeschichte als Philosophic," GW2, 84f.
Phanomenologie des Geistes (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970), 56--61 . :; :
See subj �ktivitllt �nd Intersubjektivitlit, Subjekt und Person,"
GW/0, 88f.
43 "Hegel und die antike Dialektik," GW3, 14f. See Begriffsgescbtcbte und Spracbe dcr Philosophic,"
49 "Yom Anfang GW4, 82f.
44 See "Heidegger und die Sprache," GWIO, 25. des Denkens," GW3, 382.
124 Chap. 4: The Perfonnance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
charakterisieren: sie babe den Weg der Hegelschen Phlinomenologie des Geistes insoweit
zuriickzugehen, als man in aller Subjektivitat die sie bestimmende Substantialitat aufweist.50
In "Replik zu Henneneutik und Ideologiekritik," Gadamer argues that to read The
Phenomenology ofSpirit backwards does not mean to think from the perspective
ofabsolute knowledge but to think "vom Subjekt aufdie in ihm ausgebreitete und
sein BewuBtsein iibertreffende Substanz hin."51 Although substance is the
historically pregiven, in Gadamer's use it underlines the understanding subject.
Gadamer's text does not downplay the performance ofthe subject, its Meinen, but
it contextualizes it within its history. Gadamer does not jettison the subject
altogether. He only replaces the subject as the epistemological substrate knowing
the objective world with the hermeneutic subject by placing him or her in the
process ofan ongoing dialogue. Hence, far from dismissing the subject, Gadamer
replaces him or her in the sense of situating him or her within the encompassing
hermeneutic event. As mentioned in the previous chapter, "to replace" here
means to place again, to displace and not to substitute.
Gadamer moves from the grounding or active subject to the understanding or
medial subject. The subject remains important, neither in the ancient nor in the
modem sense, but medially as sub-ject:
Der dialogische Charakter der Sprachc, den ich herauszuarbeiten suchte, liiBtden Ausgangspunkt
in der Subjektivitiit des Subjekts, gerade auch den des Spreehers in seiner Intention auf Sinn,
hinter sich. Was im Sprechen herauskonunt, st
i nicht eine bloBe Fixierung von intendiertem Sinn,
sondern ein bestllndig sich wandclnder Versuch oder besser, eine standig sich wiederholende
Versuchung, sich auf etwas einzulassen und sich mit jemandem einzulassen. Das aber heiBt, sich
aussetzen. Sprechen ist so wenig eine bloBe Ausflicherung und Geltendmachung unseter
Vorurteile, daB es vielmehr dieselbcn aufs Spiel setzt - dem eigenen Zweifel preisgibt, wie der
Entgegnung des anderen.52 (Italics mine)
The oscillation between Versuch and Versuchung accentuates the subject as sub­
ject. What comes to language in a dialogue is the ongoing process ofthe subject's
attempting and being tempted to get involved (note the get-passive) in the play
of the Sache with others. The subject's attempts at understanding are not
exclusively his or her own. They are as much appeals from the situation in which
the hermeneutic experience takes place. The subject as sub-ject is neither out for
victory nor in for defeat. The oscillation between attempt and temptation denotes
a medial process without exclusive subject: the hermeneutic experience.
In the next section, we will examine the hermeneutic experience from the
perspective of the subject as sub-ject. The question "What is the subject?" does
not aim at his or her identity but at his or her location within the process that lets
the subject understand him or herself again and anew. In the context of a medial
interpretation of philosophical hermeneutics, the possible answer "the subject is
sub-ject" addresses in fact the location and not the identity of the subject. It could
50 GWJ, 307 . .
51 "Replik zu Hermeneutik und ldeologiekritik," GW2, 271.
52 "Text und Interpretation," GW2, 335.
Characteristics and Performance ofthe Sub:iect 125
as well be an answer to the question "Where is the subject?" Thus instead of
looking for a definition of the subject's identity, we turn now to the subject's
involvement in the hermeneutic event.
Characteristics and Performance of the Sub-ject
Overall the subject's involvement in the event of understanding means
application, the central problem of hermeneutics. In the previous chapter, I noted
that application happens to the subject. The mediality of subtilitas applicandi,
however, fully emerges only now as we focus on the subject. The applying
subject is neither active nor passive. He or she tailors meaning to the
encompassing situation. Even in the proper sense, "to tailor" implies more than
just making clothes to fit a given model and particular trends. Tailoring is a
matter of taste, notjust of trend. We follow a trend blindly, being rather passive
and powerless toward it. Taste, however, implies one's judgment. With reference
to Kant, Gadamer points out that this kind of judgment is Nachfolge and not
simply Nachahmung. Taste has an awkward position: it is neither fully rational
nor fully empirical. It is neither totally independent nor does it simply passively
submit to the general taste. Gadamer writes with medial overtones:
Im Bereich des asthetischen Geschmacks hat das Vorbild und Muster zwar seine bevorzugte
Funktion, aber, wie Kant richtig sagt, nicht in dcr Weise der Nachahmung, sondern der
Nachfolge. Das Vorbild und Beispiel gibt dem. Geschmack eine Spur, seinen eigenen Gang zu
nehmen, nirnrnt ilun aber die eigentliche Aufgabe nicht ab. »Denn der Geschmack muB ein
selbsteigenes Vermogen sein«.53
The concept of Nachfolge is interesting because it lets the subject be involved in
and respond to something that is deemed worth following. This type of following
points to the performance of the subject within something that is beyond him or
her. Kant himself explains it in terms of encompassing structures into which the
individual taps. He notes the importance of virtuous examples for religious
behavior and the necessity of culturally approved examples for the preservation
of taste.54
Concerning the notion of Spur, "trace," Gadamer writes: "Eine jede Spur
verweist in eine Richtung, und zwar fiir jemanden, der schon unterwegs ist und
seinen Weg sucht."55 Though in a different context, this passage helps understand
the following in question. Taste as Nachfolge is like following a trace: it implies
the process and the subject. Nachfolge brings to language that the subject does
not passively reproduce something. It underlines mediality from the perspective
53 GWJ, 48.
54 See Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1990), 132f.
[138f., § 32].
55 "Hermeneutik auf der Spur," GWJO, 160.
126 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
of the subject. Play, fusion of horizon(s), and linguistic speculation stress the
happening of the event although they do not cancel the role of the subject. With
Nachfolge the subject comes to the fore, though, within a process.
Nachfolge means to partake in and of that which one follows, Iike the tailor
who by obeying a trend contributes to its evolution. Gadamer's own terms for the
subject's participation in and of- here I stress "in" rather than "of' - the event
of understanding are Teilhabe (the translation of the Platonic J.Le8e�l<;) and
Dabeisein.56 The former has a dialogical structure and is based on a relation to the
Sache tb.at precedes one's efforts to understand it together with others.57 The
latter describes the highest activity and reality: for instance, by being totally
involved in a cult one lets the divine come to the fore and be real.58 It is not only
activity but precisely activity and reality. It is not active but medial. Participation
is not a function, it is nothing one does, but it means being together with others
within aSache. As I noted in the previous chapter, Sache is not so much
Gegenstand, "object," as it is Unterstand, "shelter." It is something one stands
under not vis-a-vis. The stress is on the locality of the subject.59 He or she is
within the event. Gadarner relates this medial participation within a given realm
to theoria. He writes about ancient theory:
Es meint nicht ein blo!.les >Sehen<, das Vorhandenes fes
tstellt oder lnformatiooen speichert.
Contempfatio verweiltnicht bei einem bestimmt.en Seienden, sondem in einem Bereich. Theoria
ist nicht so sebt dec ei:nzelne augenblickliche Akt als eine Haltung, ein Stand und Zustand, in dem
man sicb blilt. Es ist }Dabcisein< in dem scbonen Doppelsinne, der nicht nur Anwesenbeit meint,
sondem auch dies, daB der Anweseode >ganz dabei< ist. So ist einer Teilneluner an eincr rituellcn
Prozedur oder an einer Zeremonie, wenn er in der Teilnahme an derselben aufgeht, und das
schlieBt immer auch ein, daB man mit anderen oder moglichen anderen am Gleichen teilhat60
Being together is more than being present or alongside. It also means total
involvement in the sense of being wrapped up and engaged in something. The
distinction between Anwesenheit and Dabeisein parallels the difference between
the active and the middle voices as external and internal diatheses. To be present
at something does not imply involvement Being present, I can remain fully
external to what takes place. To be together with others within something,
however, is medial. It means my action within the process that takes place. Like
"to get married" as opposed to "to marry," it wraps the subject in his or her acts.
As a medial stance, theory does not neutralize the subject. It rather intimates
i Praxis is nothing active
that the hermeneutic event is also the subject's praxs.
in the sense of external diathesis. It does not mean the active putting in service
oftheories designed to master the sensuous world. In fact, theory itself is praxi
s.
56 On participation, see, for instance, Grondin, Henneneutische Wahrheit?, 114-116 and
Wacbterhauser, Beyond Being, 77-81.
57 See ''Probleme der praktiscben Vemunft," GW2, 323.
58 See "Wort und Bild - >so wahr, so seiend<," GW8, 389.
59 See GWJ, 129.
60 "Lob der Tbeorie," GW4, 48.
Characteristics andPerfomJance ofthe Sub-jeer 127
Praxis is between Aristotle's two extremes ofpure knowledge and sheer doing.61
Like Dabeisein, which Gadamer calls the highest activity and reality, praxis
means "livingness" between activity and situatedness, Lebendigkeit zwischen
Tiitigkeit und Befind/ichkeit.62 It corresponds to the locus of hermeneutics
between strangeness and familiarity, that is, between the thematization of
tradition and the belongingness to it.
A good avenue to the subject's praxis within the hermeneutic event is to look
at the key elements of the hermeneutic experience. It allows one to catch a
glimpse at bow the subjectfares in the course ofhis or her understanding. The
core of the hermeneutic experience is seeking the right word because we can
never quite say what we would like.63 Gadamer uses even stammeln, "to
stammer," to convey how little we are in charge of our speech! 64 We are
conversation, we seek to find a common language with our interlocutor, but we
never completely succeed because meaning remains a direction. We always lag
behind language because we never are its sole subject. Language always speaks
us while we speak it. In the hermeneutic experience of conversation the
interlocutors find themselves involved in the Sache and changed by it, talking out
a common language toward its truth.65 I will first discuss the notion of
experience. Then I wiU review the following aspects directly related to the
subject's performance: openness, humility, nonegocentric self-knowledge,
hermeneutic consciousness, and reason as medial rational process.
Experience corresponds to the German Erfahrung, not Erlebnis.66 Erlebnis
means something that the subject lives, erlebt (from the verb erleben). The
connection with the immediacy of life opposes it to the scientific object but still
lets it be an object. As Gadamer notes, there are two strands in the word
Erlebnis:61 first, the verbal meaning of being contemporary with something and
witnessing it firsthand; second, the result of this witnessing. In the second sense,
Erlebnis is a given, a datum, so to speak. It is an object for the human sciences
that parallels the scientific objective given. This is true especially for Dilthey, for
whom Erlebnis as opposed to Empfindung, "sensation," is the ultimate unit of
consciousness and the ultimate building block ofmeaning. The aesthetic Erlebnis
epitomizes the structure ofthis notion. In the context of aesthetics, the Erlebnis
6 1 See "Probleme der praktiscben Vemunft," GW2, 324.
62 See Gadamer, "Hermeneutik als praktische Philosopbie," 81.
63 See "Europa und die Oikoumene," GW/0, 274; Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Reply to Carl
P
ag�" in The Philosophy ofHan.s-Georg Gadamer, cd. Lewis Edwin Hahn, 386.
See "Die Universalitiit des hermeneutischen Problems," GW2, 230.
65 See GWJ, 384; see also "Destruktiou und Dekonstruktion", GW2, 369.
66 About the notion of experience, see, for instauce, Chang, 84-89, Pierre Fruchon,
L'hermeneutique de Gadamer: PlaJonisme et 11Wdernite (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1994),
43-53, Carmichael C. Peters, A Gadamerian ReadingofKarlRahner's Theology ofGrace and
Freedom (Lanham, New York, and Oxford: Catholic Scholars Press, 2000), 45-52, and Risser,
83-116.
61 See GWI, 66f.
128 Ch.ap. 4: The PerfornUJnce oftlte Subject wit/tin the Event ofU11derstandi11g
of a work of art si an extraordinary episode that severs one from the context of
one's life and yet relates one back to the totality of one's existence through the
profusion ofmeaning present in the work ofart as aesthetic experience. Gadamer,
however, relativizes the appreciation of art based on lived experience that led to
the apotheosis of genius in the creation and the appreciation of art and to the
depreciation of commissioned art, which is supposed to restrict the creative
genius. He is not interested in an experience based on the aesthetic differentiation
that seeks the pure work ofart abstrdcted from its world. E1fahrung is much more
pedestrian. It has nothing ethereal like the aesthetic differentiation. Unlike
Erlebnis, Erfahrung is not related to life but to journey. Moreover, Etfahrung is
no datum: it is not something one has like, for instance, aesthetic culture. Its
relation to journeying bespeaks rather the continuous process of the subject's
"faring."
Gadamer notes that Erfahrung is one of the least examined concepts.68 It
usually falls under the dominant logic of induction characteristic of the natural
sciences. The scientific ideal of an objective, repeatable, and controlled
experiment puts the notion ofErfahrung in an epistemological straitjacket which
curtails its structure by ignoring its historicity. Gadamer gives the extreme
example of Bacon's active method ofinduction aimed at curbing daily experience
and its hasty anticipations in order to reach a solid and ordered interpretation of
the true being of nature. It is a gradual, methodical, experimental, and
teleological progression toward universal truths ofnature. Although it has not bad
many practical implications on the study ofnature because of its programmatic
and general tone, it is still indicative of the path modem science has taken. In
effect it muzzles the mind; it does not let it take its own course. imposing a step­
by-step procedure on the mind, it forbids it to take off and fly freely.69
The notion of experience Gadamer bas in view is totally different. The
hermeneutic experience has nothing to do with active mastery. It means the
experience of becoming aware of one's finitude and historicity within a tradition
and of the limits of one s possibility. Marked by the consciousness of its limits
• precisely because of the nature ofexperience. Experience is a historical process
and not by limitation alone, Erfahrung is neither active nor passive. The
consciousness the subject has of his or her situation prevents him or her from
dominating it and from succumbing to it. This "consciousness after all" is the
medial core of philosophical hermeneutics.
Gadamer calls three witnesses to make his case for the hermeneutic meaning
ofexperience.70 He first turns to Aristotle and his image of a routed army in the
process of getting a grip on itself. This image illustrates the passage from the
manifold perceptions that make up experience to universal knowledge. It is
68
See GWJ, 352.
69 See GWJ, 354.
70 See GWJ, 357-363, "Mensch uod Spracbe," GW2, 150, and "Zur Pbanomenologie von
Ritual und Spracbe," GW8, 405.
Characteristics and Performance ofthe Sub-jeer 129
rooted in the double meaning of ltpx11, "command" and "principle." The
progressive reordering ofa fleeing army, with one soldier at a time checking over
his shoulder whether the enemy is still pursuing them, until enough soldiers face
the enemy and form an army again, corresponds to the ordering of our
experiences into unified knowledge. The interesting part of the image is that it
highlights the fact that acquiring knowledge through experience is an open
process. Something unplanned yet not arbitrary takes place and leads to a new
order. In my reading, the image ofthe routed anny illustrates the mediality ofthis
process: the army's getting a grip on itself happens as much to the army as the
army does by itself. There is no exclusive subject that actively dominates the
scene.
From the image of the routed army we learn that experience is eventive and
open. Experience, however, is not as gradual as the becoming of the unity of
ltpx11. Gadamer calls Hegel, his second witness, to correct this shortcoming. He
emphasizesproductive negativity and historicity. Experience leads to knowledge
not only by confirming but especially by altering our expectations. The
productive negativity of experience is the core of Hegel's dialectic. It amounts
to more than correcting a mistake because, far from simply negating something,
it sheds a more general light on a particular object and on everything else we
know. It renews not only the object but also our knowledge as a whole. It thus
bas a productive meaning. Gadamer's wording again underlines the mediality of
experience: there are the experiences that confirm what we already know but
there is also the experience that one makes, the "Erfahrung, die man >macht<."71
The experience that one "makes" is the productively negative experience. We
make it but we do not master it. We are involved in it so as to be changed by it.
Our consciousness is altered.
The reversal of consciousness is a historical process. Historicity is the second
point Gadamer gleans from Hegel. Although repetition and confirmation make
us experienced, strictly speaking we cannot "make" the same experience twice
that unfolds in time. Every experience changes one's horizon. It deals a few new
cards that modify the hand that made it possible in the first place. Historicity,
however, is also the problem with Hegel. Unlike the openness of Aristotle's
experience, Hegel's di alectical experience finds completion in absolute
knowledge. Against Hegel, Gadamer argues that experience does not yield
primarily knowledge. To be experienced does not mean that one knows
everything and everything better. Instead someone truly experienced is
undogmatic and knows from experience how to be open and open him or herself
to further experiences.
The third witness is Aeschylus. His formula pathei mathos qualifies the
historicity of experience. For Aeschylus humans are responsible but within the
71 GWJ, 359.
130 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event of Understanding
actions of the gods. The encompassing divine power is called oui...A:r17ttwp,
"partner;" from oul..t..allPavw, "to take with," "to comprise," "to encompass,"
"to embrace," "to collect," and in the middle voice "to help" in the sense of
?
taking onto oneself a part of someone's pain. The g�ds o not mo�e humans
around like pawns. Humans are not passive. Our suffenng 1s the combmed result
of our action and of divine action. Instead of an exclusive subject there is a dual
motivation of acts. Destiny, which the gods ordain, and human will ground
human acts. This dual motivation underscores the "within" of one's
action/passion. IIa8et 11<X8o<; suggests that suffering is a path of learning whe�e
humans learnthe validity of the eternal decrees and become fully aware oftherr
predicament. Albin Lesley argues that Aeschylus' tragic concepti?n ofleaming
through negative experiences is the meaning of life when one realtzes that to act
means also to endure:
Wisdom through suffering; here [in the tragedy Agamemnon], as els�where
in the trilogy
put forward as the meaning of life- or part of the rneanmg, �or we only grasp
[Oresteia], this is
the whole truth when we add this: 'Who acts, shall endure. So speaks
the votce of the age-old
wisdom' (Choeph. 313). Action brings guilt, all guilt finds its �etribution
�
in sufferin ; but
e , as
hf
suffering leads to understanding and wisdom. This is the god-dtrected path through
Aeschylus saw it.72
Lesky's interpretation has obvious medial overtones. _He stresses the_simultaneity
of activity and passivity of human action. The notion of a god-d1rected path,
however, indicates more than a mere back and forth motion: it suggests that the
divine partner comprises and situates our actions.
Gadamer does not import the content ofAeschylus' metaphysics or theology,
and he does not emphasize the tragic element of suffering in Aeschylus' version
ofleaming through experience. He is only interested in its structure. He imports
_
it into his thinking and keeps it in an immanent form. To be human 1s to be and
act within history and language. Aeschylus' learning through suffering in an
immanent light becomes a witness to finitude and functions as corrective of
idealism. Experience leads to an ever deeper consciousness of one's limits. It
does not render the subject passive and preclude all his or her plans. It rather
makes one aware of the mediality of one's condition by manifesting the illusion
of an active - in the sense of external diathesis - planing reason. The stress on
finitude reminds one of the deep truth of "the sky is the limit" This expression
�
says that everything is possible precisely by setting a linUt. he consciousness of
one's fmitude is the truth value of expenence. Gadamer wntes:
hr�
Erfabnmg ist also Erfahrung der menschlichen Endlichkeit. Erfa n im eig�ntlichen Sinne ist,
wer ihrer inne si t, wer weiJ3, dall er der Zeit und der Zukunft mcht Herr 1st Der Erfahrene
namlich kennt die Grenze alles Voraussehens und die Unsicherheit aller Plline. In ihmvollendet
sich der Wahrheitswert der Erfahrung.13
,
72 Albin Le sky Greek Tragedy, trans. H. A. Frankfort, 3"' ed. (New York: Harper & Row
Publishers Inc., 1978), 75.
73 GWJ, 363.
Characteristics and Performance ofthe Sub-ject 131
Experience as the experience of finitude articulates the punctuation when
Gadamer writes that experiences that do not conform to our expectations are
experiences die man >macht<, experiences that one "makes." Instead of canceling
out the subject and his or her action, Gadamer appears to qualify the "making"
of experiences by pointing to its medial meaning.
Gadamer works with the assumptionthat the structure of experience in general
applies to the hermeneutic experience as well. The general meaning ofexperience
gleaned from Aristotle, Hegel, and Aeschylus corresponds to the hermeneutic
event. The particularity of the hermeneutic experience, however, is that it deals
with traditions. Traditions are what we experience, but not in an active sense:
Ober\ieferung ist aber nicht einfach ein Geschehen, das man durch Erfahrung erkennt und
beherrschen lernt, sondern sie ist Sprach.e, d.h. sie spricht von sich aus so wie ein Du. Ein Du ist
nicht Gegenstand, sondern verhlilt sich zu einem.74
Although Gadamer is adamant about the philosophical and descriptive nature of
his philosophical intention, the personal character of the experience of tradition
entails that the hermeneutic experience baS a moral character implying the quality
of the subject's performance. It matters how the subject enters the experience of
the thou of tradition. There is a right way to "make" this experience. That this
experience is a moral phenomenon underlines that the subject is by no means out
ofthe picture. The moral nature of the experience of tradition as an interlocutor
speaking to one does not mean that one deals with subjective intentions, personal
opinions, or life expressions of a thou. We do not understand another person but
what she is saying; we do not understand an author but a text, its meaning, its
Sache. The relation to a thou makes the hermeneutic experience personal without
turning it into something subjective.
Gadamer distinguishes three types of thou-experiences. He calls the first one
Menschenkenntnis, the calculating knowledge of typical human behaviors that
reduces the other to the level of a means to an end. It is naively teleological,
methodological, and external. It is an active relation that objectifies the other and
does not involve the subject.
The second type is egocentric although it recognizes that the other is a person.
This I-Thou relation is reflexive: the subject attempts to reflect him or herself out
ofthe relation to the other (herausre.flektieren) and to understand the other based
on his or her own self. The subject is blind to the mutuality contained in every I­
Thou relation and draws the other into his or her own sphere. This relation is not
a medial playing (spielen) but an outplaying of the other (ilberspielen). The
middle voice applies here only in the sense ofthe hybrid voice between the active
and the passive. There is no recognition of the space mutuality opens between I
and Thou and no inkling that "between" also means ''within," that this between
I and Thou happens within a process that encompasses both. The romantic ideal
of understanding an author better than he or she understood him or herself
74 GWI, 363f.
132 Chap. 4: TilePerformance ofthe Subject within the Event of Understanding
exemplifies this type of understanding. This type is also characteristic o f
historical consciousness which claims to have overcome its prejudgments and
believes that its historical vantage point is over history, not within it.
The third level is middle-voiced. Gadamer himself uses a medial expression
to describe this type of I-Thou relation: "lm mitmenschlichen Verhalten kommt
es darauf an, wie wir sahen, das Du als Du wirklich zu erfahren, d.h. seinen
Anspruch nicht zu uberhoren und sich etwas von ibm sagen zu lassen."75 To let
someone tell one something or to let something be told to one by someone is the
core of this relation. The subject does not impose his or her own point of view
and try to absorb the other by overhearing its claim. He or she listens to and hears
the other's claim. This experience is characterized by belongingness. The German
words in this context are powerful because they all have the same root:
Zugehiil.igkeit, uberhiil.en, and hiir.ig. They all contain "to hear" but in different
voices, so to speak: medial in ZugehOrigkeit, active in ilberhOren, and passive in
horig. The middle voice of the third type ofl-thou relation means that the subject
comprehends that he or she is comprehended. It intimates that the subject grasps
in so far as be or she is grasped. The subject knows of his or her limits and that
this limitedness is not an impediment but the condition of knowledge. The moral
implications of the third level of the thou-experience will resurface in the last
chapter in the context of faith as a medial experience.
For now, let us tum to the five aspects of the hermeneutic experience directly
related to the subject's performance. The fLrSt one is openness. Not to overhear
the other's claim but to Jet it tell one something demands openness. Immediately
after the passage I just quoted, Gadamer stresses openness using again the
German medial structure "sich lassen + infinitive":
Dazu gehOrt Offenheit Aber diese OIIenheit ist am Ende nicht nur fiir d.en einen da, von dem
man sich etwas sagen lassen will. Vielmehr, wcr sich Uberhaupt etwas sagen liilt,
l ist auf cine
grundsatzliche Weise offen.76
Openness characterizes the understanding subject. It is not selective or choosy
but has a general character turned to everything. It means to be open and to open
oneselfat the same time. To be open and to open oneself is a condition, even a
prerequisite, of understanding. It is not something we master at will, deciding to
put on the open mode whenever we deem it appropriate, although we must muster
it to understand. Here again mediality comes into play. Understanding lies
between the illusion of limitless freedom and passive resignation vis-a-vis the
hermeneutic frontier. Like a "pious questioning,'m it questions the other because
it does not know it. True understanding happens in the openness to the unknown
other. Understanding the other is neither bowing nor condescending, neither
subdued nor subduing, but it lets the other tell something to the subject With
75 GWI, 367.
16
Ibid.
77 See "Europa und die Oikoumcne," GWIO, 274.
Characteristics and Performance ofthe Sub-ject 133
reference to our understanding the past, Gadamer describes the historical thou
and the understanding I like this: "Der Grundcharakter des Geschichtlichseieriden
ist offenbar, bedeutend zu sein, aber dies im dem aktiven Sinne des Wortes; und
das Sein zur Geschichte ist, sich etwas bedeutcn zu lassen."78 The activity of
tradition, the active being meaningful of that which is historical, does not
correspond to the passivity of the subject. The subject does not undergo the
meaning of history. Being within history and open to it, he or she lets it be
meaningful to him or her. Openness intimates the locality of the subject within
i open rather than a back and forth relation. As Gadamer
that to which he or she s
says, there is neither I nor thou but !-saying and thou-saying?9 I and thou are
within the linguistic process ofunderstanding ofwhich they are the subjects. This
i s the core ofthe notion of the middle voice: it lets the subject act all the while
the action happens to him or her. It shows that we understand while
understanding is underway.
Sporadically Gadamer uses another word signifying hermeneutic openness:
Empfonglichkeit, translated as "sensitivity" or "receptivity." It s
i an interesting
term especially in relation to the paradigmatic medial verb yaJ.leOJ.lCn, "to get
married." Empfonglichkeit is not far from Empflingnis, "conception." The verb
empfangen means to be receptive in the sense of receiving or welcoming and
conceiving or getting pregnant. To get pregnant is an action that n
i volves several
subjects and that escapes full subjective control. The semantic field of "to get
pregnant" denotes the mediality ofbeing receptive and open: one does it, and it
is done to one. The notion ofBildung, which involves growth as well, puts into
focus the ambivalence inherent in Empflinglichkeit: edification does not only
mean that the subject elevates him or herself above him or herself toward
universality, but it also involves a fertility that is beyond the full control of the
subject. Precisely in the context ofBildung, Gadamer juggles with openness that
s
i and openness that has to be. With reference to the aesthetic sense of beauty and
ugliness and to the historic sense of what is possible in what time, he writes:
Wenn all das Bildung vora ussetzt, so heillt das: es i t nicht eine Frage des Verfahrens oder
s
Verhaltens, sondern des gewordenen Seins. Geoauer Betrachten, grilndlicher eioe Oberlieferung
Studieren tut es nicht allein, wenn nicht eine Empfltnglicbkeit filr das Andere des Kunstwerks
oder der Vergangenheit vorbereitet ist.*0
The subject has to be open; he or she has to work on being open as well as on the
Sache. Gadamer does not exclude the fact that we have to be open in the sense
of wanting someone to tell us something and of wanting to hear the claim being
made. Although this effort alone does not do it because of the encompassing
nature of the process of which the subject is subject, there is no way around the
injunction contained in openness; openness does not happen independently from
78 "Das Problem der Geschichte," GW2, 35.
: See "Die Universalitlit des hermeneutischen Problems," GW2, 223.
GWI, 22.
134 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
a person's moral character. The injunction, however, needs qualification: no
doubt, we must be open and open ourselves - but then we also must breathe to
stay alive! The injunction is not part of a hermeneutic code ofconduct but of a
description of what we are. What we are is medial. Mediality allows and requires
our participation in and of openness.
Like the Three Musketeers, Gadamer's witnesses to the notion of experience
are in fact four. In addition to Aristotle, Hegel, and Aeschylus, there is also Plato.
As a correlate to openness, Gadamer adds the dialectic of question and answer
he gleans from Plato. Openness is only possible within the question that poses
itselfas we pose it and thus orients our openness. Gadamer argues that the logical
structure of the openness of experience is the question. "Die Offenheit, die im
Wesen der Erfahnmg liegt, ist logisch gesehen eben diese Offenheit des So oder
So. Sie hat die Struktur der Frage."81 Being questioned is the experience of
negativity, that is, the experience that things are not exactly the way we thought
they were. The experience of negativity points to our finirude; similarly, the
logical structure of questioning suggests that science in the sense of knowledge
lies in nescience. This leads to humility, a further characteristic of the
hermeneutic subject.
Openness translates into hermeneutic humility, the second aspect of
understanding directly related to the subject's performance. The bumble subject
does not seek to have the last word, unlike "der schlechte Hermeneutiker."82 Like
openness, the term humility has a moral flavor that is easily misleading. It is
related to what Gadamer calls good will for the sake of understanding. Derrida
pushed him on this issue. He heard it in a Kantian sense and as belonging to a
metaphysics of the will. 83 In his reply to Derrida, Gadamer explained what he
meant by good will. Interestingly enough, the editor entitled Gadamer's piece
"Und dennoch: Macht des Guten Willen." The title is not from Gadamer. The
English translators opted for the more neutral title "Reply to Jacques Derrida."
This is significant because there is a hermeneutic twist in Gadamer's
understanding of good will. He writes that he is doing his best to try to grasp the
three questions Derrida addressed to him in the Paris encounter of 1980, and then
he goes on:
Icb kann absolut nicht einsehen, da!l diese Anstrengung etwas mit der Epoche der Metaphysik
zu tun hat oder gar mit dem kantischen Begriff des guten Willens. Was ich meinte, babe ich
deutlich gesagt, aucb in dem wirklich gehaltenen Vortrag in Paris: Guter Wille meint das, was
Plato ,eumeneis elenchoi" nennt. Das will sagen: man ist nicht daraufaus, Recht zu behalten und
will deshalb die Schwachen des anderen aufspfiren; man versucht vielmebr, den anderen so stark
wie moglich zu machen, so dall seine Aussage etwas Einleuchtcndes bekommt. Solches Verhalten
II
GWJ, 368.
82 "Nacbwort zur 3. Auflage," GW2, 478.
83 See Jacques Derridn, "Three Questions to Hans-Georg Gadamer," trans. Diane
Michelfelder and Richard Palmer in Dialogue and Deconstruction, ed. Diane P. Michelfelder aod
Richard E. Palmer 53. ,
i
Characterstics and Performance oftheSub1ect 135
scbeint mir ftlrjede Verstiindigung wesentlich. Das ist eine pure Feststellung und hat nichts mit
14
einem ,,Appeu·· zu tun, und am allerwenigsten etwas mit Ethik.
Even someone immoral is involved in the hermeneutic event. Ethics, though
related, is not the hinge of hermeneutic humility. Gadamer's good will is
i to understand what
something that understanding presupposes. What one seeks s
the other says, not to be good or have a good will. "So liegt iiberall, wo
Verstiindigung gesucht wird, guter Wille vor,•>85 writes Gadamer. He is describing
not prescribing, which does not mean that understanding cannot have ethical
consequences. Humility is like the traveler's openness: his or her attempt to
understand is not active will to power over against the other as in Derrida's
Nietzsche interpretation86 or passive self-erasure; it is part of the traveler's
viaticum, the provisions for theroad. The traveler lives offit but also replenishes
it as he or she journeys on.87
Humility is in fact closer to the Socratic docta ignorantia than to good will.
i the condition ofthe effort to understand. Docta ignorantia qualifies
Good will s
this effort. It is more than just openness to the other, receptivity, and
acknowledgment that one does not know everything. Docta ignorantia is
determinate ignorance. More than not knowing something it knows that it does
not know it. This science of nescience prompts a medial response. Here lies the
difficulty of this position. It is not content with saying "I don't know." It is not
ethically or epistemologically subdued to the other's superiority. The knowledge
of ignorance is not passively awaiting an answer. It knows that it must ask, not
only ask the other but ask together with the other and probe the Sache with him
or her. Asking is more than waiting for answers.
As a matter of fact, asking questions is the most difficult part in the dialectic
of question and answer with the other. Answers can quickly muffle what comes
to us in dialogue and mislead us into proud knowledge. Questions, however,
mean that one must first listen. With reference to philosophy, Gadamer notes that
it "must give ear to an older wisdom that speaks in living language" instead of
confining itself by defming new concepts. He then reports that Plato said that
"this was like the good cook who knows bow to carve the flesh of wild game by
so putting the knife into the joints that be does not saw through the bones."88 To
carve the bird is more difficult than to eat it; questioning is more difficult than
answering because it implies knowing about one's limits, knowing where the
bones are. Instead, of taking a shot at the Sache by answering, the humility of
84 Haos-Georg Gadamer, "Und dennoch: Macht des Guten Willens," in Text und
r
Inter elaton,
i ed. Philippe Forget (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1984), 59.
8 "Textund Interpretation," GW2, 343.
6
8 See Josef Simon. "Good Will to Understand and the Will to Power: Remarks on an
'Improbable Debate'," trans. Richard Palmer, in Dialogue and Deconstruction, ed. Diane P.
Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer, 165.
87 See GWJ, 452.
88 Gadamer, "Letter to Dallmayr," 99.
136 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding Characteristics and Performance ofthe Sub-ject 137

docta ignorantia is the questioning openness about a Sache: "Fragen heillt
Offenlegen und ins Offene stellen."89
Like the art of the good cook, humility is a Kunst. Gadamer speaks of"Kunst
des Erprobens" and "Kunst des Fragens."90 The praxis of docta ignorantia, that
is, humility, is the Kunst ofdialoguing with someone within the Sache about the
Sache. Art in the art of dialogue and att in the art of cooking, however, are not
quite the same. The cook learns his or her technique and improves over time.
Dialoguing, by contrast, is an art that does not have a beginning. One does not
learn it from scratch. Being an art, however, it leaves room for mprovement.
i One
can become better at dialoguing although one has always been able to dialogue
to some extent In this respect, the art of dialogue is like the knowledge of one's
mother tongue: if one wants one is free to learn it more thoroughly.
The structure of this Kunst is medial: the subject is neither active nor passive
but medially involved in finding with his or her partners a way to the
encompassing Saclze. Although Gadamer rejects the activity of method, he does
not subdue the subject. He writes:
DaJ3 in ihrer (der Geiste.c;wissenschaften) Erkenntnis das eigene Sein des Erkennendeo mit ins
Spiel kommt, bezeichnet zwar wirklich die Grenze der >Methode<, aber nicht die der
Wissenschaft. Was das Werkzeug der Methode nicht leistet, muB vielmehr und kann auch
wirklich durch eine Disziplin des Fragens und des Forschens geleistet werden, die Wahrheit
verbiirgt.9'
These are the last words of Truth andMethod. They clearly show that the subject
is not passive when he or she understands. Humility is not submissiveness.
The hallmark of hermeneutic humility characterized by docta ignorantia is
that it assumes that the other might be right. Hermeneutic humility prevents the
understanding subject from actively imposing his or her answer or passively
waiting for someone else's. Far from passively refraining to argue against the
interlocutor, the hermeneutically humble subject follows the lead of the Sache
and seeks to buttress his or her dialoguing partner's position for the sake of
understanding the Sache.92 In Tntth and Method, Gadamer writes about the
Platonic Stiirkermaclzen:
Dialektik besteht darin, daB man das Gesagte nicht in seiner Schwache zu treffen versucht,
sondem es erst selbst zu seiner wahren Stiirke bringt Nichtjene Kunst des Argumentierens und
i e schwache Sachc zur starken zu machen vermag,
Redens ist also darnit gemeint, die auch en
sondem die Kunst des Denkens, die Einwiinde von der Sache her stll.rker zu machen wei6.93
Gadamer does not promote cleverness. A clever speaker can strengthen any
bogus claim and win supporters for it. This is not the point. To strengthen the
other's position is not a matter of power but of service. In the context of
interpreting a difficult text, Gadamer writes: "Der Interpret hat keine andere
Funktion als die, in der Erzielung der Verstiindigung ganz zu verschwinden. Die
Rede des Interpreten ist daber nicht ein Text, sondem dient einem Text."94
Service to the Saclze is the counterpart of humility. It shows that humility is not
passive. As Gadamer stresses, the interpreter does not disappear in a negative
way. The point is not self-erasure and passivity but the hermeneutic effort
consisting in the promotion of the Sache.
It is important to note that humility is based on otherness, not similarity.
Dostal notes a difference between the Kantian respect for the other "derived from
the respect for the law and the fact that the other bears the law within himself or
herself'95 and the relation to the other in dialogue. The Kantian respect for the
other is rooted in similarity: everyone has the same law within. In hermeneutics,
however, one does not value the other because ultimately he, she, or it is
ultimately the same as oneselfbut precisely because of the otherness. The stress
on otherness together with the medial interpretation of hermeneutics manifests
a crucial facet of the subject's performance within the event of understanding.
There is always the danger in the relation to otherness to assimilate it to oneself
and thus ultimately not to respect it in its difference. Gadamer is well aware that
the event of understanding entails the risk of absorbing the other. Far from
canceling the difference of the other, however, the hermeneutic subject upholds
it in the medial play ofunderstanding.96 Again, upholding the other's difference
does not imply self-erasure. This is not humility. Gadamer speaks of"abhebende
Aneignung," of appropriation by foregrounding: "Es gilt, der eigenen
Voreingenom.menheit innezusein, damit sich der Text selbst in seiner Andersheit
darstellt und damit in die Moglichkeit kom.mt, seine sachliche Wahrheit gegen
die eigene Vormeinung auszuspielen."97 The medial task of being intimately
aware (innesein) of one's preconception foregrounds otherness and is a service
to the truth, allowing a Sache to precipitate for a while into a different (self-)
understanding. The hermeneutic subject sustains the other within the Saclze n
i
order to understand the SacJze and, ultimately, him or herself differently. This
leads to the next characteristic of the hermeneutic experience: nonegocentric self­
knowledge.
For philosophical hermeneutics understanding, not perception, makes up our
relation to the world. The subject does not perceive objects in the world but
understands the world and him or herself as being medially involved in ongoing
hermeneutic processes. Understanding does not yield to the possession of some

89 GWJ, 373. 94 "Text und Interpretation," GW2, 350.

90 Ibid. 95 Robert J. Dostal, "Philosophical Discourse and the Ethics ofHermeneutics," in Festivals
91 GWJ, 494. oflmerpretation, ed. Kathleen Wright, 77.
92 See "Die Marburger Theologie," GW3, 199. 96 See "Zwischen Phllnomenologie und Dialektik," GW2, 5; see also GWJ, 305, n.230.
93 GWI, 373. 97 GWJ, 274.
138 Chap. 4: Tire Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
cognitive content. It grants insight. Gadamer opposes knowledge to insight,
stressing that the latter includes the negativity of experience, the escape from
something that bas held us captive. Being more than a piece of information about
something, it actually corrects always anew our interpretation ofour location in
the process of understanding. The subtlety is that insight relates to the question
"Where am I?" rather than "What is it?" because it implies one's coming back
from an inadequate understanding n i which one was caught. Far from being a
cognitive object, insight is a process that sheds light on the whole of what it
means to be a human being. Gadamer writes: "Einsicht ist etwas, wozu man
kommt. Aucb das ist am Ende eine Bestimmung des menschlichen Seins selbst,
einsicbtig und einsichtsvoll zu sein.'>98 It is a quality rather than a property,
something one is rather than something one has. Insight is ultimately self­
understanding.
It is important to note that the subject gains insight into him or herself in the
hermeneutic process all the while understanding a Sache. Understanding heeds
the Delphic enjoinment "Know thyself' but never eclipses the Sache or the
hermeneutic event. When Benveniste says that the subject is the seat of he
t action
expressed in tbe middle voice, this means that the subject accomplishes
something tbat encompasses him or her and accomplishes itself in him or her.
The point is that in the middle voice the subject is nearby (dabei), attending,
within. The focus is on the subject but only in so far as be or she stands under the
hermeneutic event. The middle-voice shows that self-relatedness,
Jchbezogenheit,99 is different from /chbefangenheit,100 sclf-centeredness:
understanding happens in the concretion ofthe understanding subject, in his or
her words, but only within the play of understanding. Ichbezogenheit is not
concealed egocentrism. The mediality of understanding prevents self­
understanding from being caught in the realm of the ego because it underscores
that the hermeneutic event is subject alongside and around the understanding
subject.
The stress on self-understanding reveals once more the ambiguity inherent in
Gadamer's thought. The claim that all understanding amounts ultimately to self­
understanding is evidence that he does not want to lose the particular pole of the
subject even though understanding means the elevation to a higher level of
generality that transcends the particularities of the other and oneself. The medial
balance between event and subject allows Gadamer to keep together universals
and particulars without contradiction. The self-relatedness of understanding
highlights the subject without overshadowing the event. That is what makes
understanding an adventure (Lat. advenire) and a venture ( Wagns), i something
98 GWJ, 362.
99 See GWJ, 477.
100
See "Von Lehrenden und Lernenden," GWJO, 331.
Characteristics and Performance ofthe Sub-ject 139
that happens and something we endeavor.101 The risk oftrying out something and
also oneself is the attraction of the play of understanding. As I noted in the
previous chapter, the play the player plays with others is its own subject. Thus to
play, to try out something in a game, is to be played, to be tried oneself. As
0
Gadamer writes: "Wer so versucht, ist in Wahrheit der Versuchte."1 2 The
ambivalence of versuchen and der Versuchte sein puts into focus the oscillation
between Versuch and Versuchung noted above: it shows that the subject's self­
knowledge involves the self but without him or her being self-centered.
The nonegocentric self-understanding the hermeneutic event yields to, is
rooted in Platonic anamness
i and in Aristotelian practical knowledge. Let us first
turn to anamnesis: anamnesis is the way this nonegocentric understanding of
oneself comes about Recollection is the presupposition ofthe platonic dialectical
.
mingling mythos and logos. It points to Socrates' maieutic practice that is middle­
voiced as the verb 1-uneuo,.u:n indicates. In hermeneutic terms, understanding is
not actively created. It is born - medially - within the matrix of dialogue and
language. The words belong to no one as Socrates says in Phaedrus, 90c, and no
one has the knowledge, not even the leader ofthe conversation, because it is the
logos that manifests itself in conversation and that carries all the interlocutors}03
Being born by language, one does not cognize but one recognizes. Anamnesis
means that there is no pri stine knowledge just as there is no first word.1 04
Nevertheless, it does not force one to rehearse the same thing over and over.
Recollection does not mean that one necessarily encounters something one is
already familiar with. It is not rehearsal ofthe same old things but reversal in the
process of question and answer. The dialectic of question and answer opens a
different direction of meaning in which one recognizes oneself differently.
Recollection implies new insights because one gets to grasp that which is
recollected in its essence, without the contingencies that accompany it. In
recollection takes place what Gadamer calls total mediation: the Sache presents
itself and is recognized in its full ideality. When one recognizes something, it is
different from the first time around because it is free from the contingencies of
then and now, and yet it s i the same elevating itself to ideality.105
Anamnesis underlines that the different understanding one reaches of oneself
is not caught in Ichbefangenheit. Self-understanding is not self-rumination but
i sights that come to us in the conversation that we are. We do not understand
n
ourselves differently because we actively analyze ourselves but because the
common effort to follow the alien and estranging direction ofmeaning indicated
by any Sache in the medium of language is self-related. Gadamer writes:
101 See Gadamer, "Hermencutik als praktische Philosophie," 106.
102 GWJ, 112.
103 See GWI, 373f.
104 See "Rhetorik, Hermencutik und ldeologiekritik," GW2, 237.
105
See "Dichtung und Mimesis," GW8, 83f.
 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding Characteristics a11d Performance ofthe Sub-ject 141
140
knows to some extent. It contains models, rules, and laws, but they are not set in
Diesc aus dem Mythos geschOpfte, aber hochst rational gemeinte Wiedererinnerung ist nicht our
die der einzelnen Seele, sondem immer die des >Geistes der uns verbinden mag< uns, die ein
-
stone. In the realm of O:v8pwm:uoJ.!ttt., laws are not unchangeable. Gadamer
GesprAch sind. Im-Gespr!!cb-Sein heillt abcr Ober·sicb-hinaus-Sein, mit dem Anderen denken gives Aristotle's example of the variability ofeven the natural law: someone who
und auf sicb zurilckkonun.en als auf einen anderen.106 is predisposed to be right-banded may work on his left hand until he or she is

Gadamer is not interested in the metaphysics of the ideas, which grounds the
e
ambidextrous. Genetics is anoth r example: the so-called genetic determinism is
only half of the story because the way we treat ourselves affects which genes are
notion of recollection. He only keeps the structure of recollection as a way to
turned on. The middle-voiced particularity of practical rules and laws is that their
understand understanding. Being linguistic, recollection is always a corporate
application in particular cases amends them. This "productivity of the particular
process that happens to us as we do it and that we do as it happens to us. It is not "112 .
case has d eeper 1mp1"1cattons than the craftsman's modifications of his plan
.
determinism because we are human beings (avepwneuo�et\, a middle voice),
due to the contingencies of its realization. The external relation to a blueprint of
that is, because of the linguisticality of our being.
something one constructs has no place here because of the interplay of the rule
The other root ofnonegocentric self-understanding 1 mentioned is Aristotelian
and the context. The complexity ofparticulality entails that seeking what is right
practical knowledge. Gadamer's retrieval of this "other kind of knowledge," as
means to be fully involved within one's situation. One cannot formulate what is
he likes to call it following the Nicomachean Ethics,101 plays a key role in the
right in the same way one draws the plan for a machine because one knows what
development ofphilosophical hermeneutics. Bernstein says that "understanding,
"108 is right only in the situation that asks of us what is right. From a medial point of
for Gadamer, is a form ofphronesis, and Ting-Kuo Chang writes: "In der Tat
view, the distinction ofpractical knowledge is the subject's location within the
bildet eben diese praktische Philosophic das Kernstilck der Herrneneutik."109
11 process of seeking what is right in the light of general laws that obtain and apply
Gadamer himself calls <pp6vT)ot<; "die hermeneutische Gnmdtugend selbst." 0
in and through their being used in concrete situations.
This tenor confirms the medial interpretation ofhermeneutics because it contests
Second, practical knowledge is more than its Latin translation prudentia
the domination of active doing by promoting the understanding of the
suggests: it is not purely deontolological because its pondering the means not
encompassing and underlying conditions of human activity in general and of
only aims at an end but also updates it. Unlike technical knowledge, which
scientific activity in particular. 11 1
receives its specific ends from the particular demands ofthe current situation and
The specificity of practical knowledge lies in its distinction from technical
thinks for the most part only about their technical feasibility, practical knowledge
knowledge although at ftrst it seems to resemble it when compared to theoretical
concerns right living as a whole. Since the end of right living resists a
knowledge. Unlike theoretical knowledge, which is modeled after mathematics,
determinate definition and unfolds as one strives for it, practical knowledge must
concerns itself with the immutable, and is oriented toward proofs, practical
constantly assess and revise its aim and its means according to the situation. The
knowledge and technical knowledge guide the subject's actions and contain the
combination o f and oscillation between ends and means characteristic of
task of application so central to hermeneutics. In both cases there is a preceding
<ppOVT)<nc; points to the involvement of the subject in the experience of seeking
knowledge that must. be advisedly applied in concrete and changing situations
to live rightly and of seeking understanding. Gadamer speaks of unaujhebbares
without being necessarily proved. This resemblance, however, is only superficial.
Mitsichzurategehen, an unrelenting consulting oneself and deliberating with
Although application is key in both the technical and the practical knowledge,
oneself. <I>p6v11o�c; keeps working on itself; it never actually knows. It is the
practical knowledge is no "tCXVfJ· The subject does not actively plan what he or
experience of a ceaseless getting to know oneself within changing situations. It
she is and does. Humans are not their own artisans, they do not dispose of
themselves in the same way the craftsman fashions the "medium" through which
is not about something, it is not even a means of going about something.

he expresses himself.
<I>p6vT]o�<; happens within something. The context - a context which keeps
writing itself - of practical knowledge makes sense in the light of practical
Gadamer notes three major differences between technical and practical
knowledge, but it also shapes practical knowledge and the way practical
knowledge. First, practical knowledge is not learned and cannot be forgotten like
knowledge makes sense of it.
technical know-how. It is a knowledge that implies itself, that one always already
Third, the self-knowledge ofpractical knowledge has a unique relation to the

106 "Destruktion und Dekonstruk1:ion," GW2, 369.
1 07 See GWJ, 27, 322; also "Ober die Planung der Zukunft," GW2, 162.
108 Bernstein, 146.
109 Chang, 99.
1 10 "Probleme der praktischen Vemunft," GW2, 328.
111
See, for instance, "Replik zu >Hermcneutik und Ideologiekritik<," GW2, 251.
self: it is not egocentric, but it involves the self in so far as it belongs to the
.
medial event of understanding. It implies my belongingness to the other and to
the situation the other and I are in. To be street smart, to find one's advantage in
12
1 GWJ, 44.
142 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
every circumstance, and always to find a way out like the rumble cat landing on
its feet after every fall, is not to be q>p6n�-toc;. Practical knowledge is no
tecbnique actively and externally applied to oneselfand to the other like any of
the martial arts that teach bow to tum aroWld the energy of the assailant in order
to use it against him or her for one's own sake. <I>p6vrtcnc;, this other kind of
knowledge, means to want right, not to seek one's advantage: it is not about me
although it involves me and efforts on my part. The q>p6vq.toc; is trying his or her
best within a situation that encompasses and carries him or her together v.ritb
others. In medial terms, it means that one knows that one is not subject alone and
that one partakes in and of the process of which one is the seat
Aristotle's ethics is particularly interesting to Gadamcr because moral action
has a structural affinity with Wlderstanding. Practical knowledge and
understanding have the medial character ofplay which relativizes the distinction
between subject and object by stressing that the process is its own subject
encompassing the subject. TI1e playing subject is not the master ofthe game since
the game happens to him or her, yet be or she can become better at it by practice
and tllerefore affect its process. Like play which varies within its rules, practical
knowledge and understanding are ongoing events which keep changing within
limits.
It is important to note that if one only stresses its variability and not its medial
variability, the self-knowledge of practical knowledge leads to relativism.
Meaning, however, is not relative. It is relevant. Relative meaning depends on the
situation: anything goes as long as the situation permits it. It makes the subject
passive because the context imposes meaning. Relevant meaning, by contrast, is
not only relative to the situation, but it also medially involves the Wlderstanding
subject. It intimates the application of meaning and not only its external
characterization. Relevant meaning does not only relate to and depend on the
context, but it has a relieving aspect like the right word that puts a provisional
end to one's stammering in the quest for meaning. It is relative to some extent
because we do not make it relevant but find its c01mection to our situation. The
difference is the involvement of the subject. Relevant meaning is different from
relative meaning, just as flying is different from being suspended in the air. It lets
the subject grasp the situation which grasps him or her and make the best of it.
Relevance Wlderlincs that hermeneutics and practical philosophy not only
presuppose a lot but also that the subject acknowledges it and works with it The
subject's potential diligence, however, does not mean that he or she is active. He
or she does not make meaning happen at his or her discretion. The hermeneutic
nihilism for which one meaning is worth as much as the next one has no place
here. Meaning is not arbitrary. Gadamer rejects Paul Valery's "Mes vers ont le
sens qu'on leur prete.''113 Instead, he speaks of "Daseinsrelativitat" due to the
113
See GWJ, 100, n. 183.
Characteristics and Performance ofthe Sub-ject 143
1
linguisticality of our condition.' 4 Language is the speculative medium in which
the world represents itself to us. It is absolute because it always already
encompasses our knowledge of the world and ourselves, and yet it does not
determine it. Thus, the q>pOV\1-!0c; who is in the process ofWlderstanding that be
or she is also subject does not seek actively to clear the table to make space for
his or her understanding because he or she is aware that the table is in a room
which is in a house, which is in street, etc. On the one hand, his or her awarenes �
of relativity does not cancel relativity because the subject is not active; on the
other, relativity alone does not amount to relevance because the subject is not
passive.
The actuality of practical knowledge for philosophical hermeneutics is its
medial implication. The description of self-knowledge based on Aristotle's ethics
points to the medial balance between process and subject in understanding. The
ultimate Sache of this knowledge is oneself. This Sache is not an object one has
but something one is - is in the verbal, not essential, meaning of "to be." As
Gadanler says, we and what we know of ourselves is the content of the moral
knowledge: we know ourselves as acting and our knowledge thereof guides our
1
acting.1 5 Self-knowledge does not mean active self-possession but the event of
knowing oneself within the Sache one attempts and is tempted to Wlderstand. As
noted, self-knowledge is not about us, but it involves us. It is not an object but an
event. Gadarner writes:
Alles Verstehen ist am Ende Sichverstehen, aber nicht in der Weise eines vorgangigen oder
immer nur
schlieBlich erreichten Selbstbesitzes. Denn es verwirlclicht sich dieses Sichverstehen
im Verstehen einer Sache und hat nicht den Charakter einer freien Selbstverwirklichung. Das
Selbst, das wir sind, besitzt sich nicht selbst. Eher konnte man sagen, daB es sicb geschieht.116
As we saw in the discussion of fusion of horizon(s), this knowing rearranges
itself more than it increases since one understands differently rather than more
or better. Of course, we gain knowledge, but as finite and historical beings
involved in the medial process of Wlderstanding we are subjected to
forgetfulness. Forgetfulness is not a deficiency but a condition of renewal: it
allows one to see things in a new light. Forgetfulness is the way language and
history happen to us: we speak best when we forget that we do, 117 and history
118
carries us more in our being forgetful of it than in our remembrance of it
Forgetfulness highlights our mediality and our involvement in language and
history as well as the variable character of the nonegocentric self-knowledge.
The next feature of the hermeneutic experience I want to exarrune in order to
draw a picture of the subject within the event of understanding is hermeneutic
11
4 See GWJ, 453-456.
1 15
SeeGWJ, 3 19f.
116
"Zur Problematik des Selbstverstiindnisses," GW2 , 130.
117
See ''Text und Interpretation," GW2, 342.
118 See"Die Marburger Theologie," GW3, 201f.
 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
144
consciousness. As usual, Gadamer is not after a strict definition. He wants his
concepts to speak in the interwovenness ofliving language because their meaning
defines itself in context. His way of letting words speak for themselves allows
him to maintain the term "consciousness" despite Heidegger's criticism that it is
metaphysical. 119 Particular uses ofwords become fixed, but language- n i cluding
philosophical parlance - terminates, so to speak, terminological rigidity by
releasing concepts back into the flow ofnew usages in different contexts. What
counts for Gadamer with reference to consciousness is that it is not a res or a
thing. 120 His use of it intimates the subje<;t's medial involvement. Consciousness
is not something present and static that can be had. Far from metaphysical
presence or self-presence, it bas nothing to do with the subject being self­
transparent and better grasping him or herself.121 As Gadan1er says in one ofhis
most famous phrases: consciousness is more being than being conscious.
Consciousness is something we are, a process that keeps changing. This dynamic
aspect corresponds to the emphasis that understanding is a linguistic event, and
it corroborates the medial interpretation focusing on the relation between the
subject and the verb.
Gadamer's intention in using consciousness is not to restore the subject as the
basis of understanding. On the contrary, he aims at the limits of consciousness
which is always underway within a horizon that linllts and prompts
understanding. The limitedness of consciousness manifests itself in the famous
wirkungsgeschichtliches BewufJtsein, "the consciousness of the effect ofhjstory."
The issue for Gadamer is to think together something we do and something we
undergo. The danger ofthe term consciousness is its reflexivity and its propensity
to elevate itself above that of which it is conscious. Without denying reflexivity,
however, Gadamer seeks to uphold the event, that which happens, against the
activity ofan ultimately infinite consciousness. He seeks to consider a reality that
limits the power ofreflection without reducing it to a passive entity. That reality
is history, the linguistic process of making sense ofhistory. Here, too, the fruitful
ambiguity ofGadamer's thought comes to the fore: he affirms consciousness but
never above the mediation ofpast and present. The consciousness of the effect
of history is the event of letting and making part of the past speak to us
meaningfully. We do not know history from outside, we arc never next to history.
We are always already within it, and we encounter it when it speaks to us by
itselfand aided by us. Gadamer stresses that we are more than a link in the chain
of history because we have the possibility to understand ourselves always anew
no matter what dawns on us in and through traditions. To paraphrase Gadamer,
1 19 und
See "Zwischen Phiinomenologie und Dialektik," GW2, !Of. and "Destruktion
Dekonstruktion," GW2, 365f.
120
See Gadamer, "Letter to Dallmayr," 100.
121
See Gadamer, "Hermeneutik als praktische Philosophic," 97f.
CharaCJeristics and Performance of the Sub-ject 145
the c�n�ciousness o� the effect of history means to partake not only ofhistory but ·
also m It Gadamer ts very clear about this ambiguity:
lch nenne das >";irku_ngsgeschicbtliches Bewu�tsein<, wei! ich damit einerseits sagen will, daB
_
uns�r Bev.:uBtsem wukungsgeschichtlich bestunmt ist, d.h. durch ein wirklicbes Geschehen
bestimmt tst, das unser BewuBtsein nicbt frei sein Ia6t im Sinne eines Gegeniibertretens
_
g�genilber der �ergangenhe�t. U�d ich meine andererseits aucb, dall es gilt, ein BewuBtsein
d1eses Bewtrktsems muner Wieder m uns zu erzeugen -so wie ja aUe Vergangenheit, die uns zur
Erfahrung kommt, uns notigt, mit ihr fertig zu werden, in gewisser Wei se ihre Wahrheit aufuns
zu tibernehmen.122
For ?z"o?d�, th� n����n of the c�nsciousness of efficient history contains "une
subtile equivocite. He explams Ia notion d'rme conscience du travail de
l 'histoir� in terms of the subjective and objective genitive. Although this
explanat1?n te�ds to separate what the German expression holds together, and
_ on the notion of genitive, which is only implicitly present
�though It capttahzes
m the German expression as Grondin himself notes elsewhere, 124 it shows well
the ambiguity inherent in the wirkungsgeschichtliches BewufJtsein. Grondin
argu�s that,_ on the one hand, our consciousness is the "product" of history in a
qua�1 Marxt�t sense. The genitive is subjective in this instance: history is the
subject, and It effectuates, produces, our consciousness. On the other hand the
geniti�e in "�he c�nsciousness of efficient history" is also objec�ive:
conscwusn�s IS subject,_ and it explicitly elaborates itself in terms of being
_
:-vorked by histo�. Grondm pomtedly adds that this activity of the consciousness
1s not boundless: It leads to a clarification of our hermeneutic situation, but it also
�a r� the limits of consciousness due to our finitude. His interpretation
htghhghts the role of the subject in the event of understanding: the double
meaning of the objective genitive (reaching a clearer picture of our hermeneutic
si_tuation an� beco�ng aware ofour limits) shows that the subject works within
h1s�ory, earned by It and encouraged by his or her consciousness of being carried.
Th1s subtil� equivocite underlines the subtle balance of the subject and the
encompassmg process, of Wissen and Wirkung.125
The force of the expression wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewuj3tsein is that it is
able to hold together what tends to present itself as a situation ofeither/or. The
medi�l interpre�tion, allow_ing for nonexclusive subjects, underscores precisely
that: �� �enders m _one notion the complex unity of event and subject. From
Gro�dm s exp�anation we gather that the subject is neither active norpassive, but
prectsely m�dtal_: he o� she IS_ empowered, not paralyzed, by being limited and
acknowledgmg It. This empowerment, however, does not put the subject in
charge because for Gadamer the consciousness of being limited and conditioned
22 . . d
1 "D.1e Kontlnmtat er Geschichte
· und der Augenblick der Existenz," GW2' l42f .
123
Grondin, L 'un.iversalite de /'hermeneutique, 174.
124 ·
S ee Grondin, "La conscience du travail de l'histoire et le probleme de Ia verite en
henneneutique," 220.
125
See G WJ, 346.
146 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
does not cancel limitedness. "Das BewuJ3tsein der Bedingtheit hebt die
Bedingtheit selbst keineswegs auf."126 For instance, the modem consciousness of
language, the fact that unlike the Greeks we have a word designating language,
by no means obliterates linguisticality. Language is still at its best when it goes
unnoticed since we are conversation and inhabit our words instead of wielding
them like tools. 127 Although we name language, our power is still immanent in it;
we do not lord over it. This immanence does not signify some rigid encasing, but
it denotes the medial play oflanguage and its volume in which we are involved,
partaking in and of it.
The ambiguity of limitation as an encompassing condition of possibility that
empowers us to understand leads to the last element I want to consider: reason
in the hermeneutic process. Reason is neither the Enlightenment's absolute
criterion of truth against the fetters of tradition nor speculative idealism's
culminating and absolute point ofarrival. The only absolute aspect of reason lies
in its relation to language, which is absolute in the sense that we have to let the
world be told to ourselves. Gadarner has no illusion about reason: he even notes
that reason itself is not immune to bribes! Today's society in fact capitalizes on
this weakness. Advertisements are only one example of how some peop le make
use of the discrepancy between the actual dependency of judgment and the
enlightened rational picture we have of ourselves . 128 Advertisements lead us to
believe that we are in charge when we are not. This appraisal serious ly
compromises the active power ofreason. Gadarner, however, is no pessimist, and
his position is too medial to think about reason as if he could separate himself
from it. Reason is a process whose en lightenment is its consciousness that it
never will be fully enlightened and whose task is to remember this limitedness.
Reason is not in charge although it likes to think so, and particularly it is not
above language ; we are not actively manipulating words to label our thoughts;
individual languages are not rational fallouts, so to speak. Thinking is itself a
medial process that happens as much as we are its subjects because it does not
escape the linguisticality of understanding in general. When reason appears to
judge language, this rational critique in fact does not relativize the claim that
whatever is understandable is in language. Being itself linguistic, it does not
discredit linguisticality but only affects the opinions that circulate in a given
language. "Die Sprache ist die Sprache der Vemunft selbst"129 writes Gadamer.
The point is that the universality ofreason is the universality oflanguage because
language is the medium not by, but in which reason takes place.
The relation of thinking to speaking indicates that reason is not superior to
language but goes band in hand with it. To articulate this intimate relation,
126 GWJ, 452.
127 See "Mensch und Sprache," GW2, 148.
128 i den Geisteswissenschaflen," GW2, 42.
See "Wahrheit n
129
GWJ, 405.
Characteristics and Performance ofthe Sub-jeer 147
Gadamer refers to Plato's description ofthe nature of thinking as an ongoing and
never-ending dialogue with oneself that happens within language. He writes
about Platonic dialectic:
Dialektik ist die Kunst, ein Gesprilch zu ftihren, und das scbliel3t die Kunstein, dies Gesprlicb mit
sich selbst zu fuhren und der Verstii.ndigung mit sich selbst nachzugeben. Sie ist die Kunst des
Denkens. Das aber bedeutet die Kunst, nach dem zu fragen, was man eigentlich mit dem meint,
was man denkt und sagt. Man begibt sich damit auf einen Weg. Besser: man ist damit auf einem
I30
Wege. . . . Denken weist stets iiber sich hinaus.
Thinking is not the monologue of reason. Soliloquizing intimates that one person
is in charge of what is said. This monopoly is illusory. The compounds
"monologue" and "soliloquy" are oxymora in the light of Iinguisticality.
Although I can speak to myself, it remains that any word I use even to myself
ushers me wi lly-nilly into a community of speakers who do not let me speak
alone. Thus, to equate dialectic and thinking underlines that thinking is not an
activity in full possession of itself Although it is a Kunst (from kOnnen, "to be
able to"), although thinking is the ability of interrogating one's thoughts and
utterances, it is not one's beginning a joumey but one's journeying. The initiative
to take on a path does not belong to the rational subject alone because he or she
is always already underway within the linguistic medium.
Thinking is a process that happens to the rational subj ect since it is an ongoing
journeying rather than his or her initiating one. With reference to logos, Gadarner
notes that dialectic befalls the thinking person. It is in tltis mx8o� that that which
is makes itself known. The same applies to nous, a notion closely related to l.ogos.
Humans "have" reason, but this "possession" denotes alertness to being, not
control over reason:
Gcwill ist es erst recht eine Auszeichnung des Menschen, Nous, Vemun:ft zu >haben<. Wer >Nous<
nicht bat, der ist nicht bei Sinnen, nichtbei Verstande, nicht im Besitzseinergesunden Vemunft.
Aber was ist das filr ein >Besitz<? Gerade nicht ein Arsenal verfilgbarer Waffen, Werl<zeuge,
Wissenschaften und Worte, sondem die Wacbheit des Gewahrens und Inneseins dessen, was ist,
des Seins selber, wiees allem Gebrauch von Waffen, Werlo..eugen, Wisseoschaften und Worten
vorausliegt.131
The medial wakefulness ofbeing aware of and intimate with being and not the
active use of weapons, tools, sciences, and words describes reason. This being
awake is found both in Greek theoria and in practical life. Gadamer notes that
Aristotle considered it the highest human possibility and used it to describe what
the divine is like: constantly awake and present to itself.132 He coined evepye�cx
to characterize the essence of this being. It means Bewegtheit, "the being of
motion," not Bewegung, "the motion itself." Closer in meaning to working,
130 "Selbstdarstellung Hans-Georg Gadamer," GW2, 502.
131 "Rationalitllt im Wandel der Zeiten," GW4, 25.
132 Sec, for instance, "Heidegger und die Griechen," GWJO, 43 and "Pb.anomenologie
Henneneutik, Metapbysik," GWJ0, 108. See also Grondin, Introduction a Hans-Georg Gadamer :
140-145 and Risser, 169-172 on vigilance.
148 Chap. 4: The Peiformance ofthe Subject within the Event of Understanding
running, flowing, or functioning than to moving or laboring toward a fixed goal,
it is not a measurable motion but self-motion like play which is its own subject
and has its telos in itself. Combining movement and absence of movement, its
contrary is not immobility but potential power (ouva).nc;;). In relation to thinking,
evepyew: brings to language the event character of reason as wakefulness or
alertness. The process of thinking is different from the state of self-presence or
self-consciousness. It is the questioning wakefulness in different worlds that
become as we search for the right words. It is where wording means "worlding."
The wakeful expectation which inhabits every conversation hints at the
subject's involvement. Thinking happens and the subject thinks. He or she poses
the questions that pose themselves, he or she seeks the right words in the
encompassing linguistic medium, he or she hopes that the Sprechen he or she is
involved in will find an Entsprechen.
The subject's wakeful involvement in thinking, which is neither active nor
passive, comes to the fore in the answer Plato's Socrates gives to Meno's trick
question.133 Meno tries to entangle Socrates in a contradiction first by asking how
one can at all inquire into something one does not know and why one should
inquire if one lmows it already and, second, by asking how Socrates can claim to
teach something if there is only recollection. This sophistic use of reason is
active: it is a technique applied toward a determined purpose. It is in charge. It
does not hope to rise to the occasion to find itself within the dialectic of Sprechen
and Entsprechen, but it wants to win the other over. It speaks to an adversary to
make a point, not with a partner to question a Saclze.
In his answer to Meno, Socrates notes that reason is not passive or sluggish
but that it makes us active and enterprising. Socrates' way of thinking and
arguing, however, is not sophistically active: it is on a different - on a medial ­
plane. The response Socrates gives to Meno does not rely on arguments. It is not
on the same level as Meno's poking. Socrates mentions priests, priestesses, poets,
and other inspired people who justify their profession by saying that the soul is
in the cycle of death and rebirth. What the soul knows, it recollects from the
many places it has been. For Gadamer, the point is not the content of this myth
but its structure of thinking: the logos cannot actively refute the sophist's
argumentation, yet it is not passively resigned because it cannot win in active
terms. The mediat
ion of religious motives and philosophical thinking, the
combination of mythos and logos, articulates the mediality ofthinking. The point
is not that religious or mythical affirmations are to back up or replace a failing
argument. The point of this mythical rather than rational critique against the
vacuity of the sophist's argument is on another level: argumentation is not an
active contest opposing two contenders seeking to prove each other wrong but a
medial play in which the quest of lmowledge does not belong to any subject
alone. Reason wants to know, not to win. Its ignorance does not scare it into an
133 Plato Meno 80f.
Characteristics and Performance ofthe Sub-ject 149
aggressive show ofthe few objects it possesses but lets it discover itself within
theSache: it realizes its power to recollect, that is, it acknowledges that it cannot
rely solely on itselfand that it is not absolutely free. It realizes its mediality. With
reference to the problem of mythos, Gadamer notes that reason is more an
opportunity than a self-reliant active power:
Und hei6t das nicht amEnde und in Wahrheit dies, daB wires gar nicht sind, die die Mytheo zu
deuten vermogen, weil vielmebr die Mythen uns deuten. . . . In Wahrheit ermoglicht sich die
Vernunft nicht selber. Sie ist selbst nur cine geschichtlicbe Moglichkeit - und Chance. Sie
versteht sich selbst nicht und ebensowenig die mythische Wirklicb.keit, von der sie vielmehr
umfa.llt und getragen bleibt.134
Reason is not self-propelled. It finds itself in a medium - history, language, a
Sache - that empowers it. Neither active nor passive, it is medially involved in
the Sache it wants to understand.
As a historical possibility, reason is located within the dialectic of Gabe and
Aufgabe, "gift" and "task." Like language, it is given to us, yet we are free to
work on it. Reason's medial "freedom within" recasts the relation between reason
and tradition. The authority of tradition and the power of reason are not
necessarily in opposition. The life of traditions in fact involves the action of
reason, though often in an inconspicuous way. Gadamer writes:
In Wahrheit ist in Tradition stets ein Moment der Freiheit und der Geschichte selber. Auch die
echteste, gediegenste Tradition vollzieht sich nicht naturhaft dank der Beharrungskraft dessen,
was eirunal da ist, sondern bedarf der Bejabung, der Ergreifung und der POege. Sic ist ihrem
Wesen nach Bewahrung, wie solcbe in allem geschicbtlicben Wandel mit tiitig ist. Bewahruug
aber ist eine Tat derVernunft, frcilich eine solche, die durch Unauffiilligk:eit ausgezeichnet ist.m
Against Haberrnas who claims that tradition is a "naturwi.ichsige Substanz" that
we need to appropriate in a clever manner to break it up in favor ofreason,136
Gadamer argues for the consciousness of the effect of history and the implied
finitude of the event of understanding.137 For Gadamer there is no way of
extracting oneself from one's historical context, including traditions. This
embeddedness, however, does not imply total determination that calls for
subversion and emancipation. Traditions are not over against the understanding
subject. Just as language, they do not subjugate us. The relation to tradition is
neither passive nor active because traditions need our cultivation and preservation
to be our traditions. Their growth and unfolding involves rational and free acts
on our part, not over against but within them. As gift and task, reason is carried
by the traditions it preserves and cultivates. In this process, it not only upholds
tradition, but it also gets to lmow itself. Instead of actively uprooting itself, it
134 "Das Problem der Geschichte," GW2, 36.
135 GWJ, 286.
6
13 See Jiirgen Habennas, "Zu Gadamers Wahrheit wrd Methode," in Hermeneutik und
Ideologiekritlk, by Karl-Otto Apel, Claus v. Bormann, RUdiger Bubner, Hans·Georg Gadarner,
Hans Joachim Giegel, and Jiirgen Habermas (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971 ), 47f.
137 See "Rhetorik, Hem1eneutik und Ideologiekritik," GW2, 240.
 Chap. 4: The Peiformance ofthe Subject within the Event of Understanding
150
becomes aware that it is a historical possibility given over to itself, freeing itself
not from but within the traditions thanks to this self-knowledge.
In this section I have analyzed the perfonnance of the subject as sub-ject based
on the hermeneutic experience, openness, hermeneutic humility, nonegocentric
self-knowledge, hermeneutic consciousness, and the medial process of reason. It
bas become clear that the understanding subject is medially involved in the
hermeneutic event. As ycq.teo�-tct.t, "to get married" - the paradigm of the
hermeneutic relation - suggests, the subject is subject ofand to the process of the .
verb in and of which he or she partakes. In the remainder of this chapter, I
examine what it means to read and Gadamer's own practice ofreading in order
to further the understanding of the subject's role in the hem1eneutic event.
Hermeneutics in Operation
To ponder hermeneutics in operation, it is instructive to consid�r �e proc�ss �f
reading. Reading is more than the recognition of letters. Readmg 1s reapmg: It
nourishes who we are, it is sub-sistence, it is under-standing. In German, lesen
combined with various prefixes occurs in the context of reading and of reaping.
Gadamer writes about the verb lesen:
>Lesen< hat dabei vielfaltige Ankllinge von Zusanunenlcsen, Auflesen, Auslesen und Verlesen
wie bei der >Lese<, das heiSt der Ernte, die bleibt. Aber >Lesen< heiBt auch, was mit dem
Buchstabieren anfllngt, wenn man schreiben und lesen lemt, und wieder gibt es zahlreiche
Anklange. Man kann ein Buch aolesen oder auslescn, man kann sich einlesen, man kann
weiterlesen, nachlesen, vorlesen - und auch diese Reihe zielt auf eine Emte, die gesammelt ist
138
und aus der man sicb nahrt.
Reading is a middle-voiced reaping. It does not actively harvest objects. The
reader reaps meaning within an event in which something comes out to meet him
or her. "Es kommt heraus,"139 says Gadamer with reference to experience of art.
Es, "it," is a pronoun without a noun for which it stands; it refers to no antecedent
in the grammatical sense. As the subject of this sentence, it underlines that the
understanding subject is not the exclusive subject ofthe event of meaning. The
emphasis, however, is not only on es but also on kommt heraus, "comes out."
Reading as reaping and sub-sisting is not about objects. It is foremost a process,
a Vollzug, where something comes out and keeps showing itself. It does not show
itself once and for all. It keeps peeping in the Heideggerian mode of un­
concealment. The reader is never done reaping. He or she never has "it'' because
reading is a matter not of domination but of domesticity. Domus, the house, not
dominatio, the domination ofthe house, is the intimacy the reader reaps as he or
she reads on. With medial overtones, Gadamer puts it like this:
1 38 "Wort und Bild- >so wahr, so seiend<," GW8, 393.
139 Ibid., 384.
Hermeneutics in Operation 151
Aile unsere Erfahrung ist Lesen, ist Auslesen dessen, worauf wir gerichtet sind, und Sich­
Eiuleseu in das so artikulierte Gauze. Auch das Lesen, das mit Dichtung vertraut macht; ll!.Bt
Dasein wohnlich werden.140
Reading happens to us as we read within the direction of meaning the text tells
us, within the meaningful whole that articulates itself in the process of our
reading.
The process of reading encapsulates the performance of the understanding
subject within the hermeneutic event. For Gadamer, reading is the way we
experience anywork of art. What happens when we read particularly a literary
text is what takes place in the play of art, the hermeneutic "Paradefall."141
Although one reads best alone, reading is no more solitary than the experience
of art or the dialogue with oneself when one thinks. Its relation to language
makes it a medial event throughout. Though a process, it requires the reader's
efforts, notably because ofthe difference between the author's intention and the
meaning of the text. Far more than repeating the author's position, it is about the
Sache of the text applied to the reader's situation.142 Gadamer writes: "Der Text
bringt eine Sache zur Sprache, aber daB er das tut, ist am Ende die Leistung des
lnterpreten. Beide sind daran beteiligt."143 Just as in a dialogue, the reading
subject is not subject alone. Reader and text are not in an exclusive relation of
subject and object, but they both partake in and of the advent of meaning in
reading.
Gadamer calls reading the highest task of hermeneutics. It is reading that
overcomes the alienation due to writing. It lets/makes written words speak
again. 144 Reading is thus the process that unites writing and spealdng.145 This
unity crystallizes two crucial aspects of written language: its ideality and its
standing. First, writing is central for hermeneutics because, when written,
language reaches its full ideality:
In der Schriftlichkeit entspringt die Abgelostbeit der Sprache von ihrem Vollzug In der Fonn der
.
Schrift ist alles Oberlieferte fur jede Gegenwart gleichzeitig. In ihr besteht mithin eiue
einzigartige Koexistenz von Vergangenheit und Gegenwart, sofem das gegenwlirtige Bewulltsein
zu allem schriftlich Oberlieferten die Moglichkeit eines freien Zugangs hat.1 46
The alienation and separation of the written word from the spoken word and the
original situation of speech shows that language idealizes meaning toward certain
constants within a realm, a Spielraum, of variables and contingencies.147 Ideality
is the teleology of meaning, ofmeaning as Richtungssinn. It limits the free play
1 40 "Horen - Sehen - Lesen," GW8, 278.
141 See "Zwischen Phanomenologie und D ialektik," GW2, 5.
1 42 See Gadarner, "Hermeneutik als pra.ktische Philosophie," 91.
1 43 GWI, 391.
144 See GWI, 394.
145 See "Stimme und Sprache," GW8, 263.
146 GWI, 393.
147 See "Stimme und Sprache," GW8, 259.
152 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
of words in the realm of meaning and, therefore, grounds their communicative
function. For instance, the difference between reading handwritten texts in a
language one knows and in a language one is just learning underlines this
Spielraum and the fact that its contingencies never erase the constants: the
common language that links one to the texts whose language one knows makes
deciphering the various handwritings less ofan obstacle because one has a sense
of the direction in which the text is going.
Ideality distinguishes texts of the past from ruins. Ruins or monuments
without words remain mute for us. They do not speak to us, and the knowledge
they grant to us is fragmentary. Texts, by contrast, are not something discrete.
They bring a whole to language. Because ofthe ideality oflanguage, texts reveal
us past human life and make it current in the general relation to the world. In the
previous chapter, I noted that play reaches ideality in the transformation into
structure when in a theater play the spectators, not the actors, become the actual
players in the medial play. As Gebilde play becomes repeatable in that the Sache
and not the way it is performed comes to the fore. That is the point where it
reaches ideality. The actors and the author fade before the experience of truth that
allows us to say nothing but "thus it is." Gebilde, "structure," is the locality ofthe
play. With reference to written words, it indicates the locality of reading, its
Spielraum, where texts speak to us like no monument does. Written words are
located in a sphere of meaning whose ideality makes it accessible to everyone
who is able and willing to read.
Second, all written words do not "stand" equal. There are different types of
texts with different types of readings. A note one jots down to remember
something refers to a particular situation which it is designed to facilitate. It does
not claim to be literature. It only wants to help its author remember what it is
about. Letters are different. Although they are a kind of conversation, they
already reach a certain level of ideality because of the separation from the
correspondents. Unlike a conversation, letters do not allow us to correct ourselves
as we go along. They are more liable to abuse than the spoken word precisely
because they are written, and written words are defenseless, as Plato argued.
Some letters, however, can become literature and cease to be mere letters as, for
instance, Rilke's correspondence. In this case, the original context of
communication becomes irrelevant. This leads to what Gadamer caUs "eminent"
texts:
Dichterische Gebilde sind in einem neuartigen Sinne >Gebilde<, sie sind in eminenter Weise
>Texte<. Sprache tritt bier in ihrer vollendeten Autonomic heraus. Sie stebt fiir sicb und bringtsich
zum Stebcn, wlihrend sonst Worte durch die Intentionsrichtung der Rede ilberholt werden, die
sie hinter sich lliflt.'48
148
"Selbstdarstellung Hans-Georg Gadamer," GW2, 508.
Hermeneutics in Operation 153
It is in eminent texts that language most reveals its autonomy. Poetic language
is like the gold coins of the past:149 unlike the banknotes of today, gold coins
carried �eir value in themselves. E:ven if they lost their distinctive stamp, they
kept therr value because they were hterally worth their weight in gold. Gadamer
mentions Valery's image of the gold coins and the banknotes depicting the
difference between daily and poetic language to convey that in eminent texts
language is not just telling something but simply telling: it does not mean
something, but it is what it means.
Language shows its autonomy in eminent texts because these texts are not tied
to a particular context of communication. Eminent texts allow the reader to look
ahead toward always different understandings as he or she keeps coming back to
them instead of adhering to an original context. This infinite play is the volume
of the eminent text in which the reader dwells and listens to and for the Sache.
Gadamer notes that one cannot tell for sure if it is the increased volume of
language that turns a text into a literary one or if it is the absence of extratextual
reference in a literary text that in the first place Jets language show its full
volume. This ambiguity intimates that eminent texts are not made. They medially
become when one dwells in them, when one keeps going back to them, when one
speaks together with them, when one seeks the volume where language speaks;
they become where there is "die reine Sprachhandlung,"1so where one halts, not
in this or that, not even in the world, but in the intimacy itself within and under
which we stand for a while.1s1
The intimate moments eminent texts grant us tum certain texts into classics.
In these moments, we encounter these texts as normative. They do not tell the
readers what to do, but, as mentioned, they are telling: they interpret themselves
in every new present and allow their readers to recognize the truth of their
situation in a different light. Gadamer's thesis about eminent texts is: "Sie sind
immer erst im Zuriick.kommen auf sie eigentlich da."1s2 Eminent texts thrive in
one's coming back to them and becoming conscious that understanding them
means being medially involved in the traditions which brought the classics to us.
For the reader, the importance of returning to the eminent texts implies that the
effort ofrotelearning is valuable. Far from a mechanical or outdated exercise, to
know a text by heart allows one to hear the affinity of sound and meaning with
one's inner ear over and over again and in various ways and to dwell intimately
in it while letting it speak to one.
The autonomy of language in eminent texts means that language stands. This
standing needs qualification. Gadamer agrees with Heidegger's
phenomenological description that debunks reading a text as only reading "was
149 See "Philosophic und Literarur," GW8, 248.
ISO ''Nachwort zur 3. AuOage," GW2, 475.
lSI
See "Uber den Beitrag der Dichtkunst bei der Suche nach dcr Wahrbeit," GW8, 78.
152 "Text und Interpretation," GW2, 351.
154 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event of UnderstaiUiing
dasteht."153 The medial situation of the reader entails that he or she does not
simply read that which "stands there" because reading involves the reader. To
reveal its meaning, a text needs to be read by a reader who anticipates what the
text says and applies it to his or her situation (the verbs in this sentence should
be in the middle voice to convey that the text is not only read but also reads and
that the reader anticipates and applies not actively but carried by language, the
text, and the context). Of course, the words that stand there are important, no
doubt about it; they are the reference for the reader in his or her effort to figure
out a text's meaning; and reading happens within the limits set by them. The
words' Dastehen, however, does not mean that they stand there as if hey t were
objects at our disposal. Dastehen goes together with "es stebt geschrieben."
Gadamer mentions that Luther uses this expression in his translation of the
Bible. 154 "It stands written" confers authority to the written word. It underlines
that a text, particularly an eminent one, is normative by itselfand that it speaks
without necessary reference to any extratextual context. The authority of the
written word does not mean that words stand still, frozen forever, as soon as they
are spelled and fixed in some medium or that language speaks by itself. The
standing of written language is indicative ofthe medial presencing oflanguage.
As noted in the previous chapter, language does not replace the subject.
Language is not a metaphysical being that stands vis-a-vis tbe reading subject.
The autonomy oflanguage in texts goes hand in hand with the process of reading.
As an interlocutor that stands written, it involves a reader. Gadamer writes:
Es ist aber ein TrugschlufJ, wenn man solche Prasenz von der Sprache der Metaphysik aus als
die Gegenwlirtigkeit des Vorhandenen oder vom BegrifJd er Objektivierbarkeit aus verstehen will.
Das ist nicht die Gegenwtirtigkeit, die dem literarischen Werk zukommt, ja, sie kommt iiberhaupt
keinem Text zu. Sprache und Schrift bestehen immer in ihrer Verweisung. Sie sind oicht, sondem
sie meinen, und das gilt auch dann noch, wenn das Gemeinte nirgendwo sonst ist als in dem
erscheinenden Wort. Dichterischc Rede ist nur im Vollzug des Sprechcns bzw. des Lesens selbst
vollzogen, und d. h., sie ist nicht da, ohne verstanden zu sein.155
This passage highlights the mediality of reading: the standing ofthe written word
goes together with the understanding of it. It can only stand its ground, it can only
make its claim, its means only ifthere is a reader dwelling in and on it.
As a meaningful "building," language stands in the sense that it means
something to a reader who under-stands. Its standing needs our understanding.
We let ourselves enter the text, we are in it, as we are medially in language. In a
passage reminiscent of his daughter's remark that she is in a word (drinsein im
WorteY�6 only when she forgets how to spell it, Gadamer writes about reading
poetry:
IS)
GWI, 274.
154 "Stimme und Sprache," GW8, 262.
155 "Text und Intet pretation," GWZ, 356.
156
See "Sprache und Verstehen," GW2, 198.
Herme1reutics in Operation 155
Man ko �t immer tiefer �ein, j.e mehr Beziige von Sinn und Klang einem ins Bewu.Otsein
�e�en.Wrr_ a
l ssen de� Text mcht hinter uns, sondem lassen uns in ihn eingeben. Wir sind
dann
m ihm darm, so wteJeder, der spricht, in den Worten, die er sagt, darin ist und sienicht
in einer
Distanz halt, wie sie fur den gilt, der Werkzeuge anwendet, sie nimmt und weglegt.ts7
Reading is reminiscent ofDarstel/ung in a theater play and of the transfonnation
into Gebilde: just as a play does not play without the public but in fact involves
�be spectators and �rns them, not the actors, into the ones who actually partake
m and of the Sache It conveys, reading does not build an independent reality
but
represents � Sac_he which plays i�sel� in the reader who is reading. The building
of the Gebzlde m the act of readmg Implies the action of the subject within the
words he or she is reading, even in the case of poetry which is what it means like
the gold coin is its value.
Far �om constricting the reader, the ideality and the standing of language
�avor.hl� or her �e�om. Although reading and the understanding it implies are
�mgmst1� a�d h1stoncal processes always taking place in traditions, the subject
tS fr eeWltht� hemb�ause of the nature of writing. The wil l to preserve
. : and ltterature is about understanding a Sache that
mottvates wntmg in one's situation
and �etting it be beard by others. It is as different from amassing documents in
archives as the �vent oftruth in a dialogue is different from testifying in a trial.
The hermeneutic value of writing is not that it can record the truth and make it
available more easily. Writing is not simply oral language's crutch. It is rather
�here language. rev�ls itself most. Writing shows that language medially
t�volves the subJect m the understanding of aSache. The effort of writing may
atm at the conservation of tradition, but above all it promotes the Sache into a
level of ideality where it potentially speaks to every reader. A text is not its
author's vo!ce; it is its own or: better, that of the Sache that comes to language
wbe� there 1s �omeo�e to read tt. Gadamer closely relates the ideality oflanguage
part1c�larly m wntten fonn and the sovereignty of the understanding
consc10usness:
In der Schrifllichket
i gewinnt die Sprache ihre wahre Geistigkeit, denn der scbrift.licben
�berlt�fe�g geg�ni.iber is� das verste�ende BewuBtsein in seine volle Souvemnitiit gelangt.
Es
hangt n
� semem Sem von mchts ab. So tst das lesende BewuJ3tsein
im potentiellen Besitz seiner
Gesc�cht
t Lese
e. . . ·.�d� BewuJ3tsein ist notwendig geschichtliches und mit der geschichtlicben
Oberlieferung lD Freihett kommuniziercndes Bewul!tsein.u8
These are stron.g words in favor of the freedom of the subject. Writing is crucial
for henneneuncs because the understanding consciousness reaches its full
so:ereignty. in relation to it. The reading subject is historical, yet, through the
. he or she is the potential owner of his or her history. Gadamer
wntten tradttton,
IS?
Ibid., 358.
158 GWJ, 394f.

156 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
even says that the autonomy of written language from its inception promotes the
reader to being the advocate ofthe truth claim oftexts.159 .
The subject, however, is not free in an active and external sense. The freedom
in question is connected with the notion of hermeneutic reason we examined
above: it has nothing to do with freedom over or from traditions or texts but
everything with medial freedom within whatever is meaningful. The middle voice
prevents the freedom of the subject to be in conflict with the standing autonomy
oflanguage. Although texts free themselves from their author and their original
context they do not become objects, but they inscribe themselves into traditions
encompassing the readers. They are part of the advent of different meanings in
new situations together with the readers. This medial process denotes that the
subject is not free to understand as he or she pleases but that be or she is medially
free to understand within the ideality of the Sache brought to language and
handed down in texts.
The reader's freedom "within" translates into the right of the reader. Gadamer
speaks of the right of the reader to follow the text toward a unity ofmeaning as
opposed to an active reading that seeks to dig up a text's depth dimensions:
ManmOge mir erlauben, bier das Recht des Lcsers zu verteidigen, der ein Gedicht liest und sich
zueigen macht. In einem solchen Falle ist Verstehen genauso strokturiert wie im taglicben
Gespriich zwischen Menschen. Ob einem etwas ins Gesicht gesagt wird oder in einem Gedicht
gesagt wird- als der Andere versucht man, die Sinn-Einheit dieses Gesagten zu vollziehen. Man
ist der Partner, der mitgeht und antwortet, oder ist der Leser eines Gedichtes, der mit dem Gedicht
mitgeht und der am Ende mitsingt. Es bleibt die erste Aufgabe einer Interpretation, dieses
Mitgehen zu rordem. Die Sinnfragmente, die eine dekoostruktivistische Hinterfragung jeder
Sinnintention aufsuchen mag, mogen allerhand Interesse verdienen, aber sievermOgen nicht das
Verstandnis eines Gedichtes als einer Sinn-Binheit zu ersetzen. Wer ctwas Gesagtes verstehen
will, will das Ganze verstehen, was einem gcsagt wird. 160
The right of the reader that Gadamer defends is a right to mediality. Reading and
understanding a poem means to follow the lead oftbe text as a whole, to go along
with it, and to further this encompassing process. It takes place within the poem
in the same way thinking happens in language. The reader is carried by the
language of the poem just as language in general carries someone seeking the
right word.
The right of the reader to be open to the whole of meaning implies what
Gadamer calls "Vorgriff der Vollkomrnenheit."161 The Gadamerian
presupposition that the basis of hermeneutics is understanding and not
misunderstanding contains already this notion. The anticipation of completeness
means that at first, when we are drawn to a text and begin to read it, we assume
1)9 See GWJ, 398.
also the
I6Q "Dichten und Denken im Spiegel von HOiderlins >Andenken<," GW9, 46f.; see
Postface to the 1" edition of Wer bin /ch und wer bist Du? entitled
"1. Das Recht des Lesers,"
GW 9 427.
6'a See GWJ, 299f. and "Vom Zirkel des Verstehens," GW2, 62f.
a
Hermeneutics in Operation 157
that it speaks the truth and that it speaks it well. This assumption happens to us
more than we assume it. It bas nothing to do with behavior. It is not good WilL
It is not synonymous with giving the benefit of the doubt. No need to be
understanding to understand! Vorgriffder Vollkommenheit signifies rather the
hold, the grasp, the grip, the Griff, the Sache has on the reader of a text that
speaks to him or her. One approaches a text in the light of one's knowledge of a
Sache and then enters into the fusion of the horizon of the text and one's own
which plays itself out between a sense of familiarity with and of strangeness
toward the Sache in question. Just as with humility, the grip of completeness does
not mean that the subject is passive. This ingredient ofthe event ofunderstanding
does not force the subject into compliance. It does not say that a text is right and
that we are wrong. The Sache grasps one long before we agree or disagree with
the way in which it comes to language in a particular text. The anticipation of
completeness only says that we are objectively (sachlich) carried when we read.
It makes possible a fusion ofhorizon(s), but it does not determine its outcome.
The anticipation of completeness underscores the fact that the right of the
reader is about understanding oneself within the Sache, "sich in der Sache
verstehen."162 Intuitively we tend to agree with the author of a text that makes
sense. We easily get the impression that we rub shoulders with him or her. This
friendly feeling ofbeing in unison with the author is, however, misleading. The
same feeling can overcome us when we read a text by someone for whom we do
not have any particular esteem or even an anonymous text because, when we
read, we meet the other, not the author. To illustrate that intimacy with a text
does not make its author our soul mate, Gadamer mentions the scare, Schreck, we
experience when we hear an author read aloud one of his or her texts we know
well.163 Such a reading is often deeply disappointing and even shocking because
no voice, not even that ofthe author, is adequate to the volume a text has for the
inner ear. In the case of poetry, Gadamer even says that its voice is only to be
heard and never to be spoken. 164 This is a clear indication that the reader meets
the text's Sache, not its author. Although the reader may agree with an author and
even like him or her, the understanding that takes place happens when he or she
is literally synchronized, contemporaneous, not with the author, but with the
Sache a text brings to our present situation.
Contemporaneity is an event, not a state. It is fueled not by simultaneity but
by distance, temporal distance in particular. 165 Distance promotes understanding.
It grants us a deeper perspective and a heightened awareness of our
prejudgments, allowing us to separate the valuable prejudgements from the
162
GW/,299.
163
See "Philosophie und Literatur," GW8, 247.
64 See "Stinune und Sprache," GW8, 267.
1
• 165
See GWJ, 304, n. 228: Gadamer changed his text Distance n
i general, not only temporal
d stance, allows for the possibility of critique due to the awareness ofone s prejudgments.
1
'
158 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
nearsighted ones. Gadamer writes that it is no overstatement to speak of an actual
productivity of this event.166 This productivity, however, is by no means
exclusive of the subject. The contemporaneity that comes about in the event of
reading remains related to the I who reads. The reader is carried by the Sache,
and be or she participates in its unfolding in his or her context. The reason for the
involvement of the subject is that understanding and interpretation happen in the
words ofthe subject: be or she does not simply repeat but is productive within the
productivity of the event. "Lesendes Verstehen ist nicht ein Wiederholen von
etwas Vergangenem, sondern Teilhabe an einem gegenwartigen Sum,"167 writes
Gadamer. Our understanding belongs to the Sache, which is meaning, within the
medium of the language that we speak and that speaks us. The line of thought is
beyond passive and active: the reader is not passively catapulted into the world
of the text, nor does he or she actively recreate the situation of the text.
Contemporaneity or to be synchronized with the Sache does not mean that there
is no distance bet\veen the reader and the Sache or that he or she overcame the
i the
gap. It is a matter ofletting tb.e distance show us the direction by dwelling n
difference instead oferasing it.
The verb that expresses the becoming contemporaneous of Sache and reader
is verweilen, "to tarry," "to linger."168 Verweilen suggests that the reader of
literary texts does not rush to the end to get "it," but he or she lets him or herself
enter the text as "it" comes out and meets the reader. We do not leave texts that
invite us to linger with the consciousness of having understood them. We are
inside them. Eminent texts in particular keep speaking with us because of their
intense volume: they let their words sound and their meaning unfold much more
freely. Gadamer writes about the volume of eminent texts:
erschOpft sich nie ganz ni den Relationen, die zwischen den
ig
Das Geflecht der Sinnbezie
Hauptbedeutungen der Worte besteben. Gerade die mitspielenden Bedeutungsrelationen, die n i
die Sinnteleologie oicht eiogebunden sind, geben dem literars
i chen Satz sein Volumen. 169
The meaningful relations between the words in an eminent text reach beyond the
words' lexical meanings. Their play, like the rich tone of a well crafted string
instrument, lets them resound with each other and with the text as a whole in
ways that go beyond a single meaning. The volume of a text, in particular the
intense volume ofpoetry, invites the reader to tarry in it and to listen more and
again to that which comes to language.
Verweilen does not consist of discrete moments succeeding each other but of
an encompassing whole with which we are contemporaneous (Dabeisein) as we
are contemporaneous with the whole of meaning dawning upon us and involving
us. Gadamer writes:
166
See GWJ, 302.
167 GWJ, 396.
168
See Risser, 199-206.
169 "Text und Interpretation,"
GW2, 353.
Hermeneutics in Operation 159
Es ist kein Nacbeinander, sondern ein Zugleich, das dem :rukommt, das die Zeitstruktur des
Verweilens besiiZt. Es ist nicht ein Verrichten von diesem und jenem, erst dies und darui das
i Sehen, im Nachdenken, im Betrachten,
sondem es ist ein Gauzes, das da gegenwartig ist, m �
das man versunken ist- oder horen wir Iieber auf die Weisheit der Sprache und sagen: »in dem
man aufgeht«.170
Reading in the eminent sense opens the volume of a text and invites the
reader/hearer into it. The tarrying in it is the fulfillment of meaning. Fulfillment
does not signify accomplishment or perfection because true meaning is an infinite
process. It rather means to fill the volume ofthe text in which we are absorbed.
The volume of the eminent text in which we linger and the whole of meaning
that arises are not steps back into metaphysics. The temporal structure of the
event of understanding has nothing to do with something present, but it is
Bewegtheit, Vollzug, evepyeta. Gadamer agrees with Heidegger's temporal
interpretation of Wesen as wesen, that is, as a verb (a Zeitwort, literally a time
word) and with his reading Weile into the Greek experience oftime.171 Meaning
is not something. As noted, meaning is meaningful orientation, Richtungssinn.
The volume of a text is not out there, it is no object that stands vis-a-vis us. The
lingering within the volume of an eminent text is oriented, though in itself. The
characteristic of this teleology lies in the location of the telos: the telos is
immanent in the process. Since this process is pursuing nothing extraneous, its
motion does not arrive. Its end is not to stop at something. 112 Gadamer's
predilection for this kind of motion echos the imagery the polysemy ofthe verb
lesen suggests: reading is reaping. It is not an active production but a quasi­
natural and springlike burgeoning of meaning that finds its counterpart in our
reaping. As with all images, however, there is a limitation due to the particular
light the image sheds. Burgeoning and reaping appear to inscribe a seasonal
succession into the event of meaning: meaning grows in the spring, and we reap
it in the fall. This picture is inaccurate. The mediality of understanding intimates
that meaning and understanding succeed together, not each other. They go hand
in hand rather than in line.
The meaning of verweilen and its medial overtones come to the fore in the
Holderlin quote "DaB in der zogernden Weile einiges Haltbare sei."173 The
distance between old and new, the separation from one's previous conception and
the openness to something new, fills the Weile, "the span of time," of arising
meaning and understanding. Gadamer paraphrases this quote in a passage where
he examines the meaning ofthe Gennan foreign word Priisenz. It comes close to
the presence or the aura of a person who fills a room just by being there or ofan
170 "Wort und Bild - >SO wahr, so seiend1," GW8 387·
171 See "Destruklion und Dekonstrulction," Gw2,' 369.
172 See Natur und Welt," GW7, 423.
"
1 73 "Ober Jeere und erfiillte Zeit," GW4, 1 53.
 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
160
actor who fills the stage even if he does not have the leading role. Priisenz is
space filling:
Prasenz beifit also etwas, was sich wie in einer Art Eigengegenwart ausbreitet, so daB das
Geheimnisvolle und Unheimliche des Vergehens der Zeit, des Davonrollens der Augenblicke im
Zeitflusse, wie angehalten st.
i Daraufberuht Sprachkunst. Sie vel'lllllg es, daB in der �uderoden
�
Weile einiges Haltbare sci. Wir lesen ja auch wirklich ein literarisches Kuns:werk mcht au das
� .
hin, was es an Information bietet, sondero werden immer wieder aufd1e Emhe1t des Geb1ldes
zuriickgeworfen, das sich immer differenzierter artikuliert.174
Priisenz as space filling contemporaneity means the self-presencing of a text's
meaning when we read it, when we make and let it speak, be it only to our inner
ear. It is like a bracket in time, a moment oflingering and tarrying where time
seems on hold for us to hold on to the Sache for a while.
der Philologe, cultivates the event ofreading in this
The hwnanist philologist,
medial sense characterized by verweilen. He or she is the friend of beautiful
words, not only because they speak beautifully but especially beca�e t?e Sache
is truly present in them like beauty in the beautiful. Instead of consldenn� a te�t
. .
to be a clue for something else, he or she opens its volume while bemg w1thm It.
He or she submits to the claim of the text and follows its lead, involved in the
event of reading:
Wie Nacbfolge mehr als blofie Nachahmung ist, so ist auch sein [des Philologen] Verstehen eine
standig neue Fom1 der Begegnung und hat selber den Charakter des Geschehens, gerade well es
kein bloJ3es Dahingestelltseinlassen ist, sondem Applikation einschlieBt. Der Philologe webt
gleichsam weiter an dem groBen, uns aile tragenden Geflecht aus Herkommen und
Oberlieferung.175
The philologist medially contributes to the fabric of tradition that carries him or
her and us all in his or her encounter with it. Reading means to let/make a text
speak again and to let it tell us the world in an ever new encounter with it.
Reading is sprechen lassen and sich etwas sagen lassen together because the
reader does not stand alooffrom but under the text's Sache he or she applies to
his or her situation.
To conclude this chapter on the performance of the subject within the event
of understanding, I want to take Gadamer himself as an example of the
philologist's medial reading. Gadamer is a humanist philologist engaged in �e
medial cultivation, the Bildung, of the human self. This process of openmg
oneself and being open to the validity of the thoughts of others176 is medial
because, as Grondin writes, "humanity is not something one already has, or some
skill one could learn once and for all, it is a sense, a direction one can only try to
cultivate."177 1t resembles the mystical notion of the soul created in the image of
174 "Horen - Sehen - Lesen," GW8, 277.
175 GWJ 343.
176
See �xcerpt of an unpublished conference paper by Gadamer quoted in Grondin,
Introduction a Hans-Georg Gadamer, 45, n . l .
177 Grondin, "Gadamer on Humanism," 163.
Hermeneutics in Operation 161
8
God humans carry in them yet constantly work on.17 Bildung, like evepye�a,
does not seek to realize an external purpose because what counts is the ongoing
and involving process, the verbal medium and not just its outcome.
Gadamer's cultivation of a human self is inseparable from his ongoing
pondering of linguisticality and his own openness to learning new languages.
Gadamer's relation to language follows a Markan paradigm: like the Sabbath,
language was made for humans, and not humans for language.179 To illustrate
humans' freedom within language, Gadamer refers to the "profound" account of
Genesis according to which God gave Adam the power to name things. 180 There
is no linguistic determinism or domination. Language is neither divine nor
diabolical: neither the reflection of a perfect realm present only to God nor an
81
instrument to dominate all there is,1 it does not completely determine the
speaker because of its mediality. Gadamer stresses that we are born into a
language which gives our world to us. As he often writes, using the middle­
voiced structure "sich lassen + infinitive," one must let the world be told to one,
sick die Welt sagen lassen.
The linguisticality of our experience of the world distinguishes us from other
living beings. Humans are not only in an environment but also have a world. At
first glance, to have a world seems to indicate that humans entertain an active and
transforming relation to the world, whereas animals are passively embedded in
theirenvironment. The distinction is, however, more subtle. Gadamer writes that
"Welt haben heillt: sich zur Welt verhalten."182 This conduct of oneself toward
the world does not separate the subject from the world. The first implication of
being born to the world by language is not that we actively transform our
environment but that we are able to have a variable linguistic perspective on the
world within the world. To use Benveniste's distinction, to have a language and
thus a world is not an external but an internal diathesis. The freedom, the
elevation or the being elevated, "Erhebung oder Erhobenheit,"183 that language
grants us is a freedom from the environment which remains within the world:
Gadamer calls it "Erhebung zur Welt."184 It does not imply that one leaves one's
environment but that one holds a freer andmore distanced stance toward it in the
medium of language. As we do not master language but speak within it as it
speaks us, so we do not master the world. The freedom we have within our
language and the freedom we have within our world are the same. The power to
name things in the world does not put us in an active position over the world
because language itself is no tool at our disposal. We are not free from the world
178
See GWI, 16.
179 See Mark 2:27.
180
See GWI, 448.
8
1 1 See GWI, 451.
182 GWJ, 447.
183
GWI, 448.
184 Ibid.
162 Chap. 4: The Perjomza1rce ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstancjing
through the medium of language, but we are free within the world's linguistic
make up for us.
Learning new languages and especially becoming more intimate with one's
own bespeak the medial freedom within language and within the world. Gadamer
himselfis a prefect example of this freedom. "In 1968, when I retired from full­
time teaching, I began a whole new life, a life oftravel."185 It s
i only then that be
traveled to America and opened himself to the Anglo-Saxon world by becoming
proficient in English. English was new to him, but he quickly became fluent
enough to be able to give lectures in English, even without a manuscript. He also
familiarized himself further with Italian and made regular trips to Naples.186 In
addition to learning new languages, Gadamer's philosophical practice and his
predilection for conceptual analyses are also a testimony to the freedom within
language. Conceptual analyses are a way ofbecoming more in tune with one's
own language.
Gadamer's humanist philology translates into what be considers to be the task
of philosophy in general. He writes:
Denn ihre Aufgabe ist, das wissen zu wollen,was man so weiB, ohne es zu wissen. Das ist eine
genaue Definition dessen, was Philosophic ist, und eine gute Beschreibung filr das, was Plato
zuerst erlcannt hat, nliml.ich daB das Wissen, wn das es bier geht, Anamnesis, ein aus dem lnnem
Heraufuolen w1d zum BewuBtsein Erheben s
i t.117
To want to know what one knows without knowing it is only possible because of
the linguisticality ofour relation to the world. Gadamer's works not only describe
the process ofphilosophy within the medium oflanguage, but they are part ofthis
process; they exhibit it. With reference to Gadamer's philosophy, Dostal writes:
"Rather than discuss philosophy directly, Gadamerhas chosen, for the most pat1,
to let the reader see a philosopher at work, that is, to let philosophy show itself
through his work"188 Gadamer's philosophy s
i hermeneutics in action, im
Vollzug, where Gadamer is at work letting the Sache show itself in the medium
of language.
Gadamer chooses to let philosophy show itself by shying away fi·om
definitions. He does not posit working definitions. Instead he Jets the meaning
grow out of the texts and the contexts. In a passage where he explains that to
continue to use Bewufttsein makes sense, he writes, "Der Zusammenbang
rechtfertigt den Sprachgebrauch."189 There is no need actively to straighten
language by hastily resorting to definitions or by making up new words. Gadamer
calls the thirst for definitions and the need to forerun or outrun language
185 Hans-GeorgGadamer, "Reflections on My Philosophical Journey," in ThePhilosophy of
Hans-Georg Gadamer, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn, 18.
1 86 See Jean Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer: Eine Biographie (Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck,
�
1999 350f.
1 9 "Der Tod als Frage," GW4, 163f.
188
Dostal, "Philosophical Discourse and the Ethics of Hermeneutics," 63.
9
18 "Dekonsttuktion und Henneneutik," GWJO, 146.
Hermeneutics in Operation 163
amateurishness. Defining terms arbitrarily and creating new words instead of
listening to the living language within the dialogue of philosophy betray the
philosophical dilettante.190
Gadamer prefers constructive deconstructions to defmitions and neologisms.
He is famous for the conceptual analyses that punctuate his philosophical
writings. He acknowledges that for a long time it has been his methodical maxim
not to tackle anything without a conceptual account.191 If we do not want
language to drive us - sich von der Sprache treiben lassen - and if we want a
solid historical self-consciousness, we must be involved in the recurring
questions about the formation of words and concepts.192 Conceptual analyses are
not synonymous with etymological research. Gadamer does not hold etymologies
in high esteem. Unlike Friedrich Engels, however, who calls the reliance on
etymologies the idealists' last trick,193 Gadamer does not reject them. For him the
danger is that far from listening to the words and their use, etymological research
becomes a contest between scholars who like nothing more than to contradict
each other.194 Gadamer also mentions that he never could accept Heidegger's
etymologies.19$ In fact be studied philology to escape the power of Heidegger' s
thought. He needed to gain a ground under his feet on which be could stand more
strongly than Heidegger.196 He found his terra fenna in linguisticality. 197
Although it is fl11l,l we do not simply stand on this ground. Its meaning is close
to Heidegger's Abgrund:
Was ist ein Abgrund? Offenbar etwas, was man nie bis zumEnde ausloten kann, oder besser, was
man nur ausloten, aber nicht erreichen kann. Darin liegt aber das andere: Der Abgrund ist ein
Grund. Aber er ist so, dafi ervor einem immer wieder in die Tiefe zuriickweicht, die doch Grund
hat'98
We may only sound the linguistic ground of our being without ever reaching it.
One way Gadamer sounds the depths of language is precisely by engaging in
conceptual analyses.
Gadamer is so fond of the history of concepts because they tell our story.
"Worte erzahlen unsere Geschichte."199 To listen to the stories of words is a form
of practical !mowledge. They let us recollect what we !mow already without
190 See, for example, "Sclbstdarstellung Hans-Georg Gadamer," GW2, 507, "Dekonstruktion
und Henneneutik," GWJO, 144, Gadamer, "Letter to Dallmayr," 99.
191
See, for instance, "Subjektivitiitund lntersubjektivitlit, Subjekt und Person," GWJO, 88.
1 92 See GWJ, 15.
193 See Friedrich Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End ofClassical German Philosophy,"
in 011 Religio11, by Karl Marx andFriedrich Engels (New York: Schocken Books, 1964; reprint,
Atlanta, Ga.: Scholars Press, 1982), 239 (page reference is to the reprint edition).
194 See "Die Vielfalt der Sprachen und das Verstehen der Welt," GW8, 344.
195 See "Heidegger und die Grieehen," GWJO, 36.
196 See "Von Lehrenden und Lemenden," GWJO, 332.
197 See "Europa und die Oikoumene," GWJ0, 273.
198 "Der eine Weg Martin Heideggers," GWJ, 427.
199 "Mythos und Logos," GW8, 170.
164 Chap. 4: The Perfonnattce ofthe Subject witlrin the Event ofUnderstanding
being aware of it. For Gadamer, we are constantly involved in this process which
is the task of philosophy, as noted, and we can become better at it. Gadamer
writes about his own experience:
Slowly I became aware that the language customarily used in Gem1an philosophy was notjust
full ofpreconceptions and prejudices, but also full of depth and significance. Gradually I came
to heed the speaking power of words, a power which still goes on speaking in every linguistic
usage and in its antecedents. In sum, the language of philosophy itselfbegan to speak again.200
Gadamer learned slowly that the concepts in use are not to be feared but that they
contain a depth of meaning to listen to and to draw upon.
Conceptual analyses are so important because of the Sprachnot that
characterizes philosophy. Unlike science that has and makes its own language to
i the same way. In
express its contents, philosophy cannot oversee its language n
philosophy, the content is not the measuring rod of the way one expresses it; it
does not warrant or forbid the metaphors explaining it to the lay person. Gadamer
writes about the situation of philosophy as opposed to the so-called hard sciences:
"Dagegen ist in der Philosophie keine solche Gegeninstanz gegen die Sprache,
in der sich das Denken vollzieht, anrufbar. Wir konnen nur innerhalb der Sprache
iiber die Verfiihrungen Herr werden, die [die) Sprache ausubt. "201 Herr werden,
"to become master," is a strong expression: philosophy is not passive within
language! It examines its own concepts to reach a deeper awareness of its
tradition and constantly seeks new directions of meaning, asking questions until
an answer dawns. Gadamer calls this "Sprachfindung."202 Because of its verbal
want, philosophy is constantly involved in the search for the right word. Of
course, it also has its terminology. These terms, however, do not have a
determined and fixed meaning. The language of philosophy has no other warrant
than the process of language itself. This circularity makes conceptual analyses
necessary, although they are never complete because language is always ahead
of the speaker and never at his or her full disposal.
It is important to note that the work on language involved in conceptual
analyses is not an end in itself. Gadamer does not seek to purify language and to
weed out ienninological equivocation. Such an attempt would betray the
mediality of hermeneutics. Meaning is like sound. It is rarely pure. As Gadamer
says, when one :filters out the harmonics from music, one destroys it. Just like the
hatmonics in music, in understanding the unsaid plays together with the said.
Gadarner writes:
So kommt es auch fUr uns nicht auf die begriffsgeschichtliche Forschung als solche an, sondern
darauf: die aus der begriff.�geschichtlichen Forschung erlembare Disziplin im Gebrauch unserer
Begriffe so zu pflegen, daB sic eine echte Verbindlicbkeit in unser Denken zu bringen vermag.
Daraus folgt abcr, daB das Ideal der philosophischen Sprache nicht die denkbar grof3te Ablosung
200 Gadamer, "Reflections on My Philosophical Journey," 2 1 .
201 "Begriffsgeschichte und Sprache der Pbilosophie," GW4, 81.
202
See, for instance, "Begriffsgeschichtc als Philosophic," GW2, 83.
Hermeneutics in Operation 165
einer terminologisch einde.utig gemachten Nomenklatur vom Leben der Spracbe ist, sondem die
Riickbindung des begriftlichen Denkens an die Spracbe und das Ganze der Wabrbeit, das n i ihr
pti!sent ist. 1m wirklicben Sprechen oder im Gespli!cb, sonst nirgends, bat Philosophic ihren
wahren, ihren our ihr eigenen Prilfstein.203
Gadamer's medial relation to language allows for efforts on language within
language. Heidegger's affirmation that what counts is not leaving the
hermeneutic circle but entering into it the right way lies behind Gadamer's
medial relation to language. He does not attempt to break out of the language of
philosophy, but to familiarize himself with it and to become freer within it. The
stress is on the medial process oflanguage. Gadamer trusts it in dialogues with.
?thers. There is no right language, no language of metaphysics or philosophy, for
mstance, but only the way we use language with others within a Sache.
Dostal is right when he writes that "Gadamer calls for faithful productivity in
his philosophical treatment ofhenneneutics."204 Faithful productivity underlines
that Gadamer's hermeneutics of trust does not lack suspicion. Far from being
passive, it combines fidelity with creativity. Gadamer upholds the tradition
history, the past, language, but he does not remain there. Traditionalism :
passivity, slavish devotion, blind faith. etc., do not do justice to Gadamer's
hermeneutics. Gadamer's trust is also a thrust: it contains a task oriented toward
the future. His interpretation of Hegel's claim that what is rational is real and
what is real is rational confirms that hermeneutics lingers on what has come
down to us, not slavishly but conscious of its freedom within it. For Gadamer,
Hegel's phrase does not mean that everything that has survived the test of time
is true without question. Although what is reasonable endures whereas what is
unreasonable disappears, our experience of it is such that we are involved in its
play, each of us in a particular way. We bold a stance, we stand in it, but we also
stand under it because we do not fully understand our location. In Gadamer's
interpretation, Hegel's phrase does not warrant passivity and inactivity. On the
contrary it formulates for each of us a task within history and everything that has
been handed down to us.205 The stress on things that have endured, Bestehendes,
may appear to hamper the possibility of innovation. Passivity lurks at the comer
if one does not keep in mind the mediality of hermeneutics. History and tradition,
however, are no supersubjects above us. They are processes that carry us as much
as we are heir
t faithful and creative subjects.
The medial process that manifests itself in Gadamer's philosophical texts
com� to th� fore with equal strength in his way of reading poetry. His way of
readmg emment texts shows the reader's performance within the event of
meaning. The texts where Gadamer devotes himself to literature are for the most
part in volume nine ofthe collected works. Its title is significative: "Hermeneutik:
203
Ibid.' 90f.
204 Dostal, Philosophical Discourse and the Ethics of Hermeneutics 64;
" "
205 U:
See "Hegels Philosophic und ihre Nachwirkung bis heute," chap. Ver lwiftim Zeitalter
der Wissenschaft, 51 f.
 Chap. 4: The Peiformance of the Subject within the Event of Understanding
166
im Vollzug," that is, hermeneutics in action as evepyela, as a process that holds
its end in itself and, therefore, does not reach its end by stopping. In this
collection of articles, Gadamer does not turn the texts he reads into objects, but
he seeks to serve the event of meaning so as to partake in and of it: "Hier ist
meine Absicbt allein, dem Vollzug zu dienen, durch den Dichtung zum Partner
eines nachdenk.lichen Gespriichs zu werden vermag. "206
Reading poetry and reading philosophy share a great deal. Gadamer is
convinced that "zwischen der Sprache der Dicbtung und der Sprachfindung des
philosophischen Gedankens eigenttimliche Faden bin und her laufen."207 First,
there is a parallel between the wisdom of the poet's stammering- in particular
Holderlin's208 - and the Socratic docta ignorantia because o f the verbal straits
branding both. Poetry and philosophy are both involved in the search for
language and the right word. Gadamer quotes a passage where H5lderlin
describes what one could call the poet's eternal virginity.209 The poet is so
(begriffen) by the sound of his or her sensation that he or she sees the
grasped
world as if for the first time and that everything is ungrasped (unbegriffen),
undetermined. What counts at that moment is that the poet lets language happen
without recurring to the previously known ways of speaking. The search for
language does not imply that one forgets past knowledge. What counts is not to
delete what one knows but to open oneself and to listen to the event oflanguage
in the search of words. The mediality of this process is obvious because the
subject's perfonnance is not canceled in the event Holderlin's stammering
epitomizes what speaking is for all of us. Gadamer writes about Holderlin:
Was fiir ihn Sprechenwar, ist vielleichtdie Urform von Sprechen Uberhaupt. Sprechen ist Suchen
des Wortes. Finden des Wortes ist wohl immer schon cine Beschrtinkung. Wer wirklich zu
jemandem sprechen will, tut cs im Suchen der Worte, weil er an die Unendlicbkeit dessen denkt,
was einem zu sagen nicht gelingt - und was gerade dadureh, da6 es einem nicht gelingt, im
Anderen anzuklingen beginnt.110
Like Socrates who said that "It is not my word, whatever I say"21 1 and who knew
that the logos happens in dialogue, the poetic I also does not claim exclusivity in
the search for the right word. Gadamer stresses the ambivalence of the poet's
saying "I." The poet stammers: be or she is not master over his or her inspiration
and creation because language carries him or her as it does all ofus, including the
philosopher.212
Second, the mediality oflanguage manifests itself in poetry and in philosophy.
i self-contained: language reveals itself in full autonomy n
As noted, a poem s i the
200 "Vorwort," GW9, v.
207 Ibid.
208
See "Die Gegenwlirtigkeit Holderlins," GW9, 40.
209 See GWI, 474.
210
"Die Gcgenwli.rtigkeit Holderlins," GW9, 41.
21 1
See "Yom Anfang des Denkens," GW3, 393.
212 See "Holderlin und George," GW9, 241-244.
Hermeneutics in Operation 167
Gebilde of eminent texts. In a poem, language can most be itself: it stands by
under-stand. Gadamer uses a physical image to express the
itself and lets us
magic of words in poetry.213 A poem provides space to the words' gravitational
force and gives itself to it. It trusts the power of words and entrusts itself to it
unlike our daily use oflanguage where grammar and syntax regulate and tame the
power of words. As space, poetry is three-dimensional. Gadamer says that poems
evoke plastic art or the interplay of sounds in music rather than two-dimensional
drawings. They follow language, the interplay of the words' various facets and
sounds instead ofbeing bound to the linearity oflogically constructed arguments.
More than anything else they bring out that the medium oflanguage is a volume
- a volume that is not necessarily loud, although poetry weaves into a whole not
only meaning but also sound. A poem reminds one that a text has a texture, that
like fabric it can be smooth, rough, thick, thin, etc.
The volume that a poem opens is ajar in philosophy. Although philosophical
texts are not poems, they also manifest the medium of language because of their
reliance on the power of words. A single philosophical text, however, does not
do what a poem does. It is not self-contained but is part of ongoing and incessant
dialogues. It is a road sign in the process of philosophies, waiting to be left
behind by the next one. What poems do in themselves by amplifying the being
of language, the various philosophies do in chorus. In this sense, the unfolding
philosophical djalogues are a large-scale poem underway. The commonality
between poems and philosophy is that they are within language and that language
is their reference. Gadamer writes:
Was �oesi� alsSprache in der Tat mit Philosophic gemeinsam hat, ist, daB der Philosoph - anders
als dte Wtssenscbaft -, wenn er etwas sagt, auch nicht auf etwas anderes hinausweist, das
irgendwo existicrt, wie die Deckung, die der Geldschein auf der Bank hat. Wetm es das Denken
zur Ausformulienmg drangt, ist cs ganzbei sicb selber, so daJ3 essoz:usagen sicb selbst verwortet
und verbalisiert..114
The succession of these two sentences is telling: in the first one, the philosopher
speaks; in the second one, thinking is like an urge. This combination highlights
the mediality of the process Gadamer describes. Philosophy and art are different
from the sciences in that they are underway, though not progressing. They are not
tools or means at the subject's disposal. What counts is not to reach some end
through them but to partake in and of their process; what counts is "Teilhabe zu
gewinnen."215
The title "Hermeneutik im Vollzug" means precisely participation in and of
the interpreted - and interpreting - word. Poetry exalts the process that takes
place to some extent every time one understands something. It distinguishes itself
by its enigma which is "wabr zu sein tiber aile Einrede hinaus, und dennocb
21 3 See "Philosophic und Literatur," GWB, 253 f.
2 1 4 Ibid., 257.
215
Ibid.
168 Chap. 4: The Performance ofthe Subject within the Eve n t ofUnderstanding
6
nichts zu sein, auf das man sich berufen darf."21 Language surfaces in poetry. It
is so intense that we must heed it. The truth ofpoetry, however, leaves open so
much that we can only say yes to it while it grasps us. We cannot appeal to it
because our yes is not opposed to a no. Although we can argue about the meaning
of a poem, we cannot possess its truth and be sure that we are right. We do not
leave a poem saying "I got it." We under-stand it, we remain within it, we know
it by heart, or we follow Paul Celao 's advice quoted by Gadamer: "Mao solle die
Gedichte nur irnmer wieder lesen und lesen - dann werde das Verstandnis schon
kornmen."217 Reciting or reading again and again a poem are perhaps the best
ways really to inhabit it and to become familiar with it, its language, and
language in general. Gadamer writes:
In dcr Tat, Gedicbte sind keine Rechenaufgabe. Am Ende kann nur der Vollzug des Sinnes und
der sich bewl!hrende Vollzug des Sinnes- fiir einen selbst wie ffujeden anderen, der es damit
versucht - Ubeneugen."211
Poems are no math problems to be solved. Their only "criterion" is the event of
meaning that takes place when they start speaking to one. It is a matter of
listening to the poem even when one confronts one's interpretation with others.
The event of meaning that takes place in the volume of the text has to prevail.
One must let the text speak. With reference to Goethe's Faust, for instance,
Gadarner doubts that the question how Goethe himselfconceived the fate ofFaust
is relevant. Though interesting, such a question is a mishap because it
presupposes that there is a definitive answer and that Goethe must have had it at
some point. Its problem is not only that it focuses on the author instead of letting
the text do its work, but that it also curtails the manifold possibilities of
interpretation and understanding ofthe text. 219 This type of question in fact limits
the right ofthe reader. It prevents the medialMitgehen, the "going together" with
the text.
Gadarner goes along with the text, serving the Vollzug that allows poetry to
become a partner of dialogue. He reads as a Liebhaber, as "true amateur," a lover,
not a dilettante. He does not try to grasp the meaning of poetry at all cost, using
dictionaries and all the possible scholarship, although he does not deny the value
ofthese means. Regarding his understanding of Celan 's Atemkristall, he recounts
that it happened to him without the help of any dictionary: "Tch lag in einer
Sandkuhle in den holHindischen Diinen und wog die Verse hin und her,
i feuchten Wind<, bis ich sie zu verstehen meinte.'mo Gadamer
>lauschend ernst m
does not follow a method when he interprets poetry, not even a so-called
hermeneutic method. He says: "lnsofem befolge ich hier nicht etwa eine
216 "Das Tilnnerlied n
i Goethes >Fausl<," GW9, 127.
217 "Wer bin Icb und wcr bist Du?," GW9, 444.
2 18
"Pbanomcnologischer und semantischer Zugang zu Celan?," GW9, 465.
219
See "Die Natilrlichkeit von Goethes Sprache," GW9, 139f.
220 "Wer bin lch und wer bist Du?," GW9, 444.
cs in Operation
Hermeneuti 169
>hermeneutische Methode<. lch weill gar nicht, was so etwas sein soli. Ich suche
nur das bewu.Bt zu machen, was jeder Leser im Grunde tut."221 Or even: "Eine
berrneneutiscbe Methode gibt es nicht."222 For n
i stance, Gadamer holds that there
is no need to reconstruct the historical Bordeaux to understand Holderlin's
"Andenken," where the poet recalls this town upon returning home. The meaning
of the poem does not depend on the factual or empirical resemblance with
Bordeaux. Gadarner even goes so far as to reverse Plato's claim about art being
an imitation of an imitation: the empirical Bordeaux is thrice removed from the
tru� • from t�e real Bordeaux of the poem because the poem involves not only
.
artistic creatiOn, whose representation is not a copy, and the work of poetic
composition, but also transfiguration due to the remembering imagination since
it is an Andenken, a "remembrance."123
This absence ofmethod is connected to the question how much the interpreter
must know in order to understand a poem. To put it differently, it is the act of
balancing "it makes sense to me" and "I make sense of it." It does not contradict
the last pages of Truth and Method where Gadamer writes that method is
valuable. He does not oppose the use of method and scientific scrutiny. He
strongly rejects, however, what he calls "method without truth,"224 that is, the
effort to outsmart the text by imposing interpretations instead o f listening to it.
Gadamer gives an answer to the question how much one has to know to
understand a poem: as in science, there should be no limit to one's knowledge.
One should know as much as possible, and generally one does not know enough.
He calls, however, the use of dictionaries and encyclopedias to understand poetry
the decayed and lazy fruit of science and scholarship. He goes on:
Dagegen gibt es eine andere, prUzise und verbindliche, nur freilich nicht kontrollierbare und
fixierbare Antwort auf die Frage: Was muB der Leser wissen? Sie lautet: Er muB so viet wisscn
wie er braucht und wie er verk:raften kann. Er muB so vie! wissen, wie er in sein Lesen de �
Gcdichts, in sein H6ren aufdas Gedicht wirklich einbriogen kann und muB. Nurso vie� wie sein
dichterisches Ohr vertrl!gt, ohne zu ertauben. Das wird oft recht wenig sein - und bleibt dann
immer ooch mehr, als wenn es zuviel ist.22!1
The knowledge the reader must have must be just right for the reader and for the
i not how much knowledge one has but how adequate, how
poem. The issue s
fitting, it is. Gadarner's way ofreading, his understanding ofCelan in the Dutch
dunes shows that to understand a poem is not the privilege of the specialist. The
experience of reading i s open to everyone who is willing to try to hear always
anew. It brings to light what happens to every reader, and it highlights the
encompassing character of understanding: "Verstehen steht nicht nur am Ende
der literaturwissenschaftlichen Erforschung, sondern auch an ihrem Anfang und
� "Phlinomenologiscber und semantiscber Zugang zu Cclan?," GW9, 461.
"Wer bin lch und wer bist Du?," GW9, 447.
223
See "Dichten und Denken im Spiegel von HOlderlins >Anden
.. ken< •"GW9• 44.
224 .
See, for mstance, "Text und Interpretation," GW2, 355, n. 99.
225
"Wer bin Ich und wer bist Du?," GW9, 450.
170 Chap. 4: The Peifomumce ofthe Subject within the Event ofUnderstanding
durchben-scht das Ganze."226 It is not the amount of knowledge that counts but
the way one uses it, or, better, the way it helps us dwell in the whole of the poem.
Knowledge is a form of wealth: as with money, what we do with it counts more
than how much of it we have. Knowledge serves understanding only if it helps
the interpretation fade before the voice of the poem. Knowledge alone is not
enough because there is always the danger of falling out of the medial balance of
understanding and actively and impatiently turning up he t volume instead of
listening to how it fills itself.
Gadamer's ambiguity between method and no method, between a lot and little
knowledge, underlines that reading, listening to the text that speaks again, is
neither active nor passive but both and more: beyond the back and forth
movement between subject and object, the reading subject is within his or her
reading. The work ofunderstanding requires willingness and patience on the part
of the reader, but it also befalls or bits the subject like a sudden insight. The
lingering of the subject and the flash of understanding go hand in hand.
Sometimes Gadamer agrees with the Heraclitus inscription above the door of
Heidegger's Black Forest cabin : "The thunderbolt steers all things."
Understanding is like a burst of light. It happens suddenly like very cold water
that a jolt turns into icc in the blink of an eye.227 Despite the suddenness of
understanding, however, one does not rush through a poem to understand it. One
learns it by heart, one stays with(in) it, sometimes for years, one lingers and
tarries. Understanding is also a painstaking effort. Though instantaneous,
understanding is a slow and painstaking process. One cannot understand poetry
in a hurry. Gadamer's illustration of what it means not to understand perfectly
conveys that understanding is both an instant and a long process. Not to
tmderstand is like being at a concert; the music stops, but I have to look around
me to see what the audience does because I am not sure if it is time to applaud.228
I did not understand the music, I was not granted insight into it, I was not carried
by it. To understand, I need to sharpen my ears, to listen to more music, to be
open to a variety of styles, so as to applaud the instant the music tells me to. The
same is valid for the mediality of reading. The intimacy with language which
bares itselfparticularly in poetry grasps one in an instant; yet the more one reads,
the more one listens, and the more one tunes oneself to language, the more
intimate one becomes with it.
In conclusion, let us listen to Gadamer's medial advice to his students. The
context is the universality oflanguage and the translation back n i to a new Vollzug
of understanding that language in its written form requires:
Jedes Schriftliche verlangt, urn verstanden zu sein, so etwas wie eine Art Erhebung in das innere
Ohr. Wo es sich urn Poesie und dergleichen handelt, ist das selbstverstlindlich, und auch in der
226 Ibid., 443.
227 See "Text und Interpretation," GW2, 357 and "HOren- Sehen - Lesen," GW8, 277.
228 See "Horen- Sehen - Lesen," GW8, 277.
Hermeneutics in Operation 171
Philosophic pflege ich meinen Studenten zu sagen: Ihr mii/3t euer Ohr scharfen ihr miiBt
wissen
daB, wenn ihr ein Wort in den Mund nchmt, ihr nicht so ein beliebiges Wer he 11g angewende ;
habt, das, wenn es euch nicht pal3t, in die Ecke geworfco wird, sondern cuch i
n Wahrbeit
festgelegt habt in eine Richtung des Denkens, die von weit her komrnt und weit iiber
euch
hinausreicht. Es ist immer eine Art RUckverwandlung, die von uns geleistet wird.129
Gadamer's injunction to his students points to the mediality of the hermeneutic
event. Poet1y and philosophy require a similar eff01t of Listening to language
because of our?elongingness t? it. We do not manipulate language and language
do�s not I?arupulate u�. It tS not our tool, and we are not its toy. The
acttvelpasstve way of thtnking does not do justice to the balance of event and
�ubje�t in philosophical hermeneutics. By speaking, by using a word, we set off
m a dtrect10n that goes back a long way and will go on long after us. We take it
for a while, we follow it even into uncharted territory. Gadamer's advice to
sharpen one's ea�s means to listen more carefully to the language that speaks us
whe � we spe� tt. It means to work on the n i timacy it grants us, steering not
making, keepmg a course within a process, a space, a volume, a Spielraum.'/30
.I� thethemes
rehgtous
final c�apt�r, we will examine Gadamer's use of theological and
m phtlosophical hermeneutics as well as a few texts where his
own theology comes to the surface, and we will ask what the relation between
Christian theo l?gy and hermeneutics is. Gadamer uses important theological
themes
. to .descnbe the event ofunderstanding. We will see however that there
) '
IS a tenston between philosophical hermeneutics and Gadamer's
explicit
theology. Gadamer uses theological motives to articulate hermeneutics, but he
does not apply �ack to theology the understanding of hermeneutics he gained in
the process. At times theology as it comes to language in some ofhis texts seems
to except itself from the universality of hermeneutics. In particular Protestant
theolo� ap�ears to be a unique case. Based on the notion of faith, I will argue
that thts ten� ton does no� necessarily obtain. The medial process ofw1derstanding
tak�s �lace m theology J �t as anywhere else. No matter bow incomprehensible
Christian theology and fatth are, they remain a matter of understanding.
229 " ' .
Wte wett schret'bt Sprache das Denken vor1," GW2, 205.
230 See "O'ber die Planung der Zukunft," GW2, 165.

Chapter 5
Hermeneutics and Theology
This ftnal chapter examines the relation between Gadamer's philosophical
hermeneutics and theology. It focuses first on Gadamer's use of theological
themes and second on a tension that obtains between his explicit Protestant
theology and philosophical hermeneutics. Third, this chapter draws theological
implications regarding faith from the medial interpretation of philosophical
hermeneutics. Based on Hebrews 1 1 : 1 , it explores the possibility of speaking of
faith as a Sache in an attempt to overcome the conundrum offaith as an object we
either actively acquire or passively receive.
Before we tttm to the theological and religious themes in Gadamer's
hermeneutics, two preliminary remarks are in order. First, it is important to note
that this chapter does not concern itself with the religion ofGadamer himself. Not
the man but the work is at stake. Whether or not Gadamer is a "closet-Lutheran"1
is interesting, though ultimately beyond the question. Suffice it to note that
Gadamer has remained at the doorstep of the Church. He subscribes to a platonic
agnosticism where the divine remains in the neuter. He clearly says that he has
never managed to have faith in a Christian sense: "Also, icb habe gar nicht den
Glauben. Ich sage es immer mit einem gewissen Bedauem."2 He regrets that be
bas never been able to muster the courage to believe although he deeply respects
people who have. Grondin notes that Gadamer thinks that his not believing lies
in his early childhood education: "Die Fahigkeit zum Glauben hat er [Gadamer]
lckgefiihrt. Wem der liebe
auch spliter auf die Frilhwirkung der Erziehung zuri
Gott in den ersten Jahren seines Lebens beigebracht wird, der babe es da Ieichter,
wiederholte er oft."3 Although he was baptized and confirmed and confesses to
be a Protestant (sometimes to differentiate himselffrom Heidegger), Gadamer has
at most a "vague religious disposition.'"' This disposition hardly comes from his
father, a scientist, for whom the secret of nature may have been beyond science
but, for sure, not in the Church. Gadamer attributes this vague disposition to his
mother who died already in l904. He hardly knew her, but, as he later learned,
she had strong religious and pietistic inclinations. Although this disposition did
1 See Carr, 9.
i 1994 quoted in Grondin, Hans-Georg Gadamer: Eine Biographie,
2 Conversation recorded n
23.
3 Ibid.
4 See ibid., 19f.
Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology 173
not make him a religious person, it allowed him to appreciate the limits ofreason
and of being human in general. He admits that his notion that there is no ·total
understanding o fthe self has a pietistic undertone. Gadamer's agnosticism, his
�ack of courage to �elieve, his consciousness of our limitedness are interesting
nd ed. These details may help us understand his writings, but they are not
� �
mdispensable. The question in this chapter is not Gadamer's religion or his faith
(or absence thereof) but how he uses theological themes and how they relate to
be�eneutics. Its t �
t is that a medial process involves both the understanding
_ _
subject and the ChnstJan believer. Ultimately, the point is to show that
understanding, faith, and our condition are medial experiences.
The second preliminary remark pertains to the question why hermeneutics is
theologically pregnant. Gadamer frequently uses religious and theological themes
to describe the hermeneutic event. As noted, the specific doctrinal contents count
little. The emphasis lies on the structures of thinking characteristic of these
themes. For the theologically inclined person the question becomes: do the
structures that inspired Gadamer and that ultimately show the medial condition
of the understanding subject make sense in an explicitly theological context?
�at makes ?�losop�ical hermeneutics pregnant for theology? Is it only the
�?bon oftradtb.on that ts appealing to the �eologians because, as Caputo writes,
tt allows them to develop moderate theones of theological traditions in which
theology is neither hide-bound to archaic dogmatic formulations nor forced to
throw the dogmatic baby (a terror of a child!) out with the historical bath"?5
Cap�o ��sa valid �int. The hermeneutic trust that says that the other might
? _
e nght unphes a postttve and even optimistic outlook on tradition and meaning
m general. Robert E. Webber, for instance, argues that Postmodemity and its
failure to find a unifying factor should not be the cause of too much alarm
because "we evangelicals have a friend in the thinking of Hans-Georg Gadamer.
In Truth and M�t�o� he points to a direction for the future by suggesting 'the
need for a reh�bthtatton of the concepts of tradition, authority and prejudice. "'6
To focus on. thts aspect of Gadamer' s thought can be reassuring and tempting to
the theologian. It overlooks, however, that for hermeneutics tradition is not an
: Caputo, "Gadamer's Closet Essentialism: A Derridean Critique," 261.
Robert E. �ebber: Ancient-Future Faith: Rethinking Evangelicalism for a Postmodern
World (Grand RapJds, Mich.: Baker �ooks, 1999), 24. On Gadamer and tradition n i a theological
context, see also Carr, 50-02, P1erre Fruchon, Exstencei humaine et rewHation: Essais
d'he�en eutiqu e ��aris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1976), 135-150, Hilberath, Theologie zwischen
_ und Krtllk, 184-221, Werner G. Jeanrond, Text and Interpretation as Categories of
TradlLon
t
Theological Thinking (New York: Crossroad, 1988), 8-37, Werner G. Jeanrond, "Les
�eplacements de l'berrneneutique au x:x• siecle," in Jean-Michel Adam and others, Quand
mterpreter c'e.st changer: Actes du Congres international d'hermeneutique (Neuchiuel, 12-14
septemb�e 1994) (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1995), 23f., David J. Krieger, TheNew Universalism:
Foundattons for a Global The�logy (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1991), 140-150, Petit,
159-170, Renaud, 426-448, Th•se1ton, The 1\vo Horizons, 304-310, 314-319, and Tracy, The
Analogical Imagination, 73f., 137, n.16.
174 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology
object. The question is not whether to uphold or to reject traditions. At issue is
the subtle balance of Bewuftt-sein, of being conscious of and being within
tradition or traditions seen as a medium in which (and not only by which) we are
and influence what we are. The focus is not our action on a object, our active
tackling of traditions, but our location within a process, within the event of
tradition.
Tradition is not a Gegenstand but a Geschehen. It is a medium in and of which
the subject partakes and, therefore, a process, an event. The original title of Truth
and Method, "Verstehen und Geschehen,"7 and the fact that this work originated
in Gadarner's dialogical way of studying and in his teaching experience8
corroborate the centrality of the happening - tvepyeta, Vollzug - of the issues
we get ourselves involved in. Understanding carries the subject who says "thus
it is," almost "amen," not "yes." "Amen" does not exclude "no." As noted in
chapter one, it points to the encompassing act of understanding oneselftogether
with others in what is going on. It does not mean that one necessarily acquiesces.
The apparent gentle and humble side of hermeneutics is not false modesty that
bows to tradition. Because it operates at a medial level, understanding contains
an emancipatory element beyond actively keeping or discarding traditions.
Hermeneutics escapes the alternative of presexvation or subversion b ecause it
involves the subject as much as the Sache. It is by understanding the Sache, not
by agreeing or disagreeing with it, that I am within the Sache that changes as I
change like the hermeneutic horizon. Thus, more than the favorable conception
of tradition, the major reason why theology should be interested in hermeneutics
is Geschehen. In my vocabulary, the interest of hermeneutics for theology is its
mediality.
The connection Gianni Vattimo makes between the kenosis of God n
i Jesus
Christ and hermeneutics strikes a deeper truth than Caputo's quasi-objective
focus on tradition. Vattimo's premise is that hermeneutics has become the Koine
of philosophy. It is so vague that it bas lost much of its significance for
philosophical issues and notably for religion. Vattimo proposes to rethink what
be calls the originary "nihilistic vocation" ofhermeneutics within the history of
modernity, that is, secularization. This is not the place to discuss his conception
of nihilism. Suffice it to note what he considers its guiding thread: "the reduction
ofviolence, the weakening of strong and aggressive identities, the acceptance of
the other, to the point of charity."9 For him, nihilistic hermeneutics and the
religious tradition of the West converge precisely in the principle of charity.
Vattimo sees links between the nihilistic ontology of hermeneutics and the
kenosis of God. He argues against a linear development of hermeneutics from an
7 See Grondin, Jntroductio11 a Hans-Georg Gadamer, 26.
8 See "Selbstdarstellung Hans·Georg Gadamer," GW2, 492.
9 Gianni Vattimo, Beyond Imerpretarion: The Meaning of Hermeneutics [01· Philosophy,
trans. David Webb (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, L997), 73.
Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology 175
interpretative technique ancillary to biblical exegesis to a general philosophy
10
emancipated from its theological tutelage. The relation between hermeneutics
and theology is far more ambiguous, reciprocal, and ongoing.
On the side ofhermeneutics, thekenosis, the emptying of God, the weakening
of Being, constitutes the ground of the nihilistic vocation of hermeneutics.
Hermeneutics is an interpretation of its own history telling that Being is no
longer. Being happens, and hermeneutics inscribes itself in this event. In the
wake of kenosis, it relates philosophy and religion in a fashion that does away
with objectivity either as substrate that expresses itself in numerous ways or as
the end ofhistory.
On the side of theology, the hermeneutic basis oftheology beyond the focus
on biblical interpretation underscores that the movement of interpretation in
theology goes on despite all the dogmatic and canonic efforts to contain it.
Vattimo speaks ofa Joachimist tendency that stresses a spiritual age inaugurated
by the descent of the Spirit succeeding to the age of the Father and to the age of
the Son. In his view, this amounts to the movement of secularization not simply
in the sense of the emancipation from the Christian tradition but as the
continuation and authentic destiny of the nihilistic drift n
i scribed in the kenosis.
Concerning the medial interpretation of hermeneutics, the most interesting
aspect ofVattimo's interpretation of kenosis is that it takes place according to the
"law of religion." The event ofkenosis replaces the act of sacrifice. It does away
with the sacrificial systems of natural religions. Jesus Christ is no scapegoat
taking on himself the crimes of the believers in a one-way transfer of guilt.
Kenosis is not a transaction where the believers sacrifice an object or a person
hoping to placate the angry deity. Kenosis is different: radically contrasting the
natural logic of sacrificial cleansing, it reveals God's love rather than God's
wrath. It is an event that involves God and everyone who believes in it. It follows
what Vattimo calls the "law of religion." He opposes it to the "law of
philosophy" which corresponds to the dialectical movement toward appropriation
of religion through reason and the dialectical progress of successive
Aujhebungen:
But the kenosis that occurs as the incarnation of God and most recently as secularization and the
weakening of Being and its strong structures (to the point of the dissolution ofthe ideal of truth
as objectivity) takes place in accordance with a 'law' of religion, at least n
i the sense that it is not
by its own decision that the subject is committed to a process ofruin, for one finds onselfcalled
to such a commitmentby the 'thing itself. The idea underpinning hermeneutics ofthe belonging
of the interpreter to the 'thing' to be interpreted, or more generally to the game of interpretation,
mirrors, expresses, repeats and interprets this experience of transcendence. The difficulty of
finding the right term for the relation between the hermeneutic experience of belonging to the
thing itself and the religious experience of transcendence confinns that it is not easy to quit the
10
See ibid., 47-57.
176 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology
traditional metaphysical configurations of the philosophy-religion relation (the 'Aristotelian'
relation of ontological pluralism; and the Hegelian relation ofAujhebung).11
The "law ofreligion" resembles the middle voice: an event happens to the subject
who is involved in it. The middle voice is perhaps the right term Vattimo finds
difficult to find, a term articulating the relation between the hermeneutic
experience and the experience of transcendence.
The problem with Vattirno's interpretation, however, is that it considers only
half of the motion of kenosis: there is no mention of Jesus Christ's exaltation.
Symptomatically, Vattimo does not mention the christological hymn in
Philippians, chapter 2, verses 6-1 1, where God "superelevates" (!1tepmjr6w)
\ the
emptied and humbled Jesus Christ. He only mentions "Paul" with reference to the
opening two verses ofthe Epistle to the Hebrews where it says that God has
spoken in the past at many occasions and in many ways in his prophets and now
finally in his Son.12 He stresses what he calls "Pauline 'historicism"'13 and argues
that it provided the Aristotelian plurivocity of Being with a historical frame for
the weakening of the strong structure of Being. Vattimo uses the "Paul" of
Hebrews to place hermeneutics in the history of nihilism. For our purposes,
Vattimo's law of religion is interesting because it makes the medial core of
hermeneutics and notjust Gadamer's view oftradition theologically pregnant. In
Vattimo's interpretation ofkenosis, God's action in Christ becomes a process that
involves God and the believers. Kenosis takes on volume (though ultimately an
emptyvolume in Vattimo). It is within this volume that the believers are involved
in the event of understanding whatever gives itselfto be understood. The relation
Vattimo establishes between theology and hermeneutics goes beyond the notion
of tradition many interpreters underscore in Gadamer's writings. It reaches the
hermeneutic balance between event and subject.
We now turn to Gadamer's use of theological and religious themes. By far the
most important theological element Gadamer weaves into his description of
understanding is the Trinitarian speculation. Like Vattimo, he stresses the
incarnation. For Gadarner, however, the center of the matter is God's speaking,
not the emptying of God. The aim of the theological detours is ultimately a
different anthropology characterized by what I call rnediality.
II Ibid., 53
12 .
See ibid., 46.
13 Ibid., 47.
Theological and Religious Themes n
i Gadamer's Hermeneutics 177
Theological and Religious Themes in Gadamer's Hermeneutics
Gadamer is a philosopher, not a theologian. He explicitly says "Ich bin kein
Theologe."14 He does not proclaim a message but reflects on how we understand
it and what it means to understand it. In Kierkegaardian terms, he stays in a
dialectic between the aesthetic and the ethical without moving into the religious.
Although Gadamer is not a theologian, theology and religion are, however,
crucial to his work. In an interview conducted by Erwin Koller in 2000, Gadamer
states that humanity's task is the dialogue between the world religions. He even
hopes that the philosophers of the 21st century realize the importance of this
task.15
Theology played an important role in Gadamer's formation. Among the many
influences, three contemporary thinkers of Gadamer stand out: Martin Heidegger,
RudolfBultmann, and Karl Barth. The most prominent ofGadarner's teachers,
Heidegger, called himselfa "Christian theologian" at least until 1921, and he said
that without his theological beginning he would never have been Jed to his path
of thin.king.16 Theology - in particular the experience of time of the first
Christians in Paul's reply to the Thessalonians to the effect that the Parousia, the
return of Christ, is not a calculable point in time but an ongoing serving God and
others during one's entire lifetime because "the day of the Lord will come just
like a thiefin the night,"17 - not historicism, is the basis ofHeidegger's reflection
on the historicity of Dasein and of his questioning the meaning of being.
Gadamer writes: "Man geht nicht fehl, wenn man hier die tiefste Motivation fur
Heideggers Denkweg erkennt."18
Concerning Bultmann, he played a considerable role notably during the fifteen
years Gadamer participated in the "Bultmannsche Graeca."19 Every Thursday
Gadamer and others would meet with Bultmann to read one Greek text after the
other, particularly the Greek classics. Despite their close relationship, however,
Gadamer is not in full agreement with Bultmann on at least three points.2° First,
14 Excerpts of a 1984 interview of Gadamer conducted by Erwin Koller in Hans-Georg
Gadamer, Ichglaube nicht an die Systeme der Philosophie: Erwi11 Koller im Gesprlich mit Hans­
GeorJl Gadamer, interview by Erwin Koller, Schweizer Fernsehen DRS, 2000, videocassette.
15" Ibid.
16 See Kisiel, The Genesis ofHeidegger's B ejn�a ndTim e. 78-80. Kisiel notes that italicizing
"-logian" points to the philosophical foundations of theology from a phenomenological point of
view. Heidegger was after the Christian experience prior to the mutual influence between
Christianity and philosophy.
17 1 Thess. 5:2.
8
1 "Die religiose Dimension," GW3, 310.
19 Gadamer, Philosophical Appren.ticeships, 40. See also Jean Grondin, "Gadamer and
Bultmann," in Philosophical Henneneulics and Biblical Exegesis, ed. Petr Pokorny and Jan
Roskovec (Tiibingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002), 121-143.
20
See "Die Marburger Theologie," GW3, 204f. and GWJ, 336f. Also G'linter Stachel, Die
neue Hermeneutik: Ein Uberblick (Milnchen: Kosel-Verlag, 1968), 46, n. 52.
178 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology
Bultmann took Heidegger's transcendental analysis ofDasein and considered it
a neutral anthropological foundation grounding the distinction between
inauthentic self-reliance and reliance on God. For Gadamer, however,
Bultmann's existential presupposition is not neutral but already Christian.21
Second, he argues that Bultmann does not do justice to Heidegger's thinking as
it kept unfolding. Heidegger left behind the notion of authenticity in order to
deepen his thought about language. Gadamer quotes Heidegger saying before a
group of theologians at Marburg that the task of theology is not only to find
words that call one to faith but that keep one there.22 Truth is not set against
untruth. Truth contains its untruth in itself. It is an encompassing linguistic event
of un-concealment that escapes exclusive alternatives: authenticity like truth is
not a matter of black and white. Third, Gadamer and Bultmann disagree on the
nature of language. The notion found in Bultmann that language could be
defective23 and that it is "merely external clothing for thought''24 does not square
with philosophical hermeneutics.
Barth is the third theological influence I want to highlight. He had a deep
though indirect impact on Gadamer's work.25 As a student in Marburg, Gadamer
felt dialectical heology's
t siege of historical theology and the rumor of "Barth
ante portas."26 Barth's influence shines through certain key expressions present
in Gadamer's writings. His call to read beyond what stands there ("was dasteht")
and to focus on the Sache announces Gadamer's vocabulary.27 Barth's prejudice
that the Bible is a good book and that it is worthwhile to take its thoughts at least
as seriously as one's own resembles Gadamer's anticipation ofcompleteness that
puts oneself into play.28 Moreover, Barth's "vertical" emphasis that faith comes
before understanding is reminiscent of Gadarner's "horizonal" claim that we
come too late if we want to know what we are supposed to believe. 29 Both
Gadamer and Barth criticize in their own way the scientific analysis that claims
to lead to the truth. Both think within something: Gadamer within tradition, Barth
within the hand of God. 30
In view of these examples, it comes as no wonder that theology is so
prominent in philosophical hermeneutics. As Grondin argues, one goal of
21
See Thoma.� B. OOlOlen, "Bultmann and Gadamer: The Role of Faith in Theological
Hermeneutics," Thought 59, no. 234 (September 1984): 349-355.
22 See "Die Marburger Theologie," GW3, 197 and "Die religiose Dimension," GW3, 315.
23 See Robinson, 31 f.
24 See Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 313f.
25 See Robinson, 25-27.
26
Gadamer, Philosophical Apprenticeships, 39.
27 See Karl Barth, Der Romerbrief, 5t1> ed. (Zollikon, Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag A.G.,
1947), X-XI. See also Stachel, 46f.
28 See ibid., XVI, GWI, 299, and "Yom Zirkel des Verstehens," GW2, 62.
29 See GWI, 494.
30 See, for example, Barth, Die kirchliche Dogmatik, 155 (§ 5.3).
Theological and Religious Themes in Gadamer's Hermeneutics 179
Gadamer is to rid philosophy of its skepti cism against religion within it.31 Human
spiritual disquiet has carried philosophy from antiquity to today; without that
disquiet, it would not be philosophy. In general tenns, the importance of theology
for Gadamer lies in the notion of limit contained in the question of God. In "Kant
und die Gottesfrage" Gadamer calls it the question of the superindividual being.
The nominalism of modem science, which equates being with the repeatable
results of observation and experiment, yields a truncated being.32 Without
following medieval realism's multilayered conception of being, Gadamer argues
for a notion of being that escapes the active scientific mastery and that sets
boundaries to the proud modem subject. To set a limit, to foster an awareness of
one's limitation, is in its most general terms the role of theology in Gadamer's
philosophy. Theology plays a horizonal role: it underscores that humans are
limited and that scientific experimentation does not exhaust everything that is
worthwhile knowing. It makes evident that the scope of experience spreads far
over the scope of experiments. There is more to letting the world be told to
oneselfthan scrutinizing it objectively. Theology reminds philosophy that being
is not "up for grasps" but that we grasp it only in so far as it grasps us.
Theology, however, is not alone in showing us our limitedness. The heritage
of Greek philosophy does the same: "the Greek advantage" as I called it in
chapter three makes us aware of the limits of objectification. Objects are not at
our disposal to the extent modern science would like them to be.33 It is therefore
too vague to speak of the influence of theology as a whole. We must follow
theological motives on a more specific level. The weightiest theological theme
in Gadamer's hermeneutics is the Christological speculation about the notion of
Verbum. We will thus first examine Gadamer's interpretation of the Trinitarian
speculation. Second, we will tum to the theological and religious motives present
in temporality and application, because the role of theology and religion (notably
Greek piety) is also significant in these two contexts.
Gadamer argues that Christology has led to a new anthropology renewing
what it means to be finite within the infinite.34 Since Gadamer is not a theologian,
he is not explicitly interested in the message about Christ. Not the nature of
Christ is at stake but the patristic and medieval use of the analogy of word and
thought to express the relation between the Father and the Son.35 The fact that the
reflection about human language is not the main focus in this speculation is
secondary. What counts is that language emerges as medium in the Trinitarian
speculation. It is through this linguistic aspect that Christology constitutes the
root of what Gadamer calls the hermeneutic experience.
31 See Grondin, "Jenseits der Wirkungsgeschichte: Gadamers sokratische Destruktion der
griechischen Philosophie," 45.
32 See "Kant und the Gottesfrage," GW4, 358f.
33 See "Die griechische Philosophie und das modeme Denken," GW6, 5.
34 See GWI, 432.
35 See, for example, GWI, 425.
180 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology
Just as Gadamer is not primarily interested in the message of the doctrine of
the Trinity, he does not focus on the origin of the speculation about Verbum:
there is no concept analysis beyond the New Testament. His texts present Verbum
as though it was a starting point. Its historical roots in Judaism do not explicitly
come to language. There is no mention of the influence the Old Testament had
on the early Christians as, for instance, the Old Testament notion that God
speaks, which fostered the translation of logos first as sermo and then verbum.36
Further the connection between word and thing inherent in the Hebrew 1:11 is
like a watermark in the paper on which Gadamer writes his philosophy: it is part
of the book - for instance, in the notion of Sache- but there is no mention of it.
Last but not least, the core of Jewish theology "Hear, 0 Israel! The Lord is our
God, the Lord is one!" (Oeut. 6:4), not watch or see but hear Israel, also shines
through in themes like belongingness, Zugelliirigkeit. Here again, however, the
text resembles a palimpsest "Hear, 0 Israel" is what the text is written on but it
never explicitly comes to its surface.
Instead of pursuing the Hebrew connection present, for example, in the
Pauline fides ex auditu (Rom. 10: 17), Gadamer is concerned with the
transformation of Greek elements in the Christian tTadition. For instance, he
mentions that the Christian thinkers reversed the Stoic tendency to focus on the
internal word37 The Stoics made the distinction between an inner and an outer
logos and preferred the logos that speaks inside to the one that is uttered.
Gadamer underlines that for the early Christians the trend was at first the
opposite: the word being voiced became paradigmatic. Creation and especially
the Christ-event were considered linguistic events. God created by speaking, and
Jesus, particularly in the gospel of John, is the logos of God incarnate. Gadamer,
however, merely mentions that the notions of creation and particularly of the
1e important thing for
incarnation are non-Greek without pursuing them further. TI
him is that the Christian incarnation is the only tradition of thought that has kept
the relation between word and thought alive.38 What counts is not the origin and
history ofthe Judea-Christian traditions' way oflistening to the spoken word but
Christology' s counterbalancing the visual imagery characteristic of a rationality
manipulating and employing words instead of following them and listening to
them.
The examination of Verbum is part ofGadamer's reflections about the unity
of word and thing, the formation of the concept oflanguage, and the universality
of hermeneutics based on linguisticality. Gadarner starts out by arguing that the
notion of language in Plato's Cratylos has led to a dead end.39 Plato dodges the
36 See Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History ofthe Development ofDoctrine,
vol. I , The Emergence oftl�e Catholic Tradition (100-000) (Chicago and London: The University
of Chicago Press, 1971), 186.
37 See GWI, 423f.
38 See GWI, 422.
39 See GWI, 409-422.
Theological and Religious Themes in Gadamer's Hermeneutics 181
issue of language and the relation between word and thing. His concern with the
level of the ideas obscures the notion of language and the fact that the idealitY of
meaning lies in the words themselves. The Cratylos is the first step toward an
active conception of language as an ideal system of signs.
For Gadamer, however, words are not signs that label alinguistic truths or
prelinguistic experiences.40 Christology acts as a corrective of the modem view
of language rooted in the Cratylos. Although Christian dogmatics used mainly
Greek elements to articulate its thoughts, it nonetheless sought to express a
dimension that lay beyond Greek thought. Perhaps the most non-Greek aspect of
the incarnation is the Lautwerden of the Word, the event of its becoming loud
(Greek philosophy did everything to ward off the influence of the spoken word
and to liberate itself from it).41 As mentioned in chapter three, Lautwerden
expresses the mystery that the word has always been word and yet changes in the
process ofbecoming loud, speaking without claiming anything for itself. Though
delicate even from a Trinitarian perspective because of the danger of turning
Christ into a being inferior to God, the becoming loud of the Word in the
incamation points to an intimate link between the ideal meaning and the words
it is uttered in. The Christian speculation on the relation between God and God's
Word entailed that Lautwerden, becoming loud, being spoken, did not
automatically make the word inferior to the mind that speaks it. This is the
orthodox outcome ofthe Trinitarian controversy in the sm century: to hold on to
the humanity and the divinity of Christ "acknowledged in two natures without
confusion, without change, without division, without separation."42 Lautwerden
indicates that language and meaning, word and thought, are on a par. Only
Christianity kept this parity alive, and, as noted, that is why it is so important for
philosophical hermeneutics.
Despite the incarnation, however, language <lid not fare all that well even in
Christianity. The specter of subordinationism and philosophy's disdain for the
outer word led Christian dogmatics finallyto dampen the stress on the expressed
word. Spoken language could not compete with reason, and logos shrunk to ratio.
The incarnation could not stop the spoken word from losing ground. In tune with
Greek philosophy, spoken language was frowned upon, and it depreciated. The
initial Christian trend toward the external word reversed itself. Consequently,
Augustine and later the Schoolmen used not the spoken word but the inner word,
t)le verbum cordis, to articulate the mystery of the Trinity. Because of the
inadequacy of the external word in its many attempts to express the verbum
cordis, they focused not on the relation between thinking and speaking but on the
relation between verbum interius and intelligentia to ponder the Trinity. The
reflection about language limited itselfto what happens in the realm of thinking.
40 See GWJ, 421.
41 See GWJ, 42Jf.
42 See the Chalcedonian Definition, here quoted after Pelikan, 264.
182 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics a.nd Theology
According to Thomas, the inner word is not tied to a particular language. It
expresses the process ofthinking something through iforma excogila). Gadamer
notes that Thomas also uses the Neoplatonic notion of emanation to articulate this
particular process. Emanation is a spiritual flowing out that does not diminish its
source. In the context of theology, it shows that the Father and the Son are
cosubstantial, and yet that there is a process.4l
The dogmatic decision against the emphasis on the word-come-out in favor of
an internal word made it necessary to rethink the relation behveen word and
thought. The challenge was to express philosophically the mystery not so much
ofthe incarnation as ofthe nature ofthis word that became flesh. In tune with the
emphasis on the internal word, the attention shifted from the being spoken of the
Word to the identity in difference characteristic of the relation between the words
and the thoughts, the words being the thoughts thought through. Gadamer writes:
Das gr63ere Wunder der Sprache liegt nicht darin, daB das Wort Fleisch wird und im auBeren
Sein heraustritt, sondem dall das, was so heraustritt Wld sich in der .i\ul3erung !lullert, immer
schon Wort ist DaB das Wort bei Gott ist, und zwar von Ewigkcit her, das istdie i n der Abwehr
des Subordinationismus siegreiche Lehre der Kirche, die aucb das Problem der Sprache ganz in
das Innere des Denkens cinkehren liillt.""
In theological terms, this means that what is important is not the historical butthe
theological Jesus Christ: the issue is not who Jesus was as a man but what Christ,
the emanated word, tells us about his and our relation to God. What ultimately
counts is the way Christ opens to God, not the historical Jesus. Similarly for
language: the point is not linguistics but linguisticality. Philosophical
hermeneutics does not study an individual language but what our speaking a
language says about understanding and thinking. The spoken word reveals
thinking to us because speaking and thinking are homoousios.
It is important to note that Gadamer capitalizes on two apparently
contradictory elements: the rejection of subordination in the relation between the
Father and the Son and the notion of process. Both the unity ofFather and Son
and the dynamic character of the Word are crucial for hermeneutics. Unlike in
Greek philosophy, in Christian theology "das Wort ist reines Geschehen.'"'5
Verbum does not apply to the essence of God, to something static. It refers to the
dynamic relation within the Godhead and to God's actions in the world. The
Word is event because it is inseparable from Christ the begotten Son. Already
Augustine was very clear about the dynamic and effective aspect of verbum: he
justified the translation of logos as verbum rather than ratio by appealing to the
43 See GIVI, 426.
44 GWJ 424.
, 48 See GWI, 428-430.
45 GWJ, 423.
Theological and Religious Themes in Gadamer's Herme11eullcs 183
effect of the Word. Verbum relates to everything that has been made through the
Word whereas ratio is ratio even if nothing comes of it.46
Gadamer retrieves the combination of unity and process found in the
Trinitarian speculation and applies it to human language. He reverses the
Trinitarian speculation, so to speak, and returns to language something that is
rooted in it. For him, the mystery of the Trinity, the unity in difference of the
Father and the Son, corresponds to the miracle of language in so far as the word
is true because it says the Sache without claiming or wanting to be something for
itself. Gadamer writes that the word ''hat sein Sein in seinem Offenbarmachen.'047
The word is what it is in so far as it manifests the Sache.
Although Gadamer reads back into language what early Christians had
gleaned from speaking and thinking to articulate the Trinity, although he speaks
of the miracle of language (and understanding), although he exalts language, be
does not deify it. He stresses that the differences between the human word and
the divine Word are in fact more important than the analogies. Ultimately, be
argues, the Trinity remains a mystery despite the word analogy. In order really
to grasp the event character of the word and the linguisticality of understanding,
Gadamer turns to the imperfection of the human spirit in its differences from the
divine.
Following Aquinas, he underlines three differences between the divine Word
and the human word.43 First, the human word is potential before it is actual. When
something comes to our mind, it is like an emanation out of our memory. Our
memory is not depleted or diminished, but what comes to mind is not yet the end
product, the final word. It is only the beginning of the thinking process of seeking
the right word. Only at the end ofthis process, once the right word is there, this
word - thought-out thoughts - mirrors the Sache perfectly and exclusively.
Gadamer writes about the image of the mirror be borrows from Aquinas: "Das
GroBartige dieses Bildes ist, da13 das Wort hier ganz als die perfek:te Spiegelung
des Sache, also der Ausdruck der Sache erfa13t ist und den Weg des Denkens
hinter sich gelassen hat, dem es doch allen
i seine Existenz verdank:t.'>49 Thus for
humans something that comes to mind is the thought process ofseeking the right
word. This is not the case in God who is immutable and pure act. God does not
have to find the right word.
46 See Augustine De diversis qua.estionibu.s LXXXJIJ63: "«Inprincipio crat VerbuiJD> (Joan.,
I, I). Quod graece 46yo� dicitur, latine et rationem et verbum signi.ficat. Sed hocloco melius
verbum interpretamur, ut significetur non solum ad Patrem respectus, sed ad ilia etiam quae per
Verbum facta sunt operativa potentia. Ratio autem, etsi nihil per illam fiat, recte ratio dicitur.
"
Saint Augustin, CEuvre.s de SaintAugustin 10, Ire serie: opuscules X. Melanges doctrinaux, ed.
and trans. G. Barely, J.-A. Beckaert, and J. Boulet (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer et Cie, 1952), 212.
47 GW1,425.
49 GWJ, 429.
184 Chap. 5: Henneneutics and Theology
Second, unlike the divine Word, the human word remains always imperfect.
No human word expresses our mind completely. Gadamer, however, shifts the
imperfection from the word to our mind. As the image of the mirror tells, the
word is true to the Sache the mind is thinking. The problem is not the word itself
since it is a perfect mirror but our dissipated intellect. Our mind does not possess
the full self-presence of the divine mind. Our mind is discursive, it goes back and
forth between a multitude of thoughts. Consequently, the human word is plural:
there are many human words, perfectly expressing an imperfect mind that does
not actually know what it knows.
Third, God expresses in God's word God's nature and substance in pure
actuality. By contrast, each one of our thoughts and the words that bring them to
an end are only accidents of our mind. Our words (not because of some inherent
imperfection since they perfectly mirror the Sache but because of the finitude of
our mind) only point to the Sache without ever completely encompassing it. This
finitude is not all negative because it is the locus ofthe infinity ofour mind: our
mind never reaches its end but constantly surpasses itself in new and free
processes of thought. The perfection of words and their relation to the whole of
meaning that comes to language with every word make up the medial
belongingness of the fmite subject to language and to the infinity of possible
meaning. The belongingness to language grants us the freedom ofgoing beyond
our own notions and to explore new ones.
Gadamer stressesthe differences over the analogies between the human word
and the divine Word because his project is hermeneutic, not theological. He does
not seek to understand the Trinity but uses the Trinitarian speculation to describe
the linguisticality ofunderstanding. He claims the only tradition that retained the
dual meaning of logos and applies it not to the Godhead but human
understanding. This explains why ultimately he highlights the differences rather
than the similarities between the human word and the divine Word.
In his own assessment of the gains from the Verbum speculation for
hermeneutics, Gadamer stresses two elements. First, he underscores that the
relation between word and thought is not reflexive. 50 This point is hardly present
i portant for hermeneutics. It means that
in the Trinitarian speculation, but it is m
the word does not express or reflect the mind of the speaker but a Sache being
talked about. Gadamer writes:
Das Denken, das seinen Ausdruck sucht, ist nicbt aufden Geist, sondem auf die Sache bezogen.
So ist das Wort nicht Ausdruck des Geistes, sondem geht auf die similitudo rei. Der gedachte
Sachverbalt (diespecies) Wld das Wort sind es, die aufdas engste zusarnmengeh<iren. Ihre Einheit
t greift, sondem
ist so eng, daJ3 das Wort nicht neben des species als ein zweites im Geistc Plaz
das ist, worin die Erkenntnis sich vollcndet, d.h. worin die species ganz gedacbt wird. Thomas
verweist darauf, daB das Wort darin wie das Licht ist, in dem die Farbe erst sicb tbar ist.51
50 See GWJ, 430f.
51 GW1,430.
Theological a11d Relgwus
i Themes in Gadamer's Hermeneutics 185
Gadamer refers to the visual image that compares the word to the light that is
necessary to see color in the first place. To use an aural image, one could say that
i the volume in which we can listen to the Sache. The unity oflanguage
the word s
and thought means that language is not the mind's tool to express the Sache but
the medium where we come to understand it.
Second, Gadamer points out that the distinction between the unity of the Word
of God and the multiplicity of human words is not appropriate. Unity and
multiplicity are rather in a dialectical relation both in the divine Word and in the
human word. The Word of God is one, yet the Christian proclamation keeps
announcing Christ in many different words. The point is that the event of the
proclamation belongs to the meaning of the divine Word. On the human side, the
many human words find their way to unity in speech and concepts, particularly
in what Gadamer calls the natural formation of concepts. This formation is not
fully at our disposal; it cannot be reduced to a purely logical activity. When we
speak, the Sache encompasses us. Consequently the concepts we use are so
geared to the Sache at issue that they cannot but partake in and of it. In other
words, although we use existing concepts, our using them within a given Sache
alters their tonality and allows us to listen to the Sache differently. The natural
formation of concepts lets language evolve and lets us understand the Sache
differently in an always different conceptual unity.52
In sum, the unity and difference between word and thought and the event
character ofthe understanding ofthe Sache (a subjective and objective genitive)
are the big gains from the Trinitarian speculation. Gadamer says that Christology
paves the way to new anthropology - perhaps a medial anthropology - aware of
its limits without being forced into passivity.53 In this sense, the Trinitarian
speculation is the most weighty theological theme in Gadamer's hermeneutics.
The Trinity, however, is not the only religious theme Gadamer weaves into
hermeneutics. In addition to the Trinitarian specttlation, religious matters and
theology inform philosophical hermeneutics in at least two other respects:
temporality and application. Concerning the former, Gadamer analyzes the
temporality ofthe event ofunderstanding based on the experience of art, but the
actual ground of the discussion is religion in the sense of Greek piety. Although
Gadamer is a Protestant,S4 Greek piety can only be important for him who
adamantly underscores the deep humanity of the pagans.55 Piety describes a
respectful attitude in a medium that we cannot control because it is beyond us and
our actions are within it. It is the subject's response, his or her activity, within an
encompassing neutral divine.56 One day, during a seminar with Bultmann,
52 See GWI, 432f.
53 See GWJ, 432.
54 See, for example, "Die Aktualitat des Schonen," GW8, 126.
55 See Haos Georg Gadamcr, "Gespriich mit Hans-Georg Gadamer: Ein
- Kind, das Angst
hat,
" Lullzerische MOiraJshefle 12 (1994): 29.
56 See "Sokra1es' FrOmmigkeit des N ichtwi ssens," GW7, 84f.
186 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology
Gadamer noted that this relation to the divine is not personal like the Christian
nio·nc;.57 For the Greeks, personal faith and personal beliefs were not a religious
issue because they lived outwardly in a world that was totally animated by the
divine beyond any doubt. Their piety consisted not in inward faith but in the
outward fulfilment of their duties toward the divine. 58
The notion ofpiety epitomizes the temporality ofunderstanding in general and
of the experience ofart in particular. Art is not timeless as if it was the remnant
of a holy or whole time, long passed on the time line. The temporality in question
is not theological time, a time that reckons based on a divine revelation and not
from within the standpoint ofhuman self-understanding, but it is the way ofbeing
of understanding itself.59 The joke that people who go in circles have the past in
front ofthem is not only funny but also true.60 In its way, it says that the past and
for that matter a work of art from the past are not passed and alien so as to allow
access to them only from outside. This joke underscores that temporality is
encompassing, that it lets the subject and the work of art (from the past or the
present) be contemporaneous. Although Gadamer discusses the notion of
contemporaneity, noting that it stems from Kierkegaard/1 piety and the medial
participation it implies, rather than contemporaneity, are actually at the core of
the experience ofart as temporality.
What piety typifies from the perspective of the subject, Fest or festival
exemplifies from the angle of the event. As mentioned in chapter three, Gadamer
ponders the time structure of periodical festivals to describe what the temporality
of the medial experience of the play of art is about. The work of art is
experienced like a festival because the same work keeps corning back and
showing itselfto us differently.62 Like the festival that comes back periodically,
it has its being in its becoming and returning. The notion of festival underscores
that the experience of art and understanding in general are processes that befall
the understanding subject within them. To convey what happens and that
something happens to the subject, Gadarner uses the verb begehen. Like the
51 See ibid., 88.
58 See ibid., 89. See also James D. Garrison, Pietu.sfrom Vergil to Dryden (University Park,
Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992). Garrison traces the ongoing process of
redefinition ofpietas from Antiquity to Modernity, from the ancient noble and comprehensive
ideal including the individual's duty to family, State, and God/gods, through the Christian
appropriation ofpielas and its split into "piety" and "pity," to the modern meek and private
emotion often frowned upon and written off as hypocrisy. In the introduction, on page one, he
refers to John Dryden, who wrestled with the translation ofpietas in the Aeneid and gave this
defmition ofthe complex Latin word: "Piety alone comprehends the whole Duty ofMan towards
the Gods; toward his Country, and towards his Relations."
s9 See GWl, 127.
60
See Philippe Geluck, Le Chat a Malibu (Tournai: Casterman, 1997), 44. "Un type qui
tourne en rond il a son passe devant lui."
61
See GWJ, 132.
61 See, for example, "Wort und Bild - >so wahr, so seiend<," GW8, 391.
Theological and Religious Themes in Gadamer's Hermeneuics
t 187
informal sense of"trip," it does not mean to go somewhere with a goal in mind,
but it brings to the fore the process of journeying itself. In the same way, to
celebrate a festival is not to partition it in distinct phases that follow each other
in an orderly and surveyable fashion, but it is to be present to it as a whole as it
comes back and takes place.63
When Gadamer draws on the theoros and on the notion of theoria to describe
the temporality of understanding and the presencing of and being present to the
whole meaning, he remains in the context of piety and festival.64 The theoros is
an official observer sent to a festival. As noted, however, his role is not to inspect
and to gather information but to be there and to participate in the celebration, not
by doing anything but by being. The reference to the theoros suggests a form of
participation that combines to partake in and to partake of. Similarly, theory, in
the ancient sense, implies participation in and of the whole ofbeing rather than
active observation and control ofa section of it. Like the celebration ofa festival
it is not a method leading to a goal. Theory is not a means to something else bu �
the pUipOse itself: it is the highest way of being human.65 It involves the subject
in a contemporaneity different from the simultaneity of two things external to
each other. Like the pious fulfilment of one's duties toward the gods in a world
permeated by the divine, theory entails effort on the part of the subject, an effort
not over an object but within an ongoing event. It imposes on him or her the task
of focusing on the Sache totally mediated within the whole ofmeaning that gives
itself.66 Theoria means observation but it involves more than the active inspection
of objects; it is a stance and a tarrying in a certain realm.67 It has nothing to do
with the active relation of a subject over an object.
Although piety, Fest, and theory entail efforts, Gadamer interprets them as
passion rather than action.68 Nevertheless, the subject is not passive in the sense
that something is done to him or her. Passion, here, is closer to what happens to
the person overcome by the truth and who can only say "so ist es." Gadamer is
fond of the expression "so ist es," reminiscent of amen.69 Amen is more than
63 See "Die Aktualitl!t des Schonen," GW8, 131.
64 See GWl, 129.
65 See GWJ, 458.
66 SeeGWJ, 132.
6; See "Lob der Tbeorie," GW4, 48.
68 See GWJ, 130.
69 Although "amen" is usually rendered yevot'to in the LXX, it actually comes from the root
)Y.lN., "to be steadfast," which, particularly in the Hifil, is translated man�uc..> (and derivatives)
in the LXX. See Theologisches WOrterbuch zum Neuen Testament, s.v. "1nattUw KtA."
Interestingly enough, the Hebrew use of amen generally seiVes to confirm the truth ofsomething.
The Christian use means the prayer that God's promise be accomplished. The Hebrew rootpoints
to something stable that can be trusted; it stresses the object, lhat which can be believed. The
Greek verb stresses the believing subject. To try to hear both meanings together instead of
separating the objective from the subjective "amen"is a way to grasp the mediality offaith and
be grasped by it. See also the wordplay in lsa. 7:9 using the same verb )nN. first in the Hifil
188 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology
passive acceptance. In fact, it suggests what the temporality of art and of
understanding is about. The work of art is such that we can only say "thus it is. "70
Time is not linear, old works of art do not stay in the past, waiting to be
discovered. In the experience of art their time becomes ours and ours theirs in an
encompassing contemporaneity. Far from turning the understanding subject into
a passive entity, this contemporaneity with the work of art implies a task.
Gadamer formulates it in terms of the notion of application,71 the fundamental
problem of hermeneutics. Application shows that understanding is not a passive
drifting in the past of tradition. When application becomes an integral part of
understanding, then hermeneutics takes seriously the historicity of our condition
between historical consciousness as being and as being conscious.72
The theological influence on application is twofold. First, as already noted,
application, the subtilitas applicandi, originates in Pietism. lt is the subtilitas
Pietism added to understanding, the subtilitas intelligendi, and to interpretation,
the subtilitas explicandi. Gadamer emphasizes that the notion "subtilitas" entails
not a methodological mastery but a finesse that is ultimately not learnable. The
subtlety of application has something practical to it: as I showed in chapters three
and four, it is something we do as much as it happens to us, and yet we can
become better at it provided that we work at it.
Second, and more importantly, the theological connection is obvious in the
examples Gadamer uses: in order to show that application is inherent in
understanding and to illustrate what hermeneutics is about in the human sciences,
Gadamer regularly refers to theological hermeneutics, usually together with legal
hermeneutics. His favorite examples, theological and legal hermeneutics, already
appear on the first page of Truth and Method! They are models because they
apply their normative texts to their particular situations. Lawyers interpret the law
in and for their present situation; preachers read Scripture to preach it here and
now. Especially in theological hermeneutics, understanding is not mastery of the
text but service to the Sache of the text.73 Service seems to imply passivity. As
imperfect (usually causative and/or often used to express habitual actions) and then in the Nifal
imperfect (often passive or reflexive meaning): "If you do not stand firm in your faith, you will
not stand at all" (NIV). (See also 2 Chron. 20:20.) Isa. 7:9 is interesting for two reasons in this
context. First, it intimates that faith is the encompassingreason of our subsistence. Second, the
interpretation of this verse based on the LXX ("Unless you believe, you will not understand") is
important for the history of the notion offides quaerens intellectum, that is, faith as a henneneutic
experience. See Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christiall Tradition: A Hi
story of the Development of
Doctrine, vol. 3, The Growth ofMedieval Theology (600-1300) (Chicago and London: The
University of Chicago Press, 1978), 258-260.
70 See GWJ, 118; "Wort und Bild - >so wahr, so seiend<," GW8, 375, 386-389. See also
Richard E. Palmer, "Ritual, Rightness, and Truth in Two Late Works ofHans-Georg Gadamer,"
in The Philosophy ofHans-Georg Gadamer, ed. Lewis Edwin Hahn, 541-545.
7 1 See ''Nachwort zur 3. Auflage," GW2, 471.
12
See "Klassische und philosophische Hermeneutik," GW2, 105f.
13 See GWJ, 316.
Gadamer's Explicit Theology and the Tension It Entails with Hermeneutics 189
with "amen," however, far from forcing the subject into submissiveness, serv�ce
entails a task. To serve the Sache demands that the interpreter get involved in the
text and apply it to his or her situation instead of keeping it at a safe distance.74
The interpreter does not surrender to it but freely serves the Sache within the
limits of the text's meaning and his or her situation. This freedom within (not
from) the text is what characterizes application.
However, the way Gadamer uses his two favorite examples, theological and
legal hermeneutics, points to a tension in his thought: the tension between truth
and kerygma. The few texts where Gadamer's explicit theology (particularly his
view of Protestantism) comes to the fore suggest that what he calls "Produktivitat
des Einzelfalls"75 concerns the truth but not the kerygma. Although theology
plays a prominent role in philosophical hermeneutics, it is as if the relation
between them is one-way only. Gadamer does not seem to apply back to theology
the insights he gained from it. The Trinitarian speculation proves to be a
conceptual source with respect to the relation between word and thought. It s
i the
inspiration for the notion ofSache and for the hermeneutic experience as a whole.
Ultimately, however, Gadamer leaves behind theology and stresses the
differences between the human word and the divine Word. The Trinity is a
mystery and, even theologically, it is just fine to leave it at that. That the Trinity
is a mystery may well be true, yet it is equally true that, for those willing, it is
something to under-stand. E
ven to call it a mystery is already an interpretation!
Gadamer abandons the example of theological hermeneutics and keeps only
legal hermeneutics when it comes to the two-way relation between the Sache that
is understood and the event of understanding. This suggests that the work of
understanding in theological hermeneutics does not affect the Christian truths in
the same way the practice of law amends the law or in the same way concepts
change as they express a Sache. The ke1ygma appears to be above the
hermeneutic pit or outside the hermeneutic circle! In order to describe this
tension we must turn to the few texts where Gadamer's explicit (Protestant)
theology surfaces. These texts and the tension they bring to language are the
topics of the next section.
Gadamer's Explicit Theology and the Tension It Entails with
Hermeneutics
The tension I see in Gadamer's explicit theology concerns only the texts that
address directly Christian theology. The risk involved in speaking of a tension
between the hermeneutic event and the kerygma is to read into Gadamer's texts
an all too vertical theology, that is, an unrefined Bartbianism and to oppose his
74 See GWJ, 338.
75 GW1,44.
1 90 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology
theology to his hermeneutics. What Gadamer has to say about religion or, even
better, religions, however, shows that the tension in question is only a tension, not
a contradiction.
The way Gadamer takes to heart the dialogue between the world religions
denotes that there is no opposition between his hermeneutics and his theology.
Gadamer the Protestant is clearly open to other religions. In his remarks about the
dialogue on religion in Capri in 1994 between himself, Derrida, Vattimo, and
others, he underscores the fact thatthe dialogue's theme was not only religion but
also religions. Religion is a plural. We cannot afford to remain caught in the West
and the waning Christianity when we think about religion. He writes:
n nous faut cependant apprendre a penser a grande ecbellequand, sous le titre de «Ia religion et
les religions», nous tentons de prendre en compte le destin de l'humanite et de prendre Ia mesure
de son avenir. Nous devons aussi nous attacber a Ia question de savoir si d'autres mondes
religieux et d'autres moodes cultureIs pourraient finir par apporter a l'universalite des Lumieres
de Ia science eta ses suites une reponse autre que celle de Ia religion de I'economic mondiale. Le
monde trouvera peut-etre Utle autre reponse dont nous n'avons encore aucunc id 6e.76
Gadamer's openness to other religions is obvious in this passage. He is open to
the possibility that there might be answers in other cultures we cannot even think
o£1 Dialogue with other religions is therefore necessary, and Gadamer is a strong
advocate of it. The tension I am going to point to should not overshadow the fact
that no matter how vertical the kerygma seems to be at times, it always remains
within the horizon of dialogue.
Atthe end ofthe last section, I noted that Gadarnerfrequently uses theological
and legal hermeneutics to show the full scope of hermeneutics. He tends to
mention them together to underline that application is inherent in the event of
understanding. As long as he stresses that understanding a text affects the present
situation and that a text is read within this situation, theological and legal
hermeneutics are side by side. There is, however, one exception, and this
exception suggests a distinction of the Christian message. Theological
hermeneutics is conspicuously absent when Gadamer emphasizes the productivity
of the individual case77 and when he notes that subsuming particulars under
universals affects the universals in the interplay of text and interpretation:
Das Allgemeine, unter das man ein Besonderes subsumiert, bestimmt sich eben dadurcb selber
fort. So bestimmt sich der recbtliche Sinn eines Gesetzes seinerseits durch die Judikatur und
grundsiitzlich die Allgemeinheit der Norm durcb die Konkretion des Falles.71
In this case, Gadamer uses only the example of legal hermeneutics. The absence
of theological hermeneutics indicates that the application of Christian texts does
76 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Dialogues de Capri," in La religion, cd. Jacques Derrida and
Gianni Vattimo (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1996), 225.
77 See GWI, 44, 335.
78 "Nacbwort zur 3. Auflage," GW2, 455.
Gadamer's Explicit Theology and the Tension It Emails with Hermeneutics 19 1
not affect them in return. Are the Christian texts (as well as the kerygma and
faith, which are based on them) too different to fall under the same dialectic?
This question poses itself because Gadamer does not allow in theological
hermeneutics the interplay he sees in legal hermeneutics between the
interpretation and that which is interpreted.79 A sermon is not quite to theological
hermeneutics what ajudgment is to legal hermeneutics. A sermon adds nothing
to the message of salvation. The gospel of salvation does not acquire any new
content. A sermon is not a productive amendment of the text it interprets. The
preacher does not have the judge's dogmatic authority, although both deal with
valid truths. He or she is more passive before Scripture than thejudge under the
law. For Gadarner Scripture is the Word of God. It takes absolute precedence
over its interpretations. He goes on:
Zwar gehtes aucb in der Predigt urn die Auslegung einer gilltigen WahrbeiL Aber diese Wabrbeit
ist Verkiindigung, und ob diese geliogt, entscheidet sich nicht durch die Gedanken des Predigers,
sondem durch die Kraft des Wortes selbst, das z. B. auch durcb eine scblechte Predigt zur
Umkebr rufen kann. Die VerkOndigung lallt sich nicht von ihrem Vollzug ablosen. Alle
dogmatische Fixierung der reinen Lebre ist sekundiir. Die Heilige Scbrift ist Gottes Wort, und
das bedeutet, daB die Schrift vor der Lebre derer, die sie auslegen, einen scblechthinnigen
Vorrang behii l t.80
The effect of proclamation is not due to the preacher but to the Word itself. In
traditional terms, theological hermeneutics works ex opere operato since even a
bad sermon can call to faith, whereas one could say that legal hermeneutics is
effective ex opere operantis. Gadamer is of course right as far as the canon is
concerned. The canon is closed by now (though under flre from time to time).
Understanding the canonized version of the message of salvation, however,
remains a hermeneutic event. Therefore it does not do justice to the Christian
message and to proclamation to exclude it from the universality ofhermeneutics
and to reserve it a Vo/lzug of its own.
Gadamer's understanding of how a sennon is effective is related to his
conception of Scripture. For Gadamer Scripture appears to be universal in an
unchanging sense. In the article "Hermeneutique ct thoologie," be sets in
opposition two extremes ofreligious language: the discourse ofthe preacher and
the discourse of Scripture and ritual language. A sermon, especially in the
Protestant tradition, speaks in particular situations. The preacher is an individual
who does not follow a fixed form or text. He or she says something about
Scripture based on his or her community's needs in a given context. Gadamer
calls this the rhetoric of the sermon. This contextuality is particularly visible in
collected sermons: half of their reality is Jacking when they are collected in a
book, that is, severed from their context.
79 See Ommen, 353.
80 GWI, 336.
192 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology
At the other end of the spectrum Gadamer puts ritual language and Scripture.
He notes:
Certes le texte de l'Evangile n'est pas )'expression de la pensee de quelqu'un, il ne depend pas
d'un individu qui cxprime ou formule sa propre intention et i1 ne renferme pas une visee
specialement destinee a une conununaute particuliere. Ce disoours est d'une universalite
complete. Meme les formes les plus parlantes du culte, Ia benediction par exemple, participcnt
ace detachement de l'individu et de la situation concrete de celui qui parle. Sans doute il n'y a
aucun discours qui ne releve de Ia rhetorique. Mais cette forme de discours religicux qui est cclle
du culte est d'abord une expression de Ia foi religieuse suscitee par !'Esprit Saint et non une
expression de Ia foi d'un individu determine.••
Ritual language is not contextual. It is not someone's speech. It is a common
voice which bears the community of believers. Scripture falls in the same
category. The universality of ritual language, which is anonymous, sets the
Christian texts apart: it is completely universal according to Gadamer. It speaks
to no community in particular. Since it is not contextual, it does not change: "Le
message de l'Ecriture Sainte n' est pas chose qui change d'un interprete a I'autre,
d'un transmettcur a !'autre mais il se propose comme un texte qui a acquis
autorite et force d'obligation."82
In the interpretation ofthe Christian message and its proclamation there is no
productivity of the individual case as in legal hermeneutics or the formation of
concepts. The work of the Holy Spirit takes precedence over the work of
understanding and grants Scripture the complete and utter universality of the
Word of God.
Ifwc turn our attention fromthe proclamation ofthe Christian message based
on Scripture to the kind oftext Scripture is, we notice a similar isolation, though
with a different emphasis. In this context, Gadarner stresses the authority of the
Church instead of the work of the Holy Spirit Nevertheless whether it is the
proclamation of the kerygma or the notion of Scripture, theological hermeneutics
has something unique about it. Gadamer points out that in Ancient Greece poetry,
theology, and even philosophy to some extent were inseparable: Homer and
Hesiod were poets and theologians; Plato mixed philosophical, poetical, and
some religious elements.83 The West, however, has reached a state of strict
segregation between philosophy,poetry, and theology. Concerningtheology and
poetry, the Christian tradition demarcates its texts. As a religion of the book, it
claims that they contain the truth. Its grounding texts are not literature, they are
Scripture.
81 Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Hermeneutique et theologie," Revue des sciences religieuses 51,
no. 4 (Oct. 1977): 389.
82
Ibid., 390.
83 See Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Religious and Poetical Speaking," in Myth, Symbol. and
Reality, ed. Alan M. Olson (Notre Dame and London: University ofNotre Dame Press, 1980),
88f.
Gadamer's Explicit Theology and tlte Tension It Entails witlt Hermeneutics 193
Both literature and Scripture are texts, but they are different. Literary or
"eminent"84 texts are autonomous: they are fabrics that stand by themselves
without reference to an original speech act and to a particular context Only they
are called belles-lettres because they are desired for their own sake as is the case
with something beautiful.8s
By contrast, religious texts are not autonomous. The heteronomy of religious
texts, as Gadamer expounds it, shows that the tension between the kerygma and
the truth is merely a tension: it relativizes the emphasis on the work of the Holy
Spirit by putting the stress on the objective genitive in the expression "the Word
of God." The Word of God is the Word God speaks but also a word about God
that we hear in the Church and its traditions. At frrst, because ofGadamer's stress
on the power of the Holy Spirit and on Scripture as the unchangeable and
completely universal Word spoken by God, even though humans wrote it, one
would expect Scripture to be a text of a totally different kind and not to stand by
itself due to divine auctorial authority. This is not the case. The reason Scripture
is not autonomous is not to be found in God's original speech act but in
Scripture's connection to religious practice. The heteronomy of Scripture is not
backward but forward, so to speak. It does not stem from its origin, but it is based
on Scripture's insertion in a particular context of practice. This heteronomy
points forward. Gadamer claims that it is the authority of the Church (or the
Synagogue) - a living tradition, nothing original - that speaks in the Bible.
Opposing literary exts
t that speak by themselves to Scripture, he argues:
Bei den religiosen Texten unserer jiidisch-christlichen Oberlieferung ist die Sachlage freilich
anders. Was in der Heiligen Schrift zu uns spricht, beruht nicht primar auf der Kunst des
Schreibens, sondem auf der Autoritiit der Synagoge oder der Kirche, die dort spricht86
Gadamer does not say that this authority is "une expression de Ia foi religieuse
suscitee par !'Esprit Saint'' as we read earlier. The authority ofthe Church or the
Synagogue seems to indicate that the isolation of the holy texts and their
interpretation is not total. If authority can be taken in the medial sense of an
encompassing and involving volume that makes us what we are and that we make
what it is, then theological hermeneutics is not so unique after all.
However, in view of how Gadamer widens the gap between Scripture and
literature, the tension between the event of truth and theological hermeneutics
increases. There at least five ways in which Scripture is different. First, Scripture
is a promise. This notion is unique to Christianity, and it distinguishes the
Christian texts from poetry. Gadamer points out that a true word is a telling word,
i Asthetik,
84 See "Nachwortzur 3. Auflage," GW2, 475; also Carsten Dutt, ed., Hermeneutk,
Praktische Philosophie: Hans-Georg Gadamer im Gesprlich, 2,.. ed. (Heidelberg:
Universitiitsverlag C. Winter, 1995), 61.
ss
See "Von der Wahrheit des Wortcs," GW8 44.
86 "Asthetische und religilise Erfahrung," GW8, 145.
194 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology
a word that stands and to which one stands.87 A poem stands as Sage or Aussage:
it speaks itself out (A us-sage). It does not mean something that can be verified
but it is what it means.88 A good literary text "hits home" because it renders
present for a while one's familiarity with the world that one knows for having let
it be told to oneself. It is true without contest, yet one cannot appeal to it.
Gadamer calls this the enigma ofpoetry: "wahr zu sein fiber alle Einrede lunaus,
und doch nichts zu sein. auf das man sich berufen darf."89 The Christia.o message
is different: it promises salvation. It is not Aussage but Zusage. With reference
to Luther' s "es stehtgeschrieben," "it stands written," Gadamer explains what he
means by Zusage:
Was ist der Sinn dieses >>Es steht geschrieben«? 1m Lutherschen Sprachgebrauch liegt in dieser
Wendung oft ein besonderer Sinn von Sagen, den ich Zusage nennen mocht.c. Man k:ann sich auf
etwas Zugesagtcs berufen, z. B. im Fall des Versprechens, das einer dem anderen gibt. Wer ein
Versprechen gibt, sagt etwas zu. Ich kann mich daraufverlassen und mich daraufberufen. Das
ist nicht bloB Mitteilung, sondem ein verbindliches Wort, das gegenseitige Verbindlichkeit
voraussetzt. Es steht nicht bei mir allein, ob ich etwas versprechen kann. Das hiingt auch davon
ab, daB der andere das Versprecben annimmt. . . . Zum Wesen der Zusage gehort eben, da1l sie
ein gegenseitiges Verbliltnis des Sagens und Antwortens ist. In dicsem Sinn sind die Tex:te der
Offenbarungsreligion >Zusage<, d. h., sie gewinnen ihren Sagecbarakter allein durch das
Angenommenwerden seitens des Glliubigen.90
A promise does not stand by its own because it requires someone who accepts it.
It is Zusage, not Aussage. It speaks to the faithful unlike the eminent text which
speaks itself out.
The promise is also what separates Christianity from Judaism (Gadamer leaves
out Islam): the Old Testament claims to be the Law of God, and it implies a
contractual faithfulness. "Der >Neue Bund< ist nicht mehr ein solcher Vertrag.
Statt >Gesetz< und >Gehorsam< muB man hier >Kerygma< - >Botschaft< - und
>Glaube< sagen:>9• For Gadamer a promise is the profane analogue to the relation
between the Christian message and faith in it. Unlike a contract, it does not
legally bind. A promise is inherently free. Freely given and freely received, it
expects nothing in return and is unable to enforce its being accepted unless it
ceases to be a promise. As Gadamer notes, someone who promises too much
promises nothing at all. An impossible promise cancels itself because there is no
one to accept it, and it cannot enforce itself.
The second distinction is the correlate of the given promise: the Christian texts
demand only belief.92 They become what they are when they are believed.
Christian Scripture does not have its being in the free interpretations and
87 Sec "Von der Wahrbeit des Wort.cs," GW8, 40.
88 See "Ober den Beitrag der Dichtkunst bei der Suche nach der Wahrheit," GWB, 74-79.
"Das TUrmerlied n
89 i Goetbes >Faust<," GW9, 127.
90 "Ober den Beitrag der Dichtkunst bei der Sucbe nach der Wahrheit," GWB, 74. See also
"Von der Wahrheit des Wort.cs," GWB, 41-44.
91 "Astbetiscbe und religi<>se Erfahrwtg," GW8, 150.
92 See Gadamer, "Religious and Poetical Speaking," 95.
Gadamer's Explicit Theology and the Tension It Entails with Hermeneutics 195
variations characteristic of Greek mythology. Greek poets, philosophers, and
comedians continuously reinterpreted their mythic tradition, like muiicians
interpreting a piece by following the score and the rules of music. This
interpretation reached so far as to affect even the names of the gods! "The
re
Greeks did not feel certain about the god's authentic n
ames
. . Even in worshipping
Zeus they were never sure whether or not be should be addressed by this name;
it was just the way it was done."93 Myths have a narrative structure open to
different yet not arbitrary variations of their content. Their characteristic is that
nothing but the act o f telling them validates their content. "Das, wovon erzlihlt
wird, gewinnt im Erzahlen eine Art Anerkennung, die tiber alles hinausgeht, was
im einzelncn davon berichtet werden mag.'>94 There is no external proof or
verification of the truth of a myth. Because they are narrations that one knows
and recognizes in their continuing reinterpretations and not because we today
tend to consider them to be invented stories, myths (at least those of the official
Greek religion?5 do not demand faith as the Christian texts do:
Wir sollten uns nur hUten, Mythen in unsercm Sinne >erfundene Geschichten< zu nennen. Sie sind
>gefunden< - oder besser: innerhalb des schon ll!ngst und von alters her Bekannt.cn findet der
Dichter Neues, das das Alte erneuert. Der Mythos ist in jedem Fall das Bekannte, die Kunde, die
verbreitet ist, ohne irgendeiner Herkunftsbestimmung und Beglaubigung zu bedfufen.96
Gadamer wrote this passage in the context of the relation between logos and
mythos. It is, however, interesting to compare it to the kerygma and the response
it is supposed to elicit: faith. Myths are no invented fables but found truths that
are already known and constantly renewed in the hermeneutic process. Like
musical interpretation, they do not demand proof or belief to be true, but
recognition, Wiedererkenn.ung. They are radically (though not arbitrarily) open.
The universality ofthe divine realm they picture, for instance, allows them easily
to integrate foreign cults. Myths and music for that matter have in common a
liberty of interpretation that is absent from the Christian tradition. The Christian
texts are the unchanging Word of God in which the authority of the Church
speaks to us, and they demand only faith. They do not contain the same open­
endedness as myths. They do not have their being in their constant
reinterpretation. The Christian message is not accommodating like the ancient
myths. It does not so much integrate others as that it wants to be accepted by
them. The promise of the New Testament is not open to other gods, but it seeks
to replace them with a message that requires faith to be true. Although Gadamer
93 Ibid., 94.
94 "Mythologie und Offenbanmgsreligion," GWB, 177.
95 See Gadamcr, "Religious and Poetical Speaking," 93. Gadamer notes that besides tbe
liberal and tolerant official Greek religion, which was not based on books, "there were special
sects and religious movements where the function of the sacred book, the hieros logos, poses
difficult questions."
96 "Mythos und Logos," GWB, 172.

196 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology
knows that the Bible contains mythical material, "buntes Erziililgut,'197 he still
isolates the Christian message:
Aber erst die christliche Botschaft bat das uncntwirrbare Gemisch von Freiheit und Bindung,von
Wabrheit und Erfindung, das alles Erziiblen auszeicbnet, zu der Verbindlicbkeit einer
Verktlndiguog gesteigert, deren Annabme Sache des Glaubens und der Gnade ist. Diese
Binzigartigkeit, die mit dem Glaubensnnsprucb der christlichen Offenbarung verknilpft ist, setzt
den Mythos der Wa!Jrheitsfrage aus und nimmt ibm die Erfiillung seines Wahrheitsansprucbs.
Alles, was nicht im gescbichtlichen Zusammenhang der Heilsgescbichte seincn Platz bat, verliert
vom Glauben her gesehen die Verbindlichkeit, und die mythologische Vermittlung wird zur
heidnischen Verirrung.9s
By isolating the Christian texts and emphasizing belief, Gadamer seems to
divorce the kerygma from the medial hermeneutic event of truth. The kerygma
is given, not found or recognized, and faith in it seems to be an exception to the
continuous work ofrenewed understanding. Gadamer's claim that myths interpret
us more than we interpret them does not apply to the Christian message if it is to
be believed, not under-stood.
Third, Scripture is different from other texts because of its authors. Gadaroer
sets them apart in two ways. First, he notes that the authors of the New Testament
are secondary. To seek the meaning of a scriptural text in the men.s auctoris
falsely honors its author. These authors' actual honor is to announce something
that surpasses their own horizon of intelligibility:
Versteht man unter Sinn eines Textes die mens auctoris, d. h. den >tatsacblichen<
Verstandnishorizont desjeweiligen christlicben Schriftstellers, dann rut man den Autoren des
Neuen Testarnentes cinefalsche Ebro an. Thre eigentliche Ehre diirfte geradc darin liegen, daf3 sie
von etwas kiinden, das ihren eigenen Versandnishorizont
t ilbertriffi- aucb wenn sie Johannes
oder Paulus heiBen.99
In the case of eminent texts the mens auctoris also recedes before the Sache of
the text. This situation, however, reaches new heights in Scripture. Authorship
is radically insignificant because of the complete universality of the message of
the New Testament It is important to note that the insignificance ofthe authors
of the New Testament refers to the meaning of these texts and not to their
authority. Gadamer would certainly not have denied the role of apostolic
authorship in the formation of the canon. 100 Second Gadamer distinguishes the
people who wrote the New Testament by arguing that they are not so much
authors as "witnesses or the witnesses of witnesses." He goes on:
97 "Mythologie und Offenbarungsreligion," GW8, 175.
98 Ibid., 179.
99 "Die Marburger Theologie," GW3, 207.
100
For a brief account of the preservation of Christian books, see Raymond E. Brown, An
Introduction to the New Testament (New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, and Auckland:
Doubleday, 1997), 10-15. Besides the apostolic origin (real or putative), Brown mentions two
more criteria: the importance of the addressed communities and the confonnity with the rule of
faith.
Gadamer's Explicit Theology and the Tension It Entails with Hermeneutics 197
We know, of course, that every witness has his special view and pre-understanding. Modern
�eol�gyhas learn e�
to discriminate these authors and to discern their view as dogmatic
n
mtetions by analyztng, comparing, and combining all our knowledge of the tradition they
represent. In any case the authors are not just conveyors of a floating mythical tradition·
' they
trace themselves back to witnesses who should be believed.101
The �ew Testament authors/witnesses are not poets who retell myths. They are
the Witnesses of events that are to be believed. The difference between. them and
poets and storytellers is flagrant in the following passage about myths:
Der aus der Antike stammende Begriff des Mythos ist mit dem antikeo Begriff des Gottlichen
unlosbar verknupft. Der Mythos erzlihlt vom Gottlicben. Aber er enahlt nur von ihm. Es sind
Geschichten von Gottem oder Geschichten von Gottem und Menscben, die aufdieDimension
des Gottlichen hinausweisen. Es ist dabei selbstverst!ndlicb und wobl nicht aufdas griechische
Altertum b c �� daB das in solchen Geschicbten Enablte nicht Gegenstand eigener
1t, e
Erkenntrus s mes Flir-wahr-Haltens oder eines Glauhens, der ein Nicbtzweifeln wiire. Es ist
vielmehr wie ein lebendiges Gediichtnis, das n
i das geschichllicbe Gediichtnis der Dynastien, der
Stfunme t1D:d der Stadte, der Orte und der Landschaften unmittelbar hineinragt Der Dbergang
vom Geschichtllchen zum Mythischen ist flieBend, und flief3end sind aucb die Geschichten selbst,
die eine fast schrankenlose dichterische Erfindungskraft immer neu ausschmilckt, i\hnlich wie bei
dem genialen Mllrchenerllibler, den wir kennen. Aber daf3 es die als Welt bekannten Gotter sind,
fest102
von denen da erzahlt wird, steht
An author tells a st01y in the free space of nanation. The way the story is told
carries the �ener away into the truth of the myth. This power of the Sage, ofthe
.
myth, 1s a gift that consecrates the poet. Even today's fictions open to this truth:
"All das sind Gescbichten, die nicht wahr sein wollen, und doch sind sie wie
Welten, in denen wir heimisch werden und von denen wir uns kaum trennen
1
mogen. Gewi13, wir werden nie daran denken zu fragen, ob das alles wahr sei." 03
The Christian texts are different: their authors/witnesses testify about something
that ought to be believed by the individual believer. They do not only tell and
retell the collec�ve stories transmitted within a people as many ancient poets did,
but they bear wttness to the law ofthe Old testament and the good news of the
New Testament. 104
Fourth, Gadamer stresses the incomprehensibility inherent in the Christian
message. This is particularly true of the mystery of the Trinity "von dem ich
personlich glaube, daB es als Herausforderung fiir das Denken wie als
Verheillung, die die Grenzen menschlichen Begreifens sandig
t iiberschreitet, den
105
Gang des menschlichen Nachdenkens im Abeodland besUindig belebt hat."
1
Gadamer caBs this absence of full mental access the 'Witz der Trinitat." 06 The
gospel's greatest challenge to the human grasp is that the New Testament
101
Gadamer, "Religious and Poetical Speaking," 95f.
102
103
"Reflexionen ii.bcr das Verhliltnis von Religion uod Wissenschaft", GW8, 161.
"Zur Ph!inomenologie von Ritual und Sprache)" GW8, 424.
104 ••
See"Asthetische und religiose Erfahrung," GW8, 149f.
105
"Die Alctualitl!t des SchOnen," GW8, 96.
106 "Ein Kind, das Angst hat," 24.
198 010p. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology
demands first faith and only secondarily merit, and that this faith is a gift of
grace}07 ''11 faut realiser que c'cst une situation d'etrangete des plus radicales qui
se presente dans I 'Evangile; . . . Nous avons affaire ici a une etrangete beaucoup
plus profonde et essentielle qui tient a !'opposition de la loi et de Ia grace.''108 The
Christian message goes against all natural human expectations of merit and
reward. Gadamer speaks of, "pro-vocation radicale qui dit que Ia Promesse et son
acceptation par Ia foi ne sont pas une decision active de la volonte bumaine, mais
un don de Ia grace divine qu'il faut attendre et dans lequel il faut croire."109 This
"Zumutung"110 or exaggerated demand is the pro-vocation of the Christian
message: it calls us forth to accept the free offer ofgrace instead of following our
natural inclination to rely on our own means. 111 In fact, it is so central and so
baffling that it reduces the rest of the Church life, notably preaching, to the
function ofhelping people to believe it.
It is important to note that incomprehensibility means somethlng that we
cannot comprehend, begreifen. It does not seem to exclude our understanding it,
verstehen. From a terminological point of view, the kerygma remains thus within
the hermeneutic event. The centrality of the Trinitarian speculation in Gadamer's
hermeneutics, despite the stress on the differences between the human word and
the divine Word, confirms the affmity between this mystery and understanding.
What Gadamer says about the mystery of the Eucharist points in the same
direction. On this issue, he does not hesitate to side with Luther against Zwingli:
Jesus' words at the Last Supper "This is my body, this is my blood" signify that
the bread and the wine ofthe Eucharist do not simply mean what they say but that
i
they are what they say. Gadamer applies the Lutheran nterpretation of the
Eucharist to the understanding of art. We can and even must think in terms of
consubstantiation if we want to understand that a work of art does not simply
refer to its Sache but that it "presences" it, that the work of art yields an
11
augmentation of being. 2
Notwithstanding the affmity between the mystery of the Trinity and the
mystery of understanding, the kerygma remains an extreme case of
understanding. As long as Gadamer interprets theology to describe the
hermeneutic event, theology and hermeneutics have much in common. When he
talks about theology for its own sake, however, the mystery ofthe kerygma turns
out to be different from the mystery ofthe hermeneutic experience. Poetry and
the kerygma are both challenges, but differently. As noted, poems are eminent
texts that stand by themselves. Moreover, they tend to resist translation into
another language because their Vol/zug, the event of truth that happens to the
107
See Gadamer, "Religious and Poetical Speaking," 96.
108 G
adamer, "Henneneutique et theologie," 391.
9 113
10 Ibi d , 392.
.
110
"Asthetische und religiose Erfahrung," GW8, 151.
11
1 See Gadamer, "Hermeneutique et theologie, 391.
"
112
See"Die Aktualitiit des SchOnen " GW8, 126.
,
Gadamer's Explicit Theology and the Tenson
i It Entails with Hermeneutics 199
reader of poetry, relies not only on the poem's meaning but especially on its
language and on the volume ofthat language.113 The Christian texts, by contrast,
are not eminent. They promise the truth and call for its propagation. The truth has
to be passed along, and to pass it along implies that it is translatable even though
it is not fully comprehensible.
11
The translation and propagation (Gadamer says "ausrichten" 4) of the
Christian message seem at first sight to draw it back into the hermeneutic
experience in general. Although to accept the Christian message is beyond
humans' will and capacity, its pro-vocative character is a call to pass it along.
This task is more than repeating or forwarding it. It requires that one understand
it in a new situation and transmit it in such a way that it touches the other. It
requires that one translate it. Unlike eminent texts, the Christian message, though
beyond our full comprehension, is translatable. For Gadamer the notion of
passing along the paradoxical Christian message is the foundation of the many
languages in use and the many uses of language in the various Christian
traditions. He writes using a medial expression: "Hjer erreicht die fur jedermann
schwierige Aufgabe, sich etwas sagen zu lassen, ihre auf3erste Zuspitzung."115 To
believe in the Christian message is the most extreme instance of the general
hermeneutic experience consisting in letting the world be told to oneself.
Although it appears that the possibility and the task oftranslating the kerygma
reqwre the inclusion of theological hermeneutics in hermeneutics in general,
Gadamer nevertheless turns it into the most extreme case. Theological
hermeneutics remains special.
Finally, the fifth distinction is the reason why the Christian message is the
ultimate instance of letting something be told to oneself: faith is personal.
Although Gadamer does not deny the importance ofthe community ofbelievers,
he argues that the Christian message, if I am to believe it, has to be given to
116
me. Unlike the understanding subject who recognizes what he or she
understands carried by the hermeneutic event, the believer seems at a loss
because he or she faces the incomprehensibility of the message alone in total
dependence on God. According to Gadamer, faith is personal, even individual.
Faith is a gift, not recognition. In the case of mythical or aesthetic truth, symbols
lead to the recognition of "that is you." A symbol is originally a token of
recognition that implies something in common. This recognition in the aesthetic
experience, even in the tragedy Oedipus Rex, for instance, contributes to one's
feeling more at home in the world. Gadamer writes:
Ohne Zweifel bereitet das Werk der Kunst etwas wie Wiedererkcnnung die uns aufs neue hilft
heimisch zu werden die dem Menschen als die nie his zu Ende IOsbare
, Aufgabe seiner Existen�
See "Asthetische und religiOse Erfahrung," GW8, 148f.
114 Ibid., 150.
liS
Ibid. 151
116 See Gada�er, "Religious and Poetical Speaking," 91.
200 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology
gestcllt ist Wie anders ist demgegenilber die Verkilndigung und messianische VerheiJ3ung! Was
bedeutet im Inkamationsgeschehen und in der Osterbotschaft die Wiedererkennung im Sinne des
»Das bist dul«? Doch gewill nicht einen weiteren Schritt des Heimischwerdens des Menscben
i der Welt, wie sie selbst noch die Reinigung von Furcht und Mitleid in der tragischen Wehmut
n
gewllhrt Nicht der unendliche Reichtum von Lebens- und Weltmoglichkeiten begegnet in
solchem »Das bist du!«, soodem gerade die iiu.Berste Armut des Ecce homo. Man muS dem Wort
eine ganze andere Betonung geben: »Das bist du!«- dieser dem Leiden und dem Tode hiltlos
Ausgesetzte.11'
The contrast between the recognition in art and myths and the dumbstruckness
before the Christian message is striking. The kerygma causes shock, not
recognition. "That is you" means "that is you," ''you are that," a crucified man
who is supposed to be the Son of God! Gadamer articulates the double meaning
of "that is you" by underscoring the difference between symbol and sign.
Believing the Christian promise is different from recognizing symbols: it is to be
given a sign. The religious meaning of sign Gadamer refers to is an individual
experience. He stresses that Scripture, far from being autonomous, sends a
message; it does not have the symbolic form of recognition, but it is a sign that
potentially can realize itself for me. The characteristic of the Christian message
is that it must become a signpro me, a sign understandable only for the one who
receives it. Gadamer writes about sign and its individual reception:
Es gibt cin Heraklitwort, das diesen Zusammenhang gutbeleuchtet »Der delphische Gott spricht
wedcr aus, ooch verbirgt er, aber er zeigt.« Man muB nur verstehen, was >Zeigen< beiBt. Es ist
kein Ersatz filr >Sehen< und von aUer Aussage oder ihrer Verweigerung (dem Verscbweigen)
eben dadurch unterschieden, da6 das Gezeigte nur dem zugiinglich wird, der selber hinsieht und
sieht.m
Gadamer seems to speak as a Protestant isolated i n his belief. This passage
underscores the individuality of the response, in particular of the Protestant
response, to the Christian message. It is symptomatic that this text totally omits
the hermeneutically and medially pregnant words related to hi:iren like, for
instance, Zugehi:irigkeit. Instead of hearing there is seeing: each one has access
to what is shown only by looking and seeing. The Protestant, who risks faith
alone, does not seem to listen to a call but to watch for a sign and to receive it if
God lets him or her see it.
In the same text, in order to illustrate what he means by sign, Gadamer reports
the dialogue of two men coming out ofa Protestant Church service. The anecdote
contains the verb hi:iren, but the connection with belongingness is conspicuous
by its absence. One fellow complains to the other that the pastor just twaddled.
''Maybe," says the other, "but I did not notice." Gadamer goes on: "Der Mann
batte offenbar auf die Predigt gehOrt, aufdas, was ibm durcb die Botschaft gesagt
1
werden sollte. So war sie nur fur ihn da, und nur so war sie, was sie ist."1 9 This
1 17 "Asthetiscbe und religiose Erfahrung," GW8, 152f.
118
Ibid., 154.
119
Ibid.
Gadamer's Explicit Theology and the Tension It Enta.il.s with Hermeneutics 201
man alone received the message despite the weakness of the sermon. He did not
hear, carried by a community, but he heard because it was given to him to see a
sign. The emphasis is not on the man hearing the message within the volume of
the Word but on the message being there for him alone and being what it is in its
?
being shown t him individually. The message is a sign given pro me, for me to
see alone. Unlik
e the recognition of meaning in art accompanied by stupefaction
and dismay that understanding has happened and that someone has managed to
understand, the Christian and in particular the Protestant perception of the sign
lacks the same awe because it is given. The Christian message accentuates the
1
i possible to see it without being given to see it: 2o It
fact that it is humanly m
highlights what humans cannot do instead of revealing their medial involvement.
In Gadamer's words:
InjederAussage der Kunst wird etwas ku.ndgetan, etwas erkannt und wiedererkannt. Es ist auch
irnme� so etwaswie Bestilrzung, was mit solcher Wiedererkennung verknupft ist, ein Stauoen w1d
fast em Erschrecken,.dall solches geschah oder daB Menscben solches gelang. Gleichwohl geht
der Anspruch der chns�chen Botschaft dariiber hinaus. Er weist in die umgekehrte Richtung. Sie
ze1gt, was Menschen mcht gehngen kann, und gewinnt gerade daraus ihren Anspruch und die
Radikalitiit ihres Angebots.121
The individuality and passivity before the Christian "You are that!" distinguishes
Christianity from religion in Gadamer's view. Religion, in the general sense of
a human activity before God, is ultimately dispensable and self-deceptive because
the�e is nothing we can do about our relation to God. The gospel message is so
radical that we cannot accept it by ourselves. The necessary n
i adequateness ofthe
human response sets the interpretation o f the Christian texts apart. We cannot
recognize it like a symbol. I can only see it by an act of God, when and if God
gives it to me as a sign pro me.
As noted, belongingness is completely absent in the present context. It is no
surprise that in view of the passivity the kerygma entails the middle-voiced
objectivity of the Sache is equally absent. Wbat is shown, what is there to be
seen, does not appear to be a Sache. The Christian message, as seen in this
Protestant optic, is not under-stood. It is a sign, not a Sache that comes to
.
�
langua?e, a ache within w ich the subject understands. To see the sign is a gift
�
to the mdivtdual who passtvely receives it rather than a Sache to get medially
involved in.
120 , .
See, tOr mstance, Mary Magdalene at the tomb in John 20: I f., 1 1-18: she is weeping
b�cause she does not know where Jesus' body is. lronically, she does not understand the
st gntficance of Jesus' glorification despite the clues: the empty tomb, two angels, and Jesus
.
htrnself; whom she.lllJstakes for the gardener! By herself, she does notsee what is going on. Only
the words of the nsen Lord allow her to understand. See R. Alan Culpepper, Anatomy of the
Fourth Gospel: A Study in LiteraryDesign (Philadelphia: Fortres� Press, 1983), J43f. and Paul
D. Duke, Irony n n Knox Press, 1985)' 104"
i the Fourth Gospel (Atlanta, Ga.: Joh
- 1.
121 .•
"Asthetische und religiose Erfahrung," GW8, 155.
202 Chap. 5: Henneneutics and Theology
The emphasis on the sign the individual is gjven to see s
i in tension with the
encompassing hermeneutic experience yielding a different understanding of
oneself within it. The same tension comes to the fore in the way Gadamer
opposes the Protestant to the scientist. Unlike the isolated Protestant, the scientist
is part of a scientific community, notwithstanding his or her objectivity. He or she
is not alone. Gadamer writes:
Erst das reformatorische Christentum bat die ursprilngliche christlicbe Botschaft derart ins
Extrem des Glaubens oder des Zweifelns getrieben, daJ3 das Wagnis des Glaubens (wie der
Unglaube) von dem Einzelnen getragen werden muJ3 - wie das }Wahr< oder >Falsch< der
Erkenntnis. Aber wlibrend es fllr die theoretische Erkenntnis die Wissenscbaft gibt, durcb die sich
der Einzelne potentiell getragen und nsofern
i entlastet weill, ist der protcstantiscbe Menschfiir
das Wagnsi des Glaubens ganz aufsich selbst gestellt- das heillt: aufden Erweis der gottlicben
Gnade, die ihn erleuchteL w
The scientist is the one n
i the medial situation! He or she is carried by science.
He or she does not face the scientific truth alone. The Protestant, by contrast, is
alone in his or her relation to the Christian truth and fully dependent on God's
enlightening grace. The tension between philosophical hermeneutics and the
Christian message (from what Gadamer calls the Protestant perspective) could
hardly be greater: even the scientist, whose objective outlook Troth and Method
debunks, under-stands in contrast to the Protestant!
These five distinctions of the Christian message (Scripture as promise
demanding only faith, whose authors are in fact witnesses to something so
incomprehensible that to see it is a God-given sign to the individual) cannot but
lead to "a special and eminent function"123 of hermeneutics. For Gadamer the
skandalon of the New Testament is radically different from the provocations and
challenges of other texts or whatever there is to be understood. He writes:
New Testament hermeneutics bas the special task of making acceptable what seems to be
fundamentally incomprehensible: that faith is not the product ofa believer's merit but an act of
grace . . . . Although almost every work of art can be experienced as a kind of provocation, such
provocations are not the same work of challenge we confront n i the New Testament. To
understand the absolute and radical incomprehensibility ofthe Christian message something other
is at stake than the dimensions of our self-understanding
.124
One does not understand the Christian message in the same way one understands
any other text or work of art, no matter their challenge. The kerygma is so
incomprehensible that to envision it one must be converted to it by an act of God.
Through one's conversion one is then led to transcend one's self-understanding.
Whereas hermeneutics is all about the never-ending process of self­
understanding, the Christian conversion leaves it behind. It results in faith, which
is solely the work of God. Humans have no say in it. It is important to note that
Gadamer's use of self-understanding is related to Pietism. He points out that for
122 "Reflexionen uber das Verhi!ltnis von Religion und Wissenscbaft," GW8, 158.
123 Gadamer, "Religious and Poetical Speaking, 96. "
1 4
2 Ibid., 97.
Gadamer's Explicit Theology and the Tension It Entails with Hermeneutics 203
the Pietists humans are fundamentally incapable ofunderstanding themselves and
that this failure leads ultimately to faith.125 The point seems to be that humans
have no rights whatsoever when it comes to the Christian message. In the last
chapter we noted that Gadamer appeals to the right of the reader to read a poem
by going along with it instead of actively looking for the text's deep structure.
The stress on the gift of faith deprives the believer of this right with respect to
Scripture. The believer does not go along; he or she can only be granted to see the
truth. The Christian message is such an "exceptional and extreme situation"126
that it requires a special and eminent hermeneutics that makes the humanly
incomprehensible acceptable.
Gadamer, writing mostly from a Protestant perspective, seems to isolate and
to individualize the Christian message. Because of its incomprehensibility, the
kerygma is a truth different from the truth manifesting itself in the event of
understanding. Such an isolation of faith from the universal hermeneutic
experience appears to thwart the possibility offaith as a hermeneutic experience,
and, ultimately, it does not square with the universality of philosophical
hem1eneutics and the subtle balance between the event of understanding and the
subject within it.127
One must be careful, however, not to read a contradiction into what is merely
a tension. Again Gadamer is a philosopher, not a theologian. His purpose is not
to develop a systematic theology. It is as a philosopher, not as systematic
theologian, that he reads theology in orderbetter to describe the linguisticality of
understanding. Working on theological texts, be listens to modes ofthinking that
knew that language was more than a tool. From a theological point of view,
however, a certain hesitation pervades his work. On the one hand the Christian
message becomes an exception to the universality of hermeneutics, especially
when the Protestant in Gadamer stresses the incomprehensibility of a message
acceptable only through God's grace. On the other, it still appears to be a
hermeneutic event, particularly when Gadamer points out that the Christian
message is translatable. This hesitation suggests that if theology has left a deep
mark on hermeneutics the reverse is not true in Gadamer's writings. His
Protestantism - whether he is a believer or not is ultimately beyond the point ­
seems to be segregated from his philosophy. Christian faith and in particular
Protestantism lag behind philosophical hermeneutics. This one-way relation
between theology and hermeneutics is the locus of the tension in Gadamer's
writings between the Christian message and philosophical hermeneutics. His
openness to dialogue with other religions, however, and his wish that even
philosophers understand the need for interreligious dialogue, indicate that the
one-way relation between theology and hermeneutics is by no means final. There
1 25 See Dekonstruktion und Hermeneutik", GWJO, 142.
"
1 26 Gadamer "Religious and Poetical Speaking," 98.
127 See Grondin, "Gadarner and Bultmann," I35-138.
204 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and TheQ[ogy
is a hermeneutic impetus toward theology, but since it is not the main focus of
Gadamer' s texts it has never really taken off.
Based on the medial interpretation ofhermeneutics, the next section elaborates
on Gadamer's aborted hermeneutic impetus into theology. Reflecting on the
definition of faith in Hebrews 1 1 : l , I want to show that the medial core of
philosophical hermeneutics can also be the core ofthe Christian experience. The
radical incomprehensibility of the gift of faith which the believer can in no way
merit is itself a matter of understanding pointing to the Sachlichkeit of faith. My
argument is that our being unable ever to fulftll our self-understanding is not a
stepping stone toward the gift of faith but that faith as a medial event is part of
this never ending process of understanding. The medial interpretation offaitb is
an example of a two-way communication between theology and hermeneutics,
and it underscores what I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter: it is the
middle voice of understanding and not just the notion of tradition that makes
hermeneutics truly valuable for theology.
The Mediality of Faith
To set the stage for a discussion of the mediality of faith, it is helpful to begin
with the division of labor between God and humans concerning faith seen as an
object. As long as faith is something to be had, there will always be a transaction
concerning faith: someone bas it, someone gives it, someone receives it, etc. The
defmition of faith given in Hebrews 1 1 :1, however, is an interesting lead to
attempt to escape this conundrum. It allows one to speak of faith in terms of the
Gadamerian Sache instead of seeing it as an object. After discussing Hebrews
11:1, we will tum to Michel de Certeau's interpretation of Acts 10 and the faiths
ofPeter and Cornelius. The story oftheir encounter is an excellent example ofthe
mediality of faith.
The way Gadamer describes Christian faith, particularly in its Protestant form,
answers the conundrum of the division of labor between God and humans by
making God active and putting humans at the passive, receiving end. The believer
individually receives the gift offaitb from God. The notion of faith that surfaces
here isfiducia, the individual's salvific trust in God. For the Protestant, faith is
the key to salvation, as Luther's famous translation of Romans 3:28 makes
evident: the believer is justified by faith alone, "allein durch den Glauben.''1 28
The Protestants strongly oppose any form ofPelagianism, that is, the possibility
for humans to take the initiative in their own salvation apart from divine grace.
For the Protestants, there is no active human association in the work of salvation
and no merit involved. God gives faith to the individual because it is God who
8 Alexander J. McKelway, "The Systemalic Theology of Faith: A Protestant Perspective," in ibd
12 See, for instance, Heinz S. Bluhm, Martin Luther: Creative Translator (St-Louis, Mo.:
Concordia Publishing House, 1965), 125-137.
The Mediality ofFaith 205
saves each believer. On the Catholic side, if we generalize for the sake of
argument, faith has a different emphasis. According to Gadamer, the decisive
element of faith is not the individual trust in God but the participation in the
Church. Whereas the Protestants stress the personal relation to God, the Catholics
pay more attention to being part of the Church and her tradition. Although
salvation remains a major concern, the primordial consequence of faith is not
salvation per se but the knowledge of God and a communal way of life turned
toward God.129 Thus the Catholics have the possibility to be involved in faith and
to do something about it. Faith is not just given. At the risk ofoversimplifying a
complex matter, 130 one could formulate the difference between the Protestant and
the Catholic faiths as follows: for the Protestant, faith is subjective and passive;
it concerns the individual subject in his or her trust in God, and it is something
that he or she is given by God. For the Catholics, by contrast, faith is objective
in the sense that it is a knowledge about God and active to the extent that it
allows human activity besides divine grace.131
Although neither side is purely active or purely passive, this brief and
caricaturing description of the Protestant and the Catholic views of faith points
to the thorny issue of division of labor between God and humans concerning
faith: is having faith something we do or something that is done to us? Are we
active or passive? The medial interpretation of faith as a hermeneutic experience
says not only that we are both; it goes a step further. It does not see faith as an
object, but it listens to it within its volume as it happens. From a medial stance,
faith is a process involving the believers. The medial reading of philosophical
129 See Catechism ofthe Catholic Church (United States Catholic Conference, Inc., 1994):
the epigraph in the prologue stresses salvation (although it also mentions the knowledge ofGod,
Christ, and the truth) and no. 430 starts by mentioning that Jesus in Hebrew means "God saves."
However, the epistemological or cognitive emphasis already comes to the fore in the title of the
first section following immediately the epigraph: "'The Life ofMan- To Know and Love God."
Faith is our response to God (no. 26). By faith, we completely submit our intellect and our will
to God (no. 143) and we freely assent to the whole truth God has revealed (no. 150). Although
faith is a grace, "the human intellect and will cooperate with divine grace" (no. 155). No. 161
states that faith in Christ and n
i the One who sent him is necessary to obtain salvation, but nos.
222-227, which list the consequences of faith in One God, do notmention sal v�tion, even though
faith in God and faith in Jesus Christ cannot be separated (no. 151). Concernmg the conununal
way of life, the Catechism stresses that "I believe and "we believe" go together:
" faith is a
personal, not an isolated act "I believe" is the faith of the Church (nos. 166f.).
.
.
13° For a discussion of the differences (and similarities) between the catholic and the
protestant views and for some conslnlctive suggestions, see, for instance, KUng, 561-582. See
also Carroll Stuhlmueller, "The Biblical View of Faith: A Catholic Perspective," in Ha11dbook
ofFaith, ed. James Michael Lee (Birmingham, Ala.: Religious Education Press, 1990), 99-122,
James L. Price, "The Biblical View ofFaith: A Protestant Perspective," in ibid., 123-141, Avery
Dulles, "The Systematic Theology of Faith: A Catholic Perspective," in ibid., 142-163, and
i .,
164-200.
131 See Catechism ofthe Catholic Church, nos. 153f.
206 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology
hermeneutics bas shown that under-standing is a process of which we are subject
all the while it happens to us. The location of the subject within the verb is the
key. The same applies to faith. The collapse of the subject/object and
active/passive mode of thinking yields an understanding of faith without
exclusive subject. To have faith involves the believer in an event whose subject
is plural: I, God, the community, tradition, etc. The middle voice does not
outright cancel the distinction between the giving and the receiving end as far as
faith is concemed, but it shifts the attention from faith as an object to faith as a
process. To use Rilke's poem in the epigraph of Trnth and Method, what is
important is not so much the ball itselfas the process of playing ball, of catching
the ball, which becomes "a power - not yours, a world's."
In order to interpret faith medially, it is worthwhile to read Hebrews 11: 1.
Hebrews is a book of the New Testament that is somewhat neglected.13 2 One
might ask "Why take Hebrews to introduce the mediality of faith?" Are there not
more obvious choices as, for instance, the opposition between works and faith in
the Pauline epistles or the tension between the Pauline corpus and James?133 In
Paul the emphasis lies on faith as a personal relation to Christ that is the condition
of our salvation without ever being our work. Faith is always faith in God's
action in Christ.134 For James, by contrast, faith is dead without works. Hebrews
does not directly ask this question. Overall, this Epistle is less engaged and more
philosophical; James W. Thompson argues that this Epistle is already the
beginning of Christian philosophy.135 In tune with this philosophical tone,
Hebrews presents faith in a rather impersonal fashion and even defines it,136 "­
cas unique dans le N. T. -" as Ceslas Spicq notes.137 Erich Grasser writes: "Hb
tritt als einzige Schrift des NT mit dem Anspruch auf, definitiv formulieren zu
konnen, was Glaube ist (11, 1)."138 Definitions have a bad reputation in
philosophical hermeneutics because they tend to muzzle the event of truth by
gagging language. Hebrews 1 1 : 1, however, contains terms so general that they
are far from limiting. In fact, Hebrews's definition of faith has given room to
various readings of faith. In the context of this study, the tension between the
132 See, for instance, Marie E. Isaacs, Sacred Space: An Approach to the Theology ofthe
Epistle to the Hebrews (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1992), 1 1 .
133 See, for instance, Gal. 2:16, Rom. 3:28, and James 2:24. On this subject, see, for instance,
Gunther Bornkarnm, Paulus, "fl' ed. (Stuttgan, Berlin, Cologne: Verlag W. Kohlbarruner, 1993),
151-155 and 160-163 and Brown, 732-734 (short bibliography on this topic in note 22).
134 See Bomkamm, 151.
135 James W. Thompson, The BegiJtnings of Christian Philosophy: The Epistle co the
He�'if,ws (Washington, D.C.: :he �tholic Biblical Association of �erica, 1982), 152-160.
There has been much dSCUSSion as to whether Hebrews 1 1 :I IS actually a definition. See,
i
for instance, Ceslas Spicq, L'Ep'itre aux Hebreux, vol. 2 (Paris: J. Gaba1da et Cie, 1953), 336 and
Harold W. Attridge, The Epistle to the Hebrews (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1989), 307.
137 Spicq, 334.
138 Erich Grl!sser, Der Glaube im HebrlJerbrief(Marburg: N. G. E1wert Verlag, 1965), 3.
The Mediality ofFaith 207
objective and the subjective interpretations Hebrews 11:1 has yielded is of
particular interest because it points the mediality of faith.
Hebrews 1 1 : 1 reads: ''Now faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the
conviction ofthings not seen" (NAS). Faith is u1t6o'taotc; and Heyxoc;. It is the
support, the reality, of what the believers hope for and the warranty, the proof,
of the things that cannot be seen. Harold W. Attridge notes the variety of
interpretations of these two terms.139 'im5o'tamc; has been read in five different
ways: subjectively (confidence), objectively (foundation), legally (guarantee, title
deed), ethically (firm standing, resolution), and philosophically (substrate, reality,
realizing power). Grasser, for his part, argues that among i:be wide semantic field
ofu1t6o'taotc;, the research has tended to focus seriously on only three of these
meanings: substantia (= essentia),fiducia (=spes, expectatio), andfondamentum,
that is, on the philosophical, the subjective, and the objective meanings.140
WE/..eyxoc; is slightly less difficult to translate than U1tOO'tttcrtc;. The most
common meanings in the New Testament and n i the LXX involve discipline
(conviction, reproof, correction, punishment), but they are irrelevant in our
passage.141 Just as the English "conviction," Hen:oc; does not necessarily imply
discipline. It also means being subjectively convinced of something or
objectively and convincingly bringing something to light and demonstrating it.
It is "the act of presenting evidence for the truth of something."1�2 In this case, it
means that faith is the refutation of the notion that what we can see is all there is;
it is the proof of things not seen.
Among this variety of translations of ll1t0(J't(l<Jl<; and e/..enoc;, the most
common interpretation since Erasmus and Luther has been the subjective one.1�3
Paul Ellingworth notes that "the popularity of the meaning 'confidence'
continues among current translations."144 Its tension with the objective reading
is particularly interesting in the context of faith understood as a medial
experience. Thomas Aquinas and Jean Calvin's interpretations ofthis passage are
good examples of these two trends. They respectively bring to language faith as
an object of knowledge about God and faith as an experience in the sense of a
relation to God. Both their interpretations are set in a subject/object frame. Faith
139 Attridge, 308-3 10.
140 See Grasser, 46£.
141 See, for instance, Paul Ellingwor1h, TheEpistle to the Hebrews: A Commentary on the
Greek Text (Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1993; Carlisle:
The PaternosterPress, 1993), 565.
142 A Greek-English Lexico11 ofthe New Testament and Other Early Chrlstia11 Literature, 3'4
ed. ffiDAG), s.v. "iJ..eyxoc;."
43 See Attridge, 308. Concerning Luther, EUingworth writes: "In his 1 5 1 6-17 lectures,
Luther translated U1l6atamc; as possessio, but later, under Melanchthon's influence, adopted the
translation Zuversicht = confidence" (Ellingworth, 564). Zwingli and Grotius among others also
opted for this translation (see Grasser, 47, n. 200).
144 Ellingwortb, 565.
208 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology
is an answer to the question "What does and can the subject do?" as opposed to
"What happens and where is the subject located?"
Aquinas has an intellectualist position on faith. For him faith is a particular
attitude of the mind; it means thinking with assent based not on reason but on the
will.145 He discusses Hebrews 1 1 : 1 in theSumma at the beginning ofthe question
dealing with what faith is itself. Aquinas argues that the "definition" found in
Hebrews is accurate in content but not in form. Thus for anyone interested in
reducing the text to definitional form, he rephrases the passage as follows: ". . .
faith is that habit ofthe mind whereby eternal life begins in us and which brings
the mind to assent to things that appear not."146 He argues that this text sets faith
offfrom all other attitudes ofthe mind because only in faith does the mind adhere
firmly to a truth that is not apparent and that refers to blessedness. Faith as a
habit, from Lat. habere, "to have," a habit of the mind to adhere to something,
points to an attitude where to have faith means to accept articles offaith as true.
"To have faith" tends to become a matter of possessing the right knowledge about
God.
Calvin has a different approach, although for him faith is also a matter of
knowledge. He defines it as "a firm and certain knowledge of God's benevolence
toward us, founded upon the truth of the freely given promise in Christ, both ·
revealed to our minds and sealed upon our hearts through the Holy Spirit."147 The
emphasis, however, is not cognitive. The issue is not to know whether God exists
but what God's will is toward us. For him faith is a superior knowledge implying
certainty and confidence, fulucia, in God's forgiveness. Calvin writes that
Hebrews 1 1 : l says exactly that: "The nature of faith could, seemingly, not be
better or more plainly declared than by the substance of the promise upon which
it rests as its proper foundation. Consequently, when that promise is removed, it
will utterly fall, or rather vanish."148 Calvin's interpretation is not objectifying,
although faith is also knowledge. What counts here is the subjective certainty that
God is for me. For Calvin, it is not faith itself that is important but the relation
faith inaugurates.149 He notes that tm6o·mou; means "a sort of support upon
which the godly mind may lean and rest. It is as if he [the apostle] were to say
that faith itself is a sure and secure possession of those things which God has
promised us, unless someone prefers to understand 'hypostasis' as confidence
[fiducia]. This does not clisplease me, although I accept what is more commonly
145 See Thomas Aquinas Summa theologiae, 2a2ae, q. 2, a. l and q. 4, a. 5.
146 Ibid., q. 4, a I . . to mean, rather, something of this sort "Given the uncertainty ofGod, as a fact ofmodern life,
147 John Calvin, Institutes ofthe Christian Religion, trans. Ford Lewis Battles, ed. John T.
McNeill, The Libraries of Christian Classics, vol. 20 (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press,
8'
)
1960 551 [Bk. III, ch. ii, 7].
1 Ibid., 588 [Bk. ill, ch. ii, 41].
149 SeeFran�is Wendel, Calvin: Sources etevolution desa pensee religieuse, 2nd ed. (Paris:
Presses Universitaires deFrance, 1950; reprint, Histoire etSociete, no. 9. Geneva: Labor etFides,
1985), 199 (page reference is to the reprint edition).
The Mediality ofFaith 209
received." Calvin was probably right to accept the common reading of his time.
Thompson, for instance, writes that the faith of Hebrews 1 1 : 1 is "'reality' and
'proof,' not subjective experience."150 Nevertheless, Calvin agrees with the
interpretation that focuses onfiducia, the subjective experience of confidence in
God where the believer can rest because God is at work.
It would be unfair to accuse the Summa of turning faith into an object to be
had and the Institutes of turning faith into a subjective experience in which the
subject is passive. Aquinas is perhaps the one who clid most to conceptualize
faith, but he did not identify his system with faith nor faith with the holding of
certain ideas.151 He did not consider those who clisagreed with him faithless,
although he did see them as perhaps intellectually wrong. As for Calvin, his
emphasis on sanctification or regeneration prevents any interpretation that sees
the believer as passive in the certainty of his or her being justified. Calvin, unlike
Luther and his followers, stressed that justification and sanctification are acts of
grace of equal value. Besides the relation to Christ that faith establishes, there are
the Church and the sacraments, the external means that contribute to
sanctification and imply our participation. Aquinas and Calvin's interpretations,
however, are within trends that stress human participation in faith differently. In
an intellectualist view of faith, to believe tends to become a matter of the subject
adhering from outside to the right formulations of faith and actively subscribing
to them. By contrast, the subjective view of faith focusing onfiducia implies a
certain passivity: since God gives faith to the individual, the believer tends to be
passive in his or her faith before God and in the resulting justification.
Faith as an object ofour knowledge and faith as a gift from God are exclusive
alternatives only as long as one keeps thinking in terms of subject and object
instead ofsubject and verb. The evolution of the English "to believe" is a case in
point. The apparent opposition between subject and object did not obtain in the
original meaning of "I believe." "I believe" originally meant "I love," "I hold
dear." Until the time ofWyclif, "belief' was the term used to designate what we
call "faith." Then the meaning of belief changed, and "faith" replaced "belief."
The same shift, however, could not occur with the verb "to believe" because there
is no verb corresponding to "faith." Thus the verb "to believe" remained, though
with a changed meaning. Wilfred Cantwell Smith writes:
The long-range transformation may be characterized perhaps most dramatically thus. There was
a· time when "I believe" as a ceremonial declaration of faith meant, and was heard as meaning:
"Given the reality of God, as a fact of the universe, I hereby proclaim that I align my life
accordingly, pledging love and loyalty". A statement about a person's believing has now come
so-and-so reports that the idea of God is part of the furniture of his mind."u2
150
James W. Thompson, 7 1 .
151
See Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Faith and Belief(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,
1979�, 80-83.
I 2
Ibid., 118.
210 Chap. 5 : Hermeneutics and Theology
Currently "I believe" tends to mean "I hold something true." It is propositional
and has an object. Originally, however, the focus was not on the object but on the
verb. Smith notes that "in many instances - far more instances than are usually
remarked - the concept 'faith' in the Gospels and even the Epistles has no object.
That is, it designates a certain quality of life . . . , rather than specifies a
relationship to something external, as later came to be assumed."153 "I believe"
meant to get involved in something one loves. This was also the meaning of
credo uttered by the newly baptized. It meant "I set my heart," "I pledge
allegiance."154 The word "sacrament" points in the same direction. Sacramentum,
which translates the Greek f.1UO<t1pwv, bas a military origin: it was the pledge
to the Roman emperor the recruits took when they became soldiers. "I believe"
was not to subscribe to some truth but to get involved in it. Its meaning came
close to the "I do" or "I will" we utter when we get married. To get married does
not mean to hold true the institution of marriage; that goes without saying. It
means to get involved in the process of marriage and married life.
The point here is that faith is an event. For medially tuned ears the ethical
element that Grasser, for instance, sees in umSo1:aotc;; when he translates it as
153 Ibid., 1 0 I f. For details on the construction of"to believe" in Greek, see A Greek-English
Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 3rd ed. (BDAG), s.v.
"mo'te6w." Concerning the "object" offaith see also the debate between the proponents of the
objective genitive (James D. G. Dunn, for instance) and the defenders of the subjective genitive
in the expression nCo'tt� Xpta'toil. The fom1er translate it "faith in Christ" and the latter "faith
ofChrist." In the second appendix to his The Faith f
oJe
sus Christ: The Narrative Substructure
ofGalatians 3:1 -4:11, 200 ed. (Grand Rapids, Mich./Cambridge, U.K.: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company; Dearborn, Mich.: Dove Booksellers, 2002), Richard B. Hays notes that
"rather than defining the debate as a dispute between subjective genitive and objective genitive
readings, we would do better to speak- as some recent essays have suggested - of a distinction
between the christological and anthropological interpretations ofn(ow; Xplotoil" (277). Even
with this name, however, the debate still appears to be set in a subject/object, active/passive, and
either/or frame. The objective or anthropological interpretation stresses the individual faith in
Christ. The believer is the subject of faith and Christ is its object. Hays notes that this view
sometimes turns faith "into a bizarre sort of work, in which Christians jump through the
entranceway of salvation by cultivating the right sort of spiritual disposition" (293). The
subjective or christological reading, by contrast, makes Christ the subject of faith and the
believers the objects of the saving efficacy of Jesus' faithfulness. Although Hays stresses the
extra nos and the corporate aspect ofthe faith of the believing community who is in Christ (294,
xxix-xxxiii), although he underlines Paul's flexible language "sometimes ambiguous by design,
allowing him to speak in one breath of Christ's faith and our faith" ( 161 ), it seems that the issue
boils down to salvation either through our faith in Christ or through Christ's faithfulness. A
middle-voiced approach cancels this either/or: Christ's saving faithfulness s
i also our faith in his
faithfulness, and our saving faith in Christ s
i also his faithfulness that we must let be told to
ourselves. From a medial standpoint, there is no exclusive subject: the question is not "Whose
faith is i?''
t but "Where am I as a believer?" Location, not identity, is key. The middle voice
offers a different way of thinking about faith, but it is important to note that in the context of
mo'tetl<.> the argument is not grammatical since this verb is active. See also Attridge, 313f. on
the absence of a christological referent or object in Heb. I I : 1.
154 See Smith, 76.
The Mediality ofFaith 211
"fester Stand"155 is secondary compared to another remark he makes. He not only
emphasizes the ethical aspect but also that im6o'taot<; implies standing: '•oer
Begriff 'Stehen' bleibt im Wort das Hauptmoment. "156 For a medial interpretation
of faith, what is important is stehen, a verb, not Stand, a noun. 'Yn6o·mot<;, in
a medial reading, points not so much to one's moral submission to things hoped
for as o
t one's under-standing (im6-o•aot<;) them. The medial interpretation of
faih
t does not contest that faith has moral implications like tl1tOflOVtl,
"endurance," in Hebrews,157 but it argues that it is first a hermeneutic event, an
understanding, rather than an attitude. What counts is faith as a verb not faith as
a good behavior. A hermeneutics offaith as a medial experience is first interested
in the subject's action within the process that takes place before it concerns itself
with his or her character. As we saw in chapter four, morality in hermeneutics
means that the understanding subject enters the hermeneutic circle in the right
way, not in the sense of following a moral code but ofupholding the claim of the
other by listening to it and by belonging (Zugehorigkeit) to the Sache that comes
to language.
Hebrews 1 1 : 1 is interesting because it offers an avenue to the mediality of
faith that is different from the tension between faith and works: its challenge is
that it turns faith into an object and that it addresses the nature of faith without
reference to God or Christ. Its characteristic is to articulate what faith itself is. In
his commentary, Brooke Foss Westcott underscores the parallelism of
im6o1:aot<; and eA.eyxo<;: they describe faith under the same aspect. Both of
these terms can either express what something is, its state, or what something
does, its producing particular results. Both meanings have been proposed, but
Westcott argues that in this verse eA.eyxo<; hardly means the state of feeling
certain or of being convinced. In his understanding, it expresses the way one
reaches certainty, the proof or the test "by which the reality of the unseen is
established."158 Consequently, un6o1:aot<; does not mean assurance but essence
or substance in the sense of that which gives real or true existence to a thing.
"Thus the general scope of the statement is to shew that the future and the unseen
can be made real for men by Faith."159 Westcott's argument is interesting because
faith becomes something that makes real the things hoped for and proves the
things we cannot see. This description of faith goes beyond the questions ofhow
we believe (the division of labor between God and the believer), of what we
believe (doctrines), and of why we believe (salvation). This description
objectifies faith itself: faith is reality and proofwithout any explicit reference to
155 Grasser, 46-51 .
6
15 Ibid., 49.
157 See Heb. 10:36 and 12:1.
158 Brooke Foss Westcott, The Epistle to the Hebrews: Tire Greek Text with Notes and
Essa�s, 2"d ed. (London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 1892), 350.
1 9 Ibid., 351.
 1fle Media/ity ofFaith 213
212 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology

but it reunites fides quae creditur and fides qua creditur, the faith which is
God or Christ. The issue is faith itself, not faith in the sense of a relation or a
believed and the faith through which one believes. Like the experience of art
content.
Gadamer describes, faith has the way of being of play. Just as the players play
Although Hebrews 1 1 : I objectifies faith itself, the context clearly prevents
within play, so the believers believe within faith. For the subject this implies
faith from becoming an object opposed to a subject. Arguing that this verse is
e
listnino to the Sache that discloses itself and following its lead even against his
hardJy a definition in the strict sense, especially because it does not mention God
or Christ, Ellingworth writes that it "is more natural, in the light of the chapter
or her �wn inclination in an effort constantly to reassess his or her standing
within faith. The medial understanding of faith places the believers within their
as a whole, to think of v. l as a summary of what faith does: faith binds the
faith. As Sache, faith expands into a volume that includes them.
believer securely to the reality of what he does not (yet) see, but for which he
As noted earlier, the ambiguity of"volume" suggests not only space we find
hopes."160 Thus, faith is something, and faith does. This combination of faith's
ourselves within but also sound we hear. Thus, when faith involves the believer
objectified and verbal aspects suggests that faith is not just an object to be had or
in its volume, this means not only that it encompasses the believer but also that
a relation inaugurated by God but a Sache in Gadamer's sense. It is not an object 1
it is something we hear. As Paul says, faith comes from hearing. 63 Hearing the
one acquires actively or passively but a Sache the believer gets involved in. As
Gospel is crucial for Christians, and so it is in the Epistle to the Hebrews: for
a Sache, faith can be believed, described, understood, talked about, even had, but
instance Hebrews refers to itself as a "word ofexhortation" (13 :22); it introduces
it is not the believer's prerogative; as the Epistle also puts it, Jesus is the author
and perfecter of faith.16 1 Interpreting faith as a Sache allows one to understand it
;
Old Te tament passages not by "it is written" but by "it said," often without
explicit subject;164 for Hebrews, the message is preached and heard;165 an� the
as something we do while it happens to us. The role Hebrews attributes to Jesus
style ofHebrews, except the fmal salutation, is closer to a sermon than an Ep1�tl� :
in the event of faith by no means precludes the believers' involvement. The
the author never says that be writes but always that he speaks. The emphasiS IS
parenetical mood of the Epistle clearly implies that faith is also something we do.
clearly on a word that speaks and that we bear.
The subtlety is that the Epistle does not place the believers next to faith, outside
To speak of the volume of faith intimates that faith is a medial experience
it, so to speak, but inside it. Hebrews puts faith under the sign of endurance
whose medium is language. Language is medial par excellence. To paraphrase
during the pilgrimage through this world. The examples from the Old Testament
Gadamer, language is the medium in which everything we understand comes to
in Hebrews 1 1 :4ff. denote that faith is intimately linked to life within faith: these
us. It is the medium ofour being. What is so fascinating about language is that
figures had faith in the verbal sense, that is, they held dear a promise and pledged
it carries us without determining us. Yes, we are born into a language, yet we are
loyalty to it throughout their lives although they could not see what they were
free to deepen our knowledge of our mother tongue and to learn other languages.
promised. For them, faith was an encompassing Sache validating that in which
By taking this freedom seriously and working on our knowledge of languages we
they put their hearts and giving meaning to their lives.
allow ourselves to understand the world and ourselves differently. To stress the
The objectivity of faith as Sache is middle-voiced. To paraphrase a passage by
language aspect of faith is to say that faith itselfis a language. Just as we are born
Palmer quoted in chapter three, the Sache discloses itself, not as an object but as
into a language so are we born into a faith, into an encompassing system of
an encompassing experience. 162 This experience teaches us something and
beliefs. Just as we are free within language so are we free within our faith and our
provides us with a knowledge that lets us understand the Sache itself and,
beliefs. Just as with language, we can Jearn more about our faith and our beliefs
ultimately, ourselves differently. We partake not only in but also of this activity
and we can learn other faiths. To work on our faith, to listen to it more carefully,
of the Sache. Faith, like art and marriage for that matter, are things we engage in
is a way to let the work of faith happen, to learn more about it and ourselves.166
and that engage our whole being. The particularity ofthe knowledge these medial
experiences impart to us is that it comes as an answer to the question "Where am
I, where do I stand?" rather than only "What is it?" We do not understand a Sache 163
See Rom. 10:17. There is a certain parallelism b etween Gadamer's Zugehik.igkeit and
from outside because understanding the Sache involves the subject. Being more Paul's wordplay between aKouw, to listen," and iJnaKOOW, "to obey." For the various meanings
"

than a piece of information, it tunes always anew the interpretation of the of the Pauline expression, see, for instance, Hays, 125- I 32.
4
subject's location in the process of understanding. h1 this �edial sense, faith is 1 6 See Westcott, 474-476.
neitherjust the content ofbelieving nor just the act or the experience ofbelieving, 165 See Heb. 4:2.
66
1 Although I emphasize the hearing of faith, it is interesting to note tnat Hebrews calls those
who are baptized "enlightened" (6:4; 10:32); sec Willy Rordorf, Liturgie,foi et ve i des premiers
Chretiens (Paris: Beauchesne, 1986), 233. This light however, is itself founded on faith. Those
,

160 Ellingworth, 566.

1 who are baptized havereceived a Christian instruction and pledge allegiance to God in the n�e
16 See Heb. 12:2. of Christ. Baptism is not the illumination itself but its seal (Rordorf, 239). It has nothmg
162 See Palmer Hermeneutics, 212.
,
214 Chap. 5: Hermeneutics and Theology
Michel de Certeau's interpretation of the encounter of Peter and Cornelius in
Acts 10 provides an excellent illustration of the Sachlichkeit of faith. This
encounter manifests the medial experience of the work of faith, of faith that
works us and faith that we work. Peter and Cornelius converted each other: both
listened to their faith and to each other's faith and understood it differently. Peter,
following his faith against his inclination, came to appreciate it in a universal
light and was able to recognize a neighbor in the other. Cornelius was able to
name what he already knew, a truth already present to his prayers. Certeau argues
that Peter did not try to bracket himself and to put himself into Cornelius'
vantage point. Peter not only agreed to meet a Roman despite the ritual
prohibition to be in contact with a foreigner. He also let something be told to
himself by the encounter with Cornelius. He let his faith tell itself to himself
differently, in this case its universality. Certeau writes:
Aussi Pierre n'envisage-t-il pas de «Se mettre au point de vue de l'autre» : par un tel projet,
d'ailleurs illusoire, par une mise entre parentheses de ce qu'il est, de ce qu'il croit, de ce que Dieu
le fait, il se retirerait Ia possibilite de se rendre plus fidele, avec le paYen qui deroute ses
conceptions, au Dieu qui les elargit. II ne concilie pas. Il rejoint plus profondemcnt celui qui unit
deux etrangers en revelant au pai'en sa verite chn)tienne et au Chretien sa verite d'honune.167
Peter's experience shows that faith is not an object but the ongoing experience
ofw1derstanding one's faith and oneself in it in relation to others. Through their
encounter, led by their faith, Peter and Cornelius came to understand themselves
anew within their renewed understanding of their faith. Certeau's interpretation
of Acts 10 brings to language faith as an event ofunderstanding that involves the
believer but does not belong to him or her exclusively. Just like the speaker of
any language who begins to sound the volume of his or her words, the believer
who gets seriously involved in his or her faith realizes that faith involves more
than him or her. Faith is an encompassing medial experience.
In Hebrews 1 1 : 1 faith echos the Gadamerian Sache. Faith is sachlich: it is
something that we under-stand by believing and getting involved in. Both Peter
and Cornelius were deeply involved in their faith, but they were by no means
actively mastering it. They were both partaking i n and of something that befell
them. The mediality and Sachlichkeit of faith as a hermeneutic experience tears
down the notion that faith is an object the subject possesses or receives. It shows
that faith is not external, although it comes from outside because we have to let
it be told to ourselves, and it shows that faith is not an individual and subjective
Erlebnis, although it is an experience we make. As a Sache we experience, faith
is a constant interpretative effort. To say, for instance, that faith is God's gift or
spectacular. The illumination is in the words, not in a magical rite. To say it in a provocative
fashion, what the eyes of faith see, we can only hear it; we must let it be told to ourselves. See
also l Cor. 13:12 ("For now we see in mirror dimly, but then face to face"), 2 Cor. 4:18 (". . . we
look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen"), and 2 Cor. 5:7 ("for
we walk by faith, not by sight") (NAS).
167 Michel de Certeau, "Situations culturelles, vocation spirituelle Chrisws43 {1964): 305.
,"
The Mediality ofFaitl1 215
to understand its universal scope are particular understandings of faith. Every
different understanding allows the believers to enter the hermeneutic circle of
faith in a particular way which in turn in-forms their faith (as noted, the work of
the Sache affects the subject as well as the Sache). Even to call faith medial is
just one more way of entering the hermeneutic circle offaith. Its main innovation
is that it listens to the verb and attempts to situate the believing subject within it.
It is not a Copernican revolution a la Kant or a pick-and-choose believing a la
carte. The middle voice does notchange the perspective by swapping subject and
object or turning faith into something ad libitum. Understood medially, faith is
an experience and a linguistic event that ultimately yields a different
understanding ofthe self. The authority God gave to Adam to name things neither
puts language in command nor turns it into a labeling kit at our disposal.168 So
with faith: faith does not just befall us nor is it something we control. Hebrews
shows us faith as a Sache. It is nothing independent from the process it involves
the believer in. Gadamer's interpretation of the motto Zu den Sachen selbst
applies to faith as well: the focus is not subjects and objects but the self­
givenness offaith and the believing subject within it.
In this chapter, I examined Gadamer's use oftheological and religious themes
and pointed to a tension between philosophical hermeneutics and his explicit
(Protestant) theology. I argued that he did not apply back to theology the insights
he gained from it for hermeneutics, although he left tbe door back to theology
ajar. My interpretation of faith as a medial experience attempted to open this door
a little more and to show that it is the mediality of hermeneutics (and not just its
reading of tradition) that truly engages theology. The conclusion goes one step
farther: it draws theological implications from the medial interpretation of
hermeneutics not only with regard to faith but also to the human condition. It
underscores that both Gadamer's philosophical intention and Paul's injunction
to the Philippians in Philippians, chapter 2, verses 12 and 13, yield a medial
understanding ofour condition. Despite this likeness, however, a tension emerges
between hermeneutics and theology that is different from the tension we observed
in Gadarner's explicitly theological texts: hermeneutics incessantly seeks to be
at home in the world within the medium of language whereas theology and faith
can only be at home in so far as they keep asking "Where is home?"
168
SeeGJV/,448.

Conclusion
The interpretation of faith as a medial experience is the outcome of the medial
interpretation of hermeneutics. This study shows that understanding is a medial
process and that theology and faith are not as exceptional as Gadamer argues.
Chapter one describes the middle voice from a linguistic and philosophical point
of view. Chapter two is an overview ofthe literature about Gadamer' s work. It
concludes that very few commentators actually ponder the mediality of play (and
thus understanding) Gadarner talks about, although many write around it; some
authors even go so far as to cut out of the passages they quote the explicit
references of the medial meaning of play! Chapter three dwells on the event
character ofunderstanding by examining play, fusion ofhorizon(s), and linguistic
speculation. This triple account of the hermeneutic event denotes that
understanding happens to the subject. Chapter four describes understanding from
the standpoint of the sub-ject within it. It asks: what is the subject's role in the
event ofunder-standing? Together, chapters three and four underscore the subtle
balance in Gadamer's hermeneutics between understanding and the subject
within it; they amplify the fruitful ambiguity inherent in Bewuftt-sein, in being
and being conscious ofit Finally, chapter five directs the discussion into the field
of theology. Although Gadamer integrates theological and religious ways of
thinking into philosophical hermeneutics, his Protestantism seems to lag behind
his hermeneutics: the kerygma tends to be at best an extreme form of
hermeneutics and at worst an exception to it. Despite the tension between
hermeneutics and Gadamer's interpretation of Christianity in general and
Protestantism in particular, Gadamer does not put a wedge or a definite one-way
sign between hermeneutics and theology. He is in fact adamant about the
necessity of dialogue between the world religions, and between philosophy and
the many religions. It is this impetus into theology I follow when I give a medial
interpretation of faith as a hermeneutic experience. The medial interpretation of
faith based on the mediality of understanding suggests that hermeneutics is
theologically pregnant because it is middle-voiced. It is the mediality of
understanding and not only the rehabilitation of tradition or, for that matter, the
notions of application and dialogue that make philosophical hermeneutics so
valuable to the work of theology.
The innovation of the middle voice is that it says positively what the collapse
of the subject/object dichotomy expresses only negatively. Rather than saying
that something is no more, the middle voice offers a different way of thinking:
this different way consists in listening to the verb. By turning up the volume of
the verb, it relocates the subject, extricating him or her from his or her opposition
Conclusion 217
to the object and placing him or her within the process the verb expresses. The
more one listens to the verb the more audible it becomes that our actions are not
exclusively ours. We are not the exclusive subjects of our actions, Jet alone ofour
understanding of the world and ourselves within it.
The hermeneutic humility that puts the subject within a process that happens
to him or her resembles the Christian humility before God. Hermeneutics says
that we are conversation; from a Christian perspective we are in Christ. There is
an obvious affinity between the two positions. Both bespeak the mediality of our
condition: we are within a process that takes place, which we do not master or
possess. We noted that Gadamer's concern in Truth and Method is philosophical
and that it strongly underscores the process of understanding encompassing the
subject. As he puts it: "Mein eigentlicher Anspruch aber war und ist ein
philosophischer: Nicht, was wir tun, nicht, was wir tun sollten, sondem was uber
unser Wollen und Tun hinaus mit uns geschieht, steht in Frage."1 Gadamer does
not prescribe; he describes. He describes the conversation that we are. Although
this passage emphasizes the process more than the subject, because Gadamer
wants to make clear that philosophical hermeneutics is not about a new system
of rules of interpretation, the title Truth and Method already suggests the subtle
balance between event and subject I have pursued throughout this study.
Gadamer may have thought that the process needed reaffirming at the time he
wrote Truth and Method,2 but, as I have shovvn, the subject by no means
vanishes. Gadamer's description is surely no prescription; it nonetheless has
moral implications since it affects our way ofbeing. It is not without reason that
for Bernstein philosophical hermeneutics is the heir of practical philosophy!3
The wording ofGadamer's concern is reminiscent ofPaul's injunction to the
Philippians. Paul writes in Philippians, chapter 2, verses 12 and 13:
1zTherefore, my dear friends, as you have always obeyed - not only in my presence, but now
much more in my absence- continue to work out your salvation with fear and trembling, c;for
it is God who works in you to will and to act according to his good purpose. (NIV)
The parallelism is astonishing. Gadamer's concern is about something that
happens to the understanding subject beyond his or her willing and doing.
Similarly Paul enjoins to the Philippians to work out their salvation because God
is at work in and among them, working their willing and acting.
Just as it is crucial to maintain the subtle balance of event and subject in the
hermeneutic process, so it is important to keep verses 12 and 1 3 together.
Joachim Gnilka underlines that the "paradox must remain. Everything depends
1 "Vorwort zur 2. Auflage," GW2, 438.
2 See Weinsheimer, 15-36.
3 See Bernstein, l45f.
218 Conclusion
on God and everything depends on man.'>4 Barth also is adamant about reading
these two verses together. If one separates them, the temptation is to use one to
explain the other in the attempt to settle the interminable dispute between
Augustinian and Pelagian-minded people, between those who tend to hold that
humans are resourceless and those who hold that humans have some assets
available to them.s Verse 1 3 is not just "artillery" against the Papists, as Calvin
has it.6
One way ofholding together what Paul is telling the Philippians is to interpret
it medially. Besides the apparently paradoxical juxtaposition ofthese two verses,
both the context of the passage and the interplay of the verbs Paul uses point to
the mediality of our (Christian) condition. First, these verses come just after the
famous Christological hymn. As Gunther Bornkamm argues, the hymn about
Jesus Christ's humiliation and exaltation is not only an example for the
Philippians to emulate.7 Paul does not present Jesus Christ as a model but rather
as the medium of the Philippians' lives. The hymn shows Christ as the one in
whom the Philippians ought to live as Paul asks them to. To be in Christ is not
just to imitate a model. It is an act that it is not exclusively the Philippians'
achievement since God is at work in and amongthem. Further, the beginning of
verse 12, "as you have always obeyed," refers back to the exhortations at the
beginning of the chapter and confirms the Philippians' obedience. YmlKOUW, · in their pursuit.8
"to obey," s
i an active voice. Together with the imperative no1ein: in verse 14,
also an active, it underscores that the Philippians act and must act The fact that
tm-aKou<.> is reminiscent of the Gadarnerian ZugehOri.gkeit and the wordplay
horen-hOrig does not imply that the Philippians are passive. Obedience does not
contradict the medial reading of this passage. The focus on the location of the
subject with reference to the verb by no means erases the fact that the subject acts
and must act. What changes is the understanding ofthe subject's actions: instead
of being set against an object and acting upon it from outside, the middle-voiced
subject is within his or her actions happening to him or her. He or she is not the
exclusive subject of the process the verb expresses. He or she is also its subject.
In my reading, the combination of verses 12 and 13 and their context precisely
intimate this kind of encompassed action.
Second, if we look at the Greek verbs in our passage it is interesting to note
that Paul uses the middle-voiced 'Ka'tepy<i(oJ.Lal for the Philippians and the
active cvepyew for God. When Paul enjoins to the Philippians to work out their
4 Joachim Gnilka, "The Epistle to the Philippians," in The Epislle to the Philippians and the
Epistle to the Colossans,
i by Joachim Gnilka and Franz Mussner, trans. R. A. Wilson (New York:
Herder and Herder, !971), 41.
5 . See Karl Barth, Erkliirung desPhilipperbriefes (Mtincben: Cbr. Kaiser Verlag, J 928), 69.
6 SeeJohn Calvin, The Epistles ofPaul the Apostle to the Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians
and Colossians, trans. T. H. L. Parker, ed
.
. David W. Torrance and Thomas F. Torrance (Grand
Ra!)ds
i , Mich.: Wrn. B. Eerdmans, 1965), 253-257.
7 See Bomkamm, 207f.
Conclusion 219
salvation, he uses a middle-voiced verb. The implication is that to work out one's
salvation is not something I can claim for myself: I do not master my salvation,
but we can and must work it out together. We are taken in a process that is
beyond us but of which we are also subject The second verb is God's action.
· Evepye<.> is active. God works the Philippians' willing and doing. At first it
seems that God is at work and that the Philippians do nothing. A more careful
reading, however, reveals that the willing and doing God works in the Philippians
is still theirs. It is still the Philippians who wiU and act. The subjects in these two
verses become strangely polyphonic the more one listens to them. At first sight,
it looks as though the Philippians work in verse 1 2 and God in verse 13. If we
listen to the verbs, however, the Philippians work out their salvation because God
works in and among them, and the willing and doing God works in the
Philippians is still theirs. Whereas a superficial reading leads to an
incomprehensible division of labor between the Philippians and God, a more
attentive reading brings to language a semantic crossover between the
grammatical subjects of the Philippians' working out their salvation and God's
working their willing and doing in and among them. The Philippians are
encompassed in the process of their salvation; they are involved in it, they are
called to work it out, yet not on their own because ofthe event that carries them
Does the proximity between Gadamer's philosophical concern and the
injunction addressed to the Philippians mean that there is no difference between
understanding and believing in Christ? As this study shows, understanding is
medial, and the relevance of hermeneutics for theology lies particularly in its
mediality. Theology is the interpretation ofthe Christian message. It is a way of
speaking about how we understand ourselves that grows out of faith and returns
to faith as it tunes always anew its language in its ongoing quest for meaning.
Theology and faith are hermeneutic. The never ending dialogical process of the
hermeneutic event also takes place in them. Theology and faith are linguistic
events like any understanding. To believe in the Christian traditions and to
ponder and study them, one must let them be told to oneself, one must listen to
them so as to belong to them. Despite this proximity, however, theology and faith
are not philosophical hermeneutics. Henneneutics strongly emphasizes heimisch
8 It s i important to note that Katepy<i(O)!lU is a middle deponent. It bas a middle form with
an active meaning. It is also found in the passive with a passive meaning. Therefore, it would be
imprecise to say that Paul used a middle voice; he used a verb that happens to be a middle
deponent. See also Rom. 1:27, 2:9,4:15, 5:3, 7:8, 13, 15, 17f., 20, 15:18, 1 Cor. 5:3, 2 Cor. 4:17,
5:5, 7: !Of., 9:11, 12:12 (this verb also occurs in Eph. 6:13, James I :3, and I Pet. 4:3). In fact, the
question is not so much what Paul intended when he wrote this passage as what the text says.
When I point out the interplay ofthe verbal voices, my goal is to try to understand the text we
have from a middle-voiced standpoint. For a more detailed analysis of the verbs in these two
verses see my article "The MediaJity of Our Condition: A Christian Interpretation," Journal of
the American Academy ofReligion 67/2 (June 1999): 41 8-424.
220 Conclusion Conclusion 221

werden, the never ending task of being at home in this world. Hermeneutics is
immanent. Its house is language, not so much "im Verfolgen der geheimen Adem
im Urgestein der Sprache,"9 as Heidegger did, but in the ongoing conversation
that we are. Linguisticality means that we have to let the world, and ultimately
ourselves, be told to ourselves.
For hermeneutics it is the encompassing give and take of a successful
conversation that leads to a place that is familiar to us and within which we can
be at home together, ifonly for a while.10 In general, we are not conscious ofour
inhabiting the words that are familiar to us. It is only where words are a work
such as a poem that they become for us what they truly are: they totally
encompass us, and we let them be there as we dwell in them. 11 Unlike one's
mother tongue or any other language which tells us the world, poetry grants us
nothing but the proximity of language itself. In poetry the process ofbeing caught
in language is the most acute. 12 The word about the Word, however, does not
make us heimisch according to Gadamer. The Christian message does not open
a wealth ofpossibility, but it shuts down all our possibilities of being at home. As
noted, Gadamer argues that the Christian message is not a symbol that we
recognize but a sign that we must be given. 13
Heimisch werden in this world is problematic, but not because ofthe so-called
paradox oftbe kerygma, which, according to Gadamer, we must be shown since
we cannot recognize it. To be at borne in the world (without being of the world)
is in fact an inherent problem in Christian theology and faith. Both theology and
faith work on being at home by asking "Where is it that we are to be at home?"
Home itself, the world as home, becomes a question. For Christians, life is also
a continuous process, but it is often taken to be a journey in a foreign land. For
instance, the faithful listed as models of faith in Hebrews 1 1 were all strangers
and exiles on the earth; they could have gone back to the places they came from.
but they desired a better homeland, a heavenly country.14 Philippians 3:20 points
in the same direction when it states that our commonwealth is in heaven.
IIoA.i-reu�a, "commonwealth," "state," is interesting because it often designates
a colony of foreigners or relocated veterans; moreover the corresponding verb,
noA.tteUOf.lCC\ only occurs in the middle voice in the early Christian literature,15
and the Vulgate translates it conversor, a deponent. Today it is difficult to think
of a heavenly place in physical terms, as of a world like the one we know, only
better, and ofourselves as called to a sublime destiny as though we were not fully
part of this sublunar world. Today, to be in the world and not ofthe world does
not separate us from the world but places us in it differently. We are earthlings,
and we are in the process of learning to be responsible for our home in the
universe while at the same time becoming more aware ofhow tenuous our being
6
is in the voluminous universe. 1
Ifit is true that faith is a medial hermeneutic experience then theology is not
a special hermeneutic case, and yet it is different from hermeneutics. Both the
hermeneutic truth and the Christian kerygma are things that we must let ourselves
be told and within which we must familiarize ourselves. The tension is elsewhere.
Christian fuith is a dissident voice. It says that to be at home implies that we
move. There are many understandings of the world and therefore various ways
of living in it and sharing it with others. Did not Peter go beyond the ritual
prohibition to be in contact with foreigners and move on to an understanding of
the world open to everyone when he and Cornelius got involved in the work of
faith as it is related in Acts l 0? Peter underwent a hermeneutic event, and he
came to be at home in a different world, a world that included the pagans.
Christian faith does not take the world for granted precisely because it
understands it as being granted by God. The world is entrusted to the believers.
They belong to the world by letting it be told to them, but they also understand
themselves as being responsible for the kind of world they are in. To be at home,
yes! But where, in what world? That is also the question. Theology and faith not
only tell the world, but they also make us question it.

9 "Erirmerungen an Heideggers Anfange," GWJO, 12.

10 See "Heidegger und die Sprache," GWJ0, 28 andalso Schott, 205-208.
11 See "Sein Geist Gott,", GW3, 329.
2
1 See "Ober den Beitrag der Dichtkunst bei der Sucbe nach Wahrheit," GWB, 78f.
13 See "Asthetische und religiose Erfabrung," GW8, 152f.
14 See Heb. 1 1 : 13-16.
IS 16 See, for instance, Gordon D. Kaufman, "On Thinking of God as Serendipitous Creativity,"
See A Greek-English Lexicon ofthe New Testament and OtherEarly Christian Literature,
3'd ed. (BDAG), s.v. "noJ..itEUJ.1«" and "noh't£UOJ.l<lt." JAAR 6912 (June 2001): 409-425.
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New Testament

Mark 2 Corinthians
2:27 161 n. 179 4:17 219 n. 8
16:12 4 4:18 214 n. 166
5:5 219 n. 8
John 5:7 214 n. 166
John 20:1f., 11-18 201 n. 120 7:10f. 219 n. 8
9:11 219 n. 8
Acts ofthe Apostles 12:12 219 n. 8
1:1 12
10 5, 204, 214, Galatians
221 2:16 206 n. 133
4 32
Romans
1:27 219 n. 8 Ephesians
2:9 219 n. 8 6:13 219 n. 8
3:28 204, 206 n. 133
4:5 48 Philippians
4:15 219 n. 8 2:12f. 5, 215,
5:3 219 n. 8 217-219
7:8, 13, 15, 17f., 20 219 IL 8 2:6-ll 176
8 32 3:20 220
10:17 180, 213 n. 163
15:18 219 n. 8 1 Thessalonians
5:2 177 n. 17
1 Corinthians
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13:12 214 n. 166 1: If. 176
242 Indices

4:2 213n. 165 12:2 212 n. 161

6:4 213 n. 166 13:22 213
10:32 213 n. 166
10:36 211 n. 157 James
11:1 4, 172, 204, 1:3 219 n. 8 Index of Names
206-2 1 2 , 2 1 4 2:24 206 n. 133
I I :4ff. 212 Aeschylus, 129-13 I , 134 Ebeling, Gerhard, 59
1 1 : 1 3-16 220 n. 14 I Peter Andersen, Paul Kent, 9-11, 20 Ellingwortb, Paul, 207, 2 1 2
12:1 2 1 1 n. 157 4:3 219 n. 8 Arce-Arenales, Manuel, 1 2 Engels, Friedrich, 163
Aristotle, 18, 22, 43, 100, 123, 127-129, Erasmus, Desiderius, 207
131, 134, 139-143, 147, 176 Feuerbach, Ludwig, 19
Attridge, Harold W., 206 n. 136, 207, 2 1 0 Forget, Philippe, l l8f.
n. 153 Fox, Barbara A., 12
Augustine, 18lf., 183 n. 46 Frank, Manfred, 1 18f.
Axelrod, Melissa, 12 Fruchon, Pierre, 127 n. 66, 173 n. 6
Bacon, Francis, 128 Garrett, Jan Edward, 83, 85
Barber, E. J. W., 14, 1 5 n. 26, 1 9 Garrison, James D., 186 n. 58
Barth, Karl, 3, 4 n . 4, 59, 177f., 189, 218 Geluck, Philippe, 186 n. 60
Benveniste, Emile, 2, 7f., 14f., 20, 23-25, Giv6n, T., 19
27, 30f., 35, 48, 75, 77f., 84f., 1 1 2f., Gnitka, Joachim, 217, 218 n. 4
138, 161 Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von, 168
Bernstein, Richard J., 42f., 89 n. 78, 140, Gonda, Jan, 13f., 16, 23f.
217 Grasser, Erich, 206f., 210, 2 1 1 n. 155
Blass, F., 8 n. 2, 1 2 n. 18 Greisch, Jean, 90 n. 82, 99, 1 1 7
Bluhm, Heinz S., 204 n. 128 Grondin, Jean, 46-49, 60, 62 n. l, 65 n.
Blumenberg, Hans, I07f. 14, 67f., 72 n. 37, 84 n. 69, 87f., 89 n.
Bomkarnm, GUnther, 206 nn. 133f., 218 78, 90 n. 82, 92 n. 86, 95 n. 94, 96, 1 15,
Brown, Raymond E., 196 n. 100, 206 n. 126 n. 56, 145, 147 n. 132, 160, 162 n.
133 186, 172, 174n. 7, 177n. 19, 178, 179
Bultmann, Rudolf, SOf., 59, 177f., 185 n. 3 1 , 203 n. 127
Calvin, Jean, 207-209, 218 Grotius, Hugo, 207 n. 143
Caputo, John D., 25, 68 n. 22, 120, 173f. Haberrnas, Jfugen, 42, 97, 149
Carr, ThomasK., 72 n. 37, 172 n. I, 173 Hans, James S., 33f., 65 n. 14, 89 n.78
n.6 Hays, Richard B., 210 n. 153, 213 n. 163
Celan, Paul, 168f. Hegel, G. W. F., 34, 38, 43, 49, 51, 63,
de Certeau, Michel, 204, 214 91, 104f. , l l 0f., 118, 120, 122-124, 129,
Chang, Ting-Kuo, 77 n. 48, 89 n. 78, 95 n. 131, 134, 165, 176
94, 127 n. 66, 140 Heidegger, Martin, 17, 20-26, 28, 33-35,
Cornelius (the Roman centurion), 204, 38f., 46f., 51, 62 n. 1, 65, 67-69, 71, 84,
214,221 94, 97, 104, 1 10f., 1 1 3f., 116f., 120,
Culpepper, R. Alan, 201 n. 120 122f., 144, 150, 153, 159, 163, 165,
Dali, Salvador, 79 170, 172, 177£,220
Debrunner, A., 8 n. 2, 1 2 n. 1 8 Heraclitus, 170, 200
Derrida, Jacques, 24f., 29, 33, 62 n. I, Hesiod, 192
120, 121 n. 39, 134f., 190 Hilberath, Bernd Jochen, 56f., 173 n.6
Dilthey, Wilhelm, 39, 77, 82, 127 Hirsch, E. D., 83
Dionysios Tbrax, I Of. Holder1in, Friedrich, 159, 166, 169
Dostal, Robert J., 66n. 18, 96, 104 n. 129, Homer, 192
110, 120 n. 36, n. 38, 137, 162, 165 Hu�nga, Johan, 69
Duke, Paul D., 201 n. 120 Husserl, Edmund, 78, 110, ! !Sf.
Dulles, Avery, 205 n. 130 Isaacs, Marie E., 206 n. 132
Dunn, James D. G., 210 n. !53 Jeanrond, Werner G., 53, 173 n. 6
244
Jesus Christ, 4, 19, 49f., 52, 57, 59,
174-177, 179-182, 185, 198,201 n.
120, 205 n. 129, 206, 208{., 210 n.153,
2 1 1 {., 213 n. 166, 217-219
Kahn, Charles H., 121 f.
Kant, Immanuel, 66, 117, 123, 125, 134,
137,215
Kaufman, Gordon D., 221
Kemmer, Suzanne, 9, 14
Kierkegaard, Seren, 60, I l l, 177, 186
Kisiel, Theodore, 2 1 f., 25, 46f., 177 n. 16
Klaiman, M. H., 9 n. 3, II o. 97
Kogler, Hans-Herbert, 36f., 65 n. 14, 77 n.
48,95 n. 94
Koller, Hermann, 9f., 1 1 n. 10, 12 n. 13
Krieger, David J., 173 n. 6
Kuhn, Helmut, 77 n. 48
Kiing, Hans, 1 9 n. 34,205 n. 130
Lacan, Jacques, 1 1 8
Lakoff, R., 19
Lesky, Albin, 130
Li, Charles N., 9 n. 4
Llewelyn, John, 14, 22-25, 32f., 46
Luther, Martin, 82, 154, 194, 198, 204,
207, 209
Lyons, John, 10 n. 8, 13
Macintyre, Alasdair, 43f., 74 n. 41
Margolis, Joseph, 120
Mary Magdalene, 20 I n. 120
MeKelway, Alexander J., 205 n. 130
Meillet, Antoine, ll, 1 2 n. 12
Melanchthon, Philipp, 207 n. 143
Meno, 148
Nietzsche, Friedrich 78, 135
, 173 n. 6, 178 n. 24
Ommen, Thomas B., 178 n. 21, 191
Palmer, Richard E., 34f., 65 n. 14, 82 n.
62, 83, 89 n. 78, 92 n. 86, 95 n. 94, 98,
100, 103, 188 n. 70,212
Panini, 8
Pannenbcrg, Wolfhart, 49-52
Paul, 5, 17 n. 30, 32, 48f., 176f., 180, 196,
206, 210 n. 153, 213, 215, 217f., 219 n.
8 96, 1 10f., 126 n. 56
Pelikan, Jaroslav, 180 n. 36, 181 o. 42,
188 n. 69
Pcradotto, John, 7 Webber, Robert E., 173
Peter, 5, 204, 214, 221
Petit, Jean-Claude, 4, 173 n. 6
Plato, 17, 37, 104, 1 10, 1 1 9f., 126,
134-136, 139, 147f., 152, 162, 169,
172, 180, 192
Indices Indices 245
Price, James L., 205 o. 130 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 58 n. 92, 1 1 0 Yang, Lynne, 1 9
Quirk, R., 1 9 Wright, Kathleen, 96, IOOf., 1 2 1 n. 39 Zeno ofCitium, II
Ramberg, Bj0m T., 78 n. 51 Wyclif, John, 209 Zwingli, Ulrich, 198, 207 n. 143
Renaud, M., 77 n. 48, 173 n. 6
Rica:ur, Paul, 30, 39, 53, 55, 60, 65 n. 14,
83,94 n. 9 1
Rilke, Rainer Maria, 49, 152, 206
Ringma, Charles Richard, 92 n. 86
Risser, James, 39-41, 65 n. 14, 127 D. 66,
147 n. 132, 158 n. 168
Robertson, A. T., 8 n. 2, 13 D. 2 1 , 1 7 n. 30
Robinson, James M., 59, 178 o. 23, n. 25
Rordorf, Willy, 213, n. 166
Rorty, Richard, 34 n. 8, 44-46, 62 n. I
Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 95
Schott, Robin, 4 1f., 220 n. I 0
Schrag, Calvin 0., 29f., 1 1 2
Schweiker, William, 60, 74n . 4 1 , n. 43
Scott, Charles E., 16, 17 n. 31, 25-29
Sihler, Andrew L., 10 n. 8
Simon, Josef, 135 n. 86
Smith, Wilfred Cantwell, 209f.
Smyth, Herbert Weir, 12f., 17 n. 30, 24 n.
49
Socrates, 17f., 104, 119, 123, 139, 148,
166
Spicq, Ceslas, 206
Stachel, Gfulter, 177 n. 20, 178 n. 27
Stambaugh, Joan, 74 n. 43
Stuhlmueller, Carroll, 205 n. 130
Sullivan, Robert R., I I Of.
Tannen, Deborah, 18
Thiselton, Anthony C., 57-59, 95 n. 94,
n. 79 Thomas Aquinas, 61 n. 109, 183, 207-209
Thompson, James W., 206,209
Thompson, Sandra A., 9 n. 4
Tracy, David, 52-56, 173 n. 6
Valery, Paul, 142, 153
Vattirno, Gianni, 174-176, 190
Vico, Giambattista, 77
Wachterhauser, Brice R., 37-39, 65 n. 14,
Wallulis, Jerald, 94 n. 9 1
Warnke, Georgia, 7 1 n. 35
Weinsheimer, Joel C., 35f., 71 n. 35,90 11.
82, 92 n. 86, 94 n. 91, 217 11. 2
Wendel, Franvois, 208 n. 149
Westcott, Brooke Foss, 211, 213 n. 164
Westphal, Merold, 49 n. 63, 1 1 9

Index of subjects
absolute knowledge 105, 124, 129
active/passive (see "either/or" and
"subject and object") 2, 9-15, 18-26,
29-32, 36f., 46-48, 63, 70f., 80, 83f.,
100-102, 1 1 7f., 1 3 1 , 171,206,210
aesthetics (see "play") 10, 35, 67, 127
- aesthetic consciousness 66, 76
- aesthetic differentiation 66, 74, 76£., 98,
128
- aesthetic non-differentiation 66
- experience ofart 34f., 66f., 77, 98, 128,
150f., 185f., 188, 199, 213
- work of art 35, 66, 73, 76, 98, 128, 151,
186, 188, 198, 202
ambiguity, ambivalence 2f., 33, 57, 59,
70, 78f., 82, 87-89, 1 10f., 133, 138f.,
144-146, 153, 166, 170, 213, 216
- attempting and being tempted 143
- Gadamer oscillating 48, 70f., 79, 87,
124, 139, 141
- Versuch and Versuchung 124, 139
amen (see "yiyvo)laL, yiVO)l!n'1 16f.,
174, 187, 189
- thus it is, so ist es 152, 174, 187f.
anamnesis, recollection l39f., 148, 162
- recognition, Wiedererlrennung 74, 195f.,
199-201, 220
ancient Greek 8f., 12
- Koine8, 12
Anrede 92, 94f.
av6pwneOO)l«L 18, 140f.
anthropology (new, different, medial) 62
n. I, 176, 179, 185
anticipation of perfection or completeness
37, 156f., 178
- Vorgriffder Vol/kcmmenlreit 1 57
anO�a(VO)l«L 17, 22
appUcation 32, 51, 55, 89f., 106, 125,
140-142, 179, 185, 188-190, 216
arcbjtecture 76f., 84
assistance 72, 106
Aussage (see "Sage" and "Zusage'') 51,
194
authority
- and tradition 56, 149, 173
- oftheChurch 192f., 195
- ofthe written word (see "eminent texts"
and '\vrittcn word") 154
- preacher vs. judge 1 9 1
autonomy
- ofp1ay 35, 37, 73
- of (written) language (see "eminent
texts" and "written word 1 153f., 156,
'
166, 193
bad infinity I 04, 122
balance I, 3, 16, 20, 28, 30, 33, 37, 4If.,
46, 48, 6Hi3, 70, 78, 89, 107-110,
113, 1 1 5, I 17-119, 138, 143, 145,
170f., 174, 176,203, 2 16f.
becoming better at something that happens
to us (e.g. mother tongue) 53, 136, 142,
164, 188, 2 1 3
belongingness, Zugehorigkeit (see
"hearing") 49, 76, 92, 94f., 99f., I 03,
105, 108, 117, 127, 132, 141, 171, 180,
184, 200f., 211, 213 n. 163, 218
"between" 29f., Ill, 131
Bildung 45,62 n. I , 133, 160f.
building (see "transformation into
structure") 62 n. I, 73, 76f., 154f.
by heart (learning, knowing) 153, 168,
170
catalytic function ofthe middle voice 14,
16
Christian message (Gadamer and) (see
"sign vs. symbol") 190-192, 194-203,
220
- incomprehensibility (see "fides
quaerens inteilectum" s.v. "faith as
medial experience") 171, 197-199,
202-204
- promise (see "Zusage") 193-195, 199f.,
202
- sermon4, 191, 200f.
Christology (Gadamer and) (see "word
and Sache, speaking and thinking")
179-185
- Trinitarian speculation 3, 176, 179, 181,
183-185, 189, 198
classics 54f., 153
conceptual analyses 122, 162-164, 180
consciousness
Indices
- hermeneutic 37, 109, 117, 127, 143f.,
150
- historical 77f., 132, 188
consciousness is morebeing than being
conscious 2f., 62, 66, 84, 103, 109, 1 17,
144, 174, 188,216
- BewujJt-sein I n 1., 2, 174, 216
consciousness ofthe effect ofhistory,
wirkungsgeschichtliches BewujJtsein 36,
45, 57, 76, 109, 144f., 149
- Wirkungsgeschi
chte, 90f., 118
contemporaneity (see "Dabeisein" s.v.
"partaking in and of' and "verwei/en'}
115, 157f., 160, 186-188
conversation (our being) 67, 95, 101, 109,
121, 127, 139f., 146, 217, 220
cor-respond I n. I, I l l
- Entsprechen I l l, 120, 148
critique (issue of) 39, 42, 53, 55, 146, 148,
157 n. 165
Dahingestelltseinlassen 90, 160
Dasein 26, 28, I 13, lSI, 177f.
deponent verbs I I , 12 n. 16, 99 n. 109,
219 n. 8, 220
dialectic
- Hegelian 11 0, 129, 175
- Platonic 147
- question and answer 37, 64, 92, 95, 99,
118, 134f., 139
OUXAeyO)l!U 17
dialogue between the world religions
(Gadamer and) 177, 190,216
athesis (see "verbal process n
di i relation
to the subject") 9f., 27f.
- external diathesis !Sf., 71, 75, 85, I l l,
126, 130
- internal diathesis 2f., 15, 17f., 20-25,
27, 29-32, 35, 40, 42, 47-49, 51, 56,
70, 75, 77f., 84, 113, 161
distance 50, 52, 58, 87, 91, 157-159
division oflabor (between God and
humans) 204f., 2 1 1 , 2 1 9
docta ignora111ia (see "good wiII" and
"humility (hermeneutic)") 135f., 166
Drinsein m i Worte 102f., 154
Eigengesetzlichkeit (language's) 95
einleuchten (see "lautwerden") 67, 107f.
either/or (see "active/passive" and
"subject and objecf') 3, 30, 37, 42, 109,
1 1 1 , 1 18, 145, 2!0n. 153
CA&YXO<; 207, 21 1
247
elevation to a higher level of generality
86f., 119, 133, 138
eminent function ofhermeneutics in
theology 202f.
eminent texts (see "ofthe written word"
s.v. "authority" and "of (written)
language" s.v. "autonomy'} 65,
152-154, 158f., 165, 167, 193f., 196,
198f.
evepyel!X (see "Vollzug") 10, 147f., 159,
161, 166, 174
epigraph of Truth and Method 49, 1 1 4 n.
20, 206
epistemology 39, 45
Ereignis (Heidegger's) 28, 38, 1 1 7
Eifahrun.g 43, 66, 68, 77, 1 16, 119,
127-13 1 , 134, 145, 1 5 1
- Erlebnis 127f., 214
etymologies l n. l, 8, 17, 21, 30, 103f.,
163
faith as medial experience I, 5, 173, 207,
21 1-216,221
- faith as sachlich 204, 214
- faith not under-stood 196, 20I
-fides ex auditu (see "hearing") 180,213
-fides quaerens intellectum (see
"incomprehensibility" s.v. "Christian
message") 4, 188 n. 69
-fiducia 204, 207-209
festival,Fest (see "temporality") 74f.,
186f.
- begehen, Begehung 75, 186
finitude 30, 42, 50, 56, 6 1 , 97, 128, 130f.,
134, 145, 149, 184
following the lead oftheSaeire (see
"meaning as direction," "Nachfolge,"
and "Spur") 104, 1 1 3f., 125f., 136, 139,
156, 160, 171, 195, 213f.
foregrounding. Abhebung 85-87, 137
forgetfulness 143
- forgetfulness of Being 38, 62 n. I
freedom within (see "'within"') 32, 36,
149, 155f., 16lf., 165, 189, 213
fusion ofhorizon(s} 3, 34, 49-51, 54, 58,
64f., 76, 77-95, 98, 104, 107, 109(,
114, 126, 143, 157, 216
- "fusion of horizons" 78f.
- more knowledge or different
knowledge? 87-89
- understanding differently rather than
better 87f., 143
248 Indices Indices 249

Y<X!!eOJl<XI (see "marriage, get married")
2f., 16, 18, 19, 133, ISO
Gegenstand 57, 66, 80, 91, l02f., 115,
126, 1 3 1 , 174, 197
- Gegen-stand vs. Unter-stand 103
genitive (subjective and objective) 59,
IOOf., 145, 185, 193,210 n. 153
Geschehen 63, 91, 174, 182
get-passive 19f., 22, 85, 124
gift and task 149
y(yvO)lCil, yivO)lCLt (see "amen") 16, 121
- yevo1to 17 n. 30, 187 n. 69
glacier (analogy ofthe) (see "weather map
(analogy ofthe)") 80-82, 88, 94
good will (see "docta ignoranti
a" and
"moral aspect ofhenneneutics") l34f.,
157
Greek advantage 103f., 179
hearing (see "belongingness,
Z11geh0rigket,"
i "fides ex a11ditu" s.v.
"faith as medial experience," and
"sharpen one's ears") 94f., 100, l07f.,
200f.
hermeneutic circle 5 1 , 57, 84, 1 13f., 164f.,
189, 211
- hermeneutic circle offaith 215
hermeneutic key (the middle voice as) I,
7f., 25
heteronomy ofreligious texts 193
historicity 52, 56f., 84, 93f., 1 10, 120,
l28f., 177, 188
home (being at; heimisch, daheim) 5, 40f.,
95, 197, 199f., 2 1 5 , 2 19-221
house 30, !50
- ofbeing 5, 28, 33
- oflanguage 35, 220
how much must one know to understand?
169[
humanism 62 n. 1
humanist philologist (Gadamer as) 62 n.
160, 162
human word (as opposed to the divine
Word) 183-185, 189, 198
humility (hermeneutic) (see "docta
ignorantia" and "the other might be
right") 127, 134-137, 150, 157, 174,
217
idealism 130, 146
ideality 72, 103, 106, 139, 152, 181
- ofwritten language (see "written word")
1 5 1 f., 1 55f.
identity and difference 54, 73-75, 80f.,
93, I05f., 139, I82f., l85f.
immanence 73, 81, 117, 130, 146, 159,
220
increase in being 38, 88, 101
insight, Einsicht 93, 138f., 170
intimacy 52, 85, 108, 137, 146f., ISO, 153,
1S7, 162, 170f., 181
involvere ("involvement" comes from
Lat.) 87
!-Thou relation (see "moral aspect of
hermeneutics" and "the other might be
right") 131-133
kenosis 174-176
kerygma 3, 5, 189-203, 216, 220f.
knowledge of God 205, 207-209
language as selfless action l 01-104
language speaks us 33f., 57, 63, 98, 101,
127, 158, 1 6 1 , 171
lautwerden (see "einleuchten")1 OS-1 08,
181
law ofre1igion (Vattimo) 175f.
letting something be told to oneself 5, 8,
37, 62f., 66, 74, 102, 132, 146, 160f.,
179, 194, 199, 2 1 0 n. 1S3, 214,
219-221
- sich lassen+ infinitive 22,63, 132, 161
limbo ofignorance (Scllwebe) 93, 99
limit, limitedness 25, SO, 78, 8S, 109, l32,
135, 144, 146, 1 5 1 , 1S4, 173, 179, 185,
189
linguisticality (see "universality") 32, 34,
42, 52, 57, 95-98, 108, 117, 121, 140,
143, 146f., 161-163, 180, 182-184,
203,220
- everything understandable is in
language S, 57, 96-98, 101, 146, 176,
213
- linguistic idealism 42, 97
I, - "Sein, das verstanden 1verden kann, ist
Spraclle'' 9S, 97
linguistic speculation (see "said and
unsaid" and "minor") 3, 64, 9S-107,
109, 119, 121, 126, 2 1 6
logos, Myo� 4, 22, 100, 103, 108, 110,
117, 123, 139, 147f., 166, 180-184, 19S
maieutic, )lCUeUO!!CU l7f., 119, 139
marriage, get married (see "y«)LEOJ!CU")
2f., 16, 19f., 27, 8S, 103, 109, 126, 133,
150,210, 212
meaning as direction (sec "following the
lead ofthe Sache," "Naclifolge," and
"Spur'') 5, 38, 62 n. I, 93f., 127, 139,
151, 158f., 164, 171
nnhaftem 85, 109
- Dimension von Si
- Richtungssinn 93, 151, 159
medium in a chemical sense 8, l 01
mens auctoris, author's intention 39, 73,
83, 131, 151, 155-157, 168, 196
metaphysics 25, 29, 38, 44, 62 n. l, 75,
94, 96, 114-116, 120, 130, 134, 140,
144, 154, 159, 165, 176
- ofbeauty 40, 67, 1 07f., 160, 193
- of light 67, 107
- of presence (see "etvcn" s.v. "ontology"
and "presencing'') 20, 120, 122, 144,
154
method
- absence of 168-170
- vs. truth 39
middle voice as hybrid 2, I I , I 5, 21, 31,
56, 131
middle-voiced path 32, 56
mimesis 9, 44, 60, 74
miracle
- oflanguage 183
- ofunderstanding I l lf., 183
mirror ("linguistic speculation") 97-101,
104, 106, 183f., 214 n. 166
moral aspect ofhermeneutics (see "good
will" and "!-Thou relation") 131f.,
l34f., 142f., 2 1 1 , 2 1 7
myths, 195-197, 199f.
- mythos and logos, 139f., 148f.
- myths interpret us 63, 149, 196
Nachfolge (see "following the lead ofthe
Sache," "meaning as direction," and
"Spur") 125f., 160
new hermeneutic 5 9
nihilism 142, 174-176
not to understand 170
ontology (see "par1alcing in and of') 19,
39,46, 49, 5l, S4f., 66, 112, 121, 174
- etvcx1 (see "of presence" s.v.
"metaphysics") 121 f.
- seyn 21f., 122
- Zeitwort 22, 122, 159
openness 40, 46, 50, 92, 96, 120, 127,
129, 132-136, 150, 159, 161, 190,203
- Empfiinglichkeit 133
the other migllt be right (see "humility
(hermeneutic)," "1-Thou relation," and
"1rust (Gadarner's)") 62 n. I , 136, 173
- meetingthe other not the author 157
- other, otherness 40, 137, 174, 214
- strengthening the other's position 46,
136f.
partaking in and of(see "ontology'') 13,
19, 37, 49, 6Sf., 72, 7S, 77, 84, 89, 94,
98, 101, 106, 112[, 1 1 5f., 126, 134,
142, 145f., 150f., ISS, 166f., 174, 185,
187,212,214
- Dabeisein (see "contemporaneity") 75,
126f., 158
- Teilhabe 7S, 126, 1S8, 167
pathei mathos, nd8e1 11<i8cx; 46, 129f.
pathos, nci8o� 9f., 43, 48, 75, 147
permanence 46, 72-74, 92, 101
cpaCvOJ!Ctl, cpcx\veo8a1 17, 26, 34,40
phenomenology 17, 34, 110, 1 1S-117
- phenomenological method (Gadamer's)
113,115
- phenomenological movement 123
- zu den Sache11 selbst 115, 215
Pietism 172f., 202f.
- pietistic henneneutics 89f., 188
piety 3, 179, 18S-187
pious questioning 132
play (see "aesthetics") 6S-77
- game 33, 35f., 38, 4 1 , 68f., 71, 98, 139,
142, 175
- play (of a.rt and oflanguage) 64f.
- play ofart, henneneutisclrer Paradefall
67, 151
- play plays 27, 39, 47f., 70, 72, 1 1 1 , 1IS
- primordial, original medial meaning of
play 2, 47, 56, 68, 70f., 74, 81, 98
- Spielraum 36, 63, 68, 151f., 171
- theater play (see "representation") 3&,
71f., IS2, ISS
Postmodemity 29, 173
- death ofthe subject (see "sub-jecf') 29,
112
practical philosophy 42, 142, 217
- practical knowledge 139-143, 163
- technical knowledge 140f.
- theoretical knowledge 140
Priisenz IS4, 159f.
praxis 9, 42f., 112, 114, 126f., 136
prejudgments 32, 83-85,92, 132, 157
presencing (sec "of presence" s.v.
"metaphysics'') 27, 115, 120, 154, 160,
187, 198
250
productivity of the individual case 141,
189f., 192
Protestantism (Gadamer's) 3, I 7lf., 185,
189-191, 200-205, 215(
reading (see "right ofthe reader") 39, 65,
100, 150-171
- reading, the highest taskof
hermeneutics 1 5 1
- reading poetry and philosophy 165-171
- reaping 150, I5 9
- making and letting speak again 105,
1 1 If., 151, 160, 164, 170
reason (as a medial process) 127,
146-150, 156
reflexive, reflexivity 12f., 22, 25-27, 30,
36f., 47, 86, 118, 123, 131, 144, 184,
188 n. 69
Relative vs. relevant meaning 142
Reprllsentation I 04
representation (see "theater play" s.v.
"play") 28, 43f., 66, ?If., 74, 76f., 169
- Darstel/ung 66, 71f., 88f., 102, 106, 155
right of the reader (see "reading") 156f.,
168, 203
right word (seeking the) (see
"stammering") 62 n. I, 101, 104f., 107,
120, 127, 142, 148, 156, 164, 166, 183
risk, Wagns
i subjectivity !Sf., 26, 34, 40f., 48, 66, 71,
- hermeneutic 53, 88, 92, 137-139
- of faith 200, 202
routed army (Aristotle's image of the)
128f.
Sachlichkeit, middle-voiced objectivity
52,82(, 103, 157, 201, 204, 214
Sage (see "Aussage" and "Zusage") 194,
197
said and unsaid (see "linguistic
speculation") 51, 97, 99, 105, 110, 119,
164
Scripture (Gadamer and) 188, 191-197,
200, 202(
self-givenness
- oflanguage 10
-of the Sachen selbst 1 16f.
- offaith 215
self-understanding, self-knowledge 20,
29, 40, 50, 119, 138, 202-204
- nonegocentric self-knowledge 127,
137-143, 150
- Ichbezogenheit 138
serving (the Sache) 65, 90, 104, 106, 137,
l11dices
166, 168, 188, 189
sh:upen one's ears (see "hearing") 9, 18,
170f.
- inner ear 100, 105, 153, 157, 160, 170
sign vs. symbol (see "Christian message
(Gadamer and)") 199-202,200
situation (notion of) 91 f.
sound (see "volume") 4, 27, 40, 76, 95,
97, 105, 107, 153, 158, 164, 166f., 213
- antQnen 99f.
Sprachnot 164
Spur (see "following the lead ofthe
Sache," "meaning as direction," and
"Nachfolge") 125
stammering (see "right word (seeking
the)") 62 n. 1 , 127, 142, 166
steuern, steering 63, 171
sub-ject (see "death oftl1e subject" s.v.
"Postmodemity," "verbal process in
relation to the subject," and "where is
the subject?, location ofthe subject")
3, 95, 1 1 2-125, 150, 2 1 6
subject and object (see "active/passive"
and "either/or") 2£., 8, 11 f., 20-23, 25,
28, 3 1 , 35f., 43, 61, 63, 65, 70f., 77, 80,
82, 84, IOOf., 1 1 3 , 115, 123, 142, 151,
170, 206£., 209, 210 n. 153, 21 5f.
90, 103, 1 1 2 , 1 16, 123
subject ((non)exclusive) 2f., 15, 17f., 31,
47f., 59, 61, ?If., 80-82, 93, 102, 116,
119, 124, 129f., 145, 150f., 166, 206,
210 D. 153, 214, 21 7f.
substance 29, 73, 91f., 123f., 184, 208,
211
supersubject, supersubjective 37, 48, 98,
1 1 8f., 165
taSk ofphilosophy 162, 164
telos 42f., 96, 116, 148, 159
temporality (see "festival, Fest") 28, 74f.,
179, 185-188
tens ion
- between being at home and asking
where we are at home 5, 215, 221
- between hermeneutics and U1eology 3,
171f., 189f., 193, 202f., 215f.
theological hermeneutics 193, 199
- legal and theological hermeneutics 90,
188-192
theoria 18, 75, 126, 147, 187
theoros 43, 75, 187
Indices
"The thunderbolt steers all things" 170
tool 7, 14, 45, 56, 103, 106, l46f., 161,
167, 171, 185, 203
totality 52, 96f., 101, 104f., 128
total mediation 74, 90, 1 15, 139
tradition (positive appraisal of) 4, 56f., 63,
149£, 165, 173f., 176, 204, 215£
transformation into structure (see
"building") 72-74, 106, 152, 155
- Gebilde 72f., 106, 152, 155, 167
trust(Gadamer's) (see "the other might be
right") 95, 165, 173
- hermeneutic optimism 40, 58, 173
Tun der Sache, activity ofthe Sache 57,
63, 104, 114,212
under-standing 1 n. I, 3f., 41f., 61, 70, 82,
90, 96, 109, 150, 154, 167f., 189, 196,
201f.,206, 211, 214, 216
universality (see "linguisticality") 3, 41 f.,
95, 97f., 100, 108, 170f., 180, 191, 203
I, - in the context of theology 5, 54, 1 92f.,
195f., 214f.
- universal history 49-52
verbal process in relation to the subject
(see "diathesis" and "sub-jecf') 2, 8,
t4f 19f., 23, 25, 27. 30f 36, 4?f., 69.
.• .•
71, 77,82, 84, 112, 150,217£
verweilen (see "contemporaneity") 2 1 ,
121, 158-160
- to dwell 33, 153f., 158, 170, 220
- to linger 158-160, 165, 170
- to tarry 40, 122, 158f., 160, 170, 187
- Weile 159f.
Vollzug(see "evepyeux") 6�5. 68f., 89,
251
93, 98, 101, 103, 106, 150£, 154, 159,
162, 166-168, 170, 174, 191, 198
volume (see "sound") 4, 27f., 30, 36, 40,
70-72, 75-77, 93,95-97, 105-108,
117, 146, 153, 157-160, 167f 170f.,
.•
176, 185, 193, 199,201, 205, 213f 216 .•
wakefulness, awake, Wachheit 28, 40, 89,
117, 120, 147f.
weather map (analogy of the) (see "glacier
(analogy ofthe)") 80-82
where is the subject?, location ofthe
subject (see "sub-jecf') 3-5, 8, 15, 17,
20, 23f., 29-3 1 , 4 1 , 57, 71, 96, 98, 103,
1 12, 125, 138, 208, 210 n. 153,212,
215, 220f.
willing and doing (what happens to
subject beyond his or her) 5, 35, 46, 52,
58, 63, 1 1 3-115, 117, 217,219
"within" (see "freedom within") 20, 23,
51, 63, 68f 88, 102, 109, 122, 130, 156
.•
- a.u sei11 de 20
word and Sache, speaking and thinking
(see "Christology (Gadamer and)") 103, ·
105, 179-185, 189
written word (see "ofthe written word"
s.v. "authority,� "of(written) language"
s.v. "autonomy," and "ofwritten
language" s.v. "ideality") 151-156, 194
- was dasteht 154, 178
im6o-r«Ol� 207f., 21 Of.
- im6-o-r«ol� 2 1 1
Zusage (see "Aussage," "promise,"and
"Sage") 194
 Hermeneutische Untersuchungen zur Theologie
Edited by
Pierre BUhler, lngolf U. Dalferth, Dietz Lange, Margaret M. Mitchell

Alphabetical Index

Asher, Jeffrey R.: Polarity and Change in 1 Corinthians 15. 2000. Volume 42.
Askani, Hans-Christoph: Das Problem der Obersetzung - dargestellt an Franz
Rosenzweig. 1997. Volume 35.
Bader, GUnter: Mitteilung gottlichen Geistes als Aporie der Religionslehre
Johann Gottlieb Fichtes. 1975. Volume 15.
- Assertio. Drei fortlaufende Lektliren zu Skepsis, NaiTheit und Sunde bei
Erasmus und Luther. 1985. Volume 20.
- Symbolik des Todes Jesu. 1988. Volume 25.
- Psalterium affectuum palae stra. 1996. Volume 33.
Beutel, Albrecht: In dem Anfang war das Wort. 1 9 9 1 . Volume 27.
Brush, Jack E.: Gotteserkenntnis und Selbsterkenntnis. 1997. Volume 36.
Buhler; Pierre: Kreuz und Eschatologie. 1 9 8 1 . Volume 17.
Donelson, Lewis R.: Pseudepigraphy and Ethical Argument in the Pastoral
Epistles. 1986. Volume 22.
Droge, Artur J.: Homer or Moses? 1989. Volume 26.
Duchrow, Ulrich: Sprachverstandnis und biblisches Horen bei Augustin. 1965.
Volume 5.
Ebeling, Gerhard: Theologie und Verkiindigung. 1962, 21963. Volume 1.
Eberhard, Philippe: The Middle Voice in Gadamer's Henneneutics. 2004.
Volume 45.
Evers, Dirk: Raum - Materie- Zeit. 2000. Volume 41.
Fuchs, Ernst: Marburger Herrneneutik. 1968. Volume 9.
Gogarten, Friedrich: Die Vcrkiindigung Jesu Christi. 2 J 965. Volume 3.
Grofthans, Hans-Peter: Theologischer Realismus. 1996. Volume 34.
GriinschlojJ, Andreas: Der eigene und der fremde Glaube. 1999. Volume 37.
Harrill, J. Albert: The Manumission of Slaves in Early Christianity. 1995,
21998. Volume 32.
Heise, Jilrgen: Bleiben. 1967. Volume 8.
Holland, Glenn S.: The Tradition that You received from Us: 2 Thessalonians
in the Pauline Tradition. 1988. Volume 24.
Huppenbauer, Markus: Mythos und SubjektiviLal. 1992. Volume 31.
Jeanrond, Werner G.: Text und Interpretation als K.ategorien theologischen
Denkens. 1986. Volume 23.
Jiingel, Eberhard: Paulus und Jesus. 1962, 61986. Volume 2.
Lange, Dietz: Erfahrung und Glaubw\irdigkcit des Glaubens. 1984. Volume 18.
Leonhardt, Rochus: Skeptizismus und Protestantismus. 2003. Volume 44.
Luibl, Hans Jiirgen: Des Fremden Sprachgestalt. 1993. Volume 30.
 Hermeneutische Umersuchungen zur Theologie

Mitchell, Margaret M.: Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation. 1991.

Volume 28.
- The Heaverlly Trumpet. 2000. Volume 40.
Mostert, Walter: Sinn oder Gewil3heit? 1976. Volume 16.
Moxte1; Michael: Kultur als Lebenswelt. 2000. Volume 38.
Nestle, Dieter: Eleutheria. Volume I: Die Griechen. 1967. Volume 6.
Plutta-Messerschmidt, Elke: Gerechrigkeit Gottes bei Paulus. 1973. Volume 14.
Schindlet; Alfred: Wort und Analogie in Augustins Trinitatslehre. 1965.
Volume 4.
Schneide1; Norbert: Die rhetorische Eigenart der paulinischen Antithese. 1970.
Volume 11.
Schunack, Gerd: Das hermeneutiscbe Problem des Iodes. 1967. Volume 7.
Sinner, Rudolf von: Reden vom dreieinigen Gott in Brasilien und Indien. 2003.
Volume 43.
Stoellger, Philipp: Metapher und Lebenswelt. 2000. Volume 39.
Thee, Francis C.R. : Julius Afiicanus and the Early Christian View of Magic.
1984. Volume 19.
Thyssen, Karl W: Begegnung und Verantwortung. 1970. Volume 12.
Trumbower, Jeffrey A.: Born from Above. 1992. Volume 29.
Weinacht, Harald: Die Menschwerdung des Sohnes Gottes im Markusevange­
lium. 1972. Volume 13.
Wendel, Emst Georg: Studien zur Homiletik Dietrich Bonhoeffers. 1985.
Volume 2.

For a complete catalogue please write to the publisher

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