27. MANGGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS V.

PLDT
G.R. NO. 190389 April 19, 2017

FACTS:

Labor organization Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP), which

represented the employees of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, filed a
notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board. MKP charged
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company with unfair labor practice "for transferring
several employees of its Provisioning Support Division to Bicutan, Taguig." The notice
of strike contains the following unfair labor practices:

1. PLDT's abolition of the Provisioning Support Division

2. PLDT's unreasonable refusal to honor its commitment before this Honorable
Office that it will provide MKP its comprehensive plan/s with respect to
personnel downsizing/ reorganization and closure of exchanges.
3. PLDT's continued hiring of "contractual," "temporary," "project," and "casual"
employees for regular jobs performed by union members, resulting in the
decimation of the union membership and in the denial of the right to self-
organization to the concerned employees

Another notice of strike was filed by MKP. The labor organization accused PLDT of
unfair labor practice where PLDT's alleged restructuring of its [Greater Metropolitan
Manila] Operation Services December 31, 2002 and its closure of traffic operations at
the Batangas, Calamba, Davao, Iloilo, Lucena, Malolos and Tarlac Regional Operator
Services effective December 31, 2002. These twin moves unjustly imperil the job
security of 503 of MKP's members and will substantially decimate the parties'
bargaining unit.

Secretary of Labor and Employment certified the labor dispute at the PLDT to the NLRC
compulsory Arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of Labor Code. All striking workers are
hereby directed to return to work within twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this Order,
except those who were terminated due to redundancy. The employer is hereby enjoined
to accept the striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to
the strike. The parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any act
that might worsen the situation.

CA nullified and set aside the order of Secretary of Labor and Employment. PLDT
appealed CA’s decision to the SC. SC upheld the CA’s decision and ordered to readmit
all the workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.

However, NLRC dismissed MKP’s charges of unfair labor practices against PLDT. MKP
filed a petition for certiorari with CA. CA upheld the validity of PLDT’s redundancy
program.

Consequently, Sec of Labor and Employment dismissed MKP’s motion for execution of
the SC’s decision of readmitting all the workers. MKP filed a petition for certiorari before
CA. CA found that NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretiona and that PLDT’s
redundancy program was not unattended by unfair labor practice.

ISSUES:

1. WHETHER THE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN

UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF PLDT’S 2002 REDUNDANCY PROGRAM
2. WHETHER THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT WAS RENDERED MOOT WHEN THE NLRC
UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE REDUNDANCY PROGRAM

RULING:

1. NO. The Court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it regarded the
technological advancements resulting in less work for the redundated employees
as justifying PLDT’s declaration of redundancy.

PLDT’s declaration of redundancy was backed by substantial evidence showing

a consistent decline for operator-assisted calls for both local and international
calls because of cheaper alternatives like direct dialing services, and the growth
 of wireless communication. Thus, the National Labor Relations Commission did
not commit grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the validity of PLDT's
redundancy program. Redundancy is ultimately a management prerogative, and
the wisdom or soundness of such business judgment is not subject to
discretionary review by labor tribunals or even this Court, as long as the law was
followed and malicious or arbitrary action was not shown.

2. YES. Return-to-work order aims to preserve the status quo ante while the validity
of redundancy program is being threshed out in the proper forum. When the
petitioner filed its Motion for Execution pursuant to the Court’s ruling in PLDT,
there was no longer any existing basis for the return-to-work order. This was
because the Secretary of Labor and Employment’s return-to-work order had
been superseded by the NLRC’s Resolution. Hence, the Secretary did not err in
dismissing the motion for execution on the ground of mootness.

28. EDITHA M. CATOTOCAN v. LOURDES SCHOOL OF QUEZON CITY,

INC./LOURDES SCHOOL, INC. AND REV. FR. CESAR F. ACUIN, OFM CAP,
RECTOR

FACTS:

Editha Catotocan was a music teacher with a monthly salary Php30,081.00 of Lourdes
School of Quezon City (LSQC). By the school year 2005-2006, she had already served
for 35 years.

LSQC has an existing retirement plan providing for retirement at 60 years old, or
separation pay depending on the number of years

On November 25, 2003, LSQC issued another retirement plan providing that “an
employee may apply for retirement or be retired by the school when he /she reaches the
age of 60 years or when he/she completes 30 years of service, whichever comes first”.
Catotocan and other co-employees assailed the said order. They believed that they do
not deserve to be retired and be rehired when they are, in fact, very much capable of
doing their duties and responsibilities.

LSQC retired Catotocan sometime in June 2006 after completing 35 years of service.
Full retirement benefits were given to her computed based on the latest salary multiplied
by the total years of service. Under the school's retirement policy, 60% of her retirement
benefit was paid in lump sum by the trustee bank, and the balance was to be paid in
equal monthly pensions over the next 3 years.

60% or Php571,701.00 was credited to her savings account, which she opened in
accordance with the school's retirement policy.

Catotocan was told that if she desires, she may signify in writing her intent to continue
serving the school on a contractual basis. She responded by submitting a "Letter of
Intent" on February 14, 2006.

LSQC rehired Catotocan twice as a Grade School Guidance Counselor. On the 3rd re-
application, LSQC no longer considered her application for the position.

Catotocan filed a complaint to the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, which the latter
dismissed for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter pointed out that, although there were
exchanges of communications between her and respondents regarding her earlier
opposition to the school's retirement policy, her subsequent actions, however, such as
opening her own individual savings account where the retirement benefits were
deposited and credited thereto, her subsequent withdrawals therefrom, her application
for contractual employment after her retirement, constituted implied consent to the
assailed addendum in LSQC's retirement policy and, in effect, abandoned her objection
thereto.

NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. The NLRC held that Catotocan performed
all the acts that a retired employee would do after retirement under the new school
policy. These were voluntary acts and she cannot be considered to have been forced to
retire or to have been illegally dismissed.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or no Catotocan was illegally dismissed by LSQC.

RULING:

No, she was not for there was no illegal dismissal.

Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary agreement between
the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after reaching a certain age, agrees
to sever his or her employment with the former. Article 287 of the Labor Code is the
primary provision: In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for
retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching
the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby
declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the
said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at
least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6)
months being considered as one whole year.

Jurisprudence is replete with cases discussing the employer's prerogative to lower the
compulsory retirement age subject to the consent of its employees.

Thus LSQC's retirement plan, allowing employers to retire employees who have not yet
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years are not per se repugnant to the
constitutional guaranty of security of tenure. The Labor Code permits employers and
employees to fix the applicable retirement age at 60 years or below, provided that the
employees' retirement benefits under any CBA and other agreements shall not be less
than those provided therein.

Acceptance by the employees of an early retirement age option must be explicit,

voluntary, free, and uncompelled. While an employer may unilaterally retire an
employee earlier than the legally permissible ages under the Labor Code, this
prerogative must be exercised pursuant to a mutually instituted early retirement plan.
Due process only requires that notice of the employer's decision to retire an employee
be given to the employee.

Here, the CA and the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion. It must be stressed that
Catotocan's subsequent actions after her "retirement" are actually tantamount to her
consent to the addendum to the LSQC's retirement policy of retiring her from
service upon serving the school for at least thirty (30) continuous years, to wit: (1) after
being notified that she was being retired from service by LSQC, she opened a savings
account with BDO, the trustee bank; (2) she accepted all the proceeds of her retirement
package: the lump sum and all the monthly payments credited to her account until June
2009; (3) upon acceptance of the retirement benefits, there was no notation that she is
accepting the retirement benefits under protest or without prejudice to the filing of an
illegal dismissal case. We also did not find an iota of evidence showing that LSQC
exerted undue influence against Catotocan to acquire her consent on the school's
retirement policy. Suffice it to say that from the foregoing, Catotocan performed all the
acts to ratify her retirement in accordance with LSQC's retirement policy.

Although there was an exchange of communications about the retirees' objection to the
new retirement policy years earlier, eventually, appellant assented thereto when she
opened a savings account with BDO, withdrew the money for her personal use and
applied again for a teaching job with the school.

While it is true that the acceptance of retirement pay and her eventual appointment as
Guidance Counselor did not amount to a waiver to contest her alleged forced retirement
or illegal dismissal, the voluntary nature of her acts from June 2006 up to June 2009
clearly belies her claim of illegal dismissal.

Obviously, appellant filed this complaint claiming illegal dismissal after she had
benefited from the proceeds of her retirement in June 2006, and received salaries as
Guidance Counselor of the appellee school for the subsequent three (3) years which
ended in 2009. By her actuations, she is already estopped from questioning the legality
of the new retirement policy.
Moreover, in the Letter dated August 6, 2006 addressed to Fr. Acuin, Catotocan, along
with other co-employees, referred to themselves as "retirees" and even signed as "the
retired employees." The context of the letter does not, in any way, show any animosity
with LSQC which would otherwise indicate that they still harbor ill feelings towards
LSQC due to their alleged illegal dismissal. Thus, We hold that Catotocan's filing of the
illegal dismissal case was just an afterthought subsequent to LSQC's denial of her
fourth re-application for the Guidance Counselor position.

It must be stressed also that Catotocan's repeated application and availment of the re-
hiring program of LSQC for qualified retirees for 3 consecutive years is a supervening
event that would reveal that she has already voluntarily and freely signified her consent
to the retirement policy despite her initial opposition to it. In this case, not only did
Catotocan received all of her retirement benefits but she also applied and availed the
LSQC's re-hiring policy of retirees.

29. UST vs. SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG UST

GR No. 184262, April 24, 2017

Facts:

A complaint for regularization and illegal dismissal was filed by respondents

Samahang Manggagawa ng UST and Pontesor, et al. (respondents) against petitioner
before the NLRC. Respondents alleged that on various periods spanning the years
1990-1999, petitioner repeatedly hired Pontesor, et al. to perform various maintenance
duties within its campus. Respondents insisted that in view of Pontesor, et al.' s
performance of such maintenance tasks throughout the years, they should be deemed
regular employees of petitioner. Respondents further argued that for as long as
petitioner continues to operate and exist as an educational institution, with rooms,
buildings, and facilities to maintain, the latter could not dispense with Pontesor, et al. 's
services which are necessary and desirable to the business of petitioner.
 On the other hand, while petitioner admitted that it repeatedly hired Pontesor, et
al. in different capacities throughout the aforesaid years, it nevertheless maintained that
they were merely hired on a per-project basis, as evidenced by numerous Contractual
Employee Appointments (CEAs) signed by them. In this regard, petitioner pointed out
that each of the CEAs that Pontesor, et al. signed defined the nature and term of the
project to which they are assigned, and that each contract was renewable in the event
the project remained unfinished upon the expiration of the specified term. In accordance
with the express provisions of said CEAs, Pontesor, et al. 's project employment were
automatically terminated: (a) upon the expiration of the specific term specified in the
CEA; (b) when the project is completed ahead of such expiration; or (c) in cases when
their employment was extended due to the non-completion of the specific project for
which they were hired, upon the completion of the said project. As such, the termination
of Pontesor, et al. 's employment with petitioner was validly made due to the completion
of the specific projects for which they were hired.

Issue: WON Respondent Pontesor is a regular employee thus rendering the dismissal
invalid

Held:

YES. Pontesor should be considered regularized casual employees who

enjoy security of tenure. The law provides for two (2) types of regular employees,
namely: (a) those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer ; and (b) those who have
rendered at least one year of service, whether continuous or broken, with respect to the
activity in which they are employed. The primary standard, therefore, of determining
regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity
performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the employer.
The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or
trade of the employer. The connection can be determined by considering the nature of
work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or trade in its
entirety. Also, if the employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if
the performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems repeated and
continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not
indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered
regular, but only with respect to such activity and while such activity exists

In the case at bar, a review of Pontesor, et al. 's respective CEAs reveal that
petitioner repeatedly rehired them for various positions in the nature of maintenance
workers for various periods spanning the years 1990-1999. Although nature of work are
not necessary and desirable to petitioner's usual business as an educational institution;
nonetheless, it is clear that their respective cumulative periods of employment as per
their respective CEAs each exceed one (1) year. Thus, Pontesor, et al. fall under the
second category of regular employees under Article 295 of the Labor Code.
Accordingly, they should be deemed as regular employees but only with respect to the
activities for which they were hired and for as long as such activities exist.

30. ZAMBRANO, ET. AL V. PHILIPPINE MARKET MANUFACTURING

CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 224099, June 21, 2017

FACTS:

Petitioners were terminated on the ground of cessation of operation due to serious

business losses. They allege that their dismissal was without just cause and in violation
of due process because the closure of Phil Carpet was a mere pretense to transfer its
operations to Pacific Carpet. They claimed that the job orders of some regular clients of
Phil Carpet was transferred to Pacific Carpet and that several machines were moved
from Phil Carpet to Pacific Carpet. Petitioners also alleged that their dismissal was
constituted with unfair labor practice as it involved mass dismissal of its union officers
and members.

Respondent countered that it permanently closed and totally ceased its operations
because there had been a steady decline in the demand for its products due to global
recession, stiffer competition and the effects of a changing market. Respondent also
faithfully complied with the requisites for closure and cessation of business under the
Labor Code.

LA dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. NLRC
affirmed LA’s ruling. CA ruled that the total cessation of Phil Carpet’s manufacturing
operations was not made in bad faith because the same was clearly due to economic
necessity.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the petitioners were dismissed from employment for a lawful cause
2. Whether the petitioners’ termination from employment constitutes unfair labor
practice
3. Whether Pacific Carpet may be held liable for Phil Carpet’s obligations
4. Whether the quitclaims signed by the petitioners are valid and binding

RULING:

1. YES. Petitioners were terminated for an authorized cause.

Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, three requirements are necessary for a
valid cessation of business operations: (a) service of a written notice to the
employees and to the DOLE at least one month before the intended date thereof;
(b) the cessation of business must be bona fide in character; and (c) payment to
the employees of termination pay amounting to one month pay or at least one-
half month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher.

In this case, the LA's findings that Phil Carpet suffered from serious business
losses which resulted in its closure were affirmed in toto by the NLRC, and
subsequently by the CA. It is a rule that absent any showing that the findings of
fact of the labor tribunals and the appellate court are not supported by evidence
on record or the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts, the Court
shall not examine anew the evidence submitted by the parties.
2. NO. The dismissal did not amount to unfair labor practice.

Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the
same.

The petitioners miserably failed to discharge the duty imposed upon them. They
did not identify the acts of Phil Carpet which, they claimed, constituted unfair
labor practice. They did not even point out the specific provisions which Phil
Carpet violated. Thus, they would have the Court pronounce that Phil Carpet
committed unfair labor practice on the ground that they were dismissed from
employment simply because they were union officers and members. The
constitutional commitment to the policy of social justice, however, cannot be
understood to mean that every labor dispute shall automatically be decided in
favor of labor.

In this case, as far as the pieces of evidence offered by the petitioners are
concerned, there is no showing that the closure of the company was an attempt
at union-busting. Hence, the charge that Phil Carpet is guilty of unfair labor
practice must fail for lack of merit.

3. NO. Pacific Carpet is not liable for Phil Carpet’s obligations.

This Court has declared that "mere ownership by a single stockholder or by

another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation is not
of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate personality." It
has likewise ruled that the "existence of interlocking directors, corporate officers
and shareholders is not enough justification to pierce the veil of corporate fiction
in the absence of fraud or other public policy considerations."

The petitioners failed to present substantial evidence to prove their allegation that
Pacific Carpet is a mere alter ego of Phil Carpet.

4. YES. The quitclaims were valid and binding upon the petitioners.
 The contents of the quitclaims, which were in Filipino, were clear and simple,
such that it was unlikely that the petitioners did not understand what they were
signing.

31. Sumifru Corp. v. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm

GR. No. 202091, June 7, 2017

FACTS:

Sumifru is a domestic corporation and is the surviving corporation after its merger
with Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC) in 2008. FBAC was engaged in the
buying, marketing, and exportation of Cavendish bananas. Respondent Nagkahiusang
Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm (NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU) (NAMASUFA) is a labor
organization affiliated with the National Federation of Labor Unions and Kilusang Mayo
Uno.

Private respondent Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa filed a Petition for

Certification Election before the DOLE Regional Office in Davao City. NAMASUFA
sought to represent all rank-and-file employees, numbering around 140, of packing
plant 90 of FBAC. NAMASUFA claimed that there was no existing union in the
aforementioned establishment. FBAC filed an Opposition arguing that there exists no
employer-employee relationship between it and the workers involved as the members of
NAMASUFA are actually employees of A2Y Contracting Services (A2Y), a duly licensed
independent contractor, as evidenced by the payroll records of the latter. NAMASUFA
countered that its members were former workers of Stanfilco before FBAC took over its
operations sometime in 2002. The said former employees were then required to join the
Compostela Banana Packing Plant Workers’ Cooperative (CBPPWC) before they were
hired and allowed to work at the Packing Plant of FBAC. It further alleged that the
members of NAMASUFA were working at PP 90 long before A2Y came.

ISSUE: WON the members of the Union are employees of SUmifru

HELD:

Yes. The Court affirmed the ruling of the Med Arbiter granting the Petition for
Certification Election of NAMASUFA and declared that Sumifru was the employer of the
workers concerned.

Based on the “four-fold test”, the elements to determine the existence of an

employment relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the
payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control
the employee’s conduct. The most important element is the employer’s control of the
employee’s conduct, not only as to the result of the work to be done, but also as to the
means and methods to accomplish it.

On the first factor, it is apparent that the staff of respondent FBAC advised those
who are interested to be hired in the Packing Plant to become members first of
CBPPWC and get a recommendation from it. On the second factor, while the
respondent tried to impress upon us that workers are paid by A2Y Contracting Services,
this at best is but an administrative arrangement. The payroll summary submitted does
not contain the relevant information such as the employee’s rate of pay, deductions
made and the amount actually paid to the employee. On the third factor, it is very clear
that respondent FBAC is the authority that imposes disciplinary measures against erring
workers. This alone proves that it wields disciplinary authority over them. Finally, on the
fourth factor which is the control test, the fact that the respondent FBAC gives
instructions to the workers on how to go about their work is sufficient indication that it
exercises control over their movements. The workers are instructed as to what time they
are supposed to report and what time they are supposed to return. They were required
to fill up monitoring sheets as they go about their jobs and even the materials which
they used in the packing plant were supplied by FBAC.

Viewed from the above circumstances, it is clear that respondent FBAC is the
real employer of the workers of Packing Plant 90. They are in truth and in fact the
employees of the respondent and its attempt to seek refuge on A2Y Contracting
Services as the ostensible employer was nothing but an elaborate scheme to deprive
them their right to self-organization.

32. PANALIGAN v PHYVITA ENTERPRISES CORPORATION

G.R. No. 202086, June 21, 2017

Facts:

Phyvita Enterprises Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of

health club massage parlor, spa and other related services under the name and style of
Starfleet Reflex Zone. Panaligan et al were employees of Corporation assigned as
Roomboys.

Sometime in Jan 2005, the Corporation discovered that the amount of 180,000 including
some receipts and payroll were missing. The Corporation conducted police investigation
and while it was pending, Panaligan et al with some employees filed a complaint before
the DOLE against Corporation for 1.underpayment of wages, 2.non payment of special
and legal holidays, 3.5 days service incentive leave, 4.night shift differential pay, 5.no
pay slip, 6.signing of blank payroll. In the interim, the Corporation accused the
Panaligan et al of theft and stated that the latter were responsible for the loss of the
money and properties. Later, Corporation terminated the employer-employee
relationship between them and Panaligan et al based on loss of trust and
confidence. Also, the Corporation filed a criminal complaint of theft against the
Pangilinan et al, but the same was dismissed by the city prosecutor, there being no
sufficient evidence.
Pangilinan et al filed a complaint with the LA alleging that they were illegally
dismissed. The Corporation, on their defense, stated that the dismissal was legal
because the alleged criminal complaint was enough evidence to produce a substantial
evidence. LA ruled in favor of the Corporation. NLRC reversed the decision of LA and
decided in favor of Panaligan et al. CA reversed the decision of NLRC.
Issue:

Whether or not, Panaligan et al. were illegally dismissed.

Held: Yes, Panaligan et al. were illegally dismissed.

ARTICLE 297. Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an employment

for any of the following causes:(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work;(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;(c) Fraud or willful
breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct; it is the transgression of some established

and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and
implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. The misconduct, to be serious
within the meaning of the Labor Code, must be of such a grave and aggravated
character and not merely trivial or unimportant. Thus, for misconduct or improper
behavior to be a just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the
performance of the employee's duties; and (c) it must show that the employee has
become unfit to continue working for the employer.

On the other hand, loss of trust and confidence, as a just cause for termination of
employment, is premised on the fact that an employee concerned holds a position
where greater trust is placed by management and from whom greater fidelity to duty is
correspondingly expected. The betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for
which an employee is penalized.

Thus, it must be proved that the employees must be guilty of an actual and willful
breach of trust and that they committed a serious misconduct duly supported by
substantial evidence. However, in the case at hand, the Corporation failed to adduce
evidence supporting the accusation. Hence a Corporation dismissed criminal complaint
does not tantamount to a ground for termination of employment, the employees were
illegally dismissed.

33. IBON v. GENGHIS KHAN SECURITY SERVICES

G.R. No. 221085

FACTS:

Ravengar G. Ibon was employed as a security guard by Genghis Khan Security

Services sometime in June 2008. He was initially assigned to Mr. Solis in Quezon City.
However, in June 2009, Ibon was transferred to the Aspen Tower Condominium until his
last duty on October 4, 2010. Thereafter, respondent promised to provide him a new
assignment, which, however, did not happen.

On May 10, 2011, Ibon filed a complaint against respondent for illegal dismissal. He
alleged that he was no longer assigned to a new post after his last duty. Respondent
denied that Ibon was placed on a floating status for more than six (6) months. It claimed
that Ibon was suspended on October 4, 2010 for sleeping on the job. It also averred that
Ibon was endorsed to another client for re-assignment, but the client refused because
Ibon’s license was due for renewal, and that they sent a letter to Ibon requiring him to
report back to work.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ibon was constructively dismissed

HELD:
YES. In Reyes v. RP Guardians Security Agency, it was held that temporary
displacement or temporary off-detail of security guard is, generally, allowed in a
situation where a security agency's client decided not to renew their service contract
with the agency and no post is available for the relieved security guard. Such situation
does not normally result in a constructive dismissal. Nonetheless, when the floating
status lasts for more than six (6) months, the employee may be considered to have
been constructively dismissed. No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of
workers to security of tenure, thus, employees can only be dismissed for just or
authorized causes and after they have been afforded the due process of law.

In this case, aside from respondent's bare assertions that Ibon was suspended, which
the latter had denied, there was no evidence of the imposition of said penalty.
Respondent could have easily produced documents to support its contention that Ibon
had been suspended, considering that employers are required to observe due process
in the discipline of employees. Respondent could not rely on its letter requiring Ibon to
report back to work to refute a finding of constructive dismissal. The letters merely
requested him to report back to work and to explain why he failed to report to the office
after inquiring about his posting status. More importantly, there was no proof that Ibon
had received the letters.

In Tatel v. JFLP Investigation, the court held that [1] an employer must assign the
security guard to another posting within six (6) months from his last deployment,
otherwise, he would be considered constructively dismissed; and [2] the security guard
must be assigned to a specific or particular client. A general return-to-work order does
not suffice.

Applying the foregoing to the present controversy, respondent should have deployed
petitioner to a specific client within six (6) months from his last assignment. The
correspondences allegedly sent to petitioner merely required him to explain why he did
not report to work. He was never assigned to a particular client. Thus, even if petitioner
actually received the letters of respondent, he was still constructively dismissed
because none of these letters indicated his reassignment to another client.
 34. BRAVO vs. URIOS COLLEGE
G.R. No. 198066, June 7, 2017

FACTS:

Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher in 1988 by Urios College. In addition to his
duties as a part-time teacher, Bravo was designated as the school's comptroller from
June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2002. Urios College organized a committee to formulate a new
"ranking system for non-academic employees for school year 2001-2002” where Bravo
recommended that "the position of Comptroller should be classified as a middle
management position.

A committee to review the ranking system implemented during school year 2001-2002
was formed and found out that the ranking system for school year 2001-2002 caused
salary distortions. There were also discrepancies in the salary adjustments of Bravo
and of two (2) other employees. The committee discovered that "the Comptroller's
Office solely prepared and implemented the [s]alary [a]djustment [s]chedule" without
prior approval from the Human Resources Department. The committee recommended
that Bravo be administratively charged for serious misconduct or willful breach of trust.

On March 16, 2005, Bravo received a show cause memo requiring him to explain in
writing why his services should not be terminated for his alleged acts of serious
misconduct. A committee was organized to investigate the matter. Hearings were
conducted thereafter. Bravo was found guilty of serious misconduct for which he was
ordered to return the sum of ₱ 179,319.16, representing overpayment of his monthly
salary. On July 25, 2005, Urios College notified Bravo of its decision to terminate his
services for serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Upon receipt of the
termination letter, Bravo immediately filed before Executive Labor Arbiter a complaint for
illegal dismissal with a prayer for the payment of separation pay, damages, and
attorney's fees.

The Executive Labor dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the National
Labor Relations Commission found that Bravo's dismissal from service was illegal. The
Court of Appeals reversed the National Labor Relations Commission's Resolution and
reinstated the decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Pelaez.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner's employment was terminated for a just cause; and
(2) Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of procedural due process

RULING:

(1) YES. Under Article 297 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate the services
of an employee for “fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative”

Due to the nature of his occupation, petitioner's employment may be terminated

for willful breach of trust under Article 297(c), not Article 297(a), of the Labor
Code. A dismissal based on willful breach of trust or loss of trust and confidence under
Article 297 of the Labor Code entails the concurrence of two (2) conditions. First, the
employee whose services are to be terminated must occupy a position of trust and
confidence. And that there must be the presence of some basis for the loss of trust and
confidence. This means that "the employer must establish the existence of an act
justifying the loss of trust and confidence." Otherwise, employees will be left at the
mercy of their employers. Different rules apply in determining whether loss of trust and
confidence may validly be used as a justification in termination
cases.1âwphi1 Managerial employees are treated differently than fiduciary rank-and-file
employees.

[W]ith respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as ground for valid
dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere
uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer will not be sufficient. But,
as regards a managerial employee, mere existence of a basis for believing that such
employee has breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. Hence,
in the case of managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required, it
being sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the
employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible
for the purported misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him
unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.

The Supreme Court holds that petitioner was validly dismissed based on loss of trust
and confidence. Petitioner was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee. His position of
responsibility on delicate financial matters entailed a substantial amount of trust from
respondent. It was reasonable for the employer to trust that he had basis for his
computations especially with respect to his own compensation. Petitioner's act in
assigning to himself a higher salary rate without proper authorization is a clear breach of
the trust and confidence reposed in him. Petitioner's position made him accountable in
ensuring that the Comptroller's Office observed the company's established procedures.
It was reasonable that he should be held liable by respondent on the basis of command
responsibility.

RULING:

(2) NO. Any meaningful opportunity for the employee to present evidence and address
the charges against him or her satisfies the requirement of ample opportunity to be
heard.

In this case, respondent complied with all the requirements of procedural due process in
terminating petitioner's employment. Respondent furnished petitioner a show cause
memo stating the specific grounds for dismissal. The show cause memo also required
petitioner to answer the charges by submitting a written explanation. Respondent even
informed petitioner that he may avail the services of counsel. Respondent then
conducted a thorough investigation. Three (3) hearings were conducted on separate
occasions. The findings of the investigation committee were then sent to petitioner.
Lastly, petitioner was given a notice of termination containing respondent’s final
decision. There was a just cause for terminating petitioner from employment, there is no
basis to award him separation pay and backwages.
 35. JAVINES VS. XLIBRIS
GR. No. 214301, June 7, 2007

Facts:

Javines was hired by respondent Xlibris as operations manager in September 2011. In

July 2012, Javines submitted meal receipts for reimbursement at the finance
department of the company, wherein falsification was discovered. A notice to explain
was issued against him, charging him with acts constituting dishonesty for allegedly
tampering meal receipts from fast food chains with the total amount of P811.00 to
P10,821.00. He submitted his written explanation, denying having tampered the
receipts. He countered the allegations by explaining that it was the supervisors who
submitted the receipts to him; he merely prepared the reimbursement request, and that
he had no knowledge nor participation in the tampering of the receipts.
An administrative hearing was conducted. Javines failed to explain why and how the
incident transpired. He instead requested for further investigation because he cannot
recall who submitted the receipts to him. On the same day, notices to explain were sent
to the supervisors under Javines, who likewise denied participation in the tampering of
the receipts. Xlibris terminated Javines’ employment through an end of employment
notice.
Javines then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which was dismissed by the Labor
Arbiter who found that the dismissal was for a just cause and with due process. On
appeal, NLRC modified the decision, noting that while the dismissal was for a just
cause, Javines was not afforded due process in that no other hearing was called to
afford him the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him before he was
dismissed. Thus, P10,000.00 worth of nominal damages was awarded in his favor.
Javines did not move for reconsideration; only Xlibris elevated the case to CA on
certiorari on the issue that NLRC abused its discretion by holding that Xlibris failed to
afford Javines due process. By way of comment, Javines reiterated that he was not
granted further investigation when he requested. CA granted the petition and held that
Javines was not given an opportunity to rebut the additional pieces of evidence secured
by Xlibris. However, CA reduced the nominal damages from P10,000.00 to P1,000.00
considering that the altered meal receipts show a discrepancy of P10,000.00.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Javines was dismissed for a just cause
2. Whether or not the issue as to whether the requirements of procedural due process
to constitute a valid dismissal were complied with has been resolved with finality

Ruling:
1. Yes, Javines was dismissed for a just cause, as uniformly held by the Labor Arbiter
and NLRC.
2. Yes, the issue has attained finality. For failure to file the requisite petition before CA,
the NLRC decision attained finality and had been placed beyond the appellate court’s
power of review. The appellate court is given broad discretionary powers to waive lack
of proper assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned in the following
circumstances:
a) when the question affects jurisdiction over the subject matter;
b) matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of law;
c) matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision and complete
resolution of the case, or in serving the interests of justice or avoiding dispensing
piecemeal justice;
d) matters raised in the trial court and are of record having some bearing on the issue
submitted that the parties failed to raise or that the lower court ignored;
e) matters closely related to an error assigned; and
f) matters upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is dependent.
None of the aforesaid instances exists in the instant case. Hence, CA cannot be faulted
for not discussing said issue in its decision as the same was already resolved with
finality.

36. LUIS S. DOBLE, JR. v. ABB, INC.

 G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017

Facts:

Doble, Jr., a duly licensed engineer, was hired by respondent ABB Inc. as Junior Design
Engineer on March 29, 1993. Doble rose through the ranks and was promoted up to
Vice President and Local Division Manager of Power System Division. However, on
March 2, 2012, Doble was called by Country Manager and President Nitin Desai, and
was informed that his performance rating for 2011 was 1, which is equivalent to
unsatisfactory performance. Doble had a meeting and during the meeting, President
Desai explained to Doble that the Global and Regional Management have demanded
for a change in leadership due to the extent of losses and level of discontent among the
ranks of the PS Division. Desai then raised the option for Doble to resign. Thereafter,
HR manager Miranda told Doble that he would be paid separation pay equivalent to
75% of his monthly salary for every year of service, provided he would submit a letter of
resignation, and gave him until 12:45 PM within which to decide. Shocked by the abrupt
decision of the management, Doble asked why he should be the one made to resign.
Miranda said that it was the decision of the management and left him alone in the
conference room to decide whether or not to resign. At this juncture, the parties gave
contrasting accounts on the ensuing events which led to the termination of Doble’s
employment. Then, Doble filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement and payment of backwages, other monetary claims and damages. In a
decision the LA held that Doble was illegally dismissed because his resignation was
involuntary, and ordered ABB Inc. to pay his backwages and separation pay, since
reinstatement is no longer feasible. The NLRC granted the appeal filed by ABB Inc. and
Desai, and dismissed the partial appeal of Doble. They found that the resignation of
Doble being voluntary, there can be no illegal dismissal and no basis for the award of
other monetary claims, damages and attorney’s fees. Dissatisfied with the NLRC
decision and resolution, Doble filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.

Issues: Whether or not, Dolbe was illegally dismissed.

Held: No, Doble was not illegally dismissed.

In illegal dismissal cases, the fundamental rule is that when an employer interposes the
defense of resignation, the burden to prove that the employee indeed voluntarily
resigned necessarily rests upon the employer. But, since Doble claims to have been
forced to submit a resignation letter, it is incumbent upon him to prove with clear and
convincing evidence that his resignation was not voluntary, but was actually a case of
constructive dismissal.

Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work because continued

employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion
in rank or a diminution of pay and other benefits. It exists if an act of clear
discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the
part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his
continued employment. There is involuntary resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and
unfavorable conditions set by the employer. The test of constructive dismissal is
whether a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to
give up his employment/position under the circumstances.

On the other hand, "resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation
where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency
of the service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment.
It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of
relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to
relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee
before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he
or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment."

In the case at bar, it appears that Doble was not coerced into submitting a resignation
letter. He is holding one of the top positions in the company and answerable only to the
President, herein Desai. He is a highly educated man. It is improbable that a man of his
stature may be pressured into doing something that he does not want to do. In fact,
even if the option to resign originated from the employer, what is important for
resignation to be deemed voluntary is that the employee's intent to relinquish must
concur with the overt act of relinquishment. It was proved by substantial evidence that
Doble voluntarily resigned, as shown by the following documents (1) the affidavit of ABB
Inc.’s HR Manager Miranda; (2) the resignation letter; (3) the Employee Clearance
Sheet; (4) the Certificate of Employment; (5) photocopy of BPI’s manager’s check
representing the separation benefit; (6) Employee Final Pay Computation showing in
the payment of leave credits, rice subsidy and bonuses; and, (7) the Receipt, Release
and Quitclaim.

37. United Polyresins Inc. v. Pinuela

G.R. No. 209555, July 31, 2017

FACTS:

United Polyresins, Inc. (UPI) is a registered domestic corporation while Ernesto Uy

Soon, Jr. and Julito Uy Soon are its corporate officers. Marcelino Pinuela was employed
by UPI in 1987. He was a member of the labor union, Polyresins Rank and File
Association (PORFA), and was elected President thereof. Under the existing CBA
between UPI and PORFA, it was provided that UPI shall grant to PORFA PHP 300,000
as the union’s capital for establishing a cooperative to meet the needs of its members.
The CBA also contained a union security clause which provided that employees who
cease to be PORFA members in good standing by reason of his resignation or
expulsion shall not be retained in the employ of UPI.

During Pinuela’s term as PORFA President, it appeared that UPI automatically

deducted from the respective salaries of PORFA members amounts representing union
membership dues and loan payments. These amounts, which totalled ₱2,402,533.43,
were then regularly turned over by UPI to PORFA in the form of fifty eight (58) crossed
checks. Several days before the PHP 300,000 loan became due, the union officers and
UPI met to discuss the proposed new CBA. However, UPI told Pinuela that it will not
discuss the proposed CBA until the loan is paid. Pinuela told UPI that the union did not
have the finances. Because of the recurring threat of failed CBA negotiations and salary
deductions as a means of recovering the amount of the loan, the union members began
to demand the holding of a special election of union officers. A special election was
held, and a new union President and set of officers were elected. When the new union
officers conducted an investigation and found that the union had no more funds as they
were utilized in the prosecution of cases during Pinuela’s incumbency. Pinuela also
failed to make a formal turnover of documents to the new President.

The officers held that these violations constituted an infringement if the union’s
Constitution which prohibit the misappropriation of union funds and property and give
ground for the impeachment and recall of union officers. Thus, PORFA wrote a letter
communicating Pinuela’s expulsion from the union. Eventually, UPI issued a letter of
termination to Pinuela.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Pinuela was illegally dismissed

HELD:

Yes. The union and UPI claimed that the dismissal was based on the union security
clause. Pinuela’s expulsion from the union was based on the union’s constitution.
However, these provisions provides for the impeachment and recall of union officers,
not expulsion from union membership. Any officer found guilty of violating these
provisions shall simply be removed, impeached or recalled, from office, but not expelled
or stripped of union membership. It was therefore error on the part of PORFA and UPI
to terminate Pinuela’s employment based on Article XV, Section 1, paragraphs (e) and
(f) of the union's Constitution. Such a ground does not constitute just cause for
termination.
In addition, the union may not insist on expelling Pinuela from PORFA and assist in his
dismissal from UPI without just cause, since it is an unfair labor practice for a labor
organization to "cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee, including discrimination against an employee with respect to whom
membership in such organization has been denied or to terminate an employee on any
ground other than the usual terms and conditions under which membership or
continuation of membership is made available to other members."

38. GENP ACT SERVICES, INC. v. FALCESO

[July 31, 2017, G.R. No. 227695]

FACTS:

Genp Act Services, Inc. is engaged in business process outsourcing, particularly

servicing various multinational clients, including Allstate Insurance Company.

On different dates spanning the years 2007 to 2011, Genpact hired respondents Maria
Katrina Santos-Falceso, Janice Ann M. Mendoza, and Jeffrey S. Mariano to various
positions to service its Allstate account. However, on April 19, 2012, Allstate ended its
account with Genpact, resulting in respondents being placed on floating status, and
eventually, terminated from service.

Respondents filed a complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees against Genpact and/or its Country
Manager, Reyes. They alleged that after Allstate terminated its contract with Genpact,
they were initially placed on "benching" status with pay, and after five (5) months,
Genpact gave them the option to either "voluntarily resign" or to "be involuntarily
terminated on the ground of redundancy" with severance pay of one-half (½) month
basic salary for every year of service, in either case. Left without the option to continue
their employment with Genpact, respondents chose the latter option and were made to
sign quitclaims as a condition for receiving any and all forms of monetary benefits.
Respondents argued that the termination of Genpact and Allstate's agreement neither
amounted to a closure of business nor justified their retrenchment.

In their defense, petitioners justified respondents' termination of employment on the

ground of closure or cessation of Allstate's account with Genpact as part of the former' s
"[g]lobal [d]ownsizing due to heavy losses caused by declining sales in North
America." Further, petitioners claimed that they incessantly pursued efforts to retain
respondents within their organization, but the same proved futile, thus, leaving them
with no other choice but to provide respondents with the option to either resign or be
separated on account of redundancy - an option which they reported to the DOLE and
resorted to in the exercise of management prerogative with utmost good faith. Lastly,
petitioners pointed out that respondents were properly given separation pay, as well as
unpaid allowances and 13th month pay, thus, rendering the latter's monetary claims
bereft of merit.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed respondents' complaint for lack of merit. The LA found that
respondents' termination from service was due to the untimely cessation of the
operations of Genpact's client, Allstate, wherein respondents were assigned. In this
regard, the LA pointed out that Genpact tried to remedy respondents' situation by
assigning them to other accounts, but such efforts proved futile as respondents were
hired specifically to match the needs of Allstate. Furthermore, the LA took Genpact's act
of paying respondents their separation pay computed at one-half (½) month pay for
every year of service as a sign of good faith. Thus, the LA concluded that there was an
authorized cause in terminating respondents' services, and that Gen pact complied with
DOLE's reportorial requirements in doing so.

NLRC affirmed the LA ruling. It held that Allstate's pullout from Gen pact does not mean
an automatic termination of the employees assigned to the Allstate account, such as
respondents, but purports that the employees assigned to the withdrawing client would
be "benched" or placed on floating status as contemplated in Article 286 (now Article
301) of the Labor Code, as amended. In fact, the NLRC pointed out that Genpact
recognized the applicability of the said provision in the case of respondents, as well as
other similarly-situated employees, considering that: (a) it embarked on a Retention
Effort Program which resulted in the redeployment of more or less 100 of its employees
affected by Allstate's pullout; (b) it placed respondents and the other similarly-situated
employees on "benching" status with full pay; (c) it only resorted to termination after
alleged incessant efforts to find a suitable position for respondents proved unsuccessful;
and (d) such terminations were done during the six (6)-month period within which
employees were allowed to be placed on floating status. Thus, Genpact's acts of placing
respondents on "benching" or floating status, and thereafter, terminating their
employment were made in the exercise of its management prerogative in good faith and
in accordance with internal hiring procedures. As such, it cannot be said that
respondents were illegally dismissed from service.

Respondents moved for reconsideration, which was partly granted by the NLRC
ordering the increase of respondents' entitlement to separation pay to one (1) month
salary for every year of service. In said Resolution, the NLRC held that since
respondents' positions were rendered superfluous by the closure of the Allstate account,
then it follows that they were terminated on account of redundancy pursuant to Article
286 (now Article 301), in relation to Article 283 (now Article 298) of the Labor Code. As
such, they should be paid separation pay amounting to one (1) month salary for every
year of service, instead of the one-half (½) month salary for every year of
service. Notably, the NLRC Resolution explicitly stated that "[n]o further motion of
similar import shall be entertained."

CA dismissed outright the petition for certiorari purely on procedural grounds.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed outright the certiorari petition filed by
petitioners before it on procedural grounds.

RULING:
The petition is meritorious. (The case was remanded to the CA. The SC only ruled on
the procedural process of the case.)

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special civil action that
may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of
discretion on the part of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

Given the special and extraordinary nature of a Rule 65 petition, the general rule is that
a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower court prior to resorting to
the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, since a motion for reconsideration may still be
considered as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The
rationale for the prerequisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to
correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal
and factual circumstances of the case. This notwithstanding, the foregoing rule admits
of well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in
the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or
are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice
the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is
perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration
would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief; (j) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest
is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
A judicious review of the records reveals that the exceptions in items (d) and (e) are
attendant in this case.

The dispositive portion of the NLRC's June 30, 2014 Resolution, it explicitly warns the
litigating parties that the NLRC shall no longer entertain any further motions for
reconsideration. Irrefragably, this circumstance gave petitioners the impression that
moving for reconsideration before the NLRC would only be an exercise in futility in light
of the tribunal's aforesaid warning.

The remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration may be availed of once by each
party. In this case, only respondents had filed a motion for reconsideration before the
NLRC. Applying the foregoing provision, petitioners also had an opportunity to file such
motion in this case, should they wish to do so. However, the tenor of such warning
effectively deprived petitioners of such opportunity, thus, constituting a violation of their
right to due process.

All told, petitioners were completely justified in pursuing a direct recourse to the CA
through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.