Selected Chapter 6 RA Techniques

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Covered in Chapter 6 Chapter 8 and Chapter 15

What if What-If/Check HAZOP 1 FMEA FTA ETA
List PHA HAZOP 2

Qualitative
Semi-Qantitative elemtns may be included Quantitative

Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) is

a preliminary qualitative technique that
may require semi-quantitative or
quantitative analysis

Only What-If, What-If/Checklist PHA and HAZOP are included in this file
HAZOP Hazards and Operability Analysis
HAZOP was developed by Lawley (1974) of ICI. Based on early publication by Elliott & Owen (1968).

HAZOP is a more involved qualitative method used to identify both hazards and operability problems using
‘guide words’ to prompt team members in identifying deviations that can lead to the failures. Similar to a
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA), HAZOP identifies failure modes of a process, their causes and
resulting consequences. However, rather than starting with failures, HAZOP uses guide words to identify
deviations from intended operations, and then traces back to the possible causes and failure modes. The basis
for a HAZOP is a critical examination of information found in a process flow sheet, a plant layout, equipment
specification or a Piping and Instrument Drawing (P&ID).
P&ID Reference
HAZOP Principles include: See tabs: Ex HAZOP 1 CL and Example
1 Guide Word Ex HAZOP 2
2 Element
3 Deviation
4 Causes
5 Consequences
5 Safeguards/Control Measures
6 Recommendations / Actions
 Common HAZOP Analysis Process Parameters
Addition Pressure Frequency Flow
Composition Temperature Viscosity Mixing
Level Time Voltage Separation
pH Speed Toxicity Reaction
 HAZOP requirements

Experienced
Defined facilitator Observation
design and
intent Interview
HAZOP
Review By Documentation Follow-up
Team

Available
Multidisci Information
plinary P&Ids,
team Team HAZOP Layout
Experience
Worksheet

Safeguards/ Recommend
Deviation Causes Consequences Controls ation/Action

Risk Factor
(Optional)
HAZOP Worksheet contents may vary.
Figure 6.7 HAZOP Study Process Steps
d Arrows. Scroll down
" of the page

ects Analysis (FMEA) is

alitative technique that
emi-quantitative or
tive analysis

s file
wen (1968).

ty problems using
es. Similar to a
heir causes and
words to identify
lure modes. The basis
t layout, equipment
 Structured What-If Technique Analysis
Facility/Operation/Process: Rail Tank Car Cleaning - Vapor Combustion System
Date: June 12-17, 2012 Team: Bruce Lyon, Facilitator; Deane H., Fire Protection Specialist; Tom G., Engineering; Jay P., Safet
Health; Charles T., Environmental; Don B., Maintenance; Kevin S., Production/Tank Car Cleaning
A. Pre-Startup & Flare Purging
ID # What-If… Causes Consequences Controls
A.1. Insufficient purging of flare Inadequate amount Fire or explosion Operator training in
system of purge gas used (at purging procedure
least ten system
volumes) to drop O2
level below 8%
A.2 Steam is used to purge the flare Human error - steam Fire or explosion - Operator training in
system used to purge steam condenses in purging procedure
system piping without
displacing air.

A.3 Igniting pilots before air is Human error or Fire or explosion Operator training in
removed from system omission - purging procedure
Inadequate purge;
lack of purge
 Main
Back to Ch.6 Main Page
Tom G., Engineering; Jay P., Safety &
Production/Tank Car Cleaning

Recommendations
A.1.1 Automatic timing
system for purge; (Options:
Gauge to show adequate
volume of purge gas used;
Oxygen testing of flare system
after
A.2.1 purge to interlock
Physical verify) to
prevent steam fromA.1.2being
Purge
point
used inaspurge.
close to relief valves
as possible.
A.2.2 Warning signage
instructions
A.3.1 Procedure to verify
purging is complete before
ignition.

What-If…
Emergency Shutdown Valve 23
(ESD - 23) fails to close when
needed? (This can occur due to
extremely cold weather,
reliability due to inspection/
testing/maintenance or design
problems)
Example Worksheet Excerpt from What If/Checklist PHA Methodology
C = Consequence Class, L = Likelihood Class, R = Risk Class
Consequences /
Safeguards C L R Recommendati
Hazard
Release of highly 1. Specific 4 2 8 1. Due to cold weather modify M
flammable materials Inspection/testing/ increase ESD valve testing to 1/2
in the operating maintenance 2. Inspection records for ESD 23
area. Potential for program for ESDs to assure ESD-23 inspected as re
fire/explosion with 2. Valve actuator procedures
employee sizing 3. No equipment data sheet was
injuries/fatalities 3. ESD-23 is fail for ESD-23, follow-up with engin
closed design design is correct.
4. Consider over sizing valve actu
1 1 1
1 1 1
Example of C = Consequence Class, L = Likelihood Class Tables
PHA Methodology
= Risk Class

Recommendations

1. Due to cold weather modify MI procedures to

increase ESD valve testing to 1/2wks.
2. Inspection records for ESD 23 not in file, follow-up
to assure ESD-23 inspected as required by MI
procedures
3. No equipment data sheet was found for actuator
for ESD-23, follow-up with engineering to assure
design is correct.
4. Consider over sizing valve actuator

For those who prefer to use numerical values, the following

modification could be suggested

Example Risk Priority Matrix w/Numerical Values

Class Tables Risk Matrix 1 2 3
Consequence

4 4 8 12
3 3 6 9
2 2 4 6
1 1 2 3
Likelihood

Example Risk Priority Matrix w/Numerical Values & Letters

Risk Matrix 1 2 3
4 C4 B8 A 12
Consequen

3 C3 B6 B9
ce

2 D2 C4 B6
1 D1 D2 C3
Likelihood
 Main

alues, the following

gested

umerical Values
4
16
12
8
4
ihood

cal Values & Letters

4
A 16
A 12
B8
C4
ihood
 Example Worksheet Excerpt from What If/Checklist PHA Methodology
C = Consequence Class, L = Likelihood Class, R = Risk Class

What-If… Hazard/ Consequences Safeguards C

Pipes purged with natural gas. 1

Natural gas accumulates in the
utility room.

Based on "Deadly Practices" CSB Video

Example of C = Consequence Class, L = Likelihood Class Tables
 ecklist PHA Methodology
Class, R = Risk Class Main

L R Recommendations

1 1

1 1

1 1

For those who prefer to use numerical values, the follow

CSB Video modification could be suggested
elihood Class Tables Example Risk Priority Matrix w/Numerical Values

Risk Matrix
Consequenc 1 2
4 4 8
3 3 6
e

2 2 4
1 1 2
Likelihood

Example Risk Priority Matrix w/Numerical Values & Lette

Risk Matrix 1 2
4 C4 B8
Consequen

3 C3 B6
ce

2 D2 C4
1 D1 D2
Likelihood
numerical values, the following
uld be suggested
Matrix w/Numerical Values

3 4
12 16
9 12
6 8
3 4
Likelihood

w/Numerical Values & Letters

3 4
A 12 A 16
B9 A 12
B6 B8
C3 C4
Likelihood
 Deviations

Example Standard Set Of Generic Deviations For Process Section Types

Source: Lessons Learned From HAZOP Reviews of FCCUs by P.E. McCluer et al, Hydrocarbon Processing, Aug 1992, p-140-C

Tank or Heat
ID No. Deviation Column Vessel Line Exchanger Pump
1 High Flow X
2 High Level X X
3 High Interface X
4 High Pressure X X X
5 High Temperature X X X
6 High Concentration X X X
7 Low / No Flow X
8 Low Level X X
9 Low Interface X
10 Low Pressure X X X
11 Low Temperature X X X
12 Low Concentration X X X
13 Reverse / Misdirected Flow X
14 Tube Leak X
15 Tube Rupture X
16 Leak X X X X X
17 Rupture X X X X X

Other typical HAZOP deviations

More Flow
Less Flow
More Pressure
Less Pressure
More Level
Less Level
Part of, wrong concentration
As well as, contaminants
other than, wrong material
More Reaction
Less Reaction
No Reaction
More Mixing
Less Mixing
More Corrosion
More Erosion
Sampling

Page 18
 Deviations

rocessing, Aug 1992, p-140-C

Compressor

X
X

X
X

X
X

Page 19
 Figure 6.8 HAZOP Spreadsheet Example
Guide Element Deviation Recommended
# Causes Consequences Safeguards
Word Actions
1 Loss Chemical Loss of 1) Agitatior Unreacted HHC HHC detector 1) Add alarm
Mixer Agitation motor fails; in the reactor and alarm shutdown of
2)electrical utility carried over to system for loss of
lost/power storage tank and agitator.
outage; released to 2)Ensure
3)agitator enclosed work adequate
mechanical area. ventilation for
linkage fails; enclosed work
4)operator fails area.
to activate 3)Update
agitator procedure
Main
HAZOP Worksheet 2
 Ex HAZOP 2

Example HAZOP Analysis Worksheet

Severity
Function/ Guide
No. Item Purpose Parameter Word Deviation Consequence Cause Hazard
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
2 2

Note Check Comments - Move your cursor from 1 through 14

Simplified Guide Words and Meaning

Guide word Meaning
NO OR NOT Complete negation of the design intent
MORE Quantitative increase
LESS Quantitative decrease
AS WELL AS Qualitative modification/increase
PART OF Qualitative modification/decrease
REVERSE Logical opposite of the design inten
Alternative Guide Words and Meaning
NO or NOT Negation of intention No Flow of A
Flow of A greater than design
MORE Quantitative increase flow
LESS Quantitative decrease Flow of A less than design flow
Transfer of some component
AS WELL AS Quantitative increase additional to A
Failure to transfer all
PART OF Quantitative decrease components of A
Logical opposite of Flow of A in direction opposite to
REVERSE intention design direction
OTHER Transfer of some material other
THAN Complete substitution than A

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 Ex HAZOP 2

et
Probability

Risk
Level Recommendation Comments Main
11 12 13 14
3 6

ter than design

than design flow

me component

sfer all
fA
rection opposite to
n
me material other

Page 23
Ex HAZOP 2

1
2
3
4
5

Page 24
 CL and Example

Back to Ch.6 Main Page Main

HAZOP Studies Check List Example
See Example below
1 Changes In Quantity High Flow Pump racing, delivery vessel pressure lost, Loss of automatic
suction pressurized, scale dislodged, leak in control
heat exchanger
Low Flow Pump failure, scaling of delivery, presence of Operator error
foreign body, poor suction condition,
cavitation, leak in heat exchanger, drain
leak, valve jammed
No Flow Pump failure, delivery vessel over Failure of joint, pipe,
pressurized, gas blockage, presence of valve, trap, bursting
foreign body, scale, sediment, suction vessel disc, relief valve.
empty.
Reverse Flow Pump failure, pump reversed, delivery
vessel over pressurized, poor isolation, gas
locking, surging, back siphoning.

2 Changes in physical High or Low

condition pressure Boiling, cavitation, freezing, chemical
breakdown, flashing, condensation,
sedimentation, scaling, foaming, gas
release, priming, exploding, imploding.
Changes in viscosity, density. External Fire,
Weather conditions, Hammer.
High or Low same as 1 Given the example above, think about the following example. Click on the image below. Instead of "nuisance alarms"
Temperature pay attention to "level indicators"
Static buildup Source of Ignition, Personnel shock.

3 Changes in chemical High or Low Changes in proportion of mixture, in water or

condition Concentration solvent content.
Contaminants Ingress of air, water, steam, fuel, lubricant,
corrosion products, other process materials
from high pressure system, leakage through
heat exchangers. gas entrainment, spray,
mist.

4 Startup and Testing Vacuum, pressure testing with safe Level

Shutdown Condition. material. Indicator
Commissioning Pipe cleaning with safe alternatives (See
CSB link below)
Maintenance Purging, venting, sweetening, drying,
warming. Access, spares.

5 Hazardous Pipelines Pipeline Should this pipe be considered for

documentation documentation? Alternative Hyperlink: http://www.csb.gov/videos/anatomy-of-a-disaster/

Unsafe pipe cleaning with natural gas (min.7:30)

Click on the images to watch the videos

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