CUISON V NORTON
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, petitioner,
FACTS:
Ora was the owner of a truck which transports lumbers owned by Norton & Harrison Co.
Ora employed two minors as his helpers in securing the lumbers from the lumberyard. In
August 1928, while the truck filled with with lumber was at a stop, the lumbers slid from
the truck thereby pinning the 7 year old son of Cuison which caused the boy’s death.
Cuison sued Norton and the 2 minors for damages amounting to P30,000.00 for the death
of his son.
ISSUE: Whether or not Norton is liable as an employer.
HELD: Yes. Although the lower court did not determine the nature of relationship
between Ora and Norton it can be deduced from the testimonies given that Ora, as owner
of the truck is a contractor of Norton. But at the same time, he is also an employee of
Norton because he also acts as a foreman of the company. This being established, Norton
is liable as an employer because of Ora’s negligence in directing his men in terms of
securing the lumbers. The pertinent provisions apply:
Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or
negligence shall be liable for the damage so done. Article 1903, paragraphs 4 and 7 of the
[old Civil] Code provides: Owners or directors of any establishment or business are, in the
same way, liable for any damages caused by their employees while engaged in the branch
of the service in which employed, or an occasion of the performance of their duties. The
liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons subject thereto prove that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
Norton failed to prove that they exercised diligence in the selection of their employees.
Note further that the basis of civil liability of an employer is not respondeat superior but
the relationship of paterfamilias (or pater familias – can be spelled both ways). The theory
of pater familias bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence i.e.
selection of employees, and not that of his servant.
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CLARITA T. CAMACHO, respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Clarita T. Camacho was the operator of a gasoline station in
Naguilian Road, Baguio City, wherein she sells petitioner Shell's petroleum products.
Sometime in April 1983, private respondent requested petitioner to conduct a hydro-
pressure test on the underground storage tanks of the said station in order to determine
whether or not the sales losses she was incurring for the past several months were due to
leakages therein. Petitioner acceded to the said request and on April 27, 1983, one Jesus
"Jessie" Feliciano together with other workers, came to private respondent's station with
a Job Order from petitioner to perform the hydro-pressure test.
Feliciano and his men drained the underground storage tank which was to be tested of its
remaining gasoline. After which, they filled the tank with water through a water hose
from the deposit tank of private respondent. Then, after requesting one of private
respondent's gasoline boys to shut off the water when the tank was filled, Feliciano and
his men left. At around 2:00 a.m. the following day, private respondent saw that the
water had reached the lip of the pipe of the underground storage tank and so, she shut
off the water faucet.
At around 5:30 a.m., private respondent's husband opened the station and started selling
gasoline. But at about 6:00 a.m., the customers who had bought gasoline returned to the
station complaining that their vehicles stalled because there was water in the gasoline
that they bought. On account of this, private respondent was constrained to replace the
gasoline sold to the said customers.
However, a certain Eduardo Villanueva, one of the customers, filed a complaint with the
police against private respondent for selling the adulterated gasoline. In addition, he
caused the incident to be published in two local newspapers.
Meanwhile, petitioner undertook to settle the criminal complaint filed by Villanueva.
Subsequently, Villanueva filed an Affidavit of Desistance, 1 declaring, inter alia
"THAT, after careful evaluation of the surrounding circumstances, especially the
explanation of the representatives of SHELL Phils., that the gasoline tanks of Mrs.
Camacho were subject to Hydro test, in such a way that water was used for the said test, I
believe that she may not have had anything to do with the filling of water in the tank of
my car;
THAT, said representatives of SHELL Phils. have interceded for and in behalf of Mrs.
Camacho and have fully satisfied my claim against her.
THAT, in view of all the foregoing I do not intend to prosecute the case and I am therefore
asking for the dismissal of the case against Mrs. Camacho."
Thereafter, private respondent demanded from petitioner the payment of damages in the
amount of P10,000.00. Petitioner, instead, offered private respondent additional credit
line and other beneficial terms, which offer was, however, rejected.
Private respondent filed before the trial court a complaint for damages against petitioner
due to the latter's alleged negligence in the conduct of the hydro-pressure test in her
gasoline station.
Petitioner denied liability because, according to it, the hydro-pressure test on the
underground storage tanks was conducted by an independent contractor.
The trial court dismissed private respondent's complaint for damages for the reason that
Jesus Felciano is an independent contractor and he was not an employee of petitioner.
Jesus Feliciano is responsible for his own acts and omissions. He alone was in control of
the manner of how he is to undertake the hydro-pressure test
However, the CA reversed the said decision.
Issue: WON Petitioner should be held accountable for the damage to private respondent
due to the hydro-pressure test conducted by Jesus Feliciano.
Held:
No.
The SC held that absence of employee-employer relationship between Petitioner
and Jesus Felciano could not make Petitioner liable to PR, since in this case Feliciano was
an independent contractor, whose means and methods in conducting the hydro-pressure
test was not controlled by Petitioner. Being an independent contractor, Feliciano is
responsible for his own acts and omissions. As he alone was in control over the manner of
how he was to undertake the hydro-pressure test, he alone must bear the consequences
of his negligence, if any, in the conduct of the same.
Anent the issue of damages, the same has been rendered moot by the failure of private
respondent to establish an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and
Feliciano. Absent said relationship, petitioner cannot be held liable for the acts and
omissions of the independent contractor, Feliciano.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of respondent Court of Appeals
is hereby SET ASIDE and the decision of the trial court REINSTATED. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DE LEON BROKERAGE CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and ANGELINE STEEN, respondents.
G.R. No. L-15247 February 28, 1962
FACTS:
Andeline Steen (respondent) suffered injuries as a result of the collision between the
passenger jeepney she was riding and paetitioner’s cargo truck recklessly driven by its
employee, Luna. Luna had been prosecuted and convicted of the crime of homicide with
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. In the criminal action against Luna (and the
driver of the passenger jeepney, who was, however, acquitted), respondent had reserved
her right to file a separate civil action.
After a judgment of conviction had been rendered, respondent filed in the CFI of Manila,
an action for recovery of damages against Luna and petitioner. As proof of Luna's
negligence, she presented during the hearing the judgment of conviction in the criminal
case and likewise established her claim for actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Defendants- Luna and petitioner, sought to prove by means of the former's testimony
that he was not engaged in the performance of his duties at the time of the accident.
CFI rendered a judgment holding petitioner and Luna solidarily liable to respondent for
the sums of P1,183.70 for actual expenses; P3,000.00 for unpaid medical fees; P7,000.00
as moral damages; and P1,000.00 as attorney'sfees; all amount to earn legal interest from
the filing of the complaint, plus costs.
CA affirmed the decision of the CFI.
De Leon Brokerage claims that: (1) the allegations in respondent's complaint were so
ambiguous that it was not clear whether she was suing for damages resulting from a
quasi-delict or for civil liability arising from crime,but since the averments therein are
more characteristic of an action of the latter nature, the same, as against petitioner, is
premature for failure to allege the insolvency of its employee; (2) the judgment of
conviction is not admissible against it as evidence of a quasi-delict; (3) the employee,
Luna, was not in the discharge of his dutiesat the time of the accident; and (4) it cannot be
held solidarily liable with Luna for damages.
ISSUE: WON THE COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT WAS BASED ON A QUASI-DELICT.
HELD:
YES. The CFI and CA correctly considered respondent's complaint to be based on a quasi-
delict. She alleged that she suffered injuries because of the carelessness and imprudence
of petitioner's chauffeur who was driving the cargo truck TH-776 belonging to petitioner,
which truck collided with the passenger jeepney wherein she was riding. Since averment
had been made of the employer-employee relationship and of the damages caused by the
employee on occasion of his function, there is a clear statement of a right of action under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The complaint does not, and did not have to allege that
petitioner did not exercise due diligence in choosing and supervising Luna, because this is
a matter of defense.
The reservation made in the criminal action does not preclude a subsequent action based
on a quasi-delict. It cannot be inferred therefrom that respondent had chosen to file the
very civil action she had reserved. The only conclusion that can reasonably be drawn is
that she did not want the question of damages threshed out in the criminal action, but
preferred to have this issue decided in a separate civil action.
Considering that the judgment of conviction had been admitted without objection, its
competency can no longer be questioned on appeal.It established the fact of Luna's
negligence, giving rise to the presumption that petitioner had been negligent in the
selection and supervision of its employees.Petitioner failed to prove that it had exercised
such requisite care and diligence as would relieve it from responsibility.
Since both Luna and petitioner are responsible for the quasi-delict, their liablity is solidary,
although the latter can recover from the former whatever sums it pays to respondent.
Valenzuela V. CA (1996)
FACTS:
 June 24, 1990 2 am: While driving from her restaurant at Aranetaavenue towards the
direction of Manila, Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela noticed that she had a flat tire so she
parked along the sidewalk about 1 1/2 feet away, place her emergency lights and
seeked help
 She was with her companion Cecilia Ramon
 While she was pointing her tools to the man who will help her fixed the tires, she was
suddenly hit by another Mitsubishi Lancer driven by Richard Li who was intoxicated
and she slammed accross his windshield and fell to the ground
 She was sent to UERM where she stayed for 20 days and her leg was amputated and
was replaced with an artificial one.
 Her expenses totalled 147, 000 [120,000 php (confinement) + 27, 000 (aritificial leg)]
 PLAINTIFF filed a action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious
physical injuries. In her complaint, plaintiff prayed for moral damages in the amount
of P1 million, exemplary damages in the amount of P100,000.00 and other medical
and related expenses amounting to a total of P180,000.00, including loss of expected
earnings.
 DEFENDANT Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home,
travelling at 55 kph; considering that it was raining, visibility was affected and the
road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was driving along the inner
portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue,
when he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a
car coming from the opposite direction, travelling at 80 kph, with full bright lights.
Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding with the
oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiffs car, which he did not see because it was
midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area
was poorly lighted. He alleged in his defense that the left rear portion of plaintiffs car
was protruding as it was then at a standstill diagonally on the outer portion of the
right lane towards AranetaAvenue . He confirmed the testimony of plaintiffs witness
that after being bumped the car of the plaintiff swerved to the right and hit another
car parked on the sidewalk. Defendants counterclaimed for damages, alleging that
plaintiff was reckless or negligent, as she was not a licensed driver
 RTC: Richard Li guilty of gross negligence and liable for damages under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. Alexander Commercial, Inc., Li’s employer, jointly and severally liable
for damages pursuant to Article 2180 P41,840 actual damages, P37,500 unrealized
profits because of the stoppage of plaintiffs Bistro La Conga restaurant 3 weeks after
the accident on June 24, 1990, P20,000 a month as unrealized profits of Bistro La
Conga restaurant, from August, 1990 until the date of this judgment, P30,000.00, a
month, for unrealized profits in 2 Beauty salons, P1,000,000 in moral
damages, P50,000, as exemplary damages, P60,000, as reasonable attorney’s fees
and costs.
 CA: In agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the injuries
sustained by the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the
Lis employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any liability towards petitioner
Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the amount of moral damages to P500,000.00.
 Finding justification for exemplary damages, the respondent court allowed an award
of P50,000.00 for the same, in addition to costs, attorneys fees and the other
damages
 Eye Witness Rogelio Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just
across the scene of the accident: Valenzuela’s car parked parallel and very near the
sidewalk and Li was driving on a very fast speed and there was only a drizzle (NOT
heavy rain)
ISSUE:
1. W/N Li was driving at 55 kph - NO
2. W/N Valenzuela was guilty of contributory negligence - NO
3. W/N Alexander Commercial, Inc. as Li's employer should be held liable - YES
4. W/N the awarding of damages is proper. - YES.
HELD: CA modified with reinstating the RTC decision
1. NO
 If Li was running at only about 55 kph then despite the wet and slippery road, he
could have avoided hitting the Valenzuela by the mere expedient or applying his
brakes at the proper time and distance
 it was not even necessary for him to swerve a little to the right in order to safely
avoid a collision with the on-coming car since there is plenty of space for both cars,
since Valenzuela car was running at the right lane going towards Manila and the on-
coming car was also on its right lane going to Cubao
2. NO.
 Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a
legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is
required to conform for his own protection
 emergency rule
 an individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to
act without much time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to undertake what
subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence
 She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn
on a dark Street or alley where she would likely find no one to help her
 She stopped at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a
flat tire and to solicit help if needed
 she parked along the sidewalk, about 1½ feet away, behind a Toyota Corona Car
3. YES.
 Not the principle of respondeat superior, which holds the master liable for acts of the
servant (must be in the course of business), but that of pater familias, in which the
liability ultimately falls upon the employer, for his failure to exercise the diligence of
a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of his employees
 Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised diligent
supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter‘s assigned tasks
would be enough to relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
 situation is of a different character, involving a practice utilized by large companies
with either their employees of managerial rank or their representatives.
 Moreover, Li’s claim that he happened to be on the road on the night of the accident
because he was coming from a social visit with an officemate in Parañaque was a
bare allegation which was never corroborated in the court below. It was obviously
self-serving. Assuming he really came from his officemate’s place, the same could
give rise to speculation that he and his officemate had just been from a work-related
function, or they were together to discuss sales and other work related strategies.
 Alexander Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of the family in entrusting its
company car to Li
4. YES.
 As the amount of moral damages are subject to this Court’s discretion, we are of the
opinion that the amount of P1,000,000.00 granted by the trial court is in greater
accord with the extent and nature of the injury -. physical and psychological -
 suffered by Valenzuela as a result of Li’s grossly negligent driving of his Mitsubishi
Lancer in the early morning hours of the accident.
 the damage done to her would not only be permanent and lasting, it would also be
permanently changing and adjusting to the physiologic changes which her body
would normally undergo through the years. The replacements, changes, and
adjustments will require corresponding adjustive physical and occupational therapy.
All of these adjustments, it has been documented, are painful.
I. SHORT TITLE: Dulay vs. Court of Appeals, 243 SCRA 220
II. FULL TITLE: MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the
minor children KRIZTEEN ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all
surnamed DULAY. v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON.
TEODORO P. REGINO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84, SAFEGUARD
INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY
CORPORATION, G.R. No. 108017, April 3, 1995.
III. TOPIC: Illicit act of employee by reason of the functions entrusted to him.
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
On December 7, 1988, an altercation between BenignoTorzuela and Atty. Napoleon
Dulay occurred at the “Big Bang Sa Alabang,” Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result
of which BenignoTorzuela, the security guard on duty at the said carnival, shot and
killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay.
Petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own
behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed an action for damages against
BenignoTorzuela and private respondents Safeguard and/or Superguard, alleged
employers of defendant Torzuela.
Respondent Superguard filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint
does not state a valid cause of action. Superguard claimed that Torzuela’s act of
shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alleged act of
shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is
governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.
Superguard further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie,
since the civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the respondent argued that petitioners’
filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of Torzuela in a
criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer’s subsidiary liability.
Respondent Safeguard also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on
the ground that defendant Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners opposed
both motions, stating that their cause of action against the private respondents is
based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code. Respondent judge
declared that the complaint was one for damages founded on crimes punishable
under Articles 100 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code as distinguished from those
arising from, quasi-delict.
V. ISSUE:
(1) WON Torzuela’s act of shooting Napoleon Dulay constitutes a quasi-delict
actionable under Article 2176 of the New Civil Code;
(2) WON Article 33 of the New Civil Code applies only to injuries intentionally
committed; and
(3) WON the liability or respondents is subsidiary under the Revised Penal Code.
VI. RULING:
(1) Yes. Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides that “whoever by act or omission
causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.” Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for
limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resulting from
negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers not only acts
committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.
(2) No. The term “physical injuries” in Article 33 has already been construed to
include bodily injuries causing death. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in
the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but also consummated,
frustrated, and attempted homicide. Although in the Marcia case, it was held that no
independent civil action may be filed under Article 33 where the crime is the result of
criminal negligence, it must be noted, however, that Torzuela, the accused in the case
at bar, is charged with homicide, not with reckless imprudence, whereas the
defendant in Marcia was charged with reckless imprudence. Therefore, in this case, a
civil action based on Article 33 lies.
(3) No. Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both. The liability
of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not conditioned
upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of the
insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the private
respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and supervision of their employee.

TEODORO C. UMALI vs. HON. ANGEL BACANI (Judge, CFI Pangasinan) and FIDEL H.
SAYNES
Facts:
On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala Pangasinan.
During the storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission line of the Alcala
Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the electric wire. The live electric wire
was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric post and the other fell to the
ground. The following morning, barrio captain saw CiprianoBaldomero, a laborer of the
AEP, asked him to fix it, but the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but
that he was going to look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3
years and 8 months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the
opposite side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in
contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only after the
electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous event-
storm; (2) WON boy’s parents’ negligence exempts petitioner from liability.
Ruling: Decision affirmed.
(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of negligence on
the part of defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death of the victim by
electrocution. With ordinary foresight, the employees of the petitioner could have easily
seen that even in case of moderate winds the electric line would be endangered by
banana plants being blown down.
(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim in this
case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendants' (petitioners’) lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This law may be availed of by the
petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Petitioner's liability for injury caused by
his employees negligence is well defined in par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
RAYMUNDO ODANI SECOSA, et al. v. HEIRS OF ERWIN SUAREZ FRANCISCO
G.R. No. 160039, 29 June 2004, FIRST DIVISION, (Ynares-Santiago, J.)
FACTS
Erwin Suarez Francisco, eighteen years old, was riding a motorcycle along Radial 10
Avenue, near the Veteran Shipyard Gate in the City of Manila. At the same time, herein
petitioner, Raymundo OdaniSecosa, was driving an Isuzu cargo truck on the same road.
The truck was owned by Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. Traveling behind the
motorcycle driven by Francisco was a sand and gravel truck, which in turn was being tailed
by the Isuzu truck driven by Secosa. The three vehicles were traversing the southbound
lane at a fairly high speed. When Secosa overtook the sand and gravel truck, he bumped
the motorcycle causing Francisco to fall. The rear wheels of the Isuzu truck then ran over
Francisco, which resulted in his instantaneous death. Fearing for his life, Secosa left his
truck and fled the scene of the collision. Respondents, the parents of Erwin Francisco,
thus filed an action for damages against Raymond OdaniSecosa, Dassad Warehousing and
Port Services, Inc. and Dassads president, El BuenasucensoSy. The Regional Trail Court
rendered a decision in favor of the heirs of Francisco, which decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
Did Dassad exercise due diligence of a good father of a family to be exculpated
from liability?
RULING
NO. When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly
arises a presumption that there was negligence on the part of the employer either in the
selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. The
presumption, however, may be rebutted by a clear showing on the part of the employer
that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. Hence, to evade solidary liability for quasi-delict committed
by an employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree
of care. How does an employer prove that he indeed exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employee? While there is no rule
which requires that testimonial evidence, to hold sway, must be corroborated by
documentary evidence, inasmuch as the witnesses testimonies dwelt on mere
generalities, we cannot consider the same as sufficiently persuasive proof that there was
observance of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees. Petitioners
attempt to prove its deligentissimipatrisfamilias in the selection and supervision of
employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same with any
other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature
of the testimony.
MERCURY DRUG CORPORATION v. SEBASTIAN BAKING
FACTS:
Sebastian Baking went to Dr. Cesar Sy’s clinic for a medical check-up. The next day, after
undergoing several tests, Dr. Sy found that Baking’s blood sugar and triglyceride levels
were above normal, so he gave him 2 medical prescriptions—Diamicron (blood sugar) and
Benalize (triglyceride). Baking went to Mercury Drug Alabang branch to buy the
medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription as Dormicum, a potent
sleeping tablet, so that was what was sold to Baking. Unaware that he was given the AWARD – 50k moral damages, 25k exemplary damages
wrong medicine, Baking took one Dormicum pill a day for 3 days.
On the 3rdday of taking the medicine, Baking figured in a vehicular accident, as his car
collided with Josie Peralta’s car. Baking fell asleep while driving, and he could not
remember anything about the collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting that the tablet he
took may have a bearing on his state at the time of the collision, he returned to Dr. Sy,
who was shocked to find that what was sold to Baking was Dormicum.
Baking filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug. RTC rendered its decision in
favor of Baking. CA affirmed RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Mercury Drug is liable for damages.

HELD:
YES. MERCURY DRUG EMPLOYEE GROSSLY NEGLIGENT IN SELLING DORMICUM
To sustain a claim based on NCC 2176, the following requisites must concur:

 Damage suffered by plaintiff

 Fault or negligence of defendant
 Connection of cause and effect between A & B

The drugstore business is imbued with public interest. The health and safety of the people
will be put into jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the highest degree of
care and diligence in selling medicines. The care required must be commensurate with the
danger involved, and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of
the business which the law demands. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter
of life and death for a buying patient, the employee should have been very cautious in
dispensing medicines. She should have verified WON the medicine she gave was what was
prescribed by Dr. Sy.

MERCURY DRUG ALSO LIABLE UNDER NCC 2180

It failed to prove that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of the employee

PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT – NEGLIGENCE OF DRUGSTORE EMPLOYEE

Proximate cause – any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred
otherwise; determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of
logic, common sense, policy and precedent
Vehicular accident could not have occurred had the drugstore employee been careful in
reading the prescription; without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was
unlikely that Baking would fall asleep while driving his car, resulting in a collision
MERCURY DRUG v. DE LEON
FACTS:
1. Raul T. De Leon noticed that his left eye was reddish. He also had difficulty reading. On
the same evening, he met a friend who happened to be a doctor and had just arrived from
abroad for dinner. De Leon consulted Dr. Milla about his irritated left eye. The latter
prescribed the drugs "CortisporinOpthalmic" and "Ceftin" to relieve his eye problems.
Before heading to work the following morning, De Leon went to the Betterliving,
Parañaque, branch of Mercury Drug Store Corporation to buy the prescribed medicines.
He showed his prescription to petitioner AurmelaGanzon, a pharmacist assistant.
Subsequently, he paid for and took the medicine handed over by Ganzon. De Leon
requested his sheriff to assist him in using the eye drops. As instructed, the sheriff applied
2-3 drops on respondent's left eye. Instead of relieving his irritation, respondent felt
searing pain so immediately, he rinsed the affected eye with water, but the pain did not
subside. Only then did he discover that he was given the wrong medicine, "CortisporinOtic
Solution.” De Leon returned to the same Mercury Drug branch and confronted Ganzon
why he was given ear drops, instead of the prescribed eye drops, she did not apologize
and instead brazenly replied that she was unable to fully read the prescription. In fact, it
was her supervisor who apologized and informed De Leon that they do not have stock of
the needed CortisporinOpthalmic. De Leon wrote Mercury Drug, through its president
about the day's incident. It did not merit any response. Instead, two sales persons went to
his office and informed him that their supervisor was busy with other matters. Having
been denied his simple desire for a written apology and explanation,
De Leon filed a complaint for damages against Mercury Drug.
In fact, she presumed that since what was available was the drug CortisporinOtic Solution,
it was what De Leon was attempting to buy CA dismissed the appeal and the motion for
reconsideration on the ground that if statement of fact is unaccompanied by a page
reference to the record, it may be stricken or disregarded all together. Hence the petition.
ISSUE:
Whther or not Mercury Drug and Ganzon had exercised the degree of diligence expected
of them.
HELD:
No. Mercury Drug and Ganzon failed to exercise the highest degree of diligence expected
of them. Mercury Drug and Ganzoncan not exculpate themselves from any liability. As
active players in the field of dispensing medicines to the public, the highest degree of care
and diligence is expected of them. The profession of pharmacy demands care and skill,
and druggists must exercise care of a specially high degree, the highest degree of care
known to practical men. In other words, druggists must exercise the highest practicable
degree of prudence and vigilance, and the most exact and reliable safeguards consistent
with the reasonable conduct of the business, so that human life may not constantly be
exposed to the danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless
medicines. One holding himself out as competent to handle drugs, having rightful access
to them, and relied upon by those dealing with him to exercise that high degree of
caution and care called for by the peculiarly dangerous nature of the business.

MERCURY DRUG’S CONTENTION

- Mercury Drug and Ganzon pointed out that De Leon's own negligence was the proximate
cause of his injury. They argued that any injury would have been averted had De Leon
exercised due diligence before applying the medicine on his eye. Had he cautiously read
the medicine bottle label, he would have known that he had the wrong medicine. RTC-
rendered judgment in favor of De Leon.
a. The proximate cause of the ill fate of plaintiff was defendant AurmilaGanzon's negligent
exercise of said discretion. She gave a prescription drug to a customer who did not have
the proper form of prescription, she did not take a good look at said prescription, she
merely presumed plaintiff was looking for CortisporinOtic Solution because it was the only
one available in the market and she further presumed that by merely putting the drug by
the counter wherein plaintiff looked at it, paid and took the drug without any objection
meant he understood what he was buying. b. Although De Leon may have been negligent
by failing to read the medicine's label or to instruct his sheriff to do so, Mercury Drug was
first to be negligent. Ganzon dispensed a drug without the requisite prescription.
Moreover, she did so without fully reading what medicine was exactly being bought.
I. SHORT TITLE: Ortaliz v. Echarri. liable for the damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business
II. FULL TITLE: JOSE A. ORTALIZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. CORADO or industry."
ECHARRI, defendant-appelee, G.R. No. L-9331, July 31, 1957, ENDENCIA, J.
Defendant-appellee also contends that when the judgment in Criminal
III. TOPIC:Torts and Damages – Employer Liable for Damages Caused by Case No. 2607 of the Municipal Court of Bacolod was rendered against the
Employee Although not Engaged in Business or Industry driver SegundinoEstanda, plaintiff did not reserve the civil action and thus he
lost his right thereto and consequently the present action against the
defendant-appellee would not lie. This contention, however, is untenable,
IV. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS: for Article 33 of the Civil Code clearly provides:

In December 1953, SegundinoEstanda was driving the Studebaker Sedan car ART. 33. In cases of physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
owned by Echarri when he hit the son of Ortaliz thereby causing injuries to separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
the child. Estanda was sued and he pleaded guilty. Ortaliz subsequently sued injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
Echarri as the employer of Estanda for damages for the hospital expenses as prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
well as for moral damages because of the mental anguish, serious anxiety,
and wounded feelings he suffered due to the incident. Echarri refused to pay
alleging among others that he is not engaged in any business or industry in VII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
conjunction with which he has at any time used the said car, much less on
the occasion of the alleged accident, nor was he had at any time put out the WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal entered by the lower court is hereby revoked and the
said car for hire; that, under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, it is case remanded to said court for further proceedings. Without costs.
essential, in order for an employer to be liable subsidiarily for felonies
committed by his employee, that the former be engaged in some kind of
industry, and that the employee had committed the crime in the discharge
of his duties in connection with such industry.

V. ISSUE: Whether or not Echarri can be held liable.

VI. RULING: Yes.

Having in view the aforequoted provisions of law and those of Article

2176 to the effect that "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done", there seems to be good reason to support plaintiff's contention that
the complaint in question states sufficient cause of action. Defendant-
appellee, however, claims that there is no allegation in the complaint that
"the defendant was engaged in some kind of industry and that the employee
had committed the crime in the discharge of his duties in connection with
such industry," hence the defendant cannot be held subsidiarily liable for the
crime committed by his driver and therefore the complaint failed to state
facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. But paragraph 5 of Article
2180 refutes this contention for it clearly provides that "Employers shall be
Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District
G.R. No. L-7664 August 29, 1958
Facts:
Metropolitan Water District (defendant) owns and operates three recreational
swimming pools at its Balara filters, Diliman, Quezon City, to which people are invited and
for which a nominal fee of P0.50 for adults and P0.20 for children is charged. The main
pool it between two small pools of oval shape known as the "Wading pool" and the
"Beginners Pool." There are diving boards in the big pools and the depths of the water at
different parts are indicated by appropriate marks on the wall. The care and supervision
of the pools and the users thereof is entrusted to a recreational section composed of
Simeon Chongco as chief, Armando Rule, a male nurse, and six lifeguards who had taken
the life-saving course given by the Philippine Red Cross at the YMCA in Manila. For the
safety of its patrons, defendant has provided the pools with a ring buoy, toy roof, towing
line, saving kit and a resuscitator. There is also a sanitary inspector who is in charge of a
clinic established for the benefit of the patrons. Defendant has also on display in a
conspicuous place certain rules and regulations governing the use of the pools, one of
which prohibits the swimming in the pool alone or without any attendant. Although
defendant does not maintain a full-time physician in the swimming pool compound, it has
however a nurse and a sanitary inspector ready to administer injections or operate the
oxygen resuscitator if the need should arise.
In the afternoon of July 5, 1952, at about 1:00 o'clock, Dominador Ong, a 14-year old high
school student and boy scout, and his brothers Ruben and Eusebio, went to defendant's
swimming pools. This was not the first time that the three brothers had gone to said
natatorium for they had already been there four or five times before. They arrived at the
natatorium at about 1:45 p.m. After paying the requisite admission fee, they immediately
went to one of the small pools where the water was shallow. At about 4:35 p.m.,
Dominador Ong told his brothers that he was going to the locker room in an adjoining
building to drink a bottle of coke. Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio went to the
bigger pool leaving Dominador in the small pool and so they did not see the latter when
he left the pool to get a bottle of coke. In that afternoon, there were two lifeguards on
duty in the pool compound, namely, Manuel Abaño and Mario Villanueva. The tour of
duty of Abaño was from 8:00 to 12:00 in the morning and from 2:00 to 6:00 in the
afternoon, and of Villanueva from 7:30 to 11:30 a.m. and from 12:30 to 4:30 p.m.
Between 4:00 to 5:00 that afternoon, there were about twenty bathers inside the pool
area and Manuel Abaño was going around the pools to observe the bathers in compliance
with the instructions of his chief.
Between 4:40 to 4:45 p.m., some boys who were in the pool area informed a bather by
the name of Andres Hagad, Jr., that somebody was swimming under water for quite a
long time. Another boy informed lifeguard Manuel Abaño of the same happening and
Abaño immediately jumped into the big swimming pool and retrieved the apparently
lifeless body of Dominador Ong from the bottom. The body was placed at the edge of the
pool and Abaño immediately applied manual artificial respiration. Soon after, male nurse
Armando Rule came to render assistance, followed by sanitary inspector Iluminado
Vicente who, after being called by phone from the clinic by one of the security guards,
boarded a jeep carrying with him the resuscitator and a medicine kit, and upon arriving he
injected the boy with camphorated oil. After the injection, Vicente left on a jeep in order
to fetch Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines. Meanwhile, Abaño continued
the artificial manual respiration, and when this failed to revive him, they applied the
resuscitator until the two oxygen tanks were exhausted. Not long thereafter, Dr. Ayuyao
arrived with another resuscitator, but the same became of no use because he found the
boy already dead. The doctor ordered that the body be taken to the clinic.
Mr. and Mrs. Ong (plaintiff spouses) seek to recover from defendant, damages, funeral
expenses and attorney’s fees for the death of their son, Dominador Ong. Defendant
admits the fact that plaintiffs' son was drowned in one of its swimming pools but avers
that his death was caused by his own negligence or by unavoidable accident. Defendant
also avers that it had exercised due diligence in the selection of, and supervision over, its
employees and that it had observed the diligence required by law under the
circumstances.
After trial, the CFI dismissed the complaint.
Issues: 1. WON plaintiffs have clearly established the fault/negligence of the
defendants so as to make it liable for the damages
2. WON the Doctrine of Last Clear Chance applies
Held:
1. NO.
Since the present action is one for damages founded on culpable negligence, the principle
to be observed is that the person claiming damages has the burden of proving that the
damage is caused by the fault or negligence of the person from whom the damage is
claimed, or of one of his employees which, in the case at bar, the Spouses’ Ong failed to
establish.
There is sufficient evidence to show that appellee has taken all necessary precautions to
avoid danger to the lives of its patrons or prevent accident which may cause their death.
Thus, it has been shown that the swimming pools of appellee are provided with a ring
buoy, toy roof, towing line, oxygen resuscitator and a first aid medicine kit. The bottom of
the pools is painted with black colors so as to insure clear visibility. There is on display in a
conspicuous place within the area certain rules and regulations governing the use of the
pools. Appellee employs six lifeguards who are all trained as they had taken a course for
that purpose and were issued certificates of proficiency. These lifeguards work on
schedule prepared by their chief and arranged in such a way as to have two guards at a
time on duty to look after the safety of the bathers. There is a male nurse and a sanitary
inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen resuscitator. And there are security guards
who are available always in case of emergency.
The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom
of the pool, the employees of appellee did everything possible to bring him back to life.
Thus, after he was placed at the edge of the pool, lifeguard Abaño immediately gave him
manual artificial respiration. Soon thereafter, nurse Armando Rule arrived, followed by
sanitary inspector Iluminado Vicente who brought with him an oxygen resuscitator. When
they found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately injected
him with camphorated oil. When the manual artificial respiration proved ineffective they
applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were exhausted. And while all these
efforts were being made, they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines
who however came late because upon examining the body he found him to be already
dead. All of the foregoing shows that appellee has done what is humanly possible under
the circumstances to restore life to minor Ong and for that reason it is unfair to hold it
liable for his death.
2. NO.
The Doctrine of last Clear Chance means that, “a person who has the last clear chance to
avoid the accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in
law solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.” Since minor Ong has went
to the big swimming pool w/o any companion in violation of the rules and regulations of
the defendant as regards the use of pools, and it appearing that the lifeguard responded
to the call for help as soon as his attention was called to it, applying all efforts into play in
order to bring minor Ong back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of
the Doctrine to impute liability to appellee. Minor Ong’s fault/negligence is the proximate
and only cause of his death.
The last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to act
instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all means at
hand after the peril is or should have been discovered; at least in cases in which any
previous negligence of the party charged cannot be said to have contributed to the injury.
PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES BONIFACIO, respondents.
FACTS: Plaintiffs sued PEPSI-COLA for damages as a consequence of a collision, on May 10,
1958, involving the car of Placido Ramos and a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPSI-COLA.
Said car was at the time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos, son and co-plaintiff of
Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by its driver and co-defendant Andres
Bonifacio.
RTC: Ruled in favour of the petitioners, finding Bonifacio negligent and declaring that
PEPSI-COLA had not sufficiently proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage. PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were
ordered to pay the plaintiffs P2,638.50 actual damages; P2,000.00 moral damages;
P2,000.00 as exemplary damages; and, P1,000.00 attorney's fees, with costs.
CA: affirmed the trial court's judgment insofar as it found defendant Bonifacio negligent,
but modified it by absolving defendant PEPSI-COLA from liability, finding that, contrary to
the plaintiffs' contention, PEPSI-COLA sufficiently proved due diligence in the selection of
its driver Bonifacio.
ISSUE: WON PEPSI COLA is liable as employer of its negligent driver.
HELD: NO. PEPSI COLA is not liable.
As established in the CA the testimony of the personnel manager is entitled to full
credence. PEPSI-COLA did in fact carefully examine the driver-applicant Bonifacio as to his
qualifications, experiences and record of service. The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T.
Anasco, personnel manager of defendant company, was to the effect that defendant
driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production department; that
when he was hired as a driver, 'PEPSI had size [sic] him by looking into his background,
asking him to submit clearances, previous experience, physical examination and later on,
he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's examination, consisting of: First,
theoretical examination and second, the practical driving examination, all of which he had
undergone, and that the defendant company was a member of the Safety Council. In view
hereof, we are of the sense that defendant company had exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the choice or selection of defendant driver'. In the case of Campo vs.
Camarote No. L-9147 (1956), 53 O.G. 2794, cited in appellee's brief, the Court had
occasion to put it down as a rule that "In order that the defendant may be considered as
having exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family, he should not have been
satisfied with the mere possession of a professional driver's license; he should have
carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his experiences
and record of service." Defendant Company has taken all these steps.
 It should perhaps be stated that in the instant case no question is raised as to
due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its driver. Article 2180 of the Civil Code
provides inter alia:
... The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise
responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their functions.
x xxxxxxxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.
And construing a similar provision of the old Civil Code, this Court said in Bahia vs.
Litonjua, 30 Phil. 624, 627:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that
the presumption is juristantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently may be
rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court
that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
As pointed out, the testimony of PEPSI-COLA's witness would show sufficient
evidence to establish due diligence in the supervision by PEPSI-COLA of its drivers,
including Bonifacio.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
*** A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS FILED IN SC BUT IT WAS DENIED. In Our
decision, Werefrained from passing on the merits of the question whether PEPSI-COLA, in
operating the tractor-truck and trailer, violated the Rev. Motor Vehicle Law and the rules
and regulations related thereto, for the procedural reason that it did not appear to have
been raised before the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of Administrative Order No. 1, dated Sept.
1, 1951, in that at the time of the collision, the trailer-truck, which had a total weight of
30,000 kgms., was (a) being driven at a speed of about 30 k.p.h. or beyond the 15 k.p.h.
limit set and (b) was not equipped with a rear-vision mirror nor provided with a helper for
the driver.
It is a fact that driver Bonifacio was not accompanied by a helper on the night of the
collision since he was found to be driving alone. However, there is no finding that the
tractor-truck did not have a rear-vision mirror. To be sure, the records disclose that Pat.
Rodolfo Pahate, the traffic policeman who went to the collision scene, testified that he
saw the tractor-truck there but he does not remember if it had any rear vision mirror.4
This cannot prove lack of rear-vision mirror. And the cited provision — subpar. 4(d) — is
complied if either of the two alternatives, i.e., having a rear-vision mirror or a helper, is
present. Stated otherwise, said provision is violated only where there is a positive finding
that the tractor-truck did not have both rear-vision mirror and a helper for the driver.
The SC reiterated that the respondent superior principle is not applicable. Under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his own negligence, not that
of his employees. The former is made responsible for failing to properly and diligently
select and supervise his erring employees. We do not — and have never — followed the
respondent superior rule. So, the American rulings cited by petitioners, based as they are
on said doctrine, are not authoritative here.
SHORT TITLE: Filamer Christian Institute vs. IAC
FULL TITLE: Filamer Christian Institute, petitioner vs. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court,
Hon. Enrique P. Suplico, in his capacity as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV,
Roxas City and PotencianoKapunan Sr., respondents. G.R. No. 75112, August 17, 1992.
Gutierrez, Jr., J.
STATEMENT of THE FACTS:
Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of
petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation to the school, an employee even if he was assigned
to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the morning of each school day.
Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and
was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late
afternoon. It is significant to note that the place where Allan lives is also the house of his
father, the school president, Agustin Masa. Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha
was allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer Christian Institute.
Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road,
negotiating a sharp dangerous curb, and viewing that the road was clear. According to
Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring lights nearly hit them so that they had
to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a sound as if
something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the
Pinoy jeep swerved towards the pedestrian, PotencianoKapunan who was walking in his
lane in the direction against vehicular traffic, and hit him, which led to his hospitalization
for 20 days.
STATEMENT of THE CASE:
Kapunan filed a criminal case and an independent civil action based on Article 2180 ag
In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable
fothe tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based on Article
2180 which provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Filamer
assailed the decision and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor
Code IRR, working scholars are excluded from the employment coverage hence there is
no employer-employee relations between Filamer and Funcheta; that the negligent act of
Funcheta was due to negligence only attributable to him alone as it is outside his assigned
task of being the school janitor. The CA denied Filamer’s appeal but the Supreme Court
agreed with Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable?
RULING:
YES. The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only
meant to provide guidelines as compliance with labor provisions on working conditions,
rest periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any way affect the provisions of any
other laws like the civil code. The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In
other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor.
There is a distinction hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law
in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident
against a working student of a school and against the school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of
employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim
brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person,
against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing
rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as
a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment
for a driver’s position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly
negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for
the benefit of Filamer (the act of driving the jeep from the school to Masa’s house is
beneficial to the school because this enables Masa to do a timely school transportation
service in the morning). Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was
not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve Filamer of the burden of
rebutting the presumption juristantum that there was negligence on its part either in the
selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. Filamer has failed to
show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over
its employees Funtecha and Allan.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the decision dated October 16,
1990 is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the respondent appellate court affirming the
trial court decision is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
I.SHORT TITLE: Child Learning Center vs Tagario
II. FULL TITLE: CHILD LEARNING CENTER, INC. and SPOUSES EDGARDO L.
LIMON and SYLVIA S. LIMON, Petitioners,
vs.
TIMOTHY TAGARIO, assisted by his parents BASILIO TAGORIO
and HERMINIA TAGORIO, Respondents. G.R. No. 150920,
November 25, 2005, AZCUNA, J.
III. TOPIC: Res Ipsa Loquitur in Torts cases
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
During the school year 1990-1991, Timothy was a Grade IV student at
Marymount School, an academic institution operated and maintained by Child Learning
Center, Inc. (CLC). In the afternoon of March 5, 1991, between 1 and 2 p.m., Timothy
entered the boy’s comfort room at the third floor of the Marymount building to answer
the call of nature. He, however, found himself locked inside and unable to get out.
Timothy started to panic and so he banged and kicked the door and yelled several times
for help. When no help arrived he decided to open the window to call for help. In the
process of opening the window, Timothy went right through and fell down three stories.
Timothy was hospitalized and given medical treatment for serious multiple physical
injuries.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
An action under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was filed in the RTC of Makati by
respondents against the CLC, the members of its Board of Directors, namely Spouses
Edgardo and Sylvia Limon, Alfonso Cruz, Carmelo Narciso and Luningning Salvador, and
the Administrative Officer of Marymount School, Ricardo Pilao.
In its defense,CLC maintained that there was nothing defective about the locking
mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy was not due to its fault or negligence.
CLC further maintained that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good father of
a family to ensure the safety, well-being and convenience of its students.
After trial, the court a quo found in favor of respondents and ordered petitioners CLC and
Spouses Limon to pay respondents, jointly and severally,
P200,253.12 as actual and compensatory damages,
P200,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages,
P100,000 as attorney’s fees and the costs of the suit.
 Petitioners CLC and the Spouses Limon appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals.
3
On September 28, 2001, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto.
Petitioners elevated the case to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, after their
motion for reconsideration was denied by the CA.
VI. ISSUE:
Whether or not CLC is liable for damages caused by the injuries suffered by
Timothy Tagario on the ground of negligence of the school in maintaining its facilities.
VII. RULING:
YES. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, plaintiff has to
prove by a preponderance of evidence: (1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the
fault or negligence of the defendant or some other person for whose act he must
respond; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence and
the damages incurred.
Fault, in general, signifies a voluntary act or omission which causes damage to
the right of another giving rise to an obligation on the part of the actor to repair such
damage. Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another
person that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand. Fault requires the execution of a positive act which causes damage to another
while negligence consists of the omission to do acts which result in damage to another.
In this tort case, respondents contend that CLC failed to provide precautionary
measures to avoid harm and injury to its students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a
defective door knob despite having been notified of the problem; and (2) failure to
install safety grills on the window where Timothy fell from.
The trial court found that the lock was defective on March 5, 1991:
“The door knob was defective. After the incident of March 5, 1991, said door knob
was taken off the door of the toilet where Timothy was in. The architect who testified
during the trial declared that although there were standard specifications for door knobs
for comfort room[s], and he designed them according to that requirement, he did not
investigate whether the door knob specified in his plans during the construction [was]
actually put in place. This is so because he did not verify whether the door knob he
specified w[as] actually put in place at the particular comfort room where Timothy was
barred from getting outside. (TSN, pp. 19-20, December 8, 1994).”
The Court of Appeals held that there was no reason to disturb the factual assessment.
Petitioners would make much of the point that no direct evidence was presented
to prove that the door knob was indeed defective on the date in question.
The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the window shows that the door could
not be opened from the inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that something was
wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the principle of res ipsaloquitor.The
doctrine of res ipsaloquitor applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to
warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for the defendant’s
negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality
within the exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence
complained of; and (3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured. Petitioners are clearly answerable for
failure to see to it that the doors of their school toilets are at all times in working
condition. The fact that a student had to go through the window, instead of the door,
shows that something was wrong with the door.
As to the absence of grills on the window, petitioners contend that there was no
such requirement under the Building Code. Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as
petitioners themselves point out, was approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so that it
was within reach of a student who finds the regular exit, the door, not functioning.
Petitioners, with the due diligence of a good father of the family, should have anticipated
that a student, locked in the toilet by a non-working door, would attempt to use the
window to call for help or even to get out. Considering all the circumstances, therefore,
there is sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability on petitioners’ part.
Our pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window because he could
not get out using the door, negates petitioners’ other contention that the proximate
cause of the accident was Timothy’s own negligence. The injuries he sustained from the
fall were the product of a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening
cause, that originated from CLC’s own negligence.
VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly granted and the Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50961 dated September 28, 2001 and November 23, 2001,
respectively, are MODIFIED in that petitioners Spouses Edgardo and Sylvia Limon are
absolved from personal liability*. The Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED in all other
respects. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Mercury Drug v. Huang
Facts:
Petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug) is the registered owner of a six-
wheeler truck with. It has in its employ petitioner Rolando J. del Rosario as driver.
Respondent spouses Richard and Carmen Huang are the parents of respondent Stephen
Huang and own the red 1991 Toyota Corolla GLI Sedan.These two vehicles figured in a
road accident on December 20, 1996 at around 10:30p.m. within the municipality of
Taguig, Metro Manila. Both were traversing the C-5Highway, north bound, coming
from the general direction of Alabang going to Pasig City. The car was on the left
innermost lane while the truck was on the next lane to its right.When the truck suddenly
swerved to its left and slammed into the front right side of thecar. The collision hurled the
car over the island where it hit a lamppost, spun around andlanded on the opposite lane.
At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario only had a Traffic
Violation Receipt(TVR). His driver’s license had been confiscated because he
had been previouslyapprehended for reckless driving.The car, valued at P300,000.00,
was a total wreck. Respondent Stephen Huang sustainedmassive injuries to his spinal
cord, head, face, and lung. Despite a series of operations,respondent Stephen Huang is
paralyzed for life from his chest down and requirescontinuous medical and
rehabilitation treatment.Respondents fault petitioner Del Rosario for committing
gross negligence and recklessimprudence while driving, and petitioner Mercury Drug
for failing to exercise the diligenceof a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its driver.In contrast, petitioners allege that the immediate and proximate
cause of the accidentwas respondent Stephen Huang’s recklessness. According to
petitioner Del Rosario, hewas driving on the left innermost lane when the car bumped
the truck’s front right tire.The trial court found for petitioners and held PLDT and Del
Rosario jointly and severallyliable for actual, compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, andlitigation expenses.
Issue:
Whether or not the persumption of negligence was properly rebutted by Mercury Drug
Held:
NO. We now come to the liability of petitioner Mercury Drug as employer of
Del Rosario.Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code provide:Art. 2176. Whoever by act
or omission causes damage to another, there being fault ornegligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is nopre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and isgoverned by the
provisions of this Chapter.Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one’s ownacts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.x x xThe owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise
are likewise responsible fordamages caused by their employees in the service of the
branches in which the latter areemployed or on the occasion of their functions.x x xThe
liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or immediate. It isnot
conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing
ofinsolvency of such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee.To be
relieved of liability, petitioner Mercury Drug should show that it exercised
thediligence of a good father of a family, both in the selection of the employee and in
thesupervision of the performance of his duties. Thus, in the selection of its
prospectiveemployees, the employer is required to examine them as to their
qualifications,experience, and service records.With respect to the supervision of its
employees, theemployer should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their
implementation,and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To establish
compliance with theserequirements, employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence.In the instant case, petitioner Mercury Drug presented testimonial
evidence on its hiringprocedure. According to Mrs. MerlieCaamic, the Recruitment
and Training Manager ofpetitioner Mercury Drug, applicants are required to
take theoretical and actual drivingtests, and psychological examination. In the case of
petitioner Del Rosario, however, Mrs.Caamic admitted that he took the driving tests and
psychological examination when heapplied for the position of Delivery Man, but not when
he applied for the position of TruckMan. Mrs. Caamic also admitted that petitioner Del
Rosario used a Galant which is a lightvehicle, instead of a truck during the driving tests.
Further, no tests were conducted onthe motor skills development, perceptual speed,
visual attention, depth visualization, eyeand hand coordination and steadiness of
petitioner Del Rosario. No NBI and policeclearances were also presented. Lastly,
petitioner Del Rosario attended only three drivingseminars – on June 30, 2001,
February 5, 2000 and July 7, 1984. In effect, the onlyseminar he attended
before the accident which occurred in 1996 was held twelve yearsago in 1984.It also
appears that petitioner Mercury Drug does not provide for a back-up driver for longtrips.
At the time of the accident, petitioner Del Rosario has been out on the road for morethan
thirteen hours, without any alternate. Mrs. Caamic testified that she does not knowof any
company policy requiring back-up drivers for long trips.Petitioner Mercury Drug
likewise failed to show that it exercised due diligence on thesupervision and
discipline over its employees. In fact, on the day of the accident,petitioner Del
Rosario was driving without a license. He was holding a TVR for recklessdriving. He
testified that he reported the incident to his superior, but nothing was doneabout it. He
was not suspended or reprimanded.15 No disciplinary action whatsoever wastaken
against petitioner Del Rosario. We therefore affirm the finding that
petitionerMercury Drug has failed to discharge its burden of proving that it exercised due
diligencein the selection and supervision of its employee, petitioner Del Rosario.
AFRICA v CALTEX
FACTS:
In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing gasoline into the
underground storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out from the gasoline station and
the fire spread and burned several houses including the house of Spouses Bernabe and
Soledad Africa. Allegedly, someone (a passerby) threw a cigarette while gasoline was
being transferred which caused the fire. But there was no evidence presented to prove
this theory and no other explanation can be had as to the real reason for the fire.
Apparently also, Caltex and the branch owner (Mateo Boquiren) failed to install a
concrete firewall to contain fire if in case one happens.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.
HELD:
Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa loquitur (“the
transaction speaks for itself”) which states: “where the thing which caused injury, without
fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury
is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such control use
proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the
injury arose from defendant’s want of care.” The gasoline station, with all its appliances,
equipment and employees, was under the control of Caltex and Boquiren. A fire occurred
therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or
could have known how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but
they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that
the incident happened because of want of care.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur
is the exception because the burden of proof is shifted to the party charged of negligence
as the latter is the one who had exclusive control of the thing that caused the injury
complained of.
I.SHORT TITLE: LAMIS VS ONG
II. FULL TITLE: VICENTE LAMIS and SANDIGAN PROTECTIVE & INVESTIGATION
AGENCY, INC., petitioners, vs. DAVID Y. ONG, respondent., G.R. No. 148923. August
11, 2005, J. Sandoval-Gutierrez
III. TOPIC: Tortfeasor; Employers; Nature and kinds of Employer's liability;
Primary or Direct
IV. STATEMENT OF FACTS:
Petitioner Sandigan Protective and Investigation Agency, Inc. (Sandigan) was
the security agency providing security services at the Manila Chinese Cemetery. The
visiting hours were at 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. Sandigan instructed the security
guards not to allow any one to enter the cemetery from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.
On September 20, 1994, Vicente Lamis, also a petitioner, was the guard
assigned at the south gate of the cemetery for the 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. slot.
Around 3:00 in the morning, a Mitsubishi Lancer driven by respondent David Ong
arrived at the south gate of the cemetery. He beeped his car and continued doing
so, but Lamis did not open the gate. Eventually, he went outside the gate and
informed respondent that being beyond visiting hours, he cannot enter the
cemetery. Suddenly, respondent accelerated the speed of his car, trying to enter
the cemetery. This irked Lamis as he closed the gate and took a shot gun entrusted
to him by one of the roving guards. Respondent returned at full speed toward the
closed gate where Lamis was standing. He fired a warning shot but respondent did
not stop his car. Lamis fired another warning shot. Respondent then alighted from
his car. Seeing it was closed, he got inside the car, but before he could do so,
Lamis shot him, hitting his right arm, left hip, and right waist. He managed to drive
to the Chinese General Hospital where he was examined and treated.
Thereafter, the hospital guard reported the incident to the police who
immediately conducted an investigation. Petitioner Sandigan conducted its own
investigation but did not turn over to the police the firearm used by Lamis.
Subsequently, Sandigan paid Lamis mother the amount spent for his medical
expenses. Meanwhile, he was given another job but he absented from work
without leave. Thus, he was suspended and eventually dismissed from the service.
V. STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
Respondent filed a case for frustrated homicide against Lamis and a subsequent
complaint for damages against Lamis and Sandigan being the employer of the erring
guard.
Thereafter, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent Ong and ordered Lamis
and Sandigan to pay Ong jointly and solidarilythe following amounts: 1. Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moral damages; 2. Three Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P300,000.00) as exemplary damages; 3. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
attorneys fees, and; 4. The costs of suit. This was later affirmed by the CA in which the
appellate court held that the acts of Lamis were not the result of negligence but
were deliberate and intentional constituting, as they were, delictual acts for which
he was even charged of Frustrated Homicide. CA struck down Lamis' plea of self-
defense. CA also affirmed with the lower court's ruling as regards the payment of
damages.
VI. ISSUE:
 WON THE CA CORRECTLY DISMISSED LAMIS PLEA OF SELF-DEFENSE.
 WON THE CA CORRECTLY HELD PETITIONER SANDIGAN LIABLE DESPITE THE FACT
THAT SANDIGAN EXERCISED DUE DILIGENCE IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION
OF ITS SECURITY GUARDS
 WON THE CA, DESPITE LACK OF BASIS TO SUPPORT ANY FINDING OF LIABILITY
AGAINST PETITIONERS, CORRECTLY AWARDED DAMAGES IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENT.
VII. RULING:
The first and second issues are obviously questions of fact. Certainly, such matters
mainly require a calibration of the evidence or a determination of the credibility of
the witnesses presented by the parties and the existence and relevancy of specific
surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the
probabilities of the situation. It is doctrinally settled that where the trial courts
factual findings are adopted and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case,
the same are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
With respect to the third issue, petitioners maintain that there is no legal
basis for the trial courts award of damages. As earlier stated, the trial court found
that Lamis act of shooting the respondent was deliberate and intentional, hence,
both petitioners are jointly and solidarily liable to respondent for damages. Article
2176 of the Civil Code provides that "whoever by an act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. x xx". The obligation imposed by this Article is demandable not only
for ones own wrongful acts or omissions, but also for those persons for whom one
is responsible. Thus, petitioner Sandigan, being the employer of petitioner Lamis, is
likewise liable for damages caused by the latter.
However, SC did not agree with the award of damages by both the trial court and
CA because such awards are excessive and unwarranted. It reduced the award of moral
damages from P500K to P30K; Exemplary damages from 300K to P25K and; attorney's fees
from 50K to 20K.
VIII. DISPOSITIVE PORTION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 13, 2001
and Resolution dated June 28, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
61034 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that petitioners are ordered
to pay respondent (a) P30,000.00 as moral damages, (b) P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and (c) P 20,000.00 as attorneys fee. Costs against petitioners.
Cerezo v. Tuazon
G.R. No. 141538, March 23, 2004
TORTS: Presumption of Negligence: Employer's Vicarious Liability v. Subsidiary Liability
FACTS:
Noontime, June 26, 1993 -- A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle in
Pampanga. The driver of the tricycle Tuazon filed a complaint for damages against Mrs.
Cerezo, the owner of the bus lines, her husband, Atty. Cerezo, and bus driver Foronda.
According to the facts alleged in the complaint, Tuazon was driving on the proper lane.
There was a "Slow Down" sign which Foronda ignored. After the complaint was filed, alias
summons was served upon the person of Atty. Cerezo, the Tarlac Provincial Prosecutor.
In their reply, Mrs. Cerezo contended that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction
because there was no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover, Tuazon failed to
reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for damages in the criminal action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Mrs. Cerezo is liable for damages
HELD:
Mrs. Cerezo's contention is wrong. Tuazon's case is not based on criminal law but on
quasi-delict under the Civil Code.
The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Art. 103, RPC,
or may give rise to an action for quasi-delict under Art. 2180, C.C. An aggrieved party may
choose between the two remedies. An action based on quasi-delict may proceed
independently from the criminal action. There is, however, a distinction between civil
liability arising from a delict and civil liability arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of
remedy whether to sue for a delict or a quasi-delict, affects the procedural and
jurisdictional issues of the action.
Tuazon's action is based on quasi-delict under Art. 2180: Employer's liability.
Foronda is not an indispensable party, contrary to Mrs. Cerezo's contention. An
indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court's action in the litigation,
and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. However, Mrs. Cerezo's
liability as an employer in action for quasi-delict is not only solidary, it is also primary and
direct.
The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
Where there is a solidary liability on the part of the debtors, as in this case, each debtor is
liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable to pay for the entire obligation
in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights, but only mutual representation.
Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is indispensable, and
the other is not even a necessary party because complete relief is available from either.
Therefore, jurisdiction over Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect from
Mrs. Cerezo alone.
Moreover, an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct, while the
employer's liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words "primary and direct,"
as contrasted with "subsidiary," refers to the remedy provided by law for enforcing the
obligation rather than to the character and limits of the obligation. Although liability
under Art. 2180 originates from the negligent act of the employee, the aggrieved party
may sue the employer directly. When an employee causes damage, the law presumes that
the employer has himself committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding
the damage. This is the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in
a subsidiary capacity for the employee's criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly
liable directly and separate for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due diligence
in selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the employer's liability is wholly
subsidiary is wrong.
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another) without
including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense
that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but is not
subsidiary in the sense that it cannot be instituted till after the judgment against he
author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; action for
responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a principal action.
In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of the
employer for the criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Art. 103, RPC. To
hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the aggrieved party must
initiate a criminal action where the employee's delict and corresponding primary liability
are established. If the present action proceeds from a delict, then the trial court's
jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.
However, the action filed by Tuazon was based on a quasi-delict, which is separate and
independent from an action based on a delict. Hence, there was no need to reserve the
filing of a separate civil action. The purpose of allowing the filing the of an independent
action based on quasi-delict against the employer is to facilitate the remedy for civil
wrongs.
YONAHA VS CA (EVELYN YONAHA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS
OF HECTOR CAETE, respondents.)
Facts:
Elmer Ouano was charged with the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
In Basak, Lapulapu City, Philippines, the aforenamed accused, while driving a Toyota
Tamaraw operate it in a negligent and reckless manner, without taking the necessary
precaution to avoid injuries to person and damage to property, as a result thereof the
motor vehicle he was then driving bumped and hit Hector Caete, which caused the latters
instantaneous death, due to the multiple severe traumatic injuries at different parts of his
[
body.
When arraigned, the accused pleaded guilty.
Finding therefore the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged
against him and taking into account the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender
and plea of guilty which the prosecuting fiscal readily accepted, the Court hereby
sentences the accused to suffer and undergo an imprisonment of 1 year and 1 day to 1
year and 8 months and to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P50,000.00 for the death
of the victim; P30,000.00 for actual damages incurred in connection with the burial and
the nightly prayer of the deceased victim and P10,000.00 as attorneys fees.
A writ of execution was issued for the satisfaction of the monetary award. In his Return of
Service, dated 07 May 1992, the MTCC Deputy City Sheriff stated that he had served the
writ on accused Elmer Ouano but that the latter had manifested his inability to pay the
money obligation.
Private respondents presented a motion for subsidiary execution with neither a notice of
hearing nor notice to petitioner. Acting on the motion, nevertheless, the trial court issued
an order directing the issuance of a writ of subsidiary execution. The sheriff went to
petitioners residence to enforce the writ, and it was then, allegedly for the first time, that
petitioner was informed of Ouanos conviction. Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to
recall the subsidiary writ of execution principally anchored on the lack of prior notice to
her and on the fact that the employers liability had yet to be established. Private
respondents opposed the motion.
The trial court denied petitioners motion. On 23 September 1992, petitioners plea for
reconsideration of the denial was likewise rejected.
Petitioner promptly elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals for review. The appellate
court, in its decision of 28 September 1993, dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
In the instant appeal, petitioner additionally reminds the Court that Ouanos conviction
was not the result of a finding of proof beyond reasonable doubt but from his
spontaneous plea of guilt.

Issue: WON Ouanos conviction was the result of a finding of proof beyond reasonable
doubt but from his spontaneous plea of guilt.

Held: It was not the result of a finding of proof beyond reasonable doubt but from his
spontaneous plea of guilt.

-The Court firnds merit in the petition.

- The statutory basis for an employers subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of
[5]
the Revised Penal Code. This Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this
subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged
[6]
guilty, on the thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the execution
process of the judgment. But, execution against the employer must not issue as just a
matter of course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the
employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal
applicability and propriety of the employers liability. The requirement is mandatory even
when it appears prima facie that execution against the convicted employee cannot be
satisfied. The court must convince itself that the convicted employee is in truth in the
employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged in an industry of some kind; that the
employee has committed the crime to which civil liability attaches while in the
performance of his duties as such; and that execution against the employee is
[7]
unsuccessful by reason of insolvency.
The assumption that, since petitioner in this case did not aver any exculpatory facts
in her motion to stay and recall, as well as in her motion for reconsideration, which could
save her from liability, a hearing would be a futile and a sheer rigmarole is
unacceptable. The employer must be given his full day in court.
To repeat, the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code requires (a) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b) that the
employer is engaged in some kind of industry; (c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of
the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties
(not necessarily any offense he commits while in the discharge of such duties); and (d)
that said employee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction of the employee, of course,
[8]
concludes the employer and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the same
criminal case, but to afford the employer due process, the court should hear and decide
that liability on the basis of the conditions required therefor by law