Case Digests- Atty.

Taleon
by: Maximus Notes

Arts. 774-803
Alvarez vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
G.R. No. 68053. May 7, 1990
FERNAN, C.J.:

Doctrine(s):
The general rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors

Contention that the liability arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773A and 773B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr.
Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate after his death is untenabl
e.

Facts:
Aniceto Yanes was survived by his children, Rufino, Felipe and Teodora. Herein private respondents, Estelita, I
luminado and Jesus, are the children of Rufino who died in 1962 while the other private respondents, Antonio a
nd
Rosario Yanes, are children of Felipe. Teodora was survived by her child, Jovita (Jovito) Alib. Aniceto left his c
hildren Lots 773 and 823. Teodora cultivated only three hectares of Lot 823 as she could not attend to the other
portions of the two lots which had a total area of around twentyfour hectares. According to Estelita, from the “J
apanese time up to peace time”, her brothers did not visit the parcels of land in question but “after liberation”, w
hen her brother went there to get their share of the sugar produced therein, he was informed that Fortunato Santi
ago, Fuentebella (Puentevella) and Alvarez were in possession of Lot 773. The lot was registered in the name of
Fortunato Santiago and was later on sold to Monico B. Fuentebella, Jr. After Fuentebella’s death and during the
settlement of his estate, the administratrix thereof (Arsenia R. Vda. de Fuentebella, his wife) filed in Special Pr
oceedings No. 4373 in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, a motion requesting authority to sell Lo
ts 773A and 773B. Hence, on April 1, 1958. TCT Nos. T23165 and T23166 covering Lots 773A and 773B were
respectively issued to Rosendo Alvarez. Teodora Yanes and the children of her brother Rufino, namely, Estelit
a, Iluminado and Jesus, filed in the a complaint against Fortunato Santiago, Arsenia Vda. de Fuentebella, Alvar
ez and the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental for the “return” of the ownership and possession of Lots 773
and 823. During the pendency in court of said case or on Alvarez sold Lots for P25,000.00 to Dr. Rodolfo Siaso
n. The lower court ordered the Reconveyance of the lots to the Yanes. However, execution of said decision pro
ved unsuccessful becausevb Siason was “not a party per writ of execution. Siason filed a manifestation stating t
hat he purchased Lots 773A,773B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, “in good faith and for a valuable consideratio
n withoutany knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said propert(ies)” Siason filed a manifestation stat
ing that he purchased Lots 773A, 773B and 658, not Lots 773 and 823, “in good faith and for a valuable conside
ration without any knowledge of any lien or encumbrances against said propert(ies)” Upon motion, the lower co
urt found that Rodolfo Siason, who purchased the properties in question thru an agent as he was then in Mexico
pursuing further medical studies, was a buyer in good faith for a valuable consideration. While equity demanded
that the Yanes recover the actual value of the land because the sale thereof executed between Alvarez and Siaso
n was without court approval. The Alvarezes appealed and contended that the liability arising from the sale of L
ots No. 773A and 773B made by Rosendo Alvarez to Dr. Rodolfo Siason should be the sole liability of the late
Rosendo Alvarez or of his estate, after his death The then Intermediate Appellate Court, however, affirmed the l
ower court’s decision. Hence this instant petition,

Issue(s): Whether or not the liability or liabilities of Rosendo Alvarez arising from the sale of Lots Nos. 773A a
nd 773B of Murcia Cadastre to Dr. Rodolfo Siason, if ever there is any, could be legally passed or transmitted b
y operations (sic) of law to the petitioners without violation of law and due process.

Held:
Yes. As explained by this Court through Associate Justice J.B.L. Reyes in the case of Estate of Hemady vs. Luz
on Surety Co., Inc.41 “The binding effect of contracts upon the heirs of the deceased party is not altered by the
provision of our Rules of Court that money debts of a deceased must be liquidated and paid from his estate befo
re the residue is distributed among said heirs (Rule 89). The reason is that whatever payment is thus made from
the state is ultimately a payment by the heirs or distributees, since the amount of the paid claim in fact diminish
es or reduces the shares that the heirs would have been entitled to receive. “Under our law, therefore, the genera
l rule is that a party’s contractual rights and obligations are transmissible to the successors. Petitioners being the
heirs of the late Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the legal consequences of their father’s transaction, whic
h gave rise to the present claim for damages. That petitioners did not inherit the property involved herein is of n
o moment because by legal fiction, the monetary equivalent thereof devolved into the mass of their father’s here
ditary estate, and settled ruled is that the hereditary assets are always liable in their totality for the payment of th
e debts of the estate.
It must, however, be made clear that petitioners are liable only to the extent of the value of their inheritance.

Decision affirmed.

Gevero vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. 77029. August 30, 1990.
PARAS, J.:

Doctrine:
No legal bar to a successor to dispose his hereditary share after death of the decedent.

Facts:
Lot No. 2476 situated at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City was acquired by purchase from the late Luis Lancero on 1
964 as per Deed of Absolute Sale executed in favor of plaintiff and by virtue of which Transfer Certificate of Ti
tle No. 4320 was issued to plaintiff (DELCOR for brevity). Luis Lancero, in turn acquired the same parcel from
Ricardo Gevero on 1952 per deed of sale executed by Ricardo Gevero which was duly annotated as entry No.
1128 at the back of Original Certificate ofTitle No. 7610 covering the mother lot identified as Lot No. 2476 in t
he names of Teodorica Babangha—1/2 share and her children: Maria; Restituto, Elena, Ricardo, Eustaquio and
Ursula, all surnamed Gevero, 1/2 undivided share of the whole area containing 48,122 square meters. “Teodoric
a Babangha died long before World War II and was
survived by her six children aforementioned. Lot 2476D,among others, was adjudicated to Ricardo Gevero who
was then alive at the timeof extrajudicialsettlement and partition in 1966. Plaintiff (private respondent herein) fil
ed an action to quiet title and/or annul the partition made by the heirs of Teodorica Babangha insofar as the sam
e prejudices the land which it acquired a portion of lot 2476. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the pla
intiff corporation as the true and absolute owner of that portion of Lot No. 247. The appellate court affirmed th
e same hence, this petition.

Issue(s): WON petition has merit?

Held:
The petition lacks merit. Petitioners aver that the 1/2 share of interest of Teodorica (mother of Ricardo) in Lot 2
476 under OCT No. 7610 was not included in the deed of sale as it was intended to limit solely to Ricardos’ pro
portionate share out of the undivided 1/2 of the area pertaining to the six (6) brothers and sisters listed in the Titl
e and that the Deed did not include the share of Ricardo, as inheritance from Teodorica, because the Deed did n
ot recite that she was deceased at the time it was executed The hereditary share in a decedents’ estate is transmit
ted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of the ‘causante’ or predecessor in interest (Civil Code
of the Philippines, Art. 777), and there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposi
ng of his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not determine
d until the subsequent liquidation of the estate (De Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 46 SCRA 577 [1972]). Teodorica Ba
bangha died long before World War II, hence, the rights to the succession were transmitted from the moment of
her death. It is therefore incorrect to state that it was only in 1966, the date of extrajudicial partition, when Ricar
do received his share in the lot as inheritance from his mother Teodorica. Thus, when Ricardo sold his share ove
r lot 2476 that share which he inherited from Teodorica was also included unless expressly excluded in the deed
of sale. In addition, DELCOR’s action is barred by
laches considering that the petitioners have remained inthe actual, open, uninterrupted and adverse possession th
ereof until at present.

Petition dismissed. Decision affirmed.

Locsin vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 89783. February 19, 1992

Doctrine:
The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death and do not vest in his heirs unt
il such time.

Trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing the action for annulment and reconveyance on the g
round of prescription

Facts:
The late Getulio Locsin had three children named Mariano, Julian and Magdalena, all surnamed Locsin. He ow
ned extensive residential and agricultural properties in the provinces of Albay and Sorsogon. After his death, his
estate was divided among his three (3) children as follows: the coconut lands (700 hectares) to his daughter, M
agdalena Locsin;106 hectares of coconut lands were given to Julian Locsin, father of the petitioners Julian, Mari
ano, Jose, Salvador, Matilde, and Aurea, all surnamed Locsin; more than forty (40) hectares of coconut lands in
Bogtong, eighteen (18) hectares of riceland in Daraga, and the residential lots in Daraga, Albay and in Legazpi
City went to his son Mariano, which Mariano brought into his marriage to Catalina Jaucian in 1908. Catalina, fo
r her part, brought into the marriage untitled properties which she had inherited from herparents, Balbino Jaucia
n and Simona Anson. These were augmented by other properties acquired by the spouses in the course of their u
nion, which however was not blessed with children. Mariano Locsin executed a Last Will and Testament institut
ing his wife, Catalina, as the sole and universal heir of all his properties.3 The will was drawn up by his wife’s n
ephew and trusted legal adviser, Attorney Salvador Lorayes. Attorney Lorayes disclosed that the spouses bein c
hildless, they had agreed that their properties, after both of them shall have died should revert to their respective
sides of the family. Upon death of Don Mariano Doña Catalina was appointed executrix of his estate. Catalina
declared that “all items mentioned from Nos. 1 to 33 are the private properties of the deceased and form part of
his capital at the time of the marriage with the surviving spouse, while items Nos. 34 to 42 are conjugal.” Nine y
ear after Don Mariano’s death, Doña Catalina began transferring, by sale, donation or assignment, Don Mariano
’s, as well as her own, properties to their respective nephews and nieces. she had made a will on October 22, 19
73 affirming and ratifying the transfers she had made during her lifetime in favor of her husband’s, and her own
, relatives. Doña Catalina died on July 6, 1977. Six years after, some of her Jaucian nephews and nieces who ha
d already received their legacies and hereditary shares from her estate, filed action in the Regional Trial Court t
o recover the properties which she had conveyed to the Locsins during her lifetime, alleging that the conveyanc
es were inofficious, without consideration, and intended solely to circumvent the laws on succession. The trial c
ourt ruled against the Locsin defendants declaring the plaintiffs, except the heirs of Josefina J. Borja and Eduard
o Jaucian, who withdrew, the rightful heirs and entitled to the entire estate, in equal portions, of
Catalina Jaucian Vda. de Locsin, being the nearest collateral heirs by right of representation of Juan and Gregori
o, both surnamed Jaucian, and fullblood brothers of Catalina. The appellate court affirmed the same, hence this
petition (Rule 45).

Issue(s): WON trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in declaring the private respondents, nephews and niec
es of Doña Catalina J. Vda. de Locsin, entitled to inherit the properties which she had already disposed of more
than ten (10) years before her death.
Held:
Yes. For those properties did not form part of her hereditary estate, i.e., “the property an transmissible rights an
d obligations existing at the time of (the decedent’s) death and those which have accrued thereto since the openi
ng of the succession.” The rights to a person’s succession are transmitted from the moment of his death, and do
not vest in his heirs until such time. Property which Doña Catalina had transferred or conveyed to other persons
during her lifetime no longer formed part of her estate at the time of her death to which her heirs may lay claim.
Had she died intestate, only the property that remained in her estate at the time of her death devolved to her lega
l heirs; and even if those transfers were, one and all, treated as donations, the right arising under certain circums
tances to impugn and compel the reduction or revocation of a decedent’s gifts inter vivos does not inure to the r
espondents since neither they nor the donees are compulsory (or forced) heirs. Said respondents are not her com
pulsory heirs, and it is not pretended that she had any such, hence there were no legitimes that could conceivabl
y be impaired by any transfer of her property during her lifetime. All that the respondents had was an expectanc
y that in nowise restricted her freedom to dispose of even her entire estate subject only to the limitation set forth
in Art. 750, Civil Code which, even if it were breached, the respondents may not invoke. As to the issue of Don
a Catalina’s (90 years of Age) competence, there is not the slightest suggestion in the record that Doña Catalina
was mentally incompetent when she made those dispositions. The trial court’s belief that Don Mariano Locsin b
equeathed his entire estate to his wife, from a “consciousness of its real origin” which carries the implication tha
t said estate consisted of properties which his wife had inherited from her parents, flies in the teeth of Doña Cata
lina’s admission in her inventory of that estate. She would have known better than anyone else whether the listi
ng included any of her paraphernal property so it is safe to assume that none was in fact included. The inventory
was signed by her under oath, and was approved by the probate court in Special Proceedings No. 138 of the Co
urt of First Instance of Albay. It was prepared with the assistance of her own nephew and counsel, Atty. Salvado
r Lorayes, who surely would not have prepared a false inventory that would have been prejudicial to his aunt’s i
nterest and to his own, since he stood to inherit from her eventually.

Petition granted; decision reversed and set aside.

Opulencia vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 125835. July 30, 1998.
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Doctrine:
Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable where a party enters into a Contract to Sell in his ca
pacity as an heir, not as an executor or administrator of the estate.—

An heir becomes owner of his hereditary share the moment the decedent dies, thus, the lack of judicial approval
does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the heir has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of
his share in the estate of the decedent.—

The sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no wise stands
in the way of such administration

Facts:
In a complaint for specific performance filed with the court a quo [herein private respondents] Aladin Simundac
and Miguel Oliven alleged that [herein petitioner] Natalia Carpena Opulencia executed in their favor a “CONT
RACT TO SELL” Lot 2125 of the Sta. Rosa Estate but despite demands, failed to comply with her obligations u
nder the contract. In her traverse, [petitioner] admitted the execution of the contract in favor of plaintiffs and rec
eipt of P300,000.00 as downpayment. However, she put forward the following affirmative defenses: that the pro
perty subject of the contract formed part of the Estate of Demetrio Carpena (petitioner’s father), in respect of w
hich a petition for probate was filed with the Regional Trial Court in Laguna; that at the time the contract was e
xecuted, the parties were aware of the ppendency of the probate proceeding; that the contract to sell was not app
roved by the probate court; that realizing the nullity of the contract [petitioner] had offered to return the downpa
yment received from [private respondents], but the latter refused to accept it. It appears that [petitioner], instead
of submitting her evidence, filed a Demurrer to Evidence. In essence, defendant maintained that the contract to s
ell was null and void for want of approval by the probate court. She further argued that the contract was subject
to a suspensive condition, which was the probate of the will of defendant’s father Demetrio Carpena. The the co
urt a quo granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the complaint. The appellate court set aside the trial c
ourt’s dismissal of the complaint and held that while the document inadvertently stated that appellee executed th
e contract in her capacity as “executrix and administratrix” of the estate, a cursory reading of the entire text of t
he contract would unerringly show that what she undertook to sell to appellants was one of the “other properties
given to her by her late father,” To emphasize the ruling, it is evident from the foregoing clauses of the contract
that appellee sold Lot 2125 not in her capacity as executrix of the will or administratrix of the estate of her fath
er, but as an heir and more importantly as owner of said lot which, along with other properties, was devised to h
er under the will sought to be probated. That being so, the requisites stipulated in Rule 89 of the Revised Rules
of Court which refer to a sale made by the administrator for the benefit of the estate do not apply. Under the for
egoing premises, what the trial court should have done with the complaint was not to dismiss it but to simply pu
t on hold further proceedings until such time that the estate or its residue will be distributed in accordance with t
he approved will. Hence, this appeal.

Issue(s): Whether or not the Contract to Sell dated 03 February 1989 executed by the [p]etitioner and [p]rivate [
r]espondent[s] without the requisite probate court approval is valid?

Held:
Yes. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, be
cause petitioner entered into the Contract to Sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or administratr
ix of the estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the “lawful owner” and seller of the subject parcel of l
and. She also explained the reason for the sale to be “difficulties in her living” conditions and consequent “need
of cash.” These representations clearly evince that she was not acting on behalf of the estate under probate when
she entered into the Contract to Sell. Accordingly, the jurisprudence cited by petitioner has no application to th
e instant case We emphasize that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the decede
nt’s death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her father died. Thus, the
lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the Contract to Sell, because the petitioner has the substantive right
to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late father The Contract to Sell stipulates that petition
er’s offer to sell is contingent on the “complete clearance of the court on the Last Will and Testament of her fath
er.” Consequently, although the Contract to Sell was perfected between the petitioner and private respondents d
uring the pendency of the probate proceedings, the consummation of the sale or the transfer of ownership over t
he parcel of land to the private respondents is subject to the full payment of the purchase price and to the termin
ation and outcome of the testate proceedings. Therefore, there is no basis for petitioner’s apprehension that the
Contract to Sell may result in a premature partition and distribution of the properties of the estate. Indeed, it is s
ettled that “the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the pending administration, in no w
ise stands in the way of such administration. Finally, petitioner is estopped from backing out of her representati
ons in her valid Contract to Sell with private respondents, from whom she had already received P300,000 as init
ial payment of the purchase price.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Emnace vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 126334. November 23, 2001
YNARESSANTIAGO, J.:

Doctrine:
The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as executrix or administratrix of the estate before she can fi
le an action based on the rights of her deceased husband —she and her children are complainants in their own
right as successors, the deceased’s rights being transmitted to his heirs from the moment of death

The heirs, as successors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, can commence any action
originally pertaining to the decedent

Facts:
Petitioner Emilio Emnace, Vicente Tabanao and Jacinto Divinagracia were partners in a business concern know
n as Ma. Nelma Fishing Industry. Sometime in January of 1986, they decided to dissolve their partnership and e
xecuted an agreement of partition and distribution of the partnership properties among them, consequent to Jaci
nto Divinagracia’s withdrawal from the partnership Throughout the existence of the partnership, and even after
Vicente Tabanao’s untimely demise in 1994, petitioner failed to submit to Tabanao’s heirs any statement of asse
ts and liabilities of the partnership, and to render an accounting of the partnership’s finances. Petitioner also ren
eged on his promise to turn over to Tabanao’s heirs the deceased’s 1/3 share in the total assets of the partnership
, amounting to P30,000,000.00, or the sum of P10,000,000.00, despite formal demand for payment
thereof.2 Consequently, Tabanao’s heirs, respondents herein, filed against petitioner an action for accounting, p
ayment of shares, division of assets and damages. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grou
nds of improper venue, lack of jurisdiction over th nature of the action or suit, and lack of capacity of the estate
of Tabanao to sue.5 On August 30, 1994, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss. the trial court held that th
e heirs of Tabanao had right to sue in their own names, in view of the provision o Article 777 of the Civil Code,
which states that the rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. the
Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision,12 dismissing the petition for certiorari, upon a finding that no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction was committed by the trial court in issuing
the questioned orders denying petitioner’s motions to dismiss. Not satisfied, petitioner filed the instant petition f
o review, raising the same issues It can be readily seen that respondents’ primary and ultimate objective in instit
uting the action below was to recover the decedent’s 1/3 share in the partnership’s assets. While they ask for an
accounting of the partnership’s assets and finances, what they are actually asking is for the trial court to compel
petitioner to pay and turn over their share, or the equivalent value thereof, from the proceeds of the sale of the p
artnership assets. They also assert that until and unless a proper accounting is done, the exact value of the partne
rship’s assets, as well as their corresponding share therein, cannot be ascertained. Consequently, they feel justifi
ed in not having paid the commensurate docket fee as required by the Rules of Court.

Issue(s):
(1) WON the surviving spouse of Vicente Tabanao has no legal capacity to sue since she was never appointed a
s administratrix or executrix of his estate?

(2) WON action has prescribed?

Held:
(1) Petitioner’s objection in this regard is misplaced. The surviving spouse does not need to be appointed as exe
cutrix or administratrix of the estate before she can file the action. She and her children are complainants in thei
r own right as successors of Vicente Tabanao. From the very moment of Vicente Tabanao’s death, his rights ins
ofar as the partnership was concerned were transmitted to his heirs, for rights to the succession are transmitted f
rom the moment of death of th decedent. Whatever claims and rights Vicente Tabanao had against the partnersh
ip and petitioner were transmitted to respondents by operation of law, more particularly by succession which is
a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inh
eritance of a person are transmitted. Moreover, respondents became owners of their respective hereditary shares
from the moment Vicente Tabanao died. A prior settlement of the estate, or even the appointment of Salvacion
Tabanao as executrix or administratrix, is not necessary for any of the heirs to acquire legal capacity to sue. As s
uccessors who stepped into the shoes of their decedent upon his death, they can commence any action originally
pertaining to the decedent. From the moment of his death, his rights as a partner and to demand fulfillment of p
etitioner’s obligations as outlined in their dissolution agreement were transmitted to respondents. They, therefor
e, had the capacity to sue and seek the court’s intervention to compel petitioner to fulfill his obligations.
(2) No. When a final accounting is made, it is only then that prescription begins to run. In the case at bar, no fin
al accounting has been made, and that is precisely what respondents are seeking in their action before the trial c
ourt, since petitioner has failed or refused to render an accounting of the partnership’s business and assets. Henc
e, the said action is not barred by prescription

Petition denied, case remanded to trial court.

Rabadilla vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000
PURISIMA, J.:

Doctrine:
Successional rights aretransmitted from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to
succeed by operation of law

Inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death.

Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs first in
stituted.

In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity,
predecease or renunciation

In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and to transmit the
same later to the second heir; Without the obligation to preserve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, ther
e is no fideicommissary substitution. The fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not rel
ated by first degree to the second heir.

The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the law of succession as a
n institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal institution, the testator states (1) the, object of the inst
itution, the purpose or application of the property left by the testator, or the charge imposed by the testator upo
n the heir. A “mode” imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rig
hts to the succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen o
r be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not obli
gate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a resolutory condition.

In case of doubt, the institution should be considered as modal and not conditional

In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, the testator’s intention is to be
ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was made

Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes of his property, to take effect after
his death

Facts:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, predecesso
rininterest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was instituted as a devisee of Lot No. 1392 in Bacolod.
The said Codicil, which was duly probated and admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court
of First Instance of Negros Occidental.
Provisions:
FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
“FIRST
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla resident of 141 P. Villanu
eva, Pasay City: Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT4002 (1
0942), which is registered in my name according to the records of the
Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned prop
erty and the rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the children and
spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.

FOURTH
(a) It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge Rabadilla shall have already
received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Tit
le No. RT4002 (10942), and also at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, J
orge Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza
, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25) piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria
Marlina Coscolluel y Belleza dies.

FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered b
y Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT4002 (10492), shall have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as sp
ecified in the Fourth paragraph of his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of Decem
ber of each year.

SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one to whom I have left an
d bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have
also the obligation to respect and deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Cosco
lluela y Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY FIVE (25)
piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee or the mortgagee of this lot, not
have respected my command in this my addition (Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immedia
tely seize this Lot No. 1392 from my heir and the latter’s heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic
) and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar until Maria Mar
lina shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, th
at they will obey and follow that should they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others th
an my near descendants and my sister.”4
***
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny (petitioner), Aurora,
Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla. Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complai
nt against the abovementioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions of subjectCodicil. The Co
mplaint alleged that the defendantheirs violated the conditions of the Codicil, in that:
Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters Bank in disregard of th
e testatrix’s specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.
Defendantheirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100) piculs o sugar (75 piculs exp
ort sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Co
dicil which provided that in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee
shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein private respondent. In 19
98, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a Certain Alan Azurin, soninlaw of the herein petitioner who was lesse
e of the property and acting as attorneyinfact of defendantheirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered in
to a Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar. However, there was n
o compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sug
ar corresponding to sugar crop year 1988-1989.
Trial Court’s Ruling:
The trial court then dismissed the case and adjudged that the action was prematurely filed stating that “The reme
dy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left estate, it is opined that plaintiff may
initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meanin
g and semblance to her claim under the Codicil.”

Appellate Court’s Ruling:

Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court; it deemed it proper to order the reconveyance of title o
ver Lot No. 1392 from the estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiffappellant
must institute separate proceedings to reopen Aleja Belleza’s estate, secure the appointment of an administrator,
and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza’s legal heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the co
dicil, to receive her legacy of 100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.

Hence this petition.

Petitioner’s contentions:

1. Petitioner maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution and the testat
rix intended a mere simple substitution—i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the
testatrix’s “near descendants” should the obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not com
plied with. And since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution and such testa
mentary provision cannot be given any effect.

2.The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason that the substituted heirs a
re not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to as “near descendants” without a definite identity or
reference as to who are the “near descendants” and therefore, under Articles 8438 and 8459 of the New Civil
Code, the substitution should be deemed as not written.

3. Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is not applicable becaus
e what the testatrix intended was a substitution—Dr. Jorge Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix’s near
descendants should there be noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respond
ent

4. That private respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself

5. Also, petitioner’s submits that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codici
l has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; th
at petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his obligation through the con
summated settlement between the lessee and the private respondent, and having consummated a settlement with
the petitioner, the recourse of the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable settl
ement and not the seizure of subject property.

Issue(s):
1. WON The Court of Appeals erred in finding that the private respondent had a cause of action against the petit
ioner.
2. WON Art 882 is applicable?
3. WON private respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from the ins
tituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the buyer, lessee or mortgagee
4. WON there is merit in the contention that that by virtue of the amicable settlement, the said obligation impos
ed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee, and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation
of the lessee;
Held:
1.) No. The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely, to stress that the private respondent had a leg
ally demandable right against the petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals rul
ed in accordance with law. It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitt
ed from the moment of death of the decedent and compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law. T
he legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are co
mpulsory heirs. Thus, the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings, and the successional ri
ghts were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. Under Article 77
6 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person, not extinguish
ed by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmi
tted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part o
f the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadi
lla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his death. In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza
devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivere
d to the herein private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory heirs succe
eded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his (decedent’s) obligation to deliver th
e fruits of the lot involved to herein private respondent.

2. Yes. Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the heir or heirs
first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1) provide for the designation of another
heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritanc
e or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the e
xpress charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. In si
mple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir by reason of incapacity, prede
cease or renunciation. In the case under consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that shou
ld Dr. Jorge Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix’s near descendants wo
uld substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the condi
tions imposed in the Codicil, the property referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix’s near desce
ndants.

In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve the property and t transmit the sa
me later to the second heir. In the case under consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codic
il to alienate the property provided the negotiation is wit the near descendants or the sister of the testatrix. Thus,
a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking the obligation clearly imposing upon the f
irst heir the preservation of the property and its transmis sion to the second heir. “Without this obligation to pres
erve clearly imposed by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution.” Also, the near descend
ants’ right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass to them should Dr. Jorge Raba
dilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of the usufruct to private respondent. Another important
element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideic
ommissary to whom the property is transmitted must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciar
y. A fideicommissary substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second he
ir. In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla

3. No. In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to the application of a
ny of its provisions, the testator’s intention is to be ascertained from the words of the Will, taking into considera
tion the circumstances under which it was made.23 Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all i
ts parts must be adopted.24 Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One H
undred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is imposed on the instituted h
eir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or othe
rwise negotiate the property involved.
4. None. Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a person disposes o
f his property, to take effect after his death. Since the Will expresses the manner in which a person intends how
his properties be disposed, the wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot b
e the subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of making a Will

Petition dismissed,

Tañedo vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 104482. January 22, 1996
PANGANIBAN, J.

Doctrine:
No contract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law—such a
contract is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation between the parties.
—

An “affidavit of conformity” seeking to validate or ratify a sale of future inheritance is useless.—

Facts:
Lazaro Tañedo executed a notarized deed of absolute sale in favor of his eldest brother, Ricardo Tañedo, and th
e latter’s wife, Teresita Barera, private respondents herein, whereby he conveyed to the latter in consideration of
P1,500.00, “one hectare of whatever shareI shall have over Lot No. 191 (Tarlac) and covered by Title T13829
of the Register of Deeds of Tarlac,” the said property being his “future inheritance” from his parents. On Januar
y 13, 1981, Lazaro executed another notarized deed of sale in favor of private respondents covering his “undivi
ded ONE TWELVE (1/12) of a parcel of land known as Lot 191 x x x” (Exh. 4). He acknowledged therein his r
eceipt of P10,000.00 as consideration therefor. In February 1981, Ricardo learned that Lazaro sold the same pro
perty to his children, petitioners herein, through a deed of sale dated December 29, 1980. Petitioners on July 16,
1982 filed a complaint for rescission (plus damages) of the deeds of sale executed by Lazaro in favor of private
respondents covering the property inherited by Lazaro from his father. Petitioners also presented in evidence: (
1) a private writing purportedly prepared and signed by Matias dated December 28, 1978, stating that it was his
desire that whatever inheritance Lazaro would receive from him should be given to his (Lazaro’s) children. Priv
ate respondents, however presented in evidence a “Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale” dated March 12, 198
1 (Exh. 6), wherein Lazaro revoked the sale in favor of petitioners for the reason that it was “simulated or fictiti
ous— without any consideration whatsoever. Shortly after the case a quo was filed, Lazaro executed a sworn sta
tement (Exh. G) which virtually repudiated the contents of the Deed of Revocation of a Deed of Sale (Exh. 6) a
nd the Deed of Sale (Exh. 4) in favor of private respondents. However, Lazaro testified that he sold the property
to Ricardo, and that it was a lawyer who induced him to execute a deed of sale in favor of his children after givi
ng him five pesos (P5.00) to buy a “drink.” The trial court decided in favor of private respondents, holding that
petitioners failed “to adduce a preponderance of evidence to support (their) claim.” On appeal, the Court of App
eals affirmed the decision of the trial court, ruling that the Deed of Sale dated January 13, 1981 (Exh. 9) was val
id and that its registration in good faith vested title in said respondents

Issue(s): Is a sale of future inheritance valid?

Held:
No. The sale made in 1962 involving future inheritance is not really at issue here. In context, the assailed Decisi
on conceded “it may be legally correct that a contract of sale of anticipated future inheritance is null and void.”
But to remove all doubts, we hereby categorically rule that, pursuant to Article 1347 of the Civil Code, “(n)o co
ntract may be entered into upon a future inheritance except in cases expressly authorized by law.” Consequently
, said contract made in 1962 is not valid and cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation b
etween the parties. Hence,the “affidavit of conformity” dated February 28, 1980, insofar as it sought to validate
or ratify the 1962 sale, is also useless and, in the words of the respondent Court, “suffers from the same infirmit
y.” Even private respondents in their memorandum concede this.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Santos vs. Lumbao

G.R. No. 169129. March 28, 2007
CHICONAZARIO,J

Doctrine:
Even while an estate remains undivided, coowners have each full ownership of their respective aliquots or undi
vided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them, and, in any case, the mere fact that the deed
purports to transfer a concrete portion does not per se render the sale void

Heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessorsininterest— whatever rights and obligations of t
he decedent have over a property are transmitted to the heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the pro
perty, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs

Facts:
On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject property w
hich is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died intestate on 19 Se
ptember 1978. On the first occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mother’s estate thr
ough a document denominated as “Bilihan ng Lupa.” After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses
Lumbao took actual possession thereof and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying a exclusiv
e owners up to the present. As the exclusive owners of the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao mad
e several verbal demands upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to exec
ute the necessary documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents Spouses Lumbao in
sofar as the subject property is concerned. Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita inf
ormed respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire pr
operty inherited by her and her coheirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned. the On complaint, Spouses Lu
mbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another, executed a Deed of Extra
judicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other heirs, the estate left by Maria,
which included th subject property already sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao and now covered by TCT No.
817297 of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City. Respondents Spouses Lumbao, with leave of court, amended the
ir Complaint because they discovered that on 16 February 1990, without their knowledge, petitioners executed a
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of Julieta S. Esplana for the sum of P30,000.00. The said Deed of Real
Estate Mortgage was annotated at the back of TCT No. PT81729 on 26 April 1991. The trial court denied the co
mplaint but the Court of Appeals reversed this. hence this petition.

Issue(s):
(1) WON the sale to spouses Lumbao is valid despite the fact that at the time of the execution of the
documents denominated as “Bilihan ng Lupa,” the entire property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not
yet divided among her and her coheirs?
(2) WON heirs are bound to the obligations of their predecessors-in-interest?

Held:
Yes. It is noteworthy that at the time of the execution of the documents denominated as “Bilihan ng Lupa,” the e
ntire property owned by Maria, the mother of Rita, was not yet divided among her and her coheirs and so the de
scription of the entire estate is the only description that can be placed in the “Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August
1979 and 9 January 1981” because the exact metes and bounds of the subject property sold to respondents Spou
ses Lumbao could not be possibly determined at that time. Nevertheless, that does not make the contract of sale
between Rita and respondents Spouses Lumbao invalid because both the law and jurisprudence have categorical
ly held that even while an estate remains undivided, coowners have each full ownership of their respective aliqu
ots or undivided shares and may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage them. The coowner, however, has no rig
ht to sell or alienate a specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common, because such right over the th
ing is represented by an aliquot or ideal portion without any physical division. In any case, the mere fact that the
deed purports to transfer a concrete portion does not per se render the sale void. The sale is valid, but only with
respect to the aliquot share of the selling coowner. Furthermore, the sale is subject to the results of the partition
upon the termination of the coownership.

(2) Yes. The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessorsininterest applies i
n the present case. Article 1311 of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the said provision that whate
ver rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the heirs by way of successio
n, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the extent of the value of the inheri
tance of the heirs. Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their pred
ecessorininterest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their common ancesto
r. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They only succeed to what ri
ghts their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and binding as against them. The de
ath of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which involves a property right and the rights and o
bligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not exc
used by the death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of the contract. I
n the end, despite the death of the petitioners’ mother, they are still bound to comply with the provisions of the “
Bilihan ng Lupa,” dated 17 August 1979 and 9 January 1981. Consequently, they must reconvey to herein respo
ndents Spouses Lumbao the 107square meter lot which they bought from Rita, petitioners’ mother. And as corre
ctly ruled by the appellate court, petitioners must pay respondents Spouses Lumbao attorney’s fees and litigatio
n expenses for having been compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect their interest.

Decision affirmed.

National Housing Authority vs. Almeida

G.R. No. 162784. June 22, 2007
PUNO, C.J.:

Doctrine:
Elements of Testamentary Succession.—We need not delve into the validity of the will. The issue is for the proba
te court to determine. We affirm the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court which noted that it has an el
ement of testamentary disposition where (1) it devolved and transferred property; (2) the effect of which shall tr
anspire upon the death of the instrument maker

Facts:
The Land Tenure Administration (LTA) (now DAR) awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land whi
ch are part of the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna. The award is evidenced by an Agreement to Sell. The re
cords show that Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz HerreraMercado (the mother of private respondent)
and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz HerreraMercado predeceased her mother and left heirs. Upon death of Margarita
, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of SelfAdjudication clai
ming that she is the only remaining relative, being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed
to be the exclusive legal heir of the late Margarita Herrera. The Deed of SelfAdjudicatio was based on a Sinum
paang Salaysay dated October 7, 1960.. The said document was signed by two witnesses and notarized. The wit
nesses signed at the lefthan side of both pages of the document with the said document havin 2 pages in total. M
argarita Herrera placed her thumbmark5 above her name in the second page and at the lefthand margin of the fir
st page of the document. The surviving heirs of Beatriz HerreraMercado filed a case for annulment of the Deed
of SelfAdjudication before the Regional trial court of Laguna. During trial on the merits of the case assailing th
e Deed of SelfAdjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an application with the NHA to purchase the same lots sub
mitting therewith a copy of the “Sinumpaang Salaysay” executed by her mother. Private respondent Almeida, as
heir of Beatriz HerreraMercado, protested the application. The NHA granted the application made by Francisca
Herrera. The NHA Resolution was affirmed by the Office of the President. 1987, Francisca Herrera died. Her h
eirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they submitted to the NHA. Said transfer of rights
was approved by the NHA. Thereafter, the heirs of Francisca Herrera directed Segunda MercadoAlmeida to lea
ve the premises, Segunda filed a Complaint on February 8, 1988, for “Nullification of Government Lot’s Award
,” and invoked her fortyyear occupation of the disputed properties, and re-raised the fact that Francisca Herrera’
s declaration of selfadjudication has been adjudged as a nullity because the other heirs were disregarded. The Re
gional Trial Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. But, the RTC set aside its former ruling and declar
ed the deeds of sale executed by NHA in favor of Herrera’s heirs null and void. The Regional Trial Court ruled t
hat the “Sinumpaang Salaysay” was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property which shall take ef
fect upon death. It then held that the said document must first be submitted to probate before it can transfer prop
erty. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. It can be ascertained from its wordings
taken in their ordinary and grammatical sense that the document is a simple disposition of her estate to take effe
ct after her death. Hence this petition.

Issue(s): WON the Sinumpaang Salaysay” was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property which s
hall take effect upon death.

Held:
Yes. When the petitioner received the “Sinumpaang Salaysay,” it should have noted that the effectivity of the sa
id document commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her words “sakaling ako’y bawi
an na ng Dios ng aking buhay…” Hence, in such period, all the interests of the person should cease to be hers a
nd shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Ci
vil Code. By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has alread
y passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971.34 The NHA issued its resolution35 on Feb
ruary 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without considering that
the initial applicant’s death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the estate including whatev
er interest she has or may have had over the disputed properties. The death of Margarita Herrera does not exting
uish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had an existing Contract to Sell36 with NHA as the seller.
Upon Margarita Herrera’s demise, this Contract to Sell was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell
was an obligation on both parties—Margarita Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible.37 Margarita Her
rera’s obligation to pay became transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by operation of law. If we
sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the decedent should transf
er by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it stands, NHA cannot
make another contract to sell to other parties of a property already initially paid for by the decedent. Such would
be an act contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales and obligations. The elements of testamentary
disposition where (1) it devolved and transferred property; (2) the effect of which shall transpire upon the death
of the instrument maker were present.

Petition denied.

People vs. Umali

G.R. No. 84450. February 4, 1991
MEDIALDEA, J.:

Doctrine:
The phrase “conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law” takes into account Article 821 of the Civil
Code which states that persons “convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or false testimony” are disqua
lified from being witnesses to a will.”
Facts:
“In Criminal Case No. 85516, Francisco Manalo was charged of having in his possession Indian Hemp on April
5, 1985, inviolation of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act 6425 as amended, otherwise known as the Dangero
us Drugs Act of 1972. Pierre Pangan, who was laso charged, “never disputed the claim of Francisco Manalo tha
t the marijuana found in his possession on April 5, 1985 in the municipality of Tiaong, Quezon was sold to him
by the accused Gloria Umali. The defense also did not dispute the claim of the prosecution that in the investigati
on of Pierre Pangan, the police investigator came to know that Gloria Umali was the source of the marijuana lea
ves which he used and smoked resulting in his present drug dependency. The appellant (Umali) vehemently den
ied the findings of the lower court and insisted that said court committed reversible errors in convicting her. She
alleged that witness Francisco Manalo is not reputed to be trustworthy and reliable and that his words should n
ot be taken on its face value. Furthermore, he stressed that said witness has several charges in court and because
of his desire to have some of his cases dismissed, he was likely to tell falsehood. However, the plaintiffappellee
through the Solicitor General said that even if Francisco Manalo was then facing several criminal charges when
he testified, such fact did not in any way disqualify him as a witness. “His testimony is not only reasonable and
probable but more so, it was also corroborated in its material respect by the other prosecution witnesses, especia
lly the police officers.” The trial court found Umali guilty of violating Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Dr
ugs.

Issue(s): WON Manalo is disqualified as a witness?

Held:
No. Since the witness Francisco Manalo is not convicted of any of the abovementioned crimes to disqualif
y him as a witness and this case does not involve the probate of a will, We rule that the fact that said witness
is facing several criminal charges when he testified did not in any way disqualify him as a witness. The testimo
ny of a witness should be given full faith and credit, in the absence of evidence that he was actuated by imprope
r motive

Decision affirmed with modification