FCP - SECTION 2 - SECTION 6

SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC

FACTS:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He’s a biological male who feels trapped in a
male body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure was
successful – he (she) now has a female body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the change of
his first name (from Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth certificate. He filed the
petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these changes, among others, so that he can
marry his American fiancé.
The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted based on equity; that
Silverio’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any
way taken against him; that there was no opposition to his petition (even the OSG did not make any
basis for opposition at this point); that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the
much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fiancé and the realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA reversed the decision of
the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate may be
changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no support in existing
legislation.
Issue on the change of first name
In 2001, Republic Act 9048 (AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL
REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR
TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR
NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER) was passed.
This law provides that it should be the local civil registrar that has jurisdiction in petitions for the
change of first names and not the regular courts. Hence, the petition of Silverio insofar as his first
name is concerned is procedurally infirm. Even assuming that the petition filed properly, it cannot be
granted still because the ground upon which it is based(gender re-assignment) is not one of those
provided for by the law. Under the law, a change of name may only be grounded on the following:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and
he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Unfortunately, Silverio did not allege any of the above, he merely alleged gender re-assignment as
the basis.
Issue on the change of sex
This entry cannot be changed either via a petition before the regular courts or a petition for the local
civil registry. Not with the courts because there is no law to support it. And not with the civil registry
because there is no clerical error involved. Silverio was born a male hence it was just but right that
the entry written in his birth certificate is that he is a male. The sex of a person is determined at birth,
visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the
infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a
person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error, is immutable.
But what about equity, as ruled by the RTC?
No. According to the SC, this amounts to judicial legislation. To grant the changes sought by
Silverio will substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It
will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone sex reassignment (a
male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly
to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies
under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule
131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to
women which could be substantially affected if Silverio’s petition were to be granted.
But the SC emphasized: “If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to
enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.”

REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN

FACTS:

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live Birth. During her
childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was later on diagnosed that her ovarian
structures had minimized. She likewise has no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently, she was
diagnosed of having Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted
possess secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male hormones,
androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she
has become a male person. She filed a petition at RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth
Certificate such that her gender or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.

ISSUE: WON correction of entries in her birth certificate should be granted.

HELD:

The Court considered the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright denial. SC is of the view that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what
the individual, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. As in this
case, respondent, thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of
male hormones, there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being a
male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
PEOPLE VS JANSSEN
FACTS:
On December 26, 1928, Pedro N. Cerdeña and Juana S. del Rosario appeared before Reverend
Father H. Janssen, a Catholic parish priest of the municipality of San Jose, Antique, to have their
names inscribed in the marriage registry, which was done. On
December 30, 1928, the banns were published in his parish in San Jose, Antique.

As the classes opened on January 7, 1929, the contracting parties asked the defendant-appellant to
marry them before that date. Upon petition of the defendant-appellant, the Bishop of Jaro issued the
following dispensation on December 29, 1928 authorizing the solemnization of the marriage as long
as there are no legal impediments to the marriage. On January 4, 1929, the municipal secretary of
San Jose, Antique, gave the authority to solemnize marriage. By virtue of the above-quoted
dispensation, and in view of said authority of the municipal secretary of San Jose, Antique, the
defendant-appellant on January 6, 1929, solemnized the marriage of Pedro N. Cerdeña to Juana S.
del Rosario

ISSUE
Whether or not appellant violated violated section 2 of Act No. 3412,

HELD
The law does not impose upon priests or ministers of religion the duty In holding that it is the duty of
the accused to inquiring into and determining the residence of the contracting parties before
solemnizing marriage. It is sufficient to know that the license has been issued by a competent official,
and it may be presumed from the issuance of said license that said official has complied with his duty
of ascertaining whether the woman who desires to get married resides habitually in his municipality.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that when a marriage is solemnized by a church, sect, or
religion whose rules and practices require proclamation or publicity, it is not necessary that said
proclamation be made during ten days, unless said rules or practices so require.

GO VS CA

FACTS:

Petitioner, while traveling in the wrong direction on a one-way street, almost had a collision with
another vehicle. Petitioner thereafter got out of his car, shot the driver of the other vehicle, and drove
off. An eyewitness of the incident was able to take down petitioner’s plate number and reported the
same to the police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting,
petitioner presented himself in the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers, the police detained him.
Subsequently a criminal charge was brought against him. Petitioner posted bail, the prosecutor filed
the case to the lower court, setting and commencing trial without preliminary investigation.
Prosecutor reasons that the petitioner has waived his right to preliminary investigation as bail has
been posted and that such situation, that petitioner has been arrested without a warrant lawfully, falls
under Section 5, Rule 113 and Section 7, Rule 112 of The 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides for the rules and procedure pertaining to situations of lawful warrantless arrests. Petitioner
in his petition for certiorari assails such procedure and actions undertaken and files for a preliminary
investigation.
Issue:

Whether or Not warrantless arrest of petitioner was lawful.

Whether or Not petitioner effectively waived his right to preliminary investigation.

Held: Petitioner and prosecutor err in relying on Umil v. Ramos, wherein the Court upheld the
warrantless arrest as valid effected 1 to 14 days from actual commission of the offenses, which
however constituted “continuing crimes,” i.e. subversion, membership in an outlawed organization,
etc. There was no lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113. This is because the arresting
officers were not actually there during the incident, thus they had no personal knowledge and their
information regarding petitioner were derived from other sources. Further, Section 7, Rule 112, does
not apply.

Petitioner was not arrested at all, as when he walked in the police station, he neither expressed
surrender nor any statement that he was or was not guilty of any crime. When a complaint was filed
to the prosecutor, preliminary investigation should have been scheduled to determine probable cause.
Prosecutor made a substantive error, petitioner is entitled to preliminary investigation, necessarily in
a criminal charge, where the same is required appear thereat. Petition granted, prosecutor is ordered
to conduct preliminary investigation, trial for the criminal case is suspended pending result from
preliminary investigation, petitioner is ordered released upon posting a bail bond.

MARTINEZ VS TAN

FACTS:

It is claimed by the plaintiff that what took place before the justice of the peace, even admitting all
that the witnesses for the defendant testified to, did not constitute a legal marriage.Lower court ruled
ruled in favor of the defendant Angel Tan that Tan and Martinez were married on Sept. 25, 1907.
Evidence supporting this were: document signed by plaintiff, testimony of defendant that he and
plaintiff appeared before the justice of peace along with their witnesses (by Ballori and Esmero),
testimony of Esmero that he, the defendant, plaintiff and Ballori appeared before the justice of peace
and signed the document, the testimony of Ballori who also testified to the same effect, and the
testimony of the bailiff of court that defendant, appellant, justice of peace and two witnesses were all
present during the ceremony.

Issue
Whether or not the plaintiff and the defendant were married on the 25th day of September, 1907,
before the justice of the peace

Held
The judgment of the court below acquitting the defendant of the complaint is affirmed.

The petition signed the plaintiff and defendant contained a positive statement that they had mutually
agreed to be married and they asked the justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. The
document signed by the plaintiff, the defendant, and the justice of the peace, stated that they ratified
under oath, before the justice, the contents of the petition and that witnesses of the marriage were
produced. A mortgage took place as shown by the certificate of the justice of the peace, signed by
both contracting parties, which certificates gives rise to the presumption that the officer authorized
the marriage in due form, the parties before the justice of the peace declaring that they took each
other as husband and wife, unless the contrary is proved, such presumption being corroborated in this
case by the admission of the woman to the effect that she had contracted the marriage certified to in
the document signed by her, which admission can only mean the parties mutually agreed to unite in
marriage when they appeared and signed the said document which so states before the justice of the
peace who authorized the same. It was proven that both the plaintiff and the defendant were able to
read and write the Spanish language, and that they knew the contents of the document which they
signed; and under the circumstances in this particular case were satisfied, and so hold, that what took
place before the justice of the peace on this occasion amounted to a legal marriage.

PERIDO VS PERIDO

FACTS:

Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife
was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot 3 children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita
died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had 5 children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria,
Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943. Margarita is the only
living child of the first marriage. The children and grandchildren of the first marriage and second
marriage filed a case regarding the partition of the properties of Lucio Perido. Margarita et al
asserted that the children and grandchildren of the second marriage were illegitimate.

ISSUE: W/N the children and grandchildren of the second marriage of Lucio Perido were legitimate,
entitling them for the partition of lands

HELD: Yes. A person who was not at the marriage ceremony cannot testify as an eyewitness that the
marriage did not take place. In the absence of proof that marriage did not take place a man and a
woman living together as husband and wife are presumed married.

ENRIQUEZ VS ENRIQUEZ

FACTS:

COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE. — What are known as common-law marriages in England and the
United States were never recognized by the Spanish law in force in these Islands. No valid marriage
could exist under the Spanish law unless some ecclesiastical or civil functionary intervened in its
celebration.

A marriage ceremony having been duly celebrated between these persons in 1865, it is necessary, in
order to show that they were legally married before that time, to prove that the same kind of a
marriage ceremony had theretofore been celebrated. Although, as held by the Supreme Court of the
United States, by the common law of England, a valid marriage might be contacted without the
intervention of any ecclesiastical or civil functionary (Traverse v. Rheinhardt, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 563,
decided April 15, 1907), yet such was never the law in these Islands during the Spanish domination
here. During the entire period of that domination no valid marriage could exist unless some
ecclesiastical or civil functionary intervened in its celebration, and the intervention of civil
functionaries was limited to the short time elapsing between the 8th day of December, 1889, when
the Civil Code took effect here, and the 29th day of the same month, when the provisions of Title IV,
Book I, of that code were suspended. During the time covered by the lives of Antonio Enriquez and
Doña Ciriaca Villanueva no valid marriage between them could be contracted by their mere
agreement to live together as husband and wife.

In fact, no proof whatever was offered in the case to show the celebration of such prior marriage,
except the facts hereinbefore stated, that the parties lived together as husband and wife and had
children who were baptized as aforesaid. We hold that this evidence is insufficient to prove in this
case a prior marriage, where it appears that a marriage ceremony was duly performed between the
parties at a later date; and we therefore hold that Antonio Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva
were not legally married prior to 1865, and that, therefore, when this property was acquired by
Antonio in 1861 it did not become a part of the property belonging to the conjugal partnership, but
on the contrary was a part of the capital which he brought to the marriage. Being a part of the capital
brought to the marriage by the husband, upon the death of the wife — the husband surviving her —
no interest whatever therein passed to her heirs.

The judgment of the court below, which rests solely upon the proposition that at the time of the death
of Doña Ciriaca Villanueva one-half of this property passed to her heirs, can not, therefore, be
sustained. That judgment is reversed, without costs to either in this court, judgment is entered
acquitting the defendants of the complaint, with the costs of the first instance against the plaintiffs.
So ordered.

EUGENIO SR. VS VELEZ

FACTS:

Vitaliana Vargas’ brothers and sisters unaware of the former’s death on August 28, 1988 filed a
petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that
she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein
petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental.

The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the
writ was returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on
28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas
corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit.
Petitioner claims that as her common law husband, he has legal custody of her body.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.

Held:

The custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters.
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:

“Persons charged with duty of burial - if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child
and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the deceased.
Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married
who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband
and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our
society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law,
authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and
woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In any case, herein
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him
from even legally marrying Vitaliana.

REPUBLIC VS ALBIOS

FACTS:

Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in
Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage was a
marriage in jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship and even arranged to
pay him $2,000 in exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of
entering into a married state and complying with their marital obligations. The court even sent
summons to the husband but he failed to file an answer.

Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for lack
of consent because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00.. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the case to
the SC. According to the OSG, the case do not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest as the
parties intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage. That the parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of
Albios to acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

ISSUE:

Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

RULING:

NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent because it
was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.

Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.

That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a
full and complete understanding of the legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made
in the presence of a solemnizing officer.

A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage.

Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence. None of these are present in the case.

Therefore, their marriage remains valid.

COSCA VS PALAYPAYON

FACTS:

The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta
(Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo Villamora (Process Server). Respondents
are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court
II. All work in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage
license. Hence, the following couples were able to get married just by paying the marriage fees to
respondent Baroy: Alano P. Abellano & Nelly Edralin; Francisco Selpo & Julieta Carrido; Eddie
Terrobias & Maria Gacer; Renato Gamay & Maricris Belga; Arsenio Sabater & Margarita Nacario;
Sammy Bocaya & Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, the marriage contracts of the following
couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the
marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had
to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which happens usually several days
after the marriage ceremony.

Palaypayon contends that marriage between Abellano & Edralin falls under Article 34 of the Civil
Code thus exempted from the marriage license requirement. According to him, he gave strict
instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple copy of the marriage contract and to file the
same with the civil registrar but the latter failed to do so. In order to solve the problem, the spouses
subsequently formalized the marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage
contract, a copy of which was then filed with the civil registrar. The other five marriages were not
illegally solemnized because Palaypayon did not sign their marriage contracts and the date and place
of marriage are not included. It was alleged that copies of these marriage contracts are in the
custody of complainant Sambo. The alleged marriage of Selpo & Carrido, Terrobias & Gacer,
Gamay & Belga, Sabater & Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to solemnize them
in the absence of a marriage license and that the marriage of Bocaya & Bismonte was celebrated
even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties to avoid embarrassment with the
guests which he again did not sign the marriage contract.

An illegal solemnization of marriage was charged against the respondents.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.

HELD:

Bocaya & Besmonte’s marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other
couples. The testimonies of Bocay and Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed
that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were
advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage
license. They already started living together as husband and wife even without the formal
requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of
marriage and not a real one. However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the
wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates in front of him. The court held that
it is hard to believe that it was simulated.

On the other hand, Judge Palaypayon admitted that he solemnized marriage between Abellano &
Edralin and claimed it was under Article 34 of the Civil Code so the marriage license was dispensed
with considering that the contracting parties executed a joint affidavit that they have been living
together as husband and wife for almost 6 years already. However, it was shown in the marriage
contract that Abellano was only 18 yrs 2months and 7 days old. If he and Edralin had been living
together for 6 years already before they got married as what is stated in the joint affidavit, Abellano
must have been less than 13 years old when they started living together which is hard to
believe. Palaypayon should have been aware, as it is his duty to ascertain the qualification of the
contracting parties who might have executed a false joint affidavit in order to avoid the marriage
license requirement.

Article 4 of the Family Code pertinently provides that “in the absence of any of the essential or
formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio whereas an irregularity in the formal
requisite shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for the
irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and administratively liable.

ALCANTARA VS ALCANTARA

FACTS:

Restituto Alcantara filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita Alcantara alleging that
on December 8, 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to the
Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a “fixer” who could arrange a marriage for
them before a certain Rev. Navarro. They got married on the same day. Restituto and Rosita went
through another marriage ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on March 26, 1983. The marriage was again
celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of
Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the
said place. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Restituto prayed that after due
hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel
the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file. Rosita however asserts the validity of
their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite; that Restituto has a mistress with whom
he has three children; that Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution
for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD: Yes. The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. Restituto cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his
marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for
considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In this case, the marriage contract between the
parties reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local
civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically
identified the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and
Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein.
Restituto, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that
neither he nor respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, the Supreme Court still holds
that there is no sufficient basis to annul the marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or
municipality, not the residence of either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license
despite the absence of publication or prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are
considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any
of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for
the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable. Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage. Every intendment
of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of
great weight.

MADRIDEJOS VS DE LEON

FACTS:

Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, man and wife, had but one child, Domingo de Leon. The wife
and son survived Eulogio de Leon, who died in the year 1915. During her widowhood, Flaviana
Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births of the municipality of Siniloan,
Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, which
was named Melecio Madridejo, the necessary data being furnished by Pedro Madridejo. On June 17,
1917, a 24-day old child of Siniloan, Laguna, as a son of Flaviana Perez, no mention being made of
the father. On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a
bachelor, 30 years of age, by the parish priest of Siniloan. She died on the following day, July 9,
1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and the plaintiff-appellee Melecio
Madridejo, as well as her alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon died on the
2nd of May, 1928. Lower Court ruled that the marriage of Madridejo and Perez was valid and the
Melecio Madridejo was legitmated by that marriage. Appellant (Gonzalo de leon) contends that trial
court erred in declaring that the marriage in question was valid and that Pedro Madridejo was
legitimated by that marriage.

Issues
Whether or not the marriage of Flaviana Perez to Pedro Madridejo is valid
Whether or not the marriage subsequently legitimated Melecio Madridejo

HELD
With regard to the first assignment of error, the mere fact that the parish priest of Siniloan, Laguna,
who married Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to
the municipal secretary does not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, it not appearing that the
essential requisites required by law for its validity were lacking in the ceremony, and the forwarding
of a copy of the marriage certificate is not one of said essential requisites.

In the second issue, it is evident that Melecio Madridejo has not been acknowledged by Pedro
Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their marriage,
and therefore said marriage did not legitimate him.

HERMOSISIMA VS CA

FACTS:

In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a school teacher, later she became an insurance
underwriter), and Francisco Hermosisima, 23 years old (apprentice ship pilot), fell in love with each
other. Since 1953, both had a refular intimate and sexual affair with each other. In 1954, Soledad got
pregnant. Francisco then promised to marry Soledad. In June 1954, Soledad gave birth to a baby girl.
The next month, Francisco got married but with a different woman named Romanita Perez.
Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the latter to recognize his daughter with
Soledad and for damages due to Francisco’s breach of his promise to marry Soledad. The trial court
ruled in favor of Soledad. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and even
increased the award of damages. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Francisco is liable for damages
because he seduced Soledad. He exploited the love of Soledad for him in order to satisfy his sexual
desires – that being, the award of moral damages is proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to
marry.
HELD: No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. The Court of Appeals
based its award of damages on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which says in part that “Moral
damages may be recovered from… (3) Seduction, xxx…” However, it must be noted that the
“Seduction” being contemplated in the said Civil Code provision is the same “Seduction” being
contemplated in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code. Such “seduction” is not present in
this case.
Further, it cannot be said that Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of criminal seduction) Soledad
given the circumstances of this case. Soledad was 10 years older than Francisco. Soledad had a better
job experience and a better job overall than Francisco who was a mere apprentice. Further still, it
was admitted by Soledad herself that she surrendered herself to Francisco and that she wanted to
bind “by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.”
RAMIREZ-CUADERNO VS CUADERNO

FACTS:

It has been established that the couple were living separately since November 17, 1956 when the
husband, after having inflicted bodily injuries on the wife in the course of a quarrel between them,
took her to her mother's house where the latter stayed until the institution of the claim for support.
The wife claimed maltreatment and abandonment by the husband as basis therefor, whereas the
husband, in resisting her demand for maintenance, contended that it was she who left the conjugal
dwelling and, consequently, is not entitled thereto.

The trial court, in granting the wife's demand, sustained the theory that she was driven out of the
dwelling or, at least prevented from returning thereto by reason of defendant's maltreatment. The
Court of Appeals, on the other hand, while adopting the findings of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court as to the husband's role in the incident that led to the separation, and notwithstanding
the declaration by the husband during the hearing that "
all the trouble she(the wife) has given me is enough for me to turn my back to her ," set aside the
decision of the lower court, on the ground that it believes that the conditions were such that
cohabitation between the spouses is not yet impossible. Thus, they were admonished to live together
as husband and wife.

In the instant case, it is not disputed that the infliction of physical injuries on the wife, by the
husband gave rise to their separation. It is likewise shown it was the husband who took his wife to
her parents' home where he left her. The fact that the wife allegedly accepted money from her
husband and desisted from accepting any later,because according to the latter, she was demanding
for more, only indicates that even before the filing of the present case, the defendant-husband was
already providing something for the separate maintenance. Considering that the wife has no income
of her own,while the husband has an employment, the sum of P150.00 fixed by the trial court for the
wife's monthly support does not seem to be unreasonable. Needless to state that, as the separation has
been brought about by the husband and under the circumstances established during the trial, the same
shall subsist until a different situation between the parties shall take place.

WASSMER VS VELEZ

FACTS:

In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it
on September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding
invitations, bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days
before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be
able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the
wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will
be returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually
judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor
of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous
events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry
Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the
award of exemplary and moral damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated.
It is true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it
was not a simple breach of promise to marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations
for the wedding. Velez’s unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy. Wassmer’s cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code
which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.”
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral
damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary
damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his
promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner – this warrants the
imposition of exemplary damages against him.