HAZOP:

HAZard and OPeratibility (HAZOP). :

This is a technique developed by the Mond division of ICI.

One set of techniques designed to identify hazards to people, plants and the environment
is known as Hazard and Operability studies and widely known as HAZOP.

HAZOP is of two versions. The first versions is “Guide Word Approach” which is explained
as under. This is applicable to process industries only.

HAZOP aims to stimulate the imagination of designers in a systematic way so that they can
identify the potential hazards in a design.

Success or failure of study depends on:

- the accuracy of drawings and other data used as the basis for the study.
- the ability of the team to use the approach as an aid to their imagination in visualizing
deviations, causes and consequences.
- the ability of the team to maintain a sense of proportion, particularly when assessing
the seriousness of the hazards which are identified.

The most important terms:

Intention: The intention defines how the part is expected to operate.

Deviations: These are departures from the intention (which are discovered by
systematically applying the
guide words).
Causes: These are the reasons why deviations might occur.
Consequences: These are the results of the deviations should they occur.
Hazards: These are the consequences which can cause damage, injury or loss.
Guide words: These are simple words which are used to qualify the intention in order to
guide and
stimulate the creative thinking process and so discover deviations.

A list of guide words:

GUIDE WORDS

TYPE GUIDE WORDS MEANINGS COMMENTS

Negation No or Not The complete negation of No part of the intentions is achieved but nothing
these intentions else happens

Quantitative More Quantitative increases or These refer to quantities + properties such as

decreases flow rates and temperature as well as activities
Less like “HEAT and “REACT

Qualitative As well as A qualitative increase All the design and operating intentions are
achieved together with some additional activity

Only some of the intentions are achieved; some

Part of A qualitative decrease are not

Logical Reverse The logical opposite of This is mostly applicable to activities, for
the intention example reverse flow or chemical reaction. It
can also be applied to substances, e.g.,
‘POISON’ instead of ‘ANTIDOTE’ or ‘D’ instead of
‘L’ optical isomers.

Substitutional Other than Complete substitution No part of the original intention is achieved.
Something quite different happens.

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The procedure for a study:

- define objectives and scope

- select the team
- prepare for the study
- carry out the examination
- follow-up
- record the result

This section outlines the elements of a HAZOP. A HAZOP is a formal review of a process, its
equipment and operation in order to identify potential hazards and operational problems. The HAZOP
process assists in reducing the hazards at a facility and reduces the likelihood of commissioning
delays.

Each line or equipment item of the facility is examined systematically by a team utilising a diverse
range of skills relevant to that facility. This group 'brainstorming' approach, using a series of 'what if'
type questions, is

effective in early identification of problems before commencement of operations. Savings in resources

from commissioning time to lives can be expected to more than offset the costs of carrying out the
study and the cost of implementing recommendations.

The procedure also provides an excellent two-way communication tool between the designer(s) and
the operator(s), as well as providing training for key prospective production staff, in the case of new
plant.

Hazard and Operability Study Methodology

Essentially, the HAZOP examination procedure systematically questions every part of a process Or
operation to discover qualitatively how deviations from normal operation can occur and whether
further protective measures, altered operating procedures or design changes are required. The
examination procedure uses a full description of the process which will, almost invariably, include a
P&ID or equivalent, and systematically questions every part of it to discover how deviations from the
intention of the design can occur and determine whether these deviations can give rise to hazards.
The questioning is sequentially focused around a number of guide words which are derived from
method study techniques. The guide words ensure that the questions posed to test the integrity of
each part of the design will explore every conceivable way in which operation could deviate from the
design intention. Some of the causes may be so unlikely that the derived consequences will be
rejected as not being meaningful. Some of the consequences may be trivial and need be considered
no further. However, there may be some deviations with causes that are conceivable and
consequences that arc potentially serious. The potential problems are then noted for remedial action.
The immediate solution to a problem may not be obvious and could need further consideration either
by a team member or perhaps a specialist. All decisions taken must be recorded. Appendix 2 provides
a recording example. Secretarial software may be used to assist in recording the HAZOP, but it should
not be considered as a replacement for an experienced chairperson and secretary. The main
advantage of this technique is its systematic thoroughness in failure case identification. The method
may be used at the design stage, when plant alterations or extensions are to be made, or applied to
an existing facility.

Definition of Objectives:

- to check a design
- to decide whether and where to build
- to decide whether to buy a piece of equipment
- to obtain a list of questions to put to a supplier
- to check running instructions
- to improve the safety of existing facilities

Types of Hazard to be considered:

- to people working in a plant

- to plant and equipment
- to or from product quality
- to the general public
- to the environment

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Team Composition:

- Technical Team Members : Plant chemist, Maintenance engineer,

R&D Chemist, Instrument engineer etc.

- Supporting Team Members : Study leader(Safety officer), Secretary

The attitude of team members:

- positive attitude
- constructive attitude
- imaginative thinking

Flow Chart:

SYMBOL ACTIVITY PREDOMINENT RESULT

OPERATION Produces, accomplishes, changes furthers the process

(a)

(b) INSPECTION Verifies quantity of quality

(c) TRANSPORT Moves or carries

(d) DELAY Interferes or delays

(e) STORAGE Holds, retains or stores

Preparative work:

- obtain the data

- convert the data into a suitable form
- plan the sequence for the study
- arrange necessary meetings

The examination in practice:

- leader will select the first item for study approach

- explanation of the intention of that selected item
- discussion using guide words
- problem solving for hazard detected or search for solutions
- sum up at the end of discussion
- mark that item as “over”
- reselect the next item
- go on…

Follow-up work:

- decisions to be communicated to those responsible

- any outstanding problems must be resolved by obtaining more info
- there must be some form of progress chasing
- implement all the agreed actions

Recording:

- record results of the study

- form a file – “HAZARD” file which should contain

HRR/ISTAR/MSc-HIS/AUG2018 3


A copy of data, P&I, OI, Charts, models etc, a copy of all working
papers
- the file should be retained on the plant
- reports can also be written for the guidance
- info generated by studies can be used to improve future designs

The programming of studies:

- early checking for major hazard

- studies at “design freeze” – the best time to carry out study
- studies pre star-up
- studies on existing plants
- studies prior to plant modifications
- studies prior to taking a plant out of service
- studies on research facilities

Case : HAZOP – Guide WordApproach

A highly toxic chemical C was being produced by compounding chemicals A & B in a

reactor. A and B were being fed manually. After sometime ( 3-4 years) the quality of C was
found getting inferior. Also the reactor thickness was started reducing very fast.
Properties of A : TLV-50 ppm, neutral, explosion hazard is likely

Properties of B : TLV-1 ppm, highly corrosive especially in moist

Properties of C : TLV-0.1 ppm, decomposition in water

Reactor : SS, Jacketed for cooling

Coolant in

A
Reactor C
B

Coolant out

6 Intention Guide word Deviation Possible causes Consequences P S Actions recommended

B Flow No No flow No stock No production L L Check stock

Valve closed Check valve

Valve malfunction And correct

Less Less flow Partial effect of the Product impurity as A L M Check the flowrate
above

And correct

Provide ratio controller for A & B.

More More flow Operator error Product impurity as B L H Check the flowrate and correct

Corrosion of reactor Provide ratio controller for A & B.

As well as As well as Cooling system Slow production L L Maintain cooling system effectively
failure or ineffective and monitor temperatures

Cooling fails

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Part of Part of B flows Same as in “less flow” condition

Reverse Reverse flow Over pressurization Product mass will flow L M Provide NRV
from reactor of reactor to Supply of B
to supply of B

Vacuum in supply
line

Other than Other than Inferior quality of B Corrosion of reactor M H QA for B.

flow of B, leading to thk
moist carry reduction
over Monitor dew point of B.

Decomposition of
product Monitor of reactor thk.

Leakage of reactor

NB : P =Probability S =Severity L = Low M = Moderate H = High

The second version of the HAZOP is “Creative Checklist Approach”. This version has been
developed as a complement to the guide word approach to cover “disturbances”. The
second method uses a check list of known major hazards and nuisances. The checklist
would contain words such as fire, explosion, toxicity, corrosion, dust and smell. The
checklist is initially applied to every material likely to be present, raw materials,
intermediates, finished products, byproducts, and effluents. This establishes qualitatively
whether hazards and nuisances exist and also provides a quantitative data base of the
numerical intensities of different hazards. Thus “fire would result in not only a note that a
material is flammable but numerical measurements such as a “flash point” and flammable
limits”. Any missing data are pinpointed and timely steps taken to collect the data.

The second method continues with the association of the same checklist with each item of
equipment. The materials present in such equipment, together with the inventories, are
known as the “materials hazards”. As the analysis proceeds, the potential for all major
hazards including interactions between units or the unit and its environment are identified.
The flow of hazards can be in both directions. Fore example, the environment may pose
hazards to the unit. Although less well known that the guide word approach, the creative
checklist approach has been found to be a quick and valuable complementary approach.

Case-: HAZOP – Creative Checklist Approach

Checkpoint Fire Explosion Toxicity Corrosion Dust Smell

Materials Raw Materials

Finished Products

Intermediates

Byproducts

Effluents

Equipment

Fill up the table with the qualitative as well as quantitative database. Any missing data are
to be pinpointed and timely steps should be taken to collect such data.

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HAZOP WORKSHEET
Plant/unit : Date :

Members :

Intention Deviation Possible Consequences Recommendations

Causes

Different Worksheet Formats in practice:

Intention Deviation Possible Consequences P S Recommendations

Causes

Intention Deviation Possible Consequences P S R Recommendations

Causes

Intention Deviation Possible Consequences P S R Existing Recommendations

Causes Facilities

Intention Deviation Possible Consequences Existing Risk Existing Recommendations Revised

Causes Facilities Risk

P S R P S R

HRR/ISTAR/MSc-HIS/AUG2018 6


The Technique

A HAZOP is organized by dividing the unit to be analyzed into nodes. A node represents a section of
the process where a significant process change takes place. For example, a node might cover the
transfer of material from one vessel to another through a pump. In this case the process change is
the increase in pressure and flow that occurs across the node. Another node might include an
overhead air-cooler on a distillation column. Here temperature and phase are the process variables
that change.

Steps in a HAZOP
The HAZOP process can be organized into the steps shown below.

Steps in a HAZOP

1. Select a node, define its purpose and determine the process safe limits.
2. Select a process guideword.
3. Identify the hazards and their causes using the deviation guidewords.
4. Determine how the hazard is "announced", i.e., how the operator knows a safe limit has been
exceeded.
5. Estimate the consequences (safety, environmental, economic) of each identified hazard.
6. Identify the safeguards.
7. Estimate the frequency of occurrence of the hazard.
8. Risk rank the hazard, with and without safeguards.
9. Develop findings and potential recommendations.
10. Move on to the next process guideword, or to the next node if the guideword discussion is
complete.

Node Selection and Purpose

As discussed above, a node represents a section of a process in which conditions undergo a significant
change. For example, a pump system will be a node because liquid pressure is increased, a reactor is
a node because chemical composition changes, and a heat exchanger is a node because it causes
changes in fluid temperatures. In practice, a single node will frequently involve more than one process
change. For example, the node for a chemical reactor will include changes to pressure, temperature
and composition.

The decision as to how big a node may be will depend on the experience of the team, the degree to
which similar process systems have already been discussed, the complexity of the process and the
judgment of the leader.

Figure 1 shows how the first of the Standard Examples can be divided into three nodes. Each node
has been circled with a cloud line.

• Node 1 (blue line) is the Tank, T-100, with its associated equipment and instrumentation (the
process change is level in the tank).
• Node 2 (red line) incorporates two pumps, P-101 A/B, and the flow control valve, FCV-101
(the process changes are flow rate and liquid pressure).
• Node 3 (green line) includes the pressure vessel, V-101, with its associated relief valve, and
other instrumentation (the process changes are pressure, chemical composition and level)

Example of Node Selection

Once the team meetings start, the scribe will place a set of full-size Piping & Instrument Diagrams
(P&IDs), with the nodes marked out, on the wall of the conference room. These master P&IDs will be
the focus point for the team discussions and will serve as the official record of the discussions. Team
members can also be issued with a set of smaller, or shot-down, P&IDs for personal use.

Most team leaders use highlighter-type pens to define the boundaries of each node. As shown in
Figure 1, different colors are used so that the interfaces between the nodes are easily seen. Although
the choice of color is not usually significant, some colors may have designated meanings. For
example, the color blue may mean that the sections so highlighted were not discussed because they
had been covered by a previous HAZOP. The color brown may designate items of equipment and
piping that are deliberately being excluded from the current HAZOP discussion - maybe because they
are out of service. Yellow may indicate that a node has been defined but not yet discussed. At the

HRR/ISTAR/MSc-HIS/AUG2018 7


conclusion of the analysis all nodes should have been colored out, thus confirming that no equipment
or piping items were overlooked.

Often, node sizes increase as the HAZOP progresses because many of the identified hazards are
repeated. For example, if a process includes several sets of tank/pump/vessel systems such as that
shown in Figure 1, the team may divide the first discussion into three nodes, as shown, but then treat
subsequent systems as single nodes.

In order to save time, the leader and scribe may pre-select the nodes. In a very simple process, this
decision may make sense. Generally, however, the team as a whole should decide on the nodes,
partly because a HAZOP is a team activity, and partly because the definition and selection of a node
often is affected by the discussions that have taken place with regard to earlier nodes. Also, if the
leader and scribe are from outside the local organization, they may not fully understand all the
process parameters that could affect node selection before the HAZOP starts.

For each node, the process engineer, and others who have knowledge of the system, will explain to
the team the purpose of each node. Table provides examples of purpose descriptions.

Table
Node Purpose Descriptions
Node Name Purpose
Number
1 Tank, T-100, and T-100 contains a working inventory of liquid RM-12 which
associated is supplied by tank (rail) cars from outside suppliers. The
instrumentation. node does not include the tank loading systems.
2 Pumps, P-101 A/B, P-101 A/B transfer liquid RM-12 from Tank, T-100, to
including flow control Vessel, V-100. Flow is controlled by FRC-101, whose set
valve, FCV-101. point is provided by LRC-100 (Node 1). One pump is
operating; the other is on stand-by. A is steam driven; B
is electrically driven. B is usually on stand-by.
3 Pressure Vessel, V- Liquid RM-12 flows into this vessel from various sources.
101, including relief V-101 provides surge capacity, thus smoothing out
valve, PSV-101. fluctuations in flow. A vent line removes residual
quantities of inert gas.

The scribe will enter the node description into the hazards analysis software. The start and stop points
for the node should explained to the team. Operations and maintenance experts will then provide
some history and operating experience about it. Any relevant documentation to do with that node,
such as equipment data sheets or material safety data sheets (MSDS), should be put before the team
at this time.

HAZOP SOFTWARES :

HRR/ISTAR/MSc-HIS/AUG2018 8


HAZOP Manager Version 6.0 is a comprehensive Personal Computer program for the management of
Hazard and Operability Studies (Hazops) and other similar safety-related reviews*. It is currently
helping many companies throughout the world to conduct more efficient and effective studies. The
software incorporates features and facilities that:

• Serve as a framework within which preparation for the review can be structured.
• Ease the task of recording the meeting minutes, and help to maintain the team's focus of
attention and interest.
• Give speedy access to material useful to the study team, such as previously identified
problems, failure rate data and other such historical information.
• Allow professionally formatted reports to be produced with the minimum of effort.
• Permit additional management information to be extracted from the study records.
• Provide a comprehensive and easy to use system for effective action follow-up and close-out,
without the significant administrative burden that this usually entails.

To learn more about the HAZOP Manager software, and how it can help you in your safety, health and
environmental review work, please visit the links displayed in the panel on the left (these are also
listed at the foot of this page).

* As its name suggests, the software is most frequently employed to record and manage Hazop
Studies, as arguably this is the most widely used loss-prevention technique. However, it is designed
to be easily configured for use in other familiar methodologies such as Process Hazards Analysis
(PHA), check-list driven Hazard Identification Reviews (HazId), Risk Assessment Studies, SIL Analysis,
Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA and FMECA), etc. As an indication of its flexibility, users have
also employed the program for Project Cost & Schedule Risk Management, Workplace H&S Regulatory
Compliance Reviews, Hazards of Construction Reviews, Preliminary Hazards Analysis, Conceptual
Project Studies, and so on. In other words, the software can be utilized for most reviews where it is
required that the results are both recorded and reported, and which generate actions that need
distribution and subsequent verification that they have been satisfactorily completed.

HAZOP+ 2012

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WHAT IS A HAZOP STUDY?

The Hazard and Operability Study (or HAZOP Study) is a standard hazard analysis technique used
in the preliminary safety assessment of new systems or modifications to existing ones.

The HAZOP study is a detailed examination, by a group of specialists, of components within a

system to determine what would happen if that component were to operate outside its normal
design mode.

The effects of such behavior is then assessed and noted down on study forms. The categories of
information entered on these forms can vary from industry to industry and from company to
company.

Specialists in Safety, Security and Risk

Primatech specializes in Safety, Security and Risk Management for the process industries.
We offer consulting, training courses, webinars, and software to assist our clients in
identifying and reducing the risk of catastrophic accidents posed by hazardous materials
used in their operations. Our services and products help companies to protect employees,
the public and the environment as well as prevent damage to facilities, process equipment
and company reputations, and improve productivity and quality. We help companies comply
with the OSHA Process Safety Management (PSM) standard, EPA Risk Management
Program (RMP) rule, and other government regulations, industry guidelines and
requirements.

Bibliography :

- HAZOP by R.Ellis Knowlton, NSC Pulication

- HAZOP - introduction in ILO Practical Manual on MAH
- HAZOP – Training literature by IIT, Kanpur

HRR/ISTAR/MSc-HIS/AUG2018 10


SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVEL (SIL):

Chemical processes are controlled with Instrument System as under.

The “Controlling” output is the most desirable because it measures deviation and also
corrects that deviation, through actuator.

The successful “Controlling” depends on Reliability of the instrument.

This Instrument Reliability is presented as SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVEL (SIL).

SIL is defined as a relative level of risk-reduction provided by a safety function, or to

specify a target level of risk reduction.

In simple terms, SIL is a measurement of performance required for a Safety

Instrumented Function (SIF).

The requirements for a given SIL are not consistent among all of the functional safety
standards.

In the European Functional Safety standards based on the IEC 61508 standard four SILs
are defined, with SIL 4 being the most dependable and SIL 1 being the least.

A SIL is determined based on a number of quantitative factors in combination with

qualitative factors such as development process and safety life cycle management.

There are several methods used to assign a SIL. These are normally used in combination,
and may include:

Ø Risk Matrices

Ø Graphs

HRR/ISTAR/MSc-HIS/AUG2018 11


Ø Layers Of Protection Analysis (LOPA)

Ø There are several problems inherent in the use of Safety Integrity Levels. These
can be summarized as follows:

Ø Poor harmonization of definition across the different standards bodies which

utilize SIL.

Ø Process-oriented metrics for derivation of SIL.

Ø Estimation of SIL based on reliability estimates.

Ø System complexity, particularly in software systems, making SIL estimation

difficult to impossible

Ø Because SIL has a simple number scheme to represent its levels (1-4), a high-
level understanding of each level is typically all that is necessary to convey SIL at
management levels. This saves management from having to understand the
technical aspects of SIL, while allowing them to discuss their concerns.

Ø The International Electrotechnical Commission's (IEC) standard IEC 61508, now

IEC EN 61508, defines SIL using requirements grouped into two broad
categories: hardware safety integrity and systematic safety integrity. A device or
system must meet the requirements for both categories to achieve a given SIL.

Ø The SIL requirements for hardware safety integrity are based on a probabilistic
analysis of the device. In order To achieve a given SIL, the device must meet
targets for the maximum probability of dangerous failure and a minimum Safe
Failure Fraction. The concept of 'dangerous failure' must be rigorously defined
for the system in question, normally in the form of requirement constraints
whose integrity is verified throughout system development. The actual targets
required vary depending on the likelihood of a demand, the complexity of the
device(s), and types of redundancy used.

For continuous operation, these change to the following. (Probability of Failure per
Hour)

SIL PFH PFH (power) RRF

1 0.00001-0.000001 10−5 - 10−6 100,000-1,000,000

2 0.000001-0.0000001 10−6 - 10−7 1,000,000-10,000,000

3 0.0000001-0.00000001 10−7 - 10−8 10,000,000-100,000,000

4 0.00000001-0.000000001 10−8 - 10−9 100,000,000-1,000,000,000

FD (Probability of Failure on Demand) and RRF (Risk Reduction Factor) of low demand
operation for different SILs as defined in IEC EN 61508 are as follows:

SIL PFD PFD (power) RRF

HRR/ISTAR/MSc-HIS/AUG2018 12


1 0.1-0.01 10−1 - 10−2 10-100

2 0.01-0.001 10−2 - 10−3 100-1000

3 0.001-0.0001 10−3 - 10−4 1000-10,000

4 0.0001-0.00001 10−4 - 10−5 10,000-100,000

For continuous operation, these change to the following. (Probability of Failure per
Hour)

SIL PFH PFH (power) RRF

1 0.00001-0.000001 10−5 - 10−6 100,000-1,000,000

2 0.000001-0.0000001 10−6 - 10−7 1,000,000-10,000,000

3 0.0000001-0.00000001 10−7 - 10−8 10,000,000-100,000,000

4 0.00000001-0.000000001 10−8 - 10−9 100,000,000-1,000,000,000

Hazards of a control system must be identified then analyzed through risk analysis.
Mitigation of these risks continues until their overall contribution to the hazard are
considered acceptable. The tolerable level of these risks is specified as a safety
requirement in the form of a target 'probability of a dangerous failure' in a given period
of time, stated as a discrete SIL.

A Safety Integrity Level (SIL) is a statistical representation of the integrity of the SIS
when a process demand occurs. It is used in IEC 61508/61511 to measure the reliability
of SIS. As demonstrated in the next table, four levels of safety integrity are presented.
The higher the SIL is, the more reliable or effective the SIS is.

Safety Integrity Level (SIL) according to IEC 61508/61511

SIL PFD Availability Required 1/PFD

1 10-2 ... 10-1 90.00 ... 99.00 % 100 ... 10

2 10-3 ... 10-2 99.00 ... 99.90 % 1,000 ... 100

3 10-4 ... 10-3 99.90 ... 99.99 % 10,000 ... 1,000

4 10-5 ... 10-4 > 99.99 % 100,000 ... 10,000

The basic steps for the LOPA risk assessment typically are:

• Identify the consequence

• Define the Risk Tolerance Criteria

• Define the relevant accident scenario

HRR/ISTAR/MSc-HIS/AUG2018 13


• Determine the initiating event frequency

• Identify the IPLs and estimate the probability of

failure on demand for each IPL

• Determine the Frequency of Mitigated Consequence

• Evaluate the need for additional IPL

LAYER OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS (LOPA):

v Layer of Protection Analysis ("LOPA") is a simplified form of risk assessment.

v It builds on the information developed during a qualitative hazard evaluation,

such as a process hazard analysis (PHA).

v The primary purpose of LOPA is to determine if there are sufficient layers of

protection against the consequences of an accident scenario (can the risk be
tolerated?).

It calculates the initiating event frequency and the likelihood of failure of independent
protection layers (IPLs) to approximate the risk of a scenario.

Then, LOPA compares the frequency of mitigated consequence with a risk tolerance
criteria established by the organization to decide if existing IPLs or safeguards are
adequate.

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