01 Cruz v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No.

144464, [November 27, 2001]

FACTS:
● (September 9, 1994) Chairperson of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), received a letter from a private individual, Carmelita
B. Esteban, claiming that, during the examinations for non-professional in the career civil service, given by the Civil Service
Commission, on July 30, 1989 in Quezon City, Zenaida C. Paitim, the Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan, falsely pretending to be
the examinee, Gilda Cruz, a co-employee in the said office, took the examinations for the latter.
● Esteban requested the CSC to investigate the matter, appending to said letter, pictures purporting to be those of Gilda Cruz
and Zenaida Paitim.
● (September 20, 1994) Erlinda A. Rosas, Director IV of the Commission, issued a Memorandum to Eliseo Gatchalian, the
Director of the Management Information Office of the Commission, requesting the latter to furnish her with the picture seat plan
of the room where Gilda G. Cruz was during the said examination, to ascertain the veracity of the letter-complaint. Eliseo S.
Gatchalian did furnish Erlinda Rosas with certified true copies of the picture seat plans of the rooms where Gilda G. Cruz was
assigned not only in the 1989 but also in the 1987 and 1988 career service (sub-professional) examinations.
● (November 8, 1994), Erlinda Rosas thereby wrote a Memorandum to Civil Service Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, dated
November 8, 1994, declaring that based on the record, she found a prima facie case against Zenaida Paitim and Gilda G.
Cruz.
● (March 31, 1995), a "Formal Charge" for "Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service" was filed against Gilda Cruz and Zenaida C. Paitim
FORMAL CHARGE: It would appear that the purported picture of Cruz pasted in the Picture Seat Plan of the said July 30, 1989
examination is the picture of a different person. Further verification showed that this picture belongs to a
certain Zenaida Paitim who apparently took the said examination on behalf of Cruz and on the basis of the application bearing the
name and personal circumstances of Cruz.
● The petitioners filed their Answer to the charge entering a general denial of the material averments of the "Formal Charge."
They also declared that they were electing a formal investigation on the matter. ​The petitioners subsequently filed a Motion
to Dismiss averring that if the investigation will continue, they will be deprived of their right to due process because
the Civil Service Commission was the complainant, the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same time.
● Cochon, Atty III of CSC was thereby directed to conduct the formal administrative investigation of petitioners' case.
● Cochon issued "Investigation Report and Recommendation" finding the Petitioners guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their
dismissal from the government service. Report was forwarded to CSC.​ CSC issued resolution finding petitioners guilty.
Petitioners went to CA to assail resolution of CSC. CA denied. Motion for recon denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE:
- W/N PETITIONERS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE WHERE
CSC ACTED AS THE INVESTIGATOR, THE COMPLAINANT, THE PROSECUTOR, AND THE JUDGE, ALL AT THE SAME
TIME, AGAINST PETITIONERS. IN SO DOING, CSC COMMITTED A MOCKERY OF ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
HELD:
- NO, NOT VIOLATED.
1) CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative case instituted by it or instituted before it directly or on appeal including
actions of its officers and the agencies attached to it pursuant to

Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A, Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the Administrative Code of 1987 (11) Hear and decide
administrative cases instituted by or brought before it directly or on appeal, including contested appointments, and review decisions
and actions of its offices and of the agencies attached to it. Officials and employees who fail to comply with such decisions, orders, or
rulings shall be liable for contempt of the Commission. Its decisions, orders, or rulings shall be final and executory. Such decisions,
orders, or rulings may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty (30) days from receipt of a
copy thereof;

- The fact that the complaint was filed by the CSC itself does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge. As an
administrative body, its decision was based on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being considered
experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme Court. Petitioners were duly investigated by CSC.
● It can not be denied that the petitioners were formally charged after a finding that a prima facie case for dishonesty lies against
them. They were properly informed of the charges. They submitted an Answer and were given the opportunity to defend
themselves. Petitioners can not, therefore, claim that there was a denial of due process much less the lack of jurisdiction on
the part of the CSC to take cognizance of the case. We do not find reversible error with the decision of the Court of Appeals in
upholding the CSC Resolution.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - DUE PROCESS 1

02 Javier v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. L-68379-81, [September 22, 1986]
● Javier and private respondents were candidates for Batasang Pambansa May 1984 elections.
● On May 13, 1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter contest between the two came to a head when several followers of the
petitioner were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the private respondent’s men.
● It was in this atmosphere that the voting was held, and the post-election developments were to run true to form.
● Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the election returns, the petitioner went to the
Commission on Elections to question canvass votes and to prevent the impending proclamation of his rival, the private
respondent herein. Specifically, the petitioner charged that the elections were marred by "massive terrorism, intimidation,
duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of
ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of respondent Pacificador.
● His complaints were dismissed and the private respondent was proclaimed winner by the Second Division of the said body.
● (July 23, 1984), the Second Division promulgated the decision now subject of this petition which inter alia proclaimed Arturo F.
Pacificador the elected assemblyman of the province of Antique
● Petitioner went to SC asking to annul decision.

PETITIONER complains that the proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because all contests involving the members of
the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections en banc. This is as it should be, he says, to
insure a more careful decision, considering the importance of the offices involved.

RESPONDENTS ​argue that only contests need to be heard and decided en banc and all other cases can be — in fact, should be —
filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions.

SOLGEN makes distinction between the terms "contests" and "cases". His contention is that the pre-proclamation controversy
between the petitioner and the private respondent was not yet a contest at that time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere
division of the Commission on Elections, consonant with Section 3. The issue was at this stage still administrative and so was
resoluble by the Commission under its power to administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections, 9 not its authority as sole
judge of the election contest.
- A contest should involve a contention between the parties for the same office "in which the contestant seeks not only to
oust the intruder but also to have himself inducted into the office." No proclamation had as yet been made when the petition
was filed and later decided. Hence, since neither the petitioner nor the private respondent had at that time assumed office,
there was no Member of the Batasang Pambansa from Antique whose election, returns or qualifications could be examined
by the Commission on Elections en banc
- The en banc requirement would apply only from the time a candidate for the Batasang Pambansa was proclaimed as
winner, for it was only then that a contest could be permitted under the law.
- Shortly after, petitioner was gunned down in broad daylight.
ISSUE:
- Was the Second Division of the Commission on Elections authorized to promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984, proclaiming
the private respondent the winner in the election? LibLex
HELD:

Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution

Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:
"(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and
elective provincial and city officials."

Section 3 provides:
"The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except
contests involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and decided en banc . Unless otherwise provided by
law, all election cases shall be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision."

● As the Court sees it, the effect of this interpretation would be to divide the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections into two,
viz.: (1) over matters arising before the proclamation (pre-proclamation), which should be heard and decided by division in the
exercise of its administrative power; and (2) over matters arising after the proclamation, which could be heard and decided
only en banc in the exercise of its judicial power. ​THIS IS WRONG.
SUPREME COURT believes that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the Constitution intended to give
it full authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising before
the proclamation of the winners . It is not the intention of the framers of the Constitution to divide the electoral process into the
pre-proclamation stage and the post-proclamation stage and to provide for a separate jurisdiction for each stage, considering the first
administrative and the second judicial.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - DUE PROCESS 2

 ● As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure the most careful consideration of such cases.
Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had been
made, for it might then be too late already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest
strategy of many unscrupulous candidates which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of the
real winners in the election. Pre-proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three
members in division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the Commission en banc .
● A decision made on the contest by less than the Commission en banc would not meet the exacting standard of care
and deliberation ordained by the Constitution .
● Another matter deserving the highest consideration of this Court but accorded cavalier attention by the respondent
Commission on Elections is due process of law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair play which is the hallmark of the free
society. Commissioner Opinion ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on the ground that he was formerly a law partner of the
private respondent, he obstinately insisted on participating in the case, denying he was biased. Commissioner Opinion's
refusal to inhibit himself and his objection to the transfer of the case to another division cannot be justified by any criterion of
propriety. His conduct on this matter belied his wounded protestations of innocence and proved the motives of the Second
Division when it rendered its decision.

This Court has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of
due process.
- To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as
an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. 16 The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should
be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge,
otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment.
Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal
justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment
already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing.
- Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge
will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established
facts and the pertinent law.
- The relationship of the judge with one of the parties may color the facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a just
decision. Where this is probable or even only possible, due process demands that the judge inhibit himself
CONCLUSION: Although the case is moot and academic, the petition would have been granted and the decision of the Comelec
division is violative of the constitution. Election contests involving members of the former Batasan Pambansa must be decided by the
Commission on Elections en banc under Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution. These Sections do not distinguish
between "pre-proclamation" and "post-proclamation" contests nor between "cases" and "contests."

03 Libanan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 112386 (Resolution), [June 14, 1994]

● Petitioner Marcelino C, Libanan, the incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar, was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of that province prior to the 11 May 1992 elections. He was among those charged before the Sandiganbayan, on
25 May 1992, with having violated Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
- Accused Barbo (Governor); Camenforte, (Vice-Governor) and other Sangguniang Panlalawigan Members including
herein petitioner, of the same province, conspiring with one another through evident bad faith and manifest partiality,
prevent and exclude Agustin B. Docena, a duly appointed and Qualified replacement of deceased Sangguniang
Panlalawigan member Luis A. Capito, from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said body, by
promulgating in their official capacities Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 01, Series of 1991, wherein
accused expressed their recognition of Atty. Socrates B. Alar as the official replacement of aforesaid deceased
member, notwithstanding the recall of his appointment by the Department of Local Government, to the damage and
prejudice of Agustin B. Docena.
● Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution where the accused are hereby suspended from their respective
public positions, or from any other public office that they may be holding, the same to commence upon their receipt hereof and
for a period of ninety (90) days thereafter. cd
● Barbo and Libanan filed for motion for recon which was denied by Sandiganbayan.
PETITIONER ​contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts supposedly committed while still a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him now that he is the duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar. The
implementation of the suspension order, he further claims, would amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - DUE PROCESS 3

ISSUE:
- W/N THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION IF EXECUTED WOULD CONSTITUTE AN AFFRONT ON PETITIONER('S)
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS
HELD:
Answer: No, it does not. Petition is without merit.

"​Sec. 13. Republic Act No. 3019​ Suspension and Loss of Benefits . — Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under title 7, book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving
fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. . . ."

● The term "office" used in the law could apply to any office which the officer charged might currently be holding and not
necessarily the particular office under which he was charged. (Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan,Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan)
● Obviously, the suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Public office is "a
public agency or trust," and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provision 6 which petitioner invokes.
● When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court ratiocination or rationalization of the law.
Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally mandates the suspension of a public official from office pending a criminal prosecution
against him.

04 Lim v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111397, [August 12, 2002]

FACTS:
● (December 7, 1992) Bistro filed before the trial court a petition 5 for mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for temporary
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, against Lim in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila because policemen
under Lim's instructions inspected and investigated Bistro's license as well as the work permits and health certificates of its
staff. This caused the stoppage of work in Bistro's night club and restaurant operations. 6 Lim also refused to accept Bistro's
application for a business license, as well as the work permit applications of Bistro's staff, for the year 1993
TRIAL COURT: issued the first assailed temporary restraining order
● Despite the trial court's order, Lim still issued a closure order on Bistro's operations effective January 23, 1993, even sending
policemen to carry out his closure order. ESHAIC
● (January 25, 1993) Bistro filed an "Urgent Motion for Contempt" against Lim and the policemen who stopped Bistro's
operations on January 23, 1993
● However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26 and 27, and on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting through his agents and policemen,
again disrupted Bistro's business operations.
● (February 17, 1993,) Lim filed a motion to dissolve the injunctive order of January 20, 1993 and to dismiss the case. He insists
that “the power of a mayor to inspect and investigate commercial establishments and their staff is implicit in the statutory
power​ ​of the city mayor to issue, suspend or revoke business permits and licenses.
- As provided in Section 11 (1), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and in Section 455, paragraph 3
(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
TRIAL COURT: Denied Lim's motion to dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the case in an order
● (March 10, 1993) filed with CA petition for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus against Bistro and Judge Reyes. Lim claimed
that the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the writ of prohibitory
preliminary injunction
CA: Rendered assailed decision. Denied motion for recon.
● (July 1, 1993) ​Manila City Ordinance No. 7783 ​took effect. On the same day, Lim ordered the Western Police District
Command to permanently close down the operations of Bistro, which order the police implemented at once.
Hence, the present petition.

HELD:
- Bistro's cause of action in the mandamus and prohibition proceedings before the trial court is the violation of its property right
under its license to operate. The violation consists of the work disruption in Bistro's operations caused by Lim and his
subordinates as well as Lim's refusal to issue a business license to Bistro and work permits to its staff for the year 1993.
- The trial court granted only the prohibitory injunction. This enjoined Lim from interfering, impeding or otherwise closing down
Bistro's operations pending resolution of whether Lim can validly refuse to issue Bistro's business license and its staffs work
permits for the year 1993.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - DUE PROCESS 4

 Section 11 (1), Article II of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila, ​reads:
"Sec. 11. General duties and powers of the mayor . The general duties and powers of the mayor shall be:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the same for violation of the conditions upon which
they were granted , or if acts prohibited by law or municipal ordinances are being committed under the protection of such licenses or
in the premises in which the business for which the same have been granted is carried on, or for any other reason of general
interest." (Italics supplied)
Section 455 (3) (iv) of the Local Government Code​ provides:
"Sec. 455. Chief Executive, Powers, Duties and Compensation : . . .
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the City and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the City Mayor shall:
(3) . . .
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the condition upon which
said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance ." (Italics supplied)

From the language of the two laws, it is clear that the power of the mayor to issue business licenses and permits necessarily includes
the corollary power to suspend, revoke or even refuse to issue the same. However, the power to suspend or revoke these licenses
and permits is expressly premised on the violation of the conditions of these permits and licenses. The laws specifically refer to the
"violation of the condition(s)" on which the licenses and permits were issued. Similarly, the power to refuse to issue such licenses
and
permits is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for the issuance of such licenses and permits. ​The mayor must
observe due process in exercising these powers, which means that the mayor must give the applicant or licensee notice
and opportunity to be heard.
- The due process clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the
allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits.

IN THIS CASE, Lim has no authority to close down Bistro's business or any business establishment in Manila without due process of
law. Lim cannot take refuge under the Revised Charter of the City of Manila and the Local Government Code. There is no provision
in these laws expressly or impliedly granting the mayor authority to close down private commercial establishments without notice and
hearing, and even if there is, such provision would be void. The due process clause of the Constitution requires that Lim should have
given Bistro an opportunity to rebut the allegations that it violated the conditions of its licenses and permits. ​that Lim's exercise of
this power violated Bistro's property rights that are protected under the due process clause of the Constitution.

In this case, Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific violation of the conditions of its business license or permits. Still, Lim closed
down Bistro's operations even before the expiration of its business license on December 31, 1992. Lim also refused to accept Bistro's
license application for 1993, in effect denying the application without examining whether it complies with legal prerequisites.
- Lim's zeal in his campaign against prostitution is commendable. However, there is no excusing Lim for arbitrarily closing down,
without due process of law, the business operations of Bistro. For this reason, the trial court properly restrained the acts of
Lim.

05 Marohombsar v. Adiong, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1674, [January 22, 2004]

FACTS:
● Complainant Marohombsar was the defendant in Civil Case No. 1670-99 for "injunction with prayer for preliminary injunction."
The case was filed on March 17, 1999 by Yasmira Pangadapun, daughter of Judge Yusoph Pangadapun of RTC, Marawi City.
- In the said complaint, Pangadapun questioned the legality of Marohombsar's appointment by DSWD Regional
Secretary Salic-Malna as provincial social welfare officer V of the Department of Social Welfare and Development —
Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (DSWD-ARMM). Prior to Marohombsar's appointment, Pangadapun used
to occupy said position as officer-in-charge.
● Upon the filing of the said complaint, respondent judge issued a TRO and set the hearing on the application for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary injunction on April 6, 1999. Summons, together with a copy of the complaint and a notice indicating that a
preliminary conference would be held on March 22, 1999, was also served on both parties.
● (March 18, 1999) Marohombsar filed an ex parte urgent motion to dissolve the TRO. Pangadapun was given until March 26,
1999 to comment and, pending the filing of the same, the TRO was extended up to said date.
● (March 22, 1999) respondent issued an order stating that a preliminary conference had been held and that both parties had
waived the raffle of the case. He reset the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
● During the hearing on the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, none of the lawyers appeared. Hence,
respondent considered it submitted for resolution and issued the preliminary injunction the following day.
In his partial Comment dated November 13, 2000, respondent denied that:
(1) he issued the TRO in favor of Pangadapun without benefit of a hearing;

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - DUE PROCESS 5

(2) in his order dated March 22, 1999, he made it appear that a preliminary conference was held where the parties agreed to waive the
raffle of the case, when in fact there was none;
(3) he falsified the records of the case and
(4) he granted the preliminary injunction without a hearing.
- He alleged that the complaint was purely a harassment case filed by a disgruntled party because of the latter's failure to obtain
a favorable resolution from him. Although respondent judge admitted that Judge Yusoph Pangadapun and Judge Abdulhakim
Ibrahim were his distant relatives and townmates, he stressed that "never in our careers in the judiciary have we interfered nor
influenced one another on any pending case before our courts."
● During the preliminary hearing of the complaint on April 18, 2002 before Justice Labitoria, the parties agreed to have the case
decided based on the pleadings presented Respondent submitted additional evidence and exhibits to strengthen his case
● In his final report and recommendation, Justice Labitoria recommended that respondent judge be absolved of all the charges
against him.

HELD:
A TRO is generally granted without notice to the opposite party and is intended only as a restraint on him until the propriety of granting
a temporary injunction can be determined. It goes no further than to preserve the status quo until that determination
1. Respondent judge was justified in issuing the TRO ex parte due to his assessment of the urgency of the relief sought.

Rule 58, Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; EXCEPTION. — No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing
and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which
the application for preliminary injunction was made, may issue a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of
twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. Within the said twenty-day
period, the court must order said party or person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be
granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction shall be granted, and accordingly issue the
corresponding order.

However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer
grave injustice and irreparable injury, the executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single-sala court may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours from issuance but he shall immediately comply
with provisions of the next preceding section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith. Thereafter, within
the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to determine
whether the temporary restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be heard. In no case
shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order exceed twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two (72)
hours provided therein.

2. Complainant's assertion that she was denied due process because the preliminary injunction was issued without
hearing is likewise untenable.

The essence of due process is that a party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any evidence he may
have in support of his defense.
-In applications for preliminary injunction, the dual requirement of prior notice and hearing before injunction may issue has been
relaxed to the point that not all petitions for preliminary injunction need undergo a trial-type hearing, it being doctrinal that a
formal or trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process.
- In the present case, complainant was able to move for a reconsideration of the order in question, hence her right to due
process was not in anyway transgressed. We have ruled that a party cannot claim that he has been denied due process when
he has availed of the opportunity to present his position.
- Respondent judge, or any other member of the bench for that matter, is presumed to have acted regularly and in the manner
that preserves the ideal of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge implicit in the guarantee of due process.
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaint against Judge Santos B. Adiong is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

06 Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No. 148571, [September 24, 2002]
FACTS:
● Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States Government sent to the Philippine Government Note
accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan
Crespo.
● Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice
(SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - DUE PROCESS 6

 ● Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by the
RTC. The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition.
● The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in the said GR No. 139465. Initially,
the Court — by a vote of 9-6 — dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence.
● Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. 9 By an identical
vote of 9-6 — after three justices changed their votes — it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It held that private
respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. This Resolution
has become final and executory.
● The Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the
appropriate Petition for Extradition alleging that that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States
District Court
- The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ:
(1)​ conspiracy to defraud the United States​ and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371;
(2) ​tax evasion​, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201;
(3) ​wire fraud​, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2;
(4) ​false statements​, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and
(5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code
Section 2.
- In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to
Section 6 of PD No. 1069 .
● The RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez to set the case for hearing. CASE SET FOR HEARING.
- In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an
extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
- In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in
the amount of P100,000.
● Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and
fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required
cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001.
Hence, this petition directly to the SC.

PETITIONER contends that the procedure adopted by the RTC — informing the accused, a fugitive from justice, that an Extradition
Petition has been filed against him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest — gives him notice to escape and to avoid extradition.
Moreover, petitioner pleads that such procedure may set a dangerous precedent, in that those sought to be extradited — including
terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals — may invoke it in future extradition cases.

RESPONDENT JIMENEZ argues that he should not be hurriedly and arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional right to liberty without
due process. He further asserts that there is as yet no specific law or rule setting forth the procedure prior to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, after the petition for extradition has been filed in court; ergo , the formulation of that procedure is within the
discretion of the presiding judge.
- BOTH PARTIES INVOKE Section 6 of PD 1069
ISSUES:
1. Is Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued?
2. Is Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending?
HELD:

EXTRADITION - police assistance extended by a state to arrest a person charged with a crime in another state and surrender him
to the authorities of that state. The power to arrest by the assisting state is legitimized by a treaty, which has the force of a statute
and forms part of municipal law. The benefit of extradition is the mutual assistance between states in criminal law enforcement
across national boundaries. ​Extradition is an executive responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign
relations and to implement treaties.
FIVE POSTULATES OF EXTRADITION:
1. Extradition as the major effective instrument of international co-operation in the suppression of crime. ​Extradition
treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive
from one state to the other.
- In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford
​ e need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
to be an isolationist state​. W

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - DUE PROCESS 7

 2. The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused - An extradition treaty presupposes that both parties
thereto have examined, and that both accept and trust, each other's legal system and judicial process.
3. An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis​. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does not involve the determination of the
guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be
invoked by an extraditee.
- Extradition is summary in proceeding. Unlike criminal proceedings, it only requires prima facie evidence. Also, in an extradition
proceeding our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.
- The process of extradition does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence
will be adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only
relevant to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee
4. Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith. ​Fulfilling our obligations under the Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with the
requesting state. On the other hand, failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder paints a bad image of our country before the
world community
- It is required that we deliver the accused to the requesting country if the conditions precedent to extradition, as set forth in the
Treaty, are satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding government, where it has done all that the treaty and the law require it
to do, is entitled to the delivery of the accused on the issue of the proper warrant, and the other government is under obligation
to make the surrender." Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the accused, should it be found
proper.
5. There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
- Persons to be extradited are presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds reinforcement in the experience 44
of the executive branch: nothing short of confinement can ensure that the accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the requested
state in order to thwart their extradition to the requesting state.
- The present extradition case further validates the premise that persons sought to be extradited have a propensity to flee.
Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting country.
45 Prior acts of herein respondent — (1) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings
there; and (2) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the
crimes he is charged with are bailable — eloquently speak of his aversion to the processes in the requesting state, as well as
his predisposition to avoid them at all cost.

1. Jimenez his detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a violation of his
right to due process.

The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard but, at the same time, point out that the doctrine does not always call for a
prior opportunity to be heard. Where the circumstances — such as those present in an extradition case — call for it, a subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough.
ON THE BASIS OF THE LAW
- It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD 1069 , our Extradition Law, uses the word "immediate" to qualify the arrest of the
accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Arrest
subsequent to a hearing can no longer be considered "immediate. The law could not have intended the word as a mere
superfluity but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a sense of urgency and swiftness in the determination of whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued.
- By using the phrase "if it appears,"' the law further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The
trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the true and actual situation, immediately upon the
filing of the petition. From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected merely to get a prima facie
finding — sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the accused.
- In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the
Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
- Prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori , for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident
from the Petition itself and its supporting documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a prima facie
finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.
ON THE BASIS OF THE CONSTITUTION
- Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing before the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.

"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - DUE PROCESS 8

 seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
- To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination — under
oath or affirmation — of complainants and the witnesses they may produce . There is no requirement to notify and hear the
accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
- Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as
possible, a prima facie finding whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought is extraditable. At his discretion, the judge may require the submission
of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner.
- If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible​, the petition may be dismissed at the
discretion of the judge.
- I​f the presence of a prima facie case is determined​, then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of
the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings. Prior
to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest
the latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings. In our opinion, the foregoing procedure will "best
serve the ends of justice" in extradition cases.
2. No Violation of Due Process - ​His detention prior to the conclusion of the extradition proceedings does not amount to a
violation of his right to due process
- In the present case, respondent will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the
Petition for Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of his right to due process and fundamental fairness.
His arrest and detention will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by
(1) the DOJ's filing in court the Petition with its supporting documents after a determination that the extradition request meets the
requirements of the law and the relevant treaty;
(2) the extradition judge's independent prima facie determination that his arrest will best serve the ends of justice before the issuance of
a warrant for his arrest; and
(3) his opportunity, once he is under the court's custody, to apply for bail as an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
- It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already been
conducted in that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the requesting state before those proceedings could be
completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due process
now has thus become hollow. He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.
- Due process rights accorded to individuals must be carefully balanced against exigent and palpable government interests. We
cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives.
3. Is respondent entitled to bail?

"Art. III, Sec. 13 of the 1987 Constitution. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required."
- Constitutional provision on bail above applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine
criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
Acquittal.
- To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should
apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him(US), not before the extradition court.

EXCEPTIONS TO “NO BAIL” RULE: ​There is clear showing that -

1. O​nce granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2. that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the
highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein.
These have no statutory basis. Rather, it is derived from the principles of equity and justice.

07 Uy v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 156399-400, [June 27, 2008]

● The Ombudsman filed on (4 April 2001) with the Sandiganbayan an Information 5 charging former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, etc with the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080,
- During the period from June, 1998 to January, 2001, Estrada, along with others, accumulated and acquired by himself, directly
or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of Four Billion Ninety-seven Million Eight Hundred Four

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - DUE PROCESS 9

 Thousand One Hundred Seventy-three Pesos and Seventeen Centavos [P4,097,804,173.17], more or less, thereby unjustly
enriching himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage of the Pilipino people and the Republic of the Philippines,
through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means as follows: ---

(a) Receiving or collecting a huge amount of money from illegal gambling

(b) by diverting, receiving, misappropriating, converting OR misusing directly, or indirectly for his or their personal
gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or
less, representing a portion of the Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated
for the Province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171 , ​BY HIMSELF AND/OR in CONNIVANCE with co-accused Charlie
'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, and Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas AND OTHER JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES ​; [ underscores supplied ]
(c) (​GSIS) stocks
(d) Unjustly enriching himself with a huge amount and depositing the same under the name “Jose Velarde” at the Equitable PCI
bank
● In the course of the proceedings, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan an Omnibus Motion dated 8 January 2002
8 seeking, among others, the issuance of a warrant of arrest against Victor Jose Tan Uy alias Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy .
- The Ombudsman alleged that no warrant of arrest had been issued against the accused John Doe who was
designated in the Information as Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy ; and that, in order not to frustrate the
ends of justice, a warrant of arrest should issue against him after he had been identified to be also using the name
Victor Jose Tan Uy with address at 2041 M. J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City. Allegedly, a positive identification had
been made through photographs, as early as the Senate Impeachment Trial against former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, that John Doe a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy and VICTOR JOSE TAN UY are one and
the same person .
- To support this motion, the Ombudsman attached:
(1) copies of the photographs identified at the Senate Impeachment Trial; and
(2) the Sworn Statement of Ma. Caridad Manahan-Rodenas (the "Rodenas Sworn Statement" ) dated 26
June 2001 executed before Atty. Maria Oliva Elena A. Roxas of the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau of
the Office of the Ombudsman ("FFIB") . [For purposes of this Decision, these are collectively referred to as
the "identification documents." ]
● The petitioner's response was a Petition to Conduct Preliminary Investigation 10 filed with the Ombudsman . The petitioner
argued that:
(1) he was not subjected to a preliminary investigation or to any previous inquiry to determine the existence of
probable cause against him for the crime of plunder or any other offense, as:
(a) he was not included as respondent in either of the two Ombudsman cases — bases of the criminal
proceeding;
(b) neither his name nor his address at No. 2041 M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City was mentioned at any
stage of the preliminary investigation conducted in the criminal cases;
(c) the preliminary investigation in the cases that led to the filing of Crim. Case No. 26558 was conducted
without notice to him and without his participation;
(d) he was not served any subpoena, whether at his address at No. 2041 M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City or
at any other address, for the purpose of informing him of any complaint against him for plunder or any other
offense and for the purpose of directing him to file his counter-affidavit;
(2) dictates of basic fairness and due process of law require that petitioner be given the opportunity to avail himself o
the right to a preliminary investigation since the offense involved is non-bailable in character. aHTcD
● The petitioner additionally alleged that he filed a complaint with the RTC against a certain Eleuterio Tan for maligning him by
using his picture, address, and other personal circumstances without his consent or authority, which acts led to his alleged
involvement in the tobacco excise tax scandal. He also claimed that he personally visited then Senate President Aquilino
Pimentel at the height of the impeachment trial to dispute his identification as Eleuterio Tan; he then expressed his willingness
to testify before the Impeachment Court and subsequently wrote Senator Pimentel a letter about these concerns. 12 He
claimed further that he submitted the signatures appearing on the signature cards supposedly signed by Eleuterio Tan and the
two (2) company identification cards supposedly presented by the person who opened the Land Bank account for examination
by a handwriting expert; the result of the handwriting examination disclosed that the signatures were not his
● the petitioner asked for the suspension of the criminal proceedings insofar as he is concerned; he likewise moved for a
preliminary investigation.

ACCORDING TO OMBUDSMAN:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - DUE PROCESS 10

 1. It claimed that it served, in the preliminary investigation it conducted, the subpoena at the purported address of Eleuterio
Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy at Bagbaguin, Valenzuela City as indicated in the complaint-affidavits.
2. It was the petitioner's fault that his true name was not ascertained, the petitioner having made clever moves to make it
difficult to identify him with his nefarious deeds.
3. Petitioner could not ask for any affirmative relief from the Sandiganbayan which had not acquired jurisdiction over the
petitioner's person.

PETITIONER’S REPLY TO OPPOSITION: He additionally stressed that --

(1) the fundamental issue is whether or not a preliminary investigation was conducted with respect to him; as the records show, he
was never subjected to any preliminary investigation;
(2) he was never given by the prosecution the opportunity to prove in any preliminary investigation that he is not Eleuterio Tan; had
he been given such opportunity, petitioner would have shown that he wasted no time and took immediate steps to establish his
innocence shortly after the illegal use and submission of his photo and usurpation of his identity surfaced at the impeachment
proceedings;
(3) he timely invoked his right to a preliminary investigation, as motions or petitions for the conduct of preliminary investigation may
be entertained by the Sandiganbayan even before the movant or petitioner is brought under its jurisdiction under the rule that any
objection to a warrant of arrest or procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be
made before plea;
(4) while the invalidity of the preliminary investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it should however
suspend the proceedings and remand the case for the holding of a proper preliminary investigation; and
(5) a preliminary investigation is imperative because the offense involved is non-bailable.

- Ombudsman denied petition to conduct preliminary investigation. It rejected the petitioner's claims, reasoning out that the
petitioner's requested preliminary investigation had long been terminated and the resulting case had already been filed with
the Sandiganbayan in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure; hence, the petitioner's remedy is to ventilate the
issues with the Sandiganbayan
● Ombudsman required attendance for clarificatory hearing. Petitioner did not attend bec he asserts that there was no probably
cause to charge him for the criminal act.
● Ombudsman issued the order finding probable cause to charge petitioner before the Sandiganbayan.

The basis for the findings: ​It has to be emphasized that during the investigation conducted by the Fact-Finding and Intelligence
Bureau (FFIB), this Office, and referred to on page 2 of the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 19, 2002, granting the
motion for preliminary investigation of respondent Victor Jose Tan Uy, Ma. Caridad Manahan-Rodenas of the Land Bank of the
Philippines identified the picture bearing the name Victor Jose Tan Uy as Eleuterio Tan who presented to her two identification cards
(IDs), which were found to exactly match the picture of the said respondent with his LTO license. Verily, the identification made by
Rodenas based on pertinent documents which respondent presented when he opened the account at Land Bank remains credible,
and that Victor Jose Tan Uy was the same person who appeared and introduced himself as Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan to
Ma. Caridad A. Manahan-Rodenas of the Land Bank, thereby establishing his true identity .

Hence, the present petition.

HELD:
1. Did the Ombudsman's conduct of the Sandiganbayan-ordered preliminary investigation violate due process?
Answer: Yes, petitioner's right to due process has been violated.

A preliminary investigation is held before an accused is placed on trial to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and
oppressive prosecution; to protect him from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from the trouble, expenses, and
anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials.
- The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound for trial and before being exposed to the risk of
incarceration and penalty is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. To deny the accused's claim to a
preliminary investigation is to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process .

Although such a preliminary investigation is not a trial and is not intended to usurp the function of the trial court, it is not a casual
affair. The officer conducting the same investigates or inquires into the facts concerning the commission of the crime with the end in
view of determining whether or not an information may be prepared against the accused. Indeed, a preliminary investigation is in
effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. ​Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that
when the case is tried, the trial court may not be bound as a matter of law to order an acquittal. A preliminary investigation

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - DUE PROCESS 11

 has then been called a judicial inquiry. It is a judicial proceeding. An act becomes judicial when there is opportunity to be heard and
for the production and weighing of evidence, and a decision is rendered thereon.

a. The preliminary investigation which led to the filing of the above-entitled case never mentioned the name of herein movant
Jose Victor Tan Uy. Instead, the preliminary investigation involves one "Eleuterio Tan" a.k.a. "Eleuterio Ramos Tan"
b. Movant was able to show that his address at Cebu City was made known during the hearing before the Impeachment Court on
December 22, 2000. Yet, despite knowledge of the movant's address, no subpoena or copies of the complaints-affidavits had
been served upon him at said address by the prosecution.
- While the prosecution did not give him the opportunity to present his side, it already formed a conclusion that he and "Eleuterio
Tan" are one and the same person.
c. Movant, after learning from media reports that he was being identified as "Eleuterio Tan", immediately took steps to disprove
the same
- Sent a letter for handwriting examination.- Handwritings submitted for comparison were different.

IN SUM: the petitioner was never identified in the previous preliminary investigation to be the person identified by assumed names or
aliases in the supporting complaint-affidavits; hence, a new preliminary investigation should be conducted to identify him as the person
who, using the aliases Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, opened and withdrew from the Landbank account in the course of
a series of acts collectively constituting the crime of plunder.
- Thus, the Ombudsman still failed to establish in the Sandiganbayan-ordered preliminary investigation the direct link between
the individual identified by aliases and the petitioner
- A clarificatory hearing is necessary to establish the probable cause that up to the time of the clarificatory hearing has not been
shown. This implication becomes unavoidable for the present case, given the reason for the Sandiganbayan's order to conduct
another preliminary investigation for the petitioner, and in light of the evidence so far then presented which, as in the first
preliminary investigation, did not link the petitioner to the assumed names or aliases appearing in the Information.

A basic due process requirement that the right to know and to meet a case requires that a person be fully informed of the pertinent and
material facts unique to the inquiry to which he is called as a party respondent.
- Under this requirement, reasonable opportunity to contest evidence as critical as the identification documents should have
been given the petitioner at the Sandiganbayan-ordered preliminary investigation as part of the facts he must controvert;
otherwise, there is nothing to controvert as the burden of evidence lies with the one who asserts that a probable cause exists .
The Ombudsman's failure in this regard tainted its findings of probable cause with grave abuse of discretion that effectively
nullifies them. We cannot avoid this conclusion under the constitutional truism that in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights
takes precedence over the right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt
towards the former .

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II - DUE PROCESS 12