Republic of the Philippines 4.
That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER
CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a
judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481,
390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer
Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section
48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and
the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said
proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr.
Rodolfo Nazario is a corporation duly organized in accordance with
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr.
Rodolfo Nazario can acquire real properties pursuant to the
provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the
provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was
ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on
October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both
members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or
sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the
Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the
Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to
generation until the same came into the possession of Mariano
Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co., Inc., is continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the
present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who were granted
from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962,
hence the possession is already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant
to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute
ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land
occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the
alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced
more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of
improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during
its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on
September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be
registered by the applicant was duly recognized by the
government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela,
have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality
when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from
the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on
November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by the
Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during
their special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as
to the applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand.
Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have been
commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had
gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section
11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from
holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed
1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was
in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the
Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor of Acme
Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves
or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open.
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether
disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least
30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b)
hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted
findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the
Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this
Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased
the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national
cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors,
possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more
than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to
exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have
their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as
the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and
register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973
Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the
title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in
favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973
Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein
against private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in
lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at
the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were
then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative.
If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the
constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations
or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs.
Castro-Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that
case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of
the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two
lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed
by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia
Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On
December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Makati Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming
that the lots were public land, dismissed the application on the ground that
Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino
citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld
the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public
land only upon the issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino
citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public land
and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for
its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot
be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition
makes no distinction between (on the one hand) alienable
agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect
title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain
as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation.
 Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not
make any distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to
alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be secured
under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b)
'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of
Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of
cases beginning with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down
to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine
that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for
the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land,
upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of
judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property. That said dissent expressed what is the better — and, indeed,
the correct, view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the
principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the
Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands
wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It was
ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to
those 'who may prove' possession for the necessary time and we
do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer
would have recommended an application under the foregoing
decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of
an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in
danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove'
(acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions, might
be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation.
There are indications that registration was expected from all but
none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was
not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred
by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in
more categorical language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section
45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with,
for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and
through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public
domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July
26, 1984, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon
applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already
acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate
of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned
by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the
provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin
Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands
disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control,
and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela
Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste
vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs.
Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by
invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in
jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which
the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's
case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more
than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-
interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to
segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is
no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent.
....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in
the foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title
being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public
domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to
dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
 would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be
issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of
considering possession of public land which is of the character and
duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from
the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "...
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive
presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than
a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already
vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public
to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by
operation of law from the moment the required period of possession
became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications
that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that,
for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to
which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October
29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be
conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there
being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in
the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting
corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land,
despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title
in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the
Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire
the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935
Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from
purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had
already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title.
The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire,
hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The
purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought
under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from
owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested
before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly
valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances,
that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no
retroactive application to the sales application of Binan
Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested
right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took
effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated
by the new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public
agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four
hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of
vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights.
'A state may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by
the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal
ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except
in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of
the 1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the
land in question had become fixed and established and was no
longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for
the issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land
from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent
for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right
without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by
Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental
circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in
nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought
to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's
entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the
undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973
Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered,
only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same
benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which
violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that
the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed
to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of
cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously
and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The
Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere
lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the
basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already
private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme.
Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no
prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The
objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for
judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the
dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on
the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of
their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error not having filed the application for registration in the name of
the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land
to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any prohibition
against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the
name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons)
with the end result of their application being granted, because of
their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and
the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It
should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great
cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to
the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these
years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering
the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the
evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as
natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation
of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and
mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the
herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly
qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the
applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so
acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the
Infiels and the latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title
and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the
lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty
charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily
obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule
on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent
in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively
recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms
and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has
passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases.
Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the
concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos,
in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a
juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an
imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was
only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may,
in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short,
decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of
the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without
costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore,
dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting
opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is
herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct
view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case
of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited
therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a
land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act
provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law
[this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive
prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land
ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I
hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we
are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents
and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which departed
therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in
amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors
"shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure
established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the
statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to
a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a
legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in question by a grant of
the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and
had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to
sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case
of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral
family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which
reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the
Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and
regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well,
or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when
called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it,
as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and
related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited
established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up
to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We
reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of
alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of law without
the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso
jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property,
which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such
as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application
for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of
the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion
into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and
there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition
against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public
domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no
public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from
the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution
which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands
(except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which
imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that
the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof
as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments
redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community,
particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated
part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be
impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently
stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted
into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable
title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which
needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for
formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully
and validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the
filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly
reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered
lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied
and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso
jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the
opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the
filing of such application which would have originally expired first on
December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941,
then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further
extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31,
1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder
for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of
substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly
applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to
the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as
natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the
title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the
Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations
(both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own
private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the
private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from
the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of
the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant
was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural persons-
transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us
in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of
being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By
legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the
realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under
Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from
no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while
concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the
therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his
opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be
lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner
corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive
prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is
the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that
no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to
natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of
public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the
exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically
and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year
period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But
when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of
possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable
title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the
applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully
transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and
should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited
opinions, that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive
prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution
would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural
persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their
title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully
transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the
validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It
should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the
corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I
understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the
technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation
of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
 least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed
one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such
lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional
provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the
issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain
(Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic
vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA
449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my
opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title
over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to
ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed
to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the
circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the
courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a
dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799,
823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of
their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error in not having filed the application for registration in the name
of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of
the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being
refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners
and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition
of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption
therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of
refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years
dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision
that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision
(Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title
to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted
by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be
such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New
York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S
Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352;
cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law,
and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain
thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle
that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the
statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient
operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if
possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being
construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified,
destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is
fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect
to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is
preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to
render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover,
notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of
 extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute
may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and
words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is
necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the
provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to
make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos
vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited
in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public
policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest
manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would
alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs.
Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore,
dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting
opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is
herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct
view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case
of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited
therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established
doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a
land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act
provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law
[this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive
prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land
ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I
hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we
are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents
and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which departed
therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in
amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors
"shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure
established in the Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the
statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to
a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that
certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a
legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in question by a grant of
the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and
had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to
sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case
of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral
family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which
reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the
Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and
regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well,
or better, in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when
called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the
proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it,
as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and
related cases subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited
established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently applied up
to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was
promulgated).<äre||anº•1àw> We reaffirm the established doctrine that
such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure
or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a
certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and
becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by
qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed
in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of
the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such conversion
into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and
there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition
against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the public
domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no
public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from
the Infiels on October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution
which contained no prohibition against corporations holding public lands
(except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which
imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that
the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof
as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments
redounding presumably to the welfare and progress of the community,
particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it donated
part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be
impaired by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently
stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso jure converted
into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable
title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which
needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for
formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully
and validly transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the
filing of such applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and
incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly
reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the
settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered
lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied
and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso
jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the
opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the
filing of such application which would have originally expired first on
December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941,
then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further
extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31,
1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder
for confirmation of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of
substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is properly
applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by
considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to
the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as
natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the
title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the
Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations
(both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own
private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the
private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief
Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line from
the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of
the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant
was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural persons-
transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an
insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy,
although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed by us
in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of
being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By
legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the
realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under
Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from
no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while
concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the
therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his
opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be
lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner
corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive
prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is
the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that
no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to
natural citizens who may prove their undisputed and open possession of
public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their
predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the
exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically
and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year
period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But
when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of
possession, the Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable
title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the
applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully
transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and
should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited
opinions, that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive
prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution
would be to consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural
persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their
title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully
transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the
validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It
should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the
corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I
understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni
Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the
technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation
of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such
lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed are the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed
one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such
lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional
provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the
issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain
(Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic
vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA
449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my
opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title
over the land involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to
ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed
to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the
circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the
courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a
dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799,
823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of
their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical
error in not having filed the application for registration in the name
of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of
the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being
refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners
and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their
application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition
of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption
therein provided in their favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of
refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs.
dispose of it here and now." (Emphasis supplied) Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision Footnotes
that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision 1 114 SCRA 799.
(Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title
to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted
2 Carino vs. Insular Government, 41 Phil. 935, 944.
by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should not be
such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New
York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S 3 Susi vs. Razon, 48 Phil. 424.
Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352;
cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351). 4 Herico vs. Dar 95 SCRA 437.

It has also been said that: 5 Of said Decree/Regulations of June 25, 1880.

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the 6 emphasis supplied.
assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law,
and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain 7 63 Phil. 654.
thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle
that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the
statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient 8 Phil. 251.
operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if
possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being 9 21 SCRA 743.
construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified,
destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered 10 29 SCRA 760.
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is
fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect
11 There was withal a later attempt by the ponente in Herico
to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is
(Castro, J.) to somewhat soften the import of the doctrine, in his
preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to
concurrence in Meralco (114 SCRA 799, 810-813)
render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover,
notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of
extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute 12 Emphasis supplied; the provision referred to is Section 48(b) of
may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and C.A. No. 141. "
words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is
necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the 13 Sec. 48(b).
provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to
make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos 14 Referring, precisely, to Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973
vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited Constitution.
in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)

15 Ayog vs. Cusi, Jr., 118 SCRA 492.

The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public
policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest
manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would Teehankee, C.J.,
alter or defeat that policy.
1 Meralco vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799, and Republic vs.
Villanueva and Iglesia ni Cristo, 114 SCRA 875, respectively.
Director of Lands v. IAC, ACME Plywood and Veneer Co. Digest
Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appelate Court (IAC)
146 SCRA 509 December 29, 1986
Facts:
1. Defendant through his lawyer filed an answer therein
admitting the averment i n the complaint that the land was
acquired by the plai ntiff through i nheritance from his parents,
the former owners thereof.
2.Subsequentl y, the defendant changed his counsel, and with
leave of court, amended the answer. In the amended answer,
the admission no longer appears. The alleged ownership of the
land by the plai ntiff was denied coupled with an allegation that
the defendant is the owner of the land as he bought it from the
plaintiff’s parents while they were still alive.
3. A f t e r t r i a l , t h e lower court upheld
t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s ownership of the land. On appeal, the plaintiff
contended that the defendant is bound by the admission contained in his
original answer.
Issue: Whether or not the contention of plaintiff is correct
RULING: NO. The original pleading had been amended such that
it already disappeared from the record, lost its status as a
pleading and cease to be a judicial admission. While the said pleading may
be utilized against the pleader as extrajudicial admission, they must, in
order t o h a v e s u c h e f f e c t , b e formally offered in evidence.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and
ACMEPLYWOOD & VENEER Co. INC., ETC.146 SCRA 509
DATE: December 29, 1986
PETITIONER: The Director of Lands
RESPONDENTS: Intermediate Appellate Court and Acme Plywood & Veneer
Co.Inc., Etc.PONENTE: J. Narvasa
FACTS:The Director of Lands appealed the judgement of the Intermediate
AppellateCourt which affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Isabelaordering the registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.,
Inc. of fiveparcels of land measuring 481, 390 sqm., acquired from
Mariano and Acer Infiel,members of the indigenous Dumagat Tribe and
owners of the lots-in-questionfrom time immemorial, on October 29, 1962.
This was accordingly onlyregistered on July 17, 1982 long after the
aegis of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUES:1.Whether or not the ruling in the case, Meralco v. Castro-
Bartolome (114SRC 799) should be overturned in light of jurisprudence.
2.Whether or not the conversion of the land in question is recognized.
3.Whether or not the provision barring private companies and
associationsfrom purchasing public alienable lands in 1973 Constitution is
applicableretroactively.
RULING:1.
HELD. In light of the jurisprudence traced from Carino v. Insular Gov’t, to
Susi v. Razon, to Herico v. Dar, the court overturned the decision
onMeralco v. Castro-Bartolome, stating that a possession is said to
beprescriptively acquired by the operation of the Public Lands Act,
uponconclusively presumed fulfillment of all the necessary conditions for
aGovernment Grant. Thus, the land in question effectively ceased to be
of the public domain and was therefore classified as private property at
themoment of the sale through the continuous and unchallenged
possessionof the bona fide right t
o ownership from Meralco’s predecessors
-interest.There being no law prohibiting the sale of private lands
to privately heldcorporations, the court thus overturned the decision.2.
HELD. Referring to the ruling in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, the landheld
by the Infiels since time immemorial was effectively deemed asprivate
land, by the operation of the law, ipso jure. Thus, at the moment of the
sale, ACME Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., Etc. therefore, purchased
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46729 November 19, 1982
LAUSAN AYOG, BENITO AYOG, DAMASO AYOG, JULIO AYOG,
SEGUNDA AYOG, VICENTE ABAQUETA, BERNARDINO ADORMEO,
VIDAL ALBANO, FELICIANO ARIAS, ANTONIO BALDOS, MAXIMO
BALDOS, ROMERO BINGZON, EMILIO CADAYDAY, FRUCTUOSO
CHUA, SR., HERACLEO CHUA, GUILLERMO DAGOY, ABDON DEIMOS,
NICASIO DE LEON, JULIANA VDA. DE DIANNA, DEMOCRITO
DEVERO, ALFREDO DIVINAGRACIA, ESTEBAN DIVINAGRACIA,
LEODEGARDIO DIVINAGRACIA, NELLO DIVINAGRACIA,
MERQUIADES EMBERADOR, JESUS EMPERADO, PORFERIO ENOC,
SOFRONIO ENOC, RAFAEL GAETOS, NICOLAS GARLET, TRINIDAD
GARLET, FORTUNATA GEONZON, NICOLADA NAQUILA, TORIBIO
NAQUILA, EFREN OKAY, ELPIDIO OKAY, SR., DIEGO ONGRIA,
ERNESTO PANARES, VICENTE PATULOT, IGNACIA RIBAO, JUANO
RICO, JESUS ROSALITA, ARMANDO TANTE and ANSELMO
VALMORES, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE VICENTE N. CUSI, JR., Court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch I, PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF DAVAO, and BINAN
DEVELOPMENT CO., INC., respondents. MINISTER OF NATURAL
RESOURCES and DIRECTOR OF LANDS, intervenors.
The Director found that the protestants (defendants in the 1961 ejectment
suit, some of whom are now petitioners herein) entered the land only after
it was awarded to the corporation and, therefore, they could not be
regarded as bona fide occupants thereof. The Director characterized them
as squatters. He found that some claimants were fictitious persons (p. 30,
Rollo of L-43505, Okay vs. CA). He issued a writ of execution but the
protestants defied the writ and refused to vacate the land (p. 28, Rollo of
L-43505, Okay vs. CA). **
Because the alleged occupants refused to vacate the land, the corporation
filed against them on February 27, 1961 in the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Civil Case No. 3711, an ejectment suit (accion publiciana). The
forty defendants were Identified as follows:
1. Vicente Abaqueta 21. Eniego Garlic
2. Candido Abella 22. Nicolas Garlic
3. Julio Ayog 23. Rufo Garlic
4. Arcadio Ayong 24. Alfonso Ibales
5. Generoso Bangonan 25. Julian Locacia
6. Lomayong Cabao 26. Filomeno Labantaban

7. Jose Catibring 27. Arcadio Lumantas

AQUINO, J.:

8. Teodolfo Chua 28. Santos Militante

This case is about the application of section 11, Article XIV of the 1973
Constitution (disqualifying a private corporation from purchasing public
lands) to a 1953 sales award made by the Bureau of Lands, for which a 9. Guillermo Dagoy 29. Toribio Naquila
sales patent and Torrens title were issued in 1975, and to
the 1964 decision of the trial court, ejecting some of the petitioners from 10. Anastacia Vda. de Didal 30. Elpidio Okay
the land purchased, which decision was affirmed in 1975 by the Court of
Appeals. That legal question arises under the following facts: 11. Alfredo Divinagracia 31. Guillermo Omac

On January 21, 1953, the Director of Lands, after a bidding, awarded to 12. Silverio Divinagracia 32. Emilio Padayday
Biñan Development Co., Inc. on the basis of its 1951 Sales Application No.
V-6834 Cadastral Lot No. 281 located at Barrio Tamugan, Guianga (Baguio
13. Galina Edsa 33. Marcosa Vda. de Rejoy
District), Davao City with an area of about two hundred fifty hectares.
Some occupants of the lot protested against the sale. The Director of
Lands in his decision of August 30, 1957 dismissed the protests and 14. Jesus Emperado 34. Lorenzo Rutsa
ordered the occupants to vacate the lot and remove their improvements.
No appeal was made from that decision. 15. Porfirio Enoc 35. Ramon Samsa
16. Benito Ente 36. Rebecca Samsa
17. German Flores 37. Alfeao Sante
18. Ciriaco Fuentes 38. Meliton Sante
19. Pulong Gabao 39. Amil Sidaani
20. Constancio Garlic 40. Cosme Villegas
That ejectment suit delayed the issuance of the patent. The trial court
found that the protests of twenty of the abovenamed defendants were
among those that were dismissed by the Director of Lands in his 1957
decision already mentioned.
On July 18, 1961 the purchase price of ten thousand pesos was fully paid
by Binan Development Co., Inc. On November 10, 1961, an official of the
Bureau of Lands submitted a final investigation report wherein it was
stated that the corporation had complied with the cultivation and other
requirements under the Public Land Law and had paid the purchase price
of the land (p. 248, Rollo).
It was only more than thirteen years later or on August 14, 1975 when
Sales Patent No. 5681 was issued to the corporation for that lot with a
reduced area of 175.3 hectares. The patent was registered. Original
Certificate of Title No. P-5176 was issued to the patentee.
The Director of Lands in his memorandum dated June 29, 1974 for the
Secretary of Natural Resources, recommending approval of the sales
patent, pointed out that the purchaser corporation had complied with the
said requirements long before the effectivity of the Constitution, that the
land in question was free from claims and conflicts and that the issuance
of the patent was in conformity with the guidelines prescribed in Opinion
No. 64, series of 1973, of Secretary of Justice Vicente Abad Santos and
was an exception to the prohibition in section 11, Article XIV of the
Constitution (p. 258, Rollo).
Secretary of Natural Resources Jose J. Leido, Jr., in approving the patent
on August 14, 1975, noted that the applicant had acquired a nested
right to its issuance (p. 259, Rollo).
Before that patent was issued, there was a trial in the ejectment suit.
Fifteen defendants (out of forty), namely, Julio Ayog, Guillermo Bagoy,
Generoso Bangonan, Jose Catibring, Porfirio Enoc, Jose Emperado, Arcadio
Lomanto, Toribio Naquila, Elpidio Okay, Alfeo Sante, Meliton Sante, Ramon
Samsa, Rebecca Samsa, Arcadio Sarumines and Felix Tahantahan,
testified that they entered the disputed land long before 1951 and that
they planted it to coconuts, coffee, jackfruit and other fruit trees. (p. 28,
Record on Appeal).
The trial court did not give credence to their testimonies. It believed the
report of an official of the Bureau of Lands that in 1953 the land was free
from private claims and conflicts and it gave much weight to the decision
of the Director of Lands dismissing the protests of the defendants against
the sales award (p. 30, Record on Appeal).
Furthermore, the trial court during its ocular inspection of the land on
November 8, 1964 found that the plantings on the land could not be more
than ten years old, meaning that they were not existing in 1953 when the
sales award was made. Hence, the trial court ordered the defendants to
vacate the land and to restore the possession thereof to tile company. The
Court of Appeals affirmed that judgment on December 5, 1975 in its
decision in Binan Development Co., Inc. vs, Sante, CA-G.R. No. 37142- R.
The review of the decision was denied by this Court on May 17, 1976 in
Elpidio Okay vs. Court of Appeals, L-43505.
After the record was remanded to the trial court, the corporation filed a
motion for execution. The defendants, some of whom are now petitioners
herein, opposed the motion. They contended that the adoption of the
Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, was a supervening
fact which rendered it legally impossible to execute the lower court's
judgment. They invoked the constitutional prohibition, already mentioned,
that "no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the
public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in
area."
The lower court suspended action on the motion for execution because of
the manifestation of the defendants that they would file a petition for
prohibition in this Court. On August 24, 1977, the instant prohibition
action was filed. Some of the petitioners were not defendants in the
ejectment case.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition has no retroactive
application to the sales application of Biñan Development Co., Inc.
because it had already acquired a vested right to the land applied for at
the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. lt could not be abrogated by the
new Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows
private corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding
one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioners' prohibition action is
barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
"A right is vested when the right to enjoyment has become the property of
some particular person or persons as a present interest" (16 C.J.S. 1173).
It is "the privilege to enjoy property legally vested, to enforce contracts,
and enjoy the rights of property conferred by the existing law" (12 C.J.
955, Note 46, No. 6) or "some right or interest in property which has
become fixed and established and is no longer open to doubt or
controversy" (Downs vs. Blount 170 Fed. 15, 20, cited in Balboa vs.
Farrales, 51 Phil. 498, 502).
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. "A state
may not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment
or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in
the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police
power" (16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
It has been observed that, generally, the term "vested right" expresses
the concept of present fixed interest, which in right reason and natural
justice should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an innately
just and imperative right which an enlightened free society, sensitive to
inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny (16 C.J.S. 1174,
Note 71, No. 5, citing Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc. vs. Rosenthal,
192 Atl. 2nd 587).
Secretary of Justice Abad Santos in his 1973 opinion ruled that where the
applicant, before the Constitution took effect, had fully complied with all
his obligations under the Public Land Act in order to entitle him to a sales
patent, there would seem to be no legal or equitable justification for
refusing to issue or release the sales patent (p. 254, Rollo).
In Opinion No. 140, series of 1974, he held that as soon as the applicant
had fulfilled the construction or cultivation requirements and has fully paid
the purchase price, he should be deemed to have acquired by purchase
the particular tract of land and to him the area limitation in the new
Constitution would not apply.
In Opinion No. 185, series of 1976, Secretary Abad Santos held that where
the cultivation requirements were fulfilled before the new Constitution took
effect but the full payment of the price was completed after January 17,
1973, the applicant was, nevertheless, entitled to a sales patent (p. 256,
Rollo).
Such a contemporaneous construction of the constitutional prohibition by a
high executive official carries great weight and should be accorded much
respect. It is a correct interpretation of section 11 of Article XIV.
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the
1973 Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in
question had become fixed and established and was no longer open to
doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the
issuance of a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the
public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a patent for that land is
protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process
(Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).
As we cannot review the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, we cannot entertain petitioners' contention that many of them by
themselves and through their predecessors-in-interest have possessed
portions of land even before the war. They should have filed homestead or
free patent applications.
Our jurisdiction is limited to the resolution of the legal issue as to whether
the 1973 Constitution is an obstacle to the implementation of the trial
court's 1964 final and executory judgment ejecting the petitioners. On that
issue, we have no choice but to sustain its enforceability.
Nevertheless, in the interest of social justice, to avoid agrarian unrest and
to dispel the notion that the law grinds the faces of the poor, the
administrative authorities should find ways and means of accommodating
some of the petitioners if they are landless and are really tillers of the
soil who in the words of President Magsaysay deserve a little more food in
their stomachs, a little more shelter over their heads and a little more
clothing on their backs. The State should endeavor to help the poor who
find it difficult to make both ends meet and who suffer privations in the
universal struggle for existence.
A tiller of the soil is entitled to enjoy basic human rights, particularly
freedom from want. The common man should be assisted in possessing
and cultivating a piece of land for his sustenance, to give him social
security and to enable him to achieve a dignified existence and become an
independent, self-reliant and responsible citizen in our democratic society.
To guarantee him that right is to discourage him from becoming a
subversive or from rebelling against a social order where, as the architect
of the French Revolution observed, the rich are choking with the
superfluities of life but the famished multitude lack the barest necessities.
Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of
public agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land
ownership or to encourage "owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-
size farm" and to prevent a recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge
landholdings by corporations or private persons had owned social unrest.
Petitioners' counsel claims that Biñan Development Co., Inc. seeks to
execute the judgment in Civil Case No. 3711, the ejectment suit from
which this prohibition case arose, against some of the petitioners who
were not defendants in that suit (p. 126, Rollo).
Those petitioners are not successors-in-interest of the defendants in the
ejectment suit. Nor do they derive their right of possession from the said
defendants. Those petitioners occupy portions of the disputed land distinct
and separate from the portions occupied by the said defendants.
We hold that judgment cannot be enforced against the said petitioners
who were not defendants in that litigation or who were not summoned and
heard in that case. Generally, "it is an axiom of the law that no man shall
be affected by proceedings to which he is a stranger" (Ed. A. Keller & Co.
vs Ellerman & Bucknall Steamship Co., 38 Phil. 514, 520).
To enforce the judgment against those who were not parties to the
case and who occupy portions of the disputed land distinct and separate
from the portions occupied by the defendants in the ejectment suit, would
be violative of due process of law, the law which, according to Daniel
Webster in his argument in the Dartmouth College case, is the law of the
land, a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry
and renders judgment only after trial. "The meaning is, that every citizen
shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the protection
of the general rules which govern society." (Cited in Lopez vs. Director of
Lands, 47 Phil. 23, 32. See Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, L-35615 and Tang Tee
vs. Arlegui, L-41360, February 17, 1977, 75 SCRA 234 and Berses vs.
Villanueva, 25 Phil. 473.)
Contempt incident.-During the pendency of this case, or at about four
o'clock in the morning of December 12, 1978, Ciriaco Tebayan, Domingo
Nevasca, Rogelio Duterte and Sofronio Etac, employees of the Crown
Fruits and Cannery Corporation, plowed or bulldozed with their tractors a
portion of the disputed land which was occupied by Melquiades Emberador,
one of the petitioners herein. The disputed land was leased by Biñan
Development Co., Inc. to the canning corporation.
The four tractor drivers destroyed the improvements thereon worth about
five thousand pesos consisting of coffee, coconut and banana plants.
Emberador was in the hospital at the time the alleged destruction of the
improvements occurred. However, it should be noted that Emberador was
not expressly named as a defendant in the ejectment suit. Apparently, he
is not included in the trial court's decision although he was joined as a co-
petitioner in this prohibition case.
The petitioners in their motion of January 11, 1979 asked that the four
tractor drivers and Honesto Garcia, the manager of Biñan Development
Co., Inc., be declared in contempt of court for having disregarded the
restraining order issued by this Court on August 29, 1977, enjoining
specifically Judge Vicente N. Cusi and the provincial sheriff from enforcing
the decision in the ejectment suit, Civil Case No. 3711 (pp. 46-47, 138-
141, Rollo).
Garcia and the four drivers answered the motion. The incident was
assigned for hearing to Judge Antonio M. Martinez of the Court of First
Instance of Davao. Judge Martinez found that the plowing was made at the
instance of Garcia who told the barrio captain, petitioner Lausan Ayog, a
Bagobo, that he (Garcia) could not wait anymore for the termination of
this case.
The record shows that on April 30, 1979 or four months after the said
incident, Emberador, in consideration of P3,500, as the value of the
improvements on his land, executed a quitclaim in favor of the Crown
Fruits and Cannery Corporation (Exh. 1, 2 and 3).
We hold that no contempt was committed. The temporary restraining
order was not directed to Biñan Development Co., Inc. its officers, agents
or privies. Emberador was not named specifically in the trial court's
judgment as one of the occupants to be ejected.
For the redress of whatever wrong or delict was committed against
Emberador by reason of the destruction of his improvements, his remedy
is not in a contempt proceeding but in some appropriate civil and criminal
actions against the destroyer of the improvements.
In resume, we find that there is no merit in the instant prohibition action.
The constitutional prohibition relied upon by the petitioners as a ground to
stop the execution of the judgment in the ejectment suit has no
retroactive application to that case and does not divest the trial court of
jurisdiction to enforce that judgment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit but with the
clarification that the said judgment cannot be enforced against those
petitioners herein who were not defendants in the ejectment case, Civil
Case No. 3711, and over whom the lower court did not acquire
jurisdiction. The contempt proceeding is also dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Escolin, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
VASQUEZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the very ably written main opinion. However, I wish to erase
any possible erroneous impression that may be derived from the
dispositive portion insofar as it declares that the judgment in the
ejectment cage may not be enforced against the petitioners who were not
defendants in Civil Case No. 3711 and over whom the lower court did not
acquire jurisdiction.
The judgment in any case is binding and enforceable not only against the
parties thereto but also against "their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action" (Sec. 49[b], Rule 39,
Rules of Court). We have previously held that the judgment in an
ejectment case may be enforced not only against the defendants therein
but also against the members of their family, their relatives or privies who
derive their right of possession from the defendants (Ariem vs. Delos
Angeles, 49 SCRA 343). A further clarification of the dispositive portion is
apparently needed to exclude from the effect of the judgment in the
ejectment case only the petitioners who do not derive their right of
possession from any of the defendants in the ejectment suit.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Makasiar and De
Castro, JJ., concurs.
Separate Opinions
VASQUEZ, J., concurring:
I concur with the very ably written main opinion. However, I wish to erase
any possible erroneous impression that may be derived from the
dispositive portion insofar as it declares that the judgment in the
ejectment cage may not be enforced against the petitioners who were not
defendants in Civil Case No. 3711 and over whom the lower court did not
acquire jurisdiction.
The judgment in any case is binding and enforceable not only against the
parties thereto but also against "their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action" (Sec. 49[b], Rule 39,
Rules of Court). We have previously held that the judgment in an
ejectment case may be enforced not only against the defendants therein
but also against the members of their family, their relatives or privies who
derive their right of possession from the defendants (Ariem vs. Delos
Angeles, 49 SCRA 343). A further clarification of the dispositive portion is
apparently needed to exclude from the effect of the judgment in the
ejectment case only the petitioners who do not derive their right of
possession from any of the defendants in the ejectment suit.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Makasiar and De
Castro, JJ., concurs.
Footnotes
* According to respondent corporation, some of the
adverse claimants or protestants were not landless farmers
but were well-educated persons belonging to the middle
class. Thus, Elpidio Okay was an elementary school
principal. Vicente Rehoy was a landowner and barrio
captain. Patricio de Leon was a cashier and later assistant
branch manager of the Philippine National Baank. Ernesto
Pañares was a high school teacher and later a college
professor. Francisco Mateo was a former college dean (p.
105, Rollo).
According to the 44 petitioners, they are tillers of the soil
(p. 126, Rollo).
AYOG VS CUSI
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27059 February 14, 1928
BUENAVENTURA BALBOA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
CECILIO L. FARRALES, defendant-appellant.
Ernesto Zaragoza for plaintiff-appellant.
Alejo Labrador for defendant-appellant.
JOHNSON, J.:
The material facts in this case, as disclosed by the record, may be briefly
stated as follows.
(1) Sometime in the year 1913, the plaintiff Buenaventura Balboa filled
with the Bureau of Lands an application for homestead, No. 10619, under
the provisions of Act No. 926, covering a tract of land situated in the barrio
of Culis, municipality of Hermosa, Province of Bataan, containing 14
hectares, 49 ares and 77 centares.
(2) Five years thereafter, or in 1918, Balboa submitted proof, showing his
residence upon, and cultivation of said land, as well as his compliance with
all of the other requirements of section 3 of said Act No. 926, which final
proof was approved by the Director of Lands on February 15, 1918 (Exhibit
3). On July 1, 1919, said Act No. 926 was repealed by Act No. 2874.
(3) On September 10, 1920, or over a year after Act No. 2874 had gone
into effect, the homestead patent for said land, otherwise known as
certificate of title No. 91 (Exhibit A) was issued n favor of Buenventura
Balboa by the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands.
(4) On August 11, 1924, said Buenaventura Balboa, for and in
consideration of the sum of P950, sold said land to the defendant Cecilio L.
Farrales (Exhibit 2); and on October 16, 1924, the latter secured in his
name transfer certificate of title No. 650 of said land (Exhibit B).
On March 6, 1926, the plaintiff commenced the present action for the
purpose of having said sale declared null and void on the ground of lack of
consent on his part and fraud on the part of the defendant, and on the
further ground that said sale was contrary to, and in violation of the
provisions of section 116 of Act No. 2874.
After a careful consideration of the evidence adduced during the trial of
the cause the Honorable Leopoldo Rovira, judge, arrived at the conclusion
that the deed of sale in question (Exhibit 2) had been duly executed by the
plaintiff. He held, however, that said deed was null and void, in view of the
fact that it was executed before the lapse of five years from the date of
the issuance of the certificate of title in favor of Buenventura Balboa, in
violation of the prohibition contained in section 116 of Act No. 2874.
The pertinent parts of the decision read as follows:
Como cuestion basica, se discute en el presente asunto la validez
del documento Exhibit 2, o sea el traspaso hecho por el
demandante al demandado referente al terreno en cuestion. El
demandante sostiene que, bajo el articulo 116 de la Ley 2874, el
traspaso el nulo por cuanto tuvo lugar el 11 de agosto de 1924,
esto es sin haber transcurrido todavia los cinco anos siguientas a
la fecha en que fue expedidol el certificado de titulo No. 91 que lo
fue el 10 de septiembre de 1920; el demandado, por el contrario,
sostiene, como punto de discusion legal, que el documento de
traspaso exhibit 2 no cae bajo las disposiciones de la Ley No.
2874, sino dentro de las disposiciones de la Ley No. 926 y que
bajo esta Ley no existia tal limitacion de venta dentro de los cinco
años siguientes a la fecha de la expedicion del titulo
de homestead, y que habiendo sido la solicitud
de homestead aprobada 15 de febrero de 1918, aun contado los
cinco anos siguientes, resultaria que desde el 15 de febrero de
1918 hasta el 11 de agosto de 1924 han transcurrido mas de cinco
años.
xxx xxx xxx
De lo expuesto, el Juzgado Ilega a la conclusion de que el Exhibit 2
es nulo e ineficaz, por cuanto que la venta fue otorgada fuera de lo
prescrito en el articulo 116 de la Ley No. 2874, que procede
declarar nulo dicho documento Exhibit 21, y, consiguintemente, el
certificado de transferencia de titulo 650.
In accordance with the foregoing conclusion the trial judge rendered a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the
latter to return to the plaintiff the land in question, and the plaintiff to
return to the defendant the price received for said land, aggregating
P652.69, with interest at the rate of 12 per cent. From the judgment both
parties appealed.
The principal question raised in this appeal is whether the validity of the
sale of the land in question should be determined under the provisions of
Act No. 926 or under those of Act No. 2874. In other words, which of the
two Acts — 926 and 2874 — shall be applied in determining whether the
sale in question is valid or not?
The land in question was acquired by Buenventura Balboa as homestead
under the provisions and pursuant to the requirements of Act No. 926. He
filed his application and complied with all of the requisites to the
acquisition of said homestead, in conformity with the provisions of said Act
No. 926. In 1918 and prior to the repeal of said Act he submitted his final
proof, showing his residence upon, and cultivation of the land, as well as
his compliance with all of the other requirements of the law, and said final
proof was approved by the Director of Lands on February 15, 1918. In
other words, Buenaventura Balboa, had shown, to the satisfaction of the
Government, that he had performed all of the acts required of an applicant
for homestead, and, under the provisions of section 3 of Act no. 926, he
became entitled to a homestead patent or certificate of title to the land
covered by his application.
Section 3 of Act No. 926 provides, inter alia, that upon the filing of final
proof by the applicant and the approval thereof by the Director of Lands,
"he (the applicant) shall be entitled to a patent" or certificate of title.
Therefore, on February 15, 1918, after Buenaventura Balboa had
submitted his final proof and after the same had been approved by the
Government, and while Act No. 926 was still in force, he became the
owner of the land and "entitled to a patent." At least on that date his right
to the land, as owner, ripened into a vested right. It was no longer
expectant as depending on the continuance of existing circumstances, or
contingent as depending on some events or the performance of some
conditions.
Rights are vested when the right to enjoyment, present or
prospective, has become the property of some particular person or
persons as a present interest. (12 C. J., sec. 485, p. 955.)
Vested right "is some right or interest in property which has become fixed
and established and is no longer open to doubt or controversy." (Downs
vs. Blount, 170 Fed. Rep., 15, 20.)
The fact the homestead patent or certificate of title No. 91 was issued on
September 10, 1920, after the repeal of Act No. 926, and under the
provisions of section 116 of the repealing Act No. 2874, cannot prejudice
the vested right acquired by Buenventura Balboa under the provisions of
the former Act. The issuance of the certificate of title was a mere
ministerial act, and the certificate, an outward symbol of his vested right
to the land, of which he was virtually recognized as owner by the
Government on February 15, 1918.
In the case of United States vs. Freyberg (32 Fed. Rep., 195), where the
right of a homesteader was involved, it was held that where the right to a
patent for land has become vested in a purchaser the Government holds
the legal title in trust for the purchaser until the patent is issued. Again in
the case of Stark vs. Starr (6 Wallace [U. S.], 402), the Supreme Court of
the United States held that where the right to a patent is once vested, it is
treated by the Government, when dealing with public lands, as equivalent
to a patent issued.
A party who was has complied with all the terms and conditions
which entitle him to a patent for a particular tract of public land
acquires a vested interest therein, and is to be regarded as the
equitable owner thereof. (Wirth vs. Branson, 98 U. S. 118.)
Where the right to a patent has once become vested in a
purchaser of public lands, it is equivalent so far as the Government
is concerned, to a patent actually issued. The execution and
delivery of the patent after the right to it has become complete are
the mere ministerial acts of the officers charged with that duty.
(Simmons vs. Wagner 101 U. S., 260.)
The moment the plaintiff had received a certificate from the Government
and had done all that was necessary under the law to secure his patent,
his right had become vested before the patent was issued. His right had
already vested prior to the issuance of the patent, and his rights to the
land cannot be affected by a subsequent law or by a subsequent grant by
the Government to any other person. (Herron vs. Dater, 120 U. S., 464.)
The delay in the issuance of the patent cannot affect the vested right of
the homesteader. (Murphy vs. Packer, 152 U. S., 398; Belk vs. Meagher,
104 U. S., 279; Sullivan vs. Iron Silver Mining Co., 143 U. S., 431;
McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia, 42 Phil., 749.)
A perfected valid appropriation of public land operates as a withdraw of the
tract from the body of the public domain and, so long as such
appropriation remains valid and subsisting the land covered thereby is
deemed private property. A perfected homestead, under the law, is
property in the highest sense, which may be sold and conveyed and will
pass by descent. It has the effect of a grant of the right to present and
exclusive possession of said land. A valid and subsisting perfected
homestead, made and kept up in accordance with the provisions of the
statute, has the effect of a grant of the present and exclusive possession
of the land. Even without a patent, a perfected homestead is a property
right in the fullest sense, unaffected by the fact that the paramount title to
the land is in the Government. Such land may be conveyed or inherited.
In the United States and in each and every State of the Union vested
rights are safeguarded by the 4th Amendment to the Federal Constitution,
which provides that no State "shall deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law."
The state has no power to divest or to impair vested rights,
whether such an attempt to do so be made by legislative
enactment, by municipal ordinance, or by a change in the
constitution of the estate. This result follows from prohibitions
contained in the constitution or particularly all the states. Before
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment there was no
prohibition in the Constitution of the United States which would
prevent the states from passing laws divesting vested rights,
unless these laws also impaired the obligation of contact, or were
ex post facto laws; but vested property rights are now protected
against state action by the provision of the fourteenth amendment
that no state "shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property
without due process of law." (12 C. J., sec. 486, pp. 956, 957.)
Section 3, paragragh 1, of the Jones Law provides:
"That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, etc." Thus,
in this jurisdiction, vested rights are also protected from impairment by
express constitutional provision. Therefore, the right vested in
Buenaventura Balboa by Act No. 926 cannot be divested, impaired or
restricted by section 116 of Act No. 2874. Said right should be governed
entirely and exclusively by the provisions of Act No. 926, which it was
acquired.
Now, the vested right of Buenaventura Balboa to his homestead land
necessarily carries with it the right to alienate and dispose of the same.
The only prohibition contained in Act No. 926 against alienation of
homestead acquired under said law, appears in section 4 thereof, which
reads as follows: "No lands acquired under the provisions of this chapter
shall in any event become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted
prior to the issuance of a patent therefor." It follows, therefore that the
sale of the land in question by the plaintiff Buenventura Balboa to the
defendant Cecilio L. Farrales does not infringe said prohibition, and
consequently said sale is valid and binding, and should be given full force
and effect.
Section 116 of Act No. 2874, which prohibits the sale of homestead land
during the period of five years subsequent to the issuance of the patent or
certificate of title upon which rests the decision of the court a quo, cannot
be invoked to annul the sale in question. Said prohibition, if applied in the
present case, would impair and diminish the vested rights acquired under
Act No. 926, contrary to the uniform doctrine followed in the United
States, and in violation of the express provisions of section 3 of the Jones
Law.
The right, title and interest of the appellant having become vested under
the provisions of Act No. 926, his rights cannot be affected by any law
passed subsequent thereto. The provisions of Act No. 2874 cannot be
invoked for the purpose of defeating the vested right acquired by the
appellant before its adoption.
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from should be
and is hereby reversed, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the
defendant be absolved from all liability under the complaint, with costs
against the plaintiff-appellant. So ordered.
Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
STREET, J., concurring:
I concur and wish to point out the difference between the present case and
that of Beach vs. Pacific Commercial Co. and Sheriff of Nueva Ecija (49
Phil., 365), which turned upon the interpretation of the same provisions of
law as those that are decisive of the present case, namely, section 4 of Act
No. 926 and section 116 of Act No. 2874.
The difference is that in the Beach case an attempt was made to seize the
property under process of law to satisfy an obligation created within five
years after the issuance of a patent; and we held that, under section 116
of Act No. 2874, the property was attempt. In the case before us the
owner of the land, in the exercise of his power as such, had voluntarily
alienated the property; and the court now holds that the act of alienation
was effective notwithstanding the immunity conferred by section 116 of
Act No. 2874. Though the distinction thus involved may appear to be
somewhat refined, I believe it to be sound, and I have no hesitation in
giving my adherence to the present decision, especially in view of the fact
hat soon after Act No. 2874 was passed the Attorney-General ruled that a
voluntary alienation of a homestead, under the conditions involved in this
case, would be valid. A ruling contrary to that now made by us would have
the been acquired in good faith by purchasers relying upon the
interpretation thus placed upon the law by the Attorney-General.

In the opinion in Beach vs. Pacific Commercial Co. and Sheriff of Nueva
Ecija, supra, we used the following language in calling attention to the
difference between the situation then before and the court and that
presented in the case now before us:

The error underlying the contention of the appellee possibly has its
origin in a failure to distinguish between two entirely different
ideas expressed in section 116 of Act No. 2874. The first has
reference to the power of the homesteader to encumber or
alienate to the homestead by his voluntary act, while the second
has reference to the subjection of the property to the satisfaction
of debts against the will of the homesteader. There might possibly
be something in the contention of the appellee that the
homesteader's right became vested when he submitted his final
proof if the case were one where he had attempted to alienate the
property by voluntary exercise of the power of an owner; but we
are not called upon to pass upon this point. We are here concerned
exclusively with power of the creditor to seize the property of the
owner against his will. That the property cannot be so taken
follows in our opinion necessarily from the language of section
116.

Our present decision recognizes the validity of this distinction suggested in

the paragraph above quoted, and it with thus be seen that there is no
inconsistency between the decision now made and the conclusion reached
in the case cited.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14722 May 25, 1960
IGNACIO MESINA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, ET AL., defendants.
EULALIA PINEDA VDA. DE SONZA, defendant-appellee.
Agustin C. Bagasao for appellant.
Luis Manalang and Associates for appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiff brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija praying that Original Certificate of Title No. P-1137 of the Register of
Deeds of Nueva Ecija be ordered cancelled and that the registration case
pending before the same court covering the property described therein be
given due course and that defendants be ordered to pay plaintiff
P1,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is
already barred by the statute of limitations. The reasons advanced are:
the complaint was filed on March 25, 1958. The decree of registration or
issuance of patent over the property was issued "sometime on September
12, 1953 or thereabout", while the transfer certificate of title covering the
same was issued on September 16, 1953. The present action which calls
for the cancellation of said decree and title has, therefore, been filed after
the elapse of more than four years, which cannot be done, because the
title has already become indefeasible and incontrovertible. The court
sustained this motion and dismissed the complaint. Hence the present
appeal.
Plaintiff claims that he is the owner in fee simple of Lot No. 3259, with
improvements thereon, situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija; that he has
been in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly, peacefully
and against the whole world and up to the present time he is the only one
who benefits from the produce thereof; that said lot is at present the
subject of registration proceedings pending in the same court known as
Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad. Record No. N-12238; that
sometime in September 12, 1953, the Director of Lands, without
exercising due care, and in spite of his knowledge that defendants had not
complied with the knowledge that defendants had not complied with the
requirements of Commonwealth Act No. 141, issued a homestead patent
in their favor as a consequence of which a certificate of title was issued in
their name by the register of deeds; that said title was procured by
defendants through frauds, deception and misrepresentation since they
knew that the lot belonged to the plaintiff; and that the Director of Lands
has no authority nor jurisdiction to issue a patent covering said land
because it is a private property of plaintiff. For these reasons, plaintiff
prays that said decree and title be cancelled.
Republic Act No. 1942, which took effect on June 22, 1957 (amending
Section 48-b of Commonwealth Act 141), provides:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceeding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
In the case of Susi vs. Razon, et al., 48 Phil., 424, it was observed that
where all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are
complied with through actual physical possession openly, continuously,
and publicly, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the
provisions of Chapter VIII of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926 (carried
over as Chapter VIII of Commonwealth Act No. 141), the possessor is
deemed to have already acquired by operation of law not only a right to a
grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a
certificate of title be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by
the court — an application therefor being sufficient under the provisions of
Section 47 of Act No. 2874 (reproduced as Section 50, Commonwealth Act
No. 141). Thus, the following is what this Court said on the matter:
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in
possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely
and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the
year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. ... When on August
15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land,
Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally
and through his predecessors for thirty-forty years. And if it is
taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said land
a fish pond when he sold it on December 13, 1880, it can hardly
be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period
of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. ... In
favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover the presumption juris et
 de jure established paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, giving plaintiff a chance to prove his claim. It would have been more
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a proper for the court to deny the motion on the ground that its object does
grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in not appear to be indubitable, rather than to have dismissed it, as was
actual and physical possession, personally and through his done by the trial court.
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside. The case is remanded to
right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of the trial court for further proceedings. No costs.
Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for
the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should
be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section
47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired
the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased
to be of the public domain and had become private property, at
least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control, of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to
Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which
he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was
void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire
any right. (Emphasis supplied)

Such is the situation in which the plaintiff claims to be in his complaint. He

alleges that he is the owner in fee simple of the lot in question, with the
improvements thereon, situated in San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, and that he
has been in actual possession thereof since 1914, publicly, openly,
peacefully and against the whole world, and that up to the present time he
is the only one who benefits from the produce thereof. He further claims
that said lot is present the subject of a registration proceeding pending in
the same court, known as Registration Case No. N-372, L.R.C. Cad. Record
No. N-12238. If by legal fiction, as stated in the Susi case, plaintiff is
deemed to have acquired the lot by a grant of the State, it follows that the
same had ceased to be part of the public domain and had become private
property and, therefore, is beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
Consequently, the homestead patent and the original certificate of title
covering said lot issued by the Director of Lands in favor of the defendants
can be said to be null and void, for having been issued through fraud,
deceit and misrepresentation.

Considering that this case was dismissed by the trial court merely on a
motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiff's action is already barred by
the statute of limitations, which apparently is predicated on the theory
that a decree of registration can no longer be impugned on the ground of
fraud one year after the issuance and entry of the decree,1 which theory
does not apply here because the property involved is allegedly private in
nature and has ceased to be part of the public domain, we are of the
opinion that the trial court erred in dismissing the case outright without
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19535 July 10, 1967
HEIRS OF PELAGIO ZARA; PIO, CLEMENTE, SERAFIA, PORFIRIO
and ESTEBAN, all surnamed MINDANAO; MARIA and GLICERIA,
both surnamed SEDARIA; DULCE CORDERO, VICTORIA DE LOS
REYES and JOSE GARCIA, applicants-appellants,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Government
oppositor-appellees.
VICENTE V. DE VILLA, JR., and VICENTE S. DE VILLA, SR.,
private oppositors-appellees.
Jose L. Matias and H. A. Jambora for applicants-appellants.
Francisco Villanueva, Jr. and Gregorio L. Oquitania for private oppositors-
appellees.
Manuel Reyes Castro for oppositor-appellee Director of Forestry.
MAKALINTAL, J.:
Appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (Lipa City)
dismissing appellants' "application for registration of the parcel of land
consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, situated in the barrio of Sampiro,
Municipality of San Juan, Province of Batangas, and designated in
amended plan PSU-103696 as Lot A."
The proceedings in the court a quo are not disputed.
On August 4, 1960 appellants filed an application for registration of the
land above described pursuant to the provisions of Act 496. They alleged
that the land had been inherited by them from their grandfather, Pelagio
Zara, who in turn acquired the same under a Spanish grant known as
"Composicion de Terrenos Realengos" issued in 1888. Alternatively, should
the provisions of the Land Registration Act be not applicable, applicants
invoke the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48,
subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and their
predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of
the land in concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately
preceding the application.
Oppositions were filed by the Director of Lands, the Director of Forestry
and by Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. The latter's opposition recites:
x x x that the parcel of land sought to be registered by the
applicants consisting of 107 hectares, more or less, was included
in the area of the parcel of land applied for registration by Vicente
S. de Villa, Sr. in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 in this
Court, which was decided by this same Court through the then
incumbent Judge, the Honorable Juan P. Enriquez, on September
30, 1949; that the parcel sought to be registered by the applicants
was declared public land in said decision; that they (the oppositors
Vicente V. de Villa, Jr. and Vicente S. de Villa, Sr.) have an interest
over the land in question because for a period more than sixty
(60) years, the de Villas have been in possession, and which
possession, according to them, was open continuous, notorious
and under the claim of ownership; that the proceeding being in
rem, the failure of the applicants to appear at the case No. 26,
L.R. Case No. 601 to prove their imperfect and incomplete title
over the property, barred them from raising the same issue in
another case; and that as far as the decision in Civil Case No. 26,
L.R. Case No. 601 which was affirmed in the appellate court in CA-
G.R. No. 5847-R is concerned, there is already "res-adjudicata" —
in other words, the cause of action of the applicant is now barred
by prior judgment; and that this Court has no more jurisdiction
over the subject matter, the decision of the Court in said case
having transferred to the Director of Lands.
On November 15, 1960 the De Villas (De Villa, Sr. was subsequently
included as oppositor) filed a motion to dismiss, invoking the same
grounds alleged in its opposition, but principally the fact that the land
applied for had already been declared public land by the judgment in the
former registration case.
The trial court, over the objection of the applicants, granted the motion to
dismiss by order dated January 27, 1961, holding, inter alia, that "once a
parcel of land is declared or adjudged public land by the court having
jurisdiction x x x it cannot be the subject anymore of another land
registration proceeding x x x (that) it is only the Director of Lands who can
dispose of the same by sale, by lease, by free patent or by homestead."
In the present appeal from the order of dismissal neither the Director of
Lands nor the Director of Forestry filed a brief as appellee. The decisive
issue posed by applicants-appellants is whether the 1949 judgment in the
previous case, denying the application of Vicente S. de Villa, Sr., and
declaring the 107 hectares in question to be public land, precludes a
subsequent application by an alleged possessor for judicial confirmation of
title on the basis of continuous possession for at least thirty years,
pursuant to Section 48, subsection (b) of the Public Land Law, C.A. 141, as
amended. This provision reads as follows:
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims
and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
On the question of whether or not the private oppositors-appellees have
the necessary personality to file an opposition, we find in their favor,
considering that they also claim to be in possession of the land, and have
furthermore applied for its purchase from the Bureau of Lands.1äwphï1.ñët
Wherefore, the order appealed from is set aside and the case is remanded
to the Court a quo for trial and judgment on the merits, with costs against
the private oppositors-appellees.

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in

interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war
or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
Chapter.1äwphï1.ñët

The right to file an application under the foregoing provision has been
extended by Republic Act No. 2061 to December 31, 1968.

It should be noted that appellants' application is in the alternative: for

registration of their title of ownership under Act 496 or for judicial
confirmation of their "imperfect" title or claim based on adverse and
continuous possession for at least thirty years. It may be that although
they were not actual parties in that previous case the judgment therein is
a bar to their claim as owners under the first alternative, since the
proceeding was in rem, of which they and their predecessor had
constructive notice by publication. Even so this is a defense that properly
pertains to the Government, in view of the fact that the judgment declared
the land in question to be public land. In any case, appellants' imperfect
possessory title was not disturbed or foreclosed by such declaration, for
precisely the proceeding contemplated in the aforecited provision of
Commonwealth Act 141 presupposes that the land is public. The basis of
the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is
already privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain,
but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he is
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant.