G.R. No.
L-62431-33 August 31, 1984 hectares, and another parcel with an area of eighty-one (81) hectares
PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEVELOPMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH DIVISION) and HONOR
MOSLARES, respondents.
Azucena E. Lozada for petitioner.
Estrella Funelas Iral & Associates and Tomas Trinidad for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on June 30, 1982 in CA-G.R. Nos. 12599-R,
12600-R, and 12601-R entitled "Honor P. Moslares, petitioner v.
Honorable Reynaldo P. Honrado, et al., respondents, was filed as part of
the effort to expedite the final settlement of the estate of the deceased
NICOLAI DREPIN.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered,
judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) making permanent the temporary restraining
order issued:
(b) declaring null and void the impugned orders of
April 15, 1980, July 2, 1980, September 30, 1980,
and October 20, 1980, for having been issued in
grave abuse of discretion and in excess of
jurisdiction, with the September and October
orders having the additional defect of due process
violation;
(c) declaring null and void the Deed of
Undertaking and Deed of Sale in favor of
respondent Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc.,
for being mere consequences of null orders;
(d) ordering the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
cancel the transfer certificates of title issued to Pio
Barreto Realty Development, (TCT Nos. N-50539,
N-50540, N-50541) and to transfer the same to the
Estate of Nicolai Drepin with the annotation that
this transfer to the estate is subject to the final
decision in Civil Case No. 41287 of the CFI of
Pasig, Metro Manila; and
(e) denying the prayer for the exclusion of the
three titled lots involved from Special Proceedings
Nos. 7257, 7261, and 7269 of the CFI of Makati
Branch Civil Case No. 41287 abovementioned.
The proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Drepin were
initiated shortly after his death on July 29, 1972 with the filing of a
petition for probate of his holographic will on August 23, 1972.
In this holographic will the late Drepin listed twenty-two (22) persons
as his alleged creditors, and within the six (6) months after publication
within which to file claims against the estate, twelve (12) persons filed
their respective claims. The total amount of obligations that may be
chargeable against the Drepin Estate is P1,299,652.66.
The only asset of the testate estate of Drepin consists of three (3)
parcels of titled land with an area of approximately eighty (80)
still pending registration. The estate is saddled with claims of creditors
named in the Drepin will and creditors who have filed their claims
within the reglementary period. The only way to pay their claims is to
sell the Drepin lots, so that from the proceeds of the sale, the debts of
the estate could be paid, and any remaining balance distributed to the
Drepin heirs.
Since the filing of the petition for probate of the Drepin will, on August
23, 1972, nine (9) offers had been made for the purchase of the Drepin
lands, among them, that of GM Management Phils., dated August 15,
1978, through its President Honor P. Moslares. Basis for Moslares' letter
proposal is a deed of sale with mortgage executed by the decedent in
his favor on October 9, 1970. It appears that on said date, the deceased
sold 80.3980 hectares of land absolutely and perpetually to Honor P.
Moslares for the sum of P2,600,000.00 with a downpayment of
P300,000.00. To secure the payment of the remaining P2,300,000.00,
the latter mortgaged the land to the former. The parties further agreed
not to register the sale yet until P1,300,000.00 shall have been paid to
Drepin and P1,000.000.00 paid to Drepin's creditors.
Subsequently, on June 25, 1971, Drepin and Moslares entered into a
"Joint Venture Agreement". Said agreement listed Drepin as the
registered "owner" of the lots and denominated Moslares as
"developer" tasked with converting the lands into a residential
subdivision. The agreement specified:
(h) That the Developer agrees to reserve the right
of the registered Owner of the land to ask for
immediate CASH payment against an "Absolute
Deed of Sale " on the said above mentioned
properties, subject of this "Joint Venture
Agreement" on the amount of not less than TWO
MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P2,300,000.00) PESOS, after the big loan is
granted to the Developer in or about thirty (30)
days to forty-five (45) days from the signing of this
Joint Venture Agreement and the "Special Power of
Attorney",
(i) However, if the Owner of the property Mr.
Nicolai Drepin not choose to be paid on this said
above mentioned property in CASH of TWO
MILLION THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P2,300,000.00) PESOS, this "joint venture
agreement is still in full force and effect,
OTHERWISE if full payment of TWO MILLION
THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P2,300,000.00)
PESOS receipt is acknowledged by the said Mr.
Nicolai Drepin, the "Joint Venture Agreement" is
automatically cancelled and declared no force and
effect.
Before the agreement could be implemented, Nicolai Drepin died.
Upon learning of the existence of Special Proceedings No. 7257, 7261
and 7269 herein respondent Moslares, on August 15, 1978, informed
the Judicial Administrator
Atty. Tomas Trinidad that he is already the owner of the properties
made subject matter of the Special Proceedings and proposed that he
be permitted to pay the balance on the sale with mortgage in
accordance with the terms of his written proposal. The probate court,
on August 17, 1978 issued an order approving respondent Moslares'
proposal and authorizing administrator Trinidad to enter into the
appropriate agreement. This was reiterated by the court in its order
dated January 9, 1979, with the condition that GM Management Phils.
had only up to February 28, 1979 to comply with its letter-offer dated
August 15, 1978 and "failure on their part to comply with the same
within the period specified, the contract with the decedent shall be
deemed resolved and ineffective." Counsel for heir claimant Cornelia
Tejano was Revise given up to said date to make and submit a more
beneficial offer. Neither GM Management nor counsel for Tejano was
able to perform as required.
1|2nd Page of SPECPRO
Requests for revision of payment and extension of period within which
to pay the balance of P1,600,000.00 were made by Moslares. Further,
he filed a Manifestation and Urgent Motion proposing transfer of the
certificate of titles over the land subject of the proceedings so as to
enable him to generate funds to liquidate the payable balance. The
same were left unacted upon by the probate court.
Administrator would be permitted to accept other offers in the best
interest of the Estate. This order was the probate court's prompt action
on a "Report with Motion for Cancellation of Order Approving Sale to
GM Management, Phils. Honor P. Moslares, if it fails to make good the
April 15, 1980 check "As Token Payment in Good Faith", filed by
administrator Trinidad on the same day, April 15, 1980.

Meanwhile, on September 25,1979, A Deed of Undertaking was GM Management sought reconsideration and amendment of the Order
entered into by respondent Moslares and the Administrator to of April 15, 1980 to conform to the provisions of the Deed of
implement the Contract of Sale with Mortgage. Such deed provided for Undertaking.
the mode of payment which Moslares was to follow as well as the
clearing and transfer of the certificates of title in the name of Moslares.
On May 23, 1980, administrator Trinidad filed a "Report with Motion to
The latter proviso was to enable Moslares to secure the loan needed to
Authorize Administrator to Screen Offers to Purchase Estate and
pay for the balance of the purchase price. Postdated checks were
Others.
issued by Moslares to cover the amount embraced in said
undertaking. Approval of the agreement with Moslares was strongly
urged by the Administrator. No action was taken by the court thereon. On May 31, 1980, respondent Moslares filed another manifestation
At the hearing of October 19, 1979, Moslares tendered P1,600,000.00 praying that his pending motions be acted upon and that the motion of
to the Judicial Administrator. This was opposed by counsel for heir administrator Trinidad be denied for lack of merit.
Tejano, Atty. Ramon Encarnacion, on the ground that respondent
Moslares had only until February 28, 1979 within which to pay the
On June 30, 1980, administrator Trinidad made the following
same. Attorney Encarnacion thereupon brought to the attention of the
"Observation and Report on the Motion of Buyer GM Management
court an offer to buy the properties for P3,000,000.00 by herein
Phils. for reconsideration" —
petitioner Pio Barretto Realty Development, Inc. Because of the
differing contentions and the new offer, the probate court ordered the
parties to submit memoranda and set a conference on November 28, 2. Two checks, one for P50,000.00 and one for
1979 to discuss the new offer. P250,000.00 were deposited on April 28, 1980 after
the Order of the Probate Court. BOTH BOUNCED.
DAIF (Drawn against insufficient funds).
On November 12, 1979, respondent Moslares submitted his
memorandum containing three points to wit:
3. Another check for P300,000.00 is now held by
the Administrator, postdated for today, June 30,
l. Actually, Honor P. Moslares is already owner of
1980 and Administrator just received, June 29, 1980
the Property, subject matter of this proceedings,
a telegram asking to withhold deposit until after 30
and as such, could no longer be the subject matter
days from amendatory order of the Probate Court.
of this testate proceedings. The payment made by
Honor P. Moslares to the Judicial Administrator
through this Honorable Court on 19 October, 1979, xxx xxx xxx
is in compliance with the Contract entered into
between him and the late Nicolai Drepin, in 1970;
6. The motion of Administrator is reiterated.

2. The Order of this Honorable Court dated 9

January, 1979, particularly with reference to the
period, mentioned in No. 1, page 2 of the Order of
this Honorable Court giving Honor P. Moslares up
to 28 February, 1979, within which to comply with
his letter-offer to the Court dated 15 August, 1978,
is not yet final, said period having been extended;
3. The Order of this Honorable Court dated 9
January, 1979, particularly No. 2, Page 2 thereof,
barred Counsel for Cornelia B. Tejano from
making any further offer, his right to do so having
expired on 28 February, 1979.
Thereupon, the probate court judge directed Moslares through the
administrator Atty. Trinidad, to furnish copies of — (1) Deed of
Absolute Sale; (2) Special Power of Attorney; and (3) Joint Venture
Agreement. The same were promptly submitted.
On February 28, 1979, March 6, 1980 and April 15, 1980, letters to
Judicial Administrator Trinidad were sent by respondent Moslares
seeking further extension of time within which to pay the balance of his
obligation to the estate, and for favorable recommendations to the
probate court in his reports saying: "Help me now, this is ours. We can
make money of all this sacrifice we had on the pass (sic)."
On July 2, 1980, the probate court issued the following order:
Finding the Motion of the Administrator well-taken
and in the best interests of the Estate, the
administrator is authorized to enter into agreement
with any other interested parties on a first paid first
served basis without prejudice to G.M.
Management Philippines to continue with its offer
and make good the same in as an ordinary buyer
on the same first paid first served basis.
Respondent Moslares filed a motion for reconsideration of said July 2,
1980 order on the ground that:
1. The Honorable Probate Court has no jurisdiction
over the three (3) parcels of land, consisting of
80.3980 hectares subject matter of the Deed of Sale
which the late Nicolai Drepin, conveyed to Movant
Honor P. Moslares. The only right which pertains to
the ESTATE, is the right to demand from Honor P.
Moslares, the balance of the Deed of Sale, which
has been fixed by this Honorable Court at ONE
MILLION SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P1,600,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency;

2. As of November, 1979, the law that governs

On April 15, 1980, the probate court reiterated its order dated August
between the ESTATE and MOVANT, Honor P.
17, 1978 authorizing the Administrator to finalize the sale with GM
Moslares, is the DEED OF UNDERTAKING executed
Management Phils. and giving respondent Moslares ten (10) days from
by the Administrator in favor of Movant Honor P.
date to deposit the necessary amount to cover the value of the checks
Moslares, pursuant to the authority given by the
as each fallsdue. Failure to do so would result in the automatic
Honorable Probate Court to the Administrator
rescission of the authority to sell to GM Management Phils. and the
2|2nd Page of SPECPRO
 contained in the Order dated August 15, 1978,
reiterated in the Order dated January 9, 1979, and
in the Order dated 15 April 1980; and
3. The Honorable Probate Court has no jurisdiction
to decree rescission of the Contract into (sic)
between the decedent and Movant Honor P.
Moslares on the 9th day of October, 1970.
This motion for reconsideration was opposed by administrator
Trinidad as well as the Tejano heirs through counsel, arguing that the
probate court has jurisdiction to issue the questioned orders because
petitioner submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction and his checks
bounced also that the Deed of Undertaking was validly cancelled as a
result of the valid rescission of Trinidad's authority to sell to petitioner.
On September 30, 1980, the probate court issued an order denying
respondent Moslares' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. And
on October 10, 1980 administrator Trinidad executed the Deed of Sale
in favor of Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. transferring the titles to the
properties in question in the name of the latter. The same was duly
registered. On October 20, 1980, the probate court approved the
report of administrator Trinidad dated October 16, 1980, with xerox
copies of the Deed of Sale in favor of Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. of the
estate of Nicolai Drepin pursuant to respondent court's order
authorizing the sale, and of the approved Deed of Undertaking with the
vendee.
An urgent Motion and Manifestation was filed by respondent Moslares
on April 8, 1981 praying that his motion for reconsideration of the
orders be already resolved, followed by an Omnibus Motion on April
27, 1981 to resolve all pending motions and praying that the Deed of
Sale and Deed of Undertaking in favor of Pio Barretto be cancelled.
The same remained unacted upon.
On May 18, 1981, respondent filed Civil Case No. 41287 before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal in Pasig, Metro Manila to determine title
and ownership over the Drepin lands.
On June 23, 1981, a petition for certiorari was filed by respondent
Moslares before the Court of Appeals which issued a temporary
restraining order. Judgment was rendered by respondent court in
favor of respondent Moslares, the dispositive portion of which has
been quoted.
Barretto filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied on
November 12, 1982. Hence, this petition.
In its decision, the Court of Appeals laid down the two principal issues
involved in the case, as follows: (1) whether or not the respondent
judge (Judge R. Honrado) acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to exclude the parcels of
land involved from the testate proceedings of the Drepin estate; and
(2) whether or not the respondent judge acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the impugned
orders dated April 15, 1980, July 2, 1980, September 30, 1980, and
October 20, 1980.
We are in full accord with the respondent court's resolution of the first
issue, and we quote:
For continually presuming that the three titled lots
were part of the Drepin estate and for refusing to
provisionally pass upon the question of exclusion,
did the respondent court act without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion?
We hold that even with such presumption and
refusal, the respondent court still acted within its
jurisdiction and not with grave abuse of discretion.
After all, the jurisprudence and rule are both to the
effect that the probate court "may" provisionally
pass upon the question of exclusion, not "should".
The obvious reason is the probate court's limited
jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title
or ownership, which result to inclusion in or
exclusion from the inventory of the property, can
only be settled in a separate action. Hence, even if
respondent court presumed an the way that the
properties sold by Drepin to petitioner were part
of Drepin's estate, that would not prevent nor
defeat petitioner's remedy in a separate suit.
And We hold that Civil Case No. 41287 is just such
a suit instituted to settle the question of ownership
over the lots covered originally by TCTs Nos.
259060, 259061 and 259062, despite the claim for
damages, because of the composite effect of the
prayer in the complaint thereof ...
xxx xxx xxx
In effect, We are saying that the question of
whether the properties sold by Drepin to Petitioner
should be excluded from the probate proceedings
below, can not be determined with finality by Us in
this case, because in this petition We are merely
reviewing the acts of the respondent CFI as a
probate court. Any ruling by the probate court to
include those properties "is only provisional in
character and is without prejudice to a judgment in
a separate action on the issue of title or ownership"
(Sebial v. Sebial, L-23419, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA
385). Consequently, in reviewing the exercise of
such limited probate jurisdiction, We cannot order
an unqualified and final exclusion of the properties
involved, as prayed for; to do so would expand the
probate court's jurisdiction beyond the perimeters
set by law and jurisprudence. It is fitting and
proper that this issue be ventilated and finally
resolved in the already instituted Civil Case No.
41287, even as We hold that respondent court's act
of not excluding the lots involved did not constitute
grave abuse of discretion. In view of this limitation,
We need not resolve the issue of whether there
was novation of the Deed of Sale with Mortgage, or
not.
This same elemental principle, we found occasion to reiterate in the
cases of Junquera v. Borromeo (19 SCRA 656); Borromeo v. Canonoy (19
SCRA 667); Recto v. dela Rosa (75 SCRA 226); Lachenal v. Salas (71
SCRA 202); Bolisay v. Alcid (85 SCRA 213); Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court
of Appeals (91 SCRA 540).
However, from here, the road forks as we disagree with the
respondent court's findings on the second issue.
In his petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, respondent
Moslares assails the issuance of the four impugned orders by the
probate court on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction to
rescind the Deed of Sale with the Mortgage entered into by the
deceased during his lifetime, due to the limited jurisdiction of the
probate court merely to settle and liquidate the estates of a decedent
and not to pass upon questions of title to property.
On the other hand, the petitioner argues that in voiding and nullifying
the four orders of the probate court, the Court of Appeals, in effect,
would have the former court recognize the alleged ownership of Mr.
Moslares over the three titled Drepin lots involved in this case contrary
to its pronouncement in settling the first issue.
3|2nd Page of SPECPRO
It is to be noted that the last agreement entered into by the deceased
prior to his death, that is, the Joint Venture Agreement listing Drepin as
owner of the properties in question, and the surrender to administrator
Trinidad of the certificates of title, had led the probate court to enter or
include said properties in its inventory of the deceased's estate. Thus,
provisionally, ownership thereof was recognized as vested in the
estate. Subsequently, in the course of the probate proceedings, the
sale of the properties was found to be necessary to settle the
deceased's obligations. It was then that herein private respondent
Moslares submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court in an "Offer
to Buy" said properties, based on his previous agreement with the
deceased during the latter's lifetime.
It is noteworthy that contrary to Moslares' assertion of ownership, he
had offered to buy the Drepin lands from the probate court. Surely,
this is not conduct ordinarily expected of one who is the owner of the
property. Further, the fact that subsequent to the Deed of Sale, the
deceased as buyer and as absolute owner entered into an agreement
with the respondent merely as developer of the lands in question
evidences a change of cause or object as well as a change of relation
between the parties. Moslares' own acts negate his claims in this
petition that he had acquired ownership of the properties. Thus, the
transparency of respondent's argument becomes readily apparent.
Having submitted his letter-proposal to the court, the same was
approved, allowing Moslares to pay the balance of the purchase price
agreed upon by respondent and the decedent in the amount of One
Million Six Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,600,000.00) specifying the
time and manner of payment thereof. Thus, he was given preference
and priority over other persons or groups offering to buy the estate.
Having failed to comply with the conditions of payment of the contract,
the same was rescinded by the probate court. Now, respondent
questions this rescission which he maintains to be beyond the
jurisdiction of the court.
Estoppel works to preclude respondent from questioning the
jurisdiction of the court. By offering to buy the properties in question,
respondent has clearly recognized the jurisdiction of the probate court
to which he had effectively submitted himself. It is well settled that a
party is estopped from disputing the jurisdiction of the court after
invoking it himself (Tible v. Aquino, 65 SCRA 207). After voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the
merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of
the court (People v. Munar, 53 SCRA 278; Capilitan v. dela Cruz, 55
SCRA 706; Summit Guaranty and Insurance Co., Inc., v. Court of
Appeals, 110 SCRA 241; Tajonera v. Lamoroza, 110 SCRA 438). A party
will not be allowed to make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent
positions. Doctrine of estoppel bars a party from trifling with the courts
(Depositario v. Hervias, 121 SCRA 756).
The merits of the case likewise lead to similar conclusions.
It cannot but be conceded that the limited jurisdiction of a probate
court prohibits it from determining rights to property left by a
decedent which depends on the contract (Goodin v. Casselman 200
N.W. 94, 51 N.D. 543). However, actions of the probate court, in the
case at bar, do not refer to the adjudication of rights under the contract
entered into by the deceased during his lifetime. It is to be noted that
the dealings of the respondent with the court arose out of the latter's
bid to sell property under its authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber property of the estate to pay or settle against the estate
(Rule 89, Revised Rules of Court). Thus, respondent bound himself
under an agreement with the court separate and distinct from that
which he had with the decedent. In rescinding such contract, the court
merely seeks to enforce its right to put an end to an agreement which
had ceased to be a working proposition. Surely, this is well within the
power of the probate court. Though of limited and special jurisdiction,
it cannot be denied, however, that when the law confers jurisdiction
upon a court, the latter is deemed to have all the necessary powers to
exercise such jurisdicton to make it effective (Zuniga v. Court of
Appeals, 95 SCRA 740).
We cannot allow an absurd situation to arise where the Drepin estate
will never be settled and liquidated because even if Moslares cannot
pay the agreed purchase price of the Drepin lands, still the probate
court can no longer sell the lands to other prospective buyers. Under
the theory of respondent, it is insisted that the probate court has no
authority to cancel his unfulfilled offer to buy, notwithstanding the fact
that he failed miserably to comply with the terms of his own offer to
buy. It is to be remembered that Moslares had already been granted
undue leniency by the probate court to meet his obligations to pay.
But, the saga of Moslares' bouncing checks remains. Three reports of
Administrator Trinidad had been submitted as annexes to the petition
for certiorari. The report, dated June 30, 1980 showed that two of
Moslares' checks were dishonored, having been drawn against
insufficient funds. The August 18, 1980 report stated that: "All the
checks submitted to the probate court for payment bounced." And in
the report dated April 15, 1981, it was further averred by the
administrator that "... believing that the bouncing checks were not
intended to defraud the Estate," "he refrained from prosecuting Honor
P. Moslares criminally under the law on dishonored checks."
It is also to be emphasized that it was not respondent's contract of sale
with decedent that had been invalidated but rather the administrator's
authority to sell to respondent. Although the court recognized the
Deed of Sale with Mortgage, still the same was not being enforced as
such but was used only as basis for the terms and conditions of
respondent's agreement with the court. To enforce the same is truly
beyond the scope of the probate court's jurisdiction. The court's
actions constitute a refusal to pass upon the validity of the contract to
sell.
Further, the probate court has ample discretion in determining
whether conditions of a particular sale would be beneficial to the
estate and this is generally respected by the appellate courts (Court of
First Instance v. Court of Appeals, 106 SCRA 114, Fernandez, et al., v.
Montejo, 109 Phil. 701). To attack the nullity of the order of the probate
court to sell property of the deceased, it must be shown that the
contract of sale is null and void (Rafols v. Barba, 119 SCRA 147). The
infirmity of the subject deed of sale is premised on the alleged nullity
of the order of the court authorizing the sale. The validity of said order
may not be attacked in a collateral proceeding, the supposed ground
for declaring it void for lack of jurisdiction not being apparent on the
face thereof (Rafols v. Barba, supra). Nevertheless, respondent could
have prevented the sale of the Drepin lands. Section 3, Rule 89 of the
Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Persons interested may prevent such sale,
etc., by giving bond. — No such authority to sell
mortgage, or otherwise encumber real or personal
estate shall be granted if any person interested in
the estate gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the
court, conditioned to pay the debts, expenses of
administration, and legacies within such tune as
the court directs; and such bond shall be for the
security of the creditors, as well as of the executor
or administrator, and may be prosecuted for the
benefit of either.
provides respondent with the legal means by which he could have
forestalled the sale of the Drepin lands to the petitioner. (Court of First
Instance v. Court of Appeals, supra) If third persons oppose an
application for leave to sell the property of the decedent, claiming title
to the property, the title claim, cannot be adjudicated by the probate
court, but it can hold approval of the sale in abeyance until the
question of ownership shall have been decided in a proper action
(Baquial v. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501). But this, he failed to do. Ergo, we find
no reason to disturb the questioned orders of the probate court.
Moreover, the respondent is not without remedy if truly his claim of
ownership is proper and meritorious. Since the probate court has no
jurisdiction over the question of title and ownership of the properties,
the respondents may bring a separate action if they wish to question
the petitioner's titles and ownership (Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of
Appeals, 91 SCRA 540). Though an order of the probate court
4|2nd Page of SPECPRO
approving the sale of the decedent's property is final, the respondent
may file a complaint in the proper court for the rescission of the sale.
(Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, 99 SCRA 72). Likewise, the initial question
of respondent regarding the propriety of including the properties in
question in the inventory of the probate court as he claims ownership
thereof may therein be finally and conclusively settled (Vda. de
Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, supra; Lachenal v. Salas, 71 SCRA 202).
The respondent has ample protection of his rights for the province of
the probate court remains merely the settlement of the estate and may
not be extended beyond (Pizarro v. Court of Appeals, supra).
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals (now
Intermediate Appellate Court), dated June 30, 1982 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The permanent restraining order issued against the trial
court is hereby DISMISSED. The impugned orders of the probate court
dated April 15, 1980, July 2, 1980, September 30, 1980 and October 20,
1980 are accordingly REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108581 December 8, 1999
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as
Attorney-in-Fact of VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE
DOROTHEO, respondents.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May a last will and testament admitted to probate but declared
intrinsically void in an order that has become final and executory still
be given effect? This is the issue that arose from the following
antecedents:
Private respondents were the legitimate children of Alejandro
Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes. The latter died in 1969 without her estate
being settled. Alejandro died thereafter. Sometime in 1977, after
Alejandro's death, petitioner, who claims to have taken care of
Alejandro before he died, filed a special proceeding for the probate of
the latter's last will and testament. In 1981, the court issued an order
admitting Alejandro's will to probate. Private respondents did not
appeal from said order. In 1983, they filed a "Motion To Declare The
Will Intrinsically Void." The trial court granted the motion and issued
an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Order is
hereby issued declaring Lourdes Legaspi not the
wife of the late Alejandro Dorotheo, the provisions
of the last will and testament of Alejandro Dorotheo
as intrinsically void, and declaring the oppositors
Vicente Dorotheo, Jose Dorotheo and Nilda
Dorotheo Quintana as the only heirs of the late
spouses Alejandro Dorotheo and Aniceta Reyes,
whose respective estates shall be liquidated and
distributed according to the laws on intestacy upon
payment of estate and other taxes due to the
government. 1
Petitioner moved for reconsideration arguing that she is entitled to
some compensation since she took care of Alejandro prior to his death
although she admitted that they were not married to each other. Upon
denial of her motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed to the
Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed for failure to file
appellant's brief within the extended period
granted. 2 This dismissal became final and executory on February 3,
1989 and a corresponding entry of judgment was forthwith issued by
the Court of Appeals on May 16, 1989. A writ of execution was issued
by the lower court to implement the final and executory Order.
Consequently, private respondents filed several motions including a
motion to compel petitioner to surrender to them the Transfer
Certificates of Titles (TCT) covering the properties of the late
Alejandro. When petitioner refused to surrender the TCT's, private
respondents filed a motion for cancellation of said titles and for
issuance of new titles in their names. Petitioner opposed the motion.
An Order was issued on November 29, 1990 by Judge Zain B. Angas
setting aside the final and executory Order dated January 30, 1986, as
well as the Order directing the issuance of the writ of execution, on the
ground that the order was merely "interlocutory", hence not final in
character. The court added that the dispositive portion of the said
Order even directs the distribution of the estate of the deceased
spouses. Private respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied in an Order dated February 1, 1991. Thus, private
respondents filed a petition before the Court of Appeals, which
nullified the two assailed Orders dated November 29, 1990 and
February 1, 1991.
Aggrieved, petitioner instituted a petition for review arguing that the
case filed by private respondents before the Court of Appeals was a
petition under Rule 65 on the ground of grave abuse of discretion or
lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner contends that in issuing the two assailed
orders, Judge Angas cannot be said to have no jurisdiction because he
was particularly designated to hear the case. Petitioner likewise
assails the Order of the Court of Appeals upholding the validity of the
January 30, 1986 Order which declared the intrinsic invalidity of
Alejandro's will that was earlier admitted to probate.
Petitioner also filed a motion to reinstate her as executrix of the estate
of the late Alejandro and to maintain thestatus quo or lease of the
premises thereon to third parties. 3 Private respondents opposed the
motion on the ground that petitioner has no interest in the estate since
she is not the lawful wife of the late Alejandro.
The petition is without merit. A final and executory decision or order
can no longer be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it
may be. In setting aside the January 30, 1986 Order that has attained
finality, the trial court in effect nullified the entry of judgment made by
the Court of Appeals. It is well settled that a lower court cannot reverse
or set aside decisions or orders of a superior court, for to do so would
be to negate the hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of review.
It has been ruled that a final judgment on probated will, albeit
erroneous, is binding on the whole world. 4
It has been consistently held that if no appeal is taken in due time from
a judgment or order of the trial court, the same attains finality by mere
lapse of time. Thus, the order allowing the will became final and the
question determined by the court in such order can no longer be
raised anew, either in the same proceedings or in a different motion.
The matters of due execution of the will and the capacity of the testator
acquired the character ofres judicata and cannot again be brought into
question, all juridical questions in connection therewith being for once
and forever closed. 5 Such final order makes the will conclusive against
the whole world as to its extrinsic validity and due execution. 6
It should be noted that probate proceedings deals generally with the
extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, 7 particularly on
three aspects:
n whether
the will
submitted
is indeed,
the
decedent's
last will and
testament;
n
compliance
5|2nd Page of SPECPRO
 with the Petitioner posits that the January 30, 1986 Order is merely
prescribed interlocutory, hence it can still be set aside by the trial court. In
formalities support thereof, petitioner argues that "an order merely declaring who
for the are heirs and the shares to which set of heirs is entitled cannot be the
execution basis of execution to require delivery of shares from one person to
of wills; another particularly when no project of partition has been filed." 19 The
trial court declared in the January 30, 1986 Order that petitioner is not
the legal wife of Alejandro, whose only heirs are his three legitimate
n the
children (petitioners herein), and at the same time it nullified the will.
testamentar
But it should be noted that in the same Order, the trial court also said
y capacity
that the estate of the late spouses be distributed according to the laws
of the
of intestacy. Accordingly, it has no option but to implement that order
testator; 8
of intestate distribution and not to reopen and again re-examine the
intrinsic provisions of the same will.
n and the
due
It can be clearly inferred from Article 960 of the Civil Code, on the law
execution
of successional rights that testacy is preferred to intestacy. 20 But
of the last
before there could be testate distribution, the will must pass the
will and
scrutinizing test and safeguards provided by law considering that the
testament. 9
deceased testator is no longer available to prove the voluntariness of
his actions, aside from the fact that the transfer of the estate is usually
Under the Civil Code, due execution includes a determination of onerous in nature and that no one is presumed to give —Nemo
whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time of its praesumitur donare. 21 No intestate distribution of the estate can be
execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting done until and unless the will had failed to pass both its extrinsic and
under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is intrinsic validity. If the will is extrinsically void, the rules of intestacy
genuine and not a forgery, 10 that he was of the proper testamentary apply regardless of the intrinsic validity thereof. If it is extrinsically
age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from valid, the next test is to determine its intrinsic validity — that is
making a will. 11 whether the provisions of the will are valid according to the laws of
succession. In this case, the court had ruled that the will of Alejandro
was extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were void.
The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the
Thus, the rules of intestacy apply as correctly held by the trial court.
same may still be raised even after the will has been
authenticated. 12 Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an
extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Furthermore, Alejandro's disposition in his will of the alleged share in
Even if the will was validly executed, if the testator provides for the conjugal properties of his late spouse, whom he described as his
dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their legitime "only beloved wife", is not a valid reason to reverse a final and
or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, 13 the executory order. Testamentary dispositions of properties not
unlawful provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect. This is belonging exclusively to the testator or properties which are part of
specially so when the courts had already determined in a final and the conjugal regime cannot be given effect. Matters with respect to
executory decision that the will is intrinsically void. Such who owns the properties that were disposed of by Alejandro in the
determination having attained that character of finality is binding on void will may still be properly ventilated and determined in the
this Court which will no longer be disturbed. Not that this Court finds intestate proceedings for the settlement of his and that of his late
the will to be intrinsically valid, but that a final and executory decision spouse's estate.
of which the party had the opportunity to challenge before the higher
tribunals must stand and should no longer be reevaluated. Failure to
Petitioner's motion for appointment as administratrix is rendered moot
avail of the remedies provided by law constitutes waiver. And if the
considering that she was not married to the late Alejandro and,
party does not avail of other remedies despite its belief that it was
therefore, is not an heir.
aggrieved by a decision or court action, then it is deemed to have fully
agreed and is satisfied with the decision or order. As early as 1918, it
has been declared that public policy and sound practice demand that, WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision appealed from
at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts must at some point is AFFIRMED.
of time fixed by law 14 become final otherwise there will be no end to
litigation. Interes rei publicae ut finis sit litium — the very object of
SO ORDERED.
which the courts were constituted was to put an end to
controversies. 15 To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily, certain
time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on the G.R. No. L-42257 June 14, 1976
slothful. 16 The only instance where a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out
ILDEFONSO LACHENAL, ELIAS LACHENAL, IRENEA L. SANTOS,
by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or FLORA L. SANCHEZ and NATIVIDAD D. LACHENAL, petitioners,
inadvertence not imputable to negligence, 17 which circumstances do
vs.
not concur herein.
HON. EMILIO V. SALAS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Pasig, Rizal, Branch I, and FLAVIANA L.
Petitioner was privy to the suit calling for the declaration of the LEONIO, respondents.
intrinsic invalidity of the will, as she precisely appealed from an
unfavorable order therefrom. Although the final and executory Order
Alberto A. Tecson for petitioners.
of January 30, 1986 wherein private respondents were declared as the
only heirs do not bind those who are not parties thereto such as the
alleged illegitimate son of the testator, the same constitutes res Briñas, Atienza & Acaban Law Offices for respondents.
judicata with respect to those who were parties to the probate
proceedings. Petitioner cannot again raise those matters anew for
relitigation otherwise that would amount to forum-shopping. It should
be remembered that forum shopping also occurs when the same issue
had already been resolved adversely by some other court. 18 It is clear AQUINO, J.:
from the executory order that the estates of Alejandro and his spouse
should be distributed according to the laws of intestate succession.

6|2nd Page of SPECPRO

Victorio Lachenal died on November 20, 1969. His testate estate is
pending settlement in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch
I (Special Proceeding No. 5836). His son, Ildefonso Lachenal, was
named executor of his will. Among the properties included in the
inventory of his estate is a fishing boat called Lachenal VII.
On April 1, 1971 the executor filed in that proceeding a motion to
require the spouses Lope L. Leonio and Flaviana Lachenal-Leonio to
pay the rentals for the lease of Lachenal VII and to return the boat to
Navotas, Rizal for drydocking and repair.
Mrs. Leonio, who was a daughter of the testator, opposed the
executor's motion. She countered with a motion to exclude the fishing
boat from the decedent's estate. She claimed that she is the owner of
the boat because she purchased it from her father in 1967. The
executor opposed the motion for exclusion.
The probate court in its order of January 28, 1972 designated a
commissioner to receive the evidence of the parties relative to the
ownership of the motorboat. Mrs. Leonio had already finished the
presentation of her evidence before the commissioner.
The executor did not present his countervailing evidence. Instead, on
July 8, 1975 he and the testator's other children named Flora, Elias and
Irenea, and the children of a deceased child filed in the Caloocan City
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action against the
Leonio spouses and the other three children of the testator named
Crispula, Modesto and Esperanza, for the recovery of the
motorboat Lachenal VII, allegedly valued at P150,000, together with
back rentals and damages (Civil Case No. 3597).
It was alleged in the complaint that Victorio Lachenal in 1964 leased
the said motorboat to his son-in-law, Lope L. Leonio, for a monthly
rental of P2,000 and that after Victorio's death, the executor of his
estate demanded from Leonio the return of the boat and the payment
of the back rentals.
On July 20, 1975 the said plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3597 filed in the
probate court their own motion to exclude the said motorboat from the
decedent's estate on the ground that the, probate court has no
jurisdiction to decide the question as to its ownership because that
matter has to be resolved by the Caloocan court where Civil Case No.
3597 is pending.
The probate court denied that motion. It held that it has jurisdiction
over the issue of ownership because the heirs had agreed to present
their evidence on that point before a commissioner.
It invoked the rule that generally "questions of title to property cannot
be passed upon in testate or intestate proceedings, except when the
parties interested are all heirs of the deceased in which event it is
optional upon them to submit to the probate court the question as to
title to property and when so submitted, said probate court may
definitely pass judgment thereon. The reason is that questions of
collation or of advancement are generally inevitably involved therein
which are proper matters to be passed upon in the due course of
administration. And it has also been held that with the consent of the
parties, matters affecting property under administration may be taken
cognizance of by the court in the course of the intestate proceedings
provided the interests of third persons are not prejudiced." (3 Moran's
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, page 473, citing
Alvarez vs. Espiritu, L-18833, August 14, 1965, 14 SCRA 892, 899;
Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Vda. de Manalac vs. Ocampo, 73 Phil.
661; Cunanan vs. Amparo, 80 Phil. 227; Dinglasan vs. Ang Chia, 88
Phil. 476; Baquial vs. Amihan, 92 Phil. 501).
On January 5, 1976 the executor and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
3597 filed these special civil actions of prohibition
and certiorari against the probate court.
The issue is whether the probate court should be allowed to continue
the hearing on the ownership of the fishing boat or whether that
question should be left to the determination of the Caloocan court
where the subsequent separate action (now in the pre-trial stage) for
the recovery of the motorboat is pending.
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil
Case No. 3597 because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L Leonio, the
decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or
compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his
estate. "The administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion,
into the administration proceeding" (De la Cruz vs. Camon, 63 O.G.
8704, 16 SCRA 886; De Paula vs. Escay, infra).
This case falls under the general rule that questions as to title to
property cannot be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding
but should be ventilated in a separate action (Ongsingco vs. Tan, 97
Phil. 330, 334; Bernardo vs. Court of Appeals ,117 Phil. 835; Magallanes
vs. Kayanan, L-31048, January 20, 1976; Recto vs. Dela Rosa, L-42799,
March 16, 1976).
Where a party in a probate proceeding prays for the inclusion in, or
exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property, the court may
provisionally pass upon the question without prejudice to its final
determination in a separate action (Garcia vs. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353;
Guinguing vs. Abuton, 48 Phil. 144, 147; Junquera vs. Borromeo, L-
18498, March 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 656; Borromeo vs. Canonoy, L-25010,
March 30, 1967, 19 SCRA 667).
The Court of First Instance is a court of general original jurisdiction
invested with power to take cognizance of all kinds of cases: civil
cases, criminal cases, special proceedings, land registration,
guardianship, naturalization, admiralty and insolvency cases (Sec. 39,
Judiciary Law; De Paula vs. Escay, 97 Phil. 617, 619; Manalo vs.
Mariano, L-33850, January 22, 1976).
Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited
jurisdiction as a special court (probate, land registration, etc.) is in
reality not a question of over the subject matter. It is in essence a
procedural question involving a mode of practice "which may be
waived" (Cunanan vs. Amparo, supra, page 232; Cf. Reyes vs. Diaz, 73
Phil. 484 rejurisdiction over the issue).
Probate jurisdiction includes all matters relating to the settlement of
estates and the probate of wills of persons (Sec. 599, Act 190),
particularly the administration of the decedent's estate, the payment of
his debts, questions as to collation or advancements to the heirs, the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, and the partition and
distribution of the estate (De La Cruz vs. Camon, supra).
For the recovery or protection or the property rights of the decedent.
an executor or administrator may bring or defend in the right of the
decedent, actions for causes which survive. Actions to recover real or
personal property, or an interest therein, from the decedent's estate,
or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an
injury to or property, real or personal, may be commenced against an
executor or administrator (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 87, Rules of Court).
In the instant case, the executor, by virtue of section 2 of Rule 87, filed
a separate action in the Caloocan court for the recovery of the fishing
boat and back rentals from the Leonio spouses.
In the De la Cruz case, supra, it was held that rentals allegedly due to
the decedent's estate may not be collected by the administrator by
filing a motion in the testate proceeding. The said rentals do not
constitute property in the administrator's hands and are not thus within
the effective control of the probate court. The proper procedure in
collecting such rentals is to file an independent action in the Court of
First Instance so that the right of the estate thereto may be threshed out
in a full-dress trial on the merits.
7|2nd Page of SPECPRO
The ruling in the De la Cruz case applies with stronger force to this
case because here the executor seeks to recover not only the rentals
but also the leased property itself, as to which the wife of the lessee
had asserted adverse title.
Normally, it is expedient and convenient that the question of title to
property, which arises between the decedent's estate and other
persons, should be adjucated in a separate action because such a
question requires the presentation of appropriate pleadings
(complaint, motion to dismiss, answer, counterclaim and reply). A
resort to the modes of discovery may be necessary so that the issues
may be clearly defined and the trial may be expedited. Those matters
can be effectively accomplished in an ordinary action rather than in
the testamentary or intestate proceeding (Mangaliman vs. Gonzales, L-
21033, December 28, 1970, 36 SCRA 462).
The court may also have to resolve ancillary issues as to damages and
counterclaims for money or property. Ultimately, execution has to be
issued. The execution of a judgment is usually made by the Court of
First Instance in an ordinary action and not in a special proceeding
(See Magallanes vs. Kayanan, supra).
In the instant case, in as much as the controversy over the fishing boat
concerns members of the same family, the Caloocan court should
endeavor before trial to persuade the litigants to agree upon some
compromise (Arts. 222 and 2029, Civil Code; Sec. 1[j], Rule 16, Rules
of Court).
WHEREFORE, the probate court's orders of September 17 and October
20, 1975, asserting its jurisdiction to decide the title to the fishing boat,
Lachenal VII, are set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-42678 April 9, 1987
PEDRO E. BAYBAYAN, CIPRIANO EVANGELISTA, and SPOUSES
BARTOLOME and CONSUELO BAYBAYAN,petitioners,
vs.
HON. NARCISO A. AQUINO, as Presiding Judge CFI Pangasinan
Branch XIV; Deputy Sheriff CONSTANCIO PAGADUAN; EULALIA
EVANGELISTA, NORBERTO, PAULINA, FELIZA, all surnamed
PADUA; DIONISIA, LAUREANO, JOSEFINA, LEONARDO,
ANASTACIA, VALENTINA, all surnamed ORPIANO;
SERVILLANO, GERTRUDES, PASTORA, LORENZO, FAUSTA, all
surnamed DELFIN; and DIONISIO, FAUSTINA, AMADO
BENJAMIN, all surnamed ORIA, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the Order issued
by the respondent Judge on 4 December 1975, which dismissed,
without prejudice, the petitioners' complaint filed in Civil Case No. 23
1 -R of the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, as well as the
Order, dated 24 December 1975, which denied petitioners' motion for
the reconsideration of said order.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
On 19 January 1960, herein private respondents Norberto Padua,
Paulina Padua, Felisa Padua, Dionisia Orpiano, Laureano Orpiano,
Leonardo Orpiano, Josefina Orpiano, Valentina Orpiano, Servillano
Delfin, Gertrudes Delfin, Pastors Delfin Lorenzo Delfin, Fausta Delfin,
Dionisio Oria, Faustina Oria, Amado Oria, and Benjamin Oria, all
claiming to be the nephews and nieces of one Vicente Oria who died
intestate sometime in 1945 in Balungao, Pangasinan, filed a petition for
the summary settlement of the decedent's estate, the value of which
did not exceed P6,000.00. The petition was filed in the then Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Tayug Branch. The case was docketed
therein as Special Proceeding No. T-300. 1
After due publication and hearing, the probate court issued an order
adjudicating the estate to the heirs of the decedent, who were ordered
to submit a project of partition. 2 Sometime in 1971, the case was
transferred to the Resales Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 24-R.
On 18 September 1974, the probate court confirmed the adjudication
earlier made and ordered Eulalia Evangelista to deliver the respective
shares of her co-heirs; to make an accounting of the produce thereof
from 1960; and to deliver said produce to her co-heirs or pay its
equivalent. A writ of execution was subsequently issued pursuant
thereto. 3
A writ of possession was also issued sometime thereafter, and the
private respondents were placed in possession of their respective
shares. 4 However, when a representative of the private respondents
went to cultivate the portion adjudicated to said private respondents,
he was prevented by Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista. In view
thereof, the private respondents filed a motion to cite said Jose Diaz
and Cipriano Evangelista in contempt of court. 5
As a consequence, herein petitioners Pedro Baybayan, Cipriano
Evangelists, and the spouses Bartolome and Consuelo Baybayan,
claiming to be the registered owners of the lots involved, filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Rosales Branch
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 231-R, against the Deputy Sheriff
and the herein private respondents, for the quieting of their title, plus
damages, and to restrain said defendants from enforcing the writ of
execution issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R. 6
Meanwhile, at the hearing of the motion for contempt in Spec. Proc.
No. 24-R, the question of the Identity of the lands subject of Spec. Proc.
No. 24-R, was brought up, so that the probate court ordered a
relocation survey and commissioned a geodetic engineer to undertake
said survey. After the survey, the commissioner submitted to the Court
a report stating, among others, that the lands which were delivered by
the Deputy Sheriff to the heirs of Vicente Oria, pursuant to the writ of
possession issued by the probate court, are registered in the names of
herein petitioners under TCT No. 50269 and TCT No. 50270 of the
Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. 7
By reason thereof, the probate court, in an order dated 30 October
1975, dismissed the contempt charge against Jose Diaz and Cipriano
Evangelists. However, the same court ordered the petitioners to
amend their complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R since "it is
necessary that an amended complaint be filed by Pedro Baybayan in
order to determine whether or not the property in question is part of
the property under Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, inasmuch as it is now the
property claimed by him which is covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 50269." 8
Pursuant thereto, the herein petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion in
Civil Case No. 231-R, to which was attached an amended complaint
wherein some defendants were dropped. 9 The respondent Judge,
however, found that the Amended Complaint did not comply with his
order of 30 October 1975 to exclude Lot E and dismissed the case,
"without prejudice on the part of the plaintiffs to file a proper
complaint for the recovery of ownership or possession of the property
in controversy which is Lot B in the relocation plan and formerly
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 23684, now under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 50269." 10
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, 11 but
the motion was denied on 24 December 1975. 12 Thereupon, they filed
with this Court a petition for certiorari for the review of the orders of
the lower court. The Court treated the petition as a special civil action
for certiorari. 13
8|2nd Page of SPECPRO
Counsel for the petitioners, in this petition, contends that the
respondent Judge had no authority under the law, both substantive
and procedural, to issue the questioned orders because the order to
amend the complaint was issued in, and in connection with Spec. Proc.
No. 24-R where the herein petitioners are not even parties.
The contention, in our opinion, is not meritorious. While it may be true
that the order to amend the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R was
issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, so that it cannot ordinarily bind the
herein petitioners who are not parties in said special proceedings, it
appears, however, that the petitioners voluntarily submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, when they filed an
Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No. 231-R, wherein they prayed for
leave to amend their complaint in accordance with the order of the
probate court of 30 October 1975. They cannot now be allowed
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction
of the respondent trial Judge to whom they submitted their cause
voluntarily. 14
We find, however, that the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse
of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in dismissing the
complaint filed by the petitioners, for their alleged failure to amend
their complaint to exclude therefrom Lot E which the respondent Judge
found, in his order of 30 October 1975, issued in the probate court, to
be owned by the petitioners Cipriano Evangelists and Consuelo
Baybayan. The findings of the respondent Judge as to the ownership of
Lot E after the hearing conducted in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R do not justify
the order to amend the complaint since the determination of the
ownership of the said lot by the respondent Judge presiding over a
court exercising probate jurisdiction is not final or ultimate in nature
and is without prejudice to the right of an interested party to raise the
question of ownership in a proper action. 15
It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in
a long fine of decisions, that "when questions arise as to ownership of
property alleged to be a part of the estate of a deceased person, but
claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any
right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in
the courts of administrative proceedings. The Court of First Instance,
acting, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such
contentions, which must be submitted to the Court of First Instance in
the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a court of first instance." 16
Besides, the order to amend the complaint is vague and hazy and does
not specify what the amendments should be or how the complaint
should be amended so that the petitioners should not be faulted if the
amended complaint subsequently filed by them in Civil Case No. 231-
R does not contain the allegations that the respondent Judge would
want to appear therein.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and a writ issued, setting aside
the Orders issued by the respondent Judge on 7 December 1975 and
24 December 1975, in Civil Case No. 231-R of the then Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan. Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-6622 July 31, 1957
Intestate Estate of the deceased MARCELO DE BORJA. CRISANTO
DE BORJA, administrator-appellant,
vs.
JUAN DE BORJA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.
E. V. Filamor for appellant.
Juan de Borja for himself and co-appellees.
FELIX, J.:
The case. — Quintin, Francisco, Crisanta and Juliana, all surnamed de
Borja, are legitimate children of Marcelo de Borja who, upon his
demise sometime in 1924 or 1925, left a considerable amount of
property. Intestate proceedings must have followed, and the pre-war
records of the case either burned, lost or destroyed during the last
war, because the record shows that in 1930 Quintin de Borja was
already the administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja.
In the early part of 1938, Quintin de Borja died and Crisanto de Borja,
son of Francisco de Borja, was appointed and took over as
administrator of the Estate. Francisco de Borja, on the other hand,
assumed his duties as executor of the will of Quintin de Borja, but upon
petition of the heirs of said deceased on the ground that his interests
were conflicting with that of his brother's estate he was later required
by the Court to resign as such executor and was succeeded by Rogelio
Limaco, a son-in-law of Quintin de Borja.
It also appears that on February 16, 1940, at the hearing set for the
approval of the statement of accounts of the late administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja, then being opposed by Francisco
de Borja, the parties submitted an agreement, which was approved by
the Court (Exh. A). Said agreement, translated into English, reads as
follows:
1. All the accounts submitted and those that are to be
submitted corresponding to this year will be considered
approved;
2. No heir shall claim anything of the harvests from the lands
in Cainta that came from Exequiel Ampil, deceased, nor from
the land in Tabuatin, Nueva Ecija;
3. That the amounts of money taken by each heir shall be
considered as deposited in conjunction with the other
properties of the intestate and shall form part of the mass
without drawing any interest;
4. That it shall be understood as included in this mass the
sum of twelve thousand pesos (P12,000) that the sisters
Crisanta and Juliana de Borja paid of their own money as part
of the price the lands and three thousand pesos (P3,000) the
price of the machinery for irrigation;
5. The right, interests or participation that the deceased
Quintin de Borja has or may have in Civil Case No. 6190 of
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, shall be likewise
included in the total mass of the inheritance of the Intestate;
6. Not only the lands in Tabuatin but also those in Cainta
coming from the now deceased Exequiel Ampil shall also
from part of the total mass of the inheritance of the Intestate
of the late Marcelo de Borja;
7. Once the total of the inheritance of the intestate is made up
as specified before in this Agreement, partition thereof will
be made as follows:
From the total mass shall be deducted in case or in kind,
Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000) that shall be delivered to
Da. Juliana de Borja and Da. Crisanta de Borja in equal
shares, and the rest shall be divided among the four heirs, i.
e., Don Francisco de Borja, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, Da.
Juliana de Borja, and Da. Crisanta de Borja, in equal parts.
(TRANSLATION)
The Intestate remained under the administration of Crisanto de Borja
until the then outbreak of the war. From then on and until the
termination of the war, there was a lull and state of inaction in Special
proceeding No. 2414 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig
branch (In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja), until
9|2nd Page of SPECPRO
upon petition filed by Miguel B. Dayco, as administrator of the estate of
his deceased mother, Crisanta de Borja, who is one of heirs, for
reconstitution of the records of this case, the Court on December 11,
1945, ordered the reconstitution of the same, requiring the
administrator to submit his report and a copy of the project of
partition.
On January 3, 1946, the administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, filed his
accounts for the period ranging from March 1 to December 22, 1945,
which according to the heirs of Quintin de Borja were so inadequate
and general that on February 28, 1946, they filed a motion for
specification. On April 30, 1946, they also filed their opposition to said
statement of accounts alleging that the income reported in said
statement was very much less than the true and actual income of the
estate and that the expenses appearing therein were exaggerated
and/or not actually incurred, and prayed that the statement of accounts
submitted by the administrator be disapproved.
The administrator later filed another report of his administration, dated
August 9, 1949, corresponding to the period lapsed from December
23, 1945, to July 31, 1949, showing a cash balance of P71.96, but with
pending obligation amounting to P35,415.
On August 22, 1949, Juan de Borja and sisters, heirs of the deceased
Quintin de Borja, filed their opposition to the statement of accounts
filed by the administrator on the ground that same was not detailed
enough to enable the interested parties to verify the same; that they
cannot understand why the Intestate could suffer any loss considering
that during the administration of the same by Quintin de Borja, the
Estate accumulated gains of more than P100,000 in the form of
advances to the heirs as well as cash balance; that they desired to
examine the accounts of Dr. Crisanto de Borja to verify the loss and
therefore prayed that the administrator be ordered to deposit with the
Clerk of Court all books, receipts, accounts and other papers
pertaining to the Estate of Marcelo de Borja. This motion was answered
by the administrator contending that the Report referred to was
already clear and enough, the income as well as the expenditures
being specified therein; that he had to spend for the repairs of the
properties of the Estate damaged during the Japanese occupation; that
the allegation that during the administration of Quintin de Boria the
Estate realized a profit of P100,000 was not true, because instead of
gain there was even a shortage in the funds although said
administrator had collected all his fees (honorarios) and commissions
corresponding to the entire period of his incumbency; that the
obligations mentioned in said report will be liquidated before the
termination of the proceedings in the same manner as it is done in any
other intestate case; that he was willing to submit all the receipts of the
accounts for the examination of the interested parties before the Clerk
or before the Court itself; that this Intestate could be terminated, the
project of partition having been allowed and confirmed by the
Supreme Court and that the Administrator was also desirous of
terminating it definitely for the benefit of all the parties.
On September 14, 1949, the administrator filed another statement of
accounts covering the period of from March 1, 1945, to July 31, 1949,
which showed a cash balance of P71.95, with pending obligations in
the sum of P35,810.
The heirs of Quintin de Borja, Juan de Borja and his sisters, registered
their opposition said statement of accounts and prayed the Court to
disapprove the same and to appoint an account to go over the books of
the administrator and to submit a report thereon as soon as possible.
The heir Juliana de Borja also formally offered her objection to the
approval of the accounts submitted by the administrator and prayed
further that said administrator be required to submit a complete
accounting of his administration of the Estate from 1937 to 1949. On the
other hand, Francisco de Borja and Miguel B. Dayco, as the only heir of
the deceased Crisanta de Borja, submitted to the Court an agreement
to relieve the administrator from accounting for the period of the
Japanese occupation; that as to the accounting from 1937 to 1941, they
affirmed their conformity with the agreement entered into by all the
heirs appearing in the Bill of Exceptions of Juliana de Borja; and they
have no objection to the approval of the statement of accounts
submitted by the administrator covering of the years 1945 to 1949.
On December 6, 1949, the administrator, answered the opposition of
the heir Juliana de Borja, alleging that the corresponding statement of
accounts for the years 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940 and 1941 were presented
and approved by the Court before and during the Japanese
occupation, but the records of the same were destroyed in the Office
of the Clerk of that Court during the liberation of the province of Rizal,
and his personal records were also lost during the Japanese
occupation, when his house was burned; that Judge Peña who was
presiding over the Court in 1945 impliedly denied the petition of heirs
to require him to render an accounting for the period from 1942 to the
early part of 1945, for the reason that whatever money obtained from
the Estate during said period could not be made the subject of any
adjudication it having been declared fiat money and without value,
and ordered that the statement of accounts be presented only for the
period starting from March 1, 1945. The administrator further stated
that he was anxious to terminate this administration but some of the
heirs had not yet complied with the conditions imposed in the project
of partition which was approved by the Supreme Court; that in
accordance with said partition agreement, Juliana de Borja must
deliver to the administrator all the jewelry, objects of value, utensils
and other personal belongings of the deceased spouses Marcelo de
Borja and Tircila Quiogue, which said heir had kept and continued to
retain in her possession; that the heirs of Quintin de Borja should
deliver to the administrator all the lands and a document transferring
in favor of the Intestate the two parcels of land with a total area of 71
hectares of cultivated land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija which were in
the possession of said heirs, together with the house of Feliciana
Mariano Vda. de Sarangaya, which were the objects of Civil Case No.
6190 mentioned in Paragraph 11 of the project of partition; that as
consequence of the said dispossession the heirs of Quintin de Borja
must deliver to the administrator the products of the 71 hectares of
land in Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and the rentals of the house of
Feliciana Mariano or else render to the Court an accounting of the
products of these properties from the time they took possession of the
same in 1937 to the present; that there was a pending obligation
amounting to P36,000 as of September 14, 1949, which the heirs should
pay before the properties adjudicated to them would be delivered.
The Court, however, ordered the administrator on December 10, 1949,
to show and prove by evidence why he should not be accounts the
proceeds of his administration from 1937.
Meantime, Juliana de Borja filed a Constancia denying possession of
any jewelry belonging to the deceased spouses Marcelo de Borja and
Tarcilla Quiogue or any other personal belonging of said spouses, and
signified her willingness to turn over to the administrator the silver
wares mentioned in Paragraph III of the project of partition, which
were the only property in her care, on the date that she would expect
the delivery to her of her share in the inheritance from her deceased
parents.
On July 6, 1950, Juan de Borja and his sisters Marcela, Saturnina,
Eufracia, Jacoba and Olimpia, all surnamed de Borja, as heirs of
Quintin de Borja, filed a motion for the delivery to them of their
inheritance in the estate, tendering to the administrator a document
ceding and transferring to the latter all the rights, interests and
participation of Quintin de Borja in Civil Case No. 7190 of the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, pursuant to the provisions of the project
of Partition, and expressing their willingness to put up a bond if
required to do so by the Court, and on July 18, 1950, the Court ordered
the administrator to deliver to Marcela, Juan, Saturniana, Eufracia,
Jacoba and Olimpia, all surnamed de Borja, all the properties
adjudicated to them in the Project of Partition dated February 8, 1944,
upon the latter's filing a bond in the sum of P10,000 conditioned upon
the payment of such obligation as may be ordered by the Court after a
hearing on the controverted accounts of the administrator. The Court
considered the fact that the heirs had complied with the requirement
imposed by the Project of Partition when they tendered the document
ceding and transferring the rights and interests of Quintin de Borja in
the aforementioned lands and expressed the necessity of terminating
the proceedings as soon as practicable, observing that the Estate had
been under administration for over twenty-five years already. The
10 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
Court, however, deferred action on the petition filed by the special
administratrix of the Intestate Estate of Juliana de Borja until after
compliance with the conditions imposed by the project of partition. But
on July 20, 1950, apparently before the properties were delivered to
the heirs, Francisco de Borja and Miguel B. Dayco filed a motion
informing the Court that the two parcels of land located in Cabanatuan,
Nueva Ecija, produced some 21,300 cavans of palay, amounting to
P213,000 at P10 per cavan, which were enjoyed by some heirs; that the
administrator Crisanto de Borja had not taken possession of the same
for circumstances beyond his control; and that there also existed the
sum of P70,204 which the former administrator, Quintin de Borja,
received from properties that were redeemed, but which amount did
not come into the hands of the present, administrator because
according to reliable information, same was delivered to the heir
Juliana de Borja who deposited it in her name at the Philippine National
Bank. It was, therefore prayed that the administrator be required to
exert the necessary effort to ascertain the identity of the person or
persons who were in possession of the same amount and of the value
of the products of the lands in Mayapyap, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
and to recover the same for the Intestate Estate.
On July 28, 1950, the special administratrix of the estate of Juliana de
Borja, then deceased, filed an answer to the motion of these two heirs,
denying the allegation that said heir any product of the lands
mentioned from Quintin de Borja, and informed the Court that the
Mayapyap property had always been in the possession of Francisco de
Borja himself and prayed the court that the administrator be instructed
to demand all the fruits and products of said property from Francisco
de Borja.
On July 28, 1950, the heirs of Quintin de Borja also filed their
opposition to the said motion of Francisco de Borja and Miguel B.
Dayco on the ground that the petition was superfluous because the
present proceeding was only for the approval of the statement of
accounts filed by the administrator; that said motion was improper
because it was asking the Court to order the administrator to perform
what he was duty bound to do; and that said heirs were already barred
or stopped from raising that question in view of their absolute
ratification of and assent to the statement of accounts submitted by the
administrator.
On August 16, 1950, by order of the Court, the properties adjudicated
to Juliana de Borja in the project of Partition were finally delivered to
the estate of said heir upon the filing of a bond for P20,000. In that
same order, the Court denied the administrator's motion to reconsider
the order of July 18, 1950, requiring him to deliver to the heirs of
Quintin de Borja the properties corresponding to them, on the ground
that there existed no sufficient reason to disturb said order. It also
ruled that as the petition of Francisco de Borja and Miguel B. Dayco
made mention of certain properties allegedly belonging to the
Intestate, said petition should properly be considered to gather with
the final accounts of the administrator.
The administrator raised the matter by certiorari to this Tribunal, which
was, docketed as G.R. No. L-4179, and on May 30, 1951, We rendered
decision affirming the order complained of, finding that the Juan de
Borja and sisters have complied with the requirement imposed in the
Project of Partition upon the tender of the document of cession of rights
and quit-claim executed by Marcela de Borja, the administratrix of the
Estate of Quintin de Borja, and holding that the reasons advanced by
the administrator in opposing the execution of the order of delivery
were trivial.
On August 27, 1951, the administrator filed his amended statement of
accounts covering the period from March 1, 1945, to July 31, 1949,
which showed a cash balance of P36,660. An additional statement of
accounts filed on August 31, 1961 for the period of from August 1, 1949,
to August 31, 1951, showed a cash balance of P5,851.17 and pending
obligations in the amount of P6,165.03.
The heirs of Quintin de Borja again opposed the approval of the
statements of accounts charging the administrator with having failed to
include the fruits which the estate should have accrued from 1941 to
1951 amounting to P479,429.70, but as the other heirs seemed satisfied
with the accounts presented by said administrator and as their group
was only one of the 4 heirs of Intestate Estate, they prayed that the
administrator be held liable for only P119,932.42 which was 1/4 of the
amount alleged to have been omitted. On October 4, 1951, the
administrator filed a reply to said opposition containing a counterclaim
for moral damages against all the heirs of Quintin de Borja in the sum
of P30,000 which was admitted by the Court over the objection of the
heirs of Quintin de Borja that the said pleading was filed out of time.
The oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, then filed their answer to
the counterclaim denying the charges therein, but later served
interrogatories on the administrator relative to the averments of said
counterclaim. Upon receipt of the answer to said interrogatories
specifying the acts upon which the claim for moral damages was
based, the oppositors filed an amended answer contending that
inasmuch as the acts, manifestations and pleadings referred to therein
were admittedly committed and prepared by their lawyer, Atty.
Amador E. Gomez, same cannot be made the basis of a counterclaim,
said lawyer not being a party to the action, and furthermore, as the
acts upon which the claim for moral damages were based had been
committed prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code, the provisions
of said Code on moral damages could not be invoked. On January 15,
1952, the administrator filed an amended counterclaim including the
counsel for the oppositors as defendant.
There followed a momentary respite in the proceedings until another
judge was assigned to preside over said court to dispose of the old
case pending therein. On August 15, 1952, Judge Encarnacion issued
an order denying admission to administrator's amended counterclaim
directed against the lawyer, Atty. Amador E. Gomez, holding that a
lawyer, not being a party to the action, cannot be made answerable for
counterclaims. Another order was also issued on the same date
dismissing the administrator's counterclaim for moral damages against
the heirs of Quintin de Borja and their counsel for the alleged
defamatory acts, manifestation and utterances, and stating that
granting the same to be meritorious, yet it was a strictly private
controversy between said heirs and the administrator which would not
in any way affect the interest of the Intestate, and, therefore, not
proper in an intestate proceedings. The Court stressed that to allow
the ventilation of such personal controversies would further delay the
proceedings in the case which had already lagged for almost 30 years,
a situation which the Court would not countenance.
Having disposed of these pending incidents which arose out of the
principal issue, that is, the disputed statement of accounts submitted
by the administrator, the Court rendered judgment on September 5,
1952, ordering the administrator to distribute the funds in his
possession to the heirs as follows: P1,395.90 to the heirs of Quintin de
Borja; P314.99 to Francisco de Borja; P314.99 to the Estate of Juliana de
Borja and P314.99 to Miguel B. Dayco, but as the latter still owed the
intestate the sum of P900, said heirs was ordered to pay instead the 3
others the sum of P146.05 each. After considering the testimonies of
the witnesses presented by both parties and the available records on
hand, the Court found the administrator guilty of maladministration
and sentenced Crisanto de Borja to pay to the oppositors, the heirs of
Quintin de Borja, the sum of P83,337.31, which was 1/4 of the amount
which the state lost, with legal interest from the date of the judgment.
On the same day, the Court also issued an order requiring the
administrator to deliver to the Clerk of that Court PNB Certificate of
Deposit No. 211649 for P978.50 which was issued in the name of
Quintin de Borja.
The administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja, gave notice to appeal from
the lower Court's orders of August 15, 1952, the decision of September
5, 1952, and the order of even date, but when the Record on Appeal
was finally approved, the Court ordered the exclusion of the appeal
from the order of September 5, 1952, requiring the administrator to
deposit the PNB Certificate of Deposit No. 2114649 with the Clerk of
Court, after the oppositors had shown that during the hearing of that
incident, the parties agreed to abide by whatever resolution the Court
would make on the ownership of the funds covered by that deposit.
11 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
The issues. — Reducing the issues to bare essentials, the questions left
for our determination are: (1) whether the counsel for a party in a case
may be included as a defendant in a counterclaim; (2) whether a claim
for moral damages may be entertained in a proceeding for the
settlement of an estate; (3) what may be considered as acts of
maladministration and whether an administrator, as the one in the case
at bar, may be held accountable for any loss or damage that the estate
under his administration may incur by reason of his negligence, bad
faith or acts of maladministration; and (4) in the case at bar has the
Intestate or any of the heirs suffered any loss or damage by reason of
the administrator's negligence, bad faith or maladministration? If so,
what is the amount of such loss or damage?
I. — Section 1, Rule 10, of the Rules of Court defines a counterclaim as:
SECTION 1. Counterclaim Defined. — A counterclaim is any
claim, whether for money or otherwise, which a party may
have against the opposing party. A counterclaim need not
dismiss or defeat the recovery sought by the opposing party,
but may claim relief exceeding in amount or different in kind
from that sought by the opposing party's claim.
It is an elementary rule of procedure that a counterclaim is a relief
available to a party-defendant against the adverse party which may or
may not be independent from the main issue. There is no controversy
in the case at bar, that the acts, manifestations and actuations alleged
to be defamatory and upon which the counterclaim was based were
done or prepared by counsel for oppositors; and the administrator
contends that as the very oppositors manifested that whatever civil
liability arising from acts, actuations, pleadings and manifestations
attributable to their lawyer is enforceable against said lawyer, the
amended counterclaim was filed against the latter not in his individual
or personal capacity but as counsel for the oppositors. It is his stand,
therefore, that the lower erred in denying admission to said pleading.
We differ from the view taken by the administrator. The appearance of
a lawyer as counsel for a party and his participation in a case as such
counsel does not make him a party to the action. The fact that he
represents the interests of his client or that he acts in their behalf will
not hold him liable for or make him entitled to any award that the
Court may adjudicate to the parties, other than his professional fees.
The principle that a counterclaim cannot be filed against persons who
are acting in representation of another — such as trustees — in their
individual capacities (Chambers vs. Cameron, 2 Fed. Rules Service, p.
155; 29 F. Supp. 742) could be applied with more force and effect in
the case of a counsel whose participation in the action is merely
confined to the preparation of the defense of his client. Appellant,
however, asserted that he filed the counterclaim against said lawyer
not in his individual capacity but as counsel for the heirs of Quintin de
Borja. But as we have already stated that the existence of a lawyer-
client relationship does not make the former a party to the action, even
this allegation of appellant will not alter the result We have arrived at.
Granting that the lawyer really employed intemperate language in the
course of the hearings or in the preparation of the pleadings filed in
connection with this case, the remedy against said counsel would be to
have him cited for contempt of court or take other administrative
measures that may be proper in the case, but certainly not a
counterclaim for moral damages.
II. — Special Proceedings No. 6414 of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal (Pasig branch) was instituted for the purpose of settling the
Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja. In taking cognizance of the case,
the Court was clothed with a limited jurisdiction which cannot expand
to collateral matters not arising out of or in any way related to the
settlement and adjudication of the properties of the deceased, for it is
a settled rule that the jurisdiction of a probate court is limited and
special (Guzman vs. Anog, 37 Phil. 361). Although there is a tendency
now to relax this rule and extend the jurisdiction of the probate court
in respect to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its
recognized powers (14 Am. Jur. 251-252), this should be understood to
comprehend only cases related to those powers specifically allowed
by the statutes. For it was even said that:
Probate proceedings are purely statutory and their functions
limited to the control of the property upon the death of its
owner, and cannot extend to the adjudication of collateral
questions (Woesmes, The American Law of Administration,
Vol. I, p. 514, 662-663).
It was in the acknowledgment of its limited jurisdiction that the lower
court dismissed the administrator's counterclaim for moral damages
against the oppositors, particularly against Marcela de Borja who
allegedly uttered derogatory remarks intended to cast dishonor to
said administrator sometime in 1950 or 1951, his Honor's ground being
that the court exercising limited jurisdiction cannot entertain claims of
this kind which should properly belong to a court general jurisdiction.
From what ever angle it may be looked at, a counterclaim for moral
damages demanded by an administrator against the heirs for alleged
utterances, pleadings and actuations made in the course of the
proceeding, is an extraneous matter in a testate or intestate
proceedings. The injection into the action of incidental questions
entirely foreign in probate proceedings should not be encouraged for
to do otherwise would run counter to the clear intention of the law, for
it was held that:
The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for
the benefit of the creditors and those entitled to the residue
by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses
of administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our
probate law (Magabanua vs. Akel, 72 Phil., 567, 40 Off Gaz.,
1871).
III. and IV. — This appeal arose from the opposition of the heirs of
Quintin de Borja to the approval of the statements of accounts
rendered by the administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo de
Borja, on the ground that certain fruits which should have been
accrued to the estate were unaccounted for, which charge the
administrator denied. After a protracted and extensive hearing on the
matter, the Court, finding the administrator, Dr. Crisanto de Borja,
guilty of certain acts of maladministration, held him liable for the
payment to the oppositors, the heirs of Quintin de Borja, of 1/4 of the
unreported income which the estate should have received. The
evidence presented in the court below bear out the following facts:
(a) The estate owns a 6-door building, Nos. 1541, 1543, 1545, 1547,
1549 and 1551 in Azcarraga Street, Manila, situated in front of the
Arranque market. Of this property, the administrator reported to have
received for the estate the following rentals:
Annual
Total
Period of time monthly
rentals
rental
March to December, 1945 P3,085.00 P51.42
January to December, 1946 4,980.00 69.17
January to December, 1947 8,330.00 115.70
January to December, 1948 9,000.00 125.00
January to December, 1949 8,840.00 122.77
January to December, 1950 6,060.00 184.16
Total P40,295.00
The oppositors, in disputing this record income, presented at the
witness stand Lauro Aguila, a lawyer who occupied the basement of
Door No. 1541 and the whole of Door No. 1543 from 1945 to November
15, 1949, and who testified that he paid rentals on said apartments as
follows:
1945
Door No. 1541 (basement)
February P20.00 Door No. 1543
March 20.00 For 7 months at P300
April 60.00 a month P
12 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
 May-December 800.00
Total P900.00
1946
January-December P1,200.00 January-December
1947
January P100.00 January
February 100.00 February
March 180.00 March 1-15
April-December 1,140.00 March 16-December
P1,820.00
1948
January-December P1,920.00 January-December
1949
January-November 15 P1,680.00 January-December
From the testimony of said witness, it appears that from 1945 to
November 15,1949, he paid a total of P28,200 for the lease of Door No.
1543 and the basement of Door No. 1541. These figures were not
controverted or disputed by the administrator but claim that said
tenant subleased the apartments occupied by Pedro Enriquez and
Soledad Sodora and paid the said rentals, not to the administrator, but
to said Enriquez. The transcript of the testimony of this witness really
bolster this contention — that Lauro Aguila talked with said Pedro
Enriquez when he leased the aforementioned apartments and admitted
paying the rentals to the latter and not to the administrator. It is
interesting to note that Pedro Enriquez is the same person who
appeared to be the administrator's collector, duly authorized to
receive the rentals from this Azcarraga property and for which
services, said Enriquez received 5 per cent of the amount he might be
able to collect as commission. If we are to believe appellant's
contention, aside from the commission that Pedro Enriquez received
he also sublet the apartments he was occupying at a very much higher
rate than that he actually paid the estate without the knowledge of the
administrator or with his approval. As the administrator also seemed to
possess that peculiar habit of giving little importance to bookkeeping
methods, for he never kept a ledger or book of entry for amounts
received for the estate, We find no record of the rentals the lessees of
the other doors were paying. It was, however, brought about at the
hearing that the 6 doors of this building are of the same sizes and
construction and the lower Court based its computation of the amount
this property should have earned for the estate on the rental paid by
Atty. Aguila for the 1 1/2 doors that he occupied. We see no excuse
why the administrator could not have taken cognizance of these rates
and received the same for the benefit of the estate he was
administering, considering the fact that he used to make trips to
Manila usually once a month and for which he charged to the estate P8
as transportation expenses for every trip.
Basing on the rentals paid by Atty. Aguila for 1 1/2 doors, the estate
received P112,800 from February 1, 1945, to November 15, 1949, for
the 6 doors, but the lower Court held him accountable not only for the
sum of P34,235 reported for the period ranging from March 1, 1945, to
December 31, 1949, but also for a deficit of P90,525 or a total of
P124,760. The record shows, however that the upper floor of Door No.
1549 was vacant in September, 1949, and as Atty. Aguila used to pay
P390 a month for the use of an entire apartment from September to
November, 1949, and he also paid P160 for the use of the basement of
an apartment (Door No. 1541), the use, therefore, of said upper floor
would cost P230 which should be deducted, even if the computation of
the lower Court would have to be followed.
There being no proper evidence to show that the administrator
collected more rentals than those reported by him, except in the
instance already mentioned, We are reluctant to bold him accountable
in the amount for which he was held liable by the lower Court, and We
think that under the circumstances it would be more just to add to the
sum reported by the administrator as received by him as rents for
1945-1949 only, the difference between the sum reported as paid by
Atty. Aguila and the sum actually paid by the latter as rents of 1 1/2 of
the apartments during the said period, or P25,457.09 1/4 of which is
P6,364.27 which shall be paid to the oppositors.
The record also shows that in July, 1950, the administrator delivered to
P4,080.00
the other heirs Doors Nos. 1545, 1547, 1549 and 1551 although Doors
Nos. 1541 and 1543 adjudicated to the oppositors remained under his
administration.
P380.00 For the period from January to June, 1950, that the
entire property was still administered by him, the administrator
reported380.00
to have received for the 2 oppositors' apartments for said
period 190.00
of six months at P168.33 a month, the sum of P1,010 which
belongs to the oppositors and should be taken from the amount
4,085.00
reported by the administrator.
P5,035.00
The lower Court computed at P40 a month the pre-war rental
P5,150.00
admittedly received for every apartment, the income that said
property would have earned from 1941 to 1944, or a total of P11,520,
but as We have to exclude the period covered by the Japanese
P4,315.00
occupation, the estate should receive only P2,880 1/4 of which P720 the
administrator should pay to the oppositors for the year 1941.
(b) The Intestate estate also owned a parcel of land in Mayapyap,
Nueva Ecija, with an area of 71 hectares, 95 ares and 4 centares,
acquired by Quintin de Borja the spouses Cornelio Sarangaya and
Feliciana Mariano in Civil Case NO. 6190 of the Court of First Instance
of said province, In virtue of the agreement entered into by the heirs,
this property was turned over by the estate of Quintin de Borja to the
intestate and formed part of the general mass of said estate. The report
of the administrator failed to disclose any return from this property
alleging that he had not taken possession of the same. He does not
deny however that he knew of the existence of this land but claimed
that when he demanded the delivery of the Certificate of Title covering
this property, Rogelio Limaco, then administrator of the estate of
Quintin de Borja, refused to surrender the same and he did not take
any further action to recover the same.
To counteract the insinuation that the Estate of Quintin de Borja was in
possession of this property from 1940 to 1950, the oppositors
presented several witnesses, among them was an old man, Narciso
Punzal, who testified that he knew both Quintin and Francisco de Borja;
that before the war or sometime in 1937, the former administrator of
the Intestate, Quintin de Borja, offered him the position of overseer
(encargado) of this land but he was notable to assume the same due to
the death of said administrator; that on July 7, 1951, herein appellant
invited him to go to his house in Pateros, Rizal, and while in said house,
he was instructed by appellant to testify in court next day that he was
the overseer of the Mayapyap property for Quintin de Borja from 1937-
1944, delivering the yearly proceeds of 1,000 cavanes of Palay to
Rogelio Limaco; that he did not need to be afraid because both Quintin
de Borja and Rogelio Limaco were already dead. But as he knew that
the facts on which he was to testify were false, he went instead to the
house of one of the daughters of Quintin de Borja, who, together with
her brother, Atty. Juan de Borja, accompanied him to the house of the
counsel for said oppositors before whom his sworn declaration was
taken (Exh. 3).
Other witnesses, i.e., Isidro Benuya, Federico Cojo, Emilio de la Cruz
and Ernesto Mangulabnan, testified that they were some of the tenants
of the Mayapyap property; that they were paying their shares to the
overseers of Francisco de Borja and sometimes to his wife, which the
administrator was not able to contradict, and the lower Court found no
reason why the administrator would fail to take possession of this
property considering that this was even the subject of the agreement
of February 16, 1940, executed by the heirs of the Intestate.
The lower Court, giving due credence to the testimonies of the
witnesses for the oppositors, computed the loss the estate suffered in
the form of unreported income from the rice lands for 10 years at
P67,000 (6,700 a year)and the amount of P4,000 from the remaining
portion of the land not devoted to rice cultivation which was being
leased at P20 per hectare. Consequently, the Court held the
administrator liable to appellees in the sum of P17,750 which is 1/4 of
the total amount which should have accrued to the estate for this item.
13 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
But if We exclude the 3 years of occupation, the income for 7 years
would be P46,900 for the ricelands and P2,800 (at P400 a year) for the
remaining portion not developed to rice cultivation or a total of
P48,700, 1/4 of which is P12,175 which We hold the administrator liable
to the oppositors.
(c) The Hacienda Jalajala located in said town of Rizal, was divided into
3 parts: the Punta section belonged to Marcelo de Borja, the
Bagombong pertained to Bernardo de Borja and Francisco de Borja
got the Jalajala proper. For the purpose of this case, we will just deal
with that part called Junta. This property has an area of 1,345, hectares,
29 ares and 2 centares (Exh. 36) of which, according to the surveyor
who measured the same, 200 hectares were of cultivated rice fields
and 100 hectares dedicated to the planting of upland rice. It has also
timberland and forest which produce considerable amount of trees
and firewoods. From the said property which has an assessed value of
P115,000 and for which the estates pay real estate tax of P1,500
annually, the administrator reported the following:
Expenditure
(not including
administration's
Year Income fees
1945........... P625.00 P1,310.42
1946............. 1,800.00 3,471.00
1947............. 2,550.00 2,912.91
1948............. 1,828.00 3,311.88
1949............. 3,204.50 4,792.09
1950............. 2,082.00 2,940.91
P12,089.50 P18,739.21
This statement was assailed by the oppositors and to substantiate their
charge that the administrator did not file the true income of the
property, they presented several witnesses who testified that there
were about 200 tenants working therein; that these tenants paid to
Crisanto de Borja rentals at the rate of 6 cavanes of palay per hectare;
that in the years of 1943 and 1944, the Japanese were the ones who
collected their rentals, and that the estate could have received no less
than 1,000 cavanes of palay yearly. After the administrator had
presented witnesses to refute the facts previously testified to by the
witnesses for the oppositors, the Court held that the report of the
administrator did not contain the real income of the property devoted
to rice cultivation, which was fixed at 1,000 cavanes every year — for
1941, 1942, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950, or a total of 8,000
cavanes valued at P73,000. But as the administrator accounted for the
sum of P11,155 collected from rice harvests and if to this amount we
add the sum of P8,739.20 for expenses, this will make a total of
P19,894.20, thus leaving a deficit of P53,105.80, ¼ of which will be
P13,276.45 which the administrator is held liable to pay the heirs of
Quintin de Borja.
It was also proved during the hearing that the forest land of this
property yields considerable amount of marketable firewoods. Taking
into consideration the testimonies of witnesses for both parties, the
Court arrived at the conclusion that the administrator sold to Gregorio
Santos firewoods worth P600 in 1941, P3,500 in 1945 and P4,200 in 1946
or a total of P8,300. As the report included only the amount of P625,
there was a balance of P7,675 in favor of the estate. The oppositors
were not able to present any proof of sales made after these years, if
there were any and the administrator was held accountable to the
oppositors for only P1,918.75.
(d) The estate also, owned ricefields in Cainta, Rizal, with a total area
of 22 hectares, 76 ares and 66 centares. Of this particular item, the
administrator reported an income of P12,104 from 1945 to 1951. The
oppositors protested against this report and presented witnesses to
disprove the same.
Basilio Javier worked as a tenant in the land of Juliana de Borja which is
near the land belonging to the Intestate, the 2 properties being
separated only by a river. As tenant of Juliana de Borja, he knew the
tenants working on the property and also knows that both lands are of
the same class, and that an area accommodating one cavan of
seedlings yields at most 100 cavanes and 60 cavanes at the least. The
administrator failed to overcome this testimony. The lower Court
considering the facts testified to by this witness made a finding that the
property belonging to this Intestate was actually occupied by several
persons accommodating 13 ½ cavanes of seedlings; that as for every
cavan of seedlings, the land produces 60 cavanes of palay, the whole
area under cultivation would have yielded 810 cavanes a year and
under the 50-50 sharing system (which was testified by witness Javier),
the estate would have received no less than 405 cavanes every year.
Now, for the period of 7 years — from 1941 to 1950, excluding the 3
years of war — the corresponding earning of the estate should be
2,835 cavanes, out of which the 405 cavanes from the harvest of 1941 is
valued at P1,215 and the rest 2,430 cavanes at P10 is valued at P24,300,
or all in all P25,515. If from this amount the reported income of P12,104
is deducted, there will be a balance of P13,411.10 1/4 of which
or P3,352.75 the administrator is held liable to pay to the oppositors.
(e) The records show that the administrator paid surcharges and
penalties with a total of P988.75 for his failure to pay on time the taxes
imposed on the properties under his administration. He advanced the
reason that he lagged in the payment of those tax obligations because
of lack of cash balance for the estate. The oppositors, however,
presented evidence that on October 29, 1939, the administrator
received from Juliana de Borja the sum of P20,475.17 together with
certain papers pertaining to the intestate (Exh. 4),aside from the
checks in the name of Quintin de Borja. Likewise, for his failure to pay
the taxes on the building at Azcarraga for 1947, 1948 and 1949, said
property was sold at public auction and the administrator had to
redeem the same at P3,295.48, although the amount that should have
been paid was only P2,917.26. The estate therefore suffered a loss
of P378.22. Attributing these surcharges and penalties to the
negligence of the administrator, the lower Court adjudged him liable
to pay the oppositors ¼ of P1,366.97, the total loss suffered by the
Intestate, or P341.74.
(f) Sometime in 1942, a big fire razed numerous houses in Pateros,
Rizal, including that of Dr. Crisanto de Borja. Thereafter, he claimed
that among the properties burned therein was his safe containing
P15,000 belonging to the estate under his administration. The
administrator contended that this loss was already proved to the
satisfaction of the Court who, approved the same by order of January
8, 1943, purportedly issued by Judge Servillano Platon(Exh. B). The
oppositors contested the genuineness of this order and presented on
April 21, 1950, an expert witness who conducted several tests to
determine the probable age of the questioned document, and arrived
at the conclusion that the questioned ink writing "(Fdo)" appearing at
the bottom of Exhibit B cannot be more than 4 years old (Exh. 39).
However, another expert witness presented by the administrator
contradicted this finding and testified that this conclusion arrived at by
expert witness Mr. Pedro Manzañares was not supported by
authorities and was merely the result of his own theory, as there was
no method yet discovered that would determine the age of a
document, for every document has its own reaction to different
chemicals used in the tests. There is, however, another fact that called
the attention of the lower Court: the administrator testified that the
money and other papers delivered by Juliana de Borja to him on
October 29, 1939, were saved from said fire. The administrator
justified the existence of these valuables by asserting that these
properties were locked by Juliana de Borja in her drawer in the "casa
solariega" in Pateros and hence was not in his safe when his house,
together with the safe, was burned. This line of reasoning is really
subject to doubt and the lower Court opined, that it runs counter to the
ordinary course of human behaviour for an administrator to leave in
the drawer of the "aparador" of Juliana de Borja the money and other
documents belonging to the estate under his administration, which
delivery has receipted for, rather than to keep it in his safe together
with the alleged P15,000 also belonging to the Intestate. The
subsequent orders of Judge Platon also put the defense of appellant to
bad light, for on February 6, 1943, the Court required Crisanto de Borja
to appear before the Court of examination of the other heirs in
connection with the reported loss, and on March 1, 1943, authorized
the lawyers for the other parties to inspect the safe allegedly burned
14 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
(Exh. 35). It is inconceivable that Judge Platon would still order the
inspection of the safe if there was really an order approving the loss of
those P15,000. We must not forget, in this connection, that the records
of this case were burned and that at the time of the hearing of this
incident in 1951, Judge Platon was already dead. The lower Court also
found no reason why the administrator should keep in his such amount
of money, for ordinary prudence would dictate that as an
administration funds that come into his possession in a fiduciary
capacity should not be mingled with his personal funds and should
have been deposited in the Bank in the name of the intestate. The
administrator was held responsible for this loss and ordered to pay ¼
thereof, or the sum of P3,750.
(g) Unauthorized expenditures —
1. The report of the administrator contained certain sums amounting to
P2,130 paid to and receipted by Juanita V. Jarencio the administrator's
wife, as his private secretary. In explaining this item, the administrator
alleged that he needed her services to keep receipts and records for
him, and that he did not secure first the authorization from the court
before making these disbursements because it was merely a pure
administrative function.
The keeping of receipts and retaining in his custody records
connected with the management of the properties under
administration is a duty that properly belongs to the administrator,
necessary to support the statement of accounts that he is obliged to
submit to the court for approval. If ever his wife took charge of the
safekeeping of these receipts and for which she should be
compensated, the same should be taken from his fee. This
disbursement was disallowed by the Court for being unauthorized and
the administrator required to pay the oppositors ¼, thereof or P532.50.
2. The salaries of Pedro Enriquez, as collector of the Azcarraga
property; of Briccio Matienzo and Leoncio Perez, as encargados, and
of Vicente Panganiban and Herminigildo Macetas as forest-guards
were found justified, although un authorized, as they appear to be
reasonable and necessary for the care and preservation of the
Intestate.
3. The lower Court disallowed as unjustified and unnecessary the
expenses for salaries paid to special policemen amounting to P1,509.
Appellant contended that he sought for the services of Macario
Kamungol and others to act as special policemen during harvest time
because most of the workers tilting the Punta property were not
natives of Jalajala but of the neighboring towns and they were likely to
run away with the harvest without giving the share of the estate if they
were not policed. This kind of reasoning did not appear to be
convincing to the trial judge as the cause for such fear seemed to exist
only in the imagination. Granting that such kind of situation existed,
the proper thing for the administrator to do would have been to secure
the previous authorization from the Court if he failed to secure the help
of the local police. He should be held liable for this unauthorized
expenditure and pay the heirs of Quintin de Borja ¼ thereof
or P377.25.
4. From the year 1942 when his house was burned, the administrator
and his family took shelter at the house belonging to the Intestate
known as "casa solariega" which, in the Project of Partition was
adjudicated to his father, Francisco de Borja. This property, however,
remained under his administration and for its repairs he spent from
1945-1950, P1465,14, duly receipted.
None of these repairs appear to be extraordinary for the receipts were
for nipa, for carpenters and thatchers. Although it is true that Rule 85,
section 2 provides that:
SEC. 2. EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR TO KEEP BUILDINGS
IN REPAIR. — An executor or administrator shall maintain in
tenant able repair the houses and other structures and fences
belonging to the estate, and deliver the same in such repair
to the heirs or devisees when directed so to do by the court.
yet considering that during his occupancy of the said "casa solariega"
he was not paying any rental at all, it is but reasonable that he should
take care of the expenses for the ordinary repair of said house.
Appellant asserted that had he and his family not occupied the same,
they would have to pay someone to watch and take care of said house.
But this will not excuse him from this responsibility for the
disbursements he made in connection with the aforementioned repairs
because even if he stayed in another house, he would have had to pay
rentals or else take charge also of expenses for the repairs of his
residence. The administrator should be held liable to the oppositors in
the amount of P366.28.
5. Appellant reported to have incurred expenses amounting to
P6,304.75 for alleged repairs on the rice mill in Pateros, also belonging
to the Intestate. Of the disbursements made therein, the items
corresponding, to Exhibits I, I-1, I-21, L-26, L-15, L-64 and L-65, in the
total sum of P570.70 were rejected by the lower court on the ground
that they were all unsigned although some were dated. The lower
Court, however, made an oversight in including the sum of P150
covered by Exhibit L-26 which was duly signed by Claudio Reyes
because this does not refer to the repair of the rice-mill but for the
roofing of the house and another building and shall be allowed.
Consequently, the sum of P570.70 shall be reduced to P420.70 which
added to the sum of P3,059 representing expenditures rejected as
unauthorized to wit:
Exhibit L-59 ............. P500.00 Yek Wing
Exhibit L-60 ............. 616.00 Yek Wing
Exhibit L-61 ............. 600.00 Yek Wing
Exhibit L-62 ............. 840.00 Yek Wing
Exhibit L-63 ............. 180.00 Yek Wing
Exhibit Q-2 ............. 323.00 scale "Howe"
Total ...................... P3,059.00
will give a total of P3,479 1/4 of which is P869.92 that belongs to the
oppositors.
6. On the expenses for planting in the Cainta ricefields: — In his
statement of accounts, appellant reported to have incurred a total
expense of P5,977 for the planting of the ricefields in Cainta, Rizal,
from the agricultural year 1945-46 to 1950-51. It was proved that the
prevailing sharing system in this part of the country was on 50-50
basis. Appellant admitted that expenses for planting were advanced
by the estate and liquidated after each harvest. But the report, except
for the agricultural year 1950 contained nothing of the payments that
the tenants should have made. If the total expenses for said planting
amounted to P5,977, ½ thereof or P2,988.50 should have been paid by
the tenants as their share of such expenditures, and as P965 was
reported by the administrator as paid back in 1950, there still remains
a balance of P2,023.50 unaccounted for. For this shortage, the
administrator is responsible and should pay the oppositors ¼ thereof
or P505.87.
7. On the transportation expenses of the administrator: — It appears
that from the year 1945 to 1951, the administrator charged the estate
with a total of P5,170 for transportation expenses. The un receipted
disbursements were correspondingly itemized, a typical example of
which is as follows:
1950
Gastos de viaje del administrador From Pateros
To Pasig ................ 50 x P4.00 = P200.00
To Manila ............... 50 x P10.00 = P500.00
To Cainta ................ 8 x P8.00 = P64.00
To Jalajala ............... 5 x P35.00 = P175.00
= P399.00
(Exhibit W-54).
15 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
From the report of the administrator, We are being made to believe
that the Intestate estate is a losing proposition and
assuming arguendo that this is true, that precarious financial condition
which he, as administrator, should know, did not deter Crisanto de
Borja from charging to the depleted funds of the estate comparatively
big amounts for his transportation expenses. Appellant tried to justify
these charges by contending that he used his own car in making those
trips to Manila, Pasig and Cainta and a launch in visiting the properties
in Jalajala, and they were for the gasoline consumed. This rather
unreasonable spending of the estate's fund prompted the Court to
observe that one will have to spend only P0.40 for transportation in
making a trip from Pateros to Manila and practically the same amount
in going to Pasig. From his report for 1949 alone, appellant made a
total of 97 trips to these places or an average of one trip for every 3 1/2
days. Yet We must not forget that it was during this period that the
administrator failed or refused to take cognizance of the prevailing
rentals of commercial places in Manila that caused certain loss to the
estate and for which he was accordingly held responsible. For the
reason that the alleged disbursements made for transportation
expenses cannot be said to be economical, the lower Court held that
the administrator should be held liable to the oppositors for ¼ thereof
or the sum of P1,292.50, though We think that this sum should still be
reduced to P500.
8. Other expenses:
The administrator also ordered 40 booklets of printed contracts of
lease in the name of the Hacienda Jalajala which cost P150. As the said
hacienda was divided into 3 parts one belonging to this Intestate and
the other two parts to Francisco de Boria and Bernardo de Borja,
ordinarily the Intestate should only shoulder ¹/3 of the said expense,
but as the tenants who testified during the hearing of the matter
testified that those printed forms were not being used, the Court
adjudged the administrator personally responsible for this amount.
The records reveal, that this printed form was not utilized because the
tenants refused to sign any, and We can presume that when the
administrator ordered for the printing of the same, he did not foresee
this situation. As there is no showing that said printed contracts were
used by another and that they are still in the possession of the
administrator which could be utilized anytime, this disbursement may
be allowed.
The report also contains a receipt of payment made to Mr. Severo
Abellera in the sum of P375 for his transportation expenses as one of
the two commissioners who prepared the Project of Partition. The
oppositors were able to prove that on May 24, 1941, the Court
authorized the administrator to withdraw from the funds of the intestate
the sum of P300 to defray the transportation expenses of the
commissioners. The administrator, however, alleged that he used this
amount for the payment of certain fees necessary in connection with
the approval of the proposed plan of the Azcarraga property which
was then being processed in the City Engineer's Office. From that
testimony, it would seem that appellant could even go to the extent of
disobeying the order of the Court specifying for what purpose that
amount should be appropriated and took upon himself the task of
judging for what it will serve best. Since he was not able to show or
prove that the money intended and ordered by the Court to be paid
for the transportation expenses of the commissioners was spent for the
benefit of the estate as claimed, the administrator should be held
responsible therefor and pay to the oppositors ¼ of P375 or the sum
ofP93.75.
The records reveal that for the service of summons to the defendants in
Civil Case No. 84 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, P104 was paid
to the Provincial Sheriff of the same province (Exhibit H-7). However,
an item for P40 appeared to have been paid to the Chief of Police on
Jalajala allegedly for the service of the same summons. Appellant
claimed that as the defendants in said civil case lived in remote
barrios, the services of the Chief of Police as delegate or agent of the
Provincial Sheriff were necessary. He forgot probably the fact that the
local chiefs of police are deputy sheriffs ex-officio. The administrator
was therefore ordered by the lower Court to pay ¼ of said amount or
P10 to the oppositors.
The administrator included in his Report the sum of P550 paid to Atty.
Filamor for his professional services rendered for the defense of the
administrator in G.R. No. L-4179, which was decided against him, with
costs. The lower Court disallowed this disbursement on the ground
that this Court provided that the costs of that litigation should not be
borne by the estate but by the administrator himself, personally.
Costs of a litigation in the Supreme Court taxed by the Clerk of Court,
after a verified petition has been filed by the prevailing party, shall be
awarded to said party and will only include his fee and that of his
attorney for their appearance which shall not be more than P40;
expenses for the printing and the copies of the record on appeal; all
lawful charges imposed by the Clerk of Court; fees for the taking of
depositions and other expenses connected with the appearance of
witnesses or for lawful fees of a commissioner (De la Cruz, Philippine
Supreme Court Practice, p. 70-71). If the costs provided for in that
case, which this Court ordered to be chargeable personally against
the administrator are not recoverable by the latter, with more reason
this item could not be charged against the Intestate. Consequently, the
administrator should pay the oppositors ¼ of the sum of P550 or
P137.50.
(e) The lower Court in its decision required appellant to pay the
oppositors the sum of P1,395 out of the funds still in the possession of
the administrator.
In the statement of accounts submitted by the administrator, there
appeared a cash balance of P5,851.17 as of August 31, 1961. From this
amount, the sum of P1,002.96 representing the Certificate of Deposit
No. 21619 and Check No. 57338, both of the Philippine National Bank
and in the name of Quintin de Borja, was deducted leaving a balance
of P4,848. As Judge Zulueta ordered the delivery to the oppositors of
the amount of P1,890 in his order of October 8, 1951; the delivery of
the amount of P810 to the estate of Juliana de Borja in his order of
October 23, 1951, and the sum of P932.32 to the same estate of Juliana
de Borja by order of the Court of February 29, 1952, or a total of
P3,632.32 after deducting the same from the cash in the possession of
the administrator, there will only be a remainder of P134.98.
The Intestate is also the creditor of Miguel B. Dayco, heir and
administrator of the estate of Crisanta de Borja, in the sum of P900
(Exhibits S and S-1). Adding this credit to the actual cash on hand,
there will be a total of P1,034.98, ¼, of which or P258.74 properly
belongs to the oppositors. However, as there is only a residue of
P134.98 in the hands of the administrator and dividing it among the 3
groups of heirs who are not indebted to the Intestate, each group will
receive P44.99, and Miguel B. Dayco is under obligation to reimburse
P213.76 to each of them.
The lower Court ordered the administrator to deliver to the oppositors
the amount of P1,395.90 and P314.99 each to Francisco de Borja and
the estate of Juliana de Borja, but as We have arrived at the
computation that the three heirs not idebted to the Intestate ought to
receive P44.99 each out of the amount of P134.98, the oppositors are
entitled to the sum of P1,080.91 — the amount deducted from them as
taxes but which the Court ordered to be returned to them — plus
P44.99 or a total of P1,125.90. It appearing however, that ina Joint
Motion dated November 27, 1952, duly approved by the Court, the
parties agreed to fix the amount at P1,125.58, as the amount due and
said heirs have already received this amount in satisfaction of this
item, no other sum can be chargeable against the administrator.
(f) The probate Court also ordered the administrator to render an
accounting of his administration during the Japanese occupation on the
ground that although appellant maintained that whatever money he
received during that period is worthless, same having been declared
without any value, yet during the early years of the war, or during
1942-43, the Philippine peso was still in circulation, and articles of
prime necessity as rice and firewood commanded high prices and
were paid with jewels or other valuables.
16 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
But We must not forget that in his order of December 11, 1945, Judge
Peña required the administrator to render an accounting of his
administration only from March 1, 1945, to December of the same year
without ordering said administrator to include therein the occupation
period. Although the Court below mentioned the condition then
prevailing during the war-years, We cannot simply presume, in the
absence of proof to that effect, that the administrator received such
valuables or properties for the use or in exchange of any asset or
produce of the Intestate, and in view of the aforementioned order of
Judge Peña, which We find no reason to disturb, We see no practical
reason for requiring appellant to account for those occupation years
when everything was affected by the abnormal conditions created by
the war. The records of the Philippine National Bank show that there
was a current account jointly in the names of Crisanto de Borja and
Juanita V. Jarencio, his wife, with a balance of P36,750.35 in Japanese
military notes and admittedly belonging to the Intestate and We do not
believe that the oppositors or any of the heirs would be interested in
an accounting for the purpose of dividing or distributing this deposit.
(g) On the sum of P13,294 for administrator's fees:
It is not disputed that the administrator set aside for himself and
collected from the estate the sum of P13,294 as his fees from 1945 to
1951 at the rate of P2,400 a year. There is no controversy as to the fact
that this appropriated amount was taken without the order or previous
approval by the probate Court. Neither is there any doubt that the
administration of the Intestate estate by Crisanto de Borja is far from
satisfactory.
Yet it is a fact that Crisanto de Borja exercised the functions of an
administrator and is entitled also to a certain amount as compensation
for the work and services he has rendered as such. Now, considering
the extent and size of the estate, the amount involved and the nature of
the properties under administration, the amount collected by the
administrator for his compensation at P200 a month is not
unreasonable and should therefore be allowed.
It might be argued against this disbursement that the records are
replete with instances of highly irregular practices of the
administrator, such as the pretended ignorance of the necessity of a
book or ledger or at least a list of chronological and dated entries of
money or produce the Intestate acquired and the amount of
disbursements made for the same properties; that admittedly he did
not have even a list of the names of the lessees to the properties under
his administration, nor even a list of those who owed back rentals, and
although We certainly agree with the probate Court in finding
appellant guilty of acts of maladministration, specifically in mixing the
funds of the estate under his administration with his personal funds
instead of keeping a current account for the Intestate in his capacity as
administrator, We are of the opinion that despite these irregular
practices for which he was held already liable and made in some
instances to reimburse the Intestate for amounts that were not properly
accounted for, his claim for compensation as administrator's fees shall
be as they are hereby allowed.
Recapitulation. — Taking all the matters threshed herein together, the
administrator is held liable to pay to the heirs of Quintin de Borja the
following:
Under Paragraphs III and IV:
(a)
..............................................................................
. land known as Lot No. 1851 Flr-133 with an aggregate
(b)
..............................................................................
.
(c)
..............................................................................
. are the lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the
(d) 3,352.75
..............................................................................
.
(e) 341.74
..............................................................................
.
(f) 3,750.00
..............................................................................
..
(g) 1 ..................................................................... 532.50
2 ..................................................................... 377.25
3 ..................................................................... 366.28
4 ..................................................................... 869.92
5 ..................................................................... 505.87
6 ..................................................................... 500.00
7-a
b .................................................................. 93.75
c .................................................................. 10.00
d 137.50
...................................................................
P46,210.0
0
In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is modified by
reducing the amount that the administrator was sentenced to pay the
oppositors to the sum of P46,210.78 (instead of P83,337.31), plus legal
interests on this amount from the date of the decision appealed from,
which is hereby affirmed in all other respects. Without pronouncement
as to costs. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. 162956 April 10, 2008
FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION REYES, JULIETA
C. RIVERA, and EUTIQUIO DICO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, for himself and Attorney-in-
Fact of his daughter DEBORAH ANN C. ENRIQUEZ,
and SPS. DIONISIO FERNANDEZ and CATALINA
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 29, 2003
in CA G.R. CV No. 68147, entitled "Peter B. Enriquez,
et al. v. Faustino Reyes, et al., reversing the decision of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch XI
dated June 29, 2000, which dismissed the complaint
filed by the respondents herein.1
P7,084.27
The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of
12,175.00 area of 2,017 square meters located in Talisay, Cebu.2
According to petitioners Faustino Reyes, Esperidion
16,113.95
Reyes, Julieta C. Rivera, and Eutiquio Dico, Jr., they
subject parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera as
17 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-
3551 (T-8070). On April 17, 1996, petitioners executed
an Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of the Estate of
Dionisia Reyes (the Extra Judicial Settlement) involving
a portion of the subject parcel of land. On March 21,
1997, the petitioners and the known heirs of Anacleto
Cabrera executed a Segregation of Real Estate and
Confirmation of Sale (the Segregation and
Confirmation) over the same property. By virtue of the
aforestated documents, TCT No. RT-35551 (T-8070)
was cancelled and new TCTs were issued: (1) TCT No.
T-98576 in the name of Anacleto Cabrera covering Lot
1851-A; (2) TCT No. T-98577 covering Lot 1851-B in
the name of petitioner Eutiquio Dico, Jr.; (3) TCT No. T-
98578 covering Lot 1851-C in the name of petitioner
Faustino Reyes; (4) TCT No. T-98579 covering Lot
1851-D in the name of petitioner Esperidion Reyes; (5)
TCT No. T-98580 covering Lot 1851-E in the name of
petitioner Julieta G. Rivera; (6) TCT No. T-98581
covering Lot 1851-F in the name of Felipe Dico; and (7)
TCT No. T-98582 covering Lot 1851-G in the name of
Archimedes C. Villaluz.3
Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and
on behalf of his minor daughter Deborah Ann C.
Enriquez (Deborah Ann), also known as Dina Abdullah
Enriquez Alsagoff, on the other hand, alleges that their
predecessor-in-interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife
Patricia Seguera Cabrera (collectively the Spouses
Cabrera) owned ½ pro-indiviso share in the subject
parcel of land or 1051 sq. m. They further allege that
Spouses Cabrera were survived by two daughters –
Graciana, who died single and without issue, and Etta,
the wife of respondent Peter and mother of respondent
Deborah Ann – who succeeded their parents’ rights and
took possession of the 1051 sq. m. of the subject parcel
of land. During her lifetime, Graciana sold her share
over the land to Etta. Thus, making the latter the sole
owner of the one-half share of the subject parcel of
land. Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed
on to petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann by virtue of an
Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. On June 19, 1999,
petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann sold 200 sq. m. out
of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses Dionisio
and Catalina Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also
their co-respondents in the case at bar. After the sale,
Spouses Fernandez took possession of the said area in
the subject parcel of land.4
When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share
in the subject land, they discovered that certain
documents prevent them from doing so: (1) Affidavit by
Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his
share in Lot No. 1851, the subject property, is
approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia
Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating that Anacleto only
owned ¼ of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs
to Dionisia and the rest of the property is co-owned by
Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and
Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-Judicial Settlement with Sale
of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes dated April 17, 1996; (4)
certificates of title in the name of the herein petitioners;
and (5) Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and
Confirmation of Sale dated March 21, 1997 executed by
the alleged heirs of Dionisia Reyes and Anacleto
Cabrera. Alleging that the foregoing documents are
fraudulent and fictitious, the respondents filed a
complaint for annulment or nullification of the
aforementioned documents and for damages. 5 They
likewise prayed for the "repartition and resubdivision" of
the subject property.6
The RTC, upon motion of the herein petitioners,
dismissed the case on the ground that the respondents-
plaintiffs were actually seeking first and foremost to be
declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera since they can not
demand the partition of the real property without first
being declared as legal heirs and such may not be done
in an ordinary civil action, as in this case, but through a
special proceeding specifically instituted for the
purpose.7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC
and directed the trial court to proceed with the hearing
of the case.8 The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
herein petitioners was similarly denied.9
Hence this petition.
The primary issue in this case is whether or not the
respondents have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the
affidavits of Anacleto Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the
Extra-Judicial Settlement with the Sale of Estate of
Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of Segregation of Real
Estate and Confirmation of Sale executed by the heirs
of Dionisia Reyes and the heirs of Anacleto Cabrera, as
well as to cancel the new transfer certificates of title
issued by virtue of the above-questioned documents.
We answer in the affirmative.
An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues
another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong.10 A special
proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact.11
The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in
interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an action in
court.12A real party in interest is the one who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the
one entitled to the avails thereof.13 Such interest, to be
considered a real interest, must be one which is present
18 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
and substantial, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or
consequential interest.14 A plaintiff is a real party in
interest when he is the one who has a legal right to
enforce or protect, while a defendant is a real party in
interest when he is the one who has a correlative legal
obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by
reason of the defendant’s act or omission which had
violated the legal right of the former.15 The purpose of
the rule is to protect persons against undue and
unnecessary litigation.16 It likewise ensures that the
court will have the benefit of having before it the real
adverse parties in the consideration of a case.17 Thus, a
plaintiff’s right to institute an ordinary civil action should
be based on his own right to the relief sought.
In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose
name a property was registered sue to recover the said
property through the institution of an ordinary civil
action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and
partition,18 or nullification of transfer certificate of titles
and other deeds or documents related thereto,19 this
Court has consistently ruled that a declaration of
heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the
matter is "within the exclusive competence of the court
in a special proceeding." 20 In the recent case
of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,21 the Court had the
occasion to clarify its ruling on the issue at hand, to wit:
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and
Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative
heirs to the estate of a decedent or parties to
the special proceedings for its settlement is that
if the special proceedings are pending, or if
there are no special proceedings filed but
there is, under the circumstances of the
case, a need to file one, then the
determination of, among other issues,
heirship should be raised and settled in said
special proceedings. Where special
proceedings had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, however, or if a
putative heir has lost the right to have himself
declared in the special proceedings as co-heir
and he can no longer ask for its re-opening,
then an ordinary civil action can be filed for his
declaration as heir in order to bring about the
annulment of the partition or distribution or
adjudication of a property or properties
belonging to the estate of the deceased.22
In the instant case, while the complaint was
denominated as an action for the "Declaration of Non-
Existency[sic], Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of
Certificates of Title, etc.," a review of the allegations
therein reveals that the right being asserted by the
respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
who they claim co-owned one-half of the subject
property and not merely one-fourth as stated in the
documents the respondents sought to annul. As
correctly pointed out by the trial court, the ruling in the
case of Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay v. Hon. Roy del
Rosario23 is applicable in the case at bar. In the said
case, the petitioners therein, claiming to be the legal
heirs of the late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay filed for
annulment of the transfer certificates of title issued in
the name of Golden Bay Realty Corporation on the
ground that the subject properties rightfully belong to
the petitioners’ predecessor and by virtue of succession
have passed on to them. In affirming the trial court
therein, this Court ruled:
...(T)he plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal
heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay
have not shown any proof or even a semblance
of it — except the allegations that they are the
legal heirs of the aforementioned Yaptinchays
— that they have been declared the legal heirs
of the deceased couple. Now, the determination
of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
couple must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit
for reconveyance of property. This must take
precedence over the action for reconveyance.24
In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for
their allegations, have yet to substantiate their claim as
the legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus,
entitled to the subject property. Neither is there anything
in the records of this case which would show that a
special proceeding to have themselves declared as
heirs of Anacleto Cabrera had been instituted. As such,
the trial court correctly dismissed the case for there is a
lack of cause of action when a case is instituted by
parties who are not real parties in interest. While a
declaration of heirship was not prayed for in the
complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein that the
right the respondents sought to protect or enforce is that
of an heir of one of the registered co-owners of the
property prior to the issuance of the new transfer
certificates of title that they seek to cancel. Thus, there
is a need to establish their status as such heirs in the
proper forum.
Furthermore, in Portugal,25 the Court held that it would
be superfluous to still subject the estate to
administration proceedings since a determination of the
parties' status as heirs could be achieved in the
ordinary civil case filed because it appeared from the
records of the case that the only property left by the
decedent was the subject matter of the case and that
the parties have already presented evidence to
establish their right as heirs of the decedent. In the
present case, however, nothing in the records of this
case shows that the only property left by the deceased
Anacleto Cabrera is the subject lot, and neither had
19 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
respondents Peter and Deborah Ann presented any
evidence to establish their rights as heirs, considering
especially that it appears that there are other heirs of
Anacleto Cabrera who are not parties in this case that
had signed one of the questioned documents. Hence,
under the circumstances in this case, this Court finds
that a determination of the rights of respondents Peter
and Deborah Ann as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera in a
special proceeding is necessary.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court dated June 29, 2000 DISMISSING the
complaint is REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 155555. August 16, 2005
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS
PORTUGAL JR., Petitioners,
vs.
LEONILA PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose
Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24,
20021 Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City,
Branch 1242 which dismissed, after trial, their complaint
for annulment of title for failure to state a cause of
action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following
material allegations claims of the parties which they
sought to prove by testimonial and documentary
evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal)
married Paz Lazo.3
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de
la Puerta.4
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to
a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her
herein co-petitioner.5
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,6 later
baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein
respondent.7
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings
executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver
of Rights8 over the estate of their father, Mariano
Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964.9 In
the deed, Portugal’s siblings waived their rights,
interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m. parcel of
land located in Caloocan in his favor.10
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for
Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the
name of "Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo."11
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an
"Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of
Deceased Person"12 adjudicating to herself the Caloocan
parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-17213 in Portugal’s
name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT
No. 15981314 was issued by the Registry of Deeds for
Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of
respondent, "Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to
Merardo M. Beltran, Jr."
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and
still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title
to the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed
before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a
complaint15 against respondent for annulment of the
Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her and the
transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is
not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal,
hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land
and that she perjured herself when she made false
representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondent’s
Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be
declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for
Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondent’s
name and to issue in its stead a new one in their
(petitioners’) name, and that actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees and litigation
expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondent’s filing of her answer, the trial
court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among other
things, the issues as follows:
20 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
a. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?
b. Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and
defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due
course and can still be contested by plaintiffs.
d. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims
under the complaint.16 (Underscoring supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18,
2001,17 after giving an account of the testimonies of the
parties and their witnesses and of their documentary
evidence, without resolving the issues defined during
pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of
action on the ground that petitioners’ status and right
as putative heirs had not been established before a
probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over the
case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del
Rosario.18
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the
trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not
dissimilar to the case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage
Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and
testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of
the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a
status and right to the estate of the decedent, was
sought to be determined herein. However, the
establishment of a status, a right, or a particular
fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec.
3(c), Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil
action whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or
redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term in the
former is "to establish", while in the latter, it is "to
enforce", a right. Their status and right as putative heirs
of the decedent not having been established, as yet, the
Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without
jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs’ cause to establish their
status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the
personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in relation to
Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).19 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals,
questioning the trial court’s ratio decedendi in
dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to this
Court’s following ruling in Cariño v. Cariño,20 viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity
of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to
be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a
final judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v.
Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993])
However, for purposes other than remarriage, no
judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an
absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not
limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after
the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not
directly instituted to question the validity of said
marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. (Niñal, et al. v. Bayadog,
GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In such cases,
evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary,
to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not
be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v.
Court of Appeals, supra) (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cariño was promulgated (in
2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court
found Cariño to be inapplicable, however, to the case in
this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in
the Cariño case was the validity of the two
marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago
Cariño, whose death benefits was the bone of
contention between the two women both named Susan
(viz., Susan Nicdao Cariño and Susan Yee Cariño) both
of whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that
SPO4 S. Cariño contracted two marriages with said two
women during his lifetime, and the only question was:
which of these two marriages was validly celebrated?
The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cariño
was thus, merely an incident to the question of which
of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand,
the case at bench is of a different milieu. The main
issue here is the annulment of title to property. The
only undisputed fact in this case is that the deceased
Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of
21 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-34292. However, here come two contending parties,
— herein plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee,
— both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the
decedent. x x x. The status and rights of the parties
herein have not, therefore, been definitively established,
as yet. x x x. Necessarily and naturally, such questions
as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in
an appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary
civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or
redress of a wrong. The institution of an ordinary civil
suit for that purpose in the present case is thus
impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what the law
prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow
indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration of heirship,
or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child to be determined in an ordinary civil action, not in
an appropriate special proceeding brought for that
purpose, is thus to impinge upon this axiom. x x
x21 (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24,
2002,22 thus affirmed the trial court’s dismissal of the
case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari,23 faulting the appellate court to have erred
when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory
complaint as it failed to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel]
Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and
contrary ruling in Cariño, and (ii) when the Honorable
CA and the lower court failed to render
judgment based on the evidence presented relative to
the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .24 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this
Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA
decision be reversed, and a new one entered in
accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant
complaint based on the above disquisition and evidence
adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme
Court find that the pronouncements in Cariño apply, a
decision be entered remanding to the court a quo the
determination of the issues of which of the two
marriages is valid, and the determination of "heirship"
and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila preparatory to
the determination of the annulment of title issued in the
name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the
premises are likewise prayed for.25 (Underscoring
supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court
misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay and in
effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which is
discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cariño shows;
that Cariño allows courts to pass on the determination
of heirship and the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child
so long as it is necessary to the determination of the
case; and that contrary to the appellate court’s ruling,
they had established their status as compulsory heirs.
In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether
petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs before they can pursue
the case for annulment of respondent’s Affidavit of
Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay,26 the therein petitioners executed on March
17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, "owners-
claimants" of the two lots mentioned therein. They later
discovered on August 26, 1994 that a portion, if not all,
of the two lots had been titled in the name of the therein
respondent Golden Bay Realty and Development
Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof to the
therein individual respondents. The therein
petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of
titles. The therein respondents moved to dismiss the
case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia,
state a cause of action and prove their status as heirs.
The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in this
wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the
said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown any
proof or even a semblance of it—except the allegations
that they are the legal heirs of the aforementioned
Yaptinchays—that they have been declared the legal
heirs of the deceased couple. Now, the determination of
who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must
be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and
not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property.
This must take precedence over the action for
reconveyance . . .27 (Italics in the original; underscoring
supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit
holding that the petition was an improper recourse,
22 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the case. Citing Litam et al. v.
Rivera28 and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,29 this Court held
that "the declaration of heirship can be made only in a
special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are
seeking the establishment of a status or right."
In the above-cited case of Litam,30 Gregorio Dy
Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance of
letters of administration before the then Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that he is
the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January
10, 1951 and is survived by him and his therein named
seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by
his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated in China in 1911;
that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines
another marriage with Marcosa Rivera; and that the
decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus
prayed for the issuance of letters of administration to
Marcosa Rivera, "the surviving spouse of the decedent."
The CFI granted the petition and issued letters of
administration to, on Marcosa’s request, her nephew
Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and
his purported siblings filed a civil case before the same
court, against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator
Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu, duly
appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy
Tam and his purported siblings substantially reproduced
the allegations made in his petition in the special
proceeding, with the addition of a list of properties
allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent
and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical
to some unresolved incidents in the special proceeding,
both were jointly heard by the trial court, following
which it rendered a decision in the civil case dismissing
it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al.
are not the children of the decedent whose only
surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two
issues raised for determination was whether they are
the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether
Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and
whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam
et al., found "substantially correct" the trial court’s
findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other
things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al. "do not
establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and
the persons named therein as father [and] it does not
appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam
had in any manner intervened in the preparation and
filing thereof"; and that "[t]he other documentary
evidence presented by [them] [is] entirely immaterial
and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage
between the deceased Rafael Litam and Sia Khin and
[their] alleged status . . . as children of said decedent."
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that "the
lower court should not have declared, in the decision
appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the
decedent, for such declaration is improper in the [civil
case], it being within the exclusive competence of the
court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding."
In Solivio,31 also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel
Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was
a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special
proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole
heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedent’s maternal aunt-
half sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva, the decedent‘s paternal aunt-sister of his
father, moved to reconsider the court’s order declaring
Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she
claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the
motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of appealing
the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil
case against Celedonia before the same RTC, for
partition, recovery of possession, ownership and
damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of the
RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia.
On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court affirmed
the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by
Celedonia who posed, among other issues, "whether
Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to
entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanueva’s share of the estate of [the
deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still
pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court," this Court
held that "[i]n the interest of orderly procedure and
to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a
decedent’s estate, a court should not interfere with
[estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal
court," citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.32
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon "[c]onsidering that
the estate proceedings are still pending, but
nonetheless [therein private respondent-Concordia
Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared
as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to
discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of
justice," and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas33 cited in Solivio, a project of partition between
an adopted daughter, the therein petitioner Juanita
Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was
approved in the proceedings for the settlement of the
testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother,
23 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
following which the probate court directed that the
records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her
adoptive father to annul the project of partition on the
ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that
her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the two
lots allocated to her in the project of partition. She
subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate
proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her,
among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court,
noting the parties’ agreement to suspend action or
resolution on Juanita’s motion in the testate estate
proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots alloted
to her until after her complaint in the civil case had been
decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside
the order setting it for trial on the ground that in the
amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she
acknowledged the partial legality and validity of the
project of partition insofar as she was allotted the two
lots, the delivery of which she was seeking. She thus
posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966
order setting the civil case for hearing that there was no
longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate
estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the actual
possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of
April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order
before this Court.
The probate court’s approval of the project of partition
and directive that the records of the case be sent to the
archives notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate
estate proceedings had not been "legally terminated" as
Juanita’s share under the project of partition had not
been delivered to her. Explained this Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has
not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot
be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs.
Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not final
and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from
bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the
prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs.
Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice, however, for
the heir who has not received his share, is to demand
his share through a proper motion in the same
probate or administration proceedings,or for re-
opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if
it had already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried
by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a
decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate
court already final and executed and re-shuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos
vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano,
supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92
Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710,
March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).34 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966
order of the trial court setting the civil case for hearing,
but allowed the civil case to continue because it
"involves no longer" the two lots adjudicated to Juanita.
The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in
which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the
estate of a decedent or parties to the special
proceedings for its settlement is that if the special
proceedings are pending, or if there are no special
proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances
of the case, a need to file one, then the determination
of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and
settled in said special proceedings. Where special
proceedings had been instituted but had been finally
closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has
lost the right to have himself declared in the special
proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its
re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be filed for
his declaration as heir in order to bring about the
annulment of the partition or distribution or adjudication
of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the
deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or
wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugal’s estate,
executed on February 15, 198835 the questioned
Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of
Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.36 Said
rule is an exception to the general rule that when a
person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec.
6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case
he did, he failed to name an executor therein.37
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of
Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has
jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only
property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the
Caloocan parcel of land,38 to still subject it, under the
circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding
which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to
establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only
impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs
and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is
superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil
case – subject of the present case, could and had
24 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the
issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case,
there being no compelling reason to still subject
Portugal’s estate to administration proceedings since a
determination of petitioners’ status as heirs could be
achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners,39 the trial
court should proceed to evaluate the evidence
presented by the parties during the trial and render a
decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-
trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant
Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the deceased Jose
Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due
course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim
under the complaint.40
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial
court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented
by the parties and render a decision on the above-
enumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-8409 December 28, 1956
In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio.
EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE
EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.
Francisco M. Ramos and Valeriano Silva for appellee.
Filemon Cajator for appellants.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This case instituted on November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio
filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his
appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres
Eusebio, who died on November 28, 1952, residing, according to said
petition, in the City of Quezon. On December 4, 1953, Amanda,
Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio,
objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of
the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga, and praying, therefore, that the case be dismissed upon
the ground that venue had been improperly filed. By an order, dated
March 10, 1954, said court overruled this objection and granted said
petition. Hence, the case is before us on appeal taken, from said order,
by Amanda Eusebio, and her aforementioned sister and brothers.
The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on
November 28, 1952, for Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court,
provides:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent
is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizens or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate, in the Court
of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign
country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which
he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except
in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
It is not disputed that up to, at least, October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio
was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga,
where he had his home, as well as some other properties. Inasmuch as
his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who
treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on
October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A
España Extention, in said City (Exhibit 2). While transferring his
belongings to this house, soon thereafter, the decedent suffered a
stroke (probably heart failure), for which reason Dr. Eusebio took him
to his (Dr. Eusebio's) aforementioned residence, where the decedent
remained until he was brought to the UST Hospital, in the City of
Manila, sometimes before November 26, 1952. On this date, he
contracted marriage in articulo mortis with his common law wife,
Concepcion Villanueva, in said hospital. Two (2) days later, he died
therein of "acute left ventricular failure secondary to hypertensive
heart disease", at the age of seventy-four (74) years (Exhibit A).
Consequently, he never stayed or even slept in said house at España
Extention.
It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the
decedent was San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over
seventy (70) years, the presumption is that he retained such domicile,
and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the
contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is
retained until a new domicile is gained" (Minor, Conflict of Laws, p.70;
Restatement of the Law on Conflict of Laws, p. 47; In re Estate of
Johnson, 192 Iowa, 78). Under the circumstances surrounding the case
at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have
been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential,
namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical
presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein
permanently (Minor, Conflict of Laws, pp. 109-110; Googrich, Conflict
of Laws, p. 169; Velilla vs. Posadas, 62 Phil., 624; Zuellig vs. Republic of
the Philippines, 46 Off. Gaz. Suppl. No. 11, p. 220). Admittedly, the
decedent was juridically capable of choosing a domicile and had been
in Quezon City several days prior to his demise. Thus, the issue
narrows down to whether he intended to stay in that place
permanently.
There is no direct evidence of such intent. Neither does the decedent
appears to have manifested his wish to live indefinitely in said city. His
son, petitioner-appellee, who took the witness stand, did not testify
thereon, despite the allegation, in his answer to the aforemention,
opposition of the appellants herein, that "the deceased (had) decided
to reside . . . for the rest of his life, in Quezon City". Moreover, said
25 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
appellee did not introduce the testimony of his legitimate full brother
and son of the decedent, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, upon whose advice,
presumably, the house and lot at No. 889-A España Extention was
purchased, and who, therefore, might have cast some light on his
(decedent's) purpose in buying said property. This notwithstanding,
the lower court held that the decedent's intent to stay permanently in
Quezon City is "manifest" from the acquisition of said property and the
transfer of his belonging thereto. This conclusion is
untenable.lawphil.net
The aforementioned house and lot were bought by the decedent
because he had been adviced to do so "due to his illness", in the very
words of herein appellee. It is not improbable — in fact, its is very
likely — that said advice was given and followed in order that the
patient could be near his doctor and have a more effective treatment.
It is well settled that "domicile is not commonly changed by presence
in a place merely for one's own health", even if coupled with
"knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to
return home." (The Conflict of Laws, by Beale, Vol. I, pp. 172-173; see,
also, Shenton vs. Abbott, Md., 15., A. 2d. 906; U.S. vs. Knight, D. C.
Mont., 291 Fed. 129).
Again, the decedent did not part with, or alienate, his house in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Moreover, some of his children, who used to
live with him in San Fernando, Pampanga, remained in that
municipality. Then, again, in the deed Exhibit 2, by virtue of which
said property at No. 889-A España Extention, Quezon City, was
conveyed to him, on October 29, 1952, or less than a month before his
death, the decedent gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence.
Similarly, the "A" and "B" residence certificates used by the decedent
in aknowledging said Exhibit 2, before a notary public, was issued
in San Fernando, Pampanga. Lastly, the marriage contract Exhibit 1,
signed by the deceased when he was married, in articulo mortis, to
Concepcion Villanueva, at the UST Hospital, on November 26, 1952, or
two (2) days prior to his demise, stated that his residence is San
Fernando, Pampanga. It is worthy of notice that Alfonso Eusebio, one of
the legitimate full brothers of the herein appellee, was a witness to
said wedding, thus indicating that the children of the deceased by his
first marriage, including said appellee, were represented on that
occasion and would have objected to said statement about his
residence, if it were false. Consequently, apart from appellee's failure
to prove satisfactory that the decedent had decided to establish his
home in Quezon City, the acts of the latter, shortly and immediately
before his death, prove the contrary. At any rate, the presumption in
favor of the retention of the old domicile 1— which is particularly
strong when the domicile is one of the origin 2as San Fernando,
Pampanga, evidently was, as regards said decedent — has not been
offset by the evidence of record.
The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being
offered in evidence, and refused to entertain the same in the order
appealed from. The reason therefor are deducible from its resolution
in rejecting said documents during the hearing of the incident at bar.
The court then held:
Exihibits "1" and "2" are rejecting but the same may be
attached to the records for whatever action oppositors may
want to take later on because until now the personality of the
oppositors has not been established whether or not they
have a right to intervene in this case, and the Court cannot
pass upon this question as the oppositors refuse to submit to
the jurisdiction of this Court and they maintain that these
proceedings should be dismissed. (P. 10, t. s. n.)
In short, the lower court believed that said documents should not be
admitted in evidence before appellants had established their
"personality" to intervene in the case, referring seemingly to their
filiation. When appellants, however, sought, during said hearing, to
establish their relation with the deceased, as his alleged illegitimate
children, His Honor, the trial Judge sustained appellee's objection
thereto stating:
Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction of this
Court, and it seems that you are now trying to prove the
status of your client; you are leading so that. The main point
here is your contention that the deceased was never a
resident of Quezon City and that is why I allowed you to
cross-examine. If you are trying to establish the status of the
oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to
submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. This is not yet the time
to declare who are persons who should inherit. (p. 1, t. s. n.)
Thus, the lower court refused to consider appellant's evidence on the
domicile of the decedent, because of their alleged lack of
"personality", but, when tried to establish such "personality", they
were barred from doing so on account of the question of venue raised
by him. We find ourselves unable to sanction either the foregoing
procedure adopted by the lower court or the inference it drew from
the circumstances surrounding the case.
To begin with, His Honor, the trial Judge had taken inconsistent
positions. While, on the one hand, he declared that appellants could
not be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence of the
decedent, for they contestedthe jurisdiction of court, on the other hand,
he held, in the order appealed from, that, by cross-examining the
appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to the authority of
the court.
What is more, this conclusion is refuted by the record. At the
beginning of the hearing, in the lower court, appellants' counsel
announced that he would take part therein "only to question the
jurisdiction, for the purpose of dismissing this proceeding," (p. 2,
t.s.n.). During the cross-examination of petitioner herein, said counsel
tried to elicit the relation between the decedent and the appellants.
As, the appellee objected thereto, the court said, addressing
appellants' counsel: "Your stand until now is to question the jurisdiction
of the court. . . . It you are trying to establish the status of the
oppositors, I will sustain the objection, unless you want to submit to the
jurisdiction of the court" (p. 7, t.s.n.). Thereupon, appellants' counsel
refused to do so, stating: "I will insist on my stand." Then, too, at the
conclusion of the hearing, the court rejected Exhibits 1 and 2, for the
reason that appellants "refuse to submit to the jurisdiction of this
court and they maintain that these proceedings should be dismissed."
Thus, appellants specially made of record that they
were not submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the court, except
for the purpose only of assailing the same, and the court felt that
appellants were not giving up their stand, which was, and is, a fact.
At any rate, appellants were entitled to establish facts tending to
prove, not only their right to object to appellee's petition, but, also,
that venue had been laid improperly. Such facts were: (a) their alleged
relationship with the decedent, 3 which, if true, entitle them to proceed
him under the Civil Code of the Philippines; and (b) his alleged
residence is Pampanga. In other words, the lower court should have
admitted Exhibits 1 and 2 in evidence and given thereto the proper
effect, in connection with the issue under consideration.
Appellee, however, asks: "What will happen if this case be dismissed
in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction or improper venue?" In this connection, it appears that on
November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga received a petition of appellants herein, dated November
4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don
Andres Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition for the
docketing thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3, section 22, of the
Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order dated
November 16, 1953, which was received by the cashier of said court
on November 17, 1953, on which date the case was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 957. On December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio,
Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the children of the
decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein), moved for the
dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present
case, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, since November 16,
1953. This motion was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953,
relying upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court,
26 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
pursuant to which "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of
the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
all other courts."
Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the
case at bar. Said order did not pass upon the question of domicile or
residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking
cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said
provision of the Rules of Court evidently refers to cases triable before
two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly
have intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested
therein by law, merely because a similar case had been previously
filed before a courtto which jurisdiction is denied by law, for the same
would then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More
specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who
have properties in several provinces in the Philippines, for the
settlement of their respective estates may undertaken before the court
of first instance of either one of said provinces, not only because said
courts then have concurrent jurisdiction — and, hence, the one first
taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts — but,
also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of
the Rules of the Court immediately follows the last part of the next
preceding sentence, which deals with non-resident decedents, whose
estate may settled the court of first instance of any province in which
they have properties.lawphil.net
In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:
. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends
on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location
of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident
are instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised
before the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have
exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue, and we so held in the case
of Taciana Vda. De Borja vs. Tan, L-7792 (July 27, 1955). Should it be
decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had
been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed
and the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the
proper court.
In conclusion, we find that the decedent was, at the time of his death,
domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance
of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the
estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and
that it should, accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and
dismissed appellee's petition.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby reversed and
appellee's petition is dismissed, with costs against the appellee. It is so
ordered.
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR,
Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch
Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA
and AGUSTINA B. GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioners.
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word
"resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring
to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means.
Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is
sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of
Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a
petition for letters of administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C,
alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a
property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of
Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba,
Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable
Court." At the same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate.
On even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8,
1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the
petition for letters of administration has been served upon all persons
interested in the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in
the proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the
surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the
appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a
debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore,
prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in
lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due
hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the
Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the
jurisdictional ground raised in the motion for reconsideration of May 8,
1973 that her appointment was obtained through erroneous,
misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G.
Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown
herself unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of
administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance
of Calamba, Laguna, was published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in
the Bayanihan,a weekly publication of general circulation in Southern
Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition
for the Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G.
Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original petition in four
aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the
First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at Calamba,
Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and
Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation
that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original
petition, is the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia and that she has
expressly renounced her preferential right to the administration of the
estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G. Fule be
appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this
supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the
reason, among others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed
at the beginning because the original petition was deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original
and supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the
27 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the
estate of Amado G. Garcia, and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as
special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973,
praying for authority to take possession of properties of the decedent
allegedly in the hands of third persons as well as to secure cash
advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing
Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion, calling
attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the
special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal
and real properties making up the state of the deceased."
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order,
received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the
motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973,
appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, and admitting
the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition,
because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest
has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid;
and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to
inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental
motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix,
reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule admitted before before the
court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G. Alcalde, an
illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado G.
Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973,
one, to enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of
properties in the hands of third persons which have not been
determined as belonging to Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the
special administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the
interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the minor
Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action,
jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus
motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B.
Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the
powers of the special administratrix are those provided for in Section
2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to the previous
qualification made by the court that the administration of the
properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with
the latter; and that the special administratrix had already been
authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take custody and
possession of all papers and certificates of title and personal effects of
the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to
deliver to Preciosa B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without
any qualifying words like "married to Amado Garcia" does not appear.
Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of
jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of July 2, 1973,
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of
Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of
Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of
administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time of
his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia
had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her
objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular
administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27,
1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in
view of previous court order limiting the authority of the special
administratrix to the making of an inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also
asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack
of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia.
Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special
administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the
first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the
special administratrix, and the second, holding that the power allowed
the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an
inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of
the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973,
insofar as they sustained or failed to rule on the issues raised by her:
(a) legal standing (cause of action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c)
jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and removal of special
administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of checks
and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7,
1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned
orders: one, directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as
special administratrix, copy of the statement of accounts and final
liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the corresponding
amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to deliver
to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the
estate; and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court
all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa B.
Garcia, whether qualified with the word "single" or "married to Amado
Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C)
before Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate
of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death
was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the
residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three
months before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G.
Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba,
Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia
commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and
preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge
Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or,
in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court,
viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for
reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss the
criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among others, of
jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974, directing the
delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G.
Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc.
27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of
jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia
G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The
case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of
the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February
1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-
19738, over the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On
February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her
28 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G.
Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special
administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified
and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed
Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge
Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of
the proceedings therein by the Court of Appeals on January 30, 1975.
She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-
19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the
proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc.
No. 27-C have not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the
proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court
of the final outcome of the case pending before the Court of Appeals.
This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on December 11, 1975,
an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to
Question Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the
previous special appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention
that the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the
motion for reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the
parties had already filed their respective briefs; and that the case is
still pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded
Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent
Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" in that the payments
were for the benefit of the estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt
on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of
First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January
12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a
petition for certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the
proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani
Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was
issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for
certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670 for the reasons and considerations
hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death,
whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and
if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent,
or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case,
or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With
particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the
Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should
affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make the
appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts, such as
death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and
situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the
right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor,
or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his
last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all
subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and
that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his
death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the
court to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1),
specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence
of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of
venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It could not have been
intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because
such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely
with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the
subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the
subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given
cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by
procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or
authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though
that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of
the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the
power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may
thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may
thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to
sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at
once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just
a matter of method, of convenience to the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First
Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place
of residence of the deceased. Because of the existence of numerous
Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court, however,
purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be
brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in
settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of
administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this
reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province
where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides"
mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent
at the time of his death? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term
"resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished
from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms
"residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. 7 In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature —
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitantin a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B.
Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time
of his death. In her original petition for letters of administration before
the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule
measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving
real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B.
29 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next
requirement and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather
statement avers no domicile or residence of the deceased Amado G. the fruits than the naked ownership of a property. 18
Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba, Laguna," he also
resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as
contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death
the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B.
certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba
Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with
court and in other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was
Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter,
at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
incapable of any successional rights.19 On this point, We rule that
Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule
Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special
categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence
administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such
was at Calamba, Laguna."
appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular
administrator is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, entitled to the administration. The issue of heirship is one to be
Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court
admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the
death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was basis of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with
presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased
B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the indicated therein that he is married to Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his
deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to the Constitutional
before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970,
dated November 12, 1971 turning over the administration of his two he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his
parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative spouse. 23 Faced with these documents and the presumption that a man
Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated January 8, and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia can be
Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the late Amado G.
covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24
that Amado G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City.
Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs.
C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in
Court of Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all
the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Nevertheless, the long-
inferior courts may properly decree that venue in the instant case was
settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to waiver.
properly assumed by and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in
Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper
the interest of justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon
venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived."
City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of
In the case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in
the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of special
asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa
administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and
B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or
the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing
venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but
with the case and instead be required to transfer all the records
availed of a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her
thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the
rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the
continuation of the proceedings.
Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence
of the decedent.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17,
1975, granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as
Obligations" filed by Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738,
special administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia
subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar
claims preference to the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of
Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70
Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters
for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.
testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal
from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint
a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia
the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby
executors or administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of denied, with costs against petitioner.
a special administrator was only proper when the allowance or
disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules, however,
SO ORDERED.
broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment is now
allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among G.R. No. L-49162 July 28, 1987
themselves. 14Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special
administrator or not lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no JANICE MARIE JAO, represented by her mother and guardian ad
authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes litem, ARLENE S. SALGADO, petitioner,
and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment.
vs.
Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V.
and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and JAO, respondents.
legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should
not be taken into account in the appointment of a special
administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order PADILLA, J.:
of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in
appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that Appeal by certiorari from the decision* of the Court of Appeals in CA-
overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interestof the
G.R. No. 51078-R, dated 29 August 1978, which dismissed petitioner"s
appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow
action for recognition and support against private respondent, and
would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive
from the respondent Court"s resolution, dated 11 October 1978,
property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal denying petitioner"s motion for reconsideration of said decision.
partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more,
30 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
On 28 October 1968, petitioner Janice Marie Jao, then a minor,
represented by her mother and guardian-ad-litemArlene Salgado,
filed a case for recognition and support with the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court against private respondent Perico V. Jao. The latter
denied paternity so the parties agreed to a blood grouping test which
was in due course conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) upon order of the trial court. The result of the blood grouping
test, held 21 January 1969, indicated that Janice could not have been
the possible offspring of Perico V. Jao and Arlene S. Salgado.1
The trial court initially found the result of the tests legally conclusive
but upon plaintiff"s (herein petitioner"s) second motion for
reconsideration, it ordered a trial on the merits, after which, Janice was
declared the child of Jao, thus entitling her to his monthly support.
Jao appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial court"s
failure to appreciate the result of the blood grouping tests. As there
was no showing whatsoever that there was any irregularity or mistake
in the conduct of the tests, Jao argued that the result of the tests should
have been conclusive and indisputable evidence of his non-paternity.
The Court of Appeals upheld Jao"s contentions and reversed the trial
court"s decision. In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:
From the evidence of the contending parties, it appears
undisputed that JAO was introduced to ARLENE at the Saddle
and Sirloin, Bay Side Club, by Melvin Yabut. After this
meeting, JAO dated and courted ARLENE. Not long
thereafter, they had their first sexual intercourse and
subsequently, they lived together as husband and wife. ...
It further appears undisputed that in April 1968, JAO
accompanied ARLENE to the Marian General Hospital for
medical check-up and her confinement was with JAO"s
consent. JAO paid the rentals where they lived, the salaries
of the maids, and other household expenses. ...
The record discloses that ARLENE gave birth to JANICE on
August 16, 1968, after completing 36 weeks of pregnancy,
which indicates that ARLENE must have conceived JANICE
on or about the first week of December, 1967. "Thus, one
issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether on or about
that time, JAO and ARLENE had sexual intercourse and were
already living with one another as husband and wife.
In this connection, ARLENE contends that she first met JAO
sometime in the third or fourth week of November, 1967 at
the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club; that after several dates,
she had carnal knowledge with him at her house at 30 Long
beach, Merville, Paranaque. Rizal in the evening of
November 30, 1967, and that he started to live with her at her
dwelling after December 16, 1967, the date they finished
their cruise to Mindoro Island.
On the other hand, JAO, albeit admitting that he met ARLENE
at the Saddle and Sirloin, Bayside Club, however, maintains
that this was on December 14, 1967 because the day
following, he and his guests: ARLENE, Melvin Yabut, Didi
Crescini and Charlie Litonjua went to Mindoro by boat. He
dated ARLENE four times in January, 1968. He remembered
he had carnal knowledge of her for the first time on January
18, 1968, because that was a week after his birthday and it
was only in May, 1968 that he started cohabiting with her at
the Excelsior Apartments on Roxas Boulevard.
These conflicting versions of the parties emphasize, in
resolving the paternity of JANICE, the role of the blood
grouping tests conducted by the NBI and which resulted in
the negative finding that in a union with ARLENE, JAO could
not be the father of JANICE.
We cannot sustain the conclusion of the trial court that the
NBI is not in a position to determine with mathematical
precision the issue of parentage by blood grouping test,
considering the rulings of this Court ... where the blood
grouping tests of the NBI were admitted; especially where, in
the latter case, it was Dr. Lorenzo Sunico who conducted the
test and it appears that in the present case, the same Dr.
Sunico approved the findings and report. ... In Co Tao vs.
Court of Appeals, 101 Phil. 188, the Supreme Court had
given weight to the findings of the NBI in its blood grouping
test. Thus, it cannot be gainsaid that the competency of the
NBI to conduct blood grouping tests has been recognized as
early as the 1950"s.
The views of the Court on blood grouping tests may be
stated as follows:
Paternity — Science has demonstrated that by the
analysis of blood samples of the mother, the child,
and the alleged father, it can be established
conclusively that the man is not the father of the
child. But group blood testing cannot show that a
man is the father of a particular child, but at least
can show only a possibility that he is. Statutes in
many states, and courts in others, have recognized
the value and the limitations of such tests. Some of
the decisions have recognized the conclusive
presumption of non-paternity where the results of
the test, made in the prescribed manner, show the
impossibility of the alleged paternity. This is one of
the few cases in which the judgment of the Court
may scientifically be completely accurate, and
intolerable results avoided, such as have occurred
where the finding is allowed to turn on oral
testimony conflicting with the results of the test.
The findings of such blood tests are not admissible
to prove the fact of paternity as they show only a
possibility that the alleged father or any one of
many others with the same blood type may have
been the father of the child. But the Uniform Act
recognizes that the tests may have some probative
value to establish paternity where the blood type
and the combination in the child is shown to be
rare, in which case the judge is given discretion to
let it in (I Jones on Evidence, 5th Ed., pp. 193-194).
In one specific biological trait, viz, blood groups,
scientific opinion is now in accord in accepting the
fact that there is a causative relation between the
trait of the progenitor and the trait of the progeny.
In other words, the blood composition of a child
may be some evidence as to the child"s paternity.
But thus far this trait (in the present state of
scientific discovery as generally accepted) can be
used onlynegatively i.e. to evidence that a
particular man F is not the father of a particular
child C. (I Wigmore on Evidence 3rd Ed., pp. 610-
611).
In a last ditch effort to bar the admissibility and competency
of the blood test, JANICE claims that probative value was
given to blood tests only in cases where they tended to
establish paternity; and that there has been no case where
the blood test was invoked to establish non-paternity,
thereby implying that blood tests have probative value only
when the result is a possible affirmative and not when in the
negative. This contention is fallacious and must be rejected.
To sustain her contention, in effect, would be recognizing
only the possible affirmative finding but not the blood
grouping test itself for if the result were negative, the test is
regarded worthless. Indeed, this is illogical. .... As an
admitted test, it is admissible in subsequent similar
31 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
 proceedings whether the result be in the negative or in the
affirmative. ...
The Court of Appeals also found other facts that ran contrary to
petitioner"s contention that JAO"s actions before and after JANICE was
born were tantamount to recognition. Said the respondent appellate
court:
On the contrary, after JANICE was born, JAO did not
recognize her as his own. In fact, he filed a petition that his
name as father of JANICE in the latter"s certificate of live
birth be deleted, evidencing his repudiation, rather than
recognition. The mere acts of JAO in cohabiting with
ARLENE, the attention given to her during her pregnancy
and the financial assistance extended to her cannot
overcome the result of the blood grouping test. These acts of
JAO cannot be evaluated as recognizing the unborn JANICE
as his own as the possession of such status cannot be
founded on conjectures and presumptions, especially so
that, We have earlier said, JAO refused to acknowledge
JANICE after the latter"s birth.
JAO cannot be compelled to recognize JANICE based on
paragraph 2 of Article 283 in relation to Article 289 of the
New Civil Code which provides: "When the child is in
continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged
father by the direct acts of the latter.
Nor can there be compulsory recognition under paragraphs
3 or 4 of said article which states:
(3) When the child was conceived during the time
when the mother cohabited with the supposed
father;
(4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or
proof that the defendant is his father.
As aptly appreciated by the court below, JANICE could have
been conceived from November 20, 1967 to December 4,
1967. Indeed, ARLENE claims that her first sexual intercourse
with JAO was on November 30, 1967 while the latter avers it
was one week after January 18, 1968. However, to satisfy
paragraph 3 as above-quoted, JANICE must have been
conceived when ARLENE and JAO started to cohabit with one
another. Since ARLENE herself testified that their
cohabitation started only after December 16, 1967, then it
cannot be gainsaid that JANICE was not conceived during
this cohabitation. Hence, no recognition will lie. Necessarily,
recognition cannot be had under paragraph 4 as JANICE has
no other evidence or proof of her alleged paternity.
Apart from these, there is the claim of JAO that, at the critical
time of conception, ARLENE had carnal knowledge with two
other men: "Oying" Fernandez and Melvin Yabut, which was
not even rebutted; and considering that it was Melvin Yabut,
who introduced ARLENE to JAO at the Bayside Club.
Moreover, the testimony of ARLENE is not wholly reliable.
When the trial court said that "the Court is further convinced
of plaintiff"s cause by ARLENE"s manner of testifying in a
most straight-forward and candid manner," the fact that
ARLENE was admittedly a movie actress may have been
overlooked so that not even the trial court could detect, by
her acts, whether she was lying or not.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set
aside and a new one entered dismissing plaintiff-appellee"s
complaint. Without pronouncement as to costs. SO
ORDERED.
The petitioner now brings before this Court the issue of admissibility
and conclusiveness of the result of blood grouping tests to prove non-
paternity.
In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence,
to, affirm paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. Court of Appeals,2 an
action for declaration of filiation, support and damages. In said case,
the NBI expert"s report of the blood tests stated that "from their blood
groups and types, the defendant Co Tao is a possible father of the
child." From this statement the defendant contended that the child
must have been the child of another man. The Court noted: "For
obvious reasons, the NBI expert cannot give assurance that the
appellant was the father of the child; he can only give his opinion that
he is a "possible father." This possibility, coupled with the other facts
and circumstances brought out during the trial, tends to definitely
establish that appellant Co Tao is the father of the child Manuel."3
Where the issue is admissibility and conclusiveness of blood grouping
tests to disprove paternity, rulings have been much more definite in
their conclusions. For the past three decades, the use of blood typing
in cases of disputed parentage has already become an important legal
procedure. There is now almost universal scientific agreement that
blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although
inconclusive as to paternity — that is, the fact that the blood type of the
child is a possible product of the mother and alleged father does not
conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents; but, if the
blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the blood
of the mother and that of the alleged father are crossmatched, then the
child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father.4
In jurisdictions like the United States, the admissibility of blood tests
results to prove non-paternity has already been passed upon in
several cases. In Gilpin v. Gilpin5 the positive results of blood tests
excluding paternity, in a case in which it was shown that proper
safeguards were drawn around the testing procedures, were
recognized as final on the question of paternity. In Cuneo v.
Cuneo6 evidence of non-paternity consisting of the result of blood
grouping tests was admitted despite a finding that the alleged father
had cohabited with the mother within the period of gestation. The
Court said that the competent medical testimony was overwhelmingly
in favor of the plaintiff, and to reject such testimony would be
tantamount to rejecting scientific fact. Courts, it was stated, should
apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result was to deny
progress.7 This ruling was also echoed in Clark v. Rysedorph,8 a
filiation proceeding where an uncontradicted blood grouping test
evidence, excluding paternity, was held conclusive.9 Legislation
expressly recognizing the use of blood tests is also in force in several
states.10 Tolentino,11 affirms this rule on blood tests as proof of non-
paternity, thus —
Medical science has shown that there are four types of blood
in man which can be transmitted through heredity. Although
the presence of the same type of blood in two persons does
not indicate that one was begotten by the other, yet the fact
that they are of different types will indicate the impossibility
of one being the child of the other. Thus, when the supposed
father and the alleged child are not in the same blood group,
they cannot be father and child by consanguinity. The Courts
of Europe today regard a blood test exclusion as an
unanswerable and indisputable proof of non-paternity. 12
Moreover,
The cohabitation between the mother and the supposed
father cannot be a ground for compulsory recognition if such
cohabitation could not have produced the conception of the
child. This would be the case, for instance, if the cohabitation
took place outside of the period of conception of the child.
Likewise, if it can be proved by blood tests that the child and
the supposed father belong to different blood groups, the
cohabitation by itself cannot be a ground for recognition. 13
32 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
Petitioner has attempted to discredit the result of the blood grouping
tests in the instant case by impugning the qualifications of the NBI
personnel who performed the tests and the conduct of the tests
themselves. Her allegations, in this regard, appear to be without merit.
The NBI"s forensic chemist who conducted the tests is also a serologist,
and has had extensive practice in this area for several years. The
blood tests were conducted six (6) times using two (2) scientifically
recognized blood grouping systems, the MN Test and the ABO
System,14 under witness and supervision.15
Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have
been a proper subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly
two years after the first blood test, she, represented by her mother,
declined to undergo the same blood test to prove or disprove their
allegations, even as Jao was willing to undergo such a test
again.161avvphi1
Accordingly, the Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals
and holds that the result of the blood grouping tests involved in the
case at bar, are admissible and conclusive on the non-paternity of
respondent Jao vis-a-vis petitioner Janice. No evidence has been
presented showing any defect in the testing methods employed or
failure to provide adequate safeguards for the proper conduct of the
tests. The result of such tests is to be accepted therefore as accurately
reflecting a scientific fact.
In view of the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals, as
heretofore quoted, which are binding on this Court, we do not find it
necessary to further pass upon the issue of recognition raised by
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is hereby denied. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
x ---------------------------------------------------- x
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
vs.
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN
LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February
4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647,
which reversed and set aside the September 12, 1995 2 and January 31,
1996 3Resolutions of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998 Resolution 4 denying
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T.
San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of
Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which
were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita
and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for
Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973. 6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis,
then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of
the United Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California,
U.S.A. 7 He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18
years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18,
1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo’s estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146
thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the
time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street,
New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedent’s
surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his
first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left
real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00
more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated
and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of
Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action.
Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo’s place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed
that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because
she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his
death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her
brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal10 of the petition. On February
28, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 11 denying the two motions to
dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on
March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She submitted documentary
evidence showing that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his
public office in Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought sometime
in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued
by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that
the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved.
Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her
by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family Code and the
doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis,
separately filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying
their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26
of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondent’s bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would
impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first
marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony
E. Santos from hearing the case.
33 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order 17 denying the
motions for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the
decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that
venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification
was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding
Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending
the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan on
November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for
reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their motion for
reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on
which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order 21 granting the
motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided
by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal
capacity of respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar
manifested 23 that he is adopting the arguments and evidence set forth
in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and
June 20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters
of administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was
the duly elected governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not
in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal capacity
to file the petition for letters of administration because her marriage
with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the
decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo’s marriage to Merry
Lee was not valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who
was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the
Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
the vested rights of Felicisimo’s legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set
aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated
February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31,
1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated
February 28 and October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records
of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of
Court, the term "place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate, refers to the personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a
person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted that
although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna,
he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for
letters of administration was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to
marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera. 31 It found that the marriage between Felicisimo and Merry
Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce
issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a
result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to
contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus –
With the well-known rule – express mandate of paragraph 2, Article
26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn,
Pilapil, and the reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O.
No. 227, — there is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view
— sweeping statement — of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article 26, par. 2
of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against
divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the
law grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to
the express mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having
been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino
divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws".
For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner
should not be denominated as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the
surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased. x x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for
review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion
to adopt the said petition which was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the
venue of the subject petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid because at the time of his death, Felicisimo was a
resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant to our rulings
in Nuval v. Guray 37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City, 38"residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a
fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile at any
given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile, the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo was
void and bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence
of the latter’s marriage to Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2,
Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied because it would impair
vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo;
hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of
administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2)
whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for
letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters
of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the
Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the time of
his death." In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid
down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence – as
contradistinguished from domicile – of the decedent for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as
distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules –
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature –
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the
statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
34 | 2 n d P a g e o f S P E C P R O
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual
residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place
and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more
than temporary.41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is
synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are
inapplicable to the instant case because they involve election cases.
Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for
purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to
which when absent, one has the intention of returning. 42 However, for
purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a
person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal
residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was
domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also
maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the
time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of
Absolute Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General
Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the
address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa."
Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in
the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club,
Inc., 47 letter-envelopes 48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased’s
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceased’s calling
cards 49stating that his home/city address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his office/provincial address is in
"Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,
Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration
was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court 50 which has territorial
jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed
on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality
and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were
then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order
No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City.
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from
the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of
matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both
from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature
of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as
well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that
she should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse.
Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and
obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article
109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not
be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and
render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends
of justice are to be served. 54(Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is
not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife.
The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of
one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated that where a
Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies. 58 Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce
in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions
were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad’s legal personality to file the
recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling
petition for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of
has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a
whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may
mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a
validly remarry under the Civil Code, considering that Felicidad’s
necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained
marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the
abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we
cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign
need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code,
divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient
Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the
jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the affirmative.
aforementioned case in relation to Article 26. 61

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage between a

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical
foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently
background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of
dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming
the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse
alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal
partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the Brief Historical Background
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in
the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

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On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code,"
which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with
the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending
Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed
that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia
Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a
marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court
held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law. 63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation
where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With
the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof,
our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its
continuance intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no
possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment
between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while
the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the
alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino
spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in stating that
the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are
concerned. However, in light of this Court’s rulings in the cases
discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated
against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in
seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should
be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as
to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good
motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in
consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must
keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally
valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of
its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound,
because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same,
in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even
as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly
apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal
command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are
apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy
that goes beyond them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the
constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish
continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law
in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential
ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret
the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed
with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree
allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo
to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to
file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the
records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v.
Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and
proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24
and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public
or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the
proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the
Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and
proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee
and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal
personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as
she may be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the
properties that were acquired through their joint efforts during their
cohabitation.
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Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of
administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of the
decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for
letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and
must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and
its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial
court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be

benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct,
and not merely indirect or contingent. 75

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person

who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their
cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If
she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to
remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly
performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as
a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This provision
governs the property relations between parties who live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is
void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through
their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during
the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven. 77

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce

and the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the
Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code
by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living
together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, 79 we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family
Code took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the
property regime under this provision as follows:

The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of

parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties
acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective
contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the
extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which

involved the issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the
parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship,
respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an
affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence
and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. x x x81

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent’s legal capacity to file

the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her
status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of

Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the
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