OF

{CORP. & BUSINESS LAW}

TOPIC- “COPY RIGHT ACT”

SUBMITTED TO-
MISS. UPMA SONIK.

SUBMITTED BY-
NAME – MAHESH KUMAR
CLASS- MBA (193)
ROLL NO. – RS1903 B.55
REG. NO. - 10907445
 INDEX

- INTRODUCTION
- HISTORY OF COPY RIGHT.
- REGISTRATION PROCESS.
- TERMS AND CONDITIONS.
- CASES WHERE A COMPANY WAS SUIT
THE OTHER COMPANY
- FILMS PRODUCTION CASE.
- VEOH WINS CASE.
- HARVARD CASE.
- YAHOO CASE.
- PSYSTAR CASE.
- PSYSTER VS APPLE CASE.
- RIGHT OF AN COMPANY
- THE ROLE OF LAW IN THESE CASES.
- CONCLUSION.

INTRODUCTION TO COPYRIGHT ACT 1957-

 Exclusive legal rights that protect works of authorship,
composition or artistry. A copyright protects the publication, production or sale of the rights to
a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work or computer program or to the use of a
commercial print or label. A copyright is a form of protection provided by U.S. law to anyone
who creates "original works of authorship." Essentially, a copyright protects literary, musical,
dramatic, artistic and other qualifying creative works. The Copyright Act of 1976 further
clarified copyright protection: A copyright owner now has the exclusive right to reproduce the
work; prepare spin-off works based on the copyrighted work; and to sell, perform and/or
display the copyrighted work in public.
One of the nice things about copyrights is that securing such
protection is fairly straightforward. Copyright protection is created the moment your work is
fixed in a "tangible form of expression" (paper copy, CD, disk, videotaped performance, and
the like) for the first time. In other words, once your story is put in writing, your song is
transcribed as sheet music or recorded, or your creative work is given some fixed form, your
copyright is automatically secured. From that moment on (assuming creation occurred after
January 1, 1978), your work has copyright protection for your lifetime, plus 50 years after your
death.It's sometimes confusing as to exactly who is the owner of a work's copyright protection.
When just one author is involved, he or she can rightfully claim copyright. If the work was a
collaborative effort between several authors, each author becomes a co-owner of the copyright.
Co-ownership means each author has the rights to the work--all owners would have to agree to
sell their rights for someone to have exclusive ownership of the work. For this reason, it's a
good idea to have an agreement drawn up beforehand as to who will own the copyright.
The term of copyright in a co-authorship situation is 50 years
after the last surviving author's death. If the work was commissioned or created as part of the
creator's job, the employer is considered to be the author. After all, the author was paid for the
work with wages. In this case, the term of copyright is calculated differently. If copies of the
work are distributed to the public for sale, that first date of sale is called the publication date.
The term of copyright protection is calculated as 75 years from the publication date or 100
years from the creation date; whichever is shorter.

HISTORY OF COPY RIGHT—

Copyright was invented after the advent of the printing press and
subsequent widening of public literacy. As a legal concept, its origins in Britain were from a
reaction to printers' monopolies at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In Britain the King
of England and Scotland was concerned by the unregulated copying of books and used the royal
prerogative to pass the Licensing Act of 1662 which established a register of licensed books
and required a copy to be deposited with the Stationers Company, essentially continuing the
licensing of material for the benefit of printers that had long been in effect. The Statute of Anne
in 1709 was the first real copyright act, and gave the author in the new state of Britain rights for
a fixed period, after which the copyright expired. Internationally, the Berne Convention on 9
September 1886 set out the scope of copyright protection, and is still in force to this day.
Copyright has grown from a legal concept regulating copying rights in the
publishing of books and maps to one with a significant effect on nearly every modern industry,
covering such items as sound recordings, films, photographs, software, and architectural works.
REGISTRATION PROCESS –

- Register of Copyrights. -There shall be kept at the Copyright Office a register

in the prescribed form to be called the Register of Copyrights in which may be entered the
names or titles of works and the names and addresses of authors, publishers and owners of
copyright and such other particulars as may be prescribed.

- Entries in register of Copyrights. –

(1) The author or publisher of, or the owner of or other person interested
in the copyright in, any work may make an application in the prescribed form accompanied by
the prescribed fee to the Registrar of Copyrights for entering particulars of the work in the
Register of Copyrights : 99 [Provided that in respect of an artistic work which is used or is
capable of being used in relation to any goods, the application shall include a statement to that
effect and shall be accompanied by a certificate from the Registrar of Trade Marks referred to
in section 4 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, to the effect that no trade mark
identical with or deceptively similar to such artistic work has been registered under that Act in
the name of, or that no application has been made under that Act for such registration by, any
person other than the applicant.]
(2) On receipt of an application in respect of any work under sub-
section (1), the Registrar of Copyrights may, after holding such inquiry as he may deem fit,
enter the particulars of the work in the
Register of Copyrights.

- Indexes. -There shall be also kept at the Copyright Office such indexes of
the Register of Copyrights as may be prescribed.

- Forms and inspection of register. -The Register of Copyrights and indexes

thereof kept under this Act shall at all reasonable times be open to
inspection, and any person shall be entitled to take
copies of, or make extracts from, such register or indexes on payment of such fee and subject to
such conditions as may be prescribed.

- Register of Copyrights to be prima facie evidence of particulars entered

therein. – The Register of Copyrights shall be prima facie evidence of the
particulars entered therein and documents
purporting to be copies of any entries therein, or extracts there from certified by the Registrar of
Copyrights and sealed with the seal of the Copyright Office shall be admissible in evidence in
all courts without further proof or production of the original.

- Correction of entries in the Register of Copyrights. -The Registrar of

Copyrights may, in the prescribed cases and subject to the prescribed
conditions, amend or alter the Register of Copyrights by-
(a) correcting any error in any name, address or particulars.
(b) correcting any other error which may have arisen therein by accidental slip or omission.
 - Rectification of Register by Copyright Board. -The Copyright Board, on
application of the Registrar of Copyrights or of any person aggrieved, shall
order the rectification of the Register of Copyrights by -
(a) the making of any entry wrongly omitted to be made in the register, or
(b) (b) the expunging of any entry wrongly made in, or remaining on, the register, or
(c) (c) The correction of any error or defect in the register.
(d) [50A. Entries in the Register of Copyrights,etc, to be published. 100 Every entry
made in the
(e) Register of Copyrights or the particulars of any work entered under section 45, the
correction of every
(f) entry made in such register under section 49, and every rectification ordered under
section 50, shall
(g) be published by the Registrar of Copyrights in the Official Gazette or in such other
manner as he may.

TERMS AND CONDITIONS-

COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND DISCLAIMER

Copyright Notice

This website contains information, data, documents, pages and images ('the material') prepared
by the NSW Department of Education and Training. The material is subject to copyright under
the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth), and it is owned by the State of New South Wales through the
Department of Education and Training. The Department of Education and Training encourages
the availability, dissemination and exchange of public information. You may copy, distribute,
display, download and otherwise freely deal with the material for any purpose, on the condition
that you include the copyright notice ' State of New South Wales through the Department of
Education and Training' on all uses.

You must, however, obtain permission from the Department if you wish to:

 charge others for access to the work (other than at cost)

 include all or part of the work in advertising or a product for sale, or
 Modify the work.

Trademark notice and NSW Department of Education and Training's name

This site includes registered trademarks and trademarks that are the
subject of pending applications or which are otherwise protected by law including, but not
limited to the word NSW Department of Education and Training and the NSW Department of
Education and Training logo. Unless otherwise indicated, they are owned by NSW Department
of Education and Training in Australia and may be the subject of rights in other countries. You
may not use the NSW Department of Education and Training's trademarks or the name NSW
Department of Education and Training except (1) by saving, or printing out, a copy of NSW
Department of Education and Training's website as permitted by the Copyright notice; (2) as
permitted by a current Links Agreement; or (3) otherwise with NSW Department of Education
and Training's prior written consent.

Third party sites

This website contains links to third party sites. The NSW Department of Education and
Training is not responsible for the condition or the content of those sites as they are not under
the NSW Department of Education and Training's control. The link(s) are provided solely for
your convenience and do not indicate, expressly or impliedly, any endorsement of the site(s) or
the products or services provided there. You access those sites and use their products and
services solely at your own risk.

Disclaimer

In compiling the information contained on, and accessed through, this website ('Information')
the NSW Department of Education and Training has used its best endeavours to ensure that the
Information is correct and current at the time of publication but takes no responsibility for any
error, omission or defect therein. To the extent permitted by law, the NSW Department of
Education and Training and its employees, agents and consultants exclude all liability for any
loss or damage (including indirect, special or consequential loss or damage) arising from the
use of, or reliance on, the Information whether or not caused by any negligent act or omission.
If any law prohibits the exclusion of such liability, the NSW Department of Education and
Training limits its liability to the extent permitted by law, to the re-supply of the Information.

Use of information

Any information, ideas, concepts, know-how or techniques provided by, or obtained from, you
or your use of the NSW Department of Education and Training's website shall be deemed to be
non-confidential and the NSW Department of Education and Training shall be free to
reproduce, use, disclose and distribute the information to others without limitation.

Applicable law
This website (excluding any linked third party sites) is controlled by the NSW Department of
Education and Training through the Department of Education and Training from its offices at
35 Bridge Street, Sydney, NSW, 2000. By accessing this site, you accept that any disputes
about this website or its contents are to be determined by the courts having jurisdiction in New
South Wales in accordance with the laws in force in New South Wales (except any principle of
conflict of laws inconsistent with this requirement). This website may be accessed throughout
Australia and overseas. The NSW Department of Education and Training makes no
representation that the content of this website complies with the laws (including intellectual
property laws) of any country outside Australia. If you access this site from outside Australia,
you do so on your own responsibility and are responsible for ensuring compliance with all laws
in the place where you are located

SIX CASES IN WHICH A COMPANY WAS SIUTES-

(1) . February 02, 2009

< Film Production Company Avoids Copyright Infringement Suit on Basis of Statute of
Limitations >

Intellectual Property: State and Federal law provides various remedies for parties who have
been wronged by another. However, depending upon the nature of that claim, the injured party
only has a limited time period in which to assert his claim. These deadlines, set by the law, are
commonly referred to as “statute of limitations.” The statute of limitations for a copyright
infringement claim is generally three years. A potential plaintiff’s claim often revolves around
when the claim originally accrued that determines whether or not his lawsuit was timely filed.
This was addressed in a recent Southern District of New York case, Ortiz v. Guitian Brothers,
Inc., et al., 2008 WL 4449314. The Ortiz case was derived from a film production company
engaging an artist, Mr. Ortiz, to create the musical score for the motion picture. When Mr. Ortiz
later claimed that the film production company infringed his copyright in incorporating that
score into the movie and not paying him royalties, he sued for copyright infringement.

In copyright cases, the statute of limitations generally begins to run

when the plaintiff knows or should have reason to know of a potential infringement. Courts
make a distinction in evaluating this time period, though, when copyright ownership is at issue.
In other words, if the party alleged to have infringed upon the work is claiming that it owns the
work; such a claim changes the evaluation of the statute of limitations. In Ortiz, the defendant-
film production company defended the lawsuit by arguing that (a) they did not engage in
copyright infringement and (b) the claim was also time-barred by the statute of limitations. The
film production company included copyright notices on the DVD which arguably asserted a
claim in the copyright to the sound recording. In addition, the defendant-film production
company also filed for and received a US Copyright registration for the film. In this regard, the
production company claimed that the copyright in and to the musical score for the film was
incorporated within this filing. Without addressing this question, the Court determined that such
a copyright notice and filing was clear evidence of the film production company’s assertion of a
claim of ownership over the score. In fact, the Court noted that since Mr. Ortiz authored the
work “with the knowledge that it was going to be used in the Motion picture, he should
reasonably have anticipated that [the film production company] would seek to copyright the
Motion Picture prior to or in conjunction with marketing and distributing it and, in the exercise
of reasonable diligence, discovered [the film production company’s copyright] registration.” In
other words, the Court determined that (a) the plaintiff needed to exercise due diligence in
learning of a copyright registration that would have asserted an ownership claim and (b) by
making such a filing, the film production company did so assert its ownership so as to start the
running of the statute of limitations. “As ‘[c]opyright ownership claims accure swhen (sic) a
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury upon which the claim is premised, . . . [a]n
express assertion of sole authorship or ownership will start the copyright statute of limitations
running.” (citations omitted).

Accordingly, Mr. Ortiz’s claim was dismissed because the Court

determined that the claim accrued upon the film production company’s assertion of ownership,
which was more than three years prior to Mr. Ortiz’s institution of the lawsuit. This case
underscores the importance of evaluating potential infringement claims in a timely manner, and
undertaking enforcement action as quickly as possible. Moreover, the case points out another
benefit to making an appropriate copyright filing: based on the Ortiz decision, film production
companies should be sure to promptly file copyright registrations as they can effectively be
deemed to put potential plaintiffs on notice of the company’s assertion of ownership and
therefore start the statute of limitations clock. In other words, the sooner the film production
company files the registration, the sooner it can argue that the statute of limitations started,
therefore helping to preclude a future claim.

******************

******************

(2) < Veoh wins copyright suit, sets precedent>

In a decision that should bode well for larger video sharing sites that are in legal trouble such as
YouTube, a federal judge has absolved Veoh of any responsibility in the unauthorized posting
of copyrighted video clips. U.S. Magistrate Judge Howard Lloyd threw out the copyright
infringement lawsuit brought forward by Io Group, the adult video maker. Veoh is a site that
streams ad-supported shows but the porn company sued the site in 2006 after they claimed they
found 10 clips of their films posted without authorization. The Judge ruled that Veoh had in fact
complied with federal laws by "promptly" taking down the videos after receiving complaints
from Io. In an almost identical suit, Viacom is suing YouTube for $1 billion USD alleging that
the site is a breeding ground for unauthorized clips of hit shows such as "The Daily Show with
Jon Stewart" and "SpongeBob SquarePants". There also 12 or so smaller sites facing similar
lawsuits.
"This ruling is a big boost for YouTube," added Fred von Lohmann, an attorney with the EFF.

"Once content has been identified as infringing, Veoh's digital fingerprint technology also
prevents the same infringing content from ever being uploaded again," wrote Judge Lloyd in
his decision. "All of this indicates that Veoh has taken steps to reduce, not foster, the incidence
of copyright infringement on its Web site."

********************

(3) < Harvard Business School Publishing Files Suit, Seeks Injunction Against
Business Book>
Publication: Business Wire

Date: Wednesday, December 12 2001

Business Editors
BOSTON--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Dec. 12, 2001
Harvard Business School Publishing (HBSP) has filed suit in the United States District Court of
Boston, Massachusetts against Business Book Review (BBR) of Decatur, Georgia for copyright
infringement. Business Book Review currently publishes and sells 8-page summaries of 26
Harvard Business School Press (HBS Press) titles without HBSP's express permission. HBSP
asserts that each BBR summary consists almost entirely of language taken directly from the
original HBS Press book. The suit names BBR, its President Jagdir Sheth, publisher John
Fayed, and "book reviewer" Lydia Morris as defendants. HBSP seeks an injunction prohibiting
the further publication and sale of unauthorized summaries of HBS Press books, an award of
monetary damages as authorized by the Copyright Act, and attorneys' fees. "Only the copyright
owner has the right to sell a shortened version of its own book," said Allan A. Ryan, Director of
Intellectual Property at HBSP. "Despite our demand that it stop, BBR is publishing summaries
of our titles under the guise of book reviews - and is doing so without our permission Today we
are asking the Federal Court to enjoin BBR, so that they will stop infringing our copyright."
Harvard Business School Publishing has identified 26 Harvard
Business School Press books whose copyright BBR has infringed through the publication and
sale of summaries. In court papers, HBSP presents a side-by-side comparison of original text
from the best-selling book Serious Play by Michael Schrage, and BBR's summary. The
comparison shows conclusively that BBR directly reproduces significant portions of the text
under the guise of a "book review".
"The BBR summaries contain no significant analysis or
criticism, and BBR adds virtually nothing of its own to the condensations it publishes," Ryan
emphasized. "These are not bona fide reviews of our books," he said, "and they are not
summaries of our books' content in a paragraph to let people know what we're publishing. This
company takes eight pages of our authors' own words, packages it for sale with our authors'
names, and sells it alongside a picture of the book itself. That's not only copyright infringement,
it's a deceptive practice that misleads consumers into thinking that HBSP and our authors have
approved or endorsed the summary, which we have not." The BBR summaries are sold via
BBR's website and also at Amazon.com. The suit does not name Amazon.com as a defendant.
About Harvard Business School Publishing:
Headquartered in Boston, Massachusetts, Harvard Business School Publishing is a wholly-
owned, not for profit subsidiary of Harvard University. HBSP publishes for the general,
professional, and academic markets. Its offerings include the widely-respected Harvard
Business Review, books from Harvard Business School Press, the newsletters Harvard
Management Update, Harvard Management Communication Letter, and The Balanced
Scorecard Report, a line of multimedia products for management development, videos,
simulations, course books and cases.

********************
*******************

(4) < Yahoo Sued by Indian Music Company for Copyright Infringement>

By John Ribeiro, IDG News Service

The Delhi High Court in India passed an interim injunction on Friday that prohibits Yahoo
Video from streaming copyright content from Indian music company, Super Cassettes
Industries, according to the lawyer representing the Indian company in this case. The court,
after finding a prima-facie case, also issued a notice to Yahoo and its Indian subsidiary.

The music company, which uses the brand T-Series, is seeking a

permanent injunction and damages for the alleged dissemination and display of its copyrighted
content on Yahoo Video. Yahoo will not comment on the case as the matter is before a court, a
company spokeswoman said. Super Cassettes Industries last year sued YouTube, owned by
Google, for similar reasons. It obtained an interim restraining order on YouTube in that case
too, though the case has not been finally disposed. A "cease and desist" notice regarding the
streaming of the copyright content was served on Yahoo and its Indian subsidiary in late
February, Super Cassettes Industries' lawyer Rahul Ajatshatru said Monday. Yahoo did not
remove the content identified in the notice, and instead asked the Indian company to follow
procedures laid down by Yahoo for reporting misuse of copyright content, Ajatshatru said.
Yahoo ignored a second notice sent by the Indian company in March.

Super Cassettes Industries has filed the case against Yahoo under Indian copyright laws.

The disputes pitting Yahoo and Google against Super Cassettes Industries points out to the
differences between Indian laws and the copyright infringement and takedown provisions of the
U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). While Internet companies like Yahoo offer to
remove copyright content that has been put up on their web sites without permission, after
sufficient proof is provided of the ownership of the copyright and its misuse, Indian content
providers demand that Internet companies take responsibility for identifying misused copyright
material and taking it down from their sites. Super Cassettes publishes large numbers of videos
and music cassettes, and it is not possible for the company to spend time and resources to
monitor copyright infringements on sharing sites like those of Google and Yahoo, Ajatshatru
said.

With its interim order, the Delhi High Court also appears to have put on Yahoo the onus for
identifying and removing misused copyright material from Super Cassettes Industries on Yahoo
Video.

**************

*************

(5) < Psystar Is Swatted Down In Court In Suit Against Apple>

By Ben Liebowitz on November 21st, 2009

Those in the market for a so-called “Hackintosh,” a non-Apple computer which runs Apple’s
Mac OS X, will soon be out of luck, as commercial Mac clone dealer, Psystar, was recently
dealt a major setback in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. 
On November 13th, the court granted Apple Inc.’s summary judgment motion on its copyright
and DMCA claims against Psystar, all but foreclosing the possibility of buying a non-Apple-
made computer to run the “World’s Most Advanced Operating System.”  The summary
judgment order marked the beginning of the end of a lengthy litigation between the Cupertino
powerhouse and Psystar. In this post we unpack the competing arguments that were before the
court.

Background

Apple was not always hostile to clones. In fact, from 1995 to 1997, Apple  licensed several
companies, such as Power Computing, to build and sell Mac clones. But this era came to a
close when Steve Jobs returned to the company in 1997, and Apple has not granted a license to
produce clones since. In April 2008, Florida-based Psystar, Inc. began selling computers on
which it had installed modified copies of OS X. Apple, not surprisingly, quickly filed suit
alleging a veritable laundry list of state and federal claims. Apple recently moved for summary
judgment on its copyright infringement, DMCA violation, and contributory infringement
claims.  The court granted Apple summary judgment on all three claims.

Copyright Infringement

Apple alleged that Psystar had infringed upon its two registered copyrights in Mac OS X by
violating its reproduction right, distribution right, and right to create derivative works.

Apple’s reproduction right

Under 17 U.S.C. § 117(a), an owner of a copy of a computer program may copy or modify that
program for limited purposes. Though it is doubtful that Psystar’s use was the sort covered by
this exception, the court did not need to consider this because it found that Psystar waived the
defense by neglecting to plead it in their answer. The court also denied Psystar the defense of
“fair use” under 17 U.S.C. § 107 because Psystar failed to address the four factors used to
determine fair use. (These factors are: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the
copyrighted work,  the amount and substantiality of the portion taken, and the effect of the use
upon the potential market.)

Apple’s distribution right

The first sale doctrine, codified under 17 U.S.C. § 109, is the right of the purchaser of a copy of
a copyrighted work to then sell that particular copy of the work without the authorization of the
copyright owner. Though Apple was not willing to concede that Psystar, or anyone for that
matter, could own a copy of Mac OS X rather than a license to use it, the court assumed for the
sake of argument that Psystar did own the initial copy they purchased. Even under this
assumption, Psystar’s use was a violation of Apple’s distribution right because it made
unauthorized copies for distribution.

Apple’s right to create derivative works

Defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101, a derivative work is work based upon a preexisting work which
itself represents an original work of authorship. The court found that Psystar violated Apple’s
exclusive right to produce derivative works when it made modifications to Mac OS X to get it
to run on non-Apple hardware.

Contributory Infringement

In addition to Psystar’s direct copyright infringement, the court found that Psystar committed
“contributory infringement.” Contributory infringement occurs when an individual or entity
induces or encourages others to infringe a copyright. The court found that Psystar was
accomplishing this by selling machines to the public with its unauthorized copies of Mac OS X
installed.

Violation of the DMCA

Section 1201(a)(1)(A) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act makes it a violation of the act
to “circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected
under the title.” The court found that Psystar violated this section of the statute when it used
decryption software to circumvent the security measures Apple built into Mac OS X to prevent
it from running on non-Apple computers. Furthermore, Psystar also violated § 1201(a)(2),
which prohibits trafficking in technology designed to circumvent protections on a work covered
by the act, by marketing the computers featuring its hacked version of OS X. If this weren’t
enough bad news for Psystar, the court also found that every time a computer with their
circumvention installed was turned on they committed yet another violation of the DMCA
(§1201(b)) by creating another copy of their modified OS X in the computer’s memory.
Copyright Misuse – Psystar Grabs At A Straw

In its cross-motion for summary judgment Psystar claimed that Apple was guilty of copyright
misuse. Copyright misuse can be understood as a legal cousin of antitrust violation (a theory
already proposed by Psystar and rejected by the court). Copyright misuse occurs when a
copyright is used in a way that violates the public policy embodied in copyright law. This is a
rather nebulous concept, which the court acknowledged, but the line demarcating misuse in the
case law seems to be that a licensing agreement for use of a copyrighted work cannot go so far
as to attempt to control competition outside the copyright. The court illustrated such an
overreaching licensing agreement by citing the  Fourth Circuit case of Lasercomb America v.
Reynold, Inc., 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990). In Lasercomb America, Lasercomb sold a software
program on the condition that buyers agree to no compete language which would prohibit them
from developing their own software in that area. Apple’s refusal to allow OS X to be installed
on non-Apple machines is distinguishable because it seeks only to control the use of their own
software and is therefore not a violation.

Moving Forward

Apple hasn’t yet filed a motion on its non-copyright claims—breach of contract, induced
breach of contract, trademark infringement, trademark dilution, trade dress infringement, state
unfair competition, and common law unfair competition—which remain for trial.  Additionally,
Apple hasn’t asked for a permanent injunction yet, but it seems inevitable at this point.  As of
November 21, 2009, “Hackintosh” computers can still be purchased on Psystar’s website.

***************

***************

(6) Judge: Psystar can claim Apple 'copyright misuse'

A federal judge is letting Mac clone maker Psystar amend its
legal defence against Apple. Psystar was delivered a blow in November, when Judge William
Alsup of the U.S. District Court in Northern California dismissed Psystar's antitrust claims
against the Cupertino, Calif.-based Mac maker. The antitrust suit was a response to a copyright
and trademark infringement suit Apple filed in July against Psystar, whose Open Computers are
designed to run the Mac OS X operating system. In its amended complaint, Psystar accuses
Apple of copyright misuse, as well as unfair competition violations based on its alleged
copyright misuse.

Judge Alsup, in citing a previous case-- Practice Management

Information Corp v. American Medical Association--notes in his order: Copyright misuse
does not invalidate a copyright, but precludes its enforcement during the period of misuse."
Practice Management, 121 F.3d at 520 n.9. Moreover, "a defendant in a copyright infringement
suit need not prove an antitrust violation to prevail on a copyright misuse defense." Id. at
521While Judge Alsup found in Psystar's favour by allowing the company to continue its
counterclaim with a misuse-of-copyright argument, he denied its motion to amend its claim that
Apple's copyright-oriented conduct threatens or harms competition. Psystar argues that the
alleged misuse is, "at the least, unfair in that Apple has attempted (and continues to attempt) to
extend the reach of its copyrights by tying them to computer hardware not otherwise protected
by the Copyright Act." (Reply at 12). It fails to explain; however, how this conduct constitutes
harm to competition or a violation of the spirit of the antitrust laws. In the context of single-
firm conduct, tying requires monopolization. Psystar has identified none--other than the limited
monopolies inherent in the copyrights themselves.

Rights of an company in case of suit by another company for misuse of copyright act-
In the guise of a copyright infringement suit, this case presents
an accounting problem between two partners. Ries and his codefendants1 appeal from a
judgment awarding Oddo $10,000 statutory damages for infringement, $20,000 attorneys' fees,
general damages of $1,000, and costs of suit. Oddo and Ries entered into a partnership in
March 1978 to create and publish a book describing how to restore Ford F-100 pickup trucks.
According to the partnership agreement, Ries was to provide capital and supervise the business
end of the venture; Oddo was to write and edit the book. By January 1980, Oddo had delivered
to Ries a manuscript that contained much but not all of the material the partners planned to
include in the book. This manuscript consisted partly of a reworking of previously published
magazine articles that Oddo had written and partly of new material, also written by Oddo, that
had never before been published.At about the same time, Ries became dissatisfied with the
progress Oddo had made on the manuscript. Ries hired another writer to complete Oddo's
manuscript, and then published the finished product. The book that Ries eventually published
contained substantial quantities of Oddo’s manuscript but also contained material added by the
new writer.

Three copyrighted works are at issue in this case. The first,

actually a set of copyrighted works, consists of the magazine articles that Oddo reworked into
the manuscript that he delivered to Ries. The second work is Oddo 's manuscript, and the third
is the book that Ries published. We will refer to these works as the articles, the manuscript, and
the book. The district court did not specify which copyright Ries had infringed; it simply held
"[t]hat the copyright of Plaintiff Oddo was infringed by Defendant Ries when he caused the
Guide [i.e., the Book] to be published ...." The district court erred if it meant that Ries infringed
the copyright in the manuscript or the book. The district court concluded that the Oddo/Ries
partnership owns the copyrights in the book and the manuscript. As a partner, Ries is a co-
owner of the partnership's assets, including the copyrights. but the duty to account does not
derive from the copyright law's proscription of infringement. Rather, it comes from "equitable
doctrines relating to unjust enrichment and general principles of law governing the rights of co-
owners.

We have not found any cases dealing with the rights of partners in
copyrights held by their partnership, but we see no reason why partners should be excluded
from the general rules governing copyright co-ownership.3 Many of the copyright co-ownership
cases e.g., Richmond v. Weiner, Piantadosi v. Loew's, might be distinguished from ours on the
grounds that co-ownership in those cases arose from joint authorship of the work subject to
copyright, and Oddo and Ries are not joint authors. However, nothing in those cases suggests
that the rules they set out are restricted to cases of joint authorship. Moreover, the general rule
of copyright co-ownership has been applied to co-owners who are not joint authors.

Accordingly, Ries could not infringe the partnership's copyrights in

the manuscript or the book, but he can be required to account to Oddo for any profits he has
made from use of those copyrights. Ries may also be liable to Oddo under California
partnership law for misuse of the partnership copyrights. See Cal.Corp.Code Sec. 15025(2)(a)
(Deering 1979) (partner may not possess partnership property for non-partnership purposes
without consent of other partners). A violation of state partnership law, however, would not
transform Ries' use of the copyrights into infringement under federal law. See Meredith v.
Smith, 145 F.2d at 620 (co-owner's violation of agreement not to license copyright unilaterally
is not a federal question).

In finding infringement, the district court may have meant that Ries
infringed Oddo's copyrights in his magazine articles. If so, we must first consider Ries'
contention that the publisher of the magazines, not Oddo, owns the copyrights to the articles.

The articles were contributions to collective works. Copyright to such

a contribution vests initially in the author of the contribution; in this case, Oddo. The owner of
the copyright in the collective work (here, the magazine publisher) is presumed to have
acquired only the privilege of publishing the contribution in that particular collective work
unless he has received greater rights by an "express transfer." 17 U.S.C. Sec. 201(c) (1982). 4
Ries has not pointed to any evidence of such an "express transfer." Nor can Ries claim that the
magazine publisher acquired ownership of the copyrights in the articles as "works made for
hire" pursuant to Sec. 201(b), because a contribution to a collective work will be considered a
work made for hire only if the parties expressly so agree in a written instrument, Sec. 101, and
Ries has not pointed to any such instrument. Oddo owns the copyrights to the articles.
 We now turn to infringement of the copyrights in the articles. The
manuscript and the book are both derivative works based on the articles. See Sec. 101.5 As
derivative works they necessarily infringe the copyrights in the articles unless Oddo granted
permission to use the articles. 1 M. Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, Sec. 3.01 (1983).

The district court made no findings on whether Oddo gave Ries or the
partnership permission to use his articles in the manuscript or the book. We conclude that
Oddo, by preparing a manuscript based on his preexisting articles as part of his partnership
duties, impliedly gave the partnership a license to use the articles insofar as they were
incorporated in the manuscript, for without such a license, Oddo's contribution to the
partnership venture would have been of minimal value. However, the implied license to use the
articles in the manuscript does not give Ries or the partnership the right to use the articles in
any work other than the manuscript itself. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538
F.2d 14, 19-21 (2d Cir.1976) (license to use underlying work in a particular derivative work
does not permit licensee to use underlying work in any other derivative work). Because the
book is a work distinct from the manuscript, Ries exceeded the scope of the partnership's
license when he used the articles in the book. Ries has not shown that he was otherwise
licensed to use the articles in the book,6 so his publication of the book infringed Oddo's
copyright in the articles.

The parties have spent considerable energy arguing whether statutory

damages and attorneys' fees, Sacs. 504(c) and 505 may be awarded in this case. Because Ries
cannot be held liable for infringement of the copyrights in the manuscript and book that he co-
owns with Oddo, his use of those copyrights cannot form the basis for any sort of award under
the copyright act. Nor can Oddo recover statutory damages and attorneys' fees for infringement
of the copyrights in the articles. Section 412 bars an award of statutory damages or attorneys'
fees for "any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of the work and
before the effective date of its registration, unless such registration is made within three months
after the first publication of the work." Oddo has not shown that the copyrights in the articles
have ever been registered, much less within three months of their publication. Section Sec. 412
therefore precludes Oddo from collecting statutory damages, or attorneys' fees under Sec. 505.
Oddo may, however, recover the actual damages he suffered from infringement of the
copyrights in the articles. Sec. 504 (b).
 The federal copyright law pre-empts any other "legal or equitable
rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright."
Sec. 301(a). Ries argues that Oddo's state law causes of action are pre-empted, requiring
reversal of the district court's general damages award of $1,000. We disagree.

Section 301(a) pre-empts a state-created right if that right "may be

abridged by an act which, in and of itself, would infringe one of the exclusive rights [listed in
Sec. 106]." Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir.1983),
cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 104 Sect. 2655, 81 L.Ed.2d 362 (1984). But if violation of the state
right is "predicated upon an act incorporating elements beyond mere reproduction or the like,"
id., there is no pre-emption.

At least some of Oddo's state law claims pass the pre-emption test
stated above, and so the general damages award may stand. For example, Oddo alleged
conversion of the papers comprising his manuscript. Conversion of tangible property involves
actions different from those proscribed by the copyright laws, and thus is not pre-empted.
Harper & Row, 72 3 F.2d at 201. Oddo also claimed that Ries breached the fiduciary duty that
Ries owed Oddo as a partner. Because a partner's duty to his co-partner is quite different from
the interests protected by copyright, this cause of action is also not pre-empted.

The judgment of the district is vacated insofar as it awards Oddo

statutory damages and attorneys' fees. The cause is remanded for an award of the actual
damages that Oddo suffered from infringement of his copyrights in the articles. On remand the
district court may also consider whether, in its discretion, it should exercise jurisdiction pendent
to the infringement claim to compel Ries to account to Oddo for any profits earned from use of
the co-owned copyrights.

WHAT A COMPANY DO IN CASE OF SUITED

The law firm that represented accused file-swapper Jamie Thomas,

defended unauthorized Mac clone maker Psystar, and promised to file a class action lawsuit
against the RIAA has now sued document sharing site Scribe for "egregious" copyright
infringement. The law firm of Camera & Sibley has decided to take on document-sharing
website Scribe in a big way, seeking class action status against the site in a lawsuit filed Friday
in a Texas federal court. The charge: like YouTube, Veoh, and other user-generated content
sites, Scribe makes it just too easy to upload copyrighted content without permission, and the
company should be held liable... and pay up. What about all those cases (including the recent
Veoh ruling) which broadly construe the DMCA's "safe harbour" provisions to protect these
kinds of websites so long as they promptly take down content when notified? Hey, those cases
are all out in California, baby! It's time for Texas justice.

An egregious infringer?
What's odd about the case isn't that it was brought; given what has happened to most other user-
generated content sites, such a lawsuit was probably inevitable. No, what's odd is that the case
was brought by Camera & Sibley, the Houston law firm housed in a "custom-built four-story
Tuscan building beside Rice University featuring a fourth-floor deck with 360-degree views of
Houston and a built-in grill and wine cellar." Remember, these are the lawyers who are:

 Defending Apple nemesis Psystar, the company that sells its own computer hardware
preloaded with Mac OS X.
 Defending Jimmie Thomas, the target of the RIAA's first anti-P2P case that went all the
way to trial. Currently, the team is arguing that the $1.92 million in damages from
Thomas' retrial are "excessive, shocking, and monstrous."
 Still (apparently) planning to file a class action lawsuit against the RIAA in order to "get
the $100 million that they stole" from people as part of the group's long-running
litigation and settlement campaign against file-swappers.

This time out, though, they represent one Elaine Scott, a Houston author who was horrified to
find her 1985 book Stocks and bonds: profits and losses available for download on Scribed;
someone had apparently taken the time to scan the entire thing and upload it to the site. Scott
noticed that the book had been downloaded more than 100 times and grew incensed that her
copyright was being violated. So she notified Scribed, which takes works down when it
receives a DMCA takedown notice (as do all US-based user-generated content sites that hope to
stay in business). But the fact that Scribed would take down the book was beside the point; it
shouldn't have been there in the first place. Echoing a view that is common among rights
holders, Scott and her lawyers argue that it simply can't be the case that the onus for protecting
copyrighted works falls completely upon the rights holder. That is, sites like YouTube or
Scribed shouldn't be able to host copyrighted works, profiting from them indefinitely until a
copyright holder takes notice and asks them to stop. Such a system puts a terrific burden on
rights holders if they want to keep their works off of such sites, especially if someone else can
simply upload another copy.

What low can take action against misuse of copyright-

THE Finance Minister, Mr. P. Chidambaram, on Friday put domestic
entities on the watch-list for scrutiny of possible misuse of Double Taxation Avoidance
Agreements (DTAA). ``DTAA treaties are well-established instruments. If a case of misuse
arises, then it must be stopped. There is no reason to apprehend that the DTAAs would go. The
misuse is not by a foreign investor, but by some Indians,'' Mr. Chidambaram said at a press
conference called to explain the economic agenda of the United Progressive Alliance's (UPA)
Common Minimum Programmed (CMP). Hard-selling the CMP, the Finance Minister said that
he would be visiting Mumbai to remove apprehension from the minds of FIIs and Indian
industry.
 ``Early next week, I will visit Mumbai to meet SEBI, FIIs and
representatives of industry. I will carry the commitments (on capital market) made under CMP
to them and answer any lingering doubts,'' he said. On the imposition of cases on central taxes
to fund education, Mr. Chidambaram said that he did not see it as a ``bitter pill'' and maintained
that the doctrine of proportionality would be applied. ``The doctrine of proportionality will be
applied. The burden of cases will fall on those who can bear the burden,'' the Finance Minister
said.

On the proposal to review the Electricity Act, 2003, Mr. Chidambaram said that unbundling of
State Electricity Boards (SEBs) would be put on hold till the review takes place. He said that
more private players would be allowed into power generation and distribution. ``Pending the
review, we are postponing the unbundling of SEBs. In course of time, unbundling would take
place. While we review the Act and keep unbundling in abeyance, new private players would
come in power distribution. I don't think unbundling is a precondition for more private players
to come into power generation and distribution,'' Mr. Chidambaram said. The Finance Minister
did not give any indication on whether the mention of devising of ``special schemes to unearth
black money'' mentioned in the CMP implies that there would be a new tax amnesty scheme
like the Voluntary Disclosure of Income Scheme (VDIS). ``The word amnesty is your
interpolation. The CMP merely talks about special schemes,'' Mr. Chidambaram said. He said
that the UPA Government would try to ensure an interest rate structure that would take care of
``both savers and investors.'' He also said that attempts would be made to keep inflation at low
levels. ``That (low inflation) is the premise of every development strategy. Every effort would
be made to keep inflation under control,'' he said.

Mr. Chidambaram said that a good monsoon might result in the

indicative growth rate of 7-8 per cent being exceeded. ``If we are lucky with the monsoon, we
will get more than 8 per cent,'' he said. On foreign direct investment (FDI), he said that the
country could easily absorb 2-3 times the present level of FDI, which would mean annual
inflows of $10-15 billion.

CONCLUSION-

In this case after the study on the all matter of different cases we came to
know that those rights which are provided to any company in the copy right act, another
company cannot use that right. If that company used that right without the permission of the
real owner than, the real owner can file the case against that. Hare in these cases the all
process will done under the instruction of the law. Here the exploit party has the right to
attain the damages and the concession also. So, we can say that if any company want to use
the copy right , firstly that should be cover all the conditions which are made by the law of
that govt.