Klaus-Peter Brand

Volker Lohmann
Wolfgang Wimmer

Substation
Automation
Handbook
Comprehensive description of Substation
Automation and the coordination with
Network Operation to obtain both
performance and cost benefits by enabling
enhanced Power System Management

. ·.::
Copyright© 2003 by
Klaus-Peter Brand · klaus-peter.brand(!1 ieee.org
Volker Lohmann · volkerlohmann@ bluewin.ch
Wolfgang Wimmer · toptools (([ bluewin.ch

Neither this book. nor any part may be reproduced

or transmitted in any form or by any means, elec
tronic or mechanical. including photocopying, micro
filming, and recording or by any information storage
and retrieval system, without the permisson in
writing of the publisher.

Publisher:
Utility Automation Consulting Lohmann,
lm Meyerhof 18, CH-5620 Bremgarten, Switzerland
http://www.uac.ch

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Text and Illustrations: Klaus-Peter Brand,

Volker Lohmann, Wolfgang Wimmer
Cover illustration: Werner Lehmann
Concept Designer: Kurth Winiger, CH-8050 Zurich
Pre-Press: Romy Schutz, CH-8050 Zurich ·
Print: Jutte-Messedruck Leipzig GmbH
DE-04329 Leipzig

Printed in Germany

ISm3-85758-951-5
1 Table of content

1 Table of content 5
2 About this Book 7
3 Introduction and Scope 15
4 Challenges with introducing Substation Automation 31
5 Primary Equipment in Substations 43
6 The Functions of Substation Automation 93
7 Substation Automation Structure 141
8 Substation Automation Architectures 151
9 Asset Management Support 183
10 New Roles of Substation Automation 197
11 Wide Area Protection 211
12 Standards and Quality Definition for Substation Automation 279
13 The System Standard IEC 61850 for Substation Automation 301
14 Phase Models of Substation Automation Systems 313
15 Benefits of Substation Automation 325
16 Guide to SA System Specification 339
17 Strategy to Cope ;,vith the fast Changing Technology 345
18 Trends and Outlook 349
19 References 353
20 Glossary 361
21 Annex 367

. '(

·
2 About this Book
2.1 Preface
The purpose of this book is to bridge the gap in
mutual understanding between those readers, who
are well experienced with the technical requirements,
design, construction, testing and operation of primary
equipment in substations e.g. circuit breakers, isola
tors, current and voltage transformers or power
trans formers etc., and information technology (IT)
oriented readers, who are involved in the
development design, production, and application of
modern intelli gent electronic devices (lED) intended
to be used for Substation Automation (SA) Systems.
When the first microprocessor based substation con
trol systems (SCS) were built the prime objective was
to provide the same functionality and make them
work as reliable and fast as conventional control
systems. The system inherent problem to be solved
was the fad that the serial bus communication caus
ed a bottleneck for the system response times in
comparison with conventional parallel-wired control
systems. This SA system behavior made the commu
nication within the substation a key issue for the per
formance of SCS and numerous propriety communi
cation bus systems and protocols vvere implemented
due to the !ack of International Standards. The con
sequence was that all the SCS were vendor specific
and IEDs from other vendors could not be used in
such systems due to the lack of compatibility.
The users were not happy about this situation as they
felt to be restricted to a specific vendor if they inten
ded to extend their control systems. On the other
hand, many SCS were implemented by small compa
nies and based on general purpose programmable
logical control (PLC) systems that could not provide
the required functionality or meet the long term ori
ented system compatibility requirements, which are
typical for the electric utility business. On the other
hand, many of these small companies did not last for
a long time because of commercial problems and
many of those SCS can neither be extended nor be 2
maintained due to the lack of spares and specific
system knowledge.
The awareness of these problems leads to an ob
stacle for the acceptance of the new technology and
for the large-scale implementation of SCS. This caus
ed pressure on the reputable vendors of SCS to stand
ardize the communication within substations as well
as the engineering approach and the formal descrip
tion of the functionality in terms of a substa-tion con
figuration language (SCL). The main objective was to
achieve interoperability between IEDs that originate
from different vendors.
The authors have been personally involved in the
process, which was triggered by IEC and EPRI, to
standardize the communication and all its system
related aspects. It has resulted in the new IEC 61850
standard for communication within substations,
which is available in the year 2003. The authors are
proud to highlight in this book some achievements
made with this standard The objective of the descrip
tion is to make all those decision makers in utilities,
who are sceptical and fear the problems involved
·vvith proprietary communication, confident that the
new standard provides a comprehensive solution for
the interoperability of IEDs from various vendors, who
commit themselves to support this new standard in
their IEDs.
When the design of IEDs to be applied fnr SCS
systems was based on common main stream hard
ware components as well as on modular functional
libraries for control that were quite similar to functio
nal libraries for protection, it was possible to integra
te control and protection systems in comprehensive
systems for substation automation (SA). The authors
were personally involved with the development and
implementation of a comprehensive platform for
multipurpose control and protection IEDs. Therefore,
the focus of this book is on SA rather on SCS with 7
2.2 separated protection. The objective of the authors is
to make those readers with a background in substa
tion control or protection confident that the integra
tion of both functionalities leads to cost effectivesys
tem solutions that have the same safety and availabi
lity as systems with separate IEDs for control and for
protection.
The integration of the control and protection functio
nality to SA makes effective substation monitoring,
primary equipment condition and support of modern
systems for maintenance and asset management
possible as an additional benefit that can be derived
from SA. This book describes the realization of such
concepts, which lead to an enhancement of the over
all power system management. The objective is that
the readers, who wish to evaluate the commercial
benefits that can be derived from SA, become aware
that such an cost/benefii analysis has to take those
additional benefits into account.
In view of the fact that SA systems can be used for
the condition monitoring of primary equipment like
circuit breakers, instrument transformers and power
transformers, the descrip110n of this equipment in this
book includes the critical components, which are sub
ject to wear and aging. The objective is to make users
of SA systems aware of this new possibrlity and to
provide developers of SA application with back
ground knowledge of the criticality of the primary
equipment.
Apart from substation related issues, the implemen
tation of SA enables new strate-gies related to power
system protection that counteracts wide area distur
bances and avoids power system collapse. With the
aid of new digital sensors for the detection of volta
ge and frequency instabilities, wide area protection
systems can be implemented that provide the sys
tem operator with early indication of incipient pro
blems in the grid in order to put him into the posi
8 tion to initiate counter measures early enough that
. ·
the power system integrity is maintained. SA enables
automated corrective actions that reduce the respon
se time to problems significantly.
If sudden loss of generation or increase of load caus
es instabilities so fast that the operator has no chan
ce to react fast enough, SA can be used by the wide
area protection scheme for rapid automatic load
shedding to compensate for the loss of generation
and to reduce the load.
Because of this new role of SA, the scope of this
book as outlined in Chapter 3 has been extended
beyond the traditional functions to describe wide
area protection schemes and their interaction with
SA. The objective is to make system planners and
operators aware of the new possibilities that are offer
ed by SA in conjunction with wide area protection
systems and power system optimization concepts.
2.2 About the Authors
2.2.1 How SA has started
The idea to substitute conventional 1·elay logics for
substation control and analogue protection relays by
digital technologies based on microprocessors and
serial communication commenced in BBC in the late
1970ties. Study groups were established in BBC
Baden/Switzerland and BBC Mannhcim/Germany.
The key people of that time in BBC Baden were
Jurgen Kopainsky and Klaus-Peter Brand, who deve
loped very systematically the basic specifications and
concepts of SA. Wolfgang Wimmer beca_me involved
in these early activities when engineering issues have
been touched, und \Jolker Lohmann \/'.Jas represen-
ting the gas insulated substation (GIS) division in this
team.
Many customers were approached during this time
with these new ideas, but the users were not very
. (
enthusiastic and receptive, and no utility wanted to
take the risk to run a pilot project One of the main
obstacles for the acceptance were the utility's orga
nization. The reason was that substation control. pro
tection and communication were considered to be
separate disciplines and, consequently, each was
organized in separate departments. As the SA
approach integrated the whole lot in one system, the
idea of separate departments became obsolete,
which was perceived by the corresponding depart
ment managers as a threat.
This situation changed drastically, when BBC was
awarded by ESKOM South Africa with the world-first
800 kV GIS 'ALPHA'. on 14th of December 1982.
This spectacular order has created a huge innovative
momentum not only in BBC for the development of
a complete new size of GIS but also on ESKOM's
side with regard to the readiness to accept new ideas
and technologies [1]
The key issue for the ESKOM's acceptance of a
microprocessor based substation control system
(SCS) was the complex and large 800 kV GIS substa
tion layout comprising 12 switchgear bays that would
have required a very extensive interlocking scheme, if
it had been designed by relay logics. In view of the
fad that more than 1 00 contacts of auxiliary switches
and relay contacts would have had to be connected
in series for one single interlocking expression in
Boolean algebra, ESCOM considered such a solution
as impracticable und unreliable. The much better
solution was the BBC proposal to substitute hard
wired interlocking by a microprocessor based expert
system, called "Topology based interlocking scheme",
which was based on general rules rather than on
Boolean Algebra expressions. This new idea was
developed by Jurgen Kopainsky, Klaus-Peter Brand
and Wolfgang Wimmer. [3]
The development and implementation of this first
SCS in ALPHA was first headed by Jurgen Kopainsky
and later by Hermann Schachermayr, the customer
requirement specification and engineering was made 2.2
by Bernhard Sander, [2] and the function plan pro
gramming for the bay controllers by Fritz Wittwer,
while Volker Lohmann was the project manager of
the total contract comprising the 800 kV GIS deve
lopment and delivery as well as the SCS part.
Five years after the order, ALPHA was successfully
commissioned on 31st March 1987 within the sche
duled delivery time.
After the merger of BBC and ASEA to become ABB
on 1Oth of August 1988, the progressive activities on
SCS in Switzerland were allocated to the protection
division of ABB Switzerland, which was headed by
Jean Gantner A new group for the SCS business
development was established with Volker Lohmann
as manager and Klaus-Peter Brand, Wolfgang
Wimmer, Helmut Hager and Otto Preiss as members
of the first core team. Two years later, this division
became the new company ABB Relays AG, which
was managed by Otto Lanz.
In ABB Relays AG, the world-first commercial com
mon hardware and software platform dedicated for
the protection and control of HV substations was
developed under Fred Engler, who was head of the
development department. This innovative and revo
lutionary approach enabled to merge protection and
control functions into one integrated system and to
allow modern SA functions.
The commercial break-through of this new platform
was enabled in conjunction with the first PC based
MicroSCADA from ABB Finland, which was used as
station level HMI, and with the complementary new
range of microprocessor based protection relays and
bay control units from ABB Finland for distribution
applications. The market acceptance was achieved in
the course of the first SA projects in Switzerland and
in the UK. The key people for the successful comple
tion of these demanding projects were Otto Preiss,
Andre Kreuzer and Kurt Frei. 9
2.2.2 2.2.2 Curriculum Vitae
Klaus-Peter Brand was born 1948 in Neustadt a.d.
Aisch, Germany. From 1967, he studied physics and
mathematics in Germany at the Universities Wurz
burg, Kiel and Bonn. In Bonn, he got his Master
Degree in Physics in 1972 (Dipl. Phys.) and his PhD (Dr.
rer. nat.) in 1976 by a work about Interstellar Plasma
Physics.
From 1976 to 1982 he worked in the BBC Research
Center, Baden, Switzerland in the area of SF6 plasma
physics (SF6 arc in high voltage breakers). He intro
duced the on-line literature search facilities in the
Research Center.
From 1982 to 1988 he acted as Senior Engineer in
the department for "Power System Analysis" of BBC.
Baden, Switzerland making load flow and EMTP cal
culations. He participated in the team for the intro
duction of "Substation Automation" jointly writing the
Function and Engineering Specification, and design
ing the System architecture. He joint the project team
for the pilot project in Substation Automation of an
800 kV GIS substation and was involved in the deve
lopment and application of the topology based
Interlocking method. He further acted as co-editor of
the company owned Handbook for Electrornagr1etic
Compatibility.
After the merger of ASEA and BBC to ABB, from
1988 to 1995 he was involved in the substation
automation (SA) business development in ABB
Relays/Baden, Switzerland to set up the engineering
activities, sales support and to contribute to the
design and realization of pilot projects. In the local
ABB organization he was product manager (PM) for
SA and he acted globally as chairman of the market
requirement group to define the next ABB genera
tion of SA systems.
From 1995 to 1999 he was PM of the ABB Panorama
10 concept for Network Control and SA and coordinated
Klaus-Peter Brand
the PM act1v1t1es in ABB Network Partner/Baden
Switzerland He participated in the successful imple
mentation of the ISO Certification process and was
responsible for the definition of the PM process He
further provided sales support for complex projects,
and established the first ABB Internet based market
ing tool for Panorama.
In 2000 he moved to the ABB University Switzerland
to manage, conduct and develop training courses
mainly on the subjects of Power systems, Electro
magnetic compatibility, Substation automation and
Communication. He has further set up a new curricu
lum for Project managers.
Since 1990 he is working for CIGRE SC B5 (former
SU4) as working group (WG) and task force (TF)
convener. Since 1995 he is member of the editor
team in WG10 of the IEC technical committee TC57
for the Standard IEC 61850 "Communication Net
works and Systems in Substations'He is further
member of TK57, the Swiss National Mirror Commit
tee of TC57, and he is Senior Member of IEEE.
Volker Lohmann was born 1940 ·In Mulheirn-Ruhr,
Germany and studied Electrical Engineering at the
Rheinisches Politechnikum DUsseldorf, Germany. He
gained his professional experience from more than
30 years of working with Brown Boveri Cie (BBC) and
ABB Switzerland in various management positions
and fields related to high voltage (HV) substations, HV
. '?
 Volker Lohmann
circuit breakers (CB), gas insulated switchgear (GIS)
and substation automation (SA). He started his ca
reer 1965 with research in the application of HV
power electronics for High Voltage Direct Current
(HVDC) and variable speed drives. After several years
in research he moved into the sales and marketing
organization for HV circuit breaker and gas insulated
switchgear (GIS) as sales and project manager. In
1982 the world's first 800 kV GIS project offered him
the opportunity to initiate the development and im
plementation of the first BBC microprocessor based
substation control system (SCS) as the project mana
ger. His coauthors were member of the project team.
In the course of the merger between BBC,
Switzerland and ASEA, Sweden, in 1987 he was res
ponsible for the product management for SCS and
protection and was involved in the development of a
multi-functional and software library based platform
for intelligent electronic devices (lED) for control, pro
tection and monitoring of HV substations. In 1995 he
became member of the ABB Business Area Mana
i gement Team for SA and protection and was world
l wide responsible for the product management and
strategic marketing of SA systems. He retired in 2002
and started his own company for Utility Automation
Consulting, where he is presently working.
Wolfgang Wimmer was born 1947 in Bad
Schwartau, Northern Germany. He studied Mathe
matics and Computer Science at the University of
; ·.
' I
Wolfgang Wimmer · 2.2.2
Hamburg, where he also graduated in Computer
Science about Deadlocks in Communication net
works. After five years working for the Deutsches
Elektronensynchroton in Hamburg, where he wrote
compilers and implemented the base software for a
packet switching network, he moved to Brown Boveri
& Cie (BBC) in Baden/Switzerland.
There he started vvith the design and implementati
on of a train control system and became member of
the technical committee TC7 "Safety and Reliability"
of the European Workshop on Industrial Computer
Systems (EWICS) He was further involved in the
design of engineering systems for remote terminal
units (RTU) and Network Control Systems. During this
time, he was also member of the IEC technical com
mittee TC65 to develop the standard IEC 61508
"Safety in Industrial Electronic Systems".
His involvement in substation automation started in
1983 with participation in the development of a
topology based interlocking program, and continued
with the introduction of microprocessor based con
trol systems for the substation automation business.
After the merger of BBC with Asea in 1987, he conti
nued with these activities in the new company- ABB
with focus on engineering processes and tools. He is
currently occupied with the development of substa
tion automation and monitoring systems at ABB/
Switzerland, and he is member of the IEC TC57 work
ing group WG11 as editor of the upcoming standard
IEC 61850 for Communication in Substations, part 6. 11
 2.3 Acknowledgements
2.5 There are quite a number of colleagues to be men
tioned, who have contributed directly or indirectly to
this book by cooperating with us over more.than 20
years for a longer or shorter time. They have helped
to collect the basic information, to elaborate market
requirement specifications, to establish the SA busi
ness, to develop advanced ideas and to maintain the
high level of the state-of-the-art. Most of them came
from our internal business environment in BBC and
ABB respectively, but there have been other impor
tant contributors from customers and even from chal
lenging competitors. There have always lively discus
sions taken place, not only in our every day's working
life but also in internal and external meetings, in
International Conferences, as well as in
International Organizations like CIGRE and IEC and
the associated working groups. In order to avoid
that some contri butors are not mentioned below,
we first would like to express our cordial gratitude
and appreciation very generally to all those
colleagues, we were privileged to work with on the
subjects of SA and communica tion within
substations.
Some of these colleagues we like to mention are
listed below in alphabetic order as they have been
intensively involved in our activities in substation auto
mation and in our involvement in the IEC 6185
stand ardization, each of them in a very particular
wdy:
Lars Andersson (ABB Switzerland)
Carl Byman (ABB Sweden)
Christoph Brunner (ABB Switzerland)
Rudolph Dinges (ABB Germany)
Fred Engler (ABB Switzerland)
Kurt Frei (ABB Switzerland)
Soren Forsman (ABB Sweden)
Helmut Hager (former ABB Switzerland)
Antti Hakala-Ranta (ABB Finland)
Jurgen Kopainsky (former BBC Switzerland)
Andre Kreuzer (former ABB Switzerland)
Lars-Gunnar Malmqvist (ABB Sweden)
12 Carl-Gustav Oesterbaka (ABB Finland)
Martin Ostertag (ABB Switzerland)
Otto Preiss (ABB Switzerland)
Bernhard Sander (former BBC Switzerland)
Hermann Schachermayr (ABB Switzerland)
Leif Williamsson (ABB Finland)
We further thank our company, ABB Switzerland, that
gave us the great opportunity and support to build
up all this know-how in an inspiring international
environment, which has finally been converted into
numerous SA products, systems, and projects.
We further express our appreciation to Gbran Lind,
Head of the Division Utility Automation System in
ABB Switzerland for his continuous, encouraging and
supporting interest in our book, as well as his Sub
division Manager, Yves Baumgartner, for selecting our
book as official reference for ABB internal and exter
nal training in Substation Automation.
2.4 We would like to hear from you
This is the first edition of the Substation Automation
Handbook. In view of the fad that the technology is
developing very fast and that it will enable further
enhancements in functionality and application it may
be desirable to produce further editions. This occa
sion would be an excellent opportunity to introduce
comments and modifications, which may be raised
and proposed by some of our readers. Therefore, we
encourage you to contact us via E-mail and to help
that. the next edition can be improved accordingly.
2.5 Readers Guide
In the area of substation automation there are work
ing people with different professional background.
Very often, this leads to a lack of mutual understand-
ing between people with power system- back
ground, who e.g started their professional career
before PCs became a common working tool, and
computer scientists, who are familiar with the
modern way of thinking in the computer age_ They,
however, usually lack of the understanding of the pri
mary equipment and the particular requirements for
making electronic equipment work in the harsh envi
ronment of HV substations. Apart from this, they are
not aware of the sensitivity of the power system pro
cess and the impact of the control actions that are
initiated by the IEDs on the power system behavior.
The authors are well aware of this conflict and the
lack of mutual understanding from their personal
background in switchgear and substation automation
as well as from their extensive experience in
• Gas insulated switchgear (GIS) research, design
and application,
• The development of substation automation
concepts, software functions and components.
• The marketing and introduction of SA business
as well as negotiating SA contracts, managing
projects, trouble shooting and
• last but not least from more than 20 years of
teaching and conducting SA workshops in many
parts of the world.
Many SA projects became a disappointment for
users as well as for the suppliers as they failed to
meet the expectations with regard to cost effective-
ness. The reasons were always very similar: the
users were not in the position to specify their
requirements and the suppliers were not aware of
the genuine needs of their customers. The main
motivation to write this book was the awareness
of the need for such a SA Handbook as a
contribution to improve the mutual understanding
between the two conflicting parties.
All readers are invited to read Chapter 3
"Introduction and Scope" to get familiar with the
general way of thinking and the related vocabulary.
In addition to chapter 3 the readers may chose
those chapters that cover their missing knowledge.
The objectives of the authors are 2.5
• To transfer their extensive know-how of all the
aspects related to the technical, functional and
commercial issues around SA to all decision
makers in utility management, system operation,
system planning, engineering and maintenance
who wish to improve their personal knowledge
in this field (Chapters 4, 9, 10, 15 refer).
• To make the power system oriented readers
aware of the new possibilities and benefits that
can be exploited with the implementation of
substation auwrnation systems (Chapters 4, 9,
10, 11, 1 5 refer).
• To make the readers with a background in
conventional control and protection systems
(secondary systems) familiar with the specific
performance and safety aspects of SA systems
that comprise integrated numerical protection
and control T''"'nctionality (Chapters 6, 7, 8 refer).
• To make the readers involved in the development,
design and application of IT in terms of intelligent
electronic devices (lED) and for SA aware of the
specific needs of the power system and the safety
and availability related aspects of substation con
trol and protection (Chapters 6, 7, 8, 12, 13 refer).
• To provide the readers, who are involved with
engineering, testing and commissioning of SA
systems with background knowledge with regard
to SA systems architectures, availability and safety
aspects as well as to the allocation of functions in
a SA system (Chapters 6, 7, 8 refer).
• To convey decision makers in utilities the message
that the implementation of SA throughout their
substations offers new chances for the utilities to
improve their internal processes to the extent that
the overall costs in power system operation and
maintenance are drastically reduced, the return on
investment is accelerated and the productivity as
well as the profitability of the enterprise is signifi
cantly improved (Chapters 4, 11,15 refer).
13
 Table 2-1 provides a more detailed guidance for the
readers with various background and experience to
select the chapters that may be of particular interest
to tl1em to complement their specific knowledge
with information around SA.
..
2.6
R 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 21
Students X X X X X X X
Beginners in
Computer science,
Power systems,
Financal planning,
System operation X X X X X X X X X X X
Decison makers:
System planning,
System operation
Design/engineering,
Maintenance X X X X X X X X X

Developers X X X X X X X X X X X X
Engineering spec. X X X X X X X X X X X X
Protection spec. X X X X X X X X X X X X
SCADA spec. X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Testing/comissioning X X X X X X X X
Maintenance X x 1x X X X X
System planning X X X X X X X IX
Table 2-7 Readers Guide ·

2.6 References
[1] Volker Lohmann (BBC/Switzerland), Andrew C Bolton (ESGOM/South Africa)
Gas insulated switchgear developed for 765 kV, Modern Power Systems,
February 1985, published by United Trade Press Ltd. London/UK

[2] Eric Engelbrecht (ESCOM/South/.f'..frica), Bernhard Sander, Hermann Schachermayr (BBC/Switzerland)

Integrated control for ECOM's 800 kV ALPHA Substation, Transmission and Distribution,
Modern Power Systems, October 1987, published by United Trade Press Ltd. London/UK

[3] Klaus-Peter Brand, JUrgen Kopainsky, Wolfgang Wimmer · Topology based interlocking
14 of electrical substations, IEEE Trans. on Power Delivery PWRD-1, 3, 118-126 (1986)

' I
. ·
3 Introduction and Scope

3.1 Scope 16
3.2 Electric power as sensitive basics of our today's society 16
3.3 The electric power system 16 3
3.3.1 The long and complex path from power generation to power consumption 16 Table of
3.3.2 The power production 16 content
3.3.3 Three-phase system and current, voltage and frequency 17
3.3.4 The transportation of electric energy by the network and the related voltage levels 18
3.3.5 Some comments to voltage levels in electric power systems 19
3.3.6 The consumption of electric energy 19
3.3.6.1 The definition of root mean square values 20
3.4 Specific Aspects of the Electric Power System 20
3.4.1 The power flow 20
3.4.1.1 Production equals consumption 20
3.4.1.2 Base load demand and load peaks, variation of demand per day, week 21
3.4.1.3 Power flow controlled by physics of the power network 21
3.4.1.4 Many voltage levels for transmission and distribution 21
3.4.2 Power generation, network stability and energy quality 21
3.4.2.1 Dispersed power generation (DPG) 21
3.4.2.2 Complex network with stability problems 21
3.4.2.3 Power quality 22
3.4.3 Safety aspects 22
3.4.3.1 High currents, voltages and surges 22
3.4.3.2 Electromagnetic interference and high-frequency noise 22
3.4.3.3 Protection 23
3.5 The Role of the Substation for the grid 24
3.5.1 Node functionality 24
3.5.2 Access to the power and power network 24
3.6 The Role of Substation Automation for the Network Management 25
3.6.1 The Power Network Management System 25
3.6.1.1 The structure 25
3.6.1.2 The overall tasks 26
3.6.2 Local Functions in Substations 26
3.6.3 The local support functions for Network Level Systems 27
3.6.4 The cruci9l role of communication 27
3.7 Substation Automation Systems 28
3.7.1 Short definition of Substation Automation Systems 28
3.7.2 The History with Remote Terminal Units 28
3.7.3 From RTU to SA 28
3.8 Substation Automation Soiutions 29
3.8.1 Commercial questions behind substation automation solutions 29
3.8.2 Benefits of Substation Automation 29
3.8.3 The realization of SA automation 29
3.9 References 30 15
 3 Introduction and Scope
3.1 3.1 Scope
The topic of this book is Substation Automation.
Before we can go into this fascinating and powerful
automation area, we have to get some idea about
the role of the substation and its automation in the
electric power system. Behind all we can see the
importance of electric power for our society today.
3.2 Electric power as sensitive basics
of our today's society
We all use the benefit of electric power in our every
day's life. Already for a long time, the clean electric
light has extended the day up to 24 hours both for
work, services, and pleasure. A lot of heavy work has
taken over by electric powered machines. Medical
instruments and the complete infrastructure of hospi
tals rely on electric power. In every home, we find
many devices from vacuum cleaner to TV set all
depending on electric power. Our complete telecom
environment and all our information technology with
all its computers rely on the unlimited availability of
electric power. The strong impact of power on socie-
Figure 3-7 This schematic picture indicates the countrywide interconnection of power production
16 and consumption by the network
ty is seen by any shortage of electricity or blackouts
happening from time to time. How does the system
look that provides all this power?
3.3 The electric power system
3.3.1 The long and complex path from
power generation to power
consumption
Despite of some efforts in decentralized power pro
duction, power generation and power consumption
are separated from each other at least for bulk
power. Few production centers feed millions of con
sumers. Therefore, large transmission and distribution
networks are needed to link both parties (Figure 3-1).
An introduction to power systems is found in [1].
3.3.2 The power production
Most electric power is produced by fossil (oil. coal) or
nuclear power plants. These types of power plants
produce steam, which drives turbines and the con
nected generators providing electric energy (Fig.
3-2). A lot of power is produced also by hydropower
1..
 AQ

3.3.3

Figure 3-2 Turbine and

generator (including
Pf and QV controO
sensor
.---------,
r Mechanical AP +jAQ
3-phase
Power Electric Power

plants where the water flow is the driving force. Phase a

Wind farms (driving force wind) or photovoltaic cells
(direct production of electric power) produce a
small but increasing fraction of electric energy.
The electric power production is subject to some
dedicated sys tem features, which have to be
considered from the beginning.

3.3.3 Three-phase system and current,

voltage and frequency

Photovoltaic cells like batteries produce electric ener Figure 3-3 Three-phase synchronous machine (generator)
gy with constant voltage and current called direct cur
rent (DC).

,.·.',
The production of electric power with the above
I
I mentioned rotating machines, where coils are mov
ing in changing magnetic fields, provides a sinuosoi
dal, alternating current (AC). Since these machines
(Figure 3-3) have usually three poles displaced by 1/3
of a complete turn we get a three-phase system, i.e.
Time
three-phase belts (windings) with induced sinuosoi
dal alternating voltages feeding three conductors - Phase1 Phase 2
Phase3
- •

with sinusoidal alternating current (AC) each displac

ed by 1/3 of 360° resulting in a displacement of Figure 3-4 Three-phase Power System (Phase Currents
120° (Figure 3-4). with Amplitude normalized to 7) 17

'? '?
'?
 This rotation frequency gives the frequency both of
the voltage and the current Common values for the
power frequency are i.e. 50 Hz (e.g. in Europe) or
60 Hz (e.g. in US). For some few railway systems,
also
16.7 Hz (formerly 16 2/3 Hz) is in use. Current refers
to conducting particles (electrons) moving through a
3.3.4 conductor. Its driving force is the voltage with the
same frequency built up by the magnetic field in the
generators. Basically, power is calculated out of the
product of current and voltage. Considering the
phase shift (angle difference) described by sincp or
coscp between current and voltage or not. we get
three types of power, i.e. the apparent power (S), the
reactive power (Q) or the active power (R). The last
value is what provides the electric energy to work for
us (see section 3.3.6.1).
The three-phase system is advantageous as the three
displaced phases fit well to rotating machines whit
out dead point. and no return conductor is needed
under fault-free conditions.
The advantage of AC systems is that its voltage can
be transformed to higher and lower levels by trans
formers being based again on changing magnetic
fields in the transformer coils. These magnetic fields
result in inductance and the related electric fields in
capacitance of each wire. Both effects have to be
added to the Ohmic resistance of the conductor. The
result is the impedance meaning losses and phase
shifts of the sinusoidal currents and voltages. The
advantage of DC is that only the Ohrnic resistance
has to be considered. These advantages of DC are
used also for power transmission by High Voltage
Direct Current (HVDC) lines. With these features, we
have started already to touch the transmission and
distribution of electric energy.
3.3.4 The transportation of electric energy
by the network and the related
voltage levels
Since production and consumption of energy are nor
mally separated, a sophisticated network or grid of
conductors like transmission lines and distribution
cables has to conned both the producers and con
18 sumers of electric energy (Figure 3-5).
The conductors have some resistivity against this cur I
rent described by the above-mentioned impedance I I
(' j
consisting of indudivity, capacity, and resistivity.
Overhead lines and cables form the network and, to
some very small extent, gas isolated lines (GIL). In
plans of such networks, the conductors for all three \ !
phases are shown as single lines.
The nodes in this network are substations
providing facilities for switching on and off the
connections. In addition, the transformers are placed
here normally.
Generators produce power at voltage levels of about
10 kV. This voltage has to be transformed up to the
level of the connected transmission network. This is
done by separate transformers (block transformers),
or more advanced, by transformer windings integrat
ed in the generator itself (power former). Depending
on the capacity and length of transmission lines need
ed, high and very high voltages are used for trans
mission, typically from above 100 kV up to about
1000 kV. At the other side of the transmission lines,
these voltages are stepwise reduced by transformers
to the subtransmission and distribution level of the
network (100 kV to 10 kV) and further down to
match finally the voltage level of the consumer
(below 1 kV in the most cases). Such a network is
shown schematically in Figure 3-5.
Une
Transmission
Consumption (motors)
Figure 3-5 Schematic network diagram with
different voltage levels
 3.3.5 Some comments to voltage levels
in electric power systems
The different voltage levels found in electric power
systems are not classified in any standard as low vol
tage (LV),·medium voltage (MV), high voltage (HV),
extra-high voltage (EHV), or ultra-high voltage (UHV).
In most countries, safety laws are connected with
such a classification; national differences exist in this
classification. Only the limit between LV and MV is
very commonly fixed at 1 kV. see e.g. IEC 60038. The
classification limits have been very often created
because of historical technical steps in switchgear
technology.
To avoid too many alternative solutions and too close
voltage levels, in IEC 60038 recommended sequen
ces of voltage levels are given, but without any refe
rence to any voltage level terrn.
Another common classification of voltage levels refers
to the type or purpose of the network applied, e.g. if
it transmits power over long distances between gene
ration and load centers, or if it distributes power from
some transmission end point to the users of the load
center. A common example for AC (alternating cur
rent) is
• Distribution level (3.6 - 36 kV): Circuits transmitting
power to the final retail outlet, mostly with a radial
structure.
• Sub-transmission level (17.5 - 145 kV): Circuits
transmitting power to distribution substations and
to bulk retail outlets, mostly with a linear or/and
ring structure.
• Transmission level (72.5 - 765 kV): Circuits trans
mitting power between major substations of
interconnecting systems, and to wholesale outlets.
These transmission lines are further divided into:
• High voltage (HV): 115 - 245 kV
• Extra high voltage (EHV): 300 - 765 kV
• Ultra high voltage (UHV): greater than
765 kV
.1 '
,;,.
Direct current (DC) systems may be classified com 3.3.6
monly as follows:
• Low voltage (24- 250 V): Auxiliary power in
power plants and substations, control circuits and,
occasionally, utilization power in some industrial
plants.
• Medium voltage (300 - 600 V): Transportation
industry
• High voltage (greater than 600 V): Long
distance bulk transmission, submarine, and major
system interconnections
It should be noted that such a classification is
very often a characteristic for protection devices
(distribu tion protection, transmission protection, etc)
and, there fore, may vary to some extent from
supplier to sup plier. To follow the increasing demand
of electric ener gy, the functionalities are allocated to
higher voltage levels, e.g. in big cities energy is
distributed at HV in a typical distribution network
structure.
3.3.6 The consumption of electric energy
Big consumers like machines and other industrial
equipment are using three-phase energy supply at
medium voltage level (below 50 kV).
The private consumers may use three-phase supply
for heatig equipment like cooking and cleaning
equipment. For a!! other purposes single-phase sup
ply is provided. In any case, the voltage level for pri
vate consumers is at low voltage levels below 1 kV.
For heating only the time average of the AC power is
effective. These time-averages for current. voltage
and power are called rms (root mean square) values.
The ever-present electronic devices rectify by their
power supplies the ACto DC as needed by their
elec
tronics. 19
,;,.
 '? '?
'.[
3.4 3.3.6.1 The definition of root mean ting each other perfectly. The reactive power Q
square values shows the impact of such elements. Since Q degrad
es the transmission capacity for P and influences the
Instantaneous values of voltage and current voltage profile of the power system, producers or
consumers may have to pay a penalty.
U =Uosinwt
I =I osin( cut - rp)
U0 and lo are the amplitudes of voltage
and current respectively 3.4 Specific Aspects of the
f = 2nw is the power frequency Electric Power System
cp is the phase angle difference In addition to the features mentioned above, the
between voltage and current electric power system has many characteristics, which
are based on physical laws, equipment features and
Time averages means effective values or rms (root
user behavior. All these aspects have to be consider
mean squares)
ed for design and operation of the power system.
d lo The most important ones are listed below.
I I sm(mt - rp)
T .
le.ff = o t = r;;
0 v2 3.4.1 The power flow
T
3.4.1.1 Production equals consumption
le.ff = J I o sin(cut - rp )dt = ;
o v2 The production of power has to be more or less
T = 2n ;w is the period of the equal to the consumption since means for power
current or voltage storage are limited today (Figure 3-6). The most
powerful means are pump storage schemes, but also
Active Power pressure storage facilities, spinning wheels, batteries
and fuel cells are used to some small extent.
1T !I"
f
P =- U(t)I(t)dt
Power flow i
To

1 T . .
= ..:...U
T
of of s m mtsm(OJt- rp )dt = leffileffCOS rp
•
0

Without going more into details, the formulas for Re

active Power (Q) and Apparent Power (S) are

Q =1e.ffue.ff sin rp Generator Transmission Load (motor)

The apparent power S shows the maximum for . ?

transmission over a line with cp = 0, i.e. when
capaci
20 tance and reactance do not exist or are compensa-
Figure 3-6 Mechanical equivalent of an electric power
system showing the balance between
generation and consumption
3.4. 7.2 Base load demand and load
peaks, variation of demand per
day, week
There is a slow changing base load demand over
the year, but also strong load peaks depending on
hour, day, week and weather conditions are
occurring. It depends on factors like when and how
people are working in factories and offices, using
cooling and heating systems for their houses, and
whether a football game attracts all people to use
their TV sets.
3.4.7.3 Power flow controlled by physics
of the power network
Which way the power is flowing from production to
consumption depends on the impedance Z of the link
ing lines and cables (Figure 3-7). The impedance Z is
composed by the Ohmic resistance Rand the induct
ance L along the conductor and the conductance G
and the capacitance C between the conductor and
ground. More details see e.g. in [1].
R + j(J)L
Z=
G+ jUJC
Stepwise adjustable or tunable capacitances and
reactances can be used to influence the physical
impedance given by the properties of the lines and
cab!es. The most modern equipment for impedance
tuning and, the corresponding control of power flow
are FACTS (flexible AC transmission systems)They
allow continuous control over a very wide range of
impedance. All such measures imply losses of power
but these are at least partly compensated by the
increased transmission capacity of the line achieved.
Ldx Rdx
TCdx
+------ dx ------
Figure 3-7 The (differentiaO line impedance Z composed
of L, R, C, G per length unit of the line.
3.4.7.4 Many voltage levels for transmission 3.4.2
and distribution
For optimizing both the power transmission and dis
tribution, different voltage levels have been introduc
ed. Higher voltages allow power transmission over
long distances with lower losses; lower voltages sim
plify the safety problems in small distribution areas or
at home.
3.4.2 Power generation/ network stability
and energy quality
3.4.2. 7 Dispersed power generation (DPG)
As mentioned already above, the power system may
be characterized in most cases by large production
centers (coal fired, nuclear or hydropower plants),
which are remote from the load centers (consumers
of any kind). Today, there is some tendency towards
dispersed power generation in smaller units near to
the consumers. This shift is supported by the increas
ing use of "alternative" power (small hydro, solar,
wind, biomass, etc) and new concepts like co-genera
tion of heat and electricity.
3.4.2.2 Complex network with stability
problems
Since the electric power is produced by a large num
ber of rotating machines with dedicated load charac
teristics, static or transient instabilities may occur due
to the interactions via the associated network.
Therefore, network control or other means have to
•
assure by proper measures that the network is kept
within a stable range. Thisstability provides e.g. the
constant voltage and power frequency needed by
the consumers. Stable systems mean also that no
collapses or blackouts occur and that power is provid
ed with a high quality and availability (Figure 3-8). 21
 1.0
V,/Vs
3.4.3 Safety aspects
3.4.3
0.8

0.6
3.4.3. 7 High currents, voltages and
0.4 surges
0.2
Electrical power systems are operated at high voltage
0.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 P/Pm levels, which may endange.r human life or cause da
P/Pm= 1 mages for equipment. Therefore, adequate isolation,
Maximum power
transmission its supervision against damages, and proper ground
capability ing is essential. High currents may produce both ther
Figure 3-8 System stability: PV Operating Curve for mal effects and electromechanical forces, especially in
Transmission Lines (V5 fixed source voltage, case of short circuits. Lightning strokes and switching
V, variable load voltage, P power delivered operations may cause transient surges that proper
to load, Pm maximum power) protection means like surge arrestors have to be
applied.

3.4.2.3 Power
quality
Power quality means mainly availability and stable fre
quency and is either assumed for given or negotiated
in specific delivery contracts. These contracts may re
quire availability of electric energy without any inter
ruptions down to some milliseconds, constant power
frequency and stable supply voltage (Figure 3-9).
3.4.3.2 Electromagnetic interference
and high-frequency noise
Arcing strokes and re-strokes are caused by switching
of isolators and result in high-frequency transients
(Figure 3-10). Therefore, effective grounding of switch
gear is not only requested at power frequency condi
tions but also for high frequencies. Proper grounding
and shielding avoids all effects, which may disturb or
destroy electronic equipment inside and outside the
substation.

Due to the small radius of overhead conductors, the

high field strength at their surface produces small
discharges along the line. These discharges depend
ent on weather conditions (moisture) produce not
only energy losses but also high-frequency. noise,
which may disturb electronic devices nearby.

In most countries, the interference values _and

noise levels have to be kept within ranges
specified by Standards (see chapter 12).
Nevertheless, such inter ference determines also
the environmental condi tions for electronic or
22 Figure 3-9 Power quality (example voltage) numerical substation automa tion systems including
protection [2].
 -1 2 r/1 Load 3.4.3.3 Protection
l
,r4P
7 3
110 · kV
side
Source side

kV .Us ul
nA , ,
+100
utL 0 ......:.......r1_u_ _ un'1..!..1{ If vL \I _
-100 ' 11 Reliable power supply is important, power 3.4.3.3
equipment
0 50 100 150 ms
I, -t is costly and the high voltages and currents may
cause damages both for people and devices. Short
circuits occuring in the transmission system on gene
rators (G), transmission and distribution lines or on
the loads (L) have to be detected in the shortest pos
sible time and the associated equipment must be
protected (Figure 3-11). Therefore, adequate protec
tion functions implemented in dedicated protection
devices are installed to safeguard the operation of
the electric power system.

0 -L-- --J_ Any short circuit happening somewhere in the net

0 200 400 600 800 1000 ns
I, -t work is detected by process data supervision. Dedi
cated preprocessing, processing and data evaluation
Figure 3-70 Measured voltage during closing of an
results in a trip command to the process (circuit brea
isolator shows very high frequent behavior
action as source for electromagnetic inter
ker). Data storage and information to the HMI sup
ferences (EM!) plement the protective action.

Figure 3-7 7 Short circuits and protection

f
f f
t ®t-€G .I*------¥<.1
fm --------!
- ;?Ill- MMC ·-

l 0
--
. I'

f
li
-(])-
1 ••

--llllf
I PROTECTIONICONTRO L-

UNIT/SYSTEM
23
 3.5 The Role of the Substation
for the grid
3.5 3.5.1 Node functionality
The substation is the node in the electrical power net
work, which connects the lines and cables for trans
mission and distribution of electric power. The electri
cal node is the busbar in the substation. To cope with
the dedicated needs for reliability and availability of
the electrical power supply various busbar schemes
are in use like single busbar, double busbar, 1112 brea
ker arrangement, ring bus, and H type.
Circuit breakers and isolators are installed to connect
or disconnect the incoming and outgoing lines with
the busbar. The power flow is actively controlled and
routed by these switching devices, i.e. by opening
and closing the circuit breakers. For reliable insulation
in case of open lines, disconnectors or insulators are
associated to the circuit breakers. Since these dis
connectors cannot break power, they must only be
operated with the associated breaker in open posi
tion. To provide safety for maintenance earthing swit
ches or temporarily earthing devices are used to
assure that the area under maintenance is without
voltage and dead. Introduction to switchgear see
chapter 5 and [3].
in addition to the switchgear, there may be transfor
mers in the substation to connect busbars at different
voltages if applicable. The tap changers of the trans
formers control the voltage in between. Voltage drops
across the transmission lines between substations
occur because of the capacitance and reactance of
the lines, the voltage may be adjusted also by adapt
able capacitor banks or reactors, which serve as sour
ces or sinks of reactive power.
Depending on the voltage level and other boundary
conditions, there is a lot of different switchgear
(some times called primary equipment) installed in
substa tions. They are described in chapter 5. The
isolation medium may be air (air isolated substation
- AIS) or SF6 gas (gas isolated substation -GIS) or a
combina
24 tion of both.
Some few compact HV substations are indoor and
housed in buildings but the majority of HV sub
stations is outdoor and subject to severe climactic
conditions.
As mentioned above (Figure 3-7), the series impe
dance and the shunt admittance of transformer, lines
and cables of the power system determine the
power flow. However, the switchgear in the sub
station may also limit this power flow. The maximum
allowed continuous rating is given mainly by the ther
mal withstand capacity of the conducting material
and the withstand capacity of contacts against
magnetic forces. In addition, the short circuit breaking
capacity of the circuit breakers limits the maximum
power allowed being connected via the network.
3.5.2 Access to the power and power
network
Instrument transformers measuring the actual volta
ges and currents deliver the essential information
concerning the power system status. Both the power
frequency and the local power flow is calculated out
of these values or measured by dedicated power
meters directly.
The switchgear in the substations and the inter
connecting transmission and distribution lines are the
high valued assets of the power system owner in
power business terms. As faults and failures do not
only degrade the devices but cause also losses in
power delivery, the status of these components is
supervised or monitored in the substations for asset
management depending on the monitoring techno
logy applied and the owner's maintenance philoso
phy.
All these means in the substation provide the inter
face accessing the power system, i.e. for changing the
actual topology, for measuring voltage and current,
and for providing data about the assets. This access
may be used either by human operators or by auto
nomous automatics like protection functions.
The switchgear will be described in chapter 5. The
system and functions for controlling, monitoring and
protecting the power network in the nodes and their
relation to the overall network management will be
explained in paragraph 3.6.

3.6 The Role of Substation
Automation for the Network
Management
3.6.1 The Power Network Management
System
3.6. 7. 7 The structure
The power network management system is a multi
level hierarchical control system. The highest level, e.g.
the National Control Center (NCC) manages the com
plete network; subordinated control levels e.g. repre
sented by Regional Control Centers (RCC) manage
some regions. The lowest control level is in the sub
stations where the Substation Automation System
controls the node and provides direct access to the
power system (Figure 3-12).
At the various levels, different tasks or functions are 3.6
performed referring to the allocated parts of the
power system. From the view of the substation, all
functions performed in the substation are called local
functions and all functions at the higher control levels
are called remote functions. Therefore, the complete
network control system may be reduced to a two
level system model at least in the context of this
book.
Since a lot of local functions provide subsidiary sup
port to remote functions, the interaction of these func
tions with the network management functions has to
be discussed as a whole.
Figure 3-7 2 Hierarchy of the netvvork power
management system

NETWORK
LEVEL R
-E-G-IO-N-I a- m)--!=o9
N
-A-TI-ON
Network control

r£at" 'dI
AREA 1
2
Network control
SUB . r\1_.e_t_:_:_r - -on-_tr_o_l....,.
STATION
LEVEL

F"--· &
Switchgear Switchgear Switchgear Switchgear·-

Power transformer Power transformer Power transformer

Meas. transf. U, I . Meas. transf. U, I Meas:transf. U, I Meas. transf. U, I

- Aux. devices -Aux. devices - Aux. devices -Aux. devices 25

3.6.2 3.6. 7.2 The avera(/ tasks
The main task of power network management be
sides direct control (network control system) is ener
gy management (EM) which controls not only the
balance between production and. consumption of
power but also the path of the power flow taking
into account economical and other cnteria. Energy
management has also to take care of power system
and to assure the availability and quality of the elec
tric energy. It exchanges business-related data with
the business information and trade system of the uti
lity concerned.
The power network management system has to
acquire all the data like voltage, current, power flow,
and the status of all links of the entire power system.
In addition, it has to control all the switchgear
installed in the numerous substations. This task is
called super visory control and data acquisition
(SCADA).
I L Ii = oI IL_L_u--,-ij
Figure 3-73 The Kirchhoff's Laws
Inherent differences in the acquisition equipment and
the common time base cause some inconsistencies
26 in the data retrieved from the substations. Therefore,
. '?
a consistent data set of the entire power system has
to be generated by the so-called state estimation.
This means nothing more than the iterative verifica
tion of the compliance of the entire network with the
Kirchhoff's Laws (Figure 3-13).
Another task of the power management system is
the management of all the assets. Asset manage
ment and all supervisory functions may be processed
in on big central computer or, more commonly, in
many interlinked computers.
3.6.2 Local Functions in Substations
The two most local functions are the data acquisition
from the power grid via the switchgear including
instrument transformers (sensor, sensing) and the
activation of changes by commands to switchgear
devices that can be switched or changed (actuators,
acting). The values for power frequency, active and
reactive power may either be measured directly or
calculated out of the measured values for current and
voltage. In addition, the power quality may be moni
tored.
Such data acquisition allows many local functions like
supervision of the power network and controlling the
data flow at substation (node) level. These data are
transmitted to any function interested on, maybe up
to the NCC level. The fastest interaction between
sensors and actuators is provided by the most local
and autonomous automatic function, i.e. protection,
which issues a trip command to the allocated circuit
breaker in case of a detected fault Slower local auto
matics are voltage regulation and local load shedding
o , in case of power shortage or danger of instability.
In addition to the powr system, its most costly com
ponents, i.e. the switchgear is monitored as well pro
viding all data important for maintenance. Apart from
the power system, also the substation automation
system itself including protection is monitored, super-
vised and self-supervised. In case of any failure, either
corrective actions can be locally initiated or alarms
can be issued.
All substation related information can be accessed via
the local station HMI, which can also be used for
local operations. Since in normal situations nearly all
sub stations are running unmanned and remotely
con trolled, data and commands are exchanged via
com munication links with the remote network
control center.
3.6.3 The local support functions for
Network Level Systems
In case of remote operation of a substation, the
basic role of the substation automation system as
source of power system information and sink of
power con trol commands is still valid. All passive
and active ele ments of the switchgear are
supervised and protect ed. The most protection
functions will stay autono mous in the substation.
Process data are provided pre-processed to
informa tion for the remote network control
system. Auto matic functions in the substation
can reduce the heavy load of the functions residing
on NCC level in the network control system and
accelerate the res ponse time to contingencies to
maintain power sys tem integrity.
Very often, condition related data from all 3.6.4
substations in the network are collected in
Monitoring Centers to calculate trends and to
elaborate maintenance and planning strategies and
to elaborated a prognosis for the future behavior of
power system. Therefore, the substations are the
backbone of a global asset mana gement system.
Summarizing all the mentioned features, a
substation automation system can be seen as
both the most decentralized part and most
important part of the overall power system
management.
3.6.4 The crucial role of communication
The overall power management system is a distribu
ted system. Its lowest but most important level is sub
station automation. Therefore, reliable communica
tion plays a crucial role for reliable power system ope
ration. The fast advances in communication techno
logy provide many new opportunities. However, the
very specific functional and performance require
ments and the long lifetime of power equipment
impose some hard technical and commercial con
straints, which have to taken into consideration.

The local data from the substations may be also used

to control the global performance of the power net
work. to prevent any kind of instabilities (voltage, fre
quency, rotor angle, etc) and to avoid cascade trip
ping resulting in wide-area disturbances and black-
outs. Such systems use not only the data from the --
substation for decision making but also interact with
the locally installed protection devices modifying their
parameters according to the changes in the power
flow or power system topology (adaptive protection). 27

3.7 Substation Automation Systems
3.7 3.71 Short definition of Substation
Automation Systems
The definition of Substation Automation Systems
(SA)
can be done stepwise.
The most straightforward definition is that a Sub
station Automation System performs all the local
tasks described in section 3.6.1, i.e. providing
• local and remote access to the power
system
• local manual and automatic functions
• communications links and interfaces to the
switch
gear, within the substation automation system
and to the network management system
These functions may be performed more or less
combined in a lot of dedicated intelligent _Electro
nic Qevices (lED) for control, monitoring, protection,
automatics, communication, etc The functions of sub
station automation are described in chapter 6, the
substation automation structure in chapter 7.
3.72 The History of Remote Terminal Units
Historically, the only interface between the switch
gear and the network management system was a
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) in each substation. The
RTU was a central unit containing a lot of inputs and
outputs, nearly no local functions but the communi
cation interface to the remote network control center.
RTUs and NCC both together formed the Supervisory
Control And Data Acquisition system (SCADA). A
SCADA system is primarily used to monitor, control
and manage the power system remotely by human
intervention to deliver electrical energy as per delivery
contracts. It provides real time status information
(both analogue and digital) as well as historical infor
mation to the operator and supports his decision
making for effective supervisory control. In addition,
the action of protection like start and trip is included
28 as simple yes/no information.
;·,,
,..,
i
3.73 From RTU to SA
In contrast to RTUs, Substation automation systems
perform all the local tasks mentioned above in a
more or less decentralized structure. The functions
include all the automation of actions that are required
to manage the specific substation, whether it is to iso
late and earth a feeder bay, or to collect condition
monitoring data. Therefore, it includes the collection
and storage of a vast amount of data that are related
to substation based equipment and the surrounding
power system itself (e.g. fault location details, distur
bance recording etc). The structure of Substation
Automation is described in chapter 7. its architecture
in chapter 8.
The communication function of the RTU is also need
ed in the SA, but is changed to a communication
interface. In most cases, this function is implemented
in a gateway lED. Depending on the communication
protocols used this gateway has to convert the pro
tocols in both directions also (protocol converter). The
information collected and stored in distributed devic
es (IEDs) of the SA will be communicated to the
SCADA master via this gateway. Note that also pro
tection devices are seen as part of the Substation
Automation integrated by the common communica
tion system. Protection functions may be also imple
mented together with control functions in one single
lED.
Depending on the functionality and availability request
ed in the substation, its geographic extension and
commercial boundaries, RTUs will remain a conve
nient solution for a lot of substations. Reverse, RTUs
may be defined as most simple substation automa
tion systems also. Some comparison is given chapter
8.
The trends and outlooks for the future
developments are addressed in chapter 18.
3.8 Substation Automation Solutions
3.8.1 Commercial questions behind
substation automation solutions
Generally, one can think of many dedicated solutions,
however, one has always to take really a hard look at
the cost efficiency of those solutions and find a justi
fication for the selected implementation of SA. For
this purpose, some key questions have to be answer
ed like
• What is the impact on capital expenditure
budget?
• What is the impact on the operating
expenditure budget?
• Will all the proposed services/benefits be
utilized and is the approach cost efficient?
These questions have to be discussed in the context
of the benefits of Substation l'•.utomation.
3.8.2 Benefits of Substation Automation
In order to decide whether it is a benefit to use
SA, any utility must firstly know, and secondly
decide, what kind SA services shall be implemented.
For the elaboration of an implementation strategy,
the utility is faced with the following questions:
• What are the technical objectives of SA. and
how does each service c:::ontribute to meet the
objectives?
• What are the main business objectives of SA
and how does each service contribute to meet
the objectives?
• When the boundary between utilities and custo
mers is inside the substation, is it expected that the
customer should have similar systems/IEDs and
whether they should be integrated with the uti!it;7
Both the most basic requirements and the highest
benefits of SA systems are to minimize the number
of outages and outage times, to decrease operating
costs, increase productivity and to improve power 3.8
system performance. How this is fulfilled will be
shown in the book
One of the original means is to automate actions,
which have been previously executed by operators.
This could be realized at least partly by hardwired
logic instead of microprocessors. The full benefits
provided by the microprocessor-based lEOs only are
derived from
• easier design of complex logic by
software including designable levels of
functional integration,
• all the additional opportunities and services,
which can be provided if all the information
is available in digital format and shared
between IEDs.
To improve the overall technical and economical
management of the power system, one would want
to access all data stored in any lED from
anywhere. Depending on the communication link
in the sub station, Substation Automation Systems
provide this
opportunity either via a dedicated link via the corpo
rate network (Intranet) or via Internet selected by
security requirements. Utilities may even give dedi
cated service access to suppliers or limited user
access to major customers for data that may be rele
vant to them.
The benefits of Substation Automation are further
discussed in chapter 15.
3.8.3 The realization of SA automation -
Bearing in mind the fast changing information tech
nology, the development of systems and products
for Substation Automation should be done in a well
defined sequence of. phases. Some of them are of
interest for customers also. 29
. '? . (
3.9 The project execution shows also well-defined phases Important for the customer is to safeguard his invest
from specification to maintenance requiring a close ments in spite of the fast changing technologies.
cooperation between customer and supplier. The Recommendations how to reach this goal are given
project has to meet all standards mentioned in chap in chapter 1 7.
ter 12 if applicable. All what has to be considered for
a successful and harmonic project execution is dis
cussed in chapter 14.

309 References

[1.1] Olle I. Elgerd 0 Electric Energy Systems Theory, 2nd ed., Mac Graw Hill,
1982 [1.2] Olle I. Elgerd, Patrick. D. van der Puije 0 Electric Power Engineering,
2nd ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997

[2.1] Walter A. Elmore (Ed.) 0 Protective Relaying Theory and Applications,

Marcel Dekker, New York (1994)

[2.2] Helmut Ungrad, Wilibald Winkler, Andrej Wiszniewski 0 Protection Techniques in Electrical
Energy Systems, Marcel Dekker, New York (1995)
[3] Switchgear Manual, © ABB Calor Emag Schaltanlagen Mannheim, iOth revised edition,
Cornelsen Verlag, Berlin, 2001

30
 4 Challenges with introducing Substation Automation

4.1 Substation Automation, the ineluctable way? 32 4

4.1.1 Necessary conditions to install new technology in_ substations 32 Table of
4.1.1.1 Electrical network consideration 32 content
4.1.1.2 Utility social aspect 33
4.1.1.3 Final customer aspect 33
4.1.1.4 Utility business policy 34
4.1.2 Advantages and drawbacks of new technologies 35
4.1.2.1 Social Aspects 35
4.1.2.2 Financial aspect 35
4.1.2.3 Network and energy management aspect 35
4.1.2.4 Final customers aspects 35
4.1.3 Key success factors for the introduction of SA technology 36
4.1.3.1 Basics rules to preserve independence and to succeed 36
4.1.3.2 Find a global commitment inside your utility 36
4.1.3.3 Find a financial indicator to chose what must be made first 36
4.1.4 Conclusion 37
4.2 Management and Utilization of Substation Data 38
4.3 System Performance Aspects 38
4.3.1 Backward compatibility to allow integration with existing systems 38
4.4 Justification for Substation Automation 39
4.4.1 Typical Justification Scenarios 39
4.4.2 Perception of Substation Automation 39
4.4.3 Substation legacy systems and practices 40
4.4.4 Opportunities and justifications 40
4.4.5 Benefits of substation automation integration 41
4.4.5.1 Design Benefits 41
4.4.5.2 Operation Benefits 41
4.4.5.3 Maintenance Benefits 41
4.4.5.4 Reliability Benefits 42
4.4.5.5 Reduced cost 42
4.5 References 42

31
. !

'?
 4 Challenges with introducing Substation Automation
4.1 4.l Substation Automation,
the ineluctable way?
Twenty years ago, the first local automatism appear
ed in electrical substations.·Some of those automa
tisms were used to eliminate earth faults by opening
and closing cyclically the feeders in rlV/MV substa
tions, others were in charge to permute automatical
ly the transformers in EHV/HV substations. These
automatism were so slow that both the operating
staff and the customers could follow these protection
and optimization procedures.
Today, the information technology (IT) has
progressed in such a way that wide area protection
schemes can be realized that are in the position to
protect the en tire power system relying on co-
ordinated defense plans. They are the ultimate
barriers intended to pre vent the spreading of losses
of synchronism through out the utility network
Distributed computers, satelli te based time
synchronization and communication, broadband
communication networks and intelligent substation
automation systems and phasor measure ment
units (PMU) are involved in such protection
schemes. As the response of operating staff is too
slow with the legacy technology in emergency situa
tions, the emergency control goes through all the
automated control systems to operate globally in less
than 0.5 second.
In the meantime, electromechanical, static, electronic
and fully digital technology have been successively
installed in substations. The average outage time for
a end customer went down from 2 days to 10 minu
tes per year. Utilities are now selling quality of the
electricity rather than power of the electricity.
There are world-wide utilities who ask themselves
the question: Must we do it? Can we do it? What will
the advantages and the inconveniences be to install
fully digital substation control systems together with
32 the advanced functionality? The authors try in this
book to provide answers to these questions and
explain various options how to do it depending on
customer benefits, operating philosophies, business
environment etc
[
i
4.1.1 Necessary conditions to install
new technology in substations
We think that four different aspects have to be con
sidered in connection with the implementation of
new technologies in substations. These involve the
electrical network the utilities social aspect, the end
customer aspect and the utilities policy aspect. All
have to be analyzed in detail.
4. 7. 7. 7 Electrical network
consideration
Digital substation automation systems improve the
control of the network All basic functions like tele
control, local control, event recorder, disturbance re
corder, numerical protection, automation of substa
tion automation (SA) systems are interacting with the
entire power system control:
• The tele-control functionality allows the SCADA
operating people to have a good oveivievv control
on the network They receive supervision informa
tion and can operate the switchgear with the
highest reliability.
• The control functions allow the operating people
to run the substation as if they were inside it.
User-friendly human machine interfaces (HMI)
provide the right information at the right time.
Easy to operate and to understand are the
qualities of the control interface. We.cannot find
any operating people who are used to SA still
prefer conventional hardwired substations and
restricted HMI.
• The sequence of event recorders with time
tagging at one millisecond, which are incorporated
in the IEDs for protection and control provide
comprehensive and precise information and can
help protection people to improve the global
protection scheme (of all SA have the same time
reference).
• The disturbance recorder that are included
in SA allow the network maintenance
engineers to analyze a faulty part of the
network.
• Numerical protection relays improve the quality
of the protection. This equipment can be set with
very good precision and their behavior can even
be dynamically adapted to changing condition
and topology.
. ventive maintenance obsolete and allows changing
• Automation is a very important point. This
allows the SA to have self-response to problems
and
to arrange in a predetermined configuration
procedure the topology of the network in few
seconds. This cannot be equaled by the best
SCADA operating people.
Commencing the installation of digital substation
control systems requires very few conditions on the
electrical network. Existing SCADA can be used
because SA can be adapted to their communication
protocol. Static or electromechanical relays can still be
used even if the SA implies digital relays for new
installations. Existing substations cail be enhanced
stepwise. SA systems can easily be connected and
coordinated with switchgear placed on the lines and
cables.
4.1.1.2 Utility social aspect 4.1.1.3
Substation automation leads to unmanned substa
tions and thus fewer operating people. This is a fact
and may mean a taboo aspect and an obstacle to
introduce substation automation systems. On the
other hand, it can be a very important advantage in
cases when the substations are located far from the
operation point. Considering the flexibility of opera
ting people, we assume that with a good training
and good documentation, average operating people
have no problem to operate correctly a digital sub
station automation system, locally or from remote.
With the integrated self-diagnostic facility in connec
tion with a centralized maintenance center, just a few
maintenance people are necessary. SA makes pre-
to "just in time maintenance" practices with the aid of
condition monitoring facilities.
In addition, SA means reduced time to design, erect
and test substations. Project teams can be reduced in
number because ofthe fact that substation automa
tion systems are simpler to design, install and test.
This means, however, that that the introduction of SA
must be carefully prepared by the utility. Although the
social consequences are important, the benefits for
the utility have to be given priority. There are less
people involved but those need higher qualification
and their jobs are more challenging.
4.1.1.3 End customer aspect
Substation automation systems improve the quality
of service and thus have a positive impact on the
reliability the power supply to the end customer. SA
decreases the number of human errors as SCADA
people are enabled by means of digital interlocking
schemes to control the complex topology of the
power network with higher reliability. Such guided 33
 control decreases the number of operating faults,
especially in emergency situations. Precise analyses of
fault cohditions are processed by the SA

The disturbance recorder incorporated allow to

detect weak spots in the network that the
The technical policy is involved because of changing
4.1.1.4 interrup tions of power for the end customer are
to SA utilities can lose the control on what will be
minimized.
installed in their substations. Typical problems occur
when utilities buy different SA systems under a price
Automated functions allow the SA to control the
consideration only. The cheapest solutions change
levels of voltage, frequency and network stability. The
with the years. Five years later, the utility has seven
time that is necessary to initiate counter measures is
different suppliers, with seven or more different
around 200 milliseconds. This number has to be
systems, a lot of spare parts, and big difficulties to
com pared with 5 seconds that is needed by the
manage correctly the difficult situation, when small
SCADA people to respond to disturbances.
companies do no longer exist.
Self-diagnostic included in the SA allows the
The introduction of SA also means optimization of
mainte nance people to repair very quickly the
the substation and reducing the global lifetime cost
faulty equip ment.
of the substation. If an utility tries to install a SA
without reviewing the design of the substation (civil
4. 7.7.4 Utility business
policy
The influence of digital control systems on the utility
business policy is very significant as SA implies the Figure 4- 7 Cost/benefit analysis of new HVIMV
review of the technical, operating and maintenance Substations over 7 5 years of operation
policies as well as the financial policy.

Cost/Benefit Analysis
of New HV/MV Substations

., 100.00
1::

-
80.00
VI
VI
0 60.00
0
Q) 40.00
>
i
20.00
a;
a:: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0.00

Years of Operation

- SCS l!ii!ii!ilil Con-...entional ----.-Accumulated benefits

34

works, trenches, building, location of the cubicles
etc.)
they may have·to pay an extra cost premium of up
to
20%.
Operating and maintenance policies have to be re
viewed to exploit the full benefits of SA as well as
operating procedures, maintenance periods and
repair actions, repair actions.
The financial policy has to be changed as the intro
duction of new technologies requires consideration
.' of the costs for the total life cycle of the equipment
(Figure 4-1).
The cost/benefit analysis of a typical new SA system
(here SCS) for a typical HV/MV substations in com
parison with conventional control reveals the follow
ing facts:
1. Lower initial investment costs (-10 %)
2. Lower amortization costs for the first 3 years
3. Lower maintenance cost during 15 years
4. The accumulated benefits over the assumed
1 5 years life cycle sum up as return of investment
to 160 % of the initial investment cost
4.1.2 Advantages and drawbacks
of new technologies
4. 7.2. 7 Social
Aspects
The new technologies may reduce the number of
people necessary for SA design, erection, test opera
tion and maintenance, but they also free people to
take care for other important business aspects like
quality of services, optimization of the network per
formance, improvement customers interfaces and
power system planning. Apart from this, the new
technologies improve the knowledge and skills of the
people with regard to customer focus.
4. 7.2.2 Financial aspect
The new technologies enable utilities to earn more
money. The global lifetime costs of the computeriz€d
substations are lower than conventional. The reliabi
lity is greater and the power interrupts are shorter. 4.1.2
But the implementation of new technologies requir
es investments not only because of the financial
benefits but also due the fact that the knowledge for
maintaining and spares for repairing conventional
relays is less and less available. Utilities need to
rebuild or rethink their social policy, as well as opera
ting and maintenance policies. They need to buy fea
sibility studies or to make prototype substations.
4. 7 .2.3 Network and
energy management
aspect
The new technologies allow a better optimization of
the network by using Energy Management Systems
(EMS) linked with digital substation control systems.
Typical examples are:
• The integrated substation control systems receive
a command from the operator for load shedding
and can execute this operation very quickly to
safeguard the network stability.
• In emergency situations, load shedding can be
initiated by voltage or frequency monitoring
devices automatically to counteract wide area
disturbances that may caused by cascade tripping.
• As all substation control systems have the same
time reference, it is possible to analyze globally the
response of the protection schemes of the
network and in case of a fault to analyze precisely
why, where and when this fault has occurred.
4.7.2.4 End customers aspects
The new technologies improve the quality of service
and power quality, reduce outage times and increase
the satisfaction of final customers.
35
'? "? · '?
 4.1.3 Key success factors for the
introduction of SA technology

4.1.3 4. 7.3. 7 Basics rules to preserve
independence and to succeed
One of the most basic rules for all utilities that
intend to introduce the SA technology is to stay
indepen dent from vendors and to stay in a position
that they have the choice of the equipment But this
indepen dence has a cost aspect, as an utility cannot
afford to have 10 different suppliers for SA systems
because of the implications involved with regard to
spares, main tenance and training. Utilities need to
carefully choose the optimal solution and to buy
the best solution to their problem of their
problems.
A very important issue that assures independence is
the strict rule to accept only systems that are design
ed in accordance with International Standards, prefe
rably with IEC 61850. This is of particular importance
for the communication within the substations. IEC
61850 is the only standard that provides an open
architecture and assures interoperability with IEDs
from various vendors, who offer compliancy with IEC
61850 implemented.
In the process of introducing the new technologies, it
is highly recommend that utilities start with feasibility
studies to elaborate requirement specifications that
correspond to their specific needs. For the sake of
independence, it is recommended to select two
com petent suppliers only and to ask each of them
to pro duce pilot installations including the
complete func tional and technical specifications. The
operating peo ple should have their specific man-
machine interface and the maintenance engineers
should obtain the documentation in accordance
with their specific documentation style guide.
Aft h ·1 · 11 · · .
r..er t••e p:.ot :nsta..at:on !S ava11 able compreh.ensJve_
. could include:
factory acceptance tests should be conducted using • Lack or failure of power
generation a primary equipment simulator for product approval. • Lack or failure of
transmission
Such a product approval procedure should be
applied only once to assure that the right and feasi- • Lack or failure of distribution
36 ble product, is received on site.
As an utility primary task to maintain the quality of
service rather than to maintain suppliers equipment,
utilities may prefer to sign a maintenance
contract with the supplier to keep the SA
equipment up to date.
Such an approach will ensure successful implementa
tion of the new technology and the required inde
pendence at the same time.
It may be cost efficient to sign delivery contracts with
the suppliers for several substations over a time pe
riod of 3-5 years. Prices will be reduced and the
utili ties teams will not have to spend time on new
sub station control system designs.
4. 7 .3.2 Find a global
commitment inside your
utility
A lot of different people and disciplines are involved
during the introduction of substation automation
systems. A good way to success is to involve all the
categories of people who will be involved with the
new technology.
4. 7 .3.3 Find a financial indicator to
chose what must be made first
The crucial question for an utility is whether it is eco
nomically justified to invest in new technology for
their substations and when the investment has to be
made and to what extent it should be done. A good
approach to make this judgment is to evaluate the
shortcomings in quality of services. Such shortcomings
• Lack or failure of accounting
I.
 F
I ;
To evaluate all these parameters is a very complex
task and it is suggested to define a single non-per-
formance factor called "! on Qistributed _Energy"
The F-Time parameter has to be- cut in short time
<200 ms and long time >= 200 ms (F.S-Time and F.L-
Time) because these two kinds of failure do not have
(NDE) to analyze the shortcomings in service. the same impact for the final customer. Generally, F.S-
Time are not very sensitive for the end customer
This NDE is a new unit, in the local currency by kWh, except if this one uses programmable logic compu-
which. represents the difference of money between ters without using UPS. 4.1.4
the two states of power system: F.S-Time is coming from fault on the lines (trees,

1. The utility is able to deliver the energy storms, lightning,...) and F.L-Time is commonly coming
to the end customer and from stations or equipment
2. The utility is not able to deliver
Repeatability of non-quality is a w;ry important aspect
too. The situation involved by twenty energy prob-
The valuation of the NDE is a very sensitive action lems a year is more than twice as worst than the
because the NDE is not only the benefit by kWh but
situation involved by ten energy problems a year. It
includes all the activities of the utility. For national or
seams that the customer disappointment is propor-
state utilities, the NDE will include the lack of quality
tional to the square of the default number. To eva-
I
of energy, that this factory cannot produce and then
'I,
luate this fact, we propose to use a formula like:
i cannot grow and cannot pay its people and they can-
2
c I
I
not use electricity because they cannot pay or buy Cost = A * E * N + B * E * NDE
electric equipment. where A is a utility coefficient in currency
''· E: is the power cut in kWh
The NDE does not indicate where to invest but indi- N: is the number of faults
I' cates when and how much to invest. This is the first
B: is an utility coefficient
step. The NDE is also used to sort the projects and
I NDE: is in currency/kWh
give priority between two projects. (The NDE is also
a very good parameter to control the level invest- with this approach, every utility is able to determine
I
II ment in a utility. It can be used with great benefit by what to invest and when to invest and if we consider
the management board for financial regulation.) the substations, the utility will realize rapidly that the
costs that are caused by conventional hardwired sub-
But non-quality of service translated in NDE alone is a station control systems and old protection relays are
poor approach, if we do not consider other parame- very significant.
ters as well. Level of voltage, frequency, reactive
power transfer, number of long and short time inter-
rupts are important parameters. One part of 4.1.4 Conclusion
these
parameters is involved in network stability. Moving to substation automation system is an ine-
luctable way but is not done without
consequences.
Therefore utilities use as a more complete approach Generally, we can find advantages for the end custo-
quality parameters, which are often the time of inter- mer, but the way to provide these can be difficult
for rupts coming from the electrical network and stations utilities. Examples from European or North
failures (F-Time) and time of interrupts coming from utilities can not easily be transferred
American
directly to the works on the network and the substation (W-Time). rest of the world.
Historical and detailed information of these two
para-
meters is very important so as to be able to deter- World-wide knowledge is a good guarantee for sue-
mine where to invest to increase the quality of ser- cess in such an approach. This know-how may be
VICe. learned assisted by world-wide active companies but
the major part of the thoughts must be done
inter-
nally. This approach is necessary to avoid great
deception and disillusion in the years to come. 37
. ' . ·
 4.2 Management and Utilization
of Substation Data
4.3 Dedicated hardware devices for process data record
ing that were previously proviued for data retrieval
from the control center now become functional
modules that are integrated into the IEDs. The RTU
merely acts as a gateway to provide access to these
data, which are transmitted to the relevant historical
data base for storage and processing. These data
comprise:
• Sequence of event recordings
• Disturbance recordings
• Quality of supply measurands
• Statistical metering for power system
planning purposes
• Accounting information
With these new features an SA system can be
provid
ed by the most cost effective functions like:
• System-wide under-frequency load shed
ding: Dedicated IEDs monitor the system volta
ges, currents, frequency and power and are com
municating peer-to-peer on a real time basis over
the corporate wide area network (WAN). In case
of power generation deficit detected they deter
mine the most suitable location for performing
load shedding on the basis of real time voltage
instability studies, power swing predictions and
actually measured loads.
• Redundant protection and control functions:
The introduction of serial communication at
process level allows IEDs to share analogue and
digital data on a real time basis and to perform
mutual back-up functions. An lED acting primarily
as protection device may incorporate also back-up
control functions that are used, if the associated
lED for control is faulty. The associated lED for
control may have a back-up protection functiona
lity that can be activated automatically, if the pro
tection lED has failed to operate.
38
• Intelligent power system voltage control:
The active and reactive power flow in the network
can be tracked system wide by means of a
dedicated voltage control function. As it knows ·
the position of all transformer tap-changers it can
automatically adjust them from remote, and it also
can switch capacitor banks, or initiate of load
shedding etc
There may still be some obstacles like processing
power and speed of a typical WAN/LAN, to apply
such new functions but they may become reality in a
not too distant future.
4.3 System Performance Aspects
In order to assure that the SA system performs ade
quately to conventional systems, the following per
formance related aspects have to be addressed:
• Security, reliability, dependability and speed in
order to ensure that the protection functionality
is not degraded and has highest priority at all
times
• Flexibility, expandability and forward
compatibility with newer systems to ensure that
future expan sion can be accommodated at
minimum costs
4.3.1 Backward compatibility to allow
integration with existing systems
A secure control hierarchy and corresponding
interlocking has to ensure that remote control from
the SCADA as well as local control from the substa
tion HMI is safe by verifying the validity of control
actions beforE" Pxecution.
Redundancy of equipment and/or functionality has to
ensure that a single hardware failure does not expo
se neither the power system nor primary equipment
to unsafe and undesirable operating conditions.
 4.4 Justification for Substation
Automation
4.4.1 Typical Justification Scenarios
Most utilities today have identified potential benefits
available from the implementation of automation to
their operations. These benefits generally fall into two
distinct categories: strategic and tangible. Tre strate
gic benefits result from programs designed to impro
ve the customerfs perception of quality, reliability and
added value. Tangible benefits are derived from pro
grams to increase the ability of the organization to
work better, faster, and cheaper. Table 4-1 includes
examples of benefits falling under these categories.
Many utilities believe that automation of their power
delivery systems can improve system reliability and
lower-operation and maintenance costs if applied
correctly. The following important justification scena
rios are recognized by many utilities as necessary
consideration before capital resources can be com
mitted to a specific substation project.
Strategic - Automation project must improve power
quality, reliability of service and information available
Strategic Benefits
Improved quality of service
Improved reliability
Maintenance/expansion of customer base
High value service provider
Added value service
Improved customer access to information
Enterprise information accessibility
Flexible Billing Options
ITable 4-1 Examples of strategic and tangible benefit
-
- 4.4
to large commercial or industrial (C&I) customers. The
future success of many utilities depends on main
taining their large customers who may be subject to
strong market competition. C&l customers typically
subsidize reduced residential rates and are therefore
a most valued corporate asset
Tangible - The benefit/cost ratio of the application is
greater than 1 under the assumption of chosen eco
nometric model. Tangible benefits of automation
mayinclude deferral of planned capacity addition pro
jects, reduced operation and maintenance costs,
improved functionality, and reduced costs as compar
ed with conventional non-automated alternative sce
narios.
4.4.2 Perception of Substation Automation
Until recently, automation in the substation has meant
the presence of a SCADA remote terminal unit (RTU)
to many utility engineers. A recent Newton-Evans sur-
Tangible Benefits
Reduced manpower requirements
Reduced system implementation costs
Reduced operating costs
Reduced maintenance costs
Ability to defer capacity addition projects
Improved information for engineering decisio s
Improved information for planning decisions
Reduced customer outage time
39
4.4.4 vey indicated that RTU would be primary information
processing task handler for the majority of those
polled (54%). 35% percent indicated the require
ment for a separate processor - other than an RTU,
15% preferred a PLC-based approach and another
1 5 % indicated a combined approach using
both technologies. Approximately 30 % of th::>se
surveyed indicated that they had not yet formed an
opinion on the type of substation platform that
would be imple mented. All of these answers are, of
course, right. For the purposes of this book,
substation automation is defined as a
microprocessor based system that inte grates and
processes substation status, analog and control
information and communicates with local and/or
remote devices.
Actual, the capabilities of equipment that qualify
under this definition are quite varied. SA systems
range from simple RTUs to fully networked PC/PLC
systems that manage WAN/LAN input/outputs (1/0)
and provide advanced services for the substation
environment and mainstream distribution automation
functions.
4.4.3 Substation legacy systems and
practices
Transmission substations have received the lion's
share of automation devices in the past because of
the importance of their reliability to system opera
tions. Automation devices at these sites include RTUs,
fault recorders, sequence of events recorders (SERs),
annunciater panels, and a few microprocessor based
relays. Input/output (1/0) to these devices is typically
via hardwired connections to instrument transformers
(via transducers), field and local status contacts, inter
posing relays, and mimic style control panels. The
dominant protective devices are electromechanical
relays. The local operator interface is generally a con
trol panel, analog meters, annunciater window
boxes,
40 and recording devices of various types.
Communication links, other than voice grade tele
phone connections, are typically between transmis
sion subs and master stations via microwave, fiber
optic, or dedicated telephone lines using relatively
slow data transfer rates from 1200 to 9600 baud.
Most distribution substations today have a limited
number of IEDs. Many have RTUs, but few have
been provided with automated SER, fault
recording and microprocessor based relay systems.
Connectivity is similar to that mentioned above for
transmission sub stations.
Maintenance practices at legacy substations involve
labor intensive routine on-site manual inspection.
Field devices such as circuit breakers, switchgear,
transformers and load tap changers are maintained
routinely without detailed information on operation
of these devices.
4.4.4 Opportunities and justifications
Many opportunities exist today to design, operate
and maintain substations using better, faster and
cheaper devices and service methodologies. These
efficiencies are accomplished by eliminating unneces
sary redundant systems and using microprocessor.
based controllers to manage information supplied by
IEDs.
Typically, substation automation passes justification
tests under the following conditions.
New construction - the substitution of RTUs, mimic
style control panels, annunciaters, sequence of
events recorders (SERs), fault recorders,
cable/conduit systems, and significant control room
space with SA reduces the cost of new
construction while vastly improving functionality. SA
is a "no brainier" for new substations.

Significant retrofit or expansion of existing
substation - capital projects that add new' bays,
transformers or switchgear can easily incorporate SA
retrofit projects cost effectively. Legacy systems can
be replaced or integrated into the new SA infrastruc
ture.
Upgrading the WAN to high speed capabilities
such as Ethernet speeds - RTU architectures nor
mally communicating with SCADA master stations at
1200 baud will not be compatible with the high
speed data transfer and synchronizing required by
modern WANs.
New or replacement RTU, annunciaters,
sequence of events recorder, fault recorder, or
electromechanical relays -the integrated SA plat
form will include the functions of all these dedicated
devices plus an order of magnitude of additional
func tions and all at a significantly reduced price.
4.4.5 Benefits of substation automation
integration
Integrated substation automation systems provide
improved benefits in the functionality, design, opera
tion, maintenance and reliability of the substation
operating environment. The architectures of most
substation automation solutions vary significantly and
include smart systems, black box proprietary solu
tions, and open WAN/LAN solutions using off-the
shelf commodities from the PC and PLC marketplace.
The following lists categorize and summarize the
potential benefits available from a well integrated
substation automation architecture using PC HMI,
subLAN, lED relays, and remote modem access.
4.4.5. 7 Design Benefits
• Standardization of the user interface and
improved user access.
• System architecture standardization for uniformity
of operation and building SAIDA upgrade paths. 4.4.5
• Elimination of unnecessary redundant equipment.
• Reduced substation infrastructure including wiring,
conduit wire channels, control/relay panel space
and control house size.
• Easy upgraciability using mainstream hardware
and software.
• Protocol independence.
• Distributed computing and communication
hub for simplified integration of distribution
automation (DA).
4.4.5.2 Operation Benefits
• Uniform HMI for data access.
• lnteroperability of IEDs.
• Integrated alarm log and sequence of
events reporting.
• Custom display and reporting capability
from integrated database.
• Automatic logging of HMI accesses
and operating activities.
• Programmed logic for automatic reconfiguration
of busses and/or feeders.
• Network (peer to peer) messaging between
substation server nodes and other WAN nodes.
4.4.5.3 Maintenance Benefits
• Data for relaying, metering and
communication service is available locally or
remotely.
• Each lED can be directly accessed (locally
from the PC HMI or remotely via modem)
from
easy to use HMI for configuration, setting and
diagnostic reporting.
• Predictive maintenance is possible frorn automatic
analysis of equipment operating history.
• Supervision and management of transformer,
load tap changer, and circuit breaker internal
operations
optimizes just-in-time maintenance. 41
4.5 4.4.5.4 Reliability Benefits
• Uniformity and consistency in HMI operation
procedures reduces the chances for operating
errors.
• Integrated and sequenced databases
provide accurate information for problem
analysis and maintenance.
• Monitoring of all station equipment ensures that
failed equipment is detected and repaired before
called upon for service during system disturbances.
• Reduced customer outage minutes resulting in
improved reliability indices.
• Reduced chances for operator switching errors.
• Quick isolation of faults and restoration of service
to unfaulted feeder sections.
4.5 Reference
Ryan Bird · Justifying Substation Automation, Black & Veatch, http//tasnet.com/justa.shtml
42
4.4.5.5 Reduced cost benefits
• Reduced costs for new construction.
• Reduction of unnecessary trips to read alarms,
relay targets, and station logs.
• Readily accessible relay operation information,
fault location data and alarm log for
operators will help reduce line patrolling and
problem investigation time, and thus outage i :,
time.
• Reduced training costs because of uniform
database, HMI. customized screen format tailored
for ease of use.
• Integrated database information, comprehensive
problem reporting and a future expert system
can greatly facilitate of maintenance and repair
activities, thus reducing costs.
• Maintenance scheduling can be streamlined
and optimized for a cost effective and efficient
program, by using the ad documentation.
• Distributed computing hub to manage the
substation and connected feeder environment.
• Shared access to the enterprise WAN by SA
and DA devices.
5 Primary Equipment in Substations

5.1 Introduction 45
5.1.1 Condition Monitoring 45
5.2 Switchgear installations 46
5.2.1 Classification of switchgear installations 47 5
5.3 Single line diagram and busbar configuration 47 Table of
5.3.1 Definition of Switchgear 48 content
5.3.2 Common circuit configurations 49
5.3.3 Special configurations, mainly outside Europe 51
5.3.4 Configurations for load-center substations 52
5.4 Substation Structure 53
5.4.1 Circuit Breaker Bays/Feeders 53
5.4.2 Bus coupler bays 54
5.4.3 Connections of Instrument Transformers 54
5.5 Switching Equipment 55
5.5.1 Circuit Breakers 55
5.5.1.1 Circuit Breaker tripping operation 55
5.5.1.2 Requirements for control of circuit breakers 57
5.5.1.2.1 Phase-discrepancy monitoring 57
5.5.1.2.2 Anti-pumping control 57
5.5.1.2.3 Non-stop motor operation 57
5.5.1.2.4 SF6 gas monitoring 57
5.5.1.2.5 Local/remote control 57
5.5.1.2.6 Energy monitoring 57
5.5.1.2.7 Autoreclosure 57
5.5.1.2.8 Synchronized switching 58
5.5.1.3 Definitions 59
5.5.1.3.1 Auxiliary switches 59
5.5.1.3.2 Opening time 59
5.5.1.3.3 Total break time 59
5.5.1.3.4 Arcing time 59
5.5.1.3.5 Closing time 59
5.5.1.3.6 Operating cycle of circuit breakers 59
5.5.1.3.7 Monitoring of circuit breakers 59
5.5.1.3.8 Rapid or auto-reclosure 60
5.5.1.4 Critical CB parts to monitor 60
5.5.2 Disconnectors and Earthing Switches 61
5.5.3 Switch disconnectors -61
5.5.4 Instrument transformers 61
5.5.4.1 Definitions and electrical quantities 62
5.5.4.2 Current transformers 62
5.5.4.2.1 Definitions for current transformers 62
5.5.4.2.2 Selection of current transformers 64
5.5.4.3 Voltage transformers 65
5.5.4.3.1 Definitions for voltage transformers 65 43

. '?
 5.5.4.3.2 Inductive voltage transformers 66
5.5.4.3.3 Capacitive voltage transformers 67
5.5.4.4 Non-conventional transformers 68
5.5.4.4.1 Active non-conventional transformers 68
5.5.4.4.2 Passive non-conventional transformers 69
5.5.4.43 Cable connection to protection devices 69
5 5.5.4.4.4 Serial connection to protection devices 70
Table of 5.5.5 Innovative HV switchgear technology 70
content 5.5.5.1 Modern design concepts 70
5.5.5.1.1 Process electronics (sensor technology, PISA) 71
5.5.5.2 Innovative solutions 71
5.5.5.2.1 Compact outdoor switchgear installations 71
5.5.5.2.2 Hybrid switchgear installations 73
5.5.6 SF6 gas-insulated switchgear (GIS) 73
5.5.6.1 General 73
5.5.6.2 SF6 gas as insulating and arc-quenching medium 74
5.5.6.3 Gas Density Monitoring 75
5.5.6.4 Components 76
5.5.6.5 SMART-GIS 77
5.5.7 Surge arrestors 78
5.5.71 Design, operating principle 78
5.5.72 Application and selection of MO surge arresters 79
5.5.8 Transformers 81
5.5.8.1 Transformer connections 82
5.6 Voltage and Power Factor Control 82
5.6.1 Transformer control and voltage regulation 82
5.6.1.1 Change over switches 82
5.6.1.2 On-load tap changer (OLTC) 82
5.6.1.3 OLTC control 83
5.6.1.3.1 Local control 83
5.6.1.3.2 Station and remote control 83
5.6.1.3.3 Automatic control 84
5.6.2 Power capacitors 84
5.6.2.1 Compensation of reactive power 84
5.6.3 High voltage reactors 85
5.6.3.1 Current limiting reactors 85
5.6.3.1.1 Voltage drop and voltage variation 85
5.6.3.1.2 Reactor circuits 86
5.6.3.2 Shunt reactors 87
5.6.4 FACTS 88
5.7 Static Var (reactive power) compensation (SVC) ·- 90
5.71 Applications 90
5.72 Types of compensation 90
5.72.1 Thyristor controlled reactor (TCR) 90
5.72.2 Thyristor switched capacitors (TSG) 90
5.72.3 Thyristor switched capacitors/thyristor controlled reactor (TSC/TCR) 91
44 5.8 References 92
5 Primary Equipment in Substations
S.llntroduction
The idea to include this chapter in this book is to pro
vide background knowledge about the primary pro
cess in terms of switchgear installations, various
single line diagrams, switching equipment, and
modern fle xible AC transmission systems (FAGS)
to readers who have their professional expertise
mainly in IT applications or in secondary equipment
for control, protection and monitoring. The
descriptions of the main primary equipment that is
located in distribution and transmission substation, i.e.
• Circuit
breakers
• Disconnectors and earthing switches
• Switch disconnectors
• Instrument transformers
• Innovative switchgear technologies
• SF6 gas insulated switchgear (GIS)
• Surge arrestors
• Transformers
are detailed enough that the interaction between
substation control, protection and monitoring can be
explained. In addition to this, the attention is drawn to
those critical parts of the primary equipment, which
are subject to aging and wear.
The descriptions of FAGS applications is included
because they are mentioned in Chapter 11 'Wide area
protection" as counter measures to maintain power
system integrity in case of the occurrence of multi
contingencies.
of failure are the mechanically actuated parts such as
installations
electro-mechanical relays and signaling contacts in
the electrical control circuits and in
operating mecha- nisms for the primary
equipment
In order to increase the internal system reliability the
5.2
5.1.1 Condition Monitoring 5.1
Utilities can save themselves time and money by
employing a step-by-step condition-based, rather a
purely time-based, maintenance strategy for the pri
mary and secondary equipment.
Generally, time-based or usage-based maintenance is
a suitable strategy if degradation is gradual and pre
dictable. However, curative maintenance is also requir
ed as numerous defects cannot otherwise be pre
vented or detected. In the case of sorne parts, the
possibility of failure is constant, even if there are very
few signs of aging. However, in the longer term,
there will always be some kind of degradation
process involved. For example, in the case of static
parts, such a process rnay take 50 years or more.
However, if maintenance is only performed when
necessary, based on the condition of the component
(condition based maintenance, or CBM), overall
savings on maintenance tasks can be achieved.
Indeed, field experience has shown that savings of
20-30% are possible.
The condition of a component is estimated through
inspections, diagnostic tests, monitoring systems and
(partly) dismantling one or more samples. When app
lying CBM, there rnust be at least one condition indi
cator and proven expertise in the assessment of de
gradation. The key issue is to detect degradation
before failure occurs and apply an 'expert-rule' to
define what will happen next and when.
Condition monitoring includes acquisition, recording,
processing and visualizing measured quantities to
allow early detection of faults in important equipment
such as circuit-breakers, power transformers or instru
ment transformers. According to international surveys
conducted by CIGRE,the operating mechanisms and
the electrical control circuits in circuit-breakers are the
primary source of serious faults, i.e. failures causing
operational disruptions. The most common sources 45
.' .ll
5.2 Switchgear ·--;--.
, ..
'
'
electronic hardware and software is self-monitored.
 he large quantities of measured data because A switchgear installation contains all the
C only the combination of status acquisition with apparatus and auxiliary equipment necessary
o intelligent assessment procedures results in a to ensure reliable operation of the installation
n knowledgeable diagnosis and initiation of the and a secure supply of electricity. Three-phase
d necessary maintenance steps. Special algorithms AC high-voltage switchgear installations with
i for·reducing the data and calculating trends operating voltages of up to 800 kV are used for
t are basic for a monitoring sys tem. The P-F distributing electricity in towns and cities,
i curve for the condition degradation over time regions and industrial centers, and also. for
o (Figure 5-1) represents i.e. qualitative connection po er transmission. The voltage level employed
n between the condition of a component and the IS determin ed by the transmission capacity
time. As a result of wear, the fault mechanism and the short-circuit capacity of the power
m starts at a specific time t,, i.e. the condition system.
o deteriorates until time t 2 when the degradation
n is detected at point P, Distribu::ion networks are operated
i which is designated a "potential fault". In predominantly up to 123 kV. Power
t general, it transmission systems and ring mains r:: und
o can be assumed that from this time the state urban areas operate with 123, 245 or
r of the system continues to deteriorate, usually 420 kV. depending on local conditions. Over
i with increas ing speed until the fault (point F) v ry large diSLances, extra high powers are also
n actually occurs at time t3. A typical example for transmitt ed at 765 kV or by high-voltage
g such a response is the aging mechanism of direct-current sys tems.
oil/paper or plastic insulation or
r leakage in gas-insulated switchgear Switchc ar installations can be placed indoors
installation. or out
e
doors. SF5 gas-insulated switching stations
q
The objective of condition monitoring is to have the
u
detect the degradation at point P with importc-;t advantage of taking up little
i
sufficient assuracy, so there will be sufficient space and
r
time, to take appropriate action to prevent the being c.;affected by pollution and
e
fault within the time interval between point P environmental fac
s
and point F. t
o
c r
a s
r Z
CBM Indicator .
e
Starting point of degradation
f Indoor i--:stallations are built both with SF6 gas-
Detection point of
u degradation insulat ed equipment for all voltage ratings
l above 36 kV and also wi:1 conventional, open
e equipment up to 123 kV. SF6 :echnology,
v requiring very little floor area and building
a volume, is particularly suitable for supply1ng
l load centers for cities and industrial complexes.
u F Th1s
a kind of equipment is also applied in
t underground installations.
i
o Outdoor switching stations are used for all
n voltag.e levels from 52 to 765 kV (Figure 5-2).
They are built outside cities, usually at points
along the cross-coun try lines of bulk
o
transmission systems. Switchgear for HVDC
f
applications is also predominantly of the out
t
door type.

Transformer stations comprise not only the HV equip

46 Figure 5 - 7 Condition degradation over ment and power transformers but also medium- and
time l_
'( ',: '? ?

low-voltage switchgear and a variety of auxiliary ser-
vices. These must additionally be accounted for in the
station layout.
' '
I Depending on the intended plant site, the construe-
tion of a switchgear installation must conform to IEC
requirements, ANSI Standards or particular national
codes.
The starting point for planning a switchgear installa-
tion is its single-line diagram. This indicates the
extent
of the installation, such as the number of busbars and
branches, as well as their associated apparatus. The
most common circuit configurations of high and
medium-voltage switchgear installations are shown
in the form of single-line diagrams in chapter 5.3.
5.2.1 Classification of switchgear installations
Switchgear installations in terms of substations are
commonly classified by function, which is related to
the voltage level. While there are no utility wide stand-
ards, typical classifications are as follows:
• Distribution (3.6 - 36 kV): Substations
trans-
mitting power to the final retail outlet.
• Subtransmission (175 -145 kV): Substations
transmitting power to distribution substations
I and to bulk retail outlets.
·J
• Transmission (72.5 - 765 kV): Substations trans-
mitting power between major substations of
interconnecting systems, and to wholesale out-
lets. The voltage levels are further divided into:
• High voltage (HV): 115 - 245 kV
I I
Figure 5-2 5.3
220 kV outdoor substation
• Extra high voltage (EHV): 300 - 765 kV
• Ultra high voltage (UHV): greater than 765 kV
• Direct current systems can be classified as
follows:
• Low voltage (24 - 250 V): Auxiliary power
in power plants and substations, control
circuits and, occasionally, utilization power
in some industrial plants.
• Medium voltage (300 - 600V):
Transportation industry
• High voltage (greater than 600V):
Long distance bulk transmission, submarine,
and major system interconnections.
5.3 Single line diagram
and busbar configuration
The busbar configurations for high- and medium-val-
tage switchgear installations are governed by opera-
tiona! considerations. Whether single or multiple bus-
bars are necessary will depend mainly on how the
system is operated and on the need for sectionali-
zing, to avoid excessive breaking capacities. Account
is taken of the need to isolate parts of the installa-
tions for purposes of cleaning and maintenance;and
also of future extensions.
When drawing up a single line-diagram, a great num-
ber of possible combinations of incoming and out-
going connections have to be considered. The most
common ones are shown in the following diagrams. 47
. ·
 r:
\

5.3.1 5.3.1 Definition of Switchgear

,-

r
Symbol Designation Features !

,..,- Disconnector Mechanical switching device, providing an isolating distance in the open position.
It is capable to open or close a circuit if either a negligible current is switched or
if there is no significant change in voltage between the terminals of the poles.

,..,_ Circuit Breaker Mechanical switching devices are able to make, carry and interrupt currents under
normal conditions in the network and carry and close onto currents under speci-
fied abnormal conditions in the network, e.g. in the case of short circuits.

Draw-out Mechanical switching devices as above but withdrawable to provide in the open
Circuit Breaker position an isolating distance with the affect that separate disconnectors
are not necessary.

Link Mechanical link to outgoing or incoming overhead lines or cables (line feeder)
and transformers, reactors respectively (transformer, reactor feeder).

Earthing Mechanical switching devices for earthing and short circuiting circuits. They are
,..,--11• switch capable of carrying currents for a specified time under abnormal conditions,
e.g. short circuits.

-e- Current
transformers
The primary winding is incorporated in the HV line and carries the current flowing
in the network It has various secondary cores for protec,.on and metering with
a rated output of 5 to 60 VA depending on the rated burden at 1 or 5 A.

Inductive Inductive voltage transformers are transformers of low output with which the
voltage voltage is proportional to and in phase with the primary voltage. They are used to
transformer transform the HV to be measured to a secondary voltage to be fed to measuring
and protection devices, e.g. primary rated voltage 110 000 h/3 V, secondary
voltage 110h/3 V.

@
Power The purpose of power transformers is to transfer electrical energX from systems
transformers with one voltage U1 to systems of another voltage U2. I
L .•

48
•II• 1111 Surge arrester Surge arresters are used for protection of important equipment against over-
voltage particularly transformers, from atmospheric overvoltages due to lightning
and switching over-voltages.
5.3.2 Common circuit configurations I II I
5.3.2

--.----.----" ---r-----r--
1 I I I

t) t) t) t) Double busbars in U connection

Low-cost, space-saving arrangement for installations
Single busbar with double busbars and branches to both sides.
Suitable for smaller installations. Sectionalizer allows
the station to be split into two separate parts and the
parts to be disconnected for maintenance purposes.
II I BPB

I
_......_ _......_ _......_
0
1

Composite double bus/bypass bus

Double busbars
Preferred tor larger installations. Advantages: cleaning
and maintenance without interrupting supply.
Separate operation of station sections possible from
bus I and bus II. Busbar sectionalizing increases ope
rational flexibility.
This arrangement can be adapted to operational
requirements. The station can be operated--with a
double bus, or with a single bus plus bypass bus,
which is connected to line and transformer feeders.
The bus coupler can be used as line circuit breaker via
the bypass.
49
 J
I

5.3.2

BPB

Double busbars with draw-out circuit-breaker
In medium-voltage stations, draw-out circuit-breakers
reduce downtime when servicing the switchgear; also
a feeder disconnector is not necessary.
Double busbars with bypass busbar (US)
The bypass busbar is an additional busbar connected
via the bypass branch. Advantage: each branch of the
installation can be isolated for maintenance without
interrupting supply, with the bus coupler acting as line
circuit breaker.

1:

Two-breaker method with draw-out circuit
breakers
Draw-out circuit-breakers allow to built very econo
mical medium-voltage stations. There is no need for
busbar or feeder isolators and a bus coupler. For
sta tion operation, the draw-out breaker can be
)
I,
Triple (multiple) busbars
For vital installations feeding electrically separate net
works or if rapid sectionalizing is required in the event
of a fault to limit the short-circuit power. This layout is
frequently provided with a bypass bus.
I:

50
inserted
in a cubicle for either bus I or bus II. I,
'i

. -

5.3.3 Special configurations, mainly
outside Europe
YYY)
I Fewer circuit-breakers are needed for the same flexi bility
Double busbars with shunt disconnector
Shunt disconnector "SD" can be used to by-pass the CB of
each line feeder that it can be maintained with out supply
interruption. In shunt operation, the bus coupler CB acts
as the line CB.
Two-breaker method with fixed switchgear
Circuit-breaker, branch disconnector and instrument
transformers are duplicated in each branch. Busbar
interchange and isolation of one bus is possible, one
branch breaker can be taken out for at any time
without interrupting operation.
"-":r "--L "--
c
"-----":r"--L "--
c
5.3.3
11/2-breaker method
as above. Isolation without interruption. All brea kers are
normally closed. Uninterrupted supply thus maintained
even if one busbar fails. The branches can be through-
connected by means of linking breaker C.
Cross-tie method
With cross-tie disconnector "DT'; the power of line A can be
switched to branch A,, bypassing the busbar. The busbars
are then accessible for maintenance.
Ring busbars
Each branch requires only one circuit-breaker, and yet each
breaker can be isolated without interrupting the power
supply in the outgoing feeders. The ring bus bar layout is
often used as the first stage of 1 lf2-brea
ker configurations. 51
 A
B

5.3.4 5.3.4 Configurations for load-center

substations

Double-feed station

A B
i
c
,....-------, -----------d ,r ,
!

'i
i

Single-feed station i

A and B = Main transformer station, C = Load-

center substation with circuit-breakers or switch Ring stations
disconnec tors (SD). The use of switch-disconnectors
instead of circuit-breakers imposes operational
restrictions.

Switch-disconnectois are frequently used in load-center substations for the feeders to cables or
transformers. Their use is determined by the operating conditions and economic considerations.

......., r+
_[ j j

1 ' l_
I

H connection H connection H connection with

52

r
with circuit-breakers with switch-disconnectors three transformers

.,

1r Ring main cable connection allowing

isolation in all directions
 ll b
Cable loop

u
5.4

Simple ring main cable connection

5.4 Substation Structure 5.4.1 Circuit Breaker Bays/Feeders

Circuit breaker bays are structural elements for feed ing,
distributing and interconnection of the power flow:

Overhead line Bay unit earthing Transformer Generator

and cable bay (GIS) Bay Bay

BB I BB I BB I Q 15

:::::=c:=
BBI
BBliJ==r= BB II BB II

Q1li Q2
BBIIrr
Q25 I I
Q1 v ....._,,.

.· .
Q5
QOI Q 0 Q 5
r....._," II

Q 9\_ Q 8 Q9
SA

T
\ Q8

00: Circuit breaker, 07, 02: Busbar disconnectors,
05, 08, 075, 025: Earthing switch, SA: Surge Arrester, T:
Transformer, G: Generator, GB: Generator breaker (desig_n
tio_n, numbers according to DIN).
Line and cable bay: The earthing switch 08 eliminates
capacitive charges and provides protection against
atmospheric charges on overhead lines.
Stationary unit earthing switches are used in SF6 gas
insulated switchgear (GIS) to provide temporary earth ing to
avoid danger in case of maintenance.
Transformer bay: Feeder disconnectors are usually not provided
because the transformer is disconnected at both high
voltage and low voltage sides. The earth ing switch 08 is
recommended for maintenance
work 53

. ·.:
5.4.3 , 5.4.2 Bus coupler bays requirements concerning security of supply and the
necessary flexibility when switching over or dis
connecting.
In the configurations in chapter 5.4.1, the tie-breaker
branches are shown in a simple form. Experience Division into two bays is generally required in order to
shows, however, that more complex coupling arrange accommodate the equipment for the breaker bran r
\
ments are usually needed in order to meet practical ches.

B BIIrr ::,r=::::cJ
BI

TTQ21J
Q1 Q2Q1\,)Q2
BB I

BB II =r:=:::::c::
TG I
Q 11

_I
Q 1\ Q2

I
Q1 lQ 2Q Q2

aoJ QO
Q

Bus Coupler Bus Sectionalizer 6 Tie Bus Coupler

and Sectionalizer

5.4.3 Connections of Instrument Transformers

'·'
'

=n=
Q1 Q2
881
88 II
The instrument transfor
mers are usually placed
beyond the circuit-breaker
QO, with voltage transfor
mer TS after current trans
If the instrument transformers cease to function
when the bypass is in operation line protection of the
branch must be provided by the instrument transfor
mers and protection relays of the bypass. This is pos
sible only if the ratios of all instrument transformers in
;·

former T1. This is the cor
red arrangement for syn
00 chronizing purposes. Some
T1
T5 kinds of operation require
09\08 the voltage transformer
beyond the bay dis
•'-I•• connectors, direct on the
54 cable or overhead line.
all bays are approximately equal. The protection
relays of the bypass must also be set for the appro
priate values. Maintenance d the bay instrument
transformers is easier and can be done during bypass
operation. If capacitive voltage transformers are used
which also ad as coupling capacitors for a high
frequency telephone link, this link is similarly inopera
tive in the bypass mode.
5.5 Switching Equipment
5.5.1 Circuit Breakers
High-voltage circuit-breakers are mechanical switch
ing devices capable of making, carrying continuously
and breaking electrical currents, both under normal
circuit conditions and, for a limited period, abnormal
circuit conditions, such as in the event of a short
cir cuit. Circuit-breakers are used for switching
overhead lines, cable feeders, transformers, reactor
coils and capacitors. They are also used in bus ties
and in instal lations with multiple busbars to allow
power to be transmitted from one busbar to
another.
Figure 5-3 420 kV Circuit breaker with current trans
formers (ABB) in air insulated substation (AIS)
·
Specially designed breakers are used for specific 5.5
duties such as railways, where they have to ex
tinguish longer-burning arcs (longer half-wave) in
16 2/3-Hz networks. Breakers used with smelting fur
naces frequently operate with reduced actuating
force and lower breaking capacity. This leads to less
wear in spite of the high switching frequency and to
long seNice inteNals.
5.5. 7. 7 Circuit Breaker tripping
operation
Circuit breakers (CB) use the energy of an electric arc
for short circuit current interruption as explained in
Figure 5-4:
Shortly after energizing the tripping coil the main
contact starts to travel with very high speed from its
closed position (1) into its open position (4). The arc
starts burning as soon as the fixed and moving
contacts separate (2) and continues to burn until the
short circuit current (1 5 ) becomes zero (3). The very
high arc temperature (1 0000 °K) causes the arc
quenching medium, which may be oil,
compressed air or SF6 gas, to become fully ionized
plasma and to generate a very high blasting
pressure. This effect is used to cool the arc down
(self blasting principle) and to accelerate the mov·1ng
contact (single pressure breaker).
The plasma is conductive and makes the current flow
to continue. If the travel distance of the main contact
is long enough at the zero point of the current and if
the arc has been cooled down to the extent that the
dielectric strength of the arc quenching medium has
regained its insulating withstand capability between
the open contact, the transient recovery voltage
occurring across the open contact. cannot re-ignite
arc The CB has successfully tripped the short cir
cuit current.
The decision whether the current can be interrupted
or not is made at the critical contact position (3). If the 55
 distance between the contact opening is not big
enough at current zero then the current is interrupted
at the next current zero point after another 20 ms.
This means that the arcing time can vary between
approx. 15 and 35 ms depending on the contact
separation in relation the proximity to the next current
5.5.1.1 zero point
Arc quenching chamber with fixed and moving contact
11111111111111111 IU/111/UIIIU/1 11111!1/LIIIljl!l 1111/111//////1/1
--:=::::t=·--- ----&C:"-- -.------- ----
/J//J//J//J//J/JJ niiiiiihlim» Mliiiii!mm niiiiiii11mm
CD 0 0 0
Closed Separation Intermediate Open
Figure 5-4 AC current interruption process
There are mainly four critical factors that determine
the interrupting capability of a circuit breaker:
1. Contact speed provided by the CB operating
mechanism, which may be a spring drive, or a
hydraulic drive, or a combined spring/hydraulic
drive, or a compressed air drive in case of an
air blast CB.
2. Blasting pressure provided by the arc quenching
medium and the shaping of the fixed contact
noseI
3. Magnitude of fault current
4. MagnitudE? and rate of rise of the transient
recovery voltage
The first two critical factors are related to the CB ope
rating condition, and the third and fourth factors are
56 related to the fault and network condition.
t,
C Main contact
==
No2uxiliary swilch cont acts
==============
Figure 5-5 Short circuit current interruption
The process of the short circuit current interruption
(Figure 5-5) starts with the contact separation at t0. As
long as the short circuit current Is continues to flow
the voltage occurring over the open contact is the
voltage drop across the arc UsA As soon as the arc
extinguishes at t, because of the fact that the driving
current Is has reached its zero point, the
transient recovery voltage UR appears across the
open contact with a fast rise, high amplitude and
frequency. The high values of transient recovery
voltage last for approximately 3 ms only (E) until
the low frequency recovery voltage Us appears (S).
Voltage level and frequency of the transient recovery
voltage are influence by the line inductance (LL) and
line capacitance (CL).
Circuit breakers are subject to a number of switching
duties depending on location and network conditions
with varying characteristics of the transient recovery
voltage. The most important ones are:
• Short circuit current interruption
• Short-line faults interruption
• Out-of-phase switching
• Small inductive current switching in connection
with transformers disconnected from the load
• Capacitor current switching in connection
with capacitor banks.
 5.5. 7.2 Requirements for control
of circuit breakers
5.5.1.2.1 Phase-discrepancy monitoring
Breakers with a single-pole operating mechanism are
equipped with phase-discrepancy monitoring to
assure that all three poles have closed after thE com
pletion of a closing operation. If one or two. p les
have remained in the open position, the mon1tonng
detects this phase discrepancy and, after a preset
waiting time of about 2 seconds, a tripping of the
clos ed poles is initiated.
5.5.1.2.2 Anti-pumping control
' The anti-pumping control prevents repeated, un
desied operation of one or more breaker poles if an
existing OFF command is followed by several ON
commands. They must then close only once followed
by a lockout, i.e. it must remain in the OFF position
regardless of whether and how long control com
mands are applied.
5.5.1.2.3 Non-stop motor operation
DepPnding on the design and the type of switchi g
cycle performed, the pump or the compressor requir
es a specific period to restore the consumed energy.
If there is a leak in the system, the motor will run
more often or will run continuously. Continuous run
ning is detected and reported as a fault
5.5.1.2.4 SF6 gas monitoring
The breaking capacity of a gas-insulated circuit-brea
ker is dependent on the gas density in the breaker
chamber. This is measured by a temperature-com
pensated pressure gauge. If the gas pressure fall.s
below a specified value, an alarm is triggered, and 1f
it falls further below a second spezified value the
breaker is blocked.
5.5.1.2.5 Local/remote control 5.5.1.2
To allow work on the breaker, it can generally be
con trolled from the local control cubicle; control
can be switched from remote to local by a selector
switch.
5.5.1.2.6 Energy monitoring
The air or oil pressure is monitored and controlled in
pneumatic and hydraulic operating mechaniss by a
multiphase pressure switch. The pressure sw1tch has
the following functions:
• Control of compressor or pump motor
• OFF blocking, ON blocking, autoreclosure
blocking, dependent on available pressure.
A pressure control is not required for spring mecha
nisms. They have a gate control, which monitors and
controls the tension of the spring (spring travel) as
measure of available energy for tripping and closing
operation. A closing operation is only enab ed if there
is enough energy stored to allow a tnpp1ng opera
tion immediately after closing onto a fault without the
need to recharge the spring.
5.5.1.2.7 Autorec/osure
A single- or three-pole autoreclosure is selec:_ted de
pending on the type of power system eart 1ng, the
degree of interconnection, the length of the lines an.d
the amount of infeed large power plants. The tnp
commands of the network protection (overcurrent
and line protection, are accordingly evaluated diffe
rently for the tripping action of the breaker.
Circuit-breakers for three-pole autoreclosure only
require one common mechanism with one actuat!on
cylinder, a!tovving one Open-Ciose-_Open ope at1ng
cycle without recharging the operating mechan1sm.
57
5.5.1.2.8 For single-pole autoreclosure, these breakers have a
hydraulic spring mechanism with three actuation
cylinders, which are controlled separately. This allows
any pole to be tripped independently. Power is fed to
the three poles from one power unit. Single phase
autoreclosure is intended to trip short-time faults and
restrict them in time and without allowing larger
system units to fail for any length of time. Single-pole
tripping improves network stability and prevents the
network from going out of phase. At the same
time, breakers with single-pole autoreclosure can be
ope rated as three-pole autoreclosure by opening
and closing the three poles together.
Circuit-breakers with separate poles and single-pole
actuation are equally suited for single-pole and three
pole autoreclosure.
5.5.1.2.8 Synchronized
switching
Circuit breakers operation in high voltage networks
can be sometimes the source of undesirable transient
overvoltage and overcurrents. This is particularly true
for reactive load switching, e.g. shunt reactors, shunt
capacitors, unloaded power transformers and un
loaded transmission lines. High switching transients
can either exceed the maximum permissible values
causing the protection devices to respond or
endan ger the long term endurance of the HV
switching equipment in the network.
The traditional measures to limit the switching over
voltages and overcurrents has been the application of
surge arresters to protect transformers against over
voltages as well as closing and opening resistors,
which were associated with the circuit breakers to
switch no-load lines, no-load transformers and capa
citor banks.
Synchronized switching of circuit-breakers, in which
every breaker pole is synchronously actuated by a
suitable control unit at the instantaneous value of the
58 current or the phase-to-earth voltage, are becoming
increasingly important as a substitute for closing and
opening resistors. Examples of applications of syn
chronized switching include closing overhead lines
under no load without closing resistors, shunt re
actors and switching capacitor banks in transmission
networks.
The graph in Figure 5-6 shows how synchronous
switching is performed for switching shunt reactors.
Voltage
withstand
Voltage withstand characteristic
corresponding to tam'"
Arcing time
window for
synchronized
switching
interruption
Target for contact
separation
separation
Figure 5-6 Synchronized switching with shunt reactors
The interruption of shunt reactor current, which is
very small compared to rated interrupting current of
the CB, normally leads to current chopping before
current zero. This develops high overvoltages in the
shunt reactor. These may exceed the voltage with
stand characteristic and cause re-ignitions of the cir
cuit breaker and produce steep transient recovery
voltages. Such transients cause aging of the reactor
winding insulation. If the tripping impulse is synchro
nized such that the CB contacts separate within the
arcing time window and the current is interrupted
exactly at current zero (+/-some ms tolerance) such
voltage transients are avoided.
. ·
 5.5.1.3.6 Operating cycle of circuit breakers

Circuit breaker operating mechanisms have provisions

5.5.7.3 Definitions
5.5.1.3.1 Auxiliary switches
Auxiliary switches are devices, or parts of devices, in
or on switchgear apparatus, which are mechanically
dependent of the latter. For safety reasons they indi
cate the position of the switchgear with complemen
tary pairs of contacts, one in the normally open (NO)
and the other one in normally closed (NC) position.
for energy storage in terms of mechanical springs, air
pressure or nitrogen pressure in the case of
hydraulic drives to conduct duty cycles of close and 5.5.1.3
open ope rations. As a general safety rule it has to
be assured that the stored energy must allow an
open operation after a closing operation without
the need to re charge the energy. For spring
operating mechanism, which may have separate
springs for closing and opening operations, this
means that one OCO cycle must be assured
without the need to rewind the opening spring
after the closing operation. The follow ing duty cycles
are standard requirements.

Nominal operating cycle without autoreclosure

5.5.1.3.2 Opening time 0-t-CO-t-CO
Nominal operating cycle with autoreclosure

The interval of time between the instant the auxiliary 0 - t 0 - CO - t- CO

contact release or the contactor pertaining to the
'?
switching device attains its operating value and the
instant the main contact separates to open the cur
rent path in all poles (Figure 5-7).

5.5.1.3.3 Total break time

The interval of time between the instant the auxiliary

contact release or the contactor pertaining to the
switching device attains its operating value and the
termination of current flow in all circuit breaker poles.

5.5.1.3.4 Arcing time

The interval of time between the arc initiation upon

the separation of first pole to open and the arc
extin guishing after the termination of the current
flow in the last pole (Figure 5-4).

5.5.1.3.5 Closing time

The interval of time between the pick-up of the auxi

liary release circuit or contactor pertaining to the
switching device attains itS -operating value and the
instant the main contacts voltage close the current
path in all poles (Figure 5-7).
• 0 = Opening operation
• C = Closing operation
• CO = Closing operation followed
by an opening operation in the
shortest make-break time
characteristic of the circuit breaker.
• t = Time interval depends on the
experience an utility has made
with the self-extinguishing time
of arcs against earth on specific
overhead HV lines that are caused
by lightning strokes. This time is
approx. 3 minutes. During this time it
is allowed
to recharge the energy storage.
• t0 = Minimum dead time as it is stated by the
circuit breaker manufacturer (0.3 s +/-1 0 %).
5.5.1.3.7 Monitoring of circuit breakers
Reliability of high-voltage circuit breaker (CB) is cru
cial for the electric power system. Although circuit
breaker manufacturers are continuously working on
new features and improvements to extend the life
time of CBs, cost effective maintenance is still one of
the major issues when discussing CB performance,
life cycle costs and reliability. Some estimations indi
cate that more than half of the total substation main
tenance costs are spent on CBs, and 60 % of that is
spent on disassembly, overhaul, re-assembly and re
comm1ss1on1ng. 59
 Various diagnostic methods have been suggested
over the years that the costly maintenance can be
related to actual CB condition rather than to the ser
vice time or switching duty. The objective is to avoid
unnecessary maintenance and waste of money.
These diagnostics are based on off-line. measure
5.5.1.4 ments of main contact resistance, timing and tra
vel/velocity, and operating coil currents. More sophi
sticated methods are measurements of contact acce
leration, dynamic resistance measurements and vibra
tion testing. Such tests are well known and widely
used for periodic or preventive maintenance.
Online monitoring of CBs is very rarely used because
of the rather high expenses for sensors, evaluation
equipment and communication, despite of the fact
that approx. 10 % of circuit breaker problems and
fai lures are attributed to improper maintenance.
Online condition monitoring could, however,
eliminate too early or unnecessary off-line testing and
overhauls and make "just-in-time" maintenance
possible.
Such cost issues appear in a different light if IEDs,
which are to be installed for numerical protection
and/or control anyway, are also utilized to collect data
from online measurements rather than to install a
separate condition monitoring system on each CB.
Some of the measurements, which are recorded by
the digital fault recorders integrated in the protection
relays, can be used for diagnostics to judge the
wear
5.5. 7.4 Critical CB parts to
monitor
Fault statistics reveal the following critical CB components:
Cause of Failure
Operating mechanism
Mechanical faults with power transfer/interrupting chamber
Dielectric faults of the interrupting chamber or insulation to earth
Control and auxiliary components
SF6 Leakage (with SF6 CBs only)
60
of CB main contacts and arc quenching chambers.
Using the infrastructure of a Substation Automation
System, CBs can be monitored continuously from
remote at very little extra costs.
The associated CB monitoring software shall feature
the ability to indicate the need for maintenance,
which will extend maintenance cycles, avoid un
necessary maintenance, and enhance the reliability of
CBs. It shall recognize and report incipient CB opera
tion or maintenance problems before they become
critical. This will give the user the chance to conduct
preventive maintenance only if needed rather than
scheduled, or forced outage basis. This strategy
results not only in cost saving for maintenance but
also in increase of the availability of transmission lines.
5.5.1.3.8 Rapid or auto-reclosure
Is employed to interrupt faults of short duration,
especially in overhead transmission networks: e.g. for
eign bodies (birds, branches) between the lines,
contact between sagging lines due to high winds,
presence of earth faults or atmospheric overvoltages.
If the fault persists after auto-reclosure cycle that has
been initiated by means of appropriate relay logic the
affected line or section is definitely isolated from the
network
Disturbance Malfunctioning
44% 39.4%
10.4% 9.9%
13.9% 0.9%
24.5% 10.2%
7.2% 39.6%
I,
L
From this fault statistic it is apparent that the monito
ring of the following components contributes to the
prevention of faults:
• Operating mechanism functioning
• Arc interruption chamber, wear of
nozzles and contacts
• Main contact movement, switching times
and contact travel speed
• Control circuitry
The majority of data, which are needed for
mechani cal performance monitoring, can be
acquired from digital fault recorders, which are
integral part of numerical protection relays (Figure
5-7).
slowly, called sparking. This creates high frequency
radio noises, that may cause electromagnetic interfe
rence (EMI).
Disconnectors can carry currents under operating
conditions continuously and under abnormal condi
tions, such as short circuit for a specified time (1s, 5.5.4
3s).
More than 10 different designs are in use around the
world. The most important are rotary disconnectors,
two-column vertical break disconnectors and single
column disconnectors.
Earthing switches are used for earthing and short
circuiting de-energized station components. Earthing
switches can withstand currents during a specified
time (1 s, 3s); under abnormal conditions, such as a
short circuit, but they are not required to carry conti
nuous operating currents.

u
!!
c: 5.5.3 Switch disconnedors
3
.:;;c: ..
High-voltage switch disconnectors are switching
T1! T2 Time(ms) devices that make, carry and break operating
currents
-f---- f-----i-....Au:£ili<OQU: ctA and also carry and in part also make short-circuit cur
Auxiliary contact B rents. In their isolating open position, they also form
an isolating distance.
Closing coil current
These devices are used as follows:
• Transformer switches for smaller power supplies in
the distribution network for switching magnetizing
Auxiliary contact B, early close
currents and commutation currents (e.g. 100 A at
CB closing time ! up to 2.5 kV voltage difference) when changing
transformers or the power supply,
Figure 5-7 Circuit breaker mechanical
performance monitoring
• Line switches at one end of an overhead
line
• Busbar section switches
5.5.2 Disconnedors and Earthing Switches
• Switches for short cable length Oc <
Disconnectors are used for galvanic isolation of net 3A).
works or sections of switchgear installations. As an
independent air-insulated device, they form a visible
isolating distance in their open position. They are sui 5.5.4 Instrument transformers
table for switching small currents (<0.5 A) distance or
Instrument transformers are used to transform high
also larger currents, if the voltage does not change
voltages and currents to values that can be unified or
significantly between the contacts of a disconnector
measured safely with low internal losses. With induc
pole during switching (commutation currents).
tive current transformer (CT) the primary winding car
During opening, disconnectors generate a lot of low ries the load current while with voltage
energy discharges between the contacts that open transformers (VT), the primary winding is connected
to the service voltage. The voltage or the current of
the secondary
winding is identical to the value on the primary 61

5.5.4.2 side in phase and ratio except for the transformer
error. Current transformers operate almost under
short-circuit conditions while voltage transformers
operate at no-load. Primary and secondary sides are
nearly always electrically independent and galvanical
ly insulated from one another as required by the
ser
vice voltage. Above a service voltage of 110 kV,
instru
ment transformers are frequently manufactured as
combined current and voltage transformers.
In modern substation automation systems, current
and voltage transformers can be replaced by sensors.
They offer the same accuracy as conventional instru
ment transformers but due to the lack of an iron
core they are not subject to magnetic saturation
effects. The output signal, AID-converted, is strickly
proper tiona! to the primary current or voltage and
process ed by the digital bay control and protection
unit.
5.5.4.1 Definitions and electrical quantities
A distinction is made between CT cores for
measure ment purposes that are used to conned
instruments, meters and similar devices and
transformers for pro tection needs for connection of
protection devices.
Instrument transformers are classified according to
their measurement precision and identified accor
dingly. They are used as shown in the tabJe below:
Application
Precision measurements and calibration
Accurate power measurement and tariff metering
Tariff metering and accurate measuring instruments
Industrial meters: volta.ge, current, power, meters
Ammeters or voltmeters, overcurrent or voltage relays
Current transformer cores for protection
62
5.5.4.2 Current transformers
The primary winding is incorporated in the line and
carries the current flowing in the network. It has
various secondary cores. The current transformers are
designed to carry the primary current with respect to
magnitude and phase angle within preset error limits.
The main source of transmission errors is the magnet
izing current To ensure that this and the resulting
transmission errors remain small, the current transfor
mers without exception are fitted with high-grade
core magnets. The core material are made of high
alloy nikel-iron. In special cases, cores with an air gap
are used to influence the behavior of a transformer
core in the event of transient processes.
Depending on the design of the primary winding,
current transformers are divided into single-turn
transformers and wound-type transformers. Single
turn transformers are designed as outdoor inverted
type transformers, straight-through transformers, slip
over and bar transformers. Wound-type transformers
are bushing transformers, post-type transformers and
miniature transformers and also outdoor post-type
and tank transformers with oil-paper insulation.
5.5.4.2.1 Definitions for current transformers
• Primary rated current: the value of the
primary current that identifies the current
transformer and for which it is rated.
• Secondary rated current: the value of the
secondary current that identifies the current trans
. former and for which it is rated.
IEC Class ANSI Class
0.1 0.3
0.2 0.3
0.5 0.6-
1 1.2
3 1.2
SP, 1OP C,T
. ·
• Burden: impedance of the secondary circuit
expressed in ohms with the power factor. The
burden is usually given as apparent power in
volt amperes, which is assumed at a specified
power factor and secondary rated current.
• Rated burden: the value of the burden on
which the accuracy requirements of this standard
are based. · agree ment on connection labels.
• Rated output: the value of the apparent power
(in volt amperes at a specified power factor),
which the current transformer yields at secor>dary
rated current and rated burden.
• Current error (transformation ratio error): the
deviation of a current transformer when measu
ring ·a current intensity and derived from the
devia tion of the actual transformation from the
rated transformation. The current error is given by
the equation below and expressed as a
percentage.
Kn: Rated error
IP : Rated primary current
1 5 : Rated secondary current
• Phase displacement: the angular difference
between the primary and secondary current
vectors. The direction of the meter is specified so
that on an ideal current transformer the phase
displacement is equal to zero. The phase displace
ment is considered positive when the secondary
current meter is ahead of the primary current
meter. It is usually expressed in minutes or in
centiradians.
Note: the definition is strictly speaking only
applicable to sinusoidal currents.
• Composite error: in its stationary state, the
composite error Ec based on the rms value of
the primary current is the difference between the
instantaneous values of the primary current the
instantaneous values of the secondary current
multiplied by the rated transformation.
The positive signs of the primary and secondary cur 5.5.4.2.1
rent must be specified in accordance with the
The composite error in general is expressed as a per
centage of the rms values of the primary current as
given by the following equation:
&c=-
100 HT-f( 2
Knls-Ip) dt
Here: lp T 0
Kn: Rated transformation ratio of the current
transformer ·
IP : Rms value of the primary current
IP : Instantaneous value of the primary current
I, : Instantaneous value of the secondary current
T : Duration of fundamental period
• Rated limiting current (IPL): the value of the
lowest primary current at which the composite
error of the current transformer at the secondary
rated burden for measurements is equal to or
greater than 1 5 %.
Note: the composite error should exceed 1 0 %
to protect the device fed from the current trans
former against the high current values occurring
if there is a fault in the network.
• Overcurrent limit factor (FS): the ratio of the
rated limiting current to the primary rated current.
Note: if a short-circuit current flows through the
primary winding of the current transformer, the
load on the instruments connected to the current
transformer is smaller in proportion to smallness
of the overcurrent limit factor.
• Rated accuracy limit current: the value of the
primary current up to which the current trans
former for protection needs meets the require
ments for the composite error.
63

• Accuracy limit factor: the ratio of the
primary rated accuracy limit current to the
primary rated current.
• Thermal rated continuous current: unless
otherwise specified, the thermal rated continuous
5.5.42.2
current is equal to the primary rated current.
• Current transformer with extended current
measuring range: the thermal rated continuous
current must be equal to the extended primary
rated current. Standard values: 120 %, 150 % and
200%.
• Rated short-time thermal current: the rated
short-time thermal current (1s) must be given for
every current transformer.
Note: if a current transformer is a component of
another device (e.g. switchgear installation), a time
difference from one second may be given.
• Rated peak short-circuit current: the value of
the rated peak short-circuit current (ldyn) must in
general be 2.5 lth· Only in the event of deviation
from this value must ldyn be given on the name
plate.
5.5.4.2.2 Selection of current transformers
The choice of a current transformer is based on the
values of the primary and secondary rated current,
the rated output of the transformer cores at a given
accuracy class rating and the overcurrent limit factor.
The overcurrent limit factor must be adjusted to the
load current of the consumer.
Rated output and rated burden of current transfor
mers (at 50 Hz).
Rated output in VA 5 10
Rated burden at 5 A in Q 0.2
Rated burden at 1 A in Q 5 10
64
I,
The transformer output at 16.7 Hz must be multiplied
with the factor 0.33 and at 60 Hz with 1.2.
When selecting the current transformers, not only the
output but also the overcurrent limit factor of the
transformer must be considered. The overcurrent limit
factor is given on the nameplate.
In the case of measuring and metering cores, the
overcurrent limit factor should be as small as possible,
e.g. 5 or 10 to protect the connected instrumentation
against excessive overcurrents or short-circuit currents.
Because the overcurrent limit factor only applies for
the rated burden but actually rises with a smaller bur I.
den or smaller transformer load in approximately an I
inverse ratio, the operating burden of the connected !
instrumentation including the required connection
lines must be equal to the rated burden of the
trans former so far as possible to protect the
measuring mechanisms from destruction. Otherwise,
the second ary circuit should include an additional
burden.
Protective cores for connection of protection relays, in
contrast to the measuring cores, must be selected so
that their total error is not too large even if short-
cir cuit currents remain in the range in which the
protec tion relays should function accurately
according to their settings, e.g. 6 to 8 times rated
current. There fore, the protective core must be
designed so the product of the rated output and
the overcurrent limit factor is at least equal to the
product of the power requirement of the secondary
transformer circuit at rated current and with the
required overcurrent iimit factor. This is particularly
important if a large primary conductor cross-section
is required to meet the ther mal short-circuit
stresses. In such a case, a current transformer for
higher rated current should be select ed, where the
primary winding number and also the output will be
lower because the load current is less than the rated
current. or a special transformer can be used.
15 30 60
0.4 0.6 1.2 2.4
15 30 80
 5.5.4.3 Voltage transformers

5.5.4.3.1 Definitions for voltage transformers

. '?

Example:

Transformer for 400/5 A 15 VA 5 P 1 0

Power requirement: Overcurrent relay 8 VA

Differential relay 1 VA
Lines 3 VA
Total power requirement 12 VA

The overcurrent factor is then 15 · 1

0/12
= 1 2.5, i.e. the current transformer is correctly
selected.

An overcurrent relay set to 8 In will trip, because the

current in the above case to 12 times the rated
cur rent increases in proportion to the primary
current.

The direct current component occurring at the begin

ning of a short circuit results in transmission errors by
core saturation with fully displaced short-circuit cur
rent. Specially dimensioned cores with a high over
current limit factor (e.g. 200) or the a high transfor
mation ratio for the protective core can remedy this.

The above selection criteria also apply for

current transformers in enclosed switchgear
installations.

Current transformers according to international stand

ards (e.g. ANSI) are in principle selected under similar
criteria. Transformer dimensioning is made easier
under the above provisions by using the following
short overview with tables.
• Primary rated voltage: the value
of the primary voltage that
identifies the voltage transformer
and for which it is rated.
5.5.4.3
• Secondary rated voltage:
the value of the secondary
voltage that identifies the
voltage transformer and for
which it is rated.
• Rated transformation ratio:
the ratio of the primary rated
voltage to the secondary rated
voltage.
• Burden: the admittance of the
secondary circuit given in Siemens
with indication of the power factor
(inductive or capacitive).
Note: The burden is usually given as
apparent power in volt amperes,
which is assumed at a specified
power factor and secondary rated
voltage.
• Rated burden: the value of the burden on
which the accuracy requirements of this standard
are based.
• Rated output: the value of the apparent power
(in volt amperes at a specified power factor), which
the voltage transformer yields at secondary rated
voltage and rated burden.
• Thermal limiting output: the value of the
appa rent power - based on the rated voltage that
can be drawn at a secondary winding at primary
rated voltage without exceeding the limit values
for over temperature (dependent on the rated
voltage factor).
Note 1 : the limit values for measurement deviations
may be exceeded here.
Note 2: if there is more than one secondary
winding, the thermal limiting output is given for
each winding.
Note 3: the simultaneous load of more than one
secondary winding is not allowed without special
consultation between manufacturer and purchaser. 65

• Rated thermal limiting output of windings for
ground fault detection: the rated thermal limiting
output of the winding for ground fault detection
must be given in volt-amperes; the values must
be 15, 25, 50, 70, 100 VA and their decimal multi
ples, based on the secondary rated voltage and
a power factor of 1.
5.5.4.3.2
Note: because the windings for ground faull
detection are connected in the open delta, they
are subject to load only in the event of mal
function.
The thermal rated burden rating of the winding
for ground fault detection should be based on
a load duration of 8 h.
• Rated voltage factor: the multiple of the
,. primary rated voltage at which a voltage
transfor
mer must respond to the thermal requirements
for a specified load duration accuracy class.
• Voltage error (transformation ratio error):
the deviation of a voltage transformer when mea
suring a voltage resulting from the deviation of
the actual transformation from the transformation.
The voltage error is given by the equation below
and expressed as a percentage.
Here:
Kn : rated trar.sfo mation ratio
UP :actual primary voltage
Us : actual secondary voltage when UP is subject
to measuring conditions.
• Phase displacement: the angular difference
between the primary and secondary voltage
vectors. The direction of the vector is specified
so that on an ideal voltage the phase displace
ment is equal to zero. The phase displacement is
positive when the secondary vector is ahead of
the primary vector. It is expressed in minutes or
in centiradians.
Note: the definition is strictly speaking only
66 applicable to sinusoidal voltage.
...,
. I
:
5.5.4.3.2 Inductive voltage transformers
Inductive voltage transformers are transformers of
low output with which the secondary voltage is prac
tically proportional to and in phase with the primary
voltage. Voltage transformers are used to transform
the system voltage to be measured to a secondary
voltage to be fed to measuring and protection devi
ces. The primary and secondary are galvanically sepa
rated from each other.
Inductive voltage transformers are supplied in the fol
lowing designs: \'
• Two-phase isolated voltage transformers
for connection between two phases, ratio
60001100 V, for example. Two voltage trans
formers in V connection are normally used for I
measuring power in three-phase networks.
• Single-phase isolated voltage transformers for I
connection between one phase and ground, ratio
11 0000 I v3 II 100 I v3 V. Three transformers
connected in star are required for measuring
I
power in three-phase networks. If single-phase
isolated voltage transformers have an auxiliary
winding for ground-fault monitoring, in three
phase networks, this must be measured for the I
ratio of 1OOV3 V. The "open delta" in the three
phase set can also have a fixed resistance for
damping relaxation oscillations (resulting from
ferro-resonances in insulated networks with small
capacitances).
• Three-phase voltage transformers with the
measuring windings connected in star"and an
auxiliary winding on the 4th and 5th limb for
ground-fault detection. The auxiliary winding has
a voltage 100 V in the event of a ground fault.
• •

5.5.4.3.3 Capacitive voltage

transformers

At higher system voltages up to 765

Inductive voltage transformers are
selected by the pri mary and
secondary rated voltage and the
accuracy class and rated output of the
secondary windings in accordance the
requirements of the devices to which
they are connected.
If there is a winding for the ground
fault detection, its rated thermal limit
output must be given. For the
short-time withstand, the rated voltage
factor and the specified load duration
at increased voltage are requir ed.
kV voltage transformers that operate
under the principle of the capacitive 5.5.4.3.
voltage divider can also be used. The 3
capa citive voltage transformers are
designed for connec tion of all
standard operational instrumentation
and they are also approved for tariff
metering.
Figure 5-8 shows the line diagram of a
capacitive vol tage transformer. Network
protection relays with tran sistorized
circuits for the shortest closing times
are also securely fed from capacitive
transformers, parti cularly if the
transformers have a sampling device that
damps all transient oscillations of the
transformer in the shortest time.

C1. .Cn Capacitve 1 High voltage terminal

voltage devider 2 Medium voltage choke coil

:
3 Transformer
4 Secondary terminals
_L Cn 5 Terminal box trimming winding
-r
6 Carrier HF terminal
6 '- r- 7 Carrier HF coupling
8 Damping device
YYYtYYYYt Y
2
3
100%
( 811 4
810 .
89 0 0
88 5
%

J
 4
1 %

3 1
5
87 0
5 -< 86
85 0
o.45% 1
B4
1 o
II
.
1
5
%

83 0 o.o5% 8

0
1 _d
82
, L
.,. 7 ' 81 t
0
Filter:

Figure 5-8 Basic diagram of capacitive voltage transformer

67
 5.5.4.4 Non-conventional transformers

In contrast to conventional transformers,non-conven

5.5.4.4 Capacitive voltage transformers also have the advan
tage of being suitable for coupling high-frequency
power-line carrier systems, e.g. for telecommunica
tions, remote-control installations and similar purpo
ses. The required supplementary elements (choke,
surge arrester) can be installed in terminal boxes.
tional current and voltage transformers are distinguish
ed by compact size and low weight They are gene
rally not saturable and have high transmission band
widths. The measured values are best transmitted by
fibre-optic cables, which are practically immune to
electromagnetic fields (EMC) The non-conventional
type of measured value acquisition and transmission
requires only limited output in the area of 0.1... 5 VA
on the secondary side.

When selecting capacitive voltage transformers, pri
mary and secondary rated voltage, rated frequency,
rated output and class are the essential features. In
addition, the rated thermal limiting output of a
ground fault detector winding, rated voltage factor
and the specified load duration at increased voltage
must be considered.
Non-conventional transformers consist of a measure
ment recorder, a measured value transmission line
bridging the potential difference between high volt
age and ground potential and an electronic
interface at ground potential for measured-value
processing and connections to protection devices in
the station con trol system.

Capacitive voltage transformers are selected similarly Measurement recorders can be divided into active
to the inductive transformers, but the capacitances of
and passive systems depending on the method
the high-voltage capacitors (C 1), of the intermediate
used.
voltage capacitor (C2 ) and the rated capacity (Cn) must
also be given. A dimensioning example for a capaci
tive voltage transformer is shown below:
5.5.4.4.1 Active non-conventional
Primary rated voltage 110 OOON3 V transformers
Secondary rated voltage
Hall-effect elements, Rogowski coils without an iron
• for measurements 110N3V
core or specially designed bar-type current transfor
• of winding for mers with linear characteristics are used for current
ground detection. Voltage acquisition is generally done using
fault detection 100/3 v resistive or capacitive voltage dividers. In substation
Rated output 75 VA, Cl 0.5 technologies for rated voltages below 52 kV and also
Rated voltage factor 1.9 U0, 4 h for GIS installations for higher voltages,active non-con
ventional transformers offer very attractive solutions.
Thermal rated burden rating 120 VA. 8 h
Rated capacity 4.400 pF ± 1 0 However, in outdoor substation technology for trans
% Rated frequency 50 Hz mission networks, the electrical measured quantities
must still be converted to a digital or analogue opti
The properties with transient processes are also cal signal at high-voltage potential. This requires devic
important with capacitive transformers (interaction es for providing the required auxiliary energy at high
with network protection). SF 6-insulated switchgear voltage potential. This energy requirement-may either
installations also include inductive and capacitive vol be taken from the high-voltage that is being monitor
tage transformers. ed or by optical means, either by solar cells or by
energy transmission via fibre-optic lines.

68
5.5.4.4.2 Passive non-conventional
transformers
Passive measurement recorders do not require auxili
ary energy at high-voltage potential. They are nor
mally completely constructed of dielectric materials.
5.5.4.4.2. 7 Passive optical voltage
transformers
Linear electro-optic effects (Pockel effect) linked to
specific classes of crystals are used for voltage
meas urement with optical voltage transformers. The
physi cal principle of the Peckel effect is a change
of the polarization state of light that is sent within
an elec trical field through a transparent material.
The change in polarization is linearly proportional to
the applied electrical field.
5.5.4.4.2.2 Passive optical current transformer
An optical current transformer uses the Faraday effect
in crystalline structures for passive measurement of
currents. Again monochromatic light is sent polarized
into a solid body of glass, which surrounds the
cur rent carrying conductor. Reflection from the
beveled corners of the glass container directs the
light beam around the conducting line before it
exits again on one side.
The magnetic field around the conductor rotates the
polarization plane of the light, whose phase differen
ce is proportional to the magnetic field intensity H.
Because the light in the glass body completely sur
rounds the current path as a line integral along a clo
sed curve, the phase difference at the end of the
path in the glass body is directly proportional to
the cur rent A polarization filter at the exit point of
the light from the glass only allows one
subcomponent of the light generated by the rotation
to pass. It is fed to the processing unit through fiber-
optic cables. The inten sity of this subcomponent
scale for the polarization change and so for the
magnitude of the current
Based on the same principle, an alternative is a
fiber optic semi-closed loop around the conductor
where the injected polarized light is reflected at the
mirrored end nearby the injection point. Therefore,
the light travels forwards and backwards. trough
the loop
around the conductor showing a change of the 5.5.4.4.3
pola rization angle proportional to the current.
The for ward and backward traveling compensates
for near ly all disturbing effects like temperature
changes etc.
5.5.4.4.3 Cable connection to protection
devices
Protection devices and systems in conventional
secondary technology are generally directly linked to
the primary instrument transformers with standardi
zed current and voltage outputs according to IEC
600445-1, IEC 60186 typically 100 V or 1 A (Figure
5-9). The specification of the output ratings is based
on the requirements of analog protection devices,
which require relatively high input power ratings in
VA. The long secondary cables require special pre
cautions against electromagnetic interferences (EMI)
by specifying relatively high signal levels.
Combined electronic CTNT sensors, however, produ
ce a digital signal, which has to be converted into a
analog signal before it can be transmitted via parallel
cables to numerical protection and control devices.
These devices require on one hand a much smaller
input power for analog values compared with what
was formerly required, typically 0.1 VA to 1 VA (Figure
5-9). On the other hand, the serial signals have to be
converted first from digital into analog and in the
numerical devices from analog into digital, which is
technically not very feasible. Apart from this, such sig
nals are very sensitive against EMI, and they cannot
be transmitted over longer distances.
These small signals can also be provided with a
sup plementary amplifier that generates current and
vol tage signals that are feasible for conventional
secon dary technology (Figure 5-9). Such amplifiers,
how ever, reduce the dynamic response behavior
of the instrument transformer.
69
5.5.5 5.5.4.4.4 Serial connection to protection 5.5.5 Innovative HV switchgear technology
devices

From technical considerations, the best solution is a
direct digital/digital fiber optic process bus connection
rather than low-level and non-electric signals that
might have to be amplified to conventional values
like 1 A or 100 V thus requiring expensive amplifiers
and loosing information like bandwith by principle
(Figure 5-9). The main obstacle for the acceptance of
such a solution has been that this link could only be
a vendor specific proprietary solution because of the
lack of International Standards that assure the inter
operatibility between IEDs from various vendors as
well as sensors/actuators from various vendors. This
problem has been addressed by the new IEC 61850
standard.
5.5.5. 7 Modern design concepts
The application of processors and modern informa
tion processing technology in substation and net
work control systems and also in secondary systems
of switchgear installations, fast data bus systems that
transmit over fiber-optic cables instead of copper
wires and newly developed sensors for current and
voltage enable revolutionary designs that lead to
smaller and more compact installations with a simul I! .
taneous increase in availability and ease of mainte
nance in the area of high- and very high-voltage
equipment and switchgear installations.

Electro
mechanical
protection
IEC60044-1, IEC60186 Electro
static
·: ........ protection

lA I
I
'
' IEC60044-7
Voltage Numerical

-
IEC60044-8
amplifier , protection
& control

Low /eve/ converter

Numerical
control

Sensor/actuator for Fiber optic

switchgear control Process Bus

70 Figure 5-9 Interfaces between instrument transformer and protection/control devices

 5.5.5.1.1 Process electronics
(sensor technology, PISA)
Decentralized distributed microprocessor based
modules (PISA = J:rocess lnterface for 2ensors and
duators) can be used for direct control of the pri
mary components of switchgear installations. At the
same time, these modules enable all parameters,
such as switch position, gas density, storage pro
perties of operating mechanisms, to be recorded
where they signify current status of the equipment
and therefore provide the necessary prerequisites for
monitoring modern switchgear installations.
Examples of equipment used for this purpose are
inductive robust proximity sensors for detecting
contact position of circuit breakers and disconnectors,
gas density sensors for SF6 gas-insulated switchgear
(GIS) installations and circuit-breakers. Powerful micro
computers are used for the preparation and
prepro cessing of the sensor signals. Complex
auxiliary switch packets in operating mechanisms are
no longer need ed because the software can multiply
signals without problems. The main advantages of
this technology are therefore the ability to reduce
the quantity of moving components, the smaller
dimensioning and standardization of mass-produced
components as is already done other industries.
For the transmission of sensor data fiber optical
cables are used and for the communication the
trahs msslon protocol according to the Standard
IEC
61850.
5.5.5.2 Innovative solutions
5.5.5.2.1 Compact outdoor switchgear
installations
A significant step toward reducing the space require
ments of switchgear installations has been made by
combining primary devices into more and more com
pad multifunctional switchgear units, This concept is
J not new and has already been implemented many
times in applications such as outdoor switchgear
installations with draw-out circuit-breakers. The
implementation of non-conventional current and vol
tage transformers now makes it possible to combine
a large number of functions in one device. As a
result a range of combination switchgear has been
developed in the last few years.
Another possibility for reducing the space required
for outdoor installations significantly is to use hybrid
installation designs. In this case, gas-insulated switch
gear is used in which many primary components (cir 5.5.5.2
cuit-breakers, transformers, discor'1nectors etc) are
installed in a common gas insulated housing. Only the
busbars and, depending on the basic design, the
associated busbar disconnedors are installed out
doors.
All new switchgear components are distinguished by
consistent integration of non-conventional sensors (in
this case primarily current and voltage sensors), pro
cessor controlled mechanisms and connection to the
bay control with fiber optics. This yields the
following:
• increased
availability
• less space
required
• shorter project runtimes and
• extended maintenance intervals with a significant
increase in ease of maintenance.
Figure 5-7 0 Slide-in switching module with LTB Circuit
breaker (CB) and integrated SF6 current
transformer (CT), disconnector (Of), earthing
earthing switch (ES) and surge arrestor
(SA) for145kV
71
 Figure 5-10 shows a design for compact outdoor
switchgear installations for Un ± 145 kV with trans
verse life tank circuit-breakers (LTB) and integrated
SF6 current transformers. The illustrated compact and
prefabricated switchgear with prefabricate busbar
connections makes it easy to set up simple secondary
5.5.5.2.1 substations and H-configurations economically and
quickly. The circuit is disconnected on both sides of
the circuit-breaker by the module moving to the
side.

Another variation of a compact switching module for

use up to 1 70 kV is shown in Figure 5-11. The dis
connector functions are realized with a draw-out cir
cuit-breaker. This means that the conventional dis
connectors are replaced by maintenance-free fixed
contacts and moving contacts on the circuit-breaker.
An option is to install conventional or optical current
and voltage transformers and earthing switches. The
circuit-breaker can be simply withdrawn for mainten
ance, or if necessary, quickly replaced by a spare brea
ker. The main advantages here are also significant
space savings, smaller bases, suited for single busbars
and H-configurations.

Figure 5-7 7
Compact switching module for 170 kV with draw-out
circuit breakers (CB), disconnector (Of) and current
transformer (CT)

SF6 I Air Bushing

SF6 voltage &

current transformer
/

I
I
·..·
.,
Figure 5-72 .......1
72 Plug And Switch System PASS
I I
I I l:.
I I
·•

5.5.5.2.2 Hybrid switchgear installations The saving of space amounts to as much as 60 % in 5.5.6
new installations. For retrofit projects, the space
Two insulation media, i.e. air and SF 6 , can be
requir ed by the switchgear installations is generally
combin ed in high-voltage installation with the
dictated by the existing busbars and the gantries. In
modular prin ciple of SF6 -isolated installations. This
this case, the advantages of the PASS solutions are
type of installa tion is referred to a "hybrid
primarily in the drastically reduced cabling
installation':
requirements and fast installation and
commissioning.
Figure 5-12 shows a hybrid switching device for vol
tage levels of up to 550 kV. The name "Plug And
Switch System" - PASS - indicates the philosophy of The 11/2 circuit-breaker method can also be success
this concept. The highly integrated components form fully implemented in hybrid design ( Figure 5-13). In
a complete bay comprising SF6 gas-insulated circuit addition to saving up to 60% in surface area requir
ed, PASS is also characterized by easy replacability. It
breaker, busbar disconnectors (2 disconnectors in ca
can be connected to the overhead lines as easy as
se of a double busbar arrangement), maintenance
conventional installations.
earthing switch, current and voltage transformers.
This modular pre-tested switching units allow that in
new installations and in retrofit projects compact bay
units can be erected and commissioned very quickly.
They are connected to secondary equipment of the 5.5.6 SF6 gas-insulated switchgear (GIS)
substation by prefabricated cable links, which include
both the auxiliary voltage supply cables and the fiber
optic cables to the station automation system. 5.5. 6. 7 General

The range of application of SF6 gas-insulated switch

gear extends from voltage ratings of 72.5 up to 800
kV with breaking currents of up to 63 kA and in
spe cial cases up to 80 kA. Both small transformer
sub
stations and large load-center substations can be
designed with SF6 technology.

The distinctive advantages of SF6 gas-insulated switch

gear are: compact, low weight, high reliability, safety
against touch contact, low maintenance and long
life. Extensive in-plant assembly and testing of large
units and complete bays reduces erection and
commissio ning time on the construction site.

GIS equipment is usually of modular construction. All

components such as busbars, disconnectors, circuit
Figure 5-73 275 kV Hybrid substation 1112 CB breakers, instrument transformers, cable terminations
arrangement with Plug And Switch and joints are contained in earthed enclosures filled
System (PASS) with sulphur hexafluoride gas (SF 6) (Figure 5-14). 73
5.5.6.2
;. Voltage
r- . .

'· - - .
Transformer

Disconnector I
j
, ..

1
Earthing Switch : \

HV Cable with Busbars Circuit Breaker Control cubicle

SF6 I Oil Bushings I
l.

Figure 5-74 745 kV SF6 Gas insulated switchgear (GIS) I

Up to ratings of 170 kV, the three phases of GIS
are generally in a common enclosure, at higher
voltages phases are segregated. The encapsulation
consists of non-magnetic and corrosion-resistant cast
aluminum or welded aluminum sheet.
74
l
5.5.6.2 SF6 gas as insulating and
arc-quenching medium
Sulphur hexafluoride gas (SF6) is employed as insula
tion medium in all parts of the installation, and in the
circuit-breaker it is also_used as arc-quenching medi
um. SF6 is an electronegative gas, its dielectric
strength at atmospheric pressure is approximately
three times that of air. It is incombustible, nontoxic,
odorless, che mically inert with arc-quenching
properties 3 to 4 times better than air at the same
pressure.
Commercially available SF6 is not dangerous, and so
is not subject to the Hazardous Substances Order or
Technical Regulations on Hazardous Substances
(TRGS). New SF6 gas must comply with IEC 60673.
Gas returned from SF6 installations and apparatus is
dealt with in IEC 60480. SF6 is considered as strong
greenhouse gas. With its contribution to the green
house effect below 0.1 %, the proportion of SF6 is
low compared to that of the other known green
house gases (carbon oxide, met hane, nitrous
oxide etc.). To prevent any increase of SF 6 in the
atmosphere, its use should in future be confined to
closed systems. Devices suitable for processing and
storing SF6 for GIS are available for this purpose.
The gas pressure is monitored in the individually
seal ed gas compartments and in the circuit-breaker
hous ing. The low gas losses (below 1 % per
year) are taken into account with the first gas filling.
Automatic make-up facilities are not necessary.
The isolating gas pressure is generally 350 to 450 kPa
at 20 oc_ In some cases this can be up to 600 kPa.
The arc quenching gas pressure in circuit breakers is
600 to 700 kPa. Outdoor apparatus exposed to arc
tic conditions contains a mixture of SF6 and nitrogen
N2, to prevent the gas from liquefying. The pressure
temperature relationship of pure SF 6 gas is shown in
Figure 5-1 5.
Figure 5-75
Pressure/Temperature
diagram of pure SF6 Gas
- 60 - 40 - 20
5.5.6.3 Gas Density Monitoring 5.5.6.3
All enclosed compartments are filled with SF6 gas
once at the time of commissioning. This includes
allowance for any leakage during operation (less than
1 % per year). All the gas compartments have gas fil
ling valves, making gas maintenance very easy, most
of which can be done while the station remains in
operation. For gas treatment with the switchgear in
operation, there are two gas filling valves provided
per gas compartment (Figure 5-16) that the gas can
be treated by circulation through a gas treatment
device from outside the gas compartment. The gas
maintenance may be necessary if the moisture con
tent in gas is becoming critical due to condensation.
The gas is monitored by gas density monitor or sen
sors which are mounted directly on the components
(Figure 5-16).
Presssure Density
[PI102 kPa] [of kgfm3]
Nominal arc quenching
gas pressure in CB
10
0 20 Temperature
40 60 75
[ T I 0C]
 Figure 5-76 SF6 Gas Schematic Diagram
5.5.6.4 The insulating capability of SF6 gas is dependent on
the gas density in kg/m3. For monitoring the gas den
sity, the relation between gas pressure, density and
temperature has to be taken into account as shown
in Figure 5-15. This interdependence makes it difficult
to measure the gas density directly. There are two
measuring principles available:
• A temperature compensated pressure switch with
two contacts, one for the indication of a non
urgent low density alarm to alert the maintenance
crew for refilling the gas compartment concerned
and an urgent alarm for isolating the gas compart
ment from high voltage, as the insulating capability
is no longer assured. For circuit-breakers there is a
third contact necessary to alert the operator that
the circuit breaker is no longer capable to interrupt
short circuit currents. This contact operates before
the other two respond to decreasing gas density.
Based on the same principle, there also monitors
available on the market that deliver continuously
measured gas density values.
• An electronic gas monitoring sensor that can
directly indicate the gas density in kg/m3 by
means of an feasible measuring principle that is
independent of temperature variation. Such moni
tors are today still expensive but they may be
econorr1ical in the future.
5.5.6.4 Components
Reference is made to the typical layout of a GIS sta
tion in Figure 5-14 and gas schematic diagram Figure
5-16.
The busbars are separated by barrier insulators at
each bay and form a unit with the busbar disconnec
tors and the maintenance earthing switches.
The circuit-breaker operates on the self-blast princi
ple. Conventional puffer-type breakers use the
mechanical energy of the actuator to generate the
breaker gas stream while the self-blast breaker uses
l ··,
2
I•
1 Gas barrier insJator
2 Busbar gas cor-,partment
3 Feeder gas coMpartment
4 Circuit breaker gas compar::ment
5 Voltage transfc'mer
6 Gas filling valv::
7 Gas density rrc:;nitor/sensc'
the thermal energy of the short-circuit arc for this pur
pose. This saves up to 80 o of the actuation energy.
Depending on :heir size, the breakers have one to
four breaker gaps per pole. They have single- or tri
ple-pole hydraulic spring mechanisms.
The current transformers for measuring and protec
tion purposes are of the toroidal core type and can
be arranged before or after the circuit-breaker. depen
ding on the protection concept. Primary insulation is
provided by SF,: gas, so it is resistant to aging: Iron
free current transformers using the Rogowski coil
principle are used with SMART-GIS. They allow quan
titative evaluation of short-circuit currents and so
make it possible to create a contact erosion image of
the circuit-breaker. Also fibre optic CTs could be used
as an alternative, if available.
Voltage transformers for measurement and protec
tion can be equipped on the measuring windings
and an open delta winding for detecting earth faults.. bigger than the protected zone of the line-side arre
Inductive voltage transformers are contained in a tion. It is generally advisable to study and optimize the
housing filled with SF6 gas. Foil-insulated voltage trans overvoltage protection system, particularly with dis
formers are used, with SF6 as the main insulation.
Capacitive voltage transformers can also be employ
ed, usually for voltages above 300 kV. The high vol
tage capacitor is oil-insulated and contained in a hous
ing filled with SF6 gas. The low-voltage capacitors and
the inductive matching devices are placed in a sepa
rate container on earth potential. Capacitive tapings in
conjunction with electronic measuring ampli- fiers are
also available.
Electro-optical voltage transformers using the Pockels
principle are also used with SMART GIS.
The cable sealing end (pothead) can
accommodate any kind of high voltage cable with
conductor and connection facilities for testing the
insulation of the cables with DC voltage. If there
is a branch dis" connector, it is sufficient to open
this during testing.
Maintenance earthing switches, which may be requir
ed during servicing, are usually placed before and
after the circuit-breaker. Normally mounted on or
integrated in the disconnector housing, they are ope
rated by hand or motor only if the high-voltage part
is not under voltage. The maintenance earthing
switch after the circuit-breaker may be omitted if there
a high-speed earthing switch on the line side.
SF6 outdoor bushings allow the enclosed switchgear
to be connected to overhead lines or the bar termi
nals of transformers. In order to obtain the necessary
air clearance at the outdoor terminals, the bushings
are properly separated using suitably shaped enclo
sure sections.
The surge arresters are generally of the gap-less type 5.5.6.5
and contain metal oxide resistors. If the installation is
ster, arresters can also be arranged inside the installa
tances of more than 50 m.
Each bay has a control cubicle containing all the
equip
ment needed for control, auxiliary power supply.
The gastight enclosure of high-grade aluminum is of
low weight so that only light foundations are requi
red. The enclosure surrounds all the live parts, which
are insulated from the enclosure by SF 6 gas at a
pres sure of 350 to 450 kPa.
Barrier insulators divide the bay into separate gas
compartments sealed off from each other. This mini
mizes the effects on other components during plant
extensions, for inspection and maintenance. The flang
ed joints contain non-aging gaskets. Any slight leak
age of gas can pass only to the outside but not into
adjacent compartments.
Each switching device is provided with an easily
accessible operating mechanism (arranged outside
the enclosure) for manual emergency operation. The
contact position can be seen from reliable mechani
cal position indicators.
5.5.6.5 SMART-GIS
A characteristic of SMART-GIS is replacement of con
ventional secondary technology, such as transformers,
contactors and auxiliary switches with modern
sensor technology and actuators. Inductive
proximity swit ches and rotary transducers detect the
position of the switching devices; the SF 6 gas
density is calculated
from the gas pressure and temperature or measured
directly. 77
.

'

5.5.7 Actuators control the trip solenoids and the electric
motors of the mechanisms. Specially designed sen
sors detect current and voltage. Rogowski coils and
electro-optical voltage transformerswithout ferromag
netic components are generally used for this purpo
se. To ensure secure transmission of signals, fiber
optic cables instead of the conventional hard-wired
connections are used within the bay and station con
trol system.
The process is controlled and monitored by decen
tralized distributed microprocessor based modules
(PISA= _Erocess Interface for $ensors and 6ctuators),
which communicate with one another and with
higher-order control components via a process bus.
All sensors and the entire electronics for data
proces sing and communications are self-
monitoring and software routines continuously check
the hardware in use.
Timer controls can be set for important data. Critical
states can be avoided before they affect operation
and maintenance. This results in reduced reserve and
redundancy requirements in the system and improv-
ed economy of operation. · d
78
5.5.7 Surge arrestors
5.5.71 pesign, operating principle
The operation and design of the surge arrester has
radically changed over the last twenty years.
Arresters with spark gap and with series-connected
silicon carbide (SiC) resistors have been replaced by
surge arrester technology without spark gap and with
metal-oxide resistors. The former porcelain housing is
also being replaced more and more by polymer
insu lation.
u
a
log I
a lower linear part
b knee point·
c strongly linear part
upper linear part ("turn-up area")
A Operating point (at continuous persistent voltage)
Figure 5-7 7 Current/voltage characteristic of a metal
oxide surge arrester
The gapless arresters are based on metal oxide (MO)
resistors, which have an extremely non-linear U/1 cha
racteristic and a high energy-absorption capability.
They are known as metal oxide surge arresters, MO
arresters for short.
The MO arrester is characterized electrically by a cur
rent/voltage curve (Figure 5-17). The current range is
specified from the continuous operating range (range
A of the curve, order of magnitude 10 ·3 A) to a mini
mum of the double value of the rated discharge cur
rent (order of magnitude 1 Q3 A). The MO arrester
L.
corresponding to the characteristic changes from the
high-resistance to the low-resistance range at rising
voltage without delay. When the voltage returns to
the continuous operating voltage Uc or below, the
arrester again becomes high-ohmic

The protective level of the MO arrester .is set by its
re sidual voltage UP. The residual pea'k value of the
vol tage appears at the terminals of the arrester
when a surge current flows. A surge current with a
front time of about 1 [.IS, and a time to half value
up to 10 tS and a current up to 10 kA represents
very steep over voltage waves, and the associated
residual voltage is comparable to the front spark
over voltage of a spark-gapped arresters.
Surge arresters are protective devices that may be
overloaded under extreme fault conditions. In such
cases, e.g. when voltage leaks from one network
level to the other, a single-phase earth fault occurs in
the resistor assembly of the arrester. The pressure re
lief ensures that the housings do not explode. The
earth-fault current of the at the arrester site must be
less than the guaranteed current for the pressure re
lief of the relevant arrester.
5.5.72 Application and 5.5.7.2
selection of MO surge
arresters
Surge arresters are used for protection of important
equipment particularly transformers, from atmosphe
ric oveNoltages and switching oveNoltages (Fig. 5-18).
MO arresters primarily selected on the basis of two
basic requirements:
• The arrester must be designed for
stable continuous operation,
• Must provide sufficient protection for the
protected equipment.
Figure 5-7 8 Typical 7 45 kV transformer (T), bay
with circuit breaker (CB) surge arresters
(SA) and current transformer (U)

79
 characteristic and it is decisive for the selection of the
arrester with reference to temporary overvoltages.
During the operating duty test of an MO arrester
type, a test voltage is applied immediately following
the surge current for a period of 1 0 s to the test
object . t

5.5.7.2 Stable continuous operation means that the arrester

is electrically and mechanically designed for all load lEOs may monitor the operation of surge arrestors . '·
cases that occur under standard operation and when and provide the information via the Substation Auto
system faults occur. This requires that the electrical mation System to a remote monitoring or asset ;

and mechanical requirements are known as precisely mana gement center. .1.
as possible. The magnitude of the maximum power
frequency voltage, magnitude and duration of the u I
I
temporary overvo/tages and the anticipated stresses p.u. .!
caused by switching and lightning overvoltages must 4
all be known. In addition, the stress caused by
short circuit current forces and special environmental
con ditions, e.g. temperatures over 45 °(, 3
installation in earthquake regions etc, are very
important.
2
When selecting the arrester by its electrical data, there
must be an appropriate margin between the
protec tion level of the arrester and the insulation
levels stand ardized for he applicable operating
voltage to meet the requirements of the insulation
coordination (Figure 5 -19).
I
Parallel connecting of MO resistor columns allows
every technically necessary dimension of the energy
absorption capability to be implemented at equivalent
protection levels. Doubling the number of columns a maximum phase to ground voltage at power
can reduce the protection level and almost double frequency in normal operating conditions
the energy-absorption capability. (1 p.u. = peak value)
b peak value of maximum phase to ground voltage
For MO arresters, the continuous operating voltage U, of an adjacent phase in case of a ground fault
is defined as the maximum power frequency voltage cE earth fault factor (=14)
that the arrester can withstand continuously. The peak d Switching impulse voltage (limited by surge
value of the continuous operating voltage of the arrester to UPS)
arre ster must be higher than the peak value of the UPS Switching impulse protection level of surge arrester
ope rating voltage. On one hand, it is determined
UwL Rated lightning impulse voltage (BIL) for equipment
by the power-frequency voltage that corresponds
standard values
to the maximum voltage in the network; but on
the other hand, permissible harmonics of the UwS Rated switching impulse voltage (SIL) for equipment
standard values ·
voltage must be considered In normal networks, a
safety margin of 5% over the system voltage at
power frequency is suffi cient. Figure 5-7 9 Arrester selection for /ow-resistance
earthed transmission network for
The rated voltage U, of an MO arrester is the refe ± 245 kV with earthing factor CE= 1.4
80 rence value to the power frequency versus the time
5.5.8 Transformers

5.5.8

.. 1
S
----.-- Cooling system

A
Figure 5-20 Large power transformer comprising primary/secondary cooling systems and tap changer
with surge arrester (SA) on the primary voltage side U 7

The purpose of transformers is to transfer electrical
energy from systems of one voltage U, to systems of
another voltage U2 .
The transfmmers can be differentiated according-to
their manner of operation (Figure 5-21).
• Power transformers, the winding of which
are in parallel with the associated systems. The
systems are electrically independent. The transfer
of power solely by induction.
• Autotransformers, the windings of which are
connected in line (series winding RW and parallel
winding PW). The throughput of power is partly
by conduction and partly by induction. 81
 :
5.6 Voltage and Power Factor II
I
i
Control I '

5.6
• Booster transformers, the w!nding of which are
electrically independent. one winding being
connected in series (RW) with one system in order
to alter its voltage. The other winding is connected
in parallel with its associated system (Excitation
winding 8/11). The additional power is transferred
purely inductively.
PW
RW
5.6.1 Transformer control and voltage
regulation
One of the most important operational requirement
is that the ratios of the power transformers can be
adapted according to load variation by means of a
on-load tap changer control (OTPC) (Figure 5-20)
devices. This transformer control enables
• to maintain the system voltage
within a narrow range
• to adjust the real power and reactive
power flow in interconnected networks

EW
and rectifier plants for DC supply

For maintaining the voltage on the consumer side,

'.
Autotransformer Booster-Transformer the transformer windings on the upper voltage side i
I
Power Transformer are provided with taps which are connected in a vary
ing sequence. On-load tap changers or change-over
Figure 5-27 Different types of transformers switches allow to change the partial windings. I

5.6.1.1 Change over switches

5.5.8.1 Transformer connections
Change over switches are used in grids with
The connections of transformers shown in Table 5-1 small variations of loads and they cover a range of
are those usually employed for linking the windings ± 5 % voltage adjustment of the voltage level that
of three phase transformers. has to be guaranteed. The change over operation is
only done locally and manually operated in 2 x 2
steps of 2.5 %
each with the transformer disconnected from the
Connection Symbol HV side LV Side system voltage.

Delta D d 5.6.7.2 On-load tap changer (OLTC)

Star A y y
The on load tap changer is used in grids with fre
quent short term load variations. The range of volta
Interconnected star ""( ge adjustment is ± 16 % of the voltage level that
z z
has to be guaranteed. The range is divided in 2

A
times 16
Open steps with 1 % voltage range each. As the adjust
Ill Ill ment of the taps has to be conducted under load,
the tap changer is equipped with a spring drive
82 Table 5-7 Transformer connections
and motor for rewinding the spring after operation.
This type of operation is called step-by-step
switching.
 uv
.------------.,
1 I

5.6. 7.3 OLTC control

5.6.1.3.1 Local control

The tap changer can be manually operated via a

I_------
crank directly at the transformer (emergencf opera Control box at the Station control Network contro
transformer level
tion). In addition to the mechanical operation a (_ LV
level

elec trical operation via push buttons is provided as

well. For each tap that is intended to be changes a
sepa

rate command has to be given. This feature assures Figure 5-22 Transformer tap changer diagram for local,
station and remote control
that not several steps can be changed with one
com mand and that the voltage regulation is made
step by-step.
11 Higher/Lower mechanical
5.6.1.3

5.6.1.3.2 Station and remote control

Local/Remote switch
Apart from local control, the electric control of the tap
changer can also be made from the substation con
trol room and from a remote network control center.
@ Drive motor
A local/remote change over switch assures that no
[@]
simultaneous control operation can be initiated from A Contact resisters inactive
all three control levels.

During OLTC operation a flag on the screen in G Voltmeter

station control room or in the network control
center indica tes that the tap changer is changing its
tap position.
0 Remote indication: "Motor is running"

For the OLTC remote indication a strip of sliding

II Tap position indicator mechanical
contacts is available at the operuting mechanism,
which are provided with a chain of resistors, e.g. 3 Q
IH LI Higher/Lower electrical
for each step. A DC voltage supply e.g. with 6 V DC
is connected to the resistor chain that the voltage 11 Contact resistors active

rn
drop proportional to the tap changer position can be
measured by an position indication instrument
Tap position indicator, electrical
In addition to the position indication, the voltage
level that has to be guaranteed can be displayed
at sta tion control level.
0 Start indicator

Transducer for electrical tap changer

position indication 83
 5.6.1.3.3 Automatic control
Voltage regulation by means of tap changers can
also be done automatically. The principal
components of such a system are a voltage
regulator, a set-point adjuster, a measuring device
5.6.2 for load-dependent set point correction, and for
long lines, a means for com pensating the voltage
drop. This latter device can be contained in the
voltage regulation or be installed separately.
Measuring units are available for the follow ing
operating conditions:
• Parallel busbar operation,
• Parallel network operation,
• Networks with widely varying active
and reactive power components.
The choice of measuring units thus depends on the
operating conditions. The control system is connect
ed to voltage and instrument transformers at the vol
tage level that needs to be held constant.
Simultaneous manual/automatic operation is prevent
ed by selector switch.
If transformer are operated in parallel on one line,
special precautions have to be taken to avoid loop
currents flowing between the transformer which
could cause damage to the transformer.
5.6.2 Power capacitors
The term power capacitor is mainly applied to
capa citors having a rated frequency of 50 or 60 Hz
which compensate the reactive power at points of
heavy demand in public and industrial networks.
This gene ral designation also includes "urnace
capacitors" and "medium-frequency capacitors';
which cover the high reactive power requirement of
melting furnaces and inductive heating coils, and
also "welding machine capacitors" and "fluorescent
lamp capacitors" used for compensating welding
transformers and the bal lasts of fluorescent lamps.
84
The reactive power of a capacitor is determined by its
capacitance, the rms value of the operating voltage
and the system frequency:
Oc= U2 roC
The rated power of a capacitor as stated on its name
plate is always in relation to its rated voltage U,and
rated frequency f,.
In three-phase networks, the capacitors, always three
of the same size, are connected in either star or
delta. If
• C1 is the capacitance in one phase with
star connection
• (12 is the capacitance in one phase with
delta connection
then for the same reactive power:
c, = 3 c,2
Voltage and frequency increases and total harmonic
distortion of the voltage or the current place additio
nal stress on capacitors.
Capacitors must be able to carry continuously 1.3
times the current flowing with sinusoidal rated volta
ge and frequency at an ambient air temperature cor
responding to its temperature class. With this loading,
the voltage must not be higher than 1.1. U, with no
tra]lsient over-voltages taken into account.
5.6.2. 7 Compensation of reactive power
Only the active power produced by the active current
(IR) in Figure 5-23 a) is utilized at the point of con
sumption. The reactive power produced by the
reac tive current (IL) does not contribute to the
conversion into useful power and is therefore not
counted by the active power meter. However, the
reactive power has an unfavorable effect on the
electrical-equipment in that it constitutes an
additional load on generators, transformers and
conductors. It gives rise to additio nal voltage drops
and heat losses.
Static reactive-power (var) compensation in systems
with the aid of thyristors is described in chapter 5.7.

It is economically sound to draw the reactive power
from capacitors, Figure 5-23 b). These are loc2ted in
the vicinity of the largest reactive loads (motors and
transformers) in order to relieve the transmission net
works, including transformers and generators, from
the corresponding share of the reactive current. If the
capacitors are properly positioned, by reducing the
reactive current (IL) in this way, it is possible in many
instances to connect additional loads to existing sup
ply systems without having to increase the power or
extent of the network.
R L
lcomp t t f
--. IR IL lc
u u
a,
Figure 5-23 Active and reactive currents in an electrical
installation, a) uncompensated,
b) compensated with capacitor,
c) power vector diagram
With full compensation as shown in Figure 5-23 b)
the generator (G) supplies only the current IR for the
purely active load (R) and active current lcR for the
capacitor loss resistance Rc.
Figure 5-23 c) shows the reactive before compensa
tions with
Oc = P tan <p 1 5.6.3
And after compensation with
Oc = P tan <p2
Where <p2 is the phase displacement angle of the
desired cos <p2 . The capacitor rating required for this
is
Oc = P (tan <p, - tan <p 2)
The electricity supply utilities generally specify a
power factor of 0.8 to 0.9. Compensation beyond cos
<p= 1 (over-compensation Oc > Q 1) must be
avoided as this gives rise to capacitive reactive
power, which
stresses the conductors in the same way as inductive
C reactive power, and in addition, unwelcome voltage
increases can occur.
5.6.3 High voltage reactors
5.6.3. 7 Current limiting
reactors
Current-limiting reactors are reactances employed to
limit short-circuit currents. They are used when one
intends to reduce the short-circuit power of networks
or installations to a value which is acceptable with
regard to the short-circuit current carrying capability
of the equipment or the breaking capacity of the cir
cuit-breaker.
Since the reactance of a series reactor must remain
constant when short-circuit currents occur, only the
air-core type of construction is suitable. If iron cores
were used, saturation of the iron caused by the short
circuit currents would result in a drop in the induc
tance of the coil, thus seriously reducing the short cir
cuit protection.
5.6.3.1.1 Voltage drop and voltage variation
The rated impedance is the impedance per phase at
rated frequency. The resistance of a current-limiting
reactor is negligible and in general. amounts to not
more than some 3% of the reactance XL· 85
 AU, AU,
u"'

5.6.3.1.2 The rated voltage drop !:!. U, is the voltage induced in

the rea'ctor when operating with rated current and
rated reactance:
!:!. U= I, XL

When the vditage drop is referred to the system vol

tage, the rated voltage drop is denoted !:!. u, and
a) b)
usually stated in %.
!:!. u, =!:!. u v3 I Un 100% Figure 5-24 Vector diagram of reactor;
a) normal operation,
For given values of reactance and current. the voltage b) short circuit operation
variation U"' in the network. i.e. the difference be
tween the network voltage before and after the U,: System voltage before reactor
reac tor, is also dependent on cos <p, Figure 5-24. U2 : System voltage after reactor
Thus, whereas the voltage difference U"' across the U'f: Voltage variation in the system
reactor is small under normal operating conditions, it U2 K: System voltage after reactor during short circuit
increas es in the event of a short circuit I, : rated current
• in proportion to the short-circuit current IK : Short circuit current
and <p : Phase displacement angle
<p2 : during short circuit
• with the increase in phase displacement angle
under fault conditions <p2 .

5.6.3. 7.2 Reactor circuits

9
)
) )
0
1) r'l
9
)
) ) )
)
I

) )
j j j j
1- r i
I

t t lI 11
1I '
l_

I
a) b) c)

86 Figure 5-25 The most common reactor circuits, a) branch circuit b) group reactor circuit c) busbar reactor circuit
. '?
The scheme shown in Figure 5-25 under a), with
the reactors in the branches, is the most commonly
used. The circuit shown in b), with one common
group reactor in the supply feeder for several
branches, is often chosen for reasons of saving
space. The costs of purchase and operation for the
same degree of protection are higher than with
reactors in the bran ches.
In power stations with a high short-circuit power, it is
usual to fit busbar sectionalizing reactors together
with bypass circuit-breakers, as shown in c). In normal
operation, the closed circuit breaker and isolators pro
vide a permanent connection between the busbar
sections. In the event of a fault, the circuit-breaker
opens, and the reactor prevents that both generators
feed into the fault and limits the short-circuit
current magnitude approximately to that of the
individual systems.
5.6.3.2 Shunt
reactors
Shunt reactors in long EHV lines, mainly 400 kV
and above are applied to compensate the effects
of line capacitances and to limit the various types
of over voltages. The example in Figure 5-26 shows
the occur rence of closing overvoltages, which are
caused as soon as the line is energized with the
circuit breaker
closing at t 0. Before closing the line voltage UL = 0.
The closing overvoltage is rising fast to its maximum
value OM and after approximately 10 ms the overvol
tage OM = OLand line voltage OL becomes
equal with the source voltage 05.
The maximum value of 0 M and the rate of rise
depends on the source impedance X 5 and capaci
tance C 5 as well as the line impedance ZL and capaci
tance CL. The characteristics of the line ZL and CL
depend on voltage level and length of line.
The higher the voltage level and the longer the line 5.6.3.2
distances are the higher are the closing overvoltage.
In certain cases the value for OM can be more than 3
times 05 without any measures for limiting the peak
value to less than 2 times 05.
Such a measure can be the lateral compensation by
shunt reactors at both end to prevent pre-charges of
the open line and/or closing resistors on circuit brea
kers (CB+CR). The closing resistors contact is closed
shortly before the main contact closes to limit the line
energizing current inrush and is opened immedia
tely after the main contact has closed. Its insertion
time is not more than 3 ms. The closing resistor
value is between 0.4 to 1 kQ.
Shunt reactors of suitable size must be permanently
connected to the line to limit the temporary funda
mental frequency over voltages. Such line reactors
also serve to limit switching over voltages to some
extent However, reactive shunt compensation increas
es the surge impedance of the line and thereby
reduces the surge impedance loading (SIL) level that
is, the load at which a flat voltage profile along the
line can be achieved. These permanently connected
shunt reactors also consume active power, which is a
continuous loss to the system.
Such disadvantages can be overcome with the aid of
thyristorized controlled shunt reactors (CSR), which
offers all the advantages of the permanently connect
ed shunt reactor but only when it is required thus
reducing the continuous reactive power drawn as in
the case of a fixed shunt reactor. CSR automatically
goes of the circuit during increased line loading to
limit the power frequency dynamic over voltag s.
87

Closing EHV transmission lines
Load
---®
·--· ----·----r ,---
CJ ,. l 1
Transformer•
reactor CR reactors
Generation Plant 400 kV Transmission line Substation
Figure 5-26 HV transmission with shunt reactors to
limit switching overvoltages OM
5.6.4 The shunt reactors are switched off sometimes to
increase the power transfer capacity of the transmis
sion line during heavy load conditions. This, however,
involves the risk of oveNoltage during sudden load
throw off.
5.6.4 FACTS
Taking into account the actual structure and opera
tion of the interconnected power systems the
demand grows to utilize the network capacity in a
more effective and flexible way. That means to
increase the utilization of existing transmission facili
ties in sense of enhancement of technical and eco
nomic performance and more flexible adaptation to
changing environments.
Much research has been directed to point out the
operational benefits of flexible AC Iransmission
System (FAGS) controllers for steady state operation
as well as the power system dynamic improvement.
Using existing networks more effectively is the main
objective in the framework of FAGS device applica
88 tions. Most of these applications are focused on the
optimization of the control system for short term and
long term operation, namely power system
damping and power flow optimization.
The technological basis for the development of
FAGS devices is a yoltage ource onverter (VSC)
with high power ratings. By converting direct current
to alternating current quantities, with respect to
magnitude and phase, a VSC acts like a voltage sour
ce injecting an AC-voltage or AC-current in series or
in parallel to transmission devices. Additionally. this
technology opens new possibilities with the combi
nation of conventional equipment and power elec
tronic based components for rapid power flow and
voltage control Figure 5-27 and hence the functiona
lity of existing devices can be optimally extended.
i
i.
vsc
vsc
star point connections Series connections
Figure 5-27 Examples of voltage source converters (VSC)
confk;;urations
The VSC modules can also be placed on high volta
ge potential (Figure 5-28) as well as on low voltage
potential, which will reduce the insulation level and
hence the equipment costs (Figure 5-29).
Against this background the definition of Flexible AC
Transmission System devices is expanded to encom
pass intelligent network nodes. These are optimized
power electronic assisted substation systems aimed
at power flow control as well as voltage control and
active filtering for more effective network utilization in
a deregulated environment and large system exten
sions projects.
In modem power systems the trend to transmit
power through given corridors is rapidly evolving. The
reason for this is the lack in the right of way for new
 4

transmission lines, mainly because of environmental 5.6.4

issues. In addition to this, due to deregulation and
reconstruction of the electric power industry, the
need rises to transport large blocks of power be-
tween partners, through defined line corridors with-
out involving other partners. Thus, it is necessary to
operate the existing transmission systems more effi-
ciently and control power flows without risking the
security of the system and the quality of energy deli-
very.

In this new environment in transmission system ope

ration and in combination with the rapid develop
Figure 5-28 FAUS installation at high voltage potential ment in power electronics, FACTS devices can play a

Figure 5-29
Facts at low voltage potential

89
 5.7 Static Var (reactive power)
compensation (SVC)
5.7 5.71 Applications
In recent years, the control of reactive power has .gain
ed importance alongside active-power control. The
use of mechanically switched choke and capacitor
banks has improved the reactive current balance in
the networks. This has reduced transmission losses
and kept stationary voltage deviations within the pre
set limits. In addition to this equipment, thyristor-con
trolled reactive-power compensators (SVC=$.tatic ar
ompensator) have also been implemented. They
read virtually instantly and also offer the following
advantages:
• Very quick and infinitely variable reactive
power conditioning
• Improvement of voltage stability in
weak networks
• Increase of static and dynamic transmission
stability and attenuation of power swings
• Enhancement of transmission capacity of
lines
• Quick balancing of variable non-symmetrical loads
• Lower transmission
losses
• Increased static and dynamic stability
and reduced power fluctuations
• Increased transmission capacity
• Balancing of unsymmetrical loads
• Continuous regulation of power
factor
Equipped with electronic components, SVC systems
respond almost instantaneously. SVC systems allow
infinitely variable control across a whole band of
reac tive power. Also, the stability of networks
can be improved.
90
,--::·
5.72 Types of compensation
5.72.1 Thyristor controlled reactor (TCR)
An inductance (reactor bank) (RC) is controlled by thy
ristors as shown in Figure 5-30 a). The reactive power
in this case can continuously be changed between
zero and the maximum value by controlling the thy
ristor valves (THV) via the control unit (THC) in rela
tion to the system voltage. In many cases, this confi
guration is operated together with a parallel-switched
capacitor bank This occurs when the entire reactive
power range also includes a capacitive component.
Features of this type are:
• Continuous correcting range
• No transient influence
• Generation of harmonics
To avoid stresses due to harmonic overswingings, the
parallel capacitor banks have to be enhanced by fil
tering circuits.
5.72.2 Thyristor switched capacitors (TSG)
Thyristor-switched capacitor banks are switched ON
and OFF, path by path as shown in Figure 5-30 b). In
order to avoid transients, the thyristor gates are fired
only if thyristor voltage is zero. The feature of this
method are:
• Stepwise control
• No transient interference
• Low
losses
 THV
DC
1--
THV 5.7.2.3
RC RC

$([) 1--
I--

THC
a) b) THC

RC THV RC

c) THC

Figure 5-30 Types of static var compensation,

a) Thyristor controlled reactor (TCR),
b) Thyristor switched capacitor,
c) Thyristor switched
capacitor/thyristor controlled reactor
(TSCITCR)
5.72.3 Thyristor switched capacitors/
thyristor controlled reactor
(TSCITCR)
Often a combination of both methods provides the
best solution as shown in Figure 5-30 c). This com
pensator allows low loss thyristor control of the enti
re capacitive and reactive power correcting range. A
smoothly varied output of reactive power is obtained
by changing the phase section control of the TCR
part. As soon as the TSC range has been compensa
ted by the TCR, the capacitive part is disconnected
and the compensator works as reactor.

Features of this method are:

• Continuous adjustment
• No transient interference
• Slight generation of harmonics
• Low losses 91
 5.8 References ; ...
1---

5.8 Switchgear
[1] Switchgear Manual· © ABB Calor Emag Schaltanlagen Mannheim, 1Oth revised
edition, Cornelsen Verlag, Berlin, 2001
[2] KP. Koppel. B. Stepinski, H. Ungrad, K-P. Brand · New Sustation Concepts,
5th Conf. on Electric Power Supply Industry (CEPSI), Manila (1984)

SF6
[3] K-P. Brand, H. Jungblut · The Interaction Potentials of SF6 Ions in SF6 parent Gas
Determined from Mobility Data, Journal of Chemical Physics 78, 4, 1999-2007 (1983)
[4] K-P. Brand ·Dielectric Strength, boiling Point and Toxicity of Gases- Different
Aspects of the same Basic Molecular Properties
IEEE Trans_ on Electrical Insulation El-17, 5, 451-456 (1982)
[5] K-P. Brand, W. Egli, L. Niemeyer, K Ragaller, E. Schade· Dielectric Recovery of an Axially blown
SF6 -Arc after current Zero: Pt./11 - Comparison of Experiment and Theory
IEEE Trans. on Plasma Science PS-10, 3, 162-172 (1982)
[6] K. Ragaller, W. Egli, K-P. Brand ·Dielectric Recovery of an Axially blown SF 6 -Arc
after current Zero: Pt./1- Theoretical Investigations, IEEE Trans. on Plasrna Science PS-
10, 3,
154-162 (1982)
[7] E. Schade, K Ragaller ·Dielectric Recovery of an Axially blown SF 6 -Arc after current
Zero: Ptl- Experimental Investigations, IEEE Trans. on Plasma Science PS-1 0, 3, 141-153
(1982)
[8] K-P Brand · A Model Description of the !on Mobility in SF6 at elevated Pressures,
Proc 15th lnt.Conf.on Phenomena in Ionized Gases (ICPIG) Minsk (1981), Part I, 301-302
[9] K-P Brand, J Kopainsky ·Model Description of Breakdown Properties for Unitary
electronegative Gases and Gas mixture, Proc 3rd Int. Symp. on High Voltage Engineering (ISH),
Milan (1979), Paper 31.05 (4 pages)
[10] K-P. Brand, J Kopainsky ·Breakdown Field strength of Unitary attaching Gases
and Gas mixtures, Applied Physics 18, 321-333 (1979)
[11] K-P. Brand, J. Kopainsky ·Particle Densities in a decaying SF 6 Plasma
Applied Physics 16, 425-432 (1978)

Sensors _
[12] F. Engler et al. ·Test and Service Experiences on Gas insulated switching Systems
and Substations with intelligent Control, Cigre 2000, Paper 34-101 (7 pages), Paris, September 200
l ----

92 ',-
6 The Functions of Substation Automation

6.1 Introduction 95 6
6.2 Process Connection 95' Table of
6.2.1 Sensors and Actuators 96 content
6.2.1.1 Instantaneous analog process inputs (current, voltage) 97
6.2.1.2 Other analog inputs 98
6.2.1.3 Binary process inputs 98
6.2.1.4 Binary process outputs 98
6.2.1.5 Other binary outputs 98
6.2.1.6 Analog outputs 99
6.2.1.7 Analog data from unconventional sensors 99
6.2.1.8 Binary data from unconventional sensors 99
6.2.1.9 Binary process outputs to unconventional actuators 99
6.2.2 Pre-processing of data 99
6.2.2.1 Pre-processing binary data 99
6.2.2.2 Pre-processing of analogue data 101
6.3 Operative Functions 104
6.3.1 Monitoring and supervision functions 104
6.3.1.1 Process state display 105
6.3.1.2 Process overview display 106
6.3.1.3 System configuration display 106
6.3.1.4 Event list and handling 107
6.3.1.5 Alarm annunciation and handling 108
6.3.1.6 Measuring and metering 109
6.3.1.7 Blocking list 109
6.3.1.8 Disturbance recording 111
6.3.1.9 Archiving 111
6.3.2 Control Functions 111
6.3.2.1 Control management functions 112
6.3.3 Protection and safety related functions 118
6.3.3.1 Main protection functions 119
6.3.3.2 Protection related functions 126
6.3.3.3 Interlocking 127
6.3.4 Distributed automation support functions 128
6.3.4.1 Distributed Synchrocheck 128
6.3.4.2 Busbar image 128
6.3.4.3 Station wide interlocking 129
6.3.5 Distributed Automation Functions 132
6.3.5.1 Switching Sequences 132
6.3.5.2 Breaker failure 132
6.3.5.3 Automatic protection adaptation 132
6.3.5.4 Reverse blocking 133 93

. ?
 '
,·· '

1·.·

6 6.3.5.5 Load shedding 133

Table of 6.3.5.6 Power restoration 134
content 6.3.5.7 Voltage and reactive power control 134
6.3.5.8 lnfeed switchover and transformer change 135
6.4 System Configuration and Maintenance Functions 136
6.4.1 System Configuration and Adaptation 137
, 6.4.2 Application Software Upgrade and Maintenance 137
6.5 Communication Functions 138
6.5.1 Data Exchange within the Substation 138
6.5.2 Data Exchange with External Systems 138
6.6 Network Operation related Functions 139
6.6.1 Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) 139 I
6.6.2 Power Application Software (PAS) 139 I'
6.7 References 140

'\_

94 1-i
 6 The Functions of Substation Automation

6.1 Introduction switchyard, being the process to be monitored and 6.2

This section describes the functions typically
perform ed by a substation automation system. We
start with the data connection at the process side
and the pro blems resulting from real physical
data inputs and outputs.
We continue with the operative functions control,
monitoring, supervision and automatics including pro
tection, and then take support functions like commu
nication, configuration and system maintenance relat
ed functions. These functions are described indepen
dently from the realization by physical devices and
technologies; only examples refer to some extent to
implementations.
6.2 Process Connection
Each control and monitoring system needs input data
from the process, and outputs to control the
process. This process interface is the connection
between the
controlled, and the substation automation system
(Figure 6-1).
On one hand the process interface allows to transfer
information from the SA system to the process and
vice versa, on the other hand it is the barrier
between the control system equipment and the
hostile envi ronment of the process.
The high level of electromagnetic disturbances led
classically to interface solutions with relatively high
voltages and currents as physical transfer medium
between process and SA system. To save power as
well as cabling effort and space, the latest develop
ments allow to locate electronic sensors for voltage,
current and gas density measurements as well as for
position indication, and actuators for switchgear con
trol like circuit breakers and disconnectors into a
shield ed box directly integrated into the switchgear,
so call ed "intelligent" primary equipment. In this case
a seri al bus interface (normally an optical process
bus) can be considered as the process interface
(Fig. 6-2). Since the shielded boxes provide some
functionality,

Process Substation Automation System

·-
-Q1

Contro l/P rotection Cubicles

l..b==!O!lfii;J!!!IIi rN" 7rk

control
centre
i ' Figure 6-1 Process connection between HV switchyard
l;
95
_
and substation automation system

' HVLine
bav.
'":!ay =
...... . . , : : :--

IL
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 Intelligent Primary Equipment Substation Automation System

Drive control &

6.2.1 monitoring
·Q1 circuitry
I

0
I
I

·Q51

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1 Proce

- - -;..-- - -·
ss bu s !
\ Proces
_. :_
- - - - - - ·- · m - - - =
t a<

,
cou pl er

d\-A'-
1 l1 Bus lnterbay '
·T1 Star coupler '=====d bus .... :::··

Sampling Network
'i
AD-Conversion Centre i
Signal Processing I
I,

-Q9 Signal Filtering Figure 6-2 Process connection between

intelligent primary equipment and
substation automation system

at least the AID conversion and serial communica
tion, they act at least similar to conventional I/O cards.
Preprocessing of data for maintenance purposes and
more functionality can be added. Therefore, the pro
cess interface is moved directly into the process, i.e. to
the switchgear.
former tap changers. The most important outputs are
the control of switches and tap changers. Additionally
other physical quantities like temperature, gas pres
sure etc have to be monitored, and binary as well as
analog control outputs to different other equipment
may be necessary. This leads conventionally to the I

Another change regarding the process interfaces is
the introduction of non-conventional sensors and
actuators, e.g. based on fiber optics to generate opti
cal signals that are related to the magnitude of the
primary current rather than a magnetically transfor
med current. To make signal processing not compli
cated, all these non-electrical sensors should produce
signals that are directly proportional to the primary
source signals. Non-conventional actuators allow to
operate the drives of the switching devices directly
via a serial link also(optical process bus).
6.2.1 Conventional Sensors and Actuators
The most important inputs from the process are the
currents and voltages from different places in the
96 switchyard, and the positions of switches and trans-
1.
following kinds of sensors and actuators respective
interfaces to them:
• Currents and voltages from the switchyard:
.I
Current transformers (CT) and voltage transformers
(VT) directly located in the switchyard deliver cur
rents in ranges from 0 to 1 A or to 5 A, respective
voltages in the order of 100 or 200 V AC Voltage
transformers are sometimes also called Potential
Transformers (PT).
• Switch positions: Auxiliary switches are mecha
nically connected with the main contacts. With the
help of the station battery (auxiliary voltage) of
1001110/220 V DC they deliver binary information
to the SA system. A switch position is normally
indicated by two contacts: one is closed if the
switch is closed, and a second one is closed if the
switch is open.

This double indication shows a moving switch in
the so-called intermediate position if both
contacts are open. For disconnectors and earthing
. switches it is physically impossible that both
contacts are closed at the same time in normal
operation, so this must be regarded as an error.
The same is true for the intermediate position, if
it lasts longer than the switch movement tirr,e
(often called running time). For circuit breakers in
high voltage switchyards often each of the three
phases has its own drive. It may then happen that
one phase is in a different state than the others
(phase discrepancy). If the contaQ:s of the phases
are connected in parallel (logic OR) to get one
double indication again, then the 1-1 state may
happen, and may be cleared e.g. by an open
command. If however this state lasts too long or
can not be cleared, then again this is a serious
error (permanent pole discrepancy).
• Other indications or alarms: Similar
auxiliary switches like for switch positions are
used, but each indication has one contact only:
single indication.
• Commands: Tripping or closing coils have to
be supplied with power. Again normally a
process auxiliary voltage in the range of 1
00/110/200 V DC is used, and up to 1 A
currents have to be switched by the auxiliary
contacts.
For other physical quantities special sensors are used,
which normally deliver proportionai outputs in the
range of 0...20 mA or +-10 V DC Other ranges (e.g.
0...10 mA, 0... 20 V) are also sometimes used. For
sen
sor failure supervision 4...20 mA is also often used,
where 4 mA corresponds to a physical value of 0,
while 0 mA indicates that the sensor has failed, e.g.
because of a broken wire. These electrical quantities
have to be fed into the SA system, and there
encod ed into binary information, which is suitable
for fur
· J ther processing.
6.2.1.1 Instantaneous analog process
inputs (current voltage)
The analog process inputs are transferred to a sui
table signal range by appropriate signal transformers,
which additionally provide the galvanic isolation from 6.2.1.2
the process. The analog signals are filtered by an anti
alias filter, which suppresses multiples of the sampling
frequency, and finally converted to binary samples by
means of an AID converter (Figure 6-3). Also high
frequency damping filters are sometimes used to
suppress disturbing spikes, depending on the func
tion to be performed. After this conversion further fil
tering with digital filters is made if necessary.
Important criteria here are the .accuracy of the AID
conversion related to the measuring range, and the
sampling frequency, which may possibly influence the
functionality that is based on the signal data. Both,
amplitude and phase relations are needed. If different
phases must be compared, then they need a time
synchronization accuracy in the order of some
micro seconds, providing the accuracy needed by
the func tions considered. A timing jitter of 25 [!S
leads to an accuracy of about 2 %. The information
content of samples may be also represented as
phasors, i.e. as a value with an amplitude and a
phase angle with the same accuracy.
In pure control systems, where only RMS values of
currents, voltages and power values are needed,
dedicated measurand transducers are sometimes used
to preprocess and calculate the needed values from
VT and CT inputs. They deliver the needed analog
qu9ntities to the control system either via some serial
link, or as mA or V signals similar to e.g. pressure
sen sors.
6.2.1.2 Other analog
inputs
Because of electromagnetic disturbances the mA or
Volt inputs have to be galvanically isolated, e.g. by
iso lation amplifiers (Figure 6-3), before they can be
fed directly to an AID converter. The needed
sampling rate is normally much slower than for the
voltage and current inputs. Very often sampling is
done directly in the application function.
Examples are the so-called PT sensors for tempera-
ture with different characteristics (PT20, PT100, etc.). 97
6.2.1.6 Most of the sensors have a linear characteristic, but may happen. An often-used solution is reading back
for some of them a non-linear characteristic has to be the state of a second contact which is mechanically
applied to get the correct physical value (non linear coupled to the operating contact. With this contact
scaling). arrangement, the proper functioning of the control
circuit can be supervised by conducting operation
simulations e.g. once a day without activating the
6.2.7.3 Binary process inputs operating coils.
The process voltage, which indicates either an open
Usually, a contact has to separate each side of the
or a closed contact, is normally connected to optical
operating coil,-so that in normal state the coil is com
couplers for galvanic isolation (Figure 6-3). Thereafter
pletely isolated. This assures that even a short circuit
a discriminator determines the 0 or 1 state. Note that
cannot lead to unintended switching (Figure 6-14).
the 1 state may denote a closed contact (normally
open, NO-contact) as well as an open contact (nor Several contacts in series lead to additional time
mally closed, NC-contact). The contact inputs may be
delays. For protection trips, which must be fast, there
grouped to double indications or, e.g. in case of
fore often only one heavy-duty relay (contact) is used.
trans former tap changer position, to multiple
These single command relays are then over-dimen
indications representing digital numbers. These
sioned to get a very high reliability. This applies only
digital numbers may be binary coded, BCD coded,
for circuit breaker opening, which is not considered as
or even have some other code like Grey code. The
unsafe as other switching operations.
appropriate decoding has to be made in the
substation automation system e.g. by the tap
changer controller.
6.2. 7.5 Other binary
outputs
6.2. 7.4 Binary process
Other binary outputs may be provided for local or
outputs
remote state and alarrn indications. For these outputs
Binary command outputs to the process are perfor signaling relays are used, which are normally not
med via relays whose contacts can directly switch the safety critical and must switch only low currents in the
trip/close coil currents, so called heavy-duty contacts mA range. They may however also be used to ope
(Figure 6-3). The problem here is that these contacts rate the heavy duty relays mentioned above to provi
may burn or melt together, if they switch relatively de an additional barrier against electromagnetic inter
high currents. These command outputs are safety cri ference.
tical. because an unintended operation of a switch may
cause physical damage or endanger human beings,
which happen to be nearby the switch during
opera tion. To minimize the risk two separate output 6.2. 7.6 Analog
chan nels that are connected in series must be outputs
used to supply the operating coil current. In line
For analog outputs normally + -10 V or +- 20 mA
with the for mer RTU based solutions one is called
outputs are used. If an EMI barrier is Jlecessary, addi
the Select channel, which selects the switch, and
tional separating amplifiers are provided. In a modern
the other Execute channel, which switches the
sutslstation, there is normally no need for analog out
load current. Both contacts have to be supervised,
puts, as mostly serial interfaces and LCD or Led
so that a relay
based displays are used.
98 (contact) failure is detected before any second failure
.. • •

6.2.1.7 Analog data from 6.2.1.9 Binary process 6.2.

unconventional outputs to 2
sensors unconventional
actuators

Unconventional sensors for voltage link (optical process bus) as foreseen

and current are not based on the by IEC 61850.
magnetic transformer principle but
on electro-optical effects. Their As a result, these values are already
output is either an optical EMI proof, pre filtered (at least for
amplitude or the plane angle of anti-aliasing) and AID converted. The
polarized light modulated according new requirement is an adequate
to the AC voltages and currents serial interface in the IEDs for
from the electric power process. protection etc. The same holds for
Semi-conventional devices are all other analog input?.
capacitive voltage dividers providing
a small voltage signal proportional
to the AC process voltage. 6.2. 1.8 Binary data from
Rogowksi coils provide di/dt
unconventional
according to the AC process
current and need an integration sensors
algo rithm to obtain the current
signal. Common to all these Also binary data may be
sensors is that they do not provide produced by sensors as optical or
the com low level electrical signals not fitting
mon signals of the order of 1 A, 5 into the
A, 100 V. or 200 V, 110/220 V DC scheme. The most
partly no electrical signals at all. convenient way again is to provide
Converting the out these signals as telegrams over a
puts to small electrical signals as serial link (optical process bus) as
defined in IEC foreseen by IEC
60044 is possible, but small signals 6
are both subject ed to 1
electromagnetic interferences and 8
5
not compa tible to conventional
0
lEOs e.g. for protection. To over
.
come these problems, the most
convenient way is to provide these
signals as telegrams over a serial
The principles of unconventional
actuators integrated into the 6.2.2 Pre-
switchgear are very dedicated processing of
depending on the type and
data
design of controlled equipment
The common interface is again the
6.2.2.1 Pre-
serial link (optical pro cess bus) as
foreseen by IEC 61850. All safety
processing binary
meas ures must now be handled by data
the actuators themsel ves and their
Binary data is used for two different
controlling electronics.
purposes: show ing the current
state e.g. of switches, alarms etc.,
6.2.1.1 0 and logging of occurred events for
General later fault analysis. For the second
remarks purpose, a time stamping
resolution of
1 ms is required. The time
Conventional process interfaces,
stamping accuracy de
sensors and actua tors, input and
pends beneath this resolution
output are harmonized by
also on the device internal time
standard ized common current and
stamping accuracy as well as on
voltage levels. Unconven tional ones
the time synchronization accuracy
have to be harmonized by
between different devices. In
standardized communication
prindple this time stamping accuracy
protocols like IEC 61850. As
should therefore also be 1 ms. The
interme diate step e.g. for retrofit,
accuracy is however very cost
signals from conventional sensors
sensitive. Depending on the
and actuators may be converted
purpose, accuracy up to 10 rns may
directly nearby the switchgear and
be considered as sufficient for some
the resulting data trans mitted as
functions.
for unconventional ones.
99
 Line bay Process Communication
Interfaces Interfaces

6.2.2.1.1
...
f1 . .
Bl

1-r-1 •
Local MMI

B O

... [][] ...

AI

Bl •SA

.. ..
..
•SMS

•
81 I ,-,-:I
Intelligent electronic device (lED)
Bl Binary Input for protection and control
BO Binary Output
AI Analog Input
Fl Filter
AD Analog/Digital Converter Figure 5-3 Process connection to a typical/EO

6.2.2.1.1 Debouncing tions, these contacts need debouncing, but without

Sensors for binary data are often contacts, which
may bounce for several milliseconds. Also
mechanical vibrations of short duration caused
e.g. by circuit breaker operations may sometimes
lead to contact bouncing. In order to avoid wrong
position indica-
jeopardizing the time stamping accuracy. This is nor
mally achieved by taking the slope of the first change
for time stamping and then waiting for some time
whether the new state gets stable. If it becomes sta
ble, then the earlier time stamp is further processed
with the new state. Otherwise the time stamp and

Figure 6-4 Principle of debouncing

No change of position Position has changed

f ; lv
6
- -----

•
- -----

\jC Time
Auxiliary contact
v
VA\
100 Time stamp Time stamp

the change are suppressed. Figure 6-4 illustrates this
method. It has to be noted that it causes an
additio nal delay for the communication of the
change of state. If a fast reaction is needed, contact
debouncing should be avoided. It must however be
kept in mind that even for an optical input
debouncing cannot be avoided if the source in the
process is a mechanical contact.
6.2.2.1.2 Oscillating
Some process phenomena like waves of lake water
actuating special contacts for water level indication
may lead to oscillating, i.e. repeated opening and
clos ing of the contact within a time span of 100
ms or even longer. The oscillating may also be
caused by a broken wire of an input signal, which
flatters due to air circulation. These changes may
lead to unneces sary load of the communication
system as well as unnecessary triggering of
processing functions. Oscillation should therefore
be suppressed, but an nounced to the operator.
This feature is called anti oscillating or oscillation
suppression. It is often imple mented by counting
the changes within a fixed time interval. If this
counter reaches a pre-set limit, the oscillating state
is set, and the communication as well as the
processing of any further state changes are
suppressed. If the counter value declines below this
limit (plus sometimes an additional hysteresis value),
the oscillating flag is reset and new values are
sent and processed again.
6.2.2.2 Pre-processing of analogue data
The preprocessing of analog values after the conver
sion from analog to digital data depends on the
kind of value, and the purpose. As already stated in
6.1.1.1, the prerequisite in each case is that the
analog inputs pass through an anti-alias filter in
ordei to prevent any negative impact of the
sampling frequency.
The current and voltage samples are stored into a
buffer. Different filtering algorithms may be applied to
this buffer depending on the kind of function, which
has to rely on them (mostly protection). These fil ed
values may then be used by the various functions. A
common application for measuring purpose is to cal
culate voltage and current RMS values, frequency,
active and reactive power, as well as the power fac
tor COS!p. 6.2.2.2
The measuring process at a certain point in the pro
cess possibly leads to a calculated value like the RMS
values mentioned above. This value at a certain point
of the process, or sometimes this point itself is called
measurand. The following general measurand hand
ling functions refer to electrical measurements as well
as to non electrical measurements from sensors or
transducers, but normally not to the raw sampled
values, which are handled specially e.g. by protection
functions.
6.2.2.2.1 Scaling
The measurands coming from the AID converter are
some integers, depending on AID converter accuracy
between 8, today mostly 12 up to 16 bits wide.
Application functions need an application value in
some engineering unit. The conversion of the inte
gers to engineering units (e.g. Volts or Megawatts) is
called scaling. The resulting value then normally has
a floating-point data type. Sometimes also calculated
values have to be scaled. A power value calculated as
U * I* cos IP might already have a floating-point for
mat, but has to be normally scaled to the MW
range.
The scaling process has to consider the converter
characteristics across the converter measuring range.
Most converters have a linear characteristic, but not
all. Therefore, in special cases also other than linear
conversions might be necessary.
Linear conversion is mostly performed by providing
an offset b and a factor a, so that the scaled value s
(floating point) can be calculated from the measured
value m (integer) as ·-
s =a* m +b.
If the communication capacity is small and the
value must be transmitted as compact as possible,
the sen
der scales the value down to a minimum number of
101

digits for communication, and the receiver scales
6.2.2.2.3 back to the engineering units. If the communication
capa city and processor capabilities are not an issue,
then scaling to floating point values is performed as
near to the process as possible, i.e. immediately after
AID conversion and measurand calculation.
6.2.2.2.2 Limit supervision and dead band
suppression
The obtained measurands as well as other measur
ands coming via transducers can be supervised on
warning or alarming limits. Normally two limit pairs
(warning and alarm) can be defined for each measur
and, each pair consisting of a low and a high limit. If
the measured value crosses the limit, the value gets
an appropriate warning or alarm state attached. This
may also be logged by a time stamped event.
Measurands are often oscillating quite a lot. If
this happens near an alarm limit, this may lead to a
flood of events, which can be reduced by defining a
hyste resis value. If once an alarm state is reached
e.g. by crossing a high alarm limit, then it is only
reset if the measurand value is lower than the
hysteresis value below the alarm limit. This is
illustrated in Figure 6-5 .
In case of voltage supervision e.g. on an overhead
line, normally the voltage should be kept within a
nar-
Value
.·-7 ---------- --······-···--···-··-------·--------
1/ -·-- ..:-: -. -·-------- - C7\•-----------------
. -- ---·- --- --·--- -·--------- - --------- ------------ ---·- --
-- ·-·-·-·--···-·-- --···------- -· --------- ---,.,...-·---- --
-- -------------------- - ------- 1':-:-:...- -
Warning Alarm W w Alarm
Figure 6-5 Measurand limit supervision with hysteresis
102 and zero deadband
row range around nominal value of the line voltage.
If the line is taken out of operation, the voltage
value becomes zero. As this is below any low
voltage limit it would lead to an alarm, although it is
a normal ope rating state. Therefore the alarm
handling is mostly combined with a zero dead
band suppression. A configurable range around
zero can be exempted from the alarm zone, even
if the value zero as such would be within an alarm
zone.
6.2.2.2.3 Oscillation suppression for
communication
The same cause of frequent measurand value oscilla
tion that leads to the introduction of the limit
value hysteresis might create flooding of the
communica tion system with measurand values.
Appropriate filter ing before sending is therefore
needed, but without sacrificing the measurand
accuracy at the receiver. The simplest method, only
sending if the difference between the new and last
value sent is bigger then some parametrizable delta
value, very often jeopard izes this accuracy to reduce
the communication load. As an advantage it makes
a hysteresis on limit super vision superfluous. Other
often-used methods are the following:
• Cyclic sending with cycle times between some
seconds up to some minutes, depending on how
often an accurate measurand value is needed by
the receiving function: the measurand is accurate
at least at the time it has been sent (in the order
of the measurement input chain accuracy).
• Summation of the absolute changes with a samp
ling rate of 100 ms up to 1 s. If this sum reaches
a parametrizable delta value, then the last actual
High alarm value is sent, and the delta sum is reset to zero.
Hysteresis
This method reacts fast on big changes (in the
High warning order of the sampling rate), and values with
better accuracy are sent more often due to the
Low warning
1 absolute sum of deviations. The product of time
· Low alarm (measu rand age) and value change stays
Zero deadband constant.
Time • Combination of both of the methods mentioned
above, mostly together with a large time cycle.
w
The cyclic sending allows bigger delta values with
out obtaining too 'old' values at the receiver end,
. '
and
assur
es
updat
ing
even
in
the
case
of
mess
age
losse
s.
 6.2.2.2.4 Measurand Accuracy
The accuracy of a measurand depends on the accu
racy of the whole chain from the sensor up to the
measurand application, e.g. an application for display
or storage. In earlier times the small communication
bandwidth allowed to use only the minimum
num ber of bits that were absolutely needed for the
trans mission of the measurand value. Today the
sensor is often the most determining part of the
accuracy chain. However, when considering the
purpose of the measurand, the 'age' is as important
as the accuracy of the actual value, as already
mentioned in the pre vious section. A typical
measurement chain for an RMS voltage
measurand in an SA system looks as follows:
It must bkept in mind that the calculated quantities 6.2.2.2.4
derived from several measured values normally have
an inaccuracy range in the order of the sum of all
the inaccuracies. This is valid for sums of values, but
also a good estimation for products and divisions,
if the contributions othe individual values are in the
same order of magnitude as the final value.
Therefore, in ths linear conversion chain the maxi
mum inaccurac/ results in the sum of all inaccuracies;
which is for this example around 0.706 % at
nominal value
(0.5 + 0.1 + 0.006 + 0.1).

Function/Device Accuracy .Comments

Instrument transformer: Relative accuracy at nominal value 0.5 % Ar accuracy of 0.5 % in average, is normally
transforms kV to range use:: for plausibility check of measurands -
of +1-200 V me·;: details see in chapter 5.

Interposing transformer Relative accuracy at nominal value 0.1 % Ac-l5 as barrier against disturbances
from 200 V to 10 V as ::ell
Filter Influences frequency range only;
no influence on the RMS value.

AID converter 16 bit Conversion inaccuracy can normally be
neglected. The inaccuracy depends on the
bit range that is used for the measurand
range (e.g full 16 bit signed used for need-
ed range = > accuracy is 2·14 = 0.006 %)
An 3 bit measurand (either for transmission,
or r'om AID conversion), leads to an accu-
racy of 2.5 %, a 12 bit measurand
(11 bit + sign) to 0.25%

Scaling Can be neglected, if the result is 32 bit floating point has a mantissa
a 32 bit floating point (accuracy of 24 bits -
better than 16 bit integer)

Communication oscillation Depending on the delta: to get a The inaccuracy of cyclic sending is zero at the
suppression delta sufficient communication load reduction, moment of sending. If the maximum change
often around 0.1 % of the measurand rate of the measurand is not known, no
normal/nominal value is needed accuracy can be estimated in between.
103
6.3 Operative Functions substation specific functions comm
and performance attributes, a tion
which are nor mally not the n
needed in standard industr:al contro
SCADA sys tems. The same center
applies for the specific and the
6.3 safety related switch control toring
Operative functions are all those functions,
functions. data
which directly enable an operator to control
acquis
the substation. These are the typical SCADA
If a network control center functio
functions: Supervision,
remotely controls a sub station, SCADA
£:ontrol nd Qata cquisition. The data
then with the exception of the might
acquisition part of SA systems contains some
implem
 d at the substation. This monitoring part
tion, and the HMI and archiving related
could be completely implemented locally
functions are located in the remote control
with the possibility of remote operator access
center, which might cover a number of
to the sub station data. Another possibility is
substations. For special purpose applications
to have only the data acquisition function
like asset management even a separate remote
implemented at the substa-
monitoring center can be used. The following
sections describe the operative functions in
detail.

6.3.1 Monitoring and supervision

functions
Il •
The main purpose of monitoring and supervision ·'
func
ti
o
n
s
j·.i
is I·!
l
• to show the state of the process, i.e. the
switch
yard and the control system itself,
• to inform about the development of
possible dangerous situations and,
• to archive data for later evaluation either
of the process performance, or for later
failure analysis if some failures or
dangerous incidents have occurred.

All those functions except disturbance recording

are standard SCADA functions, i.e. they are not
specific for control of substations, although
some of their pro perties like time stamp
accuracy of 1 ms are specific for power system
applications.

Figure 6-6 Process state single line diagram for local substation operation and supervision

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104
The typical monitoring functions are
• Event management
• Alarm management
• Data storage and archiving
• Disturbance recorder/fault data retrieval
• Log management
6.3. 7. 7 Process state display
There are different methods to browse through the
process state of a system:
Zoom and pan: one can move a window across a
virtual picture of the whole system (panning) and can
zoom in an area to see more details, or to get an
overview out of an area respectively navigate to an
other (sub-)area. This is typically used for big systems
or geographical views in a geographical information
system (GIS), and mostly if one wishes to navigate
into a neighboring area.
Hierarchical windows: starting from a high level 6.3.1.1
overview window showing the complete system you
navigate with a mouse click to windows showing the
wanted subarea of the system with more informa
tion details. This is typically used if geographical neigh
bourship is not so important. but you need fast navi
gation to any subarea or even specific information
categories, and information condensing to higher
levels. It is easy to change the way of presenting infor
mation in different layers of the hierarchy
The following examples Illustrate the hierarchic win
dow approach.
The actual state of the whole switchyard is shown in a
graphical overview, and in more detailed pictures by

Figure 6-7 Process overview example of a small system with busbar coloring

Main Oplions Reporls Sialions Help

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or earthed. Apart from this, the different voltage levels
means of a single line diagram that contains
all sub station equipment (Figure 6-6) can be distinguished with different colors, or parts of the
This state typically comprises substation with different power infeeds can be distinguished
by appropriate colors (Figure 6-7).
• Positions of switches (circuit
breakers, disconnectors,
earthing switches etc)
6.3.1.2 Process overview display
6.3.1.3
• Voltages (kV) and currents (A) at In contrast to the state display showing the state of one
busbars: voltage level in detail, the overview display provid-
lines, and transformers
• Active power (MW) and reactive Figure 6-8 System configuration d1sp/ay for a small SA system
power (MVAr)

The single line diagram may be enhanced

by a bus bar coloring function to show in
different line colors whether a part of the
switchyard is under voltage, not energized,
e the whole substation.
s Only the schematically
connected power sources, 6.3.7.3 System configuration
loads, and the power display
a
n flows are shown. This may
The system configuration picture displays
be combined with a
the state of the control system itself. In the
busbar coloring function as
o case of missing data it allows the operator
we:l. One can also
v to find the reason of the pro blem, e.g. a
combine the overview
e faulted secondary device or communica
display and the process
r tion link. It shows (group) alarms on device
state display by means of
v or com munication line level, and allows
zoom and pan functions
i to go from here deeper into detail alarms.
in the HMI. It should
e It further allows to modify the online state
however be considered
w of the control system, e.g. for main
that some overview data
tenance, and to retrieve diagnostic
is normally not displayed
information from the devices. This display
o on detailed pictures and
is specific for the actual system (Figure 6-
f vice versa.
8).

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6.3.1.4

Figure 6-9 Typical event list

6.3.1.4 Event list and and process events, or for different parts of the
handling pro cess. In modern systems this feature is however
sel dom used because of the availability of highly
The event list contains a time stamped log of all reliable disks of big storage capacity. This avoids the
events that have occurred in the system in problem of running out of paper, which is by far
chronolo gical order (Figure 6-9): more often a problem than loosing some events on
• State the disk.
changes
Due to restricted storage capacity, the event list is
• Alarms appearing and often kept in a ring buffer. If the ring buffer is full the
disappearing oldest events are overwritten. New events must
• Limit never be lost, even in the case of power supply
violations failu re. Therefore, all events are also stored on non-
• Operator's actions: commands vola tile storage media. The high capacity of modern
and acknowledges etc sto rage devices allows to keep much more events
than in the past. Nevertheless some, at least today
Each event can be directly printed O!,!t on a log manual, overflow management, e.g. with yearly 107
printer (logger). It contains the time when the event transfer to a tape or CD, is necessary. Other external
happen ed, an identification of the object (device or applications
signal) to which the event belongs, and the specific
signal state, which has been caused by the
event. Sometimes there are different log printers
provided for system
 k7 ,-
for specific data evaluations should also have
access to this data e.g. for maintenance or
planning purpo ses.
The display function for the event list has often
incor porated filtering capabilities. In case of a

6.3.1
.5
failure only those events are displayed
which have occurred in 8 ....------.._

'"
the fault related time window or are Alarrr. comes Alarm com
identified by a Alarm

s
goes Acknowledge
fault expert system. 4

For power failure analysis a time stamping

resolution of 1 msec and accuracy between 1
and 20 ms is need
ed to assure the chronological order of
the events.
For power network failure analysis the same Figure 6-7 0 Alarm acknowledgement state
accuracy is necessary between different transitions
substations. Therefore, substations are time
synchronized by means of satel lite clocks 6.3. 7.5 Alarm annunciation and
like GPS or as often in Europe by radio handling
clocks like DCF77. In addition to this, the
control system must contain special means Alarms are generated if a system state requires
for time synchro nization of all its devices. the at tention of the operator. The operator
has to acknowl edge the alarm to indicate
Figure 6-7 7 Typical that he has noticed it.
alarm list

:E6 (1) • MicroSCAOA

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108
'(
· '?

?
control system related alarms have to be separated from
switchgear related alarms.

An alarm has the following states (Figure 6-10):

• Normal,
acknowledged
• Alarm,
unacknowledged
• Alarm, acknowledged (persistent
alarm)
• Normal, unacknowledged (process alarm
state disappeared, pending alarm)

The last alarm state is also called a "transient" or "fleet

ing" alarm, as the process alarm state disappeared
before it could have been acknowledged. A change
from unacknowledged to acknowledged should only
be made by an authorized operator. The purpose of
alarms is to alert operators either by activating a horn,
flashing lights or symbols on a screen etc.

If an acoustic alarm is triggered, then its acknowl

edgement only quits this acoustic alarm, but does not
acknowledge the single alarm(s) causing it.

If a substation is unmanned, alarm occurrences can

be sent by E-mails or SMS to the operator in charge,
or pagers can be triggered depending on urgency. For
availability reasons this is sometimes done via special
tele-alarm systems.

In order to assure an immediate recognition of alarms

they are shown on process displays additionally to
the alarm list. These alarm overview pictures are
mostly substation specific. The alarm list however is
a standard representation, which contains an entry
for each alarm. This entry shows as a minimum the
time when the alarm happened, the alarm descrip
tion, and the current alarm state. The alarm list has
similar filtering capabilities as the event list, and addi
tionally allows acknowledging alarms (Fig. 6-11).
Special additional alarm attributes like alarm classes,
priorities or sections provide additional filtering possi
bilities. They are needed especially in cases where one
failure would cause a lot of follower alarms, or where
The hierarchical grouping of alarms for operator information, plausibility checks and
into function or region specific group statistics. Instruments, which measure power for
alarms together with the priori tizing metering and billing purposes, must fulfill certain legal
and filtering provides a quick overview requirements to assure correct measurements and to
in case of floods of alarms occurring. prevent manipulation. The same applies for the data
These group alarms can be shown on acquisition chain from the instrument transformer up
the process overview, process single to the billing application. One of these legal require
line pictures, or on customer specific ments is that data used for billing must be archived
alarm overview for some years. Another requirement is that the
pictures. metering process must be certified by legal inspec
6.3.1.7 tion to prevent manipulation in the course of the
acquisition of the metering data, i.e. it must be sealed
in some way. A new challenge for the metering
business are the unconventional sensors. The solu
6.3. 7.6 Measuring tion may be extra channels for metering or, more
and metering convenient, special coding for meter data on the
common communication system.
The ultimate objective of the normal
operation of the power system is to
supply power in the most cost 6.3. 7.7 Blocking list
effective way. The analog data from
the process not only shows the current There are various situations during operation when it
state of the process, but also provides is necessary to block operations.
the input for load and power
consumption profiles. For billing • For maintenance work it may be necessary to
purposes the amount of the power block down-going commands. There are special
delivered needs to be measured. This measures available as described in 6.3.2.1.
function is call ed metering, in contrast Nevertheless, sometimes an explicit blocking is
to measuring, which is main ly used needed. 109
• In special failure situations it is necessary to
block up-coming process indications or
measurands. Some of the automatics for
this have been described in 6.2.1.3. Also here
sometimes addi tional explicit blocking is
needed.
exist graphical blocking oveNiews and blocking
6.3.1.7 • If a mess is printed, or a printer is defect,
lists. For process devices any blocking is mostly
then explicit blocking of printers is
also shown in the process diagrams like bay
necessary.
single line diagram with some mark. latest
• For some maintenance activities the however in the operation dia log.
blocking of communication lines may be
necessary by taking them out of use. The blocking list provides a tabular oveNiew
of all blocked objects, and enables to de-block
For all these explicit blackings there should exist them. It has similar filtering criteria as the
an oveNiew showing which blackings are alarm and event list. However, normally its
currently set because at first each blocking contents should be short, so that filtering is not
prohibits some func tion, and second it is necessary.
normally set because of a pro blem which
should be fixed. For this reason there

Figure 6-17 Disturbance record with fault evaluation

report

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number
time
= Preda (31)
= 94.5 km
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number = 1029.2 ms (-200.0 ms .. 829.2 ms)
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3. Faul1 Location:

, Fau11type = R- 0
, Fault duration = 70.8 ms (-28.3 ms .. 45 ms)
i Region with stable impedance, variations<= 3.1 %
- · - · - Impedance at16.7 ms = 8.43 Ohm,
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110
I
l.

Certain process conditions may also cause the
blocking of control, e.g. if the gas pressure on a GIS
circuit breaker is too low for safe operation it is .
blocked. The blocking list described above, however,
only concerns manual blackings out of operative rea
sons, and not those that are caused by the
process conditions. Process condition related
blackings are indicated in the alarm list.
6.3.7.8 Disturbance recording
The disturbance recording function records the
instantaneous values (samples) of the currents and
voltages to visualize fast analogue changes around a
failure (trigger) for later analysis of network problems
(Fig. 6-12). In some way it is the analog equivalent to
the binary event log. It stores analog data sampled
with rates of 600 up to 20 000 samples per second,
depending on the time resolution required. Because
of the fast response time and high data throughput
required, the recording is normally performed near to
the process, and directly after AID conversion of the
analog data. In addition to the analog values, also sta
tes of binary signals are sampled and recorded in pa
rallel input channels if applicable. ·
The analog and binary values are constantly sampled
and written into a ring buffer. As soon as a predefined
event like a fault has triggered the recording function,
the recorded data around a time window before
and after the trigger is frozen in the buffer.
Thereafter, another buffer is activated and the
procedure is restarted for a possible next recording.
This continues until all memory buffers are full. In
order to avoid loss of recorded data the files have
to be retrieved and stored somewhere else, e.g. on
a station level hard disk or transmitted to a remote
substation monitoring system. A standard storage
format of this data on disk is the COMTRADE
format (IEC 60255-24 resp. IEEE Std C37.111-
1999). Dedicated evaluation soft ware is used to
view the recordings and to conduct fault
evaluations like the determination of the dis
tance to a line fault to ground.
6.3. 7.9 Archiving
Event logging and disturbance recording files are
used in conjunction with archived fault h1story for fail
ure analysis. Additionally, also the power system per
formance during normal operation can be 6.3.2
archived for performance analysis and planning
purposes. Typical information for this purpose is the
consumed power per minute, hour, day or even
longer, trends of power consumption, temperature
profiles etc This archiving activity is done either
cyclically or event dri ven in so called history buffers.
Here also the problem of restricted storage place
has to be considered in some way, e.g. by means
of data condensing hierar chies like minute values
per hour, hourly values per day, daily values per
month etc. Other, more sophisti cated compression
methods are also applied, e.g. linear approximation
of the curves within a predefin ed accuracy
bandwidth.
The archived data can be used to create reports and
trend diagrams, which can be shown on the screen
or printed as hardcopy. Apart from this, dedicated
evaluation programs needed for special analysis tasks
may require a data import/export function with a
standardized format for the data exchange between
the substation automation system and these pro
grams.
6.3.2 Control Functions
Control functions are used for the normal day to day
operation of the substation. They are performed via
an HMI (human machine interface, e.g. screen and
keyboard) that is located either locally in the substa
tion or even in the bay, or remotely at a network con
trol center. The HMI presents the process state to an
operator and enables him to control the process
(Figure 6-13). The response time of the operational
functions and the correlated communication is typi
cally a second (human reaction time scale). It is often
distinguished between monitoring and supervision
functions thaf retrieve data from the process for per
formance analysis, and the control functions that
initiate actions on the process. Nevertheless monito
ring and process state display is the prerequisite for
conducting substation control. 111
. ?
6.3.2.1

Cancel <OS'-': :o.-f'X

t- -_.
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j

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Figure 6-7 3 Human Machine Interface (HMI) for SIS control and monitonng

Commands that directly control the process 6.3.2.1 Control management functions
can cause severe damage if they are issued
wrongly. Therefore, control functions have to be The operator's access to functions, especially to ope
protected against unauthorized access, and rational functions, has to be restricted by a set of
safeguarded that no dangerous and unnecessary or rules, which are defined in the access security
unprompted com mands can be issued. Examples of mana gement as indicated below. They concern
such safety related control functions are: human user's access only, while the access security
• Access control and operator identification between the different devices is handled at system
configura tion time.
• Operative mode
control
The Authentication: The control system shall sup
• Control of switches (commands port user authentication for user access in order to
and back-indications) ensure that only authorized users are permitted to
• Control of transformers (raise/lower use the application. The user authentication process
commands on tap changer, tap allows the system to differentiate between user res
ponsibilities and roles (for example substation opera
position)
tors, administrators, maintenance sta1t, etc) and then
I
• Management of spontaneous
change of positions to select role specific access rights. Under certain cir I
cumstances, e.g. for sensitive information retrieval or i
• Parameter setting
high security control an encryption procedure may
I
112 be used in addition to authentication. I.
I

i·
• A create privilege allows the user to create •
certain classes of application objects. A
• A delete privilege allows the user to delete g
application objects. et
/r
• A view privilege allows the user to acquire e
details concerning the existence of an object a
Access control is a function that provides the capabi lity to and the object definition. d
restrict an authenticated user to a pre-deter mined set of • A set/write privilege allows the user to set pri
functions and object properties. Access control is attribute values of an object. vil
implemented using the following privileges: · eg
e
 allows the user to get attribute values of an
object.
• An execute privilege allows the user to execute the
permitted application service.
Each system function and system object may provide
access types for user roles with an allocated set of
access rights. The sets of access rights may be defin ed
by:
• The type of action: e.g. control of the process, control
of the system, maintenance of the system,· etc
• The area of expertise: e.g. operation,
protection, control. etc.
• The level of competence of the user: e.g.
manager, substation operator, administrator, etc.
• The concerned part of the substation, when a
substation controlled by one system is shared by
different utilities: the bays or diameters, equipment.
or voltage level concerned.
Access control privileges may be altered dynamically to
resolve conflicting requirements of multiple users.
Control can be performed at a lot of places in the
system, on various system hierarchy levels as well as on
multiple work places at the same level. The
lowest level is the primary equipment itself, the next
higher ones are the bay and the substation level or a
remote operator place for the substation, and the upper
level might be one or more remote network control
centers. The access from these control loca tions must
be coordinated for safety reasons. Allo cating the higher
6.3.2.1.1
access priority to the level that is clo ser to the process
normally does this.
An operator at bay level is authorized to take over the right
for bay operation by putting the bay into the local mode,
e.g. by physically turning a key locked local! remote
switch into its local position. This auto matically blocks
commands from higher system levels in the control
hierarchy of this bay, e.g. from substa tion level or network
control centers. The same pro cedure is applied on all
hierarchy levels. In addition to this, a split of the control
system into certain regional sub-systems is possible. If an
operator takes over the responsibility for a certain region,
this blocks all the other operators on the same hierarchical
level to con trol that region. This may happen dynamically,
in con trast to the statically allocated access priorities
de scribed above. For synchronization purposes on the
same level it may be sufficient if the initiation of a
control action e.g. by selecting an object blocks all other
control actions.
6.3.2.1.1 Control functions
Control functions are either used for directing the
power flow during normal operation of the substa tion, or
for maintenance of some primary equipment They enable
the operator or an automatic function to control the
controlled object like switchgear or trans former and any
auxiliary equipment in the substation, i.e. to:
• open or close a breaker, disconnector or
earthing switch,
• raise or lower a transformer tap changer,
• set a low voltage (LV) equipment to ON or OF-f.
For safety reasons the controi functions normally
include a "Select" step before the "Execute': to check
whether the control action is valid and the correct device
has been selected, and to eventually res rve the required
resources.
113

6.3.2.1.2 The "Execute" command is subject to miscellaneous
conditions that assure that there will be no damage
if the control action is conducted:
• Correctly working control device. The self
superJision of the control device will detect failures
and block the control function if necessary.
• Interlock validity. Interlocking is a parallel
function that delivers a state to enable or disable
a control action. The control circuit may contain
an interlock override switch (hardware or software)
for manual control in interlocked condition.
• Synchrocheck validity. When closing a breaker,
the synchrocheck function will verify voltage
synchronism before the breaker is closed. This
function may also be overridden in certain cases.
• Locked (blocked) state. A controlled object
may be locked if the associated part of the
substation has been put into the maintenance
mode. This
for example prohibits any control of the breaker
if some repair work is carried out on the line.
Note that locking an object is also a control action.
• Control privilege. This privilege of an
operator is checked if he wants to control an
object.
• Substation and bay mode. The substation
must be in the remote mode to enable
control from remote (i.e. from network control
center) or in the local mode to enable control
from the substation level. The bay mode must
be in remote mode to enable control from the
station level or from the remote control level.
· • State of the controlled item. The control
action shall be physically possible without causing
damage, i.e. sufficient gas pressure in a GIS switch
and sufficient stored energy is available to perform
· the Intended operation successfuiiy. It shail further
be assured that the controlled object has a
valid position for the intended command, i.e. it
must be impossible to initiate an "OFF"
command on
114 a disconnector that is already in the open position.
'.l
If the controlled object is in an unknown state
(e.g. phase discrepancy which causes a double
point state with 1-1 value) the object has to be
tripped and blocked.
This last check can be suppressed if the object has
one common operating mechanism for all phases.
The control command is cancelled if one of these
conditions is not met, or if a cancellation order is
received form the control point. Figure 6-14 illustrates
where on the control path which conditions are
checked.
6.3.2.1.2 Control dialogs
Control dialogues are used to open and close all kind
of HV or MV switches. They are aiways performed as
a two-step process with a select and an execute
phase. They mostly are initiated at station (HMI) level
as shown in Figure 6-15, from there the commands
are sent across the communication link down to bay
level, and then from bay level to the process (Figure
6-14).
For safety reason it is a principle, that a command
within the dialog shall only be allowed, if all condi
tions as described above are fulfilled. This means that
de-blocking is only possible for a manually blocked
command, for a command that is blocked by the pro
cess de-blocking can only be made (if at all) by an
override. Some process conditions are only checked if
the switch is selected for operation. In this case the
..Select" step might be allowed, but the ..Execute"
command is later blocked, so that normally only a
cancellation of the command is possible.
Figure 6-15 shows an example of the Select/Execute
diaiog, which-appears after the selection of the switch
E1 QO. It only allows to select the Close command.
The Open command is dimmed, because the switch
is in the open position. After verification of the correct
selection.the operator can click the "Execute" button.
Substation and bay mode state

Correctly working control device For safety reasons it is important that this two-step 6.3.2.1.2
Interlock validity procedure is performed at each control level. For cir
Synchrocheck validity cuit breakers mostly all the check conditions de
scribed above apply, while for disconnedors and
earth-ing switches no synchrocheck function is
Control authority ------l-- requir ed. Figure 6-15 shows one way of working.

Integrated In case of unconventional

actuators connected by process bus
An example for the hardwired two-step control cir
Locked (blocked) state ,
cuit for disconnedors and earthing switches is shown

State of the controlled Item (breaker) > in Figure 6 -16. The Select open respective Select Go
contacts determine the turning direction of the motor.
Figure 6-74 Influencing commands from station HMI The Execute contacts then conned the DC supply to
to switchgear the motor. If the motor becomes too hot, the thermal

Figure 6-7 5 Control principle "Select" before "Execute"

------------------- -------- --·--

Lasi
. llOkV . Substation

lllCOminu feeder(=E04) BB1

Q1 Q2 -BB2
Q1
·z.
Q51
QOQ5 ,
Q51c ... - 'Q52
0 ao:_.·.· r_;
ObjectMiiU m

115
 +125VDC
6.3.2.1.5
Drive
supervision
Figure 6-7 6 Control Circuit for disconnectors
and earthing switches
contacts disconnect the DC supply, and an alarm is
initiated by the drive supervision contact. For safety
reasons all relays have an extra contact, which is
mechanically coupled to the switching contact to
supervise their correct working in order to detect a
faulted, e.g. melted contact that might cause a wrong,
unwanted and possibly dangerous motor operation.
6.3.2.1.3 Transformer control
Transformers are often equipped with automatic on
load tap changer control, which has the task to
keep the secondary voltage within a preset voltage
range and to minimize the circulating current
between pa rallel transformers (master-follower and
others). The automatic control can be switched
off to enable manual control of the transformer:
after the selection of the transformer it is possible
to either raise or lower the tap changer position
step by step. All con trol conditions. except
synchrocheck and interlocking apply in a transformer
116 specific way.
Voltage
withstand
characteris
tic
Arcing time
window for
synchronize Tripping impulse
d switching
6.3.2.1.4 Parameter switching
Protection parameters are normally configured in
such a way that they provide safe operation in· all
situations. An overload protection relay thus has to be
set to the safe side for high ambient temperatures in
summer, although at low temperatures in winter the
line transfer capacity could be much higher than in
summer. Numerical protection relays allow to select
various parameter sets, e.g. adapted according to the
actual weather condition. The switching of the para
meter sets can either be conducted by the operator
or automatically by means of a simple activate/deac
tivate command for each parameter set, or by an
integer setpoint that identifies the active parameter
set. Important is that the identification of the active
parameter set is read back and compared against the
intended activation. This check-back can be perfor
med by an operator, or it should be done
automati cally in case of automatic switching.
If parameter sets are switched from remote, it should
be kept in mind, that a faulty communication link dis
ables the reset to a "safer" parameter set. Self-moni
toring features of the relay can however handle this.
6.3.2.1.5 Synchronous or point-on-wave
switching
Circuit breaker operation can sometimes cause unde
sirable transient overvoltages and overcurrents in
high voltage networks. This is particularly true for
reactive load switching, e.g. shunt reactors, shunt
capacitor banks, unloaded power transformers and
unloaded transmission lines. In these cases, the mag
nitude of the switching transients can -either exceed
the maximum allowable switching insulation level
(SIL), or it may endanger in the long-run the electric
endurance of the HV equipment in the network
The traditional measure to protect transformers or
reactors against overvoltages caused either by light-
Voltage withstand
characteristic
corresponding to tamin
Transient
recovery
voltage
 without 6.3.2.1.5
synchro
nized interrupti
on
switching
Target for
contact
separation
Ran
ge of
conta
ct
sepa
ratio
n

Figure 6-7 7 Synchronized switching for shunt reactors

ning strokes or by switching operations is the sion lines. The desired degree of
instal compensation depends on the operating
lation of surge conditions of the network in terms of load
arresters. profile. Therefore shunt reactors are frequently
operated.
Switching oveNoltage can further be caused by
high current inrush on long transmission lines or
The interruption of shunt reactor currents, which
capacitor banks. The measure against such
are very small in comparison with the rated
oveNoltages is to equip the associated circuit
short circuit current of the circuit breaker, may
breaker with closing resis tors to limit the inrush
lead to current chopping. This generates high
current.
oveNoltages in the shunt reactors, which may
The most modern technology for switching exceed the voltage with stand characteristic of
surge control to substitute closing and opening the CB and cause re-ignition of the arc in the
resistors on circuit breakers is the synchronized or interrupting chamber. This generated steep front
point-on-wave switching. voltage waves stress the insulation of the shunt
reactor winding and may lead to aging and
The function Synchronous switching avoids finally to failures of the insulation. Therefore the--
oveNol tages by closing or opening of the opti mal solution is toavoid current chopping by
circuit breaker exactly at the current zero point. means of synchronized or point-on-wave
The example (Figure switching.
6-17) shows synchronized opening for shunt
reac As all synchronous switching needs very exact
t timing, there are, despite the advantages, up to
o now not
r many commercial implementations installed.
s 117
.

Shunt reactors are quite commonly used to

absorb reactive power, which is generated by
long transmis-

.. ... ...
.
 '? '?
'?
 6.3.2. 7.5. 7 Synchronized Closing
The objective of synchronized closing is that the main
contacts of the breaker are closed exactly at the in-
stant of equal potential on both sides of the contact
to avoid or minimize pre-arcing during the closing
6.3.3 operation. Therefore, the instantaneous voltage va-
lues on both sides of the open breaker contacts have
to be compared to calculate the optimal instant of
contact touching before the closing operation is ini-
tiated, considering the specific breaker closing time.
This calculated instant of closing shall be reached
within a tolerance of +/- 0.1 ms to minimize pre-
arcing that occurs in the course of the closing
opera- tion before the moving and the fixed contact
touch.
As the line potential has to be compared with the
busbar potential the associated VT has to be selected
in relation to the actual busbar configuration. This
information may either be provided from the station
level or already be available at the bay level.
The high accuracy required for comparison of the val- primary equipment or to a bay. The processed data
tage samples can be achieved either by synchronized belong either to the specific primary equipment or to
sampling or by asynchronous samples that are time
tagged with the same accuracy as applied for wave-
prin- form reconstruction. This depends on how the tunc-
distin- tion is implemented and on the selected communi- guished:
cation implementation (bus/protocol), in case the
vol-
tage values have to be retrieved via serial communi-
cation. The sample time accuracy should be better
than 50 f!S.
6.3.2. 7.5.2 Synchronized Opening (Tripping)
The objective of synchronized opening is to assure
that breaker contact separation occurs exactly at the
optimal instant near to current zero, so that the short
circuit current can be extinguished within the
minimal
arcing time. The calculated instant of contact separa-
tion shall be obtained within an accuracy of 1 ms.
Current information from the bay CT is needed to cal-
culate this instant of time. -------
6.3.2. 7 .5.3 Common functionality
Since the successful timing is determined by the
118 mechanical behavior of the specific breaker, the con-
tad traveling time is continuously monitored. The set-
tings of the function are adapted from breaker ope-
ration to operation accordingly.
6.3.2.7.5.4 Synchronized switching and
synchrocheck
Less demandi:1g and powerful but serving also the
minimal purpose of connecting only voltages, which
are in phase as defined by specified limits for U,
M,
and cos cp, is the very common synchrocheck (see
6.3.4.1).
6.3.3 Protection and safety related functions
Protection and safety related functions need to be
fast and autonomous, and they interact directly with ·
the process and the process data without the inter-
i
terence of the operator. This means on the other
hand, that they must work safe and reliable. The
dedicated functionality (i.e. without data acquisition or
operator interface) relates either to a specific piece of
a bay. There is an HMI provided for parameterization,
or for disabling and enabling of the function. In
ciple three classes of these functions can be
• Protection: this is the active safety level, which
supervises the process for dangerous situations
and responds to clear them by tripping the
associated circuit breaker(s). ' I'
• Interlocking: This is a passive safety level for
all kinds of commands. It identifies dangerous i'
I.
operations and blocks commands, which might t·
l·
become dangerous.
• Auto-matics: these are sequences of actions I
performed automatically, after some trigger
i
t. .
impulse has started them. They may be triggered
either by an operator or by another automatic
function like protection, or by the process i
(_
condition supervision. In the last case, normally
the condition supervision is an integral part of
the automatic function. Each automatic function
should have its own safety checks, and reside on
the top of underlying interlocking and protection
functions.
63.3.1 Main protection functions This protection concept comprises the following 6.3.3.1
devices.
In general within a substation the protection of pri-.
mary objects is used: protection of a line, a busbar, a 1. Overcurrent protection
power generator or a transformer. Therefore, the 2. Distance protection
main protection function is dedicated to the object to 3. Autoreclosure relay
be protected, although a lot of protection fur,ctions 4. Differential protection
like overcurrent protection can be used for different 5. Directional earth fault protection
object types. Here a short overview is given. More
6. Overload protection
details can be found in the vast protection literature.
7. Frequency relay
8. Voltage relay
6.3.3.1.1 Protection concept for a substation
9. Earth fault indication relay
A typical concept for a substation comprising line, 10. Busbar protection system
transformer and bus coupler is indicated in Fig. 6-18. 11. Buchholz protection, thermal monitoring

10

[jJ
: 5]
I
1
I
Auxiliary : Auxiliary I
'f" line t line •

Cable Overhead Transformer Bus

line coupler
0 Recommended basic protection

0 Optional protection
Figure 6-7 8 Protection concept for a substation 119

' '?

6.3.3.·1.2 6.3.3.1.2 Line protection
Alternating current (AC) lines are commonly classified
by function, which is related to voltage level. While
there are no utility wide standards, typical classifica
. tions are as follows:
• Distribution (3.6 - 36 kV):
Circuits transmitting power to the final retail outlet.
• Subtransmission (17.5 - 145 kV):
Circuits transmitting power to distribution
substations and to bulk retail outlets.
• Transmission (72.5 - 765
kV):
Circuits transmitting power between major
substations of interconnecting systems, and
to wholesale outlets. Transmission lines are
further divided into:
• High voltage (HV): 115- 245 kV
• Extra high voltage: (EHV): 300 - 765 kV
• Ultra high voltage (UHV): greater than
765 kV
· Direct current systems can be classified as follows:
• Low voltage (24- 250
V):
Auxiliary power in power plants and substations,
controJ circuits and, occasionally, utilization power
in some industrial plants
Type of fault Protection of MV lines
• Short circuits • Overcurrent delayed or undelayed
• Earth fault short circuits • Directional time over current
• Differential
• Distance
Table 6-1 Short circuit and earth fault protection for medium voltage (MV), high voltage (HV)
and extra high voltage (EHV) transmission lines
120
• Medium voltage (300 - 600 V):
Transportation industry
• High voltage (greater than 600 V):
Long distance bulk transmission, submarine,
and major system interconnections
Most faults experienced in a power system occur on
the lines connecting generating sources with usage
points. A line protection relay protects a line against
all kinds of overload, especially caused by short cir
cuits. There are seven protective techniques com
monly used for isolating faults on power lines:
• Instantaneous overcurrent
• Time-overcurrent
• Directional instantaneous and/or time-overcurrent
• Step time-overcurrent
• Inverse time-distance
• Zone distance
• Pilot relaying or line differential
The most common function is the simple overcurrent
protection, the most sophisticated the impedance
based zone distance protection, the most selective
but demanding from the communication infrastruc
ture is the line differential protection (Table 6-1).
Several fundamental factors influence the final choice
of the protection applied to a power line:
1. Type of circuit: cable, overhead, single line con
figuration, parallel lines, multi-terminals etc.
2. Line function and importance: effect on seiVice
continuity, realistic and practical time requirements
to isolate the fault from the rest of the system.
Protection of HV &
EHV lines
• Differential
• Distance
• Signal comparison
I · • Phase comparison
I • Direction comparison
 3. Coordination and matching requirements: com
patibility with equipment on the associated lines
and systems.
Economic factors and the relay engineer's preference
based on his technical experience must be added to
these three considerations. Because of these many
considerations it is not possible to establish firm rules
for line protection.
6.3.3.1.3 Transformer and reactor
protect!on
i .
A transformer protection relay protects a transformer
or a reactor against internal and external faults (Table
6-2)
Differential relays are the main form of fault protec
tion for transformers rated at 10 MVA and above. In
principle they work similar to the line differential pro
tection, and compare all currents entering and leaving
the transformer. Transformer differential relays are
subject to several factors that can cause misopera
tion:
• Different voltage levels, including taps, which
result in different primary currents in the
connecting circuits.
• Possible mismatch of ratios among
different current transformers
• A 30° phase shift introduced by transformer
delta connection
• Magnetizing inrush currents, which the differential
relay sees as internal fault.
Internal faults
• Coil short circuit
• Winding short circuit
i ' • Winding hot spot
'
J
• Earth fault, earth short circuit
• Damage of tap changer
• Oil leakage at the transformer tank
Table 6-2 Faults that endanger the operation of transformers and reactors
In addition to the differential protection standard pro 6.3.3.1.3
tection functions like overcurrent protection, earth
fault protection, and distance (impedance) protection
are applied as back-up or reserve protection (Table
6-3).
The selection of the appropriate transformer protec
tion is influenced by the rated capacity, the number of
windings as well as by the treatment of the star point.
Therefore it is impossible to specify a protection solu
tion that is generally valid. Two typical examples are
explained below (Figure 6-19):
• For the small transformer with two
win
dings (< 10 MVA) the differential protection
relay ( I) serves as rnain protection against internal
short circuits. It is complemented by the Buchholz
protection (BU). The first time overcurrent protec
tion (> I) serves as back-up protection, while the
second overcurrent protection (>I) protects against
overload. The sensor (cp) monitors the temperature
of the insulation oil.
• For the large transformer with three win
dings (>100 MVA) a differential protection relay
(M is provided as well for the main protection
against internal short circuit. It is complemented by
the ground fault protection relay (GF) in the star
point of the star winding and the two Buchholz
External faults
• Line short circuit
• Earth short circuit
• Overload
• Overvoltage
• Overexitation
(for generator block transformers only)
121
6.3.3.1.3

AI

j_
Protection for a small 2 Protection for a large 3
windings transformer windings transformer
> 100 MWA
Figure 6-19 Typical transformer protection schemes

Type of failure Protection function

• Differential protection (M)
• Short circuit, earth short
circuit • Time overcurrent protection (R) or
• Earth faults • Distance protection (R)
• Earth fault protection
• Buchholz protection

• Winding short circuit

• Overload
• Oil leakage

• Overload • Overcurrent protection

• Overioad protection with thermal image
• Overexitation • Overexitation protection (B)
(M) Main protection), (R) Reserve or back-up protection, (B) Block transformer protection
122 Table 6-3 Protection functions for transformers
 protection relays (BU). The distance protection relay
(>Z) anc the time over current (>I) serve as back
up protection (> 1). The remaining overcurrent
protection relays serve as overload protection.
The sensor (S) monitors the temperature of the
insulation oil.
6.3.3.1.4 Generator protection
Several of these conditions do not require that the 6.3.3.1.4
unit be tripped automatically, since, in a properly
attended generator station they can be corrected
while the machine remains in service. These condi
tions are signaled by alarms. Other conditions, how
ever, such as faults, require prompt removal of the
machine from service.

Modern design practices and improved materials
lead to low frequency of failures in generators, yet
fail ures can occur and may result in severe damage
and long outages. For this reason, abnormal
conditions must be recognized promptly and the
trouble area must be quickly isolated.
Abnormal conditions that may occur with generators
include the following:
• Faults in windings
• Overload
• Overheating of windings or bearings
• Overspeed
• Loss of excitation
• Motoring of generators
• Single phase or unbalanced operation
• Out of step
For any particular hazard, the initial operating and
maintenance costs of protection schemes and the
degree of protection must be carefully weighted
against the risk encountered if no protection is
applied. The amount of protection that should be
applied will vary according to the size and the impor
tance of the machine.
Internal faults in the generator generally develop as
ground fault in one of the phase windings and may
occasionally involve more than one phase. Differential
protection is the most effective scheme against multi
phase faults. In differential protection, the currents in
each phase on each side of the machine are com
pared in a differential circuit. Any current deviation is
used to disconnect the generator from the power
network (Table 6-4).

Internal faults External faults

• External short circuit
•
Stator • Earth fault • Unbalanced load
• Coil short circuit • Pole slipping
• Winding short • Stator overload
circuit
• Rotor overload
e Rotor • Voltage rise
• Earth fault
• Frequency decline
• Double earth fault
• Motor operation (dangerous for steam turbines)

Table 6-4 Faults that endanger the operation of a generator 123

6.3.3.1.4 As it is impossible to provide a protection scheme
that is generally valid, there are two typical examples
shown in Figure 6-20:
• The protection scheme for a small generator
(35 MVA) comprises:
• Differential protection ( I)
• Generator motoring protection (P)
• Under-frequency protection (f<)
• Stator overload protection (I>)
• Over-voltage protection (U>)
• Loss of excitation protection (- jX)
• Unbalanced faults protection (12 >)
• Stator earth fault protection (U0 >)
• Rotor earth fault protection (RE)
Figure 6-20 Typical generator protection schemes
124 Protection scheme for a small generator
• The protection scheme for the big
generator comprises:
• Stator earth protection (U0 >)
• Generator motoring protection (P)
• Loss of excitation protection (-jX)
• Plant decoupling protection (P>)
• Stator overload protection (1 5 >)
• Underfrequency protection (f<)
• Over-voltage protection (U>)
• Pole slipping protection (c)
• Back power protection 2 (P)
• Rotor overload protection (IR>)
• Unbalanced load protection (12 >)
• Distance protection (Z>)
• Stator earth fault protection (U0>)
Protection scheme for a big generator
 .
.

For big generators the protection schemes
are always duplicated and both schemes
are completely sepa rated, and each
scheme is provided with a separate
auxiliary power supply. For safety reason it
is not recommended to keep a generator in
operation if one of the two protection
systems is out of service for a longer time.
· short circuit and earth fault currents within
It should be noted that very often the
differential pro tection covers not only the
generator but also the · attached step-up
transformer as one single genera tor-
transformer block protection.
6.3.3.1.5 Busbar and breaker failure
protection
The busbar of a transmission substation is
the most sensitive node in the network. Due
to the merging of many supply circuits,
high current magnitudes are involved.
Busbar failures due to lightning strokes or
connectors melting because of overload are
relatively
rare. But if a fault occurs, the damage can
be wide spread by causing disastrous
cascade tripping of generators and lines
and finally the collapse of large parts of
the power system.
6.3.3.1.5
The term busbar protection is related to
special pro tection schemes that acquire
the area of the busbar in HV and EHV
substations. The task of a breaker failure
protec tion function is to detect that a
breaker has failed to clear a fault on the
busbar, and to trip all the remain ing
breakers feeding into the busbar section
con cerned to clear the fault. Busbar and
breaker failure protection respond in a
similar way to busbar faults, therefore both
protection functions are usually inte grated
in one common protection scheme.
Differential protection is the most sensitive
and relia ble method for protecting station
busses. However, problems can result from
a large number of circuits

Figure 6-27 Decentralized busbar

protection scheme Substation
Automation

0
Control room

L
Switchya i
rcl n
e
P
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n

lnterbaybus
Bay
Protectio
n

Q
1

QO\Tc QO\
QO\-n: p
F Double
Busbar
T1 T1 •
125

QO\
T1

T1.

't

6.3.3.2 involved and different energisation levels encounter
ed in these circuits for external faults. For example, if
there is an external fault on one circuit of a six-circuit
bus, five of the current transformers may supply
vary ing amounts of fault current, but the sixth and
faulted circuit must balance out all the others.
Consequently, this circuit is energized at a much
higher level - near saturation or with varying
degree of saturation - giving rise to high false
differential currents.
For the same reason, DC saturation is also unequal,
which is more serious than AC saturation, because a
relatively small amount of DC from an unsymmetrical
fault wave will saturate the CT core and appreciably
reduce the secondary output.
Busbar protection schemes have to be very reliable to
prevent unnecessary tripping, and selective to trip
only those breakers necessary to clear the bus bar
fault. The clearing time is important to limit the
dama ge caused by the fault current and the
power resto ration time is crucial to maintain the
power system integrity.
Modern decentralized numerical busbar protection
schemes are not sensitive against CT saturation phe
nomena by proper algorithms and detect the faults
single phase or multiphase very reliably. In addition
the sensitivity of the protection must be combined
with its capability to identify the direction of a fault on
each line in order to preserve the tripping selectivity.
The digital technique takes these constraints into
account (Figure 6-21).
For selectivity reasons the busbar protection needs a
dynamic image of the busbar (busbar topology), i.e.
which switches are connected in the single line topo
logy, and which switches are currently open or closed.
If an error is detected within the substation, e.g. by
applying Kirchhoff's law to the nodes, or by direction
comparisons, then according to this actual topology
126 the minimal necessary busbar part is isolated.
As auto-redosure and synchrocheck functions are found in 6.3.4.1. The more demanding version is
activated in connection with a protection trip, these the synchronized or point on-wave switching (seE
functions are considered to be protection related 6.3.2.1.5).
func tions.
6.3.3.3
Synchrocheck functions are also used in the cause of Interlocking
a normal circuit breaker closing to prevent connecting
of two voltage sources being out of phase. The purpose of interlocking
Synchro check is a blocking function, which is destruction of switchyard
based on ana logue values of voltages on both hazard to human beings by blocking dangerous
sides of a circuit breaker. More details can be switching operations.
A busbar protection scheme has to fulfill the follow
ing requirements to ensure save and reliable opera
tion.
• Fast fault detection
• Fast and selective operating time irrespective
of station size and configuration
• High dependability to avoid false tripping
• Minimum CT performance requirements
• High through-fault stability even if CTs saturate
• High stability in case of external faults in
the vicinity of the substation
These tasks are often fulfilled with two algorithms
running in parallel.
6.3.3.2 Protection related functions
6.3.3.2.1 Autoreclosure, synchrocheck
A successful protection operation trips the circuit
breaker, which leads to power interruption in some
part of the power network. This jeopardizes its
main functionality, which is to supply power.
In case of a lightning stroke the cause of the protec
tion trip very often disappears soon after tripping the
breaker, because the fault arc extinguishes if the line
is de-energized. Therefore it is a standard practice to
activate an auto-reclosure function after Jripping to
restore the power supply after some 100 ms (fast or
rapid auto reclosure). This time also depends on the
dead time of the circuit breaker (see Chapter 5). If,
however, the fault arc has not been cleared, the pro
tection will immediately trip the circuit breaker again.
The attempt to reclose may be repeated several
times in intervals of several seconds or even minutes
to allow e.g. a thin tree, which may have fallen onto
the line, to burn out Such longer lasting auto-redo
sure operations may cause the voltages on both
sides of the line to get out of phase. Therefore a
syn chrocheck function should be used to assure
closing of the circuit breaker with both voltages in
phase. Further, during minutes also manual
operations or some sequence based automatics can
interfere, the refore also the interlocking (e.g.
running isolators)
should be checked.
is to prevent
apparatuses or
Figure 6-22 Bay interlocking indication
The bay level (local) interlocking considers the
positi ons of switches within a bay to decide if
other swit ches of this bay might be switched. If
any switch is moving, i.e. it has an intermediate
position, it is for bidden to operate any other
switch (often in the whole switchyard), because
6.3.3.3
switches, especially dis connectors and earthing
switches, loose their isola tion capability during
the switching operation. The interlocking function
produces release and block indi cations, which are
used as constraints for the control functions (Figure
6-22).

The main difference between bay interlocking

and station wide interlocking is the scope of input
signals to be considered. But there are general
rules based on electro-technical principles applicable
in both cases. The section "Station wide
interlocking" in
6.3.4.3.1 describes more details to interlocking and
to these rules.

127
 ( ."

6.3.4 Distributed automation support

functions I
I

I'
6.3.4 Distributed automation support functions are opera- bay, where the bay VT output can be directly connect-
If
ting with data directly from the process and supply ed to these devices. Nevertheless, the output of the
II
decision data to other functions, which act directly busbar VT providing the busbar voltage either direct-
locally on the process without the interference of the
operator. In contrast to the local process automation
ly or via a busbar image remains to be switched to
the appropriate bay.
ll
(support) functions they use input data from the
whole switchyard. The core functionality (i.e. without New fast and high capacity communication media
data acquisition or HMI) uses data from several bays. nowadays allow transferring the needed busbar val-
There is an HMI for parameterization, or tor disabling tage across the communication bus in digital
form, and enabling of the function. avoiding any needs for physical switching. Due
to the
time delay caused by the communication special
I[·.·
There are essentially two automatic support means are however necessary to synchronize the
functions:
time of the voltage data retrieved from the two sour- I
I\
I

• Distributed synchrocheck, ces, bay ar:d busbar, with accuracy around 20 [.tS. I [
• Station wide interlocking.
The upcoming communication standard IEC 61850
6.3.4. 7 Distributed Synchrocheck will be an enabler for the implementation of this
cost
effective function, as it has the features to achieve
Distributed synchrocheck is essentially the same func- accuracy and to provide the necessary
this tion as the local synchrocheck, however the data of
communica- tion band·.vidth in a standardized way.
at least one voltage transformer is coming via the
communication system. This may be the voltage from
the busbar, or from another bay, if no voltage trans-
formers are available at the busbar (respective not on 6.3.4.2 Busbar image
all bus bar segments). The determination of which VT
has to be taken to obtain the correct busbar voltage If the busbar voltage transformer has been omitted in I
l\
is often called busbar image (See 6.3.4.2). the switchyard to save costs in the primary system, a
busbar image function has to be applied to deter-
Traditionally one synchrocheck device was used per
mine which line is actually connected to the busbar.
substation or voltage level. For closing a circuit brea-
The VT of this line is taken as the busbar voltage I
ker with synchrocheck the corresponding line voltage
source e.g. for synchrocheck or for the busbar
VT output as well as the busbar voltage VT output
volta-
ge measurement. This busbar image is based on the
were connected via relay contacts to this synchro-
topology of the substation single line, i.e. the
check device. The result of the voltage comparison
momen- tary state of all switches as well as their static connec- I

was fed back to all bays inclusive that one concerned. [_:_
tions. This busbar image can naturally also be used to
This VT output switching was rather dangerous and
determine the voltage at the busbar, even if there is
had to be made in a very controlled and supervised I
I'

way, because if accidentally two VT outputs were no busbar VT available (Figure 6-23), and to show I
this calculated busbar voltage at station leveL I
conneeted, the VTs could be destroyed. Using this
hardwired solution, power may be accidentally fed
back from the loaded to the unloaded It should be noted that such a busbar image is not
line. only needed for busbar protection but also for other
With the numerical bay level protection or control distributed functions like distributed synchrocheck or
128 devices the synchrocheck became a function at each station wide interlocking. i
I
i..

Cable Overhead
line
IJJ Distance protection
Autoreclosure
[I) Distributed synchrocheck
6.3.4.3 Station wide interlocking
The purpose of interlocking is to prevent destruction
of switch yard apparatuses or hazard to human
beings by blocking dangerous switching operations.
Station wide interlocking takes the position of swit
ches in more than one bay into account. This
con cerns all bays around the busbar, bay circuit
breaker by-pass situations, as well as special loop
situations across several bays.
6.3.4.3.1 Interlocking rules
The whole interlocking is based on some general
rules, which can be classified as follows:
• Safety rules for operation: these are the
minimum rules to assure that no damage is
done to equipment and human beings during
operation.
• Safety rules for maintenance: these are
the rules necessary to assure safe earthing and
6.3.4.3
!
Transformer Bus
coupler
Figure 6-23 Distributed synchrocheck for autorec/osure
after a line earth fault trip
unearthing for maintenance work, as well
as safe operation during maintenance work.
• Loop rules and switching sequences:
these assure safe handling of switching in
feeder and busbar loops, as well as avoid
unnecessary switching operations.
• Protection selectivity rules: these assure that
even in case of by-pass situations any fault can
always be cleared by tripping one single circuit
breaker only. These rules are of course not valid
for ring bus configurations and breaker-and-a-half
configurations, where lines share more than one
circuit breaker and no by-pass is used.
• Fault avoidance rules: these rules avoid
situations, which might lead to dangerous
situations, e.g. caused by induced voltages.
There are stronger ru!es for G!S than for ,t..IS,
due to higher induced voltages in neighboring
parts.
In the following the specific rules of the various clas
ses are described. 129

Safety for operation
• No switching is permitted while a switch is
running because a running disconnector does not
isolate. So a next switching operation has to wait
until the switch has reached its end position
again.
6.3.4.3.2
e Do not connect live and earthed parts. This leads
to a short circuit.
• Do not connect two power sources by
disconnector. The power flow will damage it.
• Do not interrupt power flow by disconnector.
The power flow will damage it.
• Do not enlarge parts with unknown states.
Safety for maintenance
• Earth/unearth only isolated nodes or
isolated
circuit breakers.
• Do not switch a disconnector near a partly earthed
circuit breaker, or if itself is only partly earthed.
• Do not close a partly earthed circuit breaker near
an earthed transformer.
• Do not transfer earth potential (by closing
disconnectors or circuit breakers) to unearthed
parts.
Loop rules and switching sequences
• Avoid disconnector loops in a
feeder
• Do not open busbar switches (i.e. all switches
located on busbar, bus couplers or bus sections)
during a busbar transfer. This shall assure to first
finish the busbar transfer, before conducting other
switchings.
• Close an unearthed circuit breaker only if the
disconnectors on both sides have the same
position. Otherwise the disconnectors would be
blocked, so that the circuit breaker has to be
opened again.
• Open or close a disconnector near an unearthed
circuit breaker only if the circuit breaker is open,
and the disconnector is not part of a busbar-
130 busbar connection.
''
Protection selectivity
• Each feeder must be disconnectable by one
i
circuit breaker only. !
• Do not connect two feeders directly.
• Do not close a bypass disconnector on to a
busbar if other feeders are already connec.1ed
to the busbar.
• Open a bypass disconnector in parallel to a
closed I ..
CB only, if the bus coupler is closed. This shall
indicate that the protection of the line has been
switched to the bus coupler circuit breaker.
Failure limitation
• Connect active potential via a disconnector only
to a loop (same potential at both sides) or to ..
'
an open circuit breaker (weak version for AIS:
I
to an isolated node).
• Connect a feeder via a disconnector only to
an open circuit breaker, or (in case of a bypass
disconnector) to an isolated busbar part.
• Do not open a bypass disconnector in a live
feeder, if the bypassed circuit breaker is open.
I
• Do not open a bypass disconnector, if the
resulting busbar part will not be isolated.
• Do not open a busbar disconnector if not
both resulting parts will be isolated. .I
• Do not close a busbar disconnector if not both
sides are (weak for AIS: at least one side is)
isolated.
6.3.4.3.2 Topology based interlocking
versus Boolean algebra
The implementation of an interlocking scheme is clas-
sically done with Boolean algebra expressions, whose
inputs are the auxiliary switches that indicate the posi-
tions of the switches, and where the res-ult is a relea-
se condition. These Boolean algebra expressions are
constructed from the knowledge of intended switch-
ing sequences within a substation, and according to
the general rules applied to the specific single
line
diagram of a plant bearing in mind the dangerous
situations.
 If we consider the simple bay in the Figure 6-24
then e.g. the switching of the line side disconnector
QC1 is only allowed, if the line earthing switch QE1
is opet:l, and the circuit breaker QA1 is open. This can
be writ ten in Boolean algebra as follows:
QC1.release: = QE1.open AND QA1.open
The advantage of Boolean algebra is that it is only
based on logical AND and OR operations, and can
therefore be efficiently implemented. The disadvan
tage is, that
• for big switchyards the station wide
interlocking conditions become quite complex,
• in highly meshed systems even not all
meaningful switching sequences can be
supported,
• an undefined position of a switch i.e. in case of
phase discrepancy due to operating mechanism
failure can not easily be handled.
In contrast to this, the topology implementation
approach codes the general rules into a kind of ex
pert system, which is then applied to the substation
single line and the current position of the switches.
The advantages are:
• all possible substation states can be handled,
• any switch yard topology with arbitrary complex
rings can be handled,
• even switches in unknown state can be
handled,
• only the single line topology must be configured
- much less engineering errors can occur, less
engineering work is to be done.
• If a switch is blocked the rule that has
been violated can be indicated to the
operator.
i Figure 6-24 Simple Feeder with potentials for topology
I The disadvantage however is, that the expert system
approach needs much more processing power. With
the advances in computer technology this is more
and more acceptable. For cost sensitive systems the
I use of a topology-based implementation can be
• I
I.
restricted to one lED handling all station level 6.3.4.3.2
inter
locking'tasks.
The Figure 6-24 is used to illustrate the difference:
As here we want to indicate also the opened and
closed state of a switch, we use symbols often used
on net work management single line displays.
Within this simple feeder it is assumed that the line
side disconnector QC1 is closed (filled rhomb), and
the busbar earthing switch QH1 is closed. The topo
logy interlocking then would distribute the active line
potential to one side of the circuit breaker, and the
busbar earth potential up to the busbar side of the
busbar isolator QB1. Now we can use the
general rule 'Do not connect live and earthed
parts' to see that the line earthing switch QE2 must
be interlocked, and the rule 'Do not transfer earth
potential (by clos ing disconnectors or circuit
breakers) to unearthed parts' to see that the
busbar disconnector QB1 must be interlocked. The
Boolean algebra for the QB1 e.g. considers this (and
the state of circuit breaker QA1) by means of the
switch states as follows:
QB1.release == (QH1.open AND QE1.open AND
QE2.open AND QA1.open) OR (QH1.closed AND
QE1.closed AND QE2.closed)
interlocking
131
Note: the switch naming above follows the new IEC
standard IEC 61346, Plant designation.
 r
r,
that they are station level oriented. Station level ori- i
6.3.5 Distributed Automation Functions
ented sequences can be implemented by a distribu-
ted sequencer, where a station level sequencer coor-
dinates several part sequences executed at bay level.

6.3.5 6.3.5. 7 Switching Sequences 6.3.5.2 Breaker failure

If a breaker, which is tripped by some protection (e.g.
Switching sequences contain a number of switching
line protection), does not open because of an internal
steps to put a switchyard into the wanted operatio-
failure, the fault has to be cleared by the adjacent
nal state. All switching steps are performed autono-
breakers. The adjacent breakers may include breakers
mously one after the other. The result of an
at remote substations (remote line ends). For this pur-
opera- tion is tested; and the sequence continues
pose the protection trip starts the breaker failure pro-
only if an operation has succeeded and reached its
tedion. It then supervises if the fault current
intended position. Before a sequence is started,
disap- pears or not If not, a trip signal is sent to all
certain checks are made to assure that the action is
adjacent breakers after a preset delay.
allowed and has the prerequisites to be finalized.
Safety, however, can
and must not rely on the switching sequence itself. This function needs fast detection of trip signals and
Safe operation can only be assured by the appropri- fault curre1ts and very fast reset in case of a disap-
ate interlocking constraints on the control command pearing fcJJit current. The delay is settable s100 ms.
that is sent to the individual switches. As soon as a The trip transfer time shall be in the order of 5 ms.
blocking condition is detected the switching sequen-
ce is aborted.
6.3.5.3 Automatic protection adaptation
Often a sequencer that operates autonomously in-
corporates a step mode for testing. The operator has The protection specialist may change the protection
to acknowledge the sequence after each step befo- parameters (settings) if this is needed by static or pre-
re it is continued, even if it was successful. The step dictable power systemreconfiguration.
mode allows the operator to have better control over
the sequence, because he can abort it after each step. If the concitions for protection are dynamically chang-
This function is mostly used for training purposes. ing during operation, the parameters of the protec-
tion may oe changed by local or remote functions.
Typical switching sequences are Very ofter, not single parameters are changed but
• Disconnecting a bay (line, transformer, ...) complete, pre-tested sets of parameters are swiched.
• Earthing a bay
The chance of conditions is detected and communcat-
• Bypassing a line circuit breaker ed by soe other functions. The parameter switch-
• Connecting a bay (line, transformer, generator) ing is then performed in the order of 1 00 ms up to
to a specific busbar some seconds.
• Connecting a line in bypass mode
Very often the need to adapt the configuration is
• Closing or opening a bus coupler or bus section detected outside the protection lED and then com-
• Transferring some or all currently connected municated to it, e.g. by a command to·-change the
bays with or without power interruption to parameter set. Therefore the availability of the com-
another busbar. munication is crucial for the working of this type of
protection. It is recommended that the protection
Attention is drawn to the fad that some sequences device contains a safe fall back configuration which is
mentioned above concern one bay only, while other automatically enabled some configurable time after a
132 sequences involve more than one bay, which means loss of communication.
lc
 '? '?
'? '?
 6.3.5.4 Reverse blocking

When a fault occurs in a radial network the fault

cur
rent flows between the source and the fault location:
• The upstream protections are triggered
• The downstream protections are not triggered
• Only the first upstream protection has to
trip
One possibility to reach this goal is to have longer trip
delay times at the higher levels of the radial
network.
· This leads however to extremely long delays on the
higher levels.
The reverse blocking function is a distributed function
in the power network that eliminates a fault in a mini
mum and constant time, wherever it occurs in a
radi al electric network. It offers a full tripping
discrimina tion and a substantial reduction in delayed
tripping of the circuit breaker located nearest to the
source (the first upstream protection/breaker). It
concerns phase over-current and earth fault
protections of different types: definite time (DT) and
inverse tirne delay IDMT (standard inverse time SIT,
very inverse time VIT and extremely inverse time
EIT).
Only the first upstream protection has tripped the 6.3.5.5
related breaker in a minimum and constant time.
Depending on the applied time delay based fault
discrimination scheme the block command has to be
communicated within the order of 5 ms (transfer
time).
6.3.5.5 Load shedding
When loss of generation or sudden connection of big
loads occurs on a network the variation of frequency
depends on several dynamic factors in interaction.
This can be the quantity of spinning reserve, the
limi tations of the prime mover system and the
speed of governors, the inertia of the power
system or the sensitivity of customer load. This
phenomenon is par ticularly important on isolated
power systems where the largest generating unit
represents a high propor tion of the total demand.
On these kinds of power systems, well-tuned load
shedding plans can avoid many blackouts. In
general, undue variation of fre quency or voltage
within a power network can be re gulated by
disconnecting (shedding) a certain amount of the
load, and thus "win" enough power for the
remaining load.

Fault

'(

Figure 6-25 Radial network with reverse blocking

When a protection is triggered by an over-current

(Figure 6-25)
• it sends a blocking signai to the upstream
protections
• it trips (opens) its associated circuit breaker if
it doesn't receive a blocking signal issued by
a downstream protection.
Conventional load shedding works and if the load is currently allowed to be shed or
with hard-wired relay logic and not. These parame ters can be downloaded e.g.
therefore is static In case of system from a central place
voltage or frequency decline, the whenever they change due to new operation envi- 133
scheme activates tripping of pre-selected
circuit breakers regardless of the actual
load conditions. Microprocessor
based load-shedding schemes, however,
are in the position to take the actual
load into account and to dynami cally
select only those feeders up to that
amount of load to be opened, which
are needed to regain the frequency.
stability (Figure 6-26). Parameters to
this function are the priority of the load,
'!
 Dynamic Load Shedding
Selection Release
6.3.5.7
current per voltage
feeder and frequency (f)
Figure 6-26 Dynamic load shedding scheme
ronment. If then the load shedding is triggered,
they guide the selection process of the load
shed ding, together with the measurement of
actually exi stent load (Figure 6-27).
The reaction time for shedding should be in the
range of 100 msec, while a possible change of shed
ding parameters is in the order of the human opera
tor's reaction time (1-5 sec).
6.3.5.6 Power
restoration
After a fault has been cleared by a protection trip, the
auto-rec\osure function tries to restore power per
breaker/feeder. Sometimes this does not work
because of a static fault, e.g. a permanent short
circuit on some line, or a broken transformer. A
busbar fault may lead to tripping of all connected
bays. Some times a bigger power network
disturbance happens so that at several places circuit
breakers are tripped by protection functions or by
load shedding. In these cases the load restoration
function tries to restore power to the load per
busbar or per substation.
The reconnection of feeders and consumers is made
134 in a proper sequence according to some predefined
Dynamic selective
feeder tripping
according to actual loads
Transmission
network
Distribution network
priority and according to the network conditions. This
means that on substation level the load restoration
consists of the execution of certain pre-defined switch
ing sequences, which are selected according to the
fault situation and consider the actual load situation
before the fault.
The reaction time should be within a range of the
human operator response time or switchgear opera
ting time scale, i.e. around 1 s per switching step.
6.3.5.7 Voltage and reactive power control
The voltage on a busbar in the power network de
pends on the position of the transformer taps and on
the amount of reactive power to be moved around.
By controlling both the voltage is kept at its
nominal value or in a very small well-defined range.
The con trol is made by changing.the tap positions or
by step wise switching of capacitor or reactor"'
banks. Very often only one of these means is
available for such a control function in the
substation under considera tion.
Any actions are started by deviations of voltage or
reactive power from their set points. For more than i
l
 f (Hz)
f N
6.3.5.8

f Lim 1
f Lim 2

+-----....... ---:-----------.. t (s)

P(MW) I
r--------t First attempt:
Load optimised Load of priority 1 shedded
step 1
. Load <PPt1·m1·se Second attempt:
Load 15 1 .c::t n Load of priority 2 shedded
re-balancedl-r------7--' f.l-t=========:---

L----or----+---------- - t (s)
Figure 6-27 Automated load shedding

one transformer, it is considered additionally if the over has to take place bumpless in such a way
cir that no problems regarding the synchronization
culating reactive current is above its accepted limit. of lines and loads (e.g. motors) appear.

The detection that actions are necessary must be fast,

2. In case of parallel transformers, the load of an
but response time is limited by the switching mecha
overloaded, endangered or faulted transformer
nism. The actions should however show results befo
has to be switched over to a healthy, parallel
re any protection function trips. This needs careful
running transformer. The switchover has to take
harmonization of the set points e.g. with the
place bumpless in such a way that no problems
trans former differential protection or over/under
regarding the synchronization of lines and loads
voltage protection functions.
(e.g. motors) appear. This includes besides
opening and closing circuit breakers also a
6.3.5.8 lnfeed switchover and proper setting of the tap position of the
transformer change transformer.

Both, infeed switchover and transformer change, are

a fast switchover of power source or of load to The bumpless performance means reactions·raster
assu re continued working of critical loads like than 100 msec.
motors in one of the following cases:
A typical example of a high-speed power transfer
1. Busbars with multiple infeeds have to be scheme consists of a H-type busbar configuration with
switched over to a backup infeed in case that two high voltage infeeds, and a single busbar with a
the main infeed is disturbed or lost. The switch- section coupler on the medium voltage side. 135
Each section of the medium voltage busbar has three 6.4 System Configuration and
cable feeders and three motor feeders (Figure 6-28). Maintenance Functions
In normal operation each is fed via one transformer.

In case that one of the two line circuit breakers of line
F1 or F2 is spontaneously tripped because of line or
6.4 transformer faults, the high speed power transfer
scheme assures that supply for both busbars is main
tained without extensive stress of the motors. This
requires that the CB of the MV bus section is preci
sely closed at the instant when the voltages are syn
chronous taking in consideration the motors slowing
down. After the fault has been eliminated the re
transfer of the loads can be automatically conducted.
This ply to vital auxiliaries in power plants and sensitive
functi industrial processes.
on is A substation automation system normally consists
prima out of a set of standard software packages, running
rily on a distributed system, and a lot of substation and
Figure 6-28 High speed busbar transfer
used customer specific configuration data, function para
to meters, and specifically developed software. In the
maint ideal case all software is stable, and any necessary
ain adaptations during operation or for eventual later sys
powe tem modifications and extensions can be just done
r by configuration and parameterization; this means by
sup adaptation of the appropriate data, which describe
the switchyard, the control system and its functions,

Line F1 line Protection line Protection

High-Speed
Busbar Transfer

Transformer
Protection

136

· ?
and its connections to its environment The System
Configuration and Maintenance functions are a sub
?
set of the engineering functionality, which is of
needed during commissioning, and during
operation and maintenance of the system. Note
however, that the limits between software and
data are fluent and depending on the view
point. So on one extreme a Java program is just
data for the Java compiler. On the other extreme
a selection of options for a data object can
completely change its behavior. Therefore this set
functions cannot be clearly delimited and
described.
In any case these functions must mark all the objects
(data or software) describing a system instance with
revision information. This must as a minimum
identify the revision and contain the date of the
last change. As this is normally not done for a
single item of a configuration data base, this data
must be structured into entities with a common
purpose, which then have a common revision
index. This allows to track changes during the life
time of the system. Normally more than this
absolute minimum in revision history and change
tracking should be provided, otherwise error
tracking and removal, and adaptation and
enhancement of a system will be a Sisyphus work.
6.4.1 System Configuration and
Adaptation
The system configuration consists of all data describ
ing the individual configuration of a system. It
exclu des those data which are normally
changed/adapted during operation. In some cases,
e.g. for the limits of certain measurands, it might
depend on the opera tion philosophy of the
customer if these are opera tional parameters or
configuration parameters.
Configuration parameters normally have to be
resto red during replacement of hardware, and
they are changed only, if the system is modified or
if they con
tain errors. Therefore the structuring of configuration
parameters as well as their physical storage often fol
lows the physical (lED based) structure of the auto
mation system, and only within this structure,
there might be function related substructures.
Additionally to this lED based structure there must
exist a system configuration description, which
contains the system related configuration data 6.4.2
holding the single lEOs together in the system. A
typical example is a com munication connection
scheme with connection information.
System configuration functions allow to store, load
and modify configuration data in a systematic
way, and to keep the version or revision history.
6.4.2 Application Software Upgrade
and Maintenance
It may happen, that errors found in a base
software package cause a replacement by a newer
version, or that the new hardware implemented
after a hard ware defect is not 100 % compatible,
so that other drivers or a newer operating system
version has to be installed. Sometimes these
modifications can be done on top of the existing
system. But mostly the repla cement of some base
software requires a reinstalla tion of all correlated
packages, and especially of the system specific data.
Sometimes, some system speci fic data have to be
converted into a new physical for mat, or even
some new configuration parameters have to be
set, before the new package can fully per form its
task It is important,
• that these new versions of a functional
package are compatible with the rest of the
system soft ware and data,
• and that a systematic backup process and
installation procedure allows to re-install the
complete system software and system con
figuration data afterwards.
For application related functions, the standardization
of parameter formats and archiving in an
implemen tation independent way can also
lead to better upward compatibility in case that
new software ver
sions of the application have to be installed. 137
 65 Communication Functions
6.5 Communication functions are suprort functions,
which are necessary due to the fad, that
• either the system is widely distributed and the
communication performance is not sufficient when
all functions would individually and directly access
the same data source,
• or devices from several manufacturers or
different implementation generations have to be
connected with different protocols.
6.5.1 Data Exchange withithe Substation
Data exchange within the substation is needed in dis
tributed systems, or for coordination purposes within
redundant systems, respectively between parts that
have been physically separated because of reliability
reasons. A typical communication function within the
substation enables data exchange between the
con trol devices or the station level devices at one
side, and the protection devices on the other side.
This task has become simpler since the IEC 60870-5-
103 standard exists for the serial connection of
protection devices to a substation automation
system.
Another usage for communication functions is to inte
grate devices with 'third party manufacturer' specific
protocols like DNP3, Modbus etc
Only with the upcoming lrC 61850 standard for
communication within the substation it can be expect
ed, that the communication as a special function
gets invisible at least for new systems.
6.5.2 Data Exchange with External Systems
The data exchange with external systems is the clas
sical task of Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), arJd the
Network Control Center (NCC) is the classical external
system. This ata exchange functionality has been
138 allocated to the gateway function of modern SA
systems. It provides binary and analog process relat
ed data as well as time stamped events for a net
work control center. For this functionality the
standard protocol is today IEC 60870-5-101, which
is especial ly designed for slow speed, unreliable
modem or power line carrier connections. With
the advent of high speed wide area networks e.g.
through optical cables contained within the
earthing rope of trans mission lines, there is a shift
to the IEC 60870-5-104 protocol, which is a TCP/IP
based variant of 101. In future, the new
communication bandwidth capa bilities together
with the IEC 61850·protocol could make a gateway
function superfluous. A simple bridge, router, or (for
security) firewall device could then be sufficient. It
should however be kept in mind, that at least for
control not everything of the lower level shall be
directly accessible at all higher levels. A control
coordination, data concentration and data filtering,
perhaps in specially designed firewalls, will always
remain.
New functionality and new needs lead to a second
kind of wide area connection directly to substations:
connections from maintenance centers. These com
munication functions are already now mostly based
on TCP/IP connections, because maintenance func
tions are not time critical. Therefore here the slow
speed of modem connections and higher protocol
overhead is acceptable. IEC 61850 will also here sim
plify life further by standardizing also the application
level, especially for new asset management and
power quality functions.
• •

6.6 Network Operation related

Functions

6.6.1 SupeNisory Control and Data 6.6

Acquisition (SCADA)
The term SCADA is used for the basic data acquisi
tion, supervision and control functionality of any
con trol system, and therefore is also the basic
functiona lity of an SA system. The appropriate SA
related func tions are described in 6.1, 6.2.1, and
6.2.2. This func tionality naturally supports the
appropriate SCADA functionality at network control
level. In some cases the network control center can
even shrink to a set of remote terminals at the SA
systems. At present, it is normally the other way
around, i.e. the SA system is the data acquisition part
for the NCC.

6.6.2 Power Application Software (PAS)

The term "Power Application Software" is used for all

applications that support the network operation of a
power system under normal working conditions, and
these applications run normally in network
control centers (NCC).

The SA system delivers the basic data needed for the

power application functions like RTUs to NCC
systems for energy management (EMS), automatic
generator control (AGC), energy scheduling etc The
performance of the data transmission has to be
tuned according to the functional needs. AGC e.g.
requires only a few but critical measurands with a
maximum allowed data age of 4-10 s. If the NCC
communication cycle time is in the order of 3 s, then
this data must be available at the SA gateway func
tion not later than every second.

On the other side, each central function can in princi

ple be distributed to a lower level, if the devices at
this level are interconnected with sufficient communi
cation capacity. This possibility has to be further
explored with the upcoming high bandwidth wide
139
area communication networks 0/VAN).
 ..

6.7 References

6.7 [1] Walter A Elmore (Ed.)· Protective Re(aying Theory and Applictions,
Marcel Dekker, New York (1994)

[2] Helmut Ungrad, Wilibald Winkler, AndrejWiszniewski ·Protection Techniques in Electrical

Energy Systems, Marcel Dekker, New York (1995)
[3]1EC 61850-5 Communication networks and systems in substations- Part 5:
Communication requirements for functions and device models

[4] K-P. Brand, J. Kopainsky, W. Wimmer · Mikroprozessor-gestOtzte Verriegelung von

Schaltanlagen mit beliebiger Sammelschienenanordnung (Microprocessor-aided
interlocking of substations with arbitrary busbar arrangement),
Brown Boveri Technik 74, 5, 261-268 (1987)

[5] K-P. Brand, J. Kopainsky, W. Wimmer · Topology-based interlocking of Electrical

Substation,
IEEE Trans. on Power Delivery PWRD-1, 3, 118-126 (1986)
[6] K-P. Brand, W. Wimmer· An Expert System for Topology based interlocking in digital
Substation Control, CIGRE SC34 Colloquium, Brasil, 21-26 September 1991, Paper 02-10
[7] K-P. Brand, D. Weissgerber ·Adaptive Load Shedding for industrial power networks,
CIGRE SC34 Colloquium, Stockholm, 11-17 June 1995, Paper 34-209

[8] B. Sander, S. Laderach (Eiektrizitatsgesellschaft Laufenburg/Switzerland), H. Ungrad, F. liar,

I. De Mesmaecker, (ABB Relays AG/Switzerland) ·Adaptive protection based on
interaction between protection and control, Cigre Paper 34-205, September
1994 Session in Paris
140
7 Substation Automation Structure

7.1 Introduction 142 7

7.2 Station Level 143 Table of
72.1 Human Machine Interface (HMI) 144 content
72.2 Local Control and Station Level Automatics 144
7.2.3 Substation Database and Archive 144
72.4 Process Data Access 1Ll4
7.2.5 Time Synchronization 145
72.5.1 Local time 145
7.2.5.2 Global time 145
7.2.6 Remote Control and Monitoring 146
7.2.6.1 Communication Gateway 146
72.6.2 Remote Control Functions 146
7.2.6.3 Monitoring Functions 146
72.7 Data Exchange between Station Level and Bay Level 146
7.3 Bay Level 147
7.3.1 Bay Level Control 148
7.3.2 Bay Level Protection 148
7.3.3 Bay Level Monitoring 148
7.3.4 Human Machine Interface (HMI) 148
7.4 Process Level 149
74.1 Hardwired Terminals 149
7.4.1.1 Binary Switchgear Position Indication 150 .
7.4.1.2 Analog Process Status Indication 150
7.4.1.3 Commands 150
74.2 Remote Input/Output (1/0) Units 150

141
 7 Substation Automation Structure

7.1 · 71 Introduction 3. the process levei. which is close to or even

The previous chapter dealt with the functions typical
ly available within a substation_ Already there we
distinguished between bay level functions, which only
provide and work on data from one substation bay,
and station level or system level functions, which
need or provide data across several bays. This chap
ter is more focused on the operational and physical
separation between
1. the station level, often located in a special.
if necessary shielded room and providing
an overview across the whole station, and
2. the bay level, which is usually close to the
switchgear, allows the operation within one
bay only e.g. for conducting maintenance work
on this bay or on a single switchyard object
(apparatus).
integrated in the switchgear, allows only the
operation of a single switchyard object (appa
ratus) and provides the interface between the
substation automation system and the
switch gear.
Both, the functional structuring as well as the opera
tional/physical structuring, are in principle indepen
dent from the communication and physical structure
of the SA system (except the HMI part allowing
the operator interaction). However, due to technical
limi tations, cost and especially reliability
considerations, each meaningful control system
architecture should also have some relation to these
levels.

Figure 7-1 Substation Automation structure

Network Control
>
Q)
Center NCC
....1
1:
0
i.....
U)

G)

m
>
Q)
....1

Q)
! Iiiii

-'f
HV equipment
GIS or AIS Switchgear
>
Q) Instrument Transformers
....1
)l Power Transformers
t/1
t/1
Q)
u
... Surge Arresters

0 -Q) -09 -
....
D..
-Q1
142
7 2 Station Level
Figure 7-2 Operator workplace
The station level provides the Human Machine
Interface (HMI) as central place for substation opera
tion. This is normally located in a central room, which
should be shielded against electromagnetic distur
bances from the switchyard. Further also all general
purpose hardware, screens and printers are concen
trated on station level. This commercial equipment
needs air conditioning and AC supplied by a special
uninterruptible power supply (UPS). The rest of the
substation works with 110 or 220 V DC, which is
supplied by the station battery, directly in the
switch yard environment. Consequently, all general
manage ment and station level functions like
event logging and printing, archiving and history
data stonng are located at station level, as well as
more complex sta tion level automatic functions
that can easier be implemented on powerful,
general purpose compu ters.
operational and communication software,
so that this PC is normally located in the
operation room. In case that this also
applies for the telecommunication
equipment. all can shrink down to one
7.2
Also the interfaces for the communication with remo
te centers for network control, monitoring or main
tenance are usually physically located at the station
level. The station level equipment is often separated
into two rooms:
•. the operation room providing comfortable
working conditions and noise protection for
operators is equipped with the Human Machine
Interface that consists of scr€ens, keyboards,
tablets or mice, printers, and in earlier times
also a control panel (Figure 7-2),
• and a communication equipment room,
where the computers,..backup printers, and
communication equipment reside, which may
be more noisy.
Due to the miniaturization of electronics the PC
hosting the HMI software can also run parts of the 143
room
where
equipm
may
integra
one de
 least for small to medium size ...
substations.
7.2.4 ed on one general-purpose computer, the .,
additional-
72.1 Human Machine Interface (HMI) ly needed work places are realized
as terminals, which are associated to this
central station level com-
The human machine interface (HMI) seNes to puter. The central station computer provides the
opera-
te and supeNise the substation. In modern substa- access to the process and conducts the
archiving, log- tion automation systems it comprises one or several ging and station
operator places. Each operator place has one or, in
r
automation functions. It has to be kept
in mind, however, that all station level automatic rare cases, even two to three screens, a
keyboard, and functions must be coordinated with
the operator's a mouse. Sometimes also functional keyboards or actions whether taken
on station or on bay level. graphical tablets are used, but the mouse in combi-
nation with active buttons on the screen pictures is
more and more standard practice, so that 72.3 Substation Database and Archive
functional keyboards are no longer required.
Exceptions to this are screen-based HMis in The large storage capacity that is available on station
harsh environment. which ,,
must be sealed against dust or humidity. Here often level by means of hard disks, tapes and nowadays
touch screens are used, or specially designed functio- CDs, naturally leads to a system
architecture, that locates the data archive for all archiving
nal keyboards.
functions on station level. Also the data for engineering and
A printer for screen hardcopy and reports supple- system configuration as well as for
maintenance are ments the operator place. In earlier times, also event usually stored on this
level. if not even higher to allow log printers have been used in order to overcome the
central administration for a lot of
substations. Depen- limited computer storage capacity by "storing" event ding on the purpose,
J
either data files or relational history on paper. The disadvantage was that the prin- databases are
used for data storage. Because of per- ters could run out of paper. In view of the huge star-
formance requirements actual process r
status data is age capacity that is today available on modern hard very often held in
manufacturer specific real time disks in combination with the advent of high capaci-
databases implemented in the RAM memory. New ty backup media like CDs or tapes as well
as of the technologies like object oriented
databases, OPC (OLE, possibility to use high speed communication links to i.e. Object Linking and
Embedding, for Process Con- maintenance centers the event log printer is slowly trol) for
process data access, as well as the increasing outdated. computer performance will change this
present prac- tice resulting in an object oriented data storing con-
72.2 Local Control and Station Level cept that provides data access via multiple views res-
pective different usage aspects.
Automatics
,.
Depending on size, complexity, and required reliabi-
lity, station level automatic functions may 72.4 Process Data Access
reside on a I
separate station levellED with the same reliability and All station level functions need to have-
access to the environmental quality than the bay leveiiEDs. These process data. This has
to be enabled via specific com- functions may also be implemented into the station
munication functions depending on the kind of data HMI computer or another station level
general-pur- to be accessed as well as on the
communication pro- pose computer, which then normally needs special tocol to be
used. In order to decouple the station measures like redundancy to obtain the needed avai-
level functions from the communication
protocol. a
144 lability. If all needed functionality can be concentrat- process access layer is implemented in between.
. '?'

In SCADA systems a central process database is typi
cally used provided with relatively slow wide area
communication links. Its state is regularly updated
from the process via the communication system, and
the process related information is used by all station
level functions. Industrial control systems with high
speed LANs rely in contrast on distributed process
databases that are located in the bay level controllers
and are accessed from the station level functions via
LAN.
The latest SW development harmonizes both ap
proaches by standardizing an API (Application Pro
gramming Interface) to process data. The OSF (Open
Systems Foundation) has set up an industry standard
interface for accessing the process: OPC/DA (OLE for
Process Control/Data Access). It hides the details of
data access, and can itself offer communication-bas
ed access to the process data via remote procedure
calls. The OPC history data access provides the
same service for certain kinds of archived data.
72.'-J Time Synchronization
72.5. 7 Local time
As it has been explained already in the functional
description chapter, a lot of functions need time
stamped data, and time synchronization is
therefore a very important system support function.
A lot of dif ferent methods for time distribution
and time syn chronization are applied. Two
general methods can be distinguished:
Time synchronization via a separate synchro
nization pulse: This method needs a separate wire
or optical cable for the distribution of the synchro
nizing pulse once a second or a minute to all IEDs
concerned.
GPS
Master
clock 7.2.5
lnterbay bus 1
Master
clock
lnterbay bus 2
Figure 7-3 Time synchronization via /nterbay bus
Time synchronization via communication bus
ses: A master clock that is located at each
communi cation bus maintains the correct time. The
clocks of all connected IEDs that need a
synchronized time are synchronized via the master
clocks. This may either be done by broadcasting
time telegrams from the master clock, or by slave
clocks that are regularly asking for the valid time
(Figure 7-3).
72.5.2 Global time
If time synchronization is needed between several
substations, then a common external master clock
has to be used. This can be located at a network con
trol center to synchronize the clocks of all connected
substation automation systems and RTUs. The·even
more accurate method mostly applied today is, to
use a publicly available radio clock time master for
synchronization, like the GPS satellite system or the
DCF77 radio time sender. The corresponding time
receivers are then located in the substations, typically
at station level. 145
 72.6 Remote Control and Monitoring
7.2.7 72.6. 7 Communication Gateway
The communication gateway provides data access
and control from a network control center. It needs a
physical coupling to the wide area communication
connection used by the NCC, and a protocol con r
ter, which interprets the messages according to the
NCC protocol and translates these to actions in the
Substation Automation system. The protocol conver
ter can either be a dedicated device that is connected
to the station communication system, or it can be a
SW function that is integrated into some station level
computer. In each case, it is located at station level as
well, possibly in a special communication equipment
room together with tele-protection, tele-alarm and
tele-monitoring related communication equipment
72.6.2 Remote Control Functions
The remote control function is used to operate the
power network The response time for control
actions should be within the order of seconds. Since
the communication bandwidth for remote connec
tions (Wide Area networks, WAN) and dis urbances
of communication used to be a problem in earlier
times, dedicated communication protocols have been
invented for control, which were optimized for error
detection and efficient coding, and contained a
"Select before Operate" procedure for the safety criti
cal commands.
This two step control procedure together with high
redundancy enabled the operator to check whether
the selection of a switch was correct before he
initiat ed the command, and assured that commands
were transmitted in a safe way.
The disadvantage, however, was that due to the
lack of internationai Standards, each manufacturer of
net work control systems or Remote Terminal Units
used his proprietary protocol. This lasted until the
year
2000 when the IEC 60870-5-101 standard was
146 ready to be used worldwide.
New communication technologies together with high
bandwidth communication media of high quality e.g.
with optical fibers are virtually disturbance free and
will in future allow tc use other protocols, which are
derived from standard commodity technologies. As
an intermediate step, IEC 60870-5-101 was
upgrad ed to be used on high-speed Wide Area
Networks (WAN) in IEC 60870-5-104.
72.6.3 Monitoring Functions
The monitoring functions provide an overview on the
condition of the substation equipment. the control
system equipment. and on all events and disturbanc
es that occur in the substation. The process condi
tions are naturally also taken into account for the con
trol actions.
Pure monitoring functions are usually used for asset
condition monitoring, or for detailed disturbance ana
lysis after a fault. This means that time is not critical
for remote data transmission, and it may last in the
order of minutes to hours rather than seconds. On
the other hand, the amount of data that is archived in
a substation is much bigger than just some limited
state information. If cost and bandwidth is a
problem, monitoring data can be exchanged
via dial-on demand systems, i.e. a permanent
data link is not required. This is the reason why
dedicated communi cation links for monitoring are
often separated from those used for control
purposes. The protocols used are derived from
commercially available protocols at the physical and
link layers, and complemented with manufacturer
specific protocols at the higher levels. The
application of the modern communication tech
nologies will however lead to a merge of control
and
monitoring related protocols based on commercially
available stacks - like it is envisaged in the new
sub station communication standard IEC 61850.
72.7 Data Exchange between Station Level
and Bay Level
The station level functions rely on data exchange with
the bay level functions - sending down commands as
well as configuration parameters and data, and retriev
ing the process state and locally captured fault and

1,
-
Figure 7-4 Bay control and protection cubicles in a control building
disturbance data. Up to now this has been conducted
on the basis of manufacturer specific communication
protocols often derived from existing protocol stacks
and adapted at application layer to the specific
needs. Depending on the manufacturers tradition,
master/ slave protocols or multi-peer protocols
have been used (see chapter 8 for an explanation
of these com munication modes). This also had an
impact on the implemented control system
architectures. Master/ slave based protocols lead to
star structures with a central master, while multi-peer
protocols allow the distribution of functions
between bay level devices and also distribution of
station level functions to dif ferent devices. The new
IEC standard IEC 61850 har monizes these practices
and leads to a new flexibility for control system users
as well as to improved main tenance quality.
7.3
., --,""='"="""""
7.3 Bay Levei
The physical bay level is close to the switchyard
equipment, i.e.
• In the case of medium voltage equipment this is
the medium voltage cubicle. Modern control and
protection IEDs can be incorporated directly into
this cubicle in order to save material for a separate
cubicle as well as cabling costs. The IEDs' built-in
HMI can be used directly to safely operate the
bay. .,_
• In the case of high voltage switchgear it has to
be distinguished between air insulated
substations (AIS) and SF6 gas insolated
substations (GIS). GIS 147
is normally housed in a building for protection
against rain, temperature variations, wind and dust.

7.3.4 Protection and control cubicles for GIS are located
in the building directly next to the switchgear to
keep cables short between cubicles and switch
gear. The building is further used as shielding of
the outer world, e.g. station level devices, against
electro-magnetic interferences. In the case of AIS
special bay level housings or shielded kiosks are
built near the bay. Despite of the fact that serial
communication links are provided between the
station level operator places and this bay level
kiosks to save cabling costs, a significant amount
of cabling remains between the bay kiosks and
the primary equipment (Figure 7-4).
73.1 Bay Level Control
The bay level control function allows to operate a bay
locally. All bay related measurands, alarms and rele
vant state information are displayed here, and
control commands can be initiated by means of a
control panel normally located at the same place as
the bay level cubicles. This HMI may be also
integrated in the bay control unit (BCU) as touch
screen or.screen with functional buttons (see 7.3.4).
73.2 Bay Level Protection
level, as the classical objects like lines, transformers
and generators are all allocated to switch bays, so
that they can be isolated from the substation busbar
by tripping the corresponding circuit breaker.
Digital microprocessor based protection relays can be
placed into the bay cubicles as well. Typically,the
state of a relay and some important alarms are
shown with some LEOs at its front side. Often
numerical protection relays have a LCD based built-
in HMI, which allows checking the last events and
the activated protection parameters. Sometimes this
is done additionally or instead with a plugged-in
148 laptop computer and spe cial parameterization
software.
73.3 Bay Level Monitoring
The state information and alarms necessary for ope
ration and maintenance are displayed in the bay, as
described in 7.3.1 and 7.3.2. Additional monitoring
functions might also be located in bay level cubicles,
but there is normally no dedicated HMI provided as
the condition evaluation is conducted either on sta
tion level or even higher levels.
For more accurate performance and failure analysis,
high resolution disturbance and event recorders may
be installed on bay level, often retrieving data from
several bays.
73.4 Human machine Interface (HMI)
The bay level HMI allows local control of the bay,
and performing of all control actions, which are
essential to isolate the bay from the rest of the
substation, so that maintenance work can be
conducted on the pri mary equipment
li
G-1
•
!
Figure 7-5 Bay level control via built-in LCD display
Alarm annunciators indicate causes of failures, and
the state of the protection and control equipment It
further displays the current position of the switches,
and bay related measurements. The control panel
can either consist of a LCD panel that is integrated
into the control device (Figure 7-5), or it can merely
comprise some LEOs as in the case of protection
devices.
r·

Control
cubicle
Process level Bay level
Figure 7-6 Local bay level control via cubicle
For HV or EHV transmission substations the HMI
can be located in a completely separate control
panel with mimic and key interlocked operation
over swit ches or push buttons, complimented
with alarm LEDs, analog measurement
instruments, or digital LED bars for the indication of
the measured values of voltage, current, frequency,
active and reactive power (see Figure 7-6)
A separate control panel operating on 220 V DC
has the advantage that the switchgear can be
operated even if the controllED is out of operation.
In such an emergency situation the functionality of
the local con trol cubicle is degraded, i.e. the
interlocking and syn chrocheck functions are not
active.
74 Process Level
The process level comprises:
• Hardwired cable connections to the
primary equipment.
• Auxiliary switches indicating the switchgear
positions.
• Electromechanical control relays with associated
solenoids to transfer the switching commands
into mechanical switching operations, or IEDs
Station HMI
7.4
Protection
cubicle
Station level
• Connection of conventional or electro-optical CTs
and VTs for voltage and current measurements.
• Sensors for non-electrical measurements like gas
density, oil and gas pressure, temperatures,
vibrations etc., providing electrical signals or serial
telegrams.
• Serial communication links if applicable.
Operation at this level means direct manipulation of
the switchgear (Figure 7-6). With the advent of the
unconventional sensor technologies for voltage and
current measurement, electronic sensors are directly
located in the switchgear, so that the hard-wired pro
cess interface becomes an electronic serial process bus
interface (Figure 7-7). A prerequisite for achieving ge
neral acceptance for this new technology is how
ever the availability of a world standard for process
bus communication, as it is coming with the standard
IEC 61850.
If this kind of technology is widely accepted, then,
apart from unconventional sensors, also other archi
tectural changes are possible. They range from·-sim
ple remote inputs and outputs to reduce the cabling
up to additional functions incorporated in the sensor
electronics, which support e.g. maintenance and asset
management. These are then called intelligent sen
sors and actuators, and the whole concept is known
as intelligent switchgear. 149
 Actuator
for

01
Line
Protection 1

Actuator for Bay

circuit breaker Controller
7.4.2 control
Line
Sensors for
Protection 2
current &
T1
voltage Busbar
measurement Protection

Process
Bus
Phase 1

Q8

Figure 7-7 Bay protection and control with intelligent primary equipment

7.4.1 Hardwired Terminals 74.7.3 Commands

The conventional way for the exchange of data from
and to the switchyard is to use hard-wired connec
tions to terminals and marshalling kiosks, which allow
distributing the switchgear state and position to diffe
rent control locations. Cables installed in underground
cable channels conned the marshalling kiosks with
the bay level equipment.
The terminals are wired to the opening and closing
coils of the primary equipment. The needed power
for operation is supplied via the cable to the bay level
from the auxiliary DC power supply from the station
battery.

7.4.2 Remote Input/Output (1/0) Units

74. 7. 7 Binary Switchgear
Position
Indication
The most common way is to wire potential free
contacts to the terminals of the control or protection
cubicles. The substation automation system then uses
the auxiliary DC power supply from the station bat
tery to convert the contact position into an electrical
signal as input to the bay level binary input of the
electronic cards respectively its interposing relays.
A way to reduce cabling and enlarge the number of
inputs and outputs (1/0) of the electronic equipment
is to use remote 1/0 units, short RIO. They can be
located close to the process terminals, and they are
connected to bay level equipment via a serial process
bus. Because of the severe electromagnetic interfer
ences that occur close to the switchgear, the process
bus should consist of optical fibers only.
Modern sensor technologies especially for voltage
and current transformers need electronics for sensor I.

information evaluation. This means that the electronic

74. 7.2 Analog Process Status
equipment of the sensors and actuators merges with
Indication the HV switchgear, and that only the optical process
The outputs from VTs (100 or 200 V) and CTs (1 or bus remains as process connection. In this case we
SA) are wired to the terminals. Caution must be use the term Process Interfaces for Sensors and
150 taken not to overload these connections, Actors (PISA) rather than Remote 1/0 units (RIO).
otherwise the instrument or interposing
transformers could be de stroyed.
 8 Substation Automation Architectures

8.1 Introduction 152

8.2 From conventional control to intelligent automation 152 8
8.2.1 The Impact of Computer Technology 153
Table of
8.3 Communication within the Substation 156 content
8.3.1 Design Aspects for Communication 156
8.3.1.1 Communication Requirements 156
8.3.2 Communication Modes 157
8.3.2.1 Master/Slave Communication 157
8.3.2.2 Periodic process state transfer 158
8.3.2.3 Peer-to-Peer Communication 158
8.3.2.4 Multi-peer Communication 158
8.3.2.5 Client-Server Communication 158
8.3.3 Time Synchronization 158
8.3.4 Performance of Communication 159
8.3.5 Safety and Availability Aspects 159
8.3.6 Communication Media 160
8.3.7 The User Benefits Derived from serial communication 160
8.4 From Remote Terminal Units (RTU) to Substation Automation 161
8.4.1 The Impact of communication technology on Network Control 162
8.4.2 From Centralized SCADA to Decentralized Automation 162
8.5 The Integration of Protection and Control Systems 163
8.5.1 Motivation for the Integration of Protection and Control 163
8.5.2 Safety and Reliability Aspects 163
8.6 Allocation of Functions 164
8.6.1 Criteria for the Allocation of Functions 164
8.6.2 Remote Control Function 165
8.6.3 Local Control Function 165
8.6.4 Local Automation 165
8.6.5 Safety and Reliability Criteria 166
8.6.6 Availability Criteria 167
8.7 Integration of Primary Equipment 167
8.7.1 Process Bus 167
8.8 Asset Management Support 168
8.9 Dependability 168
8.9.1 General 168
8.9.2 Functional Redundancy 170
8.9.3 Physical Redundancy 171
8.9.3.1 NCC Connection 171
8.9.3.2 Station level 171
8.9.3.3 Inter Bay Communication 172
8.9.3.4 Bay level 173
8.9.3.5 Redundancy on process bus 173
8.9.3.6 Availability calculation examples 174
8.10 References 182 151

·
 8 Substation Automation Architectures

8.2 8.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter we looked onto substation
automation system structures from the switchyard
geography and from the operator location point of
view. Here we will have another look from the up
grade possibilities of existing conventional systems to
typical communication structures, and from the
relia bility and availability point of view of these
structures.
like electromech_anical relays and push buttons only.
The main characteristic from the system structure
point of view is that each function
• is realized within its own dedicated hardware,
• needs its own inputs and
• delivers its own outputs to the
process and to its own HMI (Figure 8-
1).

The local control cubicle serves additionally as a mar

8.2 From conventional control
to intelligent automation
Conventional Control means that the substation con
trol functionality is implemented by means of devices
shalling point for wiring the data from the switchgear
to all devices which need it, using contact multipliers,
separation amplifiers etc.
For bay level control as well as central control from
station level this means a lot of cabling, parallel
wiring

Fault Bay Bay Protection Bus bar Protection

Control

II)
...1
c:
0

-
•
i
(I)

G)
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II) Local
...1
Control
•
m

-
II) -._
...1 GIS or AIS
ttl
ttl
II)
Switchgear

e
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152 Figure 8-7 Conventional substation controi and protection

For bay level control as well as central control from
station level this means a lot of cabling, parallel
wiring and marshalling from the switchyard primary
equipc ment to the appropriate control panels.
Interlocking is implemented - if at all existing and
not handled by rigorous working procedures - by
means of electro mechanical relays and contacts
with application of the Boolean algebra approach.
If additional functionality is required like event
record ing, fault recording, measurement trend
logging etc. physically separated, dedicated devices
have to be used and wired to the process. CAD
systems are used to engineer all the
electromechanical equip ment as well as the
wiring and cabling between them. Protection
devices are typically connected to control or
monitoring devices with two or three con tacts,
providing information of a protection function start,
a trip, and of the state of the protection device.
8.2.1 The Impact of Computer Technology
The advent of the microprocessor in the substation
allows to process data in digital form. Therefore, the
data must be converted to digital form, before it can
be processed. For all binary data like alarms and switch
positions this is not a big problem, because this data
is already available at (relay) contacts. For analog data
the analog/digital converters (ADC) are used to con
vert measured values to digital samples. The advan
tages of providing data in digital form are:
• Digital data cannot be distorted by aging of
the hardware. Data gets and stays much more
accurate than before. No calibration or testing
is necessary after commissioning. But the super
vision of the ADC may be recommended at least
fm protection.
• Data in digital form can easily be exchanged
by serial communication. This reduces the
former bundles of cables to a thin serial bus,
usually in form of optical fibers.
...
·
?
• With growing processing .;:Jnd memory 8.2.1
capacity
of microprocessors more intelligent functions can
be added.
• This intelligence allows a much higher degree
of self-supeNision of an lED, thus enhancing the
system safety and availability.
• Multiple processing of the same data by
different functions saves raw data connections -
previously each function needed its own inputs.
However, digitalization of analog data introduces
other categories of problems to be handled:
• Serial communication introduces additional delays.
• Instead of CAD based connection engineering
for wires and cables now signal engineering and
communication system design is necessary.
• The information processing hardware must
withstand the harsh environment in the substation,
especially the electromagnetic interferences.
This leads to the following typical structure for IEDs
(Intelligent Electronic Devices) used at bay or process
level close to the process (Figure 8-2):
• An internal bus connects the central
processing unit (CPU), the needed RAM, ROM,
EEROM or flash memory and the serial
interfaces for communication at one side, and
digital as well as analog 1/0 modules at the
other side.
• An EMI barrier against disturbances and over
voltages consisting e.g. of opto-electric couplers
or separating relays and interposing transformers
shields the 1/0 from the outside world.
• A local HMI, either built in or via a
serially connected PC allows to
configure_the lED.
153
.,
 Line bay Process Communication
Interfaces Interfaces

..
y
Bl

..
8.2.1

B O Local MMI

G •
AI
.. [][] ..
Bl .. .. • SA
• SMS

,------1
Bl
• j- ...-, ...

Bl Binary Input Intelligent electronic device (lED)

BO Binary Output
for protection and control
AI Analog Input
Fl Filter
AD Analog/Digital Converter

Figure 8-2 Typical bay levellED structure

In spite of the fact that a microprocessor is able to
perform a iot of functions, some redundancy must
be kept in the data acquisition part as well as in the
hard ware performing the functions to assure the
required availability.
The ever-growing communication bandwidth makes
the communication-related problems treatable. The
new bus technology together with multi-purpose
processing capacity allows separating availability issu
es from the functional issues, and both can be tai
lored as needed.
This fact allows structuring a modern substation auto
mation system according to the operational needs as
it has been described in the previous section, and in
154 accordance with the physical layout of the substation.
The resulting principle system architecture is shown in
Figure 8-3.
The data is acquired at the proces's level by means of
remote 1/0 units (RIO) and intelligent sensors and
actuators (PISA= j)ocess )nterface for ensors and
8ctuators). The process bus connects them to the
bay level equipment, where the bay related protec
tion and control functions including the bay level HMI
are located. The bay level units talk either to each l_
other or to the station level servers via the interbay
bus. The station level functions implemented on the
station servers talk via gateways either to network
control centers or monitoring centers, and to each
other. The station level control unit performs station
level process related tasks like switching sequences.
 External systems
HMI components
NCC
/ . .
;··t :. fJ ::-.:\ :
Figure 8-3 Basic substation automation system architecture
This architecture leads to a high degree of
dependa bility. Functions for lower hierarchical levels
are imple mented in appropriate parts of the
control system and remain operative even if devices
on higher levels or other parts in the same
hierarchical level become faulty. Further, the
environmental conditions are the harsher the closer
the hierarchy level is to the process, which requires
an appropriate physical design of the used
components.
The system is divided into the three hierarchy levels
described already in the previous section:
• On station level there are the HMI and archiving
functions, and the connections to the external
world: to a network control center (NCC), to tele
alarm systems, remote work places, protection
maintenance systems, asset management systems,
office systems etc Also devices with control func
tions covering more than one bay are related to
the station level. Station level devices can some
times be placed in office type environment, how
ever, for EMI reasons industry versions are often
needed.
Station bus 8.2.1
Station level
lnterbay bus
Bay level
Process level
• The bay related control and protection functions as
well as the safety related functions like station level
interlocking are executed on bay level. If the
process bus is an internal bus inside the lED and
no external process bus exists, and the EMI barrier
(relays, opto couplers etc.) is internal as well, then
the IEDs can directly be connected to the process.
But the devices must withstand the harsh environ
ment of a HV or MV switchyard and must be
able to be built directly into bay level cubicles
close to the switchyard.
• The process level comprises the connection to the
switchyard (the process) via cables from the bay
level 1/0s, via remote 110 devices (RIO), or via
sensors and actuators (PISA) with integrated
electronics, which may additionally contain sqme
process related functionality. All these devices are
either located in the vicinity of the switchyard, or
are even integrated into the HV or MV switchgear.
Each level contains a bus to allow communication
between devices in the same level and in adjacent
155
levels.
',:
'?
'?

8.3 • The station bus is mainly used for HMI connec
tions to terminals and printers, as well as interface
to office environments, and for the supervision
tasks between servers.
• The inter-bay bus connects bay devices to station
level (vertical communication), and additionally
allows real time communication between bay
devices (horizontal communication).
• The process bus connects actuators, sensors,
intelligent peripheral units and remote 1/0 units
with time critical real time data to the bay
level processing units.
This structuring is also a logical concept. If the data
transmission capacity of the bus used and the
com munication protocols allow it. several of the
logical busses may run on the same physical bus.
Very often, the station bus and the inter bay bus
com munication are implemented on one and the
same physical bus. Other groupings are possible as
well, if it is required with regard to the scope of
functiona lity and if the bus capacity allow this. The
extreme is that all communication runs on one
physical commu nication system. In such a case,
however, the reliabi lity of the system has to be
analyzed at communica tion system level as well, and
very often the commu nication system itself has to
be structured according to the operational levels
and groupings respectively. As is shown in [6]. even
at the current state of 100 MB Ethernet this might
also be forced by performance reasons.
One of the special features of a SA system is the
pos sibility of accurate station-wide time
synchronization, which may even be region wide if
radio or satellite clocks are used as substation level
time sources. The time master can in principle be
coupled to each level. In most cases it is connected
to inter-bay bus level,
and then all devices are synchronized from here via
156 the communication system.
8.3 Communication within
the Substation
8.3.1 Design Aspects for Communication
8.3.1.1 Communication Requirements
As already stated by CIGRE [10] and taken up in IEC
61850 part 5, the communication requirements for
communicating functions can roughly be classified
with three criteria:
1. Maximum allowed age: the maximum age
allowed for using the data by the (receiving)
function. This corresponds roughly to the
response time and can be considered as a
worst-case response time that can be tolerated.
This means, that this response time must be
guarantied in normal operation, and that it must
be detected and handled appropriately by the
receiving function in the rare cases when it can
not be kept.
2. Data integrity: the degree of communication
safety in case of disturbances. Here three levels
are identified:
• High integrity is needed, if the
data directly influence the process
(e.g. a command);
• Medium integrity is needed, if the
data indirectly (via a human operator)
influence the process (e.g. an alarm which
leads to an operator interaction);
• Low integrity can be used, if the
data does not have any influence on
the process, like monitoring data used
for later analysis only.
3. Exchange method: Spontaneous means that
data is communicated as soon as any change
happens. On request means, it is only
acquired
if needed by some function or human being iike
an operator or maintenance engineer.
The following table illustrates this classification for
some typical kinds of data exchanged in a SA System.
Data type Maximum Data Exchange Remarks 8.3.2
allowed age integrity method
Alarm 1s Medium Spontaneous Alarms are urgent process changes
that must be brought to the
attention of an operator, to perform
corrective actions
Commands 1s High Spontaneous Commands directly act on the
process
Process 2 s (binary), 5-1 0 s Medium Spontaneous Gives the operator an overview
state data (measurands) on the process state
Time stamped 10 s Low On request Sequence of event data is used
events for later analysis of a problem
Interlocking data 5 ms (fast block) High (directly influ- Spontaneous Used to prevent dangerous
ences the process commands
via commands)
Interlocking data 100 ms High (directly influ- On request Used for Interlocking to prevent
(state information), ences the process (upon a dangerous commands; or for
other Automatics via commands) command) automatics like load-shedding

Trip from 3 ms High (directly influ- Spontaneous Used to clear dangerous situations
protection ences the process by fault in the
via trips) power system
or in the switch-
gear

Table 8-7 Classification of communication functions

8.3.2 Communication Modes 8.3.2.7 Master/Slave Communication

The architecture shown in Figure 8-3 allows in
princi ple that each device connected to a bus
can com municate with other devices. But a
completely free sending of messages from any
device at any time leads to telegram collisions on
the bus, and thus to communication disturbances.
Therefore, the sending of messages has to be
regulated by communication media access
mechanisms to restrict the communica tion access or
allow the handling of collisions. This has a big
impact on the possibilities to distribute a function
between the physical devices. The most common
communication modes are discussed in the following.
Observe that these modes might be used on link
level for media access as well as on applica tion
level for application communication. We focus here
on the second aspect.
One master accesses a lot of slaves. The slave devic
es are only responding if they are polled, i.e. they are
not allowed to send information spontaneously. This
avoids message collisions, and the master can per
fectly determine how the communication bandwidth
is distributed between the slaves respective the diffe
rent kinds of data. However, no direct communica
tion betweeslaves is possible.
The Master /Slave mode is the standard mechanism
used for the communication of substations/RTUs to a
network control center, which is the master. In sub
station automation systems, the station level device is
usually the master. This restricts however the com
munication to a data flow between station and bay
level only. This means further, if the master fails, the 157
whole system is down.

simultaneously. A bus mana ger controls the

access of IEDs to the bus. This is a
generalization of the master-slave
communication mode, and all bus
participants can hear and use all process
data. It is applied in some process busses like
MVB (IEC 61375) and WorldFIP. The
8.3.3 8.3.2.2 Periodic process state transfer advantages are that no data collisions can
occur, so that the full bus bandwidth can be
The process state data are periodically sent. utilized, and that the maximum data age is
via the communication bus. It is marked deterministic and determined at the engi
with the source address, thus facilitating data
distribution on the bus to many possible users
 neering phase. However, the disadvantages are
that
• some additional measures are needed to
avoid the single point of failure: a defect
of the bus manager,
• the bus capacity is always fully utilized,
even if the data values have not
changed at aiL
8.3.2.3 Peer-to-Peer
Communication
With this communication mode, two peers can
freely talk to each other at any time This mode
is typical for a full duplex physical point to
point communication link. If applied on higher
level across a bus with more than two
devices, collisions can occur at the lower
level which must be resolved on the lower
commu nication stack levels. A typical high-
level peer-to-peer protocol is TCP, the Transfer
Control Protocol that is used for Internet
communication.
8.3.2.4 Multi-peer
Communication
Also in this mode, each device is a peer that
can free ly talk to any other peer. By using a
multicast or broad cast mechanism, it can even
transmit one message to several other peers
at the same time. Again, this
15 mode leads on a bus system to collisions that
8 must
be solved on the lower communication stack
levels. Note, that protocols with periodic
sending (8.3.2.2) allow multi-peer
communication that is collision free by
definition. If a packet switched network is
used with point to point duplex lines between
the routers, e.g. in the case of Internet or with
Ethernet switches, no collisions occur on the
link as well. However, as queues within the
routers have to be build up instead, the
lack of buffers might lead to message losses
like due to collisions.
8.3.2.5 Client-Server
communication
This mode is a variant of the master slave
mode, which is e.g. applied in the world wide
web for the HTIP protocol. or for accessing
remote data bases. A server offers data, and
the clients can ask for these data. The
differences to master slave are, that not only
one client (master) can talk to several servers,
but also a server can simultaneously be
connected to several clients. The server can
even spontaneously send data to the client as
soon as the client has esta blished a
connection. Again, collisions that might occur
on the physical bus must be resolved on lower
protocol stack levels.
8.3.3 Time
Synchronization
The standard time stamp resolution within a
substa tion is 1 ms. If the SA system is a
distributed system, then either all changed data
have to be transmitted to a central time
stamping device within 1ms time, or the clocks
of all devices must run synchronously with
1ms accuracy. For this last concept either a
separate
time synchronization 'bus' is used, which sends
a time
synchronizing pulse from a central master clock to all
I
devices that conduct time stamping, or the
central master clock synchronizes the
individual clocks of all devices connected to
the communication bus. If an other bus is
connected via a gateway, then the gate way
clock is used as master clock on the connected
bus. The gateway clock thus separates the
time set ting mechanisms of the different
connected bus seg ments (see also 7.2.5).
The concrete time synchronization method
within a
bus is specific for a bus and protocol type. In case of
 ·

a master/slave bus, synchronization simply means

sending time telegrams from the master to all slaves.
In case of an Ethernet based peer-to-peer communi
cation system like IEC 61850, specialized time servers
are provided with the SNTP (Simple Network Time
Protocol from Internet ) protocol. Each slave asks for
the current time as often as needed to assure accu becomes a single point of failure that can block the 8.3.5
racy of its own clock, and special mechanisms are entire system. Especially it sh'ould be investigated if
applied to compensate for the communication time some of its devices have failure modes that may
delays. block the whole communication system e.g. by con
stantly sending rubbish on the bus.

8.3.4 Performance of Communication

The challenge for a SA system that performs real time

functions is to guarantee the maximum allowed age
of data, to identify outdated data, and to react . '
accord ingly. This means, that communication
throughput alone is not sufficient to judge the
suitability of a communication system for real time
communication. It may be that a relatively slow
master slave system, where the performance is
calculable in advance, has a higher communication
related reliability than a faster communication
system, that is subject to colli sions causing
stochastically varying response times. The
performance that is really needed and measures
taken to guarantee the maximum allowed age
depend on the actual requirements of functions to be
performed.

To summarize the performance requirements in a

simple sentence: The actual communication system
throughput capacity must be higher than needed for
normal operation (at least 10% higher), and high
enough to guarantee the maximum age required in
the worst case load scenario to be handled.

8.3.5 Safety and Availability Aspects

The availability of a communication system depends

on all devices that belong to the communication
system. As the communication system serves for
some specific purpose, the availability is handled as a
common system requirement on functional level (see
8.9). It should however be noted, that only careful
system design can prevent that the communication
The term "Safety related" to a
communication system has two
aspects:
• No communication message
failure shall lead to unsafe
actions
• No lost or late message is
.allowed to lead to unsafe
actions.
. called Hamming distance gives the figure how many
The first point can be
tackled in two ways:
1. by using communication
error detection
mechanisms,
2. by making the transmission
media immune against
disturbances to reduce the
number of bit errors.
The standard IEC 60870-5-1 provides guidelines, to
specify how safe the communication of certain types
of data should be within a control system, and de
fines three integrity classes, which roughly corre
spond to the three classes also used by CIGRE and the
standard IEC 61850.
For each integrity class the safety is specified in terms
of the allowed residual error rate, i.e. the probability
that a communication error is not detected. The so-
errors can be detected in one message. Today all pro
cess buses use typically a Hamming distance of at
least 4, sometimes 6, to detect transmission errors.
For normal telecommunication environments this is
sufficient for medium integrity, but not for high inte
grity. And within substations the error rate is normal
ly higher than in Tele-communication environments.
Therefore glass fibers have to be used, and special
redundant communication procedures are introdu- 159
 i,,

8.3.7 ced, like Select before Operate for issuing only protection against electromagnetic disturbances,
commands as known from network control but also special care for adequate earthing of the
protocols. cable shielding.

But even if the residual error rate is small enough, In order to avoid earthing problems and to keep the
messages could be lost due to buffer overruns or bit error rate due to electromagnetic disturbances
overloaded routers and switches. Therefore, lost · practically at zero, optical cables are recommended
mes sages as well as the loss of a message source within the switchyard environment Glass fibers can
must be detected. Also here the methods used are cover a distance up to 2000 m or even more in
depen dent on the bus and protocol types. spe cial cases without loosing transmission speed,
while plastic fibers could be used for shorter
What is important and protocol independent is the lengths of some tenth of meters. As plastic fibers
provision of a means that informs an application pro are ageing relatively soon in comparison with the
gram, that such messages have been lost. In the long life of SA systems, it is highly recommended to
stand ards IEC 60870-5-101 and IEC 61850 this is use glass fibers instead for all distances.
realized by the provision of data quality attributes,
which indi cate beneath the invalid flag also a topical
flag to indi cate that the data is up to date. It
8.3.7 The User Benefits Derived from
depends on the application, however, to define
what up to date means and to take actions if serial communication
the data is not up to date. Further, the application
must be designed in such a way that missing or With careful print design, input isolation and device
late information does not lead to an unsafe state shielding, microprocessors and related electronics can
respective that the probability of an unsafe state is nowadays be installed close to the process. Data in
sufficiently low. digital form allows easy serial communication. So dis
tributed systems can be built, which keep the cabling
to the process straight forward and short, and after
wards distribute the data with serial busses
8.3.6 Communication Media
preferab ly in optical form to all places where they
are needed. This new system architecture saves
Apart from the RS232C standard for serial connec
space for cabling as well as for central electronic
tions of modems the industry process busses often
cubicles, which are eith er obsolete or significantly
used the RS485 standard with shielded twisted pair
smaller. The physical signal marshalling is replaced by
cables. Later the Ethernet bus came up using coaxial
the logical signal marshal ling, which means that the
cables to enable higher bit rates. In order to achieve
complexity is the same or even higher. On the other
better HF shielding, higher mechanical flexibility and
hand, the electrical CAD systems are replaced by
multiple connections in one cable, Ethernet has switch
powerful signal engineering tools. The physical
ed back to twisted pair cables. Therefore, communi
wiring and connection work that remains is
cation links for Ethernet with a speed of ;;;:100
Mbit/s are using shielded twisted pairs or fiber optic straightforward and can be executed much faster.
cables only rather than coaxial cables.

Within the substation environment long electrical Another big advantage of general purpose
cables, however, are sensitive against induced high micropro cessors that are capable to perform all
160 transient voltages and currents, which requires not kinds of func tions is that functionality and
availability aspects can
'? ·,
?

be separated to a large extent from each other.
Distributed systems inherently have a 'built-in' redun
dancy, however system level oriented rather than
function oriented like in a classical system. A failure of
a station level unit leaves the bay level functionality
working, and a failure of bay level devices just leads
to failed functions of the bay concerned, whle the
other bays and the station level functions continue to
work.
If there are certain critical devices that perform func
tions where failure cannot be tolerated, hardware
redundancy can be added as needed. A typical
example is a duplicated system at station level, while
all bay level (control) units are single devices. For the
same reason, duplication of protection devices is very
common at least for HV substations.
General-purpose microprocessors even allow that
different kinds of functions can be performed on the
same device. This feature can be used for new
redun dancy concepts. However, as especially
protection is a 'traditional' business, people are used
to the 'one function-one-device' concept and they
do not easily accept the new system architectures
that are possi ble.
The ever increasing communication bandwidth for
wide area communication enables direct access to SA
systems from remote, e.g. for secondary and/or pri
mary system maintenance as well as for planning
purposes, network monitoring etc This new possibi
lity enables different parties or even companies to
share this access and to offer various kinds of
main tenance services. The Internet offers a
widespread and cheaply available communication
medium all over the world, under the condition that
security aspects are solved.
8.4 From Remote Terminal
Units (RTU) to Substation
Automation
The centralization of network operation needs remo 8.4
te access to the substations. In case of conventional
substation control systems, this is implemented just
by adding a remote terminal unit (RTU) in the sub
station, which takes the needed data from some
marshalling kiosk and transfers it to the network con
trol center, respective connects commands from the
network control center to some output contacts at
the process. The RTU itself has, apart from pure com
munication handling, only the tasks to time stamp
incoming data, and to assure the safety of outgoing
commands by means of 1 out of N criteria super
vision and the select before operate principle. So,
essentially it is just a digital conversion and serializa
tion device.
The advances in microprocessor technology lead also
to more and more functionality of the PLC (Erogram
mable Logic ontroller) type within an RTU, e.g. it
becomes programmable with function charts accord
ing to IEC 61131. Advances in communication tech
nology lead to distributed RTUs. These typically con
sist of some core device containing the NCC protocol
processing and the PLC functionality, and remote 1/0
cards for binary as well as analog data. Also a direct
connection of CTs and VTs via analog inputs can be
added to omit separation amplifiers and transducers
(Figure 8-4). Thus, the RTU becomes a very basic SA
system. Nevertheless, its central or master slave relat
ed architecture normally causes some restrictions to
its functional capabilities, performance and availability.
Therefore, in a complete SA system, the RTU
functio nality is reduced to a station level gateway to
the net work control center (NCC), which could
run even independent from the station level
HMI,thus enhanc ing the overall system availability.
161
'(

. ...:v
Network Control Center
8.4.2
_.·_..:.f! r.:::_>'::
--1 -·ijir--------- 4i&'ii .A.i....v
Protection 110 , .·-''i ,
Bay 1, Bay ti,
Figure 8-4 Distributed RTU with station level HMI
8.4.1 The Impact of communication
technology on Network Control
When SCADA systems were introduced, RTUs were
connected to network control centers via specific
modems, which, due to the physical media used and
implementation technology available, had narrow
bandwidth from 20 Bit/s up to 2.4 kBit/s. The
upcom ing wide area communication technology
like optical cables, PDH and SONET respective SDH,
or Gigabit Ethernet allow today bandwidth from 10
Mbit/s up to some Gigabitls. Therefore it is today
technically feasi ble to use commercially available,
standardized com munication protocols with high
data throughput also on wide area connections.
The telegram coding efficiency is no longer an out
standing protocol property. Therefore, new standards
like IEC 60870-5-104 and IEC 61850 are technically
feasible and reduce drastically the interfacing effort
and enhance the application versatility. TCP/IP based
protocols also open the ways for new applications
like remote monitoring and maintenance, and online
connection to asset management and planning
appli cations. Their networking facilities with
automatic re routing allow further highly reliable
communication networks.
162
8.5 The Integration of Protection
and Control Systems
Historically there was one device per function. This not
only concerns protection and control functions, but
different protection functions as well. Numerical relays
lead to multi-functional devices that perform several
protection functions in parallel. Only for relia bility and
i '·
- Protebtl ff: 1/0
Bay 'Nt\i': Bay N
8.4.2 From Centralized SCADA
to Decentralized Automation
The growing processing capacity at substation level
as well as increasing wide area bandwidth allow prin
cipally to distribute most of network control center
SCADA functionality down to the substation automa
tion systems. In some cases the NCC system can be
reduced to a workplace consisting of a simple remo
te terminal that is capable to communicate with all
substations. Ho\!Vever, this does not always make
sense. If it is for example required to compare the
history of events in the two substations at both ends
of a line in correct time sequential order, then the cor
related event logs have to be merged - and this is
more than a simple terminal functionality. Apart from
this, the overall system data archiving facilities have to
be taken into account if new structures are set up. But
for a lot of functions their distribution down to SA
level is useful, e.g. that station level switching sequen
ces can be initiated with one command from the
NCC, or inter-substation interlocking can be made via
direct communication via the connecting transmission
lines between the SA systems concerned rather than
via the NCC system or the common telephone net
work
availability reasons more than one protec tion device is 8.5.1
required like main 1 and main 2 for transmission lines. M
In the utility organizations protection personnel used to o
be separated from operation personnel. This caus ed t
functions to be separated to different physical i
devices in order to set up boundaries between the
v
various areas of responsibility - even if this is techni cally
no longer necessary. It was claimed that reliabi lity of
a
t
protection is crucial - but this is true for control as well.
i
o
 n for the Integration of Protection
and Control
The occurrence of protection events - starts, trips, as well
as problems with protection devices themselves
- is critical for substation and network operation. So at
least protection-monitoring data should be shared
between operation and protection maintenance.
Therefore the first step towards the integration of
protection and control responsibility is, that monito ring
data needed from the protection units are trans ferred to
the substation automation system by means of serial
interfaces. This minimal form of inte gration is widely
accepted and is supported by the communication
standard IEC 60870-5-103.
A next step is to coordinate operational states with
protection parameterization, i.e. to combine operatio nal
actions with adaptation of protection functions. A line can
transfer more power in winter than in sum mer. So, the
ambient temperature measurements that are available
at an SA or NCC system could be used to adapt the
protection parameters accordingly via the communication
links, which is an example for so-called adaptive
protection.
._
·. · ·
A third step is the physical integration of control and
protection functions in the same device. This saves cost
and maintenance efforts (one device instead of two), but
leads to the question whether the protec tion function
reliability is affected by the additional control
functionality sharing the same HW resources.
8.5
8.5.2 Safety andReliability Aspects
Both, for protection and control functions, the requi
rements for reliability and immunity against their envi
ronment are equally high. This means, that from the
general implementation point of view there are syn
ergies that can be exploited by using the same
system platform for both functions. There are how ever
also differences: control does only work. if a command
can be communicated, while a protection device has to
perform its local protection function also, if no
communication exists. Therefore, a protec tion system
must be designed in such a way that disturbances in
its communication subsystem do not affect the working of
the protection itself. How this is achieved, depends on the
implementation strategy.
For the first numerical protection devices special ope
rating systems had been developed to assure that
sufficient processing power to perform a protection
function was always available. Nowadays, where a lot of
processing power is relatively cheaply available, more
and more commercially available real time ope rating
systems are used.
The separation of communication from function like
proted1on can be done on hardware level. The com
munication relies on its own hardware resources,
while the protection function is designed in such a way
that it can never be blocked by the communica tion part.
Nevertheless, the use of a common HW and SW plat form
for protection and control is beneficial also to the control
part, as it allows implementing backup protection
functions directly in the control unit. !f this backup
protection provides alternative protection algorithms to
the main protection, this leads to an improvement of
protection availability without the need of additional
physical devices, i.e. without
having more maintenance effort 163
-- --
8.6
 to the extent that the protection func tions are
8.6 distributed. They consist of an input/output i
.I
and communication services. This allows an easy sig
processing function part on process level. a
Allo nal engineering by just putting together logical
·proces sing function part on bay level, and an HMI
cati nodes and allocating them to physical devices. The
function part on station or bay level. Those par-s of
Fig. 8-5 gives some examples, how logical nodes
on a function that must be allocated to one physical
can be used to implement functions.
of device and cannot further be distributed are called
logical nodes (LN) according to IEC 61850. One
Fun physical device may host several logical nodes. On
The left column of Figure 8-5 lists several
logical nodes. Each of the remaining columns
ctio the other hand, the same logical node type can be illustrates by crosses in boxes how these logical
ns instantiated on dif ferent physical devices. All nodes are used to implement the functions
functions are implemented in te system by means Synchronized or point of wave CB switching,
of communicating logical nodes. The physical distance protection and over current protection
communication path is provided by the physical (vertii:al boxes). Horizontal boxes indicate the
communication connections between the devices, physical devices, which host the logical nodes.
Most to which the logical nodes are·allocated. We use
of the the term horizontal communication for data The functional specification of the functions
substa exchange between logical nodes in the same defines their implementation by means of logical
tion level, and vertical communication for data nodes and interfaces between the logical nodes;
autom exchange be tween logical nodes on different especially also what kind of data does the client
ation levels. logical node need.
functio
ns are
dis
tribute
d; at 8.6.1 Criteria for the
least Allocation of Functions

The basic criteria for function allocation are the

Physical Devic
r----
Distance
r----
1 overcu"ent I
requir ed reliability and the communication needs
in terms of bandwidth and maximum allowed age
r-------
Logical Nodes,
1 I
I protection I I protection
of data, in relation to the communication system
r------- available.
I
. HMI .. X I
A function
possibleshould be allocated
both as close to the process
r,sx;n::'!-..-r._- as to satisfy the communication
- - --- needs as well as the reliability requirements. As
S: !_ i!_ c! !i! 2!/. mentioned in the previous part, a function can be
---------,
,DJ.s!_af!.Cf! !!.l'!!t!!_C_E"!_n1 implemented by several logical nodes that reside
:Ove'fcurrelit- - - as close as possi ble to the location where they
IJT>lf!Et.i.Of2 _ _ _ _I are used. If we take the overcurrent example of
r,CJ;.rr::_-uf!-l-!a- I Figure 8-5, the logical nodes representing the
-- -
_ !e _n I bay CT and circuit breaker should be placed as
X I I X I close to the associated primary devices as
1 possible as they typically belong to the process
_x :1 - - - level.
- .I

Figure 8-5 Functions and logical The overcurrent logical node shouldbe placed at
nodes the bay level, where it can acquire data from the
bay CT and has access to the circuit breaker.

For all common functions in substations the The HMI LN is placed in the HMI device- a
standard IEC 61850 identifies the logical nodes and station level PC, a bay level control panel, etc as
164 their inter face to other logical nodes providing needed.
data objects
'? '? ?
This allocation of the functions into the various levels
has then to be matched with the physical substation
layout, which reflects the reliability considerations for
the substation, environmental conditions, installation
costs, communication and lED performance aspects
as well as operational considerations.
8.6.2 Remote Control Function
The remote control function allows operating of the
substation from one or several remote network con
trol centers. The interface to the NCCs therefore resid
es on station level. It uses, however, the same control
function parts to perform a control function as used
for station or bay level control, provided that it is al
lowed to do so. The coordination with station level
and bay level control has to be provided.
8.6.3 Local Control Function 8.6.4
Local control can be performed from station level,
from bay level, or directly at the primary equipment.
For the first two the associated HMI logical nodes
should reside at the relevant levels as illustrated in
Figure 8-6.
8.6.4 Local Automation
Local automation can either concern a bay, or the
whole substation. The allocation of HMI logical nodes
or just of the executing LNs to the relevant levels is to
be done accordingly. Examples for general automatic
functions are shown in Figure 8-6 on the left, and for
a voltage regulator function on the right.

Voltage
Regulator
LN for
station level
Interlocking
on
I VC I
functions Station Level

Automatic
Process Control
means
Generic Node for all
.............undefined functions ,......"'-', Interlocking
LN for on
bay level Bay Level
Tap
functions Changer
Controller

Figure 8-6 Interaction of LNs for the command function and (automatic) transformer control function 165
HMI CBC CB
8.6.5 Safety and Reliability Circuit
Criteria Breaker
From the safety point of view all logical nodes T la interlo
can be classified as follows: h s cking s
i si and a
• Active safety: if the process f
s c blocki
(switchgear) is in an unsafe condition, e
i al ng
8.6. active safety functions clear the fault This t
s t functi
5 is the classical task ot protection. y
t a ons.
• Passive safety: these functions prohibit h s • r
(block) actions, which lead to an unsafe e k N e
state of the process or could cause possible o o l
damage of equipment or endanger people. c f t a
t Sel
ect
e
d
(
Contro j
" l I·
·
circuit
)
for (
a i
.."
:
l
comma
r c
r
nds
e
"
C
Ii
n i
E
o
I
i
Indication
r E
0 for circuit
m (
) breaker
position
a
l
l
y

a
l
l

o
t
h
e
r

f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
.
(active safety) should clear this F
From the architecture point of view it is fault Therefore the logi cal i
important, g
nodes CBC, CB, DIS, and IL u
• that safety related functions can not be have to be regarded as r
safety related, while HMI is e
blocked by other functions,
not safety related, as long as it
• that a single failure e.g. within the needed 8
can not block or affect
resour ces (processor, memory, 1/0 -
otherwise any of the other 7
channels, support functions,
LN's.
communication) of any function cannot
C
lead to unsafe behavior, o
The safety of
also assured commands
by the spe is
• that all logical nodes, which supply data m
m
for safety related functions either to block a
them, or to influence their safety related n
behavior, have to d
be regarded as safety related.
s
e
The Figure 8-6 gives an example: The q
command out put of the circuit breaker u
controller (CBC) is a function that may cause e
n
damages in the process, if it is activ ated
c
wrongly. The interlocking function (I L) e
providing passive safety should prohibit this
to happen at the operational level. If,
however, this happens accidental ly due to cont
interlocking failure, the protection functions ext
as shown in Figure 8-7 A Select command is sent from the
HMI to logical node CBC. The CBC, after checking if a i
command is allowed at all, for wards this select request to I I
the CB lED. After success ful selection of the CB lED the I ·:
Selected response is distributed back Now the operator at !
the HMI is al lowed to give the Operate command, but I
only for exactly the same switch.

Starting from successful Select up to the Command

termination, which happens either if the switch has
successfully reached the intended position, or after a run time
supervision timeout, the CBC is in the Select ed state. This
state can be used to block during this time all further
commands, which influence the inter locking conditions for
this switch. This principle en hances the safety even further.
It has already been used with RTUs as so-called 1 out of N
blocking cri teria.

As shown in Figure 8-7, the response of the CBC to the

Select request has to wait until the response from the next
lower level arrives. Sometimes, especially if
the client is not an HMI logical node, buta network
cial command procedure. Most protocols I l
fulfill only the requirements of IEC 60870-5-4 control center, waiting times might get very
long. In
integrity class 12, while commands must fulfill
that case the select from CBC to the CB can be
the integrity class 13. This is reached be sending
delay ed to the Operate phase of CBC. In any
at least two telegrams before a command is
case, all pos sible blocking conditions
executed. This two step approach, call ed
16 Select before Operate (SBO), might look in
already checked at the Select request
6 this including interlocking have to be
rechecked when the Operate command
arrives.
 8.7 Integration of
Primary Equipment

8.6.6 Availability Criteria . · Chapt

er 6
The availability aspects have to be addressed by descri
appropriate measures depending on the importance bes
of the substation, or on the functions of the substa the
tion respectively. The single failure criteria is also a conne
general rule for ·availability: ction
• No single failure shall block several functions of a
at once (weak form). subst
• No function shall be blocked by a single ation
failure autom
(strong form). ation
syste
Naturally the criteria have to be specified to define m
what it means that a function is blocked. In a distri with
buted, multi level control system the control function conve
is often assumed to be available, even if one bay ntiona
can no longer be controlled. Only if more than l
one bay can no longer be controlled, the control curren
function is blocked (failed). t and
voltag
There are principally two ways to achieve a high
e
func
transf
tional availability:
ormer
1. To use highly reliable components and duplicate s
only those, where it is absolutely necessary for and
safety reasons or single-point-of-failure criterion. auxilia
2. To use commercially available (cheap) compo- ry
nents in a redundant architecture. switch
es.
Both methods may lead to the same operational
Apart
availability. The first one might cause slightly higher from
investment costs, but only if not every part of the
this,
second solution has to be duplicated. The second new
solution, as a contrast. needs much more spare parts
electr
and repair efforts, i.e. higher maintenance costs. In onic
practice a mixture of both methods might be used, or
senso
the commercial parts may be hardened for industrial r and
applications. The burn-in phase is therefore a must for
actuat
components in substation automation to get all com or
ponents to the bottom of their individual reliability
princ
bath tube curve. If non-industrial components are i ples
used, then the first 3 to 6 months of system opera
have
tion have to be considered as burn-in phase with a been
higher failure rate in the beginning.
devel
oped,
which
provid
e the
data
in
digital
form
alread
y. Also
proces
s interface optimiza tion leads to primary device 8.7
oriented grouping of sig nal interfaces, which then can
directly be converted to serial form. They may even be
directly incorporated into the primary equipment. This
development requir es the introduction of the process
bus into the system architecture.

8.7.1 Process Bus

167
The process bus is next to the process, i.e. it has the
highest requirements for electromagnetic interferen ce
(EMI) withstand capability. Apart from this, it needs a
very high throughput capacity with minimum delay, if
voltage and current samples have to be transferred for
measuring, metering and protection purposes,
which are very demanding requirements. One of the
first process bus solutions was based on IEC 61375,
the Multi Vehicle Bus MVB. This is a cyclic bus with
deterministic cycles ranging frorn around 1 ms up to
1 s. The bit rate is 1.5 MBit/s, which can be nearly fully
used for data transfer due to the cyclic nature of the
bus.

In view of the fact that the MVB is a standard that ori

ginates from train control it is not widely accepted as
process bus solution. A process bus concept can how
ever only be successful on the market if a widely
accepted standard for electrical and mechanical inter
faces enables to connect switchgear, transformers
and protection and control equipment from different
manufacturers. The new standard IEC 61850 is de
signed to fulfill all these requirements.

8.8 Asset Management Support
8.9 Modern asset management systems need condition
related data from all primary and secondary equip
ment in the substation. The SA system allows to
acquire such data and to transmit them to one or
several centrally located disturbance evaluation and
c:sset management systems. This means, that this nor
mal data acquisition, archiving and logging facilities of
the SA system are used for the data acquisition as
well. In cases where maintenance activities are need
ed relatively fast, these may binitiated by means of
dedicated evaluation functions at substation level in
conjunction with the alarming facilities. The open sys
tem features of modern SA systems and the Internet
based communication possibilities will allow to inte
grate this data exchange even more into asset and
maintenance management concepts.
The upcoming interfacing standards IEC 61968 be
tween distribution automation andmanagement
func tions, and IEC 61970 for power application
functions at network level will accelerate this process.
The imple mentation of the data exchange into an
open com munication architecture must, however,
be done in such a way that neither the power
network opera tion can be endangered, nor the
database can be accessed by unauthorized people.
8.9 Dependability
8.9.1 General
All hardware and software components of the
Sub station . .utomation system are designed and
manu factured in such a way that they meet the
high avai lability requirements. This means a high
reliability (long MTIF times) as well as short down
times (low MTIR) in case of a fault. (see chapter 12
for general
168 definitions with regard to reliability).
·-
Short down times are achieved by means of
• extensive diagnostic functions down to
replacement module (circuit board) level with
associated reporting,
• a modular hardware
design,
• fast reconfiguratiqn and restart after repair,
• automatic restart after a power supply failure,
• combined with an efficient repair.
The basic distributed architecture allows very high
system availability and functional redundancy for the
most important SA function, namely control, even if
no explicit redundancy is used. If the NCC connection
function runs on another hardware than the SCS ser
ver for station level operation, then only the power
supply modules of a passive star coupler of the inter
bay bus must be redundant. This assures that there is
no single point of failure for the control function of
the complete system (although control of one single
bay may tail). Apart from this, all functions are de
signed for graceful degradation in case that a com
munication connection or one of the connected devi
ces fails. From an overall system point of view, also
the power supply for the SA system should be redun
dant, i.e. by means of a redundant station battery.
Even in a non redundant system critical data like com
mands and interlocking states are secured for safety
reasons by two hardware channels from/to the pro
cess and appropriate information redundancy on the
communication system. These two channels as well
as the timely updating of needed information are
supervised, and a fault leads to an invalid state or
blocking of command execution. Even if a part of the
system fails, the system-wide functions can continue
to operate safely, but eventually with restricted
scope of function (graceful degradation). Note that
such an invalid state or blocking shall only be reset
by human intervention, to avoid that a second failure
can endan ger the safety.
If a higher availability is needed, then redundant (dupli
cated) devices or modules can be used. It should
however be kept in mind that redundancy introduces
more hardware, i.e. the overall failure rate and there
fore repair activity is duplicated, and that redundant
devices mostly need some additional, often not re-
.

·
dundant hardware for supervision and switchover.
Redundancy can be introduced:
• At station level by redundant servers
and
HMI devices.
• At the inter-bay bus by redundant power supplies
and duplicated lines between star couplers and
to station level.
• At bay level by redundant control devices
and several protection devices.
• At process bus level by duplicated PISAs/RIOs
together with duplicated protection devices. In
this case each protection system needs its own
physical process bus.
A prerequisite to achieve higher availability is that
even inactive redundant hardware parts (spares,
standby parts etc) are regularly supervised and repair
ed in case of a failure. Experience with electronics
shows that the failure rate on unused equipment is
as high as on normally used (not overloaded) equip
ment.
As indicated below, there are different possibilities
how redundancy can be used or which class of
redundancy is needed in the system under the
consi deration of the length of the down time and
loss of historical data. The choice depends on the
availability required, the functions considered as well
as the struc ture level. What kind of redundancy is
the recom mended will be explained further below.
• Spare parts: diagnosis and repair of faulty parts
inclusive reloading of configuration data by trained
people can be done in less than 2 hours in case
of bay or process level devices, less than 4 h for
station level devices. But, the traveling time to site
should be short.
• Cold standby: a standby hardware device exists,
which is physically connected and preconfigured
(but it may be used for other purpose). In case of
a failure the operational software is started
manually. Start up time is in the order of 5 to 1 0 8.9.1
minutes, archived data on the failed part, which
has not been secured, is probably lost.
• Warm standby: a standby part constantly
super vises the active (hot) component. In case of
a failure it takes over automatically. There is a
small risk that time stamped events may be lost,
but all archived data is preserved, and commands
are reusable after 1 0 - 30 sec. If the failed
system
is repaired and put to standby mode again, its
archive and configuration data is automatically
updated.
• Hot standby: a standby part constantly super
vises the active (hot) component. In case of a
failure it takes over. No time stamped events are
lost, no archived data is lost, and commands are
reusable after 1- 5 sec. If the failed system is
repaired and put to standby mode again, its archive
and configuration data is automatically updated.
In the case of bay devices where the switchover
times are usually below 100 ms, this
switchover is called bumpless.
• Duplicated Components: two devices are
running in parallel (hot). This means: commands
are always usable at least on one of them. But
configuration data, event- and alarm lists as well
as archived data may be and mostly are different,
resulting from different operations at the systems.
Further a special management for common
resources (e.g. serial connections, event loggers) is
needed. The two hot systems may supervise each
other to give an alarm if the other system fails.
Warm and hot standby systems need a manual
switch over function to be able to perform
maintenance. This allows a controlled shut down of
the hot system and the communication, so that even
on a warm standby system no events are lost, and
the data integrity of the shut down system for later
upcoming is guaran
. ·
teed.
169
Net Operator
wor Remote
k workplace
cont workplace
rol
cent
er

8.9.2
Hardcopy
Printer
b .F

Alarm/EVent
Printer
Ethernet (TCP/1 P)

:·

Protection
Protection
Unit ·

Unit

Third Transmission Distribution level

party level
Protecti
on
Figure 8-8 Functional redundancy configuration

It has to be kept in mind, that availability
considera tions always refer to the availability of
a function with in the whole system. This
concerns usually the control function, if not other
functions are specified. Control as a system
function is regarded to be available even if one
bay has failed, as this has only seldom an
impact on the interlocking scheme. If this
would be the case, it could be circumvented by
means of the interlocking override function.
8.9.2 Functional
Redundancy
pletely independent from all station level units.
This concept in conjunction with a redundant
power sup ply in the star couplers (which are
the possible single point of failure in this
system) assures a very high availability for the
control function. The NCC control io:; functionally
redundant to station level control, which is, on
the other hand, functionally redundant to bay
level control. If the availability of control from the
NCC is an issue, then installing a separate
remote work place at the NCC, which is directly
connected to the SA server, could enhance this.
This workplace can be used e.g. over the
telephone network in case the NCC server
connection is disturbed.

The Figure 8-8 shows a single SA system, where
the SCS server and the station level HMI use
another hardware device than the NCC server.
Both servers are completely independent from
each other, al though they supervise each
170 other. Further, the interlocking function across
the interbay bus is com-
The separate protection devices, which are
connect ed to the NCC server, are not relevant
for the control function, they are however not
available if the NCC server fails. Usually, remote
control is the more impor tant function. This is
the reason why they are connect ed to the NCC
server.
. '-?
In case that the station level operation is most impor
tant, they might be connected to the SA server
instead.
The time synchronization task of the clock master
(CM) could also be taken over by the SA server, but
possibly with less synchronization accuracy against
absolute time. An alternative would be to duplicate
the satellite/radio master clock
Due to the interlocking override functionality, the
con trol can be regarded as available even in case
that one bay control unit fails.
8.9.3 Physical Redundancy
Physical redundancy means duplication of critical devic
es. This can be done in different ways, depending on
the level of system/function availability required. It
has
to 9e noted that physical redundancy of the secon
dary equipment should be accompanied by a dupli
cation of the auxiliary power supply, e.g. a battery
backup system or uninterruptible power system
(UPS). This is, however, not investigated here any fur
ther, as it is normally outside the delivery scope of a
secondary system itself. Nevertheless, this aspect has
to be taken into account for the sake of the overall
availability, as it does not make sense to have a high
ly redundant SA system and the system power sup-
ply is a single point of failure. · however, make sense if NCC server and SCS server
8.9.3. 7 NCC Connection
Dependent on the needs of the network control
cen
ter different levels of redundancy can be employed:
• Double NCC connection (lines) with its own
modems, but one server line interface only:
Two modems on two NCC connection lines from
the NCC server are connected to one serial inter
face of the SA system. This serial interface sends
to both modems, its receiver is connected to the
modems with a switch, which is controlled by the
NCC server via the RS232 control wires. The server
switches its receiver to another modem, if it does
not receive any signal for a certain time. Further it
switches the receiver e.g. once a day to supervise,
if both lines are working.
8.9.3.
3
• Two serial lines at the server: The NCC 8.9.3
always sends on both lines and selects one
receiver.
The NCC server listens and responds on both
lines to all received requests, but uses only one
line (on which it receives requests) for activating
commands.
• Two NCC servers: in this case a hot-hot confi
guration with supervision is used, as there is no
problem with event lists and archives. The NCC
sends on both lines and selects one for receiving.
Both servers respond to received requests, but
only one of them executes received commands.
In case that one server does no longer receive
messages, the other one gets the command
responsibility. For better transparency (e.g. if the
connection of the command responsible server
to the NCC is lost, this can only be detected by
the NCC) the NCC could have the possibility to
determine which of the two servers shall execute
the commands.
Note: a redundant NCC server which is connected to
only one NCC line connection normally makes no
sense from the system availability point of view. It may,
run combined on the same hardware, thus also offer
ing a redundant station level HMI. In this case, a
warm or hot standby solution is recommended (see
also next chapter).
8.9.3.2 Station level
Here it can be distinguished between SCS server re
dundancy and HMI (terminal) redundancy.
• In case that consistent configuration and archives
are important, a warm standby configuration is
chosen. in case that under no circumstances time
stamped events shall be lost, a hot standby system
is needed.
• In case that configuration and archive consistency
is not so important, a duplicated hot-hot system 171
 can be applied. This allows to have different
confi gurations on both servers, e.g. for
testing configu ration changes/extensions or
new functions only on one server, while
operation is performed by
the other server. The process database on both
172
systems is always up to date, so that in case
of a shut down of one server the other one
can continue giving commands without
interruption. The management of common
resources like disturbance archive, NCC
connections, event log printers etc must
however be specified and engineered on a
per project base. Archives may be different
(although equivalent) even if both systems
are operating, and holes in one archive
during shut down are not automatically filled
on system startup. Event lists are different,
because e.g. commands and alarm
acknowledges are logged only on the
executing system, and opera tional
parameters like measurand limits and dead
band may be different if they are
interactively changed during operation of
the system.
• In case of HMI devices like terminals and
printers always duplicated components shall
be chosen.
If more than one physical device (PC) exists,
pre ferably an HMI terminal should run on
each of them (e.g. one on the hot system
and one on the standby system). Additional
terminals can be added as X-Terminal devices
at the station bus. The supervision of the
HMI hardware like screen, keyboard and
mouse has to be done by the human users.
The Figure 8-9 shows a standard
configuration, where NCC server and SCS server
are running on the same physical server. The
redundancy is configured as a hot standby
system. Therefore each physical ser ver is
connected to an alarm unit, the master clock,
and with a fall back switch to the NCC line and
to the serial communication to bay devices
with master slave protocol. Printers and a third
HMI are connec ted to both servers with the
station bus. This means that the printing
function is not redundant, but has a high
reliability, as no (electromechanical) switches are
used. The redundatlcy of the time
synchronization is assured (except for the
satellite/radio clock itself), because the SCS
server can take over synchroniza tion in case
that the inter-bay bus master clock fails,
Networ1<: Operator
control wor1<:place 2
center
! ...
although eventually .with reduced accuracy. If a
high accuracy across the system is needed to
fulfill its func tionality (e.g. for distributed
synchrocheck), then a second bus master
clock should be used. If high accuracy
against absolute time is mandatory, even the
satellite/radio clocks themselves should be
dupli cated.
8.9.3.3 Inter Bay
Communication
The behavior of inter bay communication
depends a lot on the type of bus that is used,
and how it is phy sically implemented. The
following example assumes that the
communication network distributes messa ges
only on physical level. Schemes with redundant
communication might have to be designed
different ly, if the physical network includes
switches and rou ters, which are also complex
electronic devices. An appropriate example is
shown in Figure 8-13.
The inter-bay communication scheme
discussed below consists physically of star
couplers that inter connect the bay and station
level devices by means of optical links (Figure
8-9). Within the passive star couplers the
physical bus consists of wires with an
availability of practically 100 %, and for each
connect ed device there is one opto-electrical
converter. So the common points of failure of
the star coupler are:
• The power supply. This can and should
be duplicated, and (if possible) each
power supply supplied from another
power source.
• A common mode failure of the
opto electrical converters to the
bus. This probability can be neglected,
if the couplers are carefully designed.
• A failure on one line (e.g.
permanent
light), which blocks the whole star
coupler. This is prevented by appropriate
design of the star coupler converter
modules.
Operator Remote Optional
wor1<:place 1 wor1<:place Operator
wor1<:place

Protection Protection Protection
Uriit Unit Unit
Third party Transmission level
Protection
Figure 8-9 Hot Standby Configuration
The optical glass fibers have practically an availability
of 100 %, unless they are endangered by a special
environmental aspect like frequent construction work.
In such a case the links to the station level devices
and betvveen star couplers should be duplicated and
laid in separately routed cable channels, and they
should be supervised to detect interruptions.
8.9.3.4 Bay level
The usage of redundant control units is possible, al
though in most cases not necessary. A functional
redundancy (e.g. emergency circuit breaker control
with use of protection devices) is sufficient in most
cases, if redundancy is needed at all. Apart from this,
a possibility for either direct switchgear control or a
backup panel can already provide the means for
emergency control.
Redundant protection, however, is necessary at least
on HV transmission level. On the functional level this
means the usual duplication of protection device as
.,:...} .
8.9.3.5
··· scs -> ·
HMI system: .:
Distribution level
a main1, main 2, and backup protection. This practice
results not only in physical but also in functional redun
dancy, if different protection algorithms are employ
ed for the main 1 and main 2 protection.
8.9.3.5 Redundancy on process bus
If a process bus is used, it should be redundant, in
particular in case of redundant protection, and also
the most critical PISAs (for a,
VT and circuit breaker)
should be duplicated. A simple way is to provide a
dedicated process bus and dedicated PISAs for each
bay device together with redundant bay devices.
More sophisticated ways of how to achieve redun
dancy depend on the process bus type.
If redundancy on PISA level is considered, then the
failure rate of the PISA has to be compared with the
failure rate of the sensor. Often the PISA electronics
has a much higher reliability than the sensor. Then
redundancy makes only sense if also the sensors are
duplicated. 173
 Network Control Center

Nc' ·' ( wr

.- . - serveF·
8.9.3.6

-;;;-
P rot

-
ectio n

star coopier ,---

I
I

control Prdt!ed:ion Control

Bay 1 Bayt.: Bay; - BayN

Figure 8-7 0 SA configuration for Availability calculation

i,.•.

8.9.3.6 Availability calculation examples

Availability normally refers to a function. Therefore it

must be defined what system availability really shall
means. In the following example the availability cal
culations refer to the availability of the control func . '?
tion from station level or from remote. It is further
assumed that the control function is considered as
available, if one, but not more than one bay is no
long er controllable from station level or from
remote. The calculation uses the form of
availability diagrams, where the components that
are used together to perform a function are put in
series, and the redun dant components are put in
parallel. The first system is described in chapter 8.9.2,
Figure 8-9. The configu ration is however reduced to
that shown in the Figure
8-10.

We assume 18 bays with bay controllers (BCU), one

station level SA seNer and one NCC seNer inclusive
gateway function. The system needs one star coup
ler with 20 lines, which works on the physical level of
the communication stack and therefore has a high
reliability. To enhance this reliability even further, i.e. to
fulfill the single failure criterion, a redundant power
supply is used in the star coupler. The following table
174 lists typical MTIF times in hours of the used compo
nents. It is a typical example for a system built from
h omponents as currently available from
i protection system manufacturers.
g
h In the following the availability
l diagrams are shown for the single
y parts, up to the whole system.
The bus system (Table 8-2) consists of
r the star coup ler with redundant
e power supply. The opto-electronic
l converters on both sides of an
i optical line are from the availability
a point of view combined with the
b opti cal line to an 'optical connection'.
l This is put in series with the
e • The resulting mean time to failure (MTIF) of
connected components, i.e. not seen
at the star coupler availability
c
diagram. The rest of the star coupler is passive and
can therefore be neglected.
Mean time to failure (MTIF) is the statistical time until
the component needs repair. MTIF with repair means
the statistical time until a second failure appears at
the same time before the first fault is fixed and the
whole system is declared unavailable, despite of im
mediate repair of any faulted components (e.g. within
8 hours).
The availability diagram Table 8-2 show- the calcula l.
ted J'.'ai!abi!ity of the redundant power supply of the
star coupler, which is a critical part of the bus system:
the system (without any previous repair of failed
redundant components) is 342 years.
 Device type MTIF(h} MTIF(y} Failure rate(lh }

"Star coupler Pows:· 1 500 000 171 6.666666666666667E-7

"optconnection" 11 750 000 1341 8.51 063829787234E-8

"NCC Server" 251 000 28.7 3.98406374501992E-6

"SCS Server" 251 000 28.7 3.98406374501992 8.9.3.6

"HMI Console" 87 600 10 1.141552511415525E-5

"BCU" 850 000 97 1.176470588235294E-6

"NCC Modem" 100 000 11.4 1.0E-5

"Industrial-proof Ethernet switch" *) 438 000 50 2.2E-6 *)

*) it should be noted that with the fast increasing use of switches in industrial applications, the MTIF will be improved
continuously.

• All 749 999 hours (= 65 years) a repair has • MTIF with repair: 8
to be performed. years
• If the repair can be made within an a mean • Availability: 99.9887 %
time to repair (MTIR) of 8 hours, the MTIF with
In case that fibers could be damaged, or faster
repair that can be achieved is
aging plastic fibers were used, this would have to be
321 065 years.
taken into consideration accordingly.
• The corresponding availability with repair is
NCC gateway single
99.99999999 %. MTTF(h):710n (y): 8.113858180MTTF for repair(h): 71077
MTTR(h)8.0 MTTF(y) with repair: 8.113668881
Availability(%): with repair: 99.98874566 no component repair: 99.98874593
opt.connection NCC Server NCCModem
• If a repair is only done in the case the system MTTF(h):11750000 MTTF(h)251000 MTTF(h)100000

fails, i.e. if both power supplies have failed, the

corre sponding availability without repair is
99.9997%
and the corresponding MTIF is 342 years, as Table 8-3 Availability of a network control center
mentioned under the first bullet. (NCC) server

Bus system
Table 8-4 shows the availability figures for the HMI
MTIF(h)3000000(y): 342.4657534 MTTF for repair(h): 749999 part, which consists of the SA server and the HMI
MTIR(h)8.0 MTTF(y) with repair: 32106512.61
Availability(%): with repair. 99.99999999 no component repair. 99.99973333 console, and is connected to the star coupler similar
star coupler PS [ as the NCC server above:
MTIF(h):1500000 r
• MTIF with repair: 7 years
star coupler PS
• Availability: 99.987 %
MTIF(h):1500000

HMI part single

MTTF(h)64579 (y): 7.372134185MTTF for repair(h): 64579
Table 8-2 Availability of a redundant star coupler MTTR(h)8.0 MTTF(y) with repair: 7.371955975 --
Availability(%): with repa1r: 99.98761347 no component repair: 99.98761377
opt.connection SCS Server HM! Ccn c!c
MTTF(h):11750000 MTTF(h)251000 MTTF(h)87600
The diagram in Table 8-3 shows the availability of the
NCC server, which is connected to the star coupler via
optical fibers, i.e. two opto-electric converters plus the
connecting glass fibers, with an assumed availability
of the fiber of 100 %.
·
Table 8-4 Availability figures of the human machine
interface (HMI)

175

· '?

The Table 8-5 shows the availability figures of bay • The second one, MTIF with repair of 8 years,
control units (BCU) which are also connected via the is the resulting system MTIF, if any failure is
optical fibers to the star coupler: repaired within in average the MTIR of 8 hours.
• MTIF with repair: 90 • MTIF between any repairs 26239
years hours
• Availability: 99.99899074 % = 2.99 years

The second MTIF is longer,.because of the high pro

=CU+opt.
MTfF(h):792658 (y): 90.48615641MTfF for repair(h): 792658 bability that the system remains available during the
MTIR(h/;8.0 . MTIF(y) with repair. 90.48609895
Avallab11ty(%): With repa1r. 99.99899074 no component repair. 99:99899074 repair of a redundant component, e,g. during the
BCU opt.connection replacement of a star coupler power supply, or a
MTfF(h):850000 MTIF(h):11750000
bay control unit For the single system above these
figu
res are more or less identical, due to the fad that the ! •
Table 8-5 Availability figures of the bay control
most critical part is the sta!ion level NCC gateway.
units (BCU)

If, however, independent seNers for the NCC connec

tion and for the station level HMI are provided
8.9.3.6 From the availability figures of the individual instead, as shown in the Figure 8-10, this is regarded
compo nents the availability of a small system, for the control function as redundancy, and the cor
where the NCC gateway function runs on the SA responding availability figures obtained are indicated
seNer, is shown in Table 8-6. It has not been taken in Table 8-7.
into account that
control from NCC could be possible even without the • MTIF with repair: 30 903 years
HMI console, and that the SA seNer could run • MTIF for 2.13 years
with out modem to NCC. so the calculation below repair: 99.99999704 %
is a worst case consideration. • Availability:

For the bay controllers we assume that the system =unci.Redundancy

MTTF(h): 112405 (\1): 12.83171046 MTTF lor repair(h): 18658
is available if not more than one of them has MTTR(h): 8.0 MTTF(\1) wilh repair. 30903.51988
Availabilily(%): with repair. 99.99999704 no componenlrepair: 99.99288343
failed. Therefore the (n-1) of n condition is
BCU+opl.
maintained. MTTF(h): 839285

• MTIF with repair: 8 years (n-1) oln: 18

• Availability: 99.9887%

=ingle System Table 8-7 Availability figures with separate HMI

MTTF(h): 64127 (y): 7.320463234 MTTF for repair(h): 26239
MTTR(h): 8.0 MTTF(y) with repair. 8.112543568 and Gateway server to NCC
Availabllily("h>): with repair. 99.98874410 no component repair. 99.98752636

BCU+apt Bussr. tem NCC gateway single

MTTF(h):839285 MTTF(h): 3000000 MTTF(h):7f077
(n-1) ofn: 18
The availability with repair has drastically gone up,
Table 8-6 Availability figures of a small SA system however the average time between any component
repairs (MTIF for repair) has gone down, because of
the fad that the quantity of components involved
has increased.
In the diagram we find two MTIF times.
• The first one of 7 years is the system In order to obtain real redundancy for remote control,
MTIF, if it is operated without any repair until a redundant station HMI is installed at the NCC as
176 it fails entirely. shown in the Figure 8-12.
 Network Control Center

8.9.3.6

A
Control ProteCti<).ri
Protection BayN ····.··
Bay1
Bay 1

Figure 8-11 SA system with NCC GW and station HMI redundancy

Network Control Center_.•••

Remote
•:Jt
I .? F:t"t'

HMI :··
Modem
L_Telephone networ1<
Aif Modem/
NCC (GW)
server
:a ;mA-r
C
server t m- ·· '

Star coupler
45
Control
Protection
Bayt
• Bay;1

Figure 8-12 SA system, functional redundant with remote HMI at NCC

It is assumed that this is PC based, having the • MTIF with repair: 47359 years
same MTIF as the SCS server with HMI and two
• MTIF for repair: 1.63 years
modems. The resulting availability figures are
indicated in Table • Availability: 99.9999807 %
177
8-8.
 =ingle Sys, rem.HMI
MTTF(h): 130945 (y): 14.94816226 MTTF for repair(h): 14286
MTTR(h): 8.0 MTTF(y) with repair: 47359.69576
Availabilily(Ok): with repair: 99.99999807 no component repair: 99.99389098

BCU+opl MTTF(h): Vsus system SCS server+opt SYS500MMI

839285 (n-1) of n: MTTF(h): 300000J . MTTF(h): 245280 MTTF{h): 87600
8.9.3.6 18
.

Remote PC+Modem
MTTF(h): 61000

CC gateway single
MTTF(h): 71077

Table 8-8 Availability figures with redundant NCC workplace for control

As can be seen, this measure changes the availability
figures only marginally, but it provides genuine redun
dant remote control.
The calculation in Table 8-9 is made for a system
where both, NCC server and SA server run on the
same but duplicated computers (Figure 8-11). A seri
al switch and a modem are used at each server but
the NCC connection between the two PCs has to be
switched over. The resulting availability figures are:
• MTIF with repair: 23 years
• MTIF for repair: 1.42 years
• Availability: 99.99599444 %
Due to the relatively low MTIF of the serial switch the
overall availability of control from NCC is much lower
than for the system with remote HMI above. On the
other hand, there is also only one communication line
required. This example shows the high impact of com
mon/voting equipment in case of redundant com
munication. The provision of either a more reliable
switch or a second communication line to avoid swit
ching can help to obtain reliability figures that are clos
er to the above ones.
Only a slightly higher availability could be achieved if
the HMI part (screen, keyboard etc.) or the modems
would be switched (e.g. by manual plugging) bet-

=
MTTF(h 901 (y): 5.924858153 MTTF forrepair(h): 12498
MTT h :8.0 MTTF(y) with re air: 22.79846674
Availa · ): with repair: 99.9 9444 no component repair: 99.98458863
Bus em Serial Swtlch HM arts Modem
BCUll
MTTF ):839285 MT F(h): 9 MTTF(h):100000 -
MTT (h):3000000 MTTF(h):200000
(n-1)o n: 18

HMI part single Modem

MTTF(h):64579 MTTF(h):100000

178 Table 8-9 Availability figures for SA and NCC server on the same but redundant PC
 Network Control Center
q;_

NCC(GW)
server - : scs serJci' 8.9.3.6.1

Switch
...... Switch.'

A••I'W'Switc h -- • ., {witc_..h.).liiii.-
'Proteeti.on
--Bay 1..
Control
Bayl
...... Protection
Bay N
coiiff6i
Bay·N_ -
Figure 8- 7 3 Ethernet ring configuration

ween the two computers. An automatic switching
would further reduce availability due to the common
component
8.9.3.6.1 System availability for Ethernet
based station level
communication equipment
from the availabiiity modeling point of view, this is
similar to a 1 out of n BCU configuration plus
switch at the lower layer, and PC plus switch at
the station layer The protection IEDs are disregarded
for the con trol function. A bus system as such is,
however, no longer needed, as all communication
goes around the ring, which is regarded as faulty
only if at least two switches ha;e failed (1 out of n
of Bay).

For the calculation of system availability for an Ether

net based station level equipment it is assumed that
the bay control units and the station level = NCC gateway
hardware as such have the same MTIF as in MlTF(h)61473 (yl:
MTTR(hJl.O
7.017524239\ATTF for repair(h): 61473
MTTF(y) with repair: 7.017276565
the previous examples. This might not necessarily be Availability(%): wi1h repa1r: 99.98698749 no component repair:99.98698795

true because Switch NCC Server NCC Modem

MTTF(h OOO MTTF(h)251000 MTTF(h)100000
of the fact that the reliability of commercially available
Ethernet chips is relatively low. This can also be seen
from the fact that Ethernet based routers and swit
ches for office environment have a MTIF between
5 and 20 years. Only recently special industrial swit
=CU+SWitch
ches for redundant Ethernet rings with an MTIF MTTF(h):289052_ M: 32.99689440MTIF for repair(h): 289052
MTTR(ht8.0 MTTF(y) with re_pair. 32.99668946 . .
around 50 years have appeared on the market but Availability(%): with repa1r. 99.99723239 no component repe1r._ 99.99723241
with continuous increasing MTIF. We consider in the BCU
SWitch
MTIF(h):438000
MTTF(h):850000
following calculation a redundant Ethernet ring confi
guration (Figure 8-13) with such a switch at each
con nected control device. All these switches are
connect
ed with glass fibers to a ring. Again the availability of
the glass fiber itself is regarded to be 100 %.
Thus ,
Table 8-7 0 Availability figures of an Ethernet based
station level equipment

179

'?
'?
 with the substation and often also a station level HMI
with the distributed 1/0 units (Figure 8-4).

In order to have a system that is comparable to the

SA systems described above, it is assumed that the
RTU is distributed to save cabling costs. This means,
8.9.3.6.2 From these components we calculate the availability that a central unit handles the communication via mo
for those configurations above with the highest avai dem to the NCC, and via serial interface or Ethernet
lability. to a local HMI.
• MTIF with 7379 years The central unit further hosts the control specific logic
repair: functionality, as long as it is not faster than 100 ms,
1 years
• MTIF for repair: and the distributed 1/0 units are connected either
99.99987% point to point or via star couplers, as well as the bay
• Availability:
level protection devices. We further assume 18 bays
which leads to 18 distributed 1/0 units and protection

=_Sv.ltem, rem.HMI
MTTF(h): 95102 (y): 10.85641651 MTTF forrepair(h): 8873 devices, which corresponds to the number of the
MTTR(h) 8.0 MTTF (y) wilh repair 7379 092508
Availability(%): wilh repair. 99.99998762 no component repair. 99.99158870 bays of the SA systern.
SCS se!Ver+SwOCh SYS500MMI
BCU+Swil:h MTTF(h): 157680 MTTF(h) 87600 In view of the high processing power required at the
MTTF(h):
(n-1) ofn: 18
central part. we assume a higher integrated device
with more electronic chips and therefore -regard the
Remote PC+Modem
MTTF(h): 61000 MTIF by 25% lower than for a bay unit. For the dis
tributed 1/0 units that are simpler we assume a 25 %
E_NCC gateway
higher iviTTF. Further, we assume point-to-point opti
MTTF(h): 61473 cal connections to the distributed 1/0 units. This might
not be practical for 20 or more connections, but it
leads to better reliability figures than if an additional
Table 8-11 Availability figures of a complete system central star coupler or switch was implemented.
including communication availability

All these assumptions lead to the following

availabi lity figures. For the distributed 1/0 unit with
The result is clear: system MTIF (with repair) decreas
es from 43000 years down to 73UO years. Further, optical connection:
the MTIF between repairs goes down from around MTIF with repair: 110 years
14000 h (1.6 y) to around 8800 hours (1y). These MTIF for repair: 110 years
re
sults show the high impact of the communication Availability: 99.999%
system reliability on the overall system availability.
However, the general availability also in this case is for
=tO unit+opt.
most applications good enough.
MTTF(h)9 867 (y): 110.0305008MTTF for repair(h): 963867 ·
MTTR(hJl.O MTTF(y) with repair: 110.0304320 ..
Availability(%): with repair:99.99917001 no compoQent repair:99.999170..e,1 .
IOunit oot.connection
MTTF(h)1050000 MTTF(h)j 1750000
8,9.3.6.2 Systemavailabi/ity
of a distributed RTU

An RTU based control system can be central, or dis

tributed. The distributed RTU is a system with a cen Table 8-12 Availability figures for 110 unit in distributed
RTU system
180 tral point that connects the network control centers
 8.9.3.6.2
=RTU system
MTTF(h):l16230 (y): 13.26829202/ITTF for repair(h): 21854
MTTR(h)8.0 MTTF(y) with re air: 74.07761248
Availallility(%): with repa1r: 99.998 6719 no component repair:99.99311758

Vlo unit+oflt.
MTTF(h) 020565
RTUbase
MTTF(h)650000
Modem
MTTF(h):l 00000
(n-1)ofn: 18

SCS server HMI console

MTTF(h)251000 MTTF(h)86500

Table 8-7 3 Availability figures for a redundant control via NCC and local HMI

The RTU system with redundant control via NCCI Further for the comparison of the architectures it was
modem and via local HMI. not considered how the synchrocheck functionality is
• MTIF with repair: 74 implemented in a system with distributed RTU. Very
years often one central device is taken for synchrocheck,
which is then switched to the relevant CB that has to
• MTIF for repair: 2.5
be closed. This synchrocheck device would, however,
years
introduce a further single point of failure, which does
• Availability: 99.9876 not exist in a distributed SA system, where the syn
% chrocheck function runs on each BCU or protection
device.
If we compare RTU based systems with an SA system
that incorporates functional redundancy, we find that
the MTIF of RTU based systems without repair is
slightly better (13 years instead of 12 years), but the
MTTF with repair is drastically lower (74 years
instead of 30903 years) due to the RTU base
being the one single point of failure.

We must further consider, that the SA system addi

tionally includes a (backup) protection, and a
syn chrocheck function within each bay unit. Both is
not considered here for the availability calculations of
the RTU system.

The protection could have an impact on the

control functionality if the control of a bay is to be
181
blocked as soon as the protection is out of order.
This has not been considered in all configurations,
because the impact would have been the same.
. ·
 8.1 0 References

8.10 [1] G. W. Scheer, D. A. Woodward·Speed and Reliability of Ethernet networks for Teleprotection
and Control, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories Inc (SEL), 2001

[2] G. W. Scheer, D. J. Dolezilek ·Comparing the reliability of Ethernet network topologies in Substation
control and Monitoring Networks, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories Inc (SEL),
(Western Power Delivery Automation Conference 2000, Spokane, Washington), 2000

[3] L. Andersson, K.-P. Brand, W. Wimmer · The impact of the coming standard /EC67850
on the life cycle of Open Communication Systems in Substations,
Distribution 2001, Brisbane, Australia, November 2001

[4] L. Andersson, K.-P. Brand, W. Wimmer · The communication standard IEC67850 supports flexible
and optimised substation automation architectures, Integrated Protection, Control and Communication
Experience, Benefits and Trends, Session IV - Communication for protection and control.
(pages IV-17 to IV-23), New Delhi, India, 10-12 October 2001.

[5] T. Skeie, S. Johannessen, 0. Holmeide · Highly Accurate Time Synchronization over Switched Ethernet
In Proceedings of 8th IEEE Conference on Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation (ETFA'01),
pages 195-204, 2001.

[6] T. Skeie, S. Johannessen, and C. Brunner· Ethernet in Substation Automation, IEEE Control Systems
Magazine, 22(3): 43-51, June 2002

[7] K.-P. Brand, K. Frei, 0. Preiss, W. Wimmer ·A coordinated Control and Protection Concept
Medium Voltage Substations and its Realization, CIRED 1991

[8] 0. Preiss, W Wimmer · Goals and Realization of an Integrated Substation Control System,
DPSP&C 1994, Peking, 1994

[9] EWICS TC7, Dependability of critical computer systems, Elsevier Applied Science, London, 1988

[10] CIGRE - Technical Report, Ref. No.180 · Communication requirements in terms of data flow
within substations. CE/SC 34 03, 2001, 112 pp. Ref. No

182

. ·
9 Asset Management Support

9 Asset Management Support 184 9

9.1 Setting new business goals 185 Table of
9.1.1 T&D Business Perspective 185 Content
9.1.2 The Impact on Industrial Customers 185
9.2 Maintenance 186
9.2.1 Kinds of Maintenance 186
9.2.2 Change of Paradigm for Maintenance 186
9.2.3 Principles of Reliability Centered Maintenance 186
9.2.4 Benefits of RCM in the Electric Utility Industry 187
9.3 Power system monitoring 187
9.3.1 Data acquisition 188
9.3.2 Substation monitoring changes data into information 189
9.3.3 Disturbance recording for fault location and power quality assessment 189
9.3.4 Power system condition assessment for better knowledge 192
9.4 Monitoring of Substation Automation System 192
9.4.1 Different levels of monitoring 192
9.4.2 Self-supervision of devices 193
9.4.3 Supervision of communication 194
9.4.4 The connection to central monitoring systems 194
9.5 References 196

183
 9 Asset Management Support
9 Asset management in the broadest sense is the opti
mal management of all assets of a company accord
ing to the company goals. In this book we consider
transmission and distribution (T&D) utility companies,
and restrict to the assets necessary to supply power
to the utility customers, i.e:
• The power network consisting of lines and
substation primary equipment
• The protection system
• The network control system
• The substation automation systems (SA)
The protection system can be seen as part of the SA
system, and the network control system is outside
the scope of the book, but its asset character may be
treated similar as the SA system. Therefore, the asset
Maintenance
Figure 9-7 Facets of asset management in relation
184 to utility specific activities
management support discussed in this chapter is
focused on:
• The power system
• The protection system
• The SA system
The task of utilities is to supply power. The focus of
the detailed company goals might change due to
deregulation. Government owned utilities put the
focus on reliable power supply, while privatized utili
ties will focus rnore on return on investment The
asset management policy is influenced by the com
pany goals, policies and resulting strategies.
Figure 9-1 tries to give an overview on the depen
dencies between utility activities to illustrate the diffe-
L I
t

rF-nt facets of asset management Thin arrows deno
te goal setting and planning process dependencies,
while thick arrows denote possible information flow
during day to day business.
Asset management in the narrower sense focuses
around maintenance of the power system, power
system development planning, and the coordination
of these activities with operation to assure retrieval of
data about equipment state and strain for optimized
maintenance and new planning, as well as coopera
tion between maintenance and operation for mini
mal power interruption and safe working procedures.
9.1 Setting new business goals
The focus on return on investment (ROI) caused by
deregulation leads to a trend to seek for more effi
cient, more accurate, more economical ways of pro
viding T&D services:
• The implementation of communication networking
within and between substations allows for faster
access to intelligent electronic devices (lED) via
high-speed wide area networks and communi
cation via public networks, providing the means
to obtain more data about equipment state and
equipment usage.
• The microprocessors used in relaying,
SCADA
systems and other equipment provides more,
and more accurate real-time information from the
substations to maintenance and planning centers.
This will drive automation down to distribution
level. with major system architectures focused on
distribution optimization.
The formation of independent system operators ISO
and power exchange organizations represents a pro
found change in the way electricity is brought to mar
ket
9.1.1 T & D Business Perspective
Today, utilities show a growing need for support and
training services when tackling substation automation
and integration programs. This results in the
change of equipment specification from yesterday's 9.1
largely utility specific requirements to today's
national and international standards. In future, the
needs for long term maintenance agreements,
commissioning, and installation and design
services will extend these requirements.
9.1.2 The lmpad on Industrial Customers
The quality and reliability of power supply is of
vital importance to the utility customer business.
The impact of voltage sags, surges and outages on
po wer systems can be translated into heavy
economic impact in terms of lost production time
and product waste. The topic is prominently
addressed in interna tional organizations like IEEE,
lEE, Cigre and CIRED.
The reason for all the interest and concern is the con
tinuing increase in overall load sensitivity. Industrial
operations of modern plants are built around sophi
sticated electronic controls that are negatively affect
ed by poor power quality. Further a lot of industrial
processes rely on energy for a specific period of
time, otherwise the production process will be
disturbed resulting in high losses. While today most
customers work with their local utility to resolve
power quality issues, it is unclear if this arrangement
works in dere gulated electricity markets. A possible
solution is the accurate monitoring of power quality,
and including quality requirements into pricing as
well as penalties. Another solution is that the
industrial customer builds up his own emergency
power generation and swit ches over the power
supply to obtain the needed power quality at least
for his most sensitive proces ses.
Maintaining power quality to the_level needed is not
only a consequence of correct operation, but also of
maintenance. In the following, a closer look will be
taken into maintenance and the supporting monito
185
ring functions in the operational part.
 9.2 Maintenance or periodically as good as possible, and based
on the result it is dedded when the preventive
maintenance has to take place.

The advantage of preventive maintenance is that it

can be scheduled in advance at times when the influ-
9.2 9.2.1 Kinds of Maintenance ences on operation are minimal, and that failures are
avoided and the impact of outages due to the main-
The task of maintenance is to handle any failures that tenance activities is kept at minimum. The
additional influence the power system operation. These are fai- advantage of condition based
maintenance is, that lures in the primary equipment as well as in the con- unnecessary maintenance or
diagnostics are avoided. trol and protection equipment, and also in power These activities not only
cost money, but can even system design and protection or control system cause outages resulting
from errors during the main- design respectively. Failures are typically caused by tenance process itself.
• component aging
• human (operation or maintenance work) errors 9.2.2 Change of Paradigm for Maintenance
• system design errors of power system, protection
system or control system T&D equipment design and maintenance require-
ments have significantly changed over the past years. !
• environmental influences and incidents like
These changes have been driven by the enormous
thunderstorms, or power demand exceeding
increase in the number and types of equipment that
generation.
must be maintained, the increasing complexity in
All failures that directly influence the business goals equipment design, and the availability of new main-
have to be handled and repaired as fast as possible, tenance techniques. Maintenance strategies have
to keep losses by power system unavailability as also been responding to changing equipment
small as possible. This kind of maintenance is called performance expectations. This includes the growing
repair or corrective maintenance. awareness of the extent to which equipment failure
affects safety and the environment as well as the
If the aging of components is known, aging parts can relationship between maintenance and product or
be replaced before the equipment as a whole fails. service quality, and the increasing pressure to reduce
This is called preventive maintenance. Preventive costs.
maintenance can be done in different ways:
Under this condition, a new strategic approach to
• Scheduled maintenance: worn out parts are maintenance that has been successfully applied in
cleaned or replaced periodically, i.e. the mainte- the commercial aviation and nuclear power industries
nance time is scheduled in advance. Typical is Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM).
examples for secondary equipment are replace
ment of batteries and cleaning or replacement of
dust filters. For complex primary equipment often 9.2.3 Principles of Reliability Centered
a diagnosis is done at the start of maintenance to Maintenance
determine, tf the aging caused in service was really
[
as big as expected, and whether replacement is Traditionally, equipment maintenance is performed '·
I

really necessary. This is called detective main- on a time-driven basis (scheduled maintenance) with i_.

equipment replacement based primarily on age with

tenance. Typical examples are the replacement
of circuit breaker contacts or transformer oil.
• Predictive or Condition based maintenance:
the actual load of an equipment respective its
186 actual condition is measured either permanently
a limited knowledge of the actual equipment perfor-
mance and usage.
The type of maintenance policy to select for specific
equipment for transmission and distribution depends
? ? ·
on reliability and on economic and customers' busi
ness related availability considerations, which take the
consequences of failures into account.
Reliability centered maintenance (RCM) is the defini
tion of equipment maintenance procedures on an as
needed basis as opposed to time-driven basis. RCM
can establish an effective maintenance program while
keeping the needed degree of reliability and availabi
lity of the system, eliminating ineffective preventive
maintenance tasks, and prioritize condition based
maintenance tasks. RCM makes use of analytical
techniques to determine applicable and cost-effective
preventive maintenance tasks that address dominant
equipment failure modes that are critical to
system performance.
RCM establishes preventive maintenance tasks to
avoid or at least to mitigate the consequences of fail
ures and not always to attempt to prevent the fail
ures themselves. All preventive maintenance tasks
defined by RCM are technically and economically fea
sible. Thus, this methodology of selecting and prioriti
zing maintenance tasks translates into substantial
reductions in routine work that together with the
eli
mination of unproductive tasks, leads to more effect
ive and less costly maintenance.
9.2.4 Benefits of RCM in the Electric
Utility Industry
The objective of every utility is to supply reliable
power at the least costs. Reliable power and mini
mum cost are usually economic opposites. Higher
reliability generally involves increased investment and
maintenance costs. However, RCM should lead to
reduced power delivery failure rates without increas
ing maintenance costs. Thus, RCM has the potential
of improving reliability whilst simultaneously reducing
costs.
An examples with fictive figures might illustrate this:
A power line in the transmission backbone is critical
for the whole power flow. A loss of the line might
cause costs of 500 k$ per hour due to not delivered
power and penalties. Preventive maintenance increas-
9.3.1 Data acquisition
The trend within data acquisition goes to intelligent
electronic devices (lED) for protection or control.
Besides their primary functions, they host more and
more additional functionality. Many of these additio
9.3.1 nal functions provide a sound foundation for basic
monitoring systems, are cost-effective and may com
prise (Figure 9-2):
es the line availability by 1 %, and costs around 50 9.3
k$ per year. Thus, it saves around 43 200 k$, i.e.
mainte nance pays off.
If, however, with 40 000 k$ a second line could be
built, this would enhance the availability e.g. by 4%
saving 1 72 000 k$ per year, even without any
pre ventive maintenance. Any availability
improvement on a redundant line due to preventive
maintenance is much smaller than 1 %, as long as not
additional costs (like having to replace a circuit
breaker) can be pre vented.
9.3 Power system monitoring
For once neglecting outages as a result of wrong
human operation, there are basically three reasons
for power interruptions:
• The breakdown of a utility asset through
normal wear and aging under working
conditions.
• The outage of an asset being effected by
an external event or fault.
• A temporary system disturbance where
the external influence disappears, e.g a
lightning stroke causing an earth fault on a
line.
Condition monitoring mainly addresses the wear
and aging caused by normal or temporarily
abnormal working conditions. This is done first in that
they sup port the evaluation of the actual condition
of assets, and second, in that they might explicitly
support the prediction of the further evolution of a
detected pro blem, and the probability of
breakdown.
Power system monitoring in a narrower -sense
addresses faults and problems in the network. As
these are often cleared by the protection system, and
this also delivers necessary data, it is often also
called protection monitoring, although it
additionally delivers power system problem
diagnosis data like
fault locations on a line. 187
• Disturbance recorders
• Event recorders
• Statistical value evaluation
• Power quality analysis
With computing power making its way into the pri
mary equipment together with new sensor techno-
logy, high voltage equipment can be made available to • Switching currents
more the outside at reasonable costs like • Manufacturing data
and
• Switching counters • Original value of key performance criteria
more
intern • Thermal information
al • Quality of isolation media This kind of data is the source of valuable condition
data information and exploited for building up condition
• Timing curves of switching operations
from monitoring.

. ...,
_ _
'>.olli .. IT o oe '•· ,.. 1 • '- .,.. '"" o •
•••t•
II
Uo0• :>"',"' •

!Advanced analysis
f.

:tools
; ,.,_ .11
j,
,
1:

188 Figure 9-2 Typical example of data acquisition from various lEOs in a substation
Event printer
......................................
Figure 9-3 Substation monitoring system
9.3.2 Substation monitoring changes
data into information
Substation monitoring systems are often defined and
understood as functional and even physical subsets
of substation automation systems, with mostly the
control functionality not being included. This is how
ever a rather restricted perception that does no justi
ce to the importance of the monitoring applications,
and neglects the currently growing interest in
condi tion monitoring applications as well as the
increasing need for business related information.
Therefore, a more general definition of monitoring is
better suited to describe the state-of-the-art
monitoring approach:
Substation monitoring is a station or network mana
gement technique, which exploits the regular evalua
tion of the actual operating condition, in orderto
minimize the combined costs of power transmission/
distribution operation and maintenance.
This means effectively, that it might cover condition
monitoring as well as protection system monitoring
at least at the concerned substation.
'(
9.3.3
Star coupler
lnterbay-Bus
Monitoring systems are scalable solutions ranging
from single IEDs respective an add-on communica
tion kit for existing single IEDs up to complete stand
alone systems with one or several PCs for decentra
lized as well as centralized data evaluation and failure
analysis. It archives the data which is collected from
the IEDs like numerical protection devices through a
substation wide bus. A typical structure of a local
system (i.e. within a substation) is shown in Fig. 9-3.
The data is presented after analysis on dedicated
SMS operator displays (Figure 9-2).
9.3.3 Disturbance recording for fault loca
tion and power quality assessment
In the last decades, the power systems have been
monitored in order to be able to determine the exact
type of fault, to find the proper ways to clear the
faults, and to check the reactions of the protective
devices. This was mainly done for reporting purposes,
i.e. extracting the exact picture of the fault. to include
these data in reports. Another goal for this
monito
ring system was network engineering oriented, that is 189
'( '?
'?
 improving the theoretical models of the
electrical net works, thus studying the
appropriateness of the "cal culated behavior of
the network" against the "actual behavior of
the network".
These monitored data was used as well in
9.3.
litigation context, where the responsibility
3
between several actors in the electrical
networks was to be looked into for cost
assignment in particularly severe conse quences
of faults on the electrical network. In some
cases a very accurate analysis of the fault was
requir ed to know the exact values of the
electrical para meters just before the faults, to
see whether such piece of equipment was
right to have failed to work or not.
With the power quality concerns, the goals are
diffe rent. If the use of the data for internal
engineering purposes are still valid, a new
approach is to evaluate the level of quality of
the electrical supply, giving information on
which legal contractual agreements can be
based upon, and providing data which can be
Figure 9-4 Disturbance recording and fault
evaluation
190
issued to the public This is particularly true
with the deregulation occurring on the
markets, where legal interfaces have to be
defined to more than one actor in the Energy
market.
I:'
When a disturbance record file is uploaded
from a fault recording system, it can
automatically be evaluat ed and the result of
the analysis printed in the form of a "short
fault report': and faxed to the protection
engineer (Figure 9-4). This kind of automatic
fault location and analysis even helps to bring
the system faster back into operation. Under
a fault recording system we understand here a
system with dedicated recorders with mostly
higher resolution than those integrated in
protection devices.
i-
 9.3.3

Figure 9-5 Central retrieval and evaluation of event and fault records

Figure 9-6 Power system monitoring structure Printer

Central EValuation Statio " r-----------------,

Functionality Central System
• Archiving I Management of the
files from different Stations
• Evaluation of Disturbance Records
- Merging of records
-Analysis I Computation I
Documentation
• Remote HMI

SMSSystem

r--M-o-de-m'-----,1-A
Functionality Station SMS

lnte rba y- Bus I • Automatic Collection of Data

• Archiving I management offiles

I
I • Summary reports
I • Device HMI
• Data Transfer (on request, automatic,
Data Compression)
• Collection of Disturbance Record files
from Foreign devices 191
 c '

: I

9.4 9.3.4 Power system condition assessment connections can be set up on demand by the
for better knowledge center, i.e. via modems, and therefore do not need
perma nent connections like an NCC. But also other
Precondition for condition based maintenance is to kinds of wide area connections like routed packet
know more about the equipment, its load, and switched networks are possible.
the operation conditions. For this many data has not
only to be gathered, but also to be evaluated, What the Figure 9-6 does not show is, that from the
correlated, and after evaluation some configuration central system the evaluated data is again distributed:
data in the system to be modified. A central power to office work places via intranet LAN, or to mainte
system moni toring therefore offers some or all of nance personnel via mail. fax, SMS, pager etc
the following features (Figure 9-5):
• Protection related information as input for
protection system supervision and fault location '
I
• Direct access to substation monitoring
and automation system supervision data
• Parameter setting from remote 9.4 Monitoring of Substation
• Assessment of power Automation System
quality
• Historical data base for enterprise resource
planning 9.4.1 Different levels of monitoring
• Visualization of critical areas via geographical
information system (GIS) The Substation Automation System or any dedicated
Monitoring System is supervising both the phenome
• Identification of weak spots in combination
na in the power network and the allocated
with lightning data base
switch gear. These phenomena may require fast
• Support of maintenance and asset management response by protection or automatics, or actions by
systems the opera tor e.g. an acknowledgement of the
related alarms. They also produce non time-critical
The results of monitoring systems are not needed for
data for mainte nance and planning.
direct power system operation, but more for
mainte nance and planning. Therefore they are often
The loss of the substation automation system would
gather ed separately from the network control
have a severe impact on the operation of the power
centers, al though some of their data should also be
system. Same holds to a much larger extent for the
correlated with data gathered in network control
network control and management system. The deg
centers.
radation of monitoring systems would affect the
Therefore, typical Power system monitoring (PSM) asset management and cause problems at least mid
term.
systems might look like Figure 9-6.
Highly sensitive components should be duplicated to
Local SMS systems, substation automation systems,
avoid that a single failure can block the functionality
or even directly protection devices or disturbance
recording systems are connected to some central
192 place via wide area connections. These wide area of a complete system. The redundancy of campo-
nents is however limited both because of costs result will be an input for the utility
and technical feasibility for reliable switchover. Apart asset management system.
from this, the increased quantity of redundant
devices would decrease the mean time to failures In the following two sections, the
(MTIF) for repairs in the system. As is shown in basic monitoring procedures for
chapter 8, the decrease in availability is, however, systems are explained.
relatively small if the failed component is not
replaced as fast as pos sible (see system MTIF
without repair in contrast to MTIF with repair).
Therefore, all these systems have to be supervised
carefully to detect any degradation in time. The
9.4.2 Self-supervision of devices (EMI). Reliable and often redundant power
supplies contribute to the robustness of lEOs.
Each intelligent electronic device (lED) has a lot of interacting
components. The design should be made in such a way that all
components have a high MTIF, and that the complete
arrangement is insensitive against electromagnetic interferences
9.4.2

Figure 9-7 Typical/EO self-supervision and local communication supervision

193
! i

·
9.4.4 Nevertheless, self-supervision is necessary. AJD con
version that might be subjected to aging should be
supervised by means of a reference signal. Watch
dogs should supervise the response times from pro
cessing algorithms. If memories are used for the
sto rage of data, checksums should be used to
detect any failure. Loss of power supply should be
monitor ed as well. The question, how many
percent of the device should be covered by self-
supervision, is very academic A typical example for
self-supervision of an lED is shown in Figure 9-7
• Self-supervision of communicating devices
• Supervision, if all nodes in the
communication network are still operative and
responding
• Detection of errors in telegrams at least on
the receiver side
• Supervision on communication overload and
acceptable response times
• Counting of lost messages and detected errors

9.4.3 Supervision of communication 9.4.4 The connection to central monitoring

i
systems . i !
Communication is the backbone of any system and i

should, therefore, be supervised in any case. A

stable communication is not only needed for safe
operation but also for the transfer of the results
from the lED self-supervision to higher monitoring
levels. The com munication medium in substations
normally consists of interference free fiber optical
cables or of screened wires. Communication problems
occur in the senders and receivers or in
communication devices in be tween, e.g. star
coupler, routers, switches, etc All this communication
equipment is subject to self-supervi sion according to
9.4.2. There are different levels of communication
supervision, i.e.
Self-supervision of devices or a substation automati
on system is required. If, however. a substation is not
I
manned, than it can only be used to shut down parts I,
of the system. Thus self-supervision enhances the
safety for operation errors, but it does not improve
the availability, i.e. that one is able to do what is
requir ed at a certain point in time. Therefore,
also the results of this self-monitoring should be
permanently supervised. In case of unattended
substation auto mation systems this is normally
performed by the associated network control center,
which then has to pass the information of failures to
the maintenance staff. The centralized power system
monitoring sys-

Mechanical Self supervision Self supervision

Protection, and remote
no supervision supervision
MTTF (years) 50 years 50 years 50 years
MTTR 24 hours 3 month 24 hours
Error detection.time 3 month 1 hour 1 hour
Availability (%) 99.504 99.509 99.994
Safety(%) 99.509 99.99977 99.99977

1 94 Table 9-7 Comparison of availability and safety depending on supervision types

tem with direct automatic link to maintenance staff as 9.4.4
mentioned above would do this as well. It even could
supeNise remotely the protection devices by gathe- ·
ring the results of the permanent self supeNision in
order to increase the protection system availability.
This is usually cost efficient even if there are no distur
bance recorder data available from these devices. An
example for the improvement of safety and availabi
lity by self-supeNision and remote supeNision is
shown in the Table 9-1. The calculations are based on
a simple Markov model considering the mean time
to failure (MTIF), mean time to repair (MTIR), and
the error detection times due to either self-supeNision
or periodic manual tests.

In Table 9-1 the MTIF for the JED is in all cases assum
ed to be identical, i.e. 50 years, to see the effects of
self supeNision and remote supeNision. It is further
assumed that if no supeNision is done, then failures
are only detected in the course of periodic mainte
nance every 6 months. This leads to an average error
detection time of 3 months. In the case of JEDs with
self-supeNision, but no remote monitoring, the MTIR
is assumed to be 3 month, as the periodic inspection
time has to be added to the delay of repair. Apart
from this, the error detection time of the self-super
vision is assumed to be 1 hour. Any delay in commu
nicating this by remote monitoring is within the 24 h
MTIR. It can be seen immediately that the self-super
vision alone mainly enhances the· safety. In order to
obtain a similar degree of improvement of the availa
bility, at least daily supeNision is necessary in addition.
And it should be kept in mind that the availability
of protection is the security of the power system.

195
 9.5 References

9.5 [1] F. Engler, A.W. Jaussi · Intelligent substation automation - monitoring and diagnostics in
HV switchgear installations, ABB Review 3/1998

[2] R. ltschner, C. Pommerell, M. Rutishauser · GlASS - Remote Monitoring of Embedded Systems

in Power Engineering, IEEE Internet Computing, May/June 1998
[3] Xiaobing Qiu, Wolfgang Wimmer · Applying Object-Orientation and Component Technology
to Architecture Design of Power System Monitoring, PowerCon 2000, 4th International Conference
on Power System Technology, Perth, Australia, December 4-7, 2000

[4] I. De Mesmaeker, H. Ungrad, G. Wacha, W. Wimmer · The role of SMS in enhancing

protection and control functions, CIRED 93, Birmingham, 1993

[5] K P. Brand, H. Singh, H. Ungrad, W. Wimmer · Enhancement of distribution protection by

communication, 2nd Int. Symposium, Singapore, 1991
'.,
[6] V. Lohmann · Integrated Substation Automation System Support: New Maintenance Strategies II
for T&D Equipment, Electrical Engineering Technical Exchange Meeting at Saudi Arabian Oil Company,
November 1998

[7] V. Lohmann, I. De Mesmaeker, B. Eschermann · New Maintenance Strategies for Power Systems
supported by Substation Automation, Cigre Conference June 1999 in London/UK
[8] V. Lohmann, 0. Preiss · Less Impact of Power Failures Due to Substation Automation,
CIRED Conference, 1999 in Nice

''

196
 10 New Roles of Substation Automation

10.1 Impact of the Deregulation of the Power Industry 198 10

10.1.1 Reshaping the Business 198 Table of
10.1.2 Working Plants Harder 198 content
10.1.2.1 Enhancing System Thermal Capability 199
10.1.2.2 Maintaining Voltage Stability 199
10.1.23 Real Time Network Analysis 199
10.1.2.4 Post Fault Actions 200
10.2 Motivation for Modernizing Substations 200
10.2.1 Contribution of IT to Provide New Opportunities 200
10.2.2 Efficient data exchange for up-to-date information 200
10.2.3 Advanced Power System Management 201
10.2.4 Typical estimates of benefits and costs 204
10.2.5 Cost comparison SA versus conventional 204
10.2.6 Capturing benefits 205
10.2.7 Reorganization 205
10.2.8 Upgrade steps towards advanced power system management 206
10.2.9 Summary and conclusion 207
10.3 Policy for substation refurbishment 207
10.4 Business related impact of SA 208
10.4.1 Better Information 209
10.5 References 210

197

. ·
 10 New Roles of Substation Automation
10 10.1 Impact of the Deregulation
of the Power Industry
Over the past decade the electricity supply
industry has been subjected to dramatic changes.
World-wide the trend is to restructure vertically
integrated utilities catering for generation,
transmission and distributions into smaller
"unbundled" companies. The new plant owners are
pushed to minimize costs through great er utilization
of existing assets. This can be achieved by reducing
operating security margins. As a matter of fad, this
new operation philosophy is enabled by the rapid
advances, which are made in the field of digital
technology applied for protection, control and
communication. These developments drive significant
changes in power system management, substation
automation and broadband communications.
Various aspects of the utilities needs have been dis
cussed in the Cigre 99 London Symposium on the
subject: 'Working Plant and Systems harder'Enhanc
ing the management and performance of plant and
power systems is being addressed widely at many
international conferences. The overall conclusion per
ceived is that there are a lot of new technologies
available, which will help planners and operators to
find new solutions to maxirnize the use of the power
systems and adapt to the fast changing environment.
10.1.1 Reshaping the Business
The final decade of the 20th century saw
unprece dented changes in the structure of the
electricity industry as the "deregulation fever''
spread around the globe. With deregulation of this
historically con trolled market, shareholder and
customer interest became a key factor in the
competitive free market as corporate officers traded
unbundled business sec tors internationally for the
highest stakes. These board room-level issues have
overshadowed the ever
198 changing responsibilities for the engineering busi-
• Better modelling and more detailed technical
analysis. Using these techniques it is often
possible to assign enhanced ratings to
transmission equip ment, and hence increase
system power transfers.
• Better analysis of system conditions. As a result
of increased power transfers across the system
there is a reduction in operational "margins for
error'. This means that accurate prediction and
analysis
ness that continues to develop new technology to
meet the demand for more electrical energy. The
engineering decision-making process now must con
sider, in addition to engineering and financial issues,
the impact on the local and global environment in the
form of environmental studies and life-cycle assess
ments. Consumers now regard electricity as an essen
tial ingredient to improve the quality of life, and the
industry faces the challenge of satisfying the demand
for energy in a manner that has minimum impact on
the environment. The large interconnected national
and international transmission systems that bridge
geographical and political boundaries continue to offer
the opportunity to optimise and share the use of
energy efficient resources.
In the increasingly competitive arena there is signifi
cant pressure on power providers for greater syst_em
reliability ard improvement of customer sat1sfad1on,
while similar emphasis is placed on cost reduction.
These cost reductions focus on reducing operating
and maintenance expenses, and minimizing invest
ments in ne.v plants and equipment. If plant invest
ments are [CJ be made only for that which is absolu
tely necessary the existing systern equipment must
be pushed :o greater limits in order to defer capital
investments
10.1.2 Working Plants Harder
Enhancing Lhe management and performance of
plant and power systems is being discussed widely at
many interrational conferences. The overall conclu
sion perceived is that there are a lot of new techno
logies available, which will help planners and opera
tors to find new solutions to maximize the use of the
power systems and adapt to the fast chanqing envi
ronment.
The innovations which can be developed and imple ..i
mented to enable to work the system harder include i
the following:
of power system pr
conditions are vital. es
• A reduction in the timescales in su
which the control engineer can re
act. To this end better alarm cata s
analysis is required, together with to
automatic instead of manual re
actions. du
ce
In addition to the pressures to "work th
the system har der:there are also e
 overhead costs of the system operation function.
.
This implies a need to use more efficient
working practices, for example telecommand and
sequence switching and extensive automatic ·
voltage control equipment.

Monitor can be applied which uses the same

10. 7 .2.1 Enhancing System Thermal mathe matical model as that used to derive the
Capability rating sche dule but it collects real-time data
from outstations along the routes of selected
With increasing environmental pressures the circuits. In a similar way, an on-line Transformer
options for building new transmission lines are Thermal Monitor collects data and provides ratings
very limited, even rebuilding or raising towers for for selected transmission system transformers.
increased ground clearance can present
considerable problems in ob taining the necessary In both cases the data collected are fed back to
consents. Existing overhead line rating schedules are a master station located at the Control Center
based on probabilistic methods, in many countries which has the cable and transformer models. The
with four rating seasons covering the twelve results obtained are available in the control room.
months of the year. These assume fixed values of Because the data is collected in real-time, it is not
Vv'ind speed, temperature and isolation for each necessary to apply the same factors of safety that
rating season. On certain days however, these need to be applied to probabilistic ratings, hence
ratings may be enhanced if actual meteorological higher rating are generally produced. As the
data is used. In the UK considerable research installation of the out stations and monitoring
has been carried out and tools have been equipment is relatively expensive, its application is
developed that can provide at the day ahead stage, limited to certain critical circuits.
weather related iine ratings for critical circuits.
Uprating up to 20 % can be possible on over 50%
of days. [6] 10.1.2.2 Maintaining Voltage Stability
Transformer and cable ratings can also be based A system that is heavily voltage constrained
on rating seasons. In the case of cables there are requires a great deal of analysis to ensure that it is
usually two rating seasons, the actual ratings being operated within security standards whilst out-of-
derived from data provided by the manufacturers. merit genera tion costs are kept to a necessary
Cables and their surroundings have long thermal minimum. To exploit the increased thermal
time constants and therefore quite large overloads capability it may be required to install capacitive
can be sustained for up to several hours. An on- compensation for provid ing an appropriate margin
line Cable System to voltage instability.

I .
10.1.2.3 Real Time Network
Analysis
The real time network analysis (RTNA) is an
invalua ble tool for the control engineer,
especially if the system is being operated at or
close to its limits. Whilst off-line studies give
accurate results they can never fully reflect the real
system because of such factors as demand
estimating errors, changes to the scheduled
generating plant and transmission system
reconfigurations. If real time data is used the
RTNA can, in certain circumstances, give significant
enhanc ements to system capability. The quality of
the state
10.1.2.3

199
10.2 estimation using the RTNA depends on the accuracy
of the existing metering and the representation of
adjacent and lower voltage systems.
1 0.1.2.4 Post Fault
Actions
Frequently it is necessary to identify post-fault actions
such as re-switching a substation or rapidly reducing
MW generation to mitigate the consequences of cre
dible system faults. Utilities specific procedures spe
cify maximum numbers of actions considered per
missible within a given timescale. Generally, manual
actions in less than 10 minutes are not considered
feasible. If these actions could be carried out auto
matically then the timescales could be reduced, which
allows greater short term ratings to be utilized allow
ing system transfers to be increased. Certain
automa tic schemes are often installed but these
only cater for a small number of eventualities. Also,
these sche mes tend to be hard wired, inflexible
and expensive to install. Advanced automatics may
overcome these limitations in the future.
10.2 Motivation for Modernizing
Substations
10.2.1 Contribution of IT to Provide
New Opportunities
Over the past thirty years the following key technolo
gies and marketing developments have affected the
entire electric power transmission and distribution
world:
All of them have become great enabler with regard
to new business opportunities, challenging market
needs and new requirements, in view of the fad
that the pressure on utilities for cost reduction and
pro ductivity improvement requires new concepts for
• Energy management and power system
management
• Substation automation
• Feeder automation
However, for working plants harder the moderniza
tion of exiting substations is a prerequisite. In addition
to this, utilities will in future need more comprehensive
service and support.
10.2.2 Efficient data exchange for
up-to-date information
The prerequisite for the provision of up-to-date criti
cal operating information to engineers and account
managers is an efficient communication network. This
must be capable not only to support remote control
from network control centers but also retrieval of
data on loading, interruptions, voltage disturbances,
and other electrical events from all substations
throughout the utility service area for the protection,
maintenance and planning departments.
It is recommended to split the communication system
into two partial networks:
1. Real time communication between the network
control centers for supervisory control and data
acquisition (SCADA) and energy management
systems (EMS) as well as between the various
substations for control actions:

• The invention and large-scale application ..·-P·QSition status

of microprocessors • Commands
• The development of high-speed • Interlocking
digital communications • Automated functions
• The world-wide implementation of Internet
200 networking. • Actual process values
2. Non-real time communication to transmit data s
10.2.3 Advanced Power System
to the back-office departments for protection, u
engineering, and maintenance as well as for Management p
planning and asset management: There are three area where information technology p
(IT) applications can contribute significant benefits in l
• Setting parameters
terms of advanced power system management y
• Disturbance records .
(Figure 10-1):
• Statistics .
1. Enhanced power system operation, which
• Trends results in higher reliability of power supply 3.
• Condition related data Onli
2. Substation automation which assures
ne
• Non-urgent indications higher availability and flexibility of power po
 wer system monitoring to work systems
harder and to save maintenance costs
10.2.3

Figure 70-7 Advanced Power System Management Overview

Power Substation Substation Demand side

.·Optimisation Automation Automation Management

····power ·Power,
·fio l'er · . Consumers
Distribution ·
Transrriission ill
AI

·;Power System· 201

The objective of the Advanced Power System titude of proprietary communication protocols that
Management (APSM) concept is the optimization of
the power system performance in tf'rms of reliability
and availability at minimal operation and maintenan
ce costs.

It comprises a distributed concept consisting of

10.2.4
• Power supply optimization, substation
automation and demand side management ·
on consumer level
• Wide area communication network as link
between the process level and the network
control and power system management level
• Enhanced power system operation modules to
provide data and information for energy manage
ment and supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems
• Online power system monitoring to provide
data and information for Asset Management as
well as Engineering and Maintenance

The main obstacle to realise this vision was the mul

have erability between the numerous vendor specific 10.2.4 Typical estimates of benefits
limited protection and control IEDs. With the intro duction and costs
the of the new international communication standard
capacit \EC 61850 all requirements for communica tion The estimated first cost benefits indicated as per
y for capability and compatibility, interoperability be Table 10 -1 are for a new substation construction
data tvveen vendor specific devices and forward comparing conventional substation design with auto
transmi compa tible engineering standards this vision is mated substation design. [1] These figures serve as a
ssion going to become reality. For further details model for cost comparison only. The substation con
and please refer to chapter 13. figuration assumes a 138/15 kV transformer, 6-13 kV
the circuit breakers, breaker & 112 arrangement, and 2
interop times 6 position feeders of 15 kV metal clad distribu
tion switchgear.

Table 7 0-7 Estimated benefit/cost for SA retrofit of medium sized utility

Eliminated items Qty Unit $/Unit Material Mhrs/unit Labor Total

Control Panels 6 ea 8 000 48 000 50 12 000 60 000

I

Relay Panels 4 ea 5 000 20 000 50 8 000 28 000

Taxation relays 2 ea 3 500 7 000 20 1 600 8 600
Feeder relays 10 ea 2 500 25 000 20 8 000 33 000
Conduits 2 000 ft 1 2 000 0.20 16 000 18 000
Wiring 6 000 ft 4 24 000 0.10 24 000 48 000
Control building 160 sqft 15 2 400 5 32 000 34400
RTU 1 ea 18 000 18 000 750 30 000 48 000
Fault iecorder 1 ea 25 000 25 000 100 4 000 29 000
Sequ. event rec 1 ea 18 000 18 000 100 4000 22 000
Annunciators 2 ea 3 000 6 000 20 1 600 7 600
Total in US$ 195 000 141 200 336 600
202

. ·
• PC human machine interface (H'/11)
with all necessary software, drivers,
net:lork managment.
• Local Area Network (LAN) with
:lterfaces for all IEDs Programmable
logic contro er (PLC) and remote
The estimated costs to provide fud substation 1/0 modules.
auto
mation for this arrangement would range from • Full compliment of IEDs with
$100 000 to $200 000 and induce pr;'ilary and secon dary protection
schemes on all r-ajor equipment. For
most economical arrangemeIEDs
are
 located nearest to the eqipmenc :hey • Full drawing management software package
protect. for all substation physical, schematic, wiring,
• Transformer management sense'S and arrange menand other technical drawings at
software. the site with as built changes, forwarded to
drafting for revision and returned to the
substation via included wide area network
10.2.4
management software.
• Full system configuration,
tesinstallation, documentation and
commissioning.
It is obvious that the benefits exceed the
implemen tation costs for new substation
construction. The esti mated implementation
costs may vary according to the level of
redundancy required and conservatism with
respect to the use of traditional mimic style con
trols. The least cost system will locate lEOs
nearest the controlled equipment and use only
one HMI (PC).

Table 10-2 indicates typical benefits and costs

for substation a·utomation at a medium sized
utility with
116 total substations. 16 bulk power substations,
40 medium sized distribution substations, and
60 small distribution substations. [1]

Table 7 0-2 Estimated benefits/cost "Jr SA retrofit of medium sized utility

Benefit Item Est.$ Cost Item Total

Est.$ estim
ated
Reduces time to find and fix prot ms 2 250 000 Small SIS with IEDs 4 bene
800 000 fits
Reduced SCADA O&M (US
34 800 Medium S/S with IEDs 4
$)
000 000
5
Reduced metering O&M 46 400 Large S/S with IEDs 1 223
920 000
413
Reduced protective relay O&M 232 000 Transformer monitoring 1 Total
320 000 subst
Reduced SER & Fault recording Total estimated Cost 12 ation
11 600
040 000 s
S/S
Remote operation via modem 174 000 116
Predictive maintenance 718 504
Transformer load optimization 1 437 008
Reduced trouble shooting 153 000 Small SIS
16
Reduced training costs 50 000 Medium S/S
40
Drawing management 116 000 Large S/S
16
 203

. ·
 10.2.5 Cost comparison SA versus
conventional
The costs benefits as per section 1 0.2.4 refer to the
following cost structure for conventional protection
and control of a typical distribution 138/15 kV sub In this specific case the estimated costs for SA are
:0.2.5 station with 6 feeders 138 kV and 12 feeders 15 kV smaller than indicated in the Graph 10-1.
[1].
The main savings are achieved with the following
Cost Items % cost items:
Control Panels 16 • Wiring substituted by fibre optic cables
Protection Panels 8 • Less cable conduits
Metering Panels 2 • Annunciaters and fault recorders are
Feeder Protection Relays 9 integrated in the IEDs for protection and
Cable Conduit 5 control
Wiring 13 • Reduced space requirements for the control
Control Building 9 building
Remote Terminal Unit (RTU) 13 • RTUs are no longer required
Fault Recorder 8
Sequence of Event Recorder 6 The cost benefits for SA compared with transmission
I i
Annunciator 2 substations of 245 kV, 420 kV and 525 kV are even I ;
more significant due to the vast space requirement I I
SAT. Commisioning 9
and the large amount of wiring and cable conduits
Total costs 100 required as shown in Graph 10-2.
Table 7 0-3 Cost splitting of conventional control and The comparisons of the installation costs reveal that
protection for a 7 3817 5 kV SIS SA is the most cost effective solution in every case.

Graph 7 0-7 Cost comparison between conventional control and protection and SA for a 7 3817 5 kV SIS

Cost Comparison conventional control and protection

versus substation automation (SA)
I I
I I
! !
• SAT, Commisioning
o Annunciator ' I
\
o PC-based SA System, t-MI & SW
300'000 1!1 Sequence of Event Recorder")
•Fault Recorder*)
250'000 o Remote Term inla Unit (RTU) j
•Control Building
200'000 EIWiring ..)
150'000 : Cab!e Cendu!t
o Feeder Protection Relays
100'000 o Metering Panels
•Protection Panels
50'000 o Control Panels
)04
0
Conventional
SA
 Installation Costs Conventional Control & Protection
versus Substation Automation

1'800'000 10.2.7
1'600'000

1'400'000

1'200'000

0 1'000'000
(/)

800'000

600'000

400'000

200'000

0
115115 k\1 2451123 kV 420/123 kV 525/123 kV

I-+- Conventional ----Substation Autorration I

Graph 10-2 Installation costs for conventional control and protection versus SA for various voltages

With higher system voltages the impact of the instal to fully automated substation environments will inclu
lation cost for conduits and wiring becomes the main de metering, protection, SCADA, and maintenance.
. '
driver for the steeper increase of the installation costs. These groups have enjoyed the autonomy associated . r

with the use of independent special purpose systems

1 0.2.6 Capturing benefits
The business case for doing any sizable automation
implementation will likely be based on the strategic
and tangible benefits mentioned previously. It is likely
that a large percentage of these estimated benefits
might be based on reduced operation and mainte
nance costs resulting from reduced manpower and
streamlined business processes. In order to capture
these benefits it will be necessary to make changes
in the organization as the automation functions and
improved business processes are deployed.
10.2.7 Reorganization
Utility departments that will be impacted by the
tran
sition from conventional non-automated substations
requiring specially trained groups of employees. New
substation automation systems Will Incorporate digi
tal processing and client-server technologies that will
make most of the activities associated with the "old
school" obsolete.
Metering personnel will no longer need to design
and maintain systems with dedicated meters. Meter
ing functions will be performed by certified IEDs
and made available to all network applications from
a- real time database._Tbeintegrated database
will re
cord historical data for billing, trending and
analysis.
Protection engineers will enjoy remote access to the
configurations, reports and historical performance of

those devices via direct network or modem
commu nications. Travel time for information
gathering, cali bration and routine maintenance
will be minimized or eliminated. All
documentation required to support the
system will be incorporated into its integrated
10.2. database. As built changes to documents and
8 draw ings will be made online at the same
time that hard ware and software changes are
made.
SCADA RTUs will not be required. The SA
platform will filter the required analog and
status information from the network and
emulate the EMS protocol through a gateway
that will appear as an RTU to the EMS. Control
through the SA will be transparent to the EMS.
Routine substation maintenance will be
minimized. Fault duties of major substation
equipment will be monitored and alarms will be
sent when maintenance thresholds have been
exceeded. Many of the lEOs and
communication devices will have self-diagnostic
capability. Maintenance will become predictive
and not periodic any longer.
The resulting staff required to support the
substation will be reduced considerably.
SCADA/EMS
• System operation
• Energy Management
• Power Quality
206 Figure 7 0-2 Nine upgrade steps towards advanced power system management
205
1 0.2.8 Upgrade steps towards
advanced power system I ·-
management
The application of modern IT solutions with
imple menting lEOs is the state-of-the-art for
new sub stations. The benefits of advanced
power system management can, however, only
be exploited if the legacy electro-mechanic
control and protection sys tems in existing
substations are substituted with modem IEDs,
and if access is provided for data retriev al via
modern communication networks.
Even if a modern wide area networks (WAN) is
avai lable for real-time data exchange, there
remains the decision to be taken for the most
feasible step-by step retrofit strategy for the
substitution of the legacy equipment. The
strategy as outlined below for a sub station
with conventional control and protection
systems suggests nine upgrade options
depending on the required scope of
functionality (Figure 10-2):
Utility Back office f
• Engineering
• Planning
• Maintenance
 ·
'(
:

1. Remote terminal (RTU) permit remote control

from supervisory control systems (SCADA) in
network control centers and numerical protection
offers more functionality and the acquisition of
condition related data.
2. Central control system with IEDs enhances the
functionality of a RW and integration of digital
fault recording reduces the costs for finding
and fixing of faults. The serial link with the
IEC 870-05-103 or IEC 61850 respectively proto
col is used to conned the protection lED with
the RTU.
3. Decentralized control system with IEDs close
to the primary equipment offers significant cost
reduction for secondary cabling and the data
retrieval via modem allows cost-effective main
tenance and parameter adaptation from remote.
4. Interaction of IEDs for control and protection via
an ·Inter-bus allows more complex control and
protection functions to improve the flexibility and
availability of substations.
5. Substation automation systems enable local
operation of substations, comprehensive
substation monitoring and the provision of a
substation database for data processing.
6. Substation monitoring systems enable comp
rehensive substation monitoring and the proces
sing of data to protection related information
10.2.9 Summary and conclusion
Significant benefits are available today for utilities to
build a business case for integrated substation auto
mation. The modular architectural concept provides a
smooth migration path for utilities by initially targeting 10.3
resources to the highest benefit sites,and then adding
future sites as new business cases develop. The con
solidation of substation automation computing and
communication resources in the substation also pro
vides a natural configuration for extending distribu
tion automation (DA) services. Ultimately, true distri
buted processing in the substations will make large
scale advanced DA control and monitoring applica
tions possible.
10.3 Policy for substation
refurbishment
Modern SA system comprise intelligent electronic
devices (lED) for protection and control and provide
an infrastructure to collect, to process and to transmit
data and information, which can be utilized for cost
effective condition monitoring of circuit breakers,
power transformers, instrument transformers etc
(Figure 10-3).
NetlNOrk
control
center

Station computer (HMI)

like fault location and short reports.
7 Inter-station automation based on wide area
protection and optimization system 0/1/APS) is 11::
applied for advanced energy management, 0
".j:i Printer
load shedding and controlled disconnection
(islanding) of subsystems to maintain power
system integrity and local power restoration.
8. Network level system for centralized retrieval
and transmission of data enables the mainten
ance and protection engineer to evaluate data Control
from many substations. panel
Protection
panel
9. Corporate information systems in terms of WAN
and broad band technology allows the
exchange of data and information between
GIS or AIS
substations, SCADNEMS and utility back-office
Swichgear
..
in order to insure that the right information is
transmitted to the right people at the right time.
207
Figure 70-3 Modern substation automation system
10. In the past, utility engineers often struggled
4 ii ..
with the fact that too little data was
available when they attempted to analyze
problems within their power systems. They
also did not have enough information to
predict or ascertain the level of maintenance
need ed and of when it would be required Sure the answer cannot be: because SA
for the major equipment located within their exists and therefor€ one has to make it
substations. As IEDs have made their way happen! The imple mentation strategy should i

into substations, the same engineers may be rather be based on a busi ness pull and . '

suffering from data overload. They may even technology push, not the other way around.
have more data than can be processed and Business requirements should always be the
assimilated in the time available. leading arguments.

The most important aspects of a profitable

Today the challenge is to automatically convert
data to information, which frees up
manpower to imple ment corrective or
preventive maintenance. There are basically
two strategies where SA can contribute
benefits to achieve more power in terms of
better uti lity performance:
1. Better information, for higher
productivity
2. Intelligent automation for higher
availability
The prerequisite, however, is an efficient
corporate communication network for easy
access from remo te to primary equipment
condition related informati on and for real-time
interaction between substations.
The World Wide Web as an information
source and its commercial application has
created a mass market where the technology
costs are shared by millions of developers and
companies. They have, however, to be
complemented by special safety and
security measures to make them feasible to
be used for the power business.
business are cost efficiency and reliable
information. As explain ed above, SA systems
are valuable sources of process data and
information, which can be transmitted to a
commonly shared database, where they are
proces sed and evaluated to provide reliable
business infor mation.
Business benefits must be real and tangible
and it should be possible to quantify the
;-.
expected results with a relatively high
accuracy/certainty. From a busi ness point of
view, the following points are clear ad
vantages (Figure 10-4) for the justification of
the im plementation of SA:
1. Better information, which result in
higher productivity
2. Intelligent automation, which assures
higher productivity and higher
availability : :-
'I
i

20
8 1 0.4 Business related impact
of SA
With privatization and deregulation of the
power business in mind pure technical
arguments as men tioned above are not
convincing enough for the justi fication of SA Figure 10-4 Substation automation
Therefore, the following questions should be (SA) leads to more power
raised:
1. What can be gained with the
implementation of SA?
2. What are the criteria the decision to
implement
SA should be based on7
More power in this context means:
• Technical performance improvements
• Less customer interruption time and
MVA
hours of lost power delivery
• Lower maintenance costs by changing
from periodic to predictive maintenance
practice
• Power system performance data provide reliable
input for system extension planning
• Business performance improvements
• Decreasing operation costs by
reducing staff numbers
• Increased productivity and
cost effectiveness
• Decreased maintenance costs due to
less frequent and preventive maintenance
• Decreased capital expenditure because
of lower installation costs
The prerequisite, however, is efficient communication
for easy access from remote to primary equipment
condition and SA system status related information
and fast inter-station communication (Figure 10-5).
Figure 70-5 Communication network for access to substation related information
Protection/
.EMS/SCADA
.Centre 1
Systemwide
Master Clock
SA SA
Substation 1 Substation 2 Substation 3
10.4.1 Better Information 10.4.1
Apart from monitoring the condition of primary
equipment and thereby avoiding power interruptions,
an elaborate post fault analysis supported by moni
toring systems is equally important.
It has been observed that a large proportion of major
blackouts of electric power systems is caused by pro
tection system failures. In the case of conventional
protection relays, such failures are hidden and only
exposed during the rare occasion of system distur
bances. It is therefore important to capture as much
information as possible during a system disturbance
from associated fault and disturbance recorders and
protection relays. The subsequent settings refinement
of the parameter is a corrective measure to prevent
similar faults from happening again, or, at least, mini
mize impact of unavoidable faults on the power sup
ply system.
Operation I Planning I Asset
Maintenance Centre Management Centre
lntersubstation
SA real time SA
communication Substation n 209
 1 0.5 References

i ..
10.5 [1] Ryan Bird ·,1ustifying Substation Automation, Black & Veatch http/ /tasnetcom/justa.shtml

[2] V. Lohmann, H. Kattemoelle · Enhanced Customer Values enabled by Synergies between

Protection and Control in HV Substations, lEE International Conference on Power System Control
and Management in London/UK, April 1996

[3] V. Lohmann, J. Bertsch · Information Technology (IT) and the Application of Numerical Protection
and Control Devices to enhance management and Utilization of Power Networks, International
Distribution Utility Conference, Sydney/Australia, November 1997

[4] V. Lohmann · Integrated Substation Automation enables new Strategies for Power T&D,
Southern Africa Power System Conference in Johannesburg/South Africa, November 2000

[5] V. Lohmann ·Advances in Power System Management Conference on Global Participation in

Indian
International Grid, Energy Management and Convergence, Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd.
and Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in Mumbai/lndia, August 2001

[6] REIarp, MA. Lee, C. Proudfoot · Working the Protection Engineer Harder,
Cigre Symposium June 1999, in London/UK, Paper No. 320-1

, r

210
11 Wide Area Protection

11.1 Role of Wide Area Protection 214 11

11.1.1 Wide Area Power System Disturbances 215 Table of
11.1.1.1 Cascade line tripping control 215 content
11.1.1.2 Voltage collapse control 216
11.1.1.3 Undamped power swings control 217
11.1.1.4 Loss of synchronism cor,trol 218
11.1.1.5 Large frequency variatiotcontrol and load shedding 219
11.1.2 Measures against Power Systems Disturbances 222
11.1.2.1 Exchange of information, signals and measurements 222
11.1.2.2 Possible common studies 223
11.1.2.3 Principal recommendations about International defense plans 224
11.1.3 Conclusions 225
11.2 Achievements with WAPS on power systems 226
11.3 Power system phenomena with possible WAPS solutions 227
11.3.1 Angle instability (transient and small signal) 228
11.3.1.1 Transient angle instability 228
11.3.1.2 Small signal angle instability 228
11.3.2 Frequency instability 229
11.3.3 Voltage Instability 230
11.3.4 Cascade line tripping 231
11.4 Classification of WAPS 233
11.4.1 Classification of WAPS according to its input variables 233
11.4.1.1 Response-based vs. event based 233
11.4.2 Classification of WAPS according to its impact on the power system 234
11.4.3 Classification of WAPS according to its operating time 234
11.5 Detailed description of the various WAPS 235
11.5.1 Generation rejection 236
11.5.2 Turbine fast valving 237
11.5.3 Fast unit and pumping storage unit start-up 237
11.5.4 AGC set-point changes 237
11.5.5 Underfrequency load shedding 237
11.5.5.1 Description and main characteristics 237
11.5.5.2 Improvement of system stability 238
11.5.5.3 Potential problems or harmful impact on equipment system 239
11.5.6 UndeNoltage load shedding 239
11.5.7 Remote load shedding 240
11.5.8 HVDC fast power change 240
11.5.9 Automatic shunt switching (shunt reactor/capacitor tripping or closing) 240
11.5.10 Braking resistor 241
11.5.11 Controlled opening of interconnection 242
11.5.12 Tap changers blocking and set-points adjustment 243 211

'·
 11.5.12.1 Improvement of system stability 244
11.5.12.2 Reduction of set-point of LTC 244
11.5.13 Quick increase of synchronous condenser voltage set-point 245
11.6 Voltage stability assessment guidelines 245
11.6.1 Off-line studies and on-line studies 245
11.6.2 Voltage stability margins and criteria 246
11 11.6.3 Voltage stability assessment 247
Table of 11.6.3.1 PV-based margin computation 247
content 11.6.3.2 QV-based margin computation 248
11.6.4 On-line VSA functional requirements 249
11.6.4.1 Introduction 249
11.6.4.2 Contingency selection and screening 250
11.6.4.3 Voltage security evaluation 250
11.6.4.4 Voltage security 9nhancement 250
11.6.4.5 General requirements 251
11.6.5 Contingency definition 252
11.6.6 Contingency selection 252
11.6.7 Contingency screening 252
11.6.8 Contingency analysis 253
11.6.9 Voltage stability criteria 254
11.6.10 Security monitor 254
11.6.10.1 Security monitor capabilities 254
11.6.10.2 Direct (scan rate) monitoring 255
11.6.11 Security enhancement 255
11.6.11.1 On-line determination of preventive actions 256
11.6.11.2 On-line determination of remedial actions 256
11.6.12 Modeling and data requirements 257
11.6.12.1 Modeling requirements 257
11.6.13 VSA Data Requirements 258
11.6.13.1 Model Data Requirements 258
11.6.13.2 Default data 259
11.7 On-line VSA execution modes 260
11.71 On-line VSA execution control requirements 260
11.7.1.1 On-line VSA execution trigger 260
11.7.1.2 VSA execution abort 261
11.7.1.3 Execution control 261
11.7.1.4 Validity of VSA results 261 I

11.7.2 Study mode execution control requirements 261

11.8 On-line VSA user Requirements 261
11.8.1 General VSA user requirements 261
11.8.1.1 User interface environment 262
11.8.1.2 User interaction 262
11.8.1.3 Save case capability 262
11.8.1.4 User documentation 263
11.8.2 Operator requirements 263
11.8.2.1 Operator interaction 263
212 11.8.2.2 Security related information provided for the operator 263
!

. · ..
 11.8.2.3 Applications of the on-line VSA function 263 11
11.8.2.4 Direct (scan rate) monitoring 264 Table of
11.8.3 Operations planners/engineers user requirements 264 content
11.8.4 Manager user requirements 264
11.9 Interface requirements 265
11.9.1 Consideration of existing automated operating orders 265
11.9.2 Interface with EMS functions 265
11.9.3 Interface with EMS services 266
11.10 The implementation of Wide Area protection 266
11.10.1 System Set-up 267
11.10.1.1 Hardware system set-up 267
11.10.1.2 System protection center 268
11.10.2 Voltage Instability Prediction 269
11.10.2.1 Options for guided control actions 272
11.10.2.2 Control of On Load Tap Changers 272
11.10.2.3 Load Shedding 273
11.10.3 Interaction with SA and SCADA systems 274
11.10.3.1 Wide area protection on network level 274
11.10.3.2 Disturbance Recording 276
11.10.3.3 Communication to SCADA/ EMS 276
11.10.3.4 Communication to power system monitoring 276
11.10.3.5 Communication to station level 277
11.10.3.6 WAPS communication to bay level 277
11.10.3.7 Substation monitoring system 277
11.10.3.8 Protection adaptation 277
11.11 References 278

213
 11 Wide Area Protection

11.,1 11 .1 The Role of Wide Area In the times of deregulation and globalization of the
power industry it is for sure that an increase in power
Protection exchange between companies and countries will
Power systems are planned, built and operated in occur. This contributes to making the interconnected
such a manner that customers should not be power systems less able to face large incidents if
affect ed; within given limits, by possible appropriate measures are not implemented. This
contingencies. Even if a power system is planned to evolution leads to a new conception of defence
withstand cre dible contingency, it may be affected plans and to a proposal concerning more
by more severe disturbances, resulting from coordinated defence actions between
multiple and simulta neous outages. companies/countries.
Beyond such occurrences of credible contingencies, a A group of experts on "Defence Plans Against Major
power system may also be affected by more severe Disturbances" elaborated some suggestions and re
disturbances, resulting from multiple and simulta commendations, which are summarized below, for a
neous outages, with possible conjunction of protec better international coordination of defence plans
tion or regulation failures leading to severe electro and the normal and emergency control actions to
mechanical and slow transient phenomena with prevent system incidents or to limit their consequen
sta bility problems, vo!tage collapse and large ces in large interconnected power systems as in the
frequency deviation. Even if the probability of such case of the European System (East-West Inter
disturbances is very low, the result may be a system connection). These suggestions and recommenda
collapse for the whole network or a large part of it tions are based on the reflections of the Group,
start ing from the answers to a Questionnaire
To face such severe perturbations, the utilities adopt
distributed to all the companies/countries who are
special defensive measures under the name of
members of UNIPEDE (International Union of
"defence plans": these measures, which must be
Producers and Distributors of Electrical Energy,
automatic and very fast, are intended to keep the
Paris/France).
spread of disturbances inside the network of each
utility. or even in the whole interconnected power
In view of the fad
system. In this respect, whereas interconnecting
that:
powe(systems result in better security in case of
limit ed outages or imbalances between generation • the interconnected power system should be
and demand, it provides conditions for a wider planned to withstand credible contingencies with
propaga tion of complex incidents. or without activating any emergency measures or
or defence plans, tested both from static and
The reason is that most of the measures adapted by dynamic points of view (suitable reliability criteria),
the companies/countries in the frame of defense
plans have been conceived, more or less, in a scope • appropriate agreements, which regulate the
confin ed to each company/country and the ultimate common use of the operational reserves should
action may be to open interconnections at be taken into account to cover some defined
boundaries. Even outages in operation planning and operations
if the achievement of an overall coordination is very · stages,
difficult due to both technical reasons and high costs, a set of preventive and curative coordinated measur
it is however suitable to improve the coordination of es should be foreseen in terms of defence plans to
defence plans because the electric phenomena do prevent major incidents or limit their consequences.
214 not stop at boundaries.
Definitions: • Normal: following any credible contingency, action
all loadings are within the continuous s
Defence plan: A set of measures to be taken to capabilities of system components, with must
pre voltage and frequency within prefixed be
vent major incidents or to limit their consequences. operational limits and overall demand is taken
supplied. rapidl
Credible contingency: any single or multiple
• Alert: the system is in acceptable conditions, y to
outage of system components taken into account,
but, if at least one credible contingency occurs, preve
such as losing any single-circuit line, losing any
the system will enter the emergency state. The nt
double-circuit line, losing any generator, etc.
alert state requires short-term or immediate unacc
States of the system: action: the existing conditions are such that eptab
le
 overloading, voltage conditions, frequency changes
or compo nent outages caused by pro(ections
operation.
• Emergency: loading, voltage or frequency un
acceptable conditions already exist on the system.
Or the demand has been lost, or the system is
split. Actions must be taken immediately to bring
the system into an acceptable condition.
11.1.1 Wide Area Power System Disturbances
A list of the most severe phenomena which can
cause major incidents may be the following:
• Cascade line tripping,
• Voltage collapse,
• Undamped power swings,
• Loss of synchronism,
• Large frequency diminution.
Some of these phenomena are often present
together. In the following, for sake of simplicity, each
of them will be dealt with separately along with its
control measures. This approach is based on preven
tive and curative actions for controlling phenomena
which can deteriorate the system performances and
cause an uncontrolled and widespread blackout
11.1.1.1 Cascade line tripping
control
The cascade line tripping may affect tie-lines be
tween a part and the rest of the power system,
when this part is importing or exporting much power.
11.1.1
It may occur after multiple line fault and/or multiple
genera ting unit tripping and/or during an expected
extreme increase of the consumption, or as a
"transfer effect" between parallel tie-lines when
some of them trip, which increases load flows on
the remaining ones.
The protective relays whose activation is responsible
for the cascade line tripping can be overload relays
("static overload") installed in order to prevent over
heating of the lines or distance protective relays "tran
sient overload': when these relays are not blocked
against power swings.
The dynamics depend on the relays involved: from
several minutes for the static overload relays, to less
than one second for the distance protective relays
activation.
The consequences can be voltage collapse, undamp
ed power swings, loss of synchronism, or a direct
net work splitting.
11.1.1.1.1 Present situation
The list of the actions taken can be classified accord
ing to two categories. The first category includes the
following preventive actions:
e Each company follows security rules, in planning
and operating stages; this contributes obviously
to prevent such problems from occurring,
• The majority of utilities use power swing
blocking relays, while some use out-of-step relays,
• Others use preventive (or early) automatic load
shedding or unit shedding to avoid cascade line
tripping. Based on the monitoring of the breaker
position of determined lines.
The second category includes curative actions such
as:
• Fast manual (5-10 minutes) load shedding (some
times by remote control from Control Centers).
• Fast manual action on generators power
set
points and starting fast power reserves (gas
turbines, Hydro units). 215
 11.1.1.1.2 Recommendations
To avoid cascade line tripping it might be desirable to
adopt the following criteria:
• Protection systems on major transmission lines
and interconnections should be coordinated with
11.1.1.2
the adjacent system, acmrding to the following
requirements:
• Signal links between both ends of
the lines to facilitate speed and
selectivity when disconnecting faulty
lines.
• Single-phase automatic reclosing
systems on all important lines, following
single phase faults. In the case of poly-
phase faults, automatic 3-phase reclosing
systems at both ends of international tie-
lines and important internal line (phase
displace ment between 20°- 60°
depending on
the length of the line and on eventual
stresses concerning the shaft of big
generating units).
• Synchronizing equipment on all
major network interconnection points
(inter national and internal)
• Power swing blocking relays to prevent
transient overloads; in such a case out
of-step relays suitably located are recom
mended to eliminate loss of synchronism
of system areas.
• Settings of overload relays (on the
main lines and/or transformers) agreed
with neighboring utilities.
• Periodically updating of protection set
tings and coordination, for example every
year and whenever major changes in
generating resources. transmission, load
or operating conditions are foreseen.
The observance of these criteria
• allows correct removing of faults,
• avoids tripping of lines due to untimely
tripping command of distance protections,
• permits quick reclosure of important
connections in case of temporary faults,
216 • guarantees a high degree of connection in the
absence of more severe phenomena like loss of
synchronism or rapid voltage collapse.
• enables. the implementation of Wide Area
Protection Schemes (WAPS) or Special Protection
Schemes (SPS) such as unit shedding and/or load
shedding in interconnected operations.
• requires the extension of the coordination
between neighboring companies for off-line
detection of potential critical situations, by means
of dedicated planning or operation-planning
studies, and exchange of data.
If necessary due to particular network structure and
conditions, it could be indispensable to use signals
coming from neighboring companies or to send trip
ping orders to neighboring companies.
In case of degraded network or heavy operating con
ditions in terms of power flows, suitable automatic
fast disconnection of load or generation can avoid
cascade line tripping as consequence of transient or
static overloads after some lines have tripped due to
fault.
The implementation of such WAPS also provides eco
nomical advantages because it enables to work the
transmission network harder, still with appropriate
security margins in case of emergency conditions.
Particular attention must be paid to the reliability and
dependability aspects of such WAPS.
11.1.1.2 Voltage collapse control
The voltage instability (or voltage collapse) phenome
non may affect a part of the power system, especial
ly if this part is importing much power or is connect
ed to the rest of the system with rather long lines.
It may occur after multiple line tripping, and/or mul-
tiple generating unit tripping, and/or during an unex-
pected increase of the consumption. The consequen-
ce is a voltage decrease in some seconds or minutes
in the affected part, with risks of line tripping due to
protection operation, generator tripping and large
black-outs.
11.1.1.2.1 Present situation
The list of the actions taken can be classified accord
ing to two categories.
The first category includes preventive actions con
sisting in planning MVAr reserve margins and con
trolling voltage profiles, with respect to security rules:
• Adjusting generation
schedule,
• Adjusting voltage set points on generators and
synchronous compensators. Manually or under
automatic secondary voltage control,
• Adjusting taps on some transformers,
• Switching on/off shunt capacitors or reactors.
Such measures are taken by all the utilities and aim
at managing correctly reactive resources.
The second category includes curative actions, taken
in order to face a voltage collapse which is occurring:
• Blocking on load tap changers (OLTCs) on trans
formers, used by the majority of utilities; some
initiate blocking automatically, otherwise it is
manually conducted. In some cases OLTCs blocking
is applied in a preventive way.
• Reduction of voltage references of OLTCs is
used by some European utilities.
• In some special cases, early load shedding is
auto
matically ordered following important lines trip.
Taken into account that power systems are operated
under increasingly stressed conditions, the ability to
maintain voltage stability has become a growing con
cern. Along with the need for coordinating reactive
resources and operation measures in critical areas
involving areas of the grid common to more utilities.
11.1.1.2.2 Recommendations
• Coordination between neighboring utilities on
reactive margins management and voltage profile
control, particularly if some problems are detected
during off-line studies.
• Use of agreed procedures between neighboring
utilities for coordination of manual curative actions,
particularly in structurally critical arecas.
• Extension to all the countries/utilities of the 11.1.1.3
OLTCs blocking, the diminution of OLTCs voltage
references.
• Adoption of WAPS, like load shedding (in inter
connected operation) submitted to particular
network conditions and/or events (e.g. important
lines tripping, low voltage values in some particular
critical busses). To realize such control actions
on-line exchange of agreed measurements and/or
signals between neighboring companies may be
necessary.
7 7. 7. 7.3 Undamped power swings control
Undamped electromechanical oscillations between
two parts of the power system can be of a
"local type" (local oscillation mode) or of a "global
type" (inter-area oscillation mode). In the first case,
the oscil lations have high amplitude only on the
electrical quantities, mainly real power and
frequency, of a single power station or a small
area. In the second case, the oscillation's amplitudes
are relatively high on real powers and frequencies in
two or more areas of the system.
This phenomenon can be due to structural reasons
and may happen without apparent initial causes (no
special events) or can be the consequence of losing
important inter-area lines. The main structural rea
sons are: high load flows along long lines, high
reac tive absorption on generators, fast primary
voltage regulator of the units without suitable Power
System Stabilizers (PSSs).
In both the cases (local and global), the consequen
ces are large swings, having an oscillation period
from about 0.4 s (local oscillations) to about 10 s
(inter-area oscillations), on system quantities with
risks of generating unit tripping, operation of
distance pro tective relays, and network splitting.
217
 .,
11.1.1.3.1 Present situation
The list of the actions taken can be classified accord
ing to two categories.
The first category includes preventive actions con
sisting of:
11.1.1.4.1
• The respect of real power transfer limits
(according to the security rules),
• The respect of reactive power absorption
limits and low voltage limits on generators,
• Around two third of companies/countries
use WAPS on their important generators.
The second category includes curative actions taken
in order to face a power swing phenomenon which
is occurring:
• The reduction of real power transfers and/or the
increase of reactive power generation on concern ed
power units and synchronous compensators,
• The initiation of moderation on HVDC lines.
• As a last resort, the disconnection of a radially
connected parts of the system.
Concerning curative actions it is worth noting that
around one third of companies/countries provide
manual actions and another quarter rely on automa tic
actions.
11.1.1.3.2 Recommendations
To avoid undamped electromechanical oscillations it
might be desirabie to adopt the following criteria:
• Providing each impprtant power unit of all coun
tries/utilities with WAPS, taking care of both local
oscillation modes and inter-area oscillation modes,
with (if necessary) an on-line automatic updating of
WAPS measurements.
• Increasing the coordination between neighboring
utilities for off-line detection of potential critical
situations, by means of dedicated planning or
operation planning studies concerning this parti
cular dynamic behavior of-the-interconnected
system.
• Making agreements concerning operating rules,
such as power transfer limits (short term remedy), if
problems are detected.
218
The second category includes curative actions on the
generators and/or on the network with reference to As far as the actions on the network are concerned,
the units: there are:
• About half of the European utilities disconnect • Out-of-step relays on some lines
generators by out-of-step-relay or under-voltage • Blocking of distance protective relays against
protection or power derivative relays; such actions power swings.
may be fast (1 or 2 electric cycles) or delayed
(back-up of a network action);
11.1.1.4.2 Recommendations
• Generating units without fast valving are often
rapidly tripped.
·
7 7. 7.7.4 Loss of synchronism control
The loss of synchronism (or out-of-step) phenomena
may occur after a large disturbance (severe short-cir
cuit, multiple lines tripping, multiple generators trip
ping...). It may appear suddenly or after a series of
divergent swings.
The loss of synchronism can affect a single genera
ting unit, an entire power plant, a region, or several
reg1ons.
The risk is greater when the network is not very mesh
ed or when power flows are high.
The consequences are:
• Large transients (frequency, voltage amplitude,
real power,...) both on the generating units and
on the network with serious risk of units fast
disconnection and network splitting due to the
distance protections operation;
• Large disturbances for customers (frequency
deviation, voltage dips);
• Risk of fast spreading throughout the power
system (in a few seconds);
• Problems in supplying generating unit auxiliaries,
due to large variations of frequency and voltage of
the units.
11.1.1.4.1 Present situation
The list of the actions taken can be classified, once
again, into two categories.
The first category includes preventive actions, such
as:
• Security rules followed by each country/utility, in
planning and operation stages; this contributes
obviously lo preventing such phenomena from
occurring
• Fast valving, which is used by some utilities
• Other utilities use preventive (or early) automatic
load shedding or unit shedding either to avoid the
loss of synchronism or to avoid the event (multiple
line tripping) which could lead to a loss of
synchronism.
To avoid
loss of
synchroni
sm the
following
may be
desirable
:
•
Implem
 enting of WAPS as unit shedding and/or load
shedding in interconnected operation, when
necessary due to particular network structure and
conditions.
• Using of fast valving on thermal units: this action
must be coordinated with all the electrical protec- .
tions of the units and the adjacent network. The
effectiveness of this action is confined to small areas
including few power plants.
• Utilizing, in the case of loss of synchronism of
large system areas and in the presence of swing
blocking relays, out-of step relays suitably located in
the network or network splitting along pre defined
sections (another type of WAPS).
• Preventing automatic reclosing during out-of-step
conditions.
• Increasing of the mutual cooperation between
neighboring utilities, or more generally to the
overall interconnected system, intending to study
possible risks and remedies by specifying the
scenarios and the type of data to be exchanged
to perform common dynamic studies for verifying
by simulations the effectiveness of the actions
implemented and, eventually, their improvement.
11.1.1·.5.2 11.1.1.5.2 General principles
Schematically, one could say that a load shedding
plan has been conceived, more or less in each coun
try/utility, to meet requirements related to a frequen cy
drop concerning a part or the totality of the coun
7 7. 7. 7.5 Large frequency variation
control and load shedding
If, in spite of the control actions taken to maintain the
network interconnected, a network separation oc
curs, or in case of a controlled network splitting as
well as in case of a large deficit in the interconnected 11.1.1.5
system, it is essential to control the frequency varia
tion in both the separated parts of the interconnec
ted system by balancing generation and load. Parti
cular attention must be paid to the frequency dimi
nution, especially when it is not completely controlled
by the frequency regulation. In such a case, a com
mon and coordinated automatic underfrequency load
shedding scheme should operate.
11.1.1.5.1 Present situation
The comparison of the different measures in various
countries leads to some general results which are stat
ed as follows:
• The primary spinning reserve is mainly in the
range 2-3% of the demand all the time.
• Network splitting on underfrequency conditions
at boundaries of a company is made by many
utilities.
• In the range between 50 Hz and about 49 Hz,
all countries activate available power reserve such as
spinning reserve, pumps shedding, change from
pumping to generation mode, start of hydro units
and gas turbines, changes of HVDC links operation
mode, etc.
• In nearly all European countries the first step for load
shedding is about 49 Hz; only in Switzerland. Belgium
and Yugoslavia the first step is respectively
49.5, 49.4 and 49.2 Hz. In Italy the first seven load
shedding steps depend on frequency (f) and
the rate of change of frequency (df/dt) or pure
frequency criteria: this means that 4-28% of the
demand can be shed at 49.1 Hz depending on
df/dt value. Most of load shedding is done from
49 Hz to 48 Hz. In some countries there are ome
additional steps down to 47.5 Hz. Most of the -
thermal units are disconnected from the grid on
this threshold in order to save their auxiliary supply.
• Generally a load shedding is operating without
intentional time delay. Time delays, depending on
special situations in the grid, are allowed only by 219
Portugal, some NORDEL and some IPS partners.
try/utility isolated from the rest of the
system. On the other hand, a close
coordination of underfrequency load
shedding plans is recommended because
the international interconnected grid is in
general so close meshed that a sudden
and severe power imbalance will not be
restricted to the national borders.
As an example, two different situations can
be consi dered referring to the size of the
affected system. In fad, the power
imbalance can concern a part of the
 interconnected network, involving more than one single power station happens, the frequency in the
country/utility which has been isolated due to an partially interconnected network should not drop
initiating incident or the power imbalance can ap below 49 Hz (where load shedding starts). Of course
pear in a larger part of the interconnected system it is not good enough to have a sufficient amount
(one example of this category could be a large loss of of primary spinning reserve, but "seen
generation occurring inside the overall interconnected · from the network" the primary frequency control
system itself). loop should have suitable dynamic and static
characteristics in terms of
To comply with all the possible situations and pertur
bations the following main principles should be taken • Transient statics, responsible for the
into account from the "system dynamic behavior" mechanical power variation in the first
point of view: instants after a perturbation or respon
sible for the speed-of-response,
• The frequency range from 50 Hz up to 47.5 Hz is to
be considered, because most thermal units are • Ratio between the minimum frequency
specified for a minimum frequency of 47.5 Hz. If the value during the transient and the new
frequency drops below 47.5 Hz, the thermal units steady-state frequency value,
have to be disconnected. This frequency range can • Peak time (corresponding to the minimum
be divided into three regions, namely: frequency),
50 to 49 Hz, 49-48 Hz, below 48 Hz. • Permanent statics.
• From 50 Hz to about 49 Hz, the first action to • Sealing time (corresponding to the reach
restore normal frequency conditions has to be ing of the new steady-state condition).
initiated by the primary and secondary frE>quency
control. Each country/utility has to provide a suffi Seen from the power stations, it is desirable that at
cient spinning reserve according to adopted rules, · least the 50 % of the primary reserve of all the units is
that is a reserve equal to a suitable percentage of available within 5 s and 100 % within 30 s.
the respective power demand at all time. In other
In addition to the primary and secondary frequency
control, every possible measure should preferably be
taken in an automatic way, to stabilize and norma
lize the frequency, like:
• Shedding of pump storage units,
• Starting of hydro units and of gas turbines,
• Quick increasing power or changing from export
lo import on DC links,
• Demand side management (or switching-off of
customers having particular contracts).
• From about 49 to 48 Hz a common load shed ding
scheme should operate, in order to stop the
frequency drop and to stabilize grid operation before
thermal power stations trip. The first thresh old (49
Hz) should give sufficient time-for the operation of
primaryfrequency control. For shed ding pumps in
appropriate sequence and, more generally, taking all
the measures cited in the pre vious points and facing
some defined outages.
The last threshold (about 48 Hz) should permit the
220 words, if an outage of a single power unit or a the frequency stabilization before the tripping of
thermal power stations due to the operation of must be to keep the network interconnected as long as the
minimum frequency protection. From this point of frequency is above 48 Hz.
view, it is worth noting that presently the most
common setting value is 47.5 Hz (instantaneously or 11.1.1.5.3 Recommendations about load shedding
with a delay 'Of 2-4 s), but some units are tripped
The automatic load shedding plan of the inter connected
at 48 Hz, others in the range 47-46.5 Hz.
power system should be adequately coor dinated, in the range 49-
• The interconnected partners should abstain from 48 Hz, so that the amount of the demand shed in the various
isolating their networks from the neighbors before interconnected net works (which must be approximately equal to
common load shedding has been effected. This the power imbalance) and the related setting values should not
means that when load shedding may become determine overloads on the lines or other network problems, which
necessary, for instance in case of multiple outages can cause other perturba tions, network splitting and the collapse in
or network splitting, every partner of the network some parts of the interconnected system.
should participate in load shedding. The first aim
To satisfy such basic requirements it is necessary that:·
• The load shedding plan should operate strictly
coordinated in all countries/utilities, sharing out
the risk among the partners. This mutual help
under emergency conditions is in accordance with
the proposal of sharing the primary reserve rele vant
to the primary frequency contra!.
• The operating time of the different load shedding
devices should be harmonized, otherwise only the
fastest ones would operate. This means that the
load shedding should not be intentionally delayed
(or delayed as little as possible).
• The load should be divided into small portions.
For this purpose it should be shed on suitable
voltage levels of the system.
• The maximum load shedding amount should be
about 40 % - 50 % of the total demand. This
amount is reasonable because, if too little load is
11.1.2 11.1.1.5.4 Recommendations about
power
restoration
shed, the desired effect could not be reached.
Conversely, if more than about 50 % of the load is
shed, voltage instability owing to increasing
voltage values (due to the· presence of many EHV
lines) and consequent frequency collapse may
appear.
• An adequate common load shedding scheme 11.1.1.5.3
depends on the structure of the network of each
partner. There are networks with production and
load at the same place and networks having a load
center and a production center far away.
To unify the approach of interconnected partners
the following three ranges of frequency scale with
related portions of load are suggested:
Range 1
49.0 - 48.8 Hz =1 5 % of instantaneous load
Range 2
48.7 - 48.4 Hz =1 5% of instantaneous load
Range 3
48.3 - 48.9 Hz =1 5 % of instantaneous load
Within these frequency ranges, every interconnected
partner could be free to decide the number of thresh
olds. It is particularly recommended that the first fre
quency threshold (49 Hz) is the same for all inter
connected partners.
• The frequency thresholds and related amounts of
demand to be shed could be verified by per
forming an ad-hoc study including
• A choice of a suitable set of operating
conditions (typically peak and minimum,
winter and summer demand)
• A choice of a set of severe disturbances in
terms of power imbalance and the absence
of sufficient primary spinning reserve, taking
also into account critical sections (in terms of
structure and power flow) along which the
interconnected systems could be
separated (the sepa ration involving more
han one country/ utility) and loss of units
after the sepa- - ration as experience in real
incidents occurred in the past
Finally, it should be noted that the realization of a
common load shedding plan, as suggested above,
would require appropriate modifications of the pre-
sent situation. 221
,..
'i.
• Also, behavior of voltages, reactive power
flows and influence of automatic voltage
regulations have to be considered.
11.1.2 Measures against Power Systems
Disturbances
The following paragraphs describe some
reflections from the recommendations
above concerning coor-
 dination of problems among
It could be important to coordinate not only the load
interconnected utilities.
shedding scheme itself but also the main steps for
' restoring the grid to 11.1.2.1
normal Exchange of information,conditions
operating signals
I after commori load shedding occurred. Of course, this
and measurements
t

item is not relevant to the classical restoration phase

after a complete black-out, which is outsideItthe is essential
scope for common operation of
interconnect- ed grid to exchange
this subject, but it is limited to the particular restora-
important information between neighbors,
e.g. relating to
tion after load
shedding.
• The non-availability or loss of important lines
Such a coordination, involving the roles of the '.
• Temporary weak points in the power generation
Opera- tors and Control Centers as well as !
exchange of sig-
nals and possible mutual agreements, could be • Major disturbances in the power generation
based on the following main suggestions:
This information allows the partners to estimate the
• The dispatchers whose network is involved in security of the grid operation and should
be given as common load shedding, should restore the grid to early as possible.
normal conditions in very close cooperation, e.g.
by exchanging information about the The continuous exchange of signals is useful to apply
respective
to control actions. Normally every partner
operating situation of the grid, before isolated
receives indications concerning the
parts of the network are synchronized or before
operating situation in the neighboring
the shedded load is reconnected to the network.
networks for his own measuring equip-
me
nt
abo
ut:
• The reconnection of the shedded load should
take place in taking the transmission capacity • Deviations of the scheduled power
exchange of the respective network into account. • Changes of reactive power flows
and voltage
• If it is possible to synchronize isolated parts of conditions in the vicinity of the
borders of his the network within a short time, more generation neighbors
capacity should be activated and the supply of the • The load of
the tie-lines disconnected customer should be restored under
1,_
the following conditions: Usually the values of reactive power, voltage
and tie-
• Reconnection of load should take place line load have only local importance and
concern bila- only if the frequency has increased to teral operational conditions of only
about the nominal value,
two partners. For getting more reliable information as
redundancy
• Reconnection of load should be initiated it is suggested that two partners establish a
perma-
i
in small suitable portions nent exchange of information concerning their sub-
only. I
• It ought to be considered that depending on the stations next to the common border as follows:
I,
duration of the interruption and because of special
demand (e.g. by heating or cooling • Signals of tie-lines breakers
equipment) !]

the load after reconnection can be higher than • Voltage values of busbars
222 before the disturbance happened. • Real and reactive power values of the tie-lines
 .
.

Moreover, it is suggested to exchange olds and

signals of breakers of the internal lines The increase of the mutual cooperation the
going out from the sub station next to the among the partners of the correlated
common border. interconnected system, in particular amount
between neighboring companies, could of
In particular cases it may be advisable to
require some common studies on the demand
exchange additional information
system static and dynamic behavior for to be
continuously, e.g. power flow values of
an off-line detection of potential critical shed by
special lines, phase displacement of voltage
situations (or possible risks) during the
in special busbars and so on, which can
planning or ope ration-planning phases. common
cause opera tional restrictions of the grid
or a possible operation of defence plans in automatic
In particular, such studies should identify underfreq
one or more than one country.
all the possi ble control actions to uency
Furthermore, the·neighboring partners counteract cascade line tripping, voltage load
should inform (minimum once a year or instability, undamped power swings, loss shedding
more often in cases of big changes) each of scheme.
other about the impedance values of their
whole grid giving at least the lumped Besides,
impedan ce to the substation next to the they
border to the normal grid situation. This should
way every country/utility is able to take into indicate
account the influence of the neighboring the most
networks on their own grid with regard important
to static security calculations and on-line informatio
security analysis, and the relative data set n,
can be adjusted according to the present- measure
day information from the neighbors. ments
and
7 7. 7.2.2 Possible common signals
that have
studies to be
exchange
11.1.2.2.1 Types of common
d on-line,
studies
which
In the planning phase each utility/country can
usually per forms studies on a regular basis activate
with a several years outlook. The aim is to the
define the necessary measures to be taken opera
in the system to meet the future require tion of
ments and to determine the necessary defence
investments.· In the operation-planning plans in
phase each utility/country usually performs one or
studies on a regular basis (e.g. each week, more
each month, etc.). The aim is to adapt than one
the actual maintenance schedule for the coun try.
generation and transmission system.
 • Special system components
11.1.2.2.2 Data required to (SVCs, FACTs)
perform common • The parameter of system
studies protection like
To perform such studies it is necessary to • Line and transformer
know: protections
11.1.2.2
• Network structure, parameters and • Generator protection '
operating conditions. against external faults
• The parameters of the dynamic • The parameters and characteristics of
components indicated below defence plans.
• Generators
• Loads 11.1.2.2.3 Procedures for data
exchange
• Voltage regulators
eWAPS The procedures of data exchange can
• Frequency regulators have Se\f.eral different forms, but according
to existing experience it is suggested to
• Supply systems and controls
proceed in several steps:
• Capability dynamic limits
• Secondary voltage control • Each partner prepares data of his
system for a defined time interval
• Load frequency control
(e.g. 5 years outlook).
• On load tap changer regulations
• All partners send their data in
agreed form to
synchronism as well as to verify the one chosen partner.
frequenc thresh- 223
commonly accessible computer. In
all the
· cases, the maintenance of the data
base is required. Same procedures
may be used for the exchange of
fixed data for short-time studies (e.g.
on-line analysis) completed by some
11.1.2.3 • The chosen partner, who may be
information, signals and measur
the same each time or not
ements coming from neighbors.
collects all data and prepares the
"data- book" both in written form
and in computer form. 11.1.2.3 Principal
• This data-book is sent recommendations about
back to all partners
International
involved.
defense plans
• Each partner approves his data in
the "data-book". Based on the recommendations
explained in detail above the
This way the prepared data are valid following principles can be
for an agreed in teNal of time (until summarized:
the next data exchange) and seNe as
a base for all computations of • The main aim is to avoid
common interest. network splitting (islan ding)
and demand disconnection in
The higher form of this organization cases of over load, large voltage
is having all data on one drop, large frequency drop
 and system instability. Another defence plans and to take into
aim is to assure a account that the extension of the
controlled and limited separation interconnected grid can lead to wide
of the network. spread and severe incidents. Apart
• The majority of the utilities have from the need for coordination
modified their defence plans between neighboring utilities, there
following large incidents over is also ·a need for the systematic
the last ten years, mainly by international coordina tion of the
updating load shedding schemes various control actions, and for a
and adding WAPS. common definition of defence plans
philosophy as well as a common
!n order to pursue the planning and operational-planning
objectivesoJJbeJics.t item, it is of vital analysis related to possible defence
importance for an interconnected plans operation.
system to coordinate all the control
techniques that are appro priate to In view of the fact that each utility
control the system in normal and follows coordina ted security rules, in
emergen cy conditions. On the other planning and operation stages, these
hand, the need is evident can be considered as the most
important pre ventive actions taken
to counteract phenomena that could
cause widespread and severe
disturbances. In addition to this, it is
recommended to coordinate the
defence plans for controlling alert
and emergency states of the system,
as mentioned in detail above.

Among those suggested actions, the

most important and urgent ones in
an international context, .and having
the same degree of priority from the
point of view of network security
(even if for different rea sons), are
the following:
• To implement the blocking of
OLTCs. In order to reduce the
probability for a voltage
collapse.
• To provide each important
power unit of all
countries/utilities with WAPS, mainly taking care
.I

of inter-area oscillation modes.

• To coordinate with neighboring
utilities the settings of overload
relays and more generally of all
the protective devices on the-main
lines and/or transformers in the
vicinity of the boundaries.
• To install WAPS, as unit shedding
and/or load shedding in
interconnected operation, where it
is necessary because of particular • The use of power swings
network topology and conditions blocking relays to prevent
and to exchange information on transient overloads. In such a
defined events (e.g. important lines case, out of-step relays suitably
tripping, low voltage values in some located in the network, or
particular critical busses, etc). It could network splitting along predefined sections (a
also be necessary to interchange type
signals coming from neighboring of WAPS), are recommended to avoid loss of
utilities or to send tripping
commands to neighboring utilities.
2 for continuous updating and synchronism of system areas.
2 improving the existing
4
• To coordinate the automatic load
shedding plan of the interconnected Beyond such occurrences of
power system in the range credible contingencies, a
4 power system may also be
9 attacked by more severe
- disturbances, resulting from
4 multiple and simulta neous dents
8 outages, in conjunction with unless
H approp
possible protec
z
tion or regulation failures. riate
.
Owing to that, the need aris counte
• To conduct common studies on the rmeas
es for the implementation of
system dyna mic behavior during ures
special defensive meds ures in
planning and operational planning are
order to avoid the spread of
stages, for off-line detection of imple
the disturbances not only in
possible critical grid topology and mente
the network of each utility but
operating conditions d.' This
also in the whole
and for the determination of the leads
interconnected power
relevant control measures as well as to a
system.
of the most feasible informac tion, new
measurements and signals to be conce
However, most of the
exchanged on-line. ption
measures presently taken by
the utilities in the context of of
11.1.3 defence plans are con fined defen
Conclus to each utility and the ultimate ce
ions action may be to open plans
interconnections at boundaries. and
In view of the fact that the power Even if it is very difficult to to
systems are to be planned, built and achieve an overall coordination more
operated in such a manner that because of technical obstacles coordi
customers should not be affected, and costs, it is advisable to nated
within given limits, by possible extent the present defen
contingencies and not suffer coordination of defence ce
consequen ces from a defined list of plans as the electric actions
"credible contingencies" this generally phenomena do not stop at amon
leads to the adoption of planning and system bounda ries. g
ope rating rules ensuring that the utilitie
power system will remain viable if one s.
(sometimes several) system com ponent
As far
(line, generator, substation) are lost.
as
defence plans are concerned, the new approach
should be based on preventive and curati ve
actions for controlling phenomena that can dete
riorate the system performances and cause an
un controlled and widespread blackouts. More
precisely, the objectives of the such a defence plan
should be the following
• To provide all the measures necessary to
maintain the power S)'Stem interconnected as
long as possible after the occurrence of greatest
number
of phenomera, e.g:
• Thermal overloads,
• Trarsient overloads,
• High and instantaneous voltage drop,
• SID':; and continuous voltage decline,
• Loss of synchronism of small areas,
• Frecuency drop.
In the process of globalization and
deregulation of the power industry, the
power exchanges between utilities will
increase. This causes the
interconnected power system less
capable to withstand large inci-
. ·
It is of vital importance to avoid the
cascade line tripping, if necessary due
to particular network structure anc
conditions by means of WAPS for unit
and/or load shedding. It is
indispensable to keep the po.ver 11.1.3
systems interconnected as long as
possible as it is of utmost importance
to all the partners, both to the
weakest ones in terms of available
pm'Ier and also to those partners
who
are normally exporting power. The
implementation
of such WAPS provide economical
advantages as it is possible to stress
the transmission network considerably,
and to keep up the security margins
even in emergency situations.
• To initiate controlled network
splitting aimed at isolating the
phenomenon in case of loss of
synchronism involving larger
system areas. Such
type of WAPS should be implemented on the
225
 I -
'

11.2 Achievements with WAPS I

on power systems

11.2 condition that the network splitting does not
cause other disturbances, e.g. cascade line tripping
in the neighboring countries.
• To control the frequency variation in all the
separated section of the interconnected system by
balancing generation and load, if a controlled
network splitting or network separatior. could not
be avoided, or in case of a large deficit in the
interconnected system Particular attention must be
paid to frequency decline because of insufficient
frequency regulation: In such a case, a common
and coordinated automatic load shedding scheme
should be activated
In order to achieve the objectives mentioned above,
a number of preventive and curative actions has been
recommended.
Finally, the increase of the mutual cooperation among
the partners of the interconnected system, in
particu- lar between neighboring utilities could
require:
• The on-line exchange of agreed measurements
and signals.
The task of the power system planner is to find a
technical and economical trade-off between invest-
ments, operation costs and customer service quality.
WAPS play a significant part in this trade-off and are
mainly used on a power system to: :I
')
• Improve power system operation. WAPS are
often conceived by operational planner specialist
l
to cope with
• operational difficulties imposed by
particular power system characteristics,
• operating conditions that involve heavy
energy transfers due to generation
co-ordination, i"
'
• higher exposure to multiple faults than
what was originally planned and
• special operational problems imposed
by long UHV transmission systems with
hydro generation located far away from
load centers
All examples of those situations are often mitigat-
ed by WAPS.
I!
I

• Common studies on the system dynamic behavior • Operate power system closer to their limits.
for an off-line detection of potential critical
Situations (or possible risks) during planning or gins
operation-planning phases. A list of data to be
exchanged and a procedure as proposed above
that enable to conduct such studies.
• The coordination of the main steps for restoring
the grid to normal operating conditions after
common load shedding has been executed. Such
a coordination should comprise the roles of the
Operators and Control Centers as well as the
exchange of signals and possible mutual agree-
ments.
226
In many power systems, the operative safety mar- I
began to decrease quickly as a consequence I;
II
of restrained possibility of network development
caused by environmental problems or as a conse-
quence of financial difficulties in following the
schedule of the transmission expansion planning.
• Increase power transfer limits while main-
taining the same level of system security.
WAPS may be used to postpone some trans-
mission expansion projects to cope with scarce
financial resources while maintaining the same r·
j i
level of power system security. In many power I
l..
utilities, \fl/.f'>..PS is one of the key elements in the
power system planner's toolbox to meet system
performance requirements.
• In temporary installation to compensate for
delays in the construction program, e.g. as a

temporary solution before a new transmission line is ducted to determine their effects on power system relative
constructed. performance and to measure the robustness of the ly low
power system. The use of WAPS to increase power a smal
• Increase the power system security particu larly
system security is a world-wide acceptable practice to number
towards extreme contingencies leading to system
counter extreme contingencies, when experience of
collapse. Extreme contingencies
proves that these events occur too frequently and/or WAPS
usually refer to events resulting in multiple campo-
causes system collapse. are
. nents removed or cascading out of service such as the
probab
loss of transmission lines on a common right of-way or It is recognized that it is not feasible or possible to ly
faults with delayed clearing (stuck brea ker or protection predict or prevent all multiple contingency events that sufficie
system failure) on a bus section. Extreme contingency could occur randomly and could lead to power nt to
evaluations are usually con system collapse. When the complexity of a system is
protect the system adequately. However, large systems
must call upon a set of coordinated measures whose
design and operation must involve high levels of complexity.
This is necessary to ensure the system is able to cope
with all possible major incidents.
Defence plans should be defined as a set of coordi nated
defensive measures whose main purpose is to ensure the
overall power system is protected against major
disturbances, to limit the consequences of these low
probability and unexpected events, and to prevent system
collapse. Defence plans are thus mainly used to increase
power system security.
A defence plan can be considered as an additional level
of protection, designed to initiate the final attempt at
stabilizing the power system when a widespread
collapse is imminent. At pre5ent, very few power systems
are equipped with such a defence plan and depending
on the power system design they differ significantly.
Individual WAPS based on generation rejection, load
shedding, shunt switching or system splitting must be
regarded as basic actions, that can be used within a
defence plan.
. ?
11.3 Power system phenomena with
possible WAPS solutions
11.3
The use of WAPS is most frequently justified for loss of
network integrity characterized by one or more of the
following phenomena:
• Angle instability (transient and small signal)
• Frequency instability ·
• Voltage instability
• Cascade line tripping
The structure of the system and its type of inter
connection with its neighbors are significant factors in the
analysis of the phenomena. Indeed some of these
phenomena can be amplified or attenuated according to
the various characteristics of the system. System structures
can be roughly divided between:
• Densely meshed transmission systems with
dispersed generation and demand or
• Lightly meshed transmission system with localized
centers of generation and demand
The type of interconnection can be classified as:
• Transmission system which is part of a larger
interconnection or
• Transmission system that is not synchronously
interconnected with neighbors or is the largest
partner in the interconnection.
Table 11-1 highlights the dominant phenomena for each
type of system and makes it possible to appre ciate the
relations between these two aspects.
The main purpose of this section is to identify if an WAPS is
required and to determine the type of WAPS that will prevent
a loss of network integrity. The deci sion is based on the type
of instability and the-struc ture of the power system on which
the WAPS is to be applied. After a severe disturbance some
of these phenomena will occur together, but for
simplicity, each will be discussed separately. The discussion
will consider the possible WAPS actions that can be used
for controlling them. 227
11.3.1.
Densely meshed system
with dispersed generation
and demand
System in a large Small signal stability
interconnection Thermal overload
No large frequency variation
System not Thermal overload
interconnected or by Large frequency variation
far the largest partner
Table 11-1 Dominant phenomena in relation to power system types
Table 11-1, presented at the end of this section, lists
the types of WAPS most likely to be used to limit
the consequences of transient angle instability,
frequency instability, voltage instability, and instability
resulting from cascade line tripping. Particular WAPS
solutions are described in detail in section 11.5.
11.3.1 Angle instability (transient and
sma·11 s1. gnaI,)
11.3.1.1 Transient angle instability
The transient stability of a power system describes
the ability of all the generators to maintain synchro
nism when subject to a severe disturbance such as a
heavy current fault, loss of major generation or loss of
a large block of load The system response will invol
ve large excursions in generator angles and signifi
cant changes in real and reactive power flow, bus vol
tages and other system variables. Loss of synchro
nism can affect a single generating unit, a power
plant consisting of multiple units, a region of the net
work or several regions connected together. The loss
may appear suddenly (during the first swing) or after
228 a series of divergent swings. The risk of loss is great-
Lightly meshed system with
localized centers of
generation and/or demand
Transient stability
Small signal stability
Voltage stability
Transient stability
Voltage stability
Large frequency variation
er when the system is loosely meshed or the
power flows are high. The main consequences
are large disturbances for customers (voltage dips,
frequency deviations) and/or large transients (real
power, volta ge, frequency etc.) on the generating
units and on the system. The latter may significantly
increase the risk of fast disconnection of units and
system separa tion due to incorrect line protection
operation.
To prevent loss of synchronism, rapid and massive
actions based on the direct detection of the contin
gency are often required. The following WAPS func
tions have proven to be especially effective in this
role:
• Generation rejection and fast valving
• Dynamic braking
• Reactor switching near generators
• Automatic load shedding
.I.., I
..•..,.J'."I ". "'".Jr/1:tOl.l....;t)ef':j/IQ/ Qff':JI
,·nstabl·z,·ty
Small signal stability refers to the ability of the power
system to maintain in synchronism when subjected
to small disturbance. Power systems contain many
modes of oscillation due to a variety of interactions of
 •

its components. Many of the

oscillations are due to generator rotor
masses swinging relative to one an
other. Power systems having several
machines will exhibit multiple modes
of oscillations. These electro
mechanical modes usually occur in other band. For example,. the composite 11.3.2
the frequency range of 0.1 to 2.0 Hz. curve indica tes that operation between
Undamped electromechanical modes 58.5 Hz and 579 Hz is permitted for ten
can be of a local type (frequency range minutes before turbine blade dama ge is
of 0.7 to 2.0 Hz) or of inter-area probable. If a unit operates within this
oscillation mode (frequen cy range of frequen cy band for one minute, then
0.1 to 0.7 Hz). nine more minutes of operation within
this band are permitted over the life of
In many systems the damping of the blade.
these electrome chanical modes is a
critical factor for operating in a secure
manner. Counter-measures used to
solve small signal stability problems
rely for the most part on closed-loop
controls. Closed-loop controls provide
dynamic control of electric system
quantities and fall outside the scope
of this book. Examples of closed loop
control devices include generator
excitation con trol, power system
stabilizer and static VAr, compen sators
(SVCs).

WPS are associated with non i as, or major

continuous-controls and are not n outages of
normally used to improve the behavior t generating plant.
of the system in the case of small o If, despi te of the
signal stability problems. control actions
i taken to maintain
11.3.2 s the net
Frequency o
instability l
a
Frequency stability describes the ability t
of a power system to maintain the e
system frequency within an acceptable d
range during normal operating
conditions or after a severe a
disturbances that have caused cas r
cade line tripping, splitting of the system e
"'
.5
59++"-+"-,...._--i+
i}
.t
work integrity, network separation
occurs, it is impor tant to keep the
frequency under control. Generators can
operate without restriction within ± 0.5
Hz from normal frequency (50 or 60 Hz
system) and for a limit ed time outside
these values (according to manufac
turer's constraints).
Figure 11-1 illustrates typical steam
turbine limitations during abnormal
frequency conditions. The curve is
derived by considering the worst case
limitations spe cified by five turbine
manufacturers. (Note: steam tur bines
are generally the weakest type of
turbine when considering under-
frequency operation.) In this figure,
time spent in a given frequency band
is cumulative but independent of the
time accumulated in any
. ,
Time in minutes
Figure 11-1 Steam turbine
limitations
during abnormal
frequency
conditions
A major problem for a steam turbine
is the frequen cy drop resulting from a
sudden loss of generation. In a large
interconnected system, this is
particularly onerous if immediately prior
to the disturbance signi ficant power
transfer is taken place from
one·region of the network to another.
If an interconnection or a power plant
outage occurs in a region with a
gene ration shortage, a severe under-
frequency disturban ce will result.
Under-frequency operation (frequency
deviation >-2.5 Hz) can lead to the
damage of ther
mal unit turbine blades and to life period reduction.
229
 • Changing the operating mode of a hydro
gene rator from a synchronous compensator to
a synchronous generator.
• Islanding of thermal power units with local
loads. The purpose of this measure is to keep
the thermal units in service prior to the splitting of
11.3.3 Consequently, 'to protect the unit, the time duration islanding of the system. After the split, these
for underfrequency operation is limited. In some units should maintain supply to the consumers
situa tions, the frequency drop can be so deep, that within the islanded area.
under frequency relays will disconnect thermal • Overfrequency tripping of some or all of
units from the network, which· increases the power the units in hydro power plants (f > 61.5 Hz)
deficit. The other problem associated with operation to avoid thermal unit tripping.
at low fre quency is the effect on the output of plant
• Automatic load restoration initiated by the ope
auxiliaries (fans, boiler .feed pumps) and the reduC:ion
ration of overfrequency relays, designed to correct
this caus es in the output of the main generating
a frequency overshoot following the operation of.
unit.
an under-frequency load shedding.
If we now consider the region of the network with a
The main influencing factors for frequency variation
surplus of generation and assume that the inter-ties
can be summarized as: the power deficit (P), the
used to transfer power to the remote loads are sud
load damping constant (D) in the power deficit-area
denly tripped, the "local" system frequency will start
and the inertia constant (I) of the units. The
increasing. If the frequency increases above a pre-set
frequency deviation in a large interconnected
value (normally 61 Hz on a 60 Hz network) the
system can be expressed as:
governors may go into an over speed mode and
close their main valve. If the over-frequency is not .M(%) =- P(%) (1-e-lff) K
reduced within a pre-set time period the unit will be where K = 1/D and T = M/D
tripped because of the unstable boiler condition. The
problem of overfrequency is less troublesome than
underfrequency because tripping of the unit will
11.3.3 Voltage Instability
cause a frequency reduction. However, if the reduc Voltage stability is concerned with the ability to main
tion is insufficient, further units will need to be trip tain steady acceptable voltages at all buses under
ped, or if excessive an underfrequency will result. normal conditions, and after being subjected to a
disturbance. Voltage stability results from the attempt
Load shedding WAPS are used on most power of loads to restore above the maximum power that
system networks to control the frequency. Types of the combined generation and transmission system
WAPS that have proven especially effective in the can deliver to them. This maximum power is directly
control of frequency are: influenced by electrical distances between generation
• Underfrequency load shedding used to stop or and load centers, as well as by the reactive power
reverse a frequency drop. This must occur before limitations of generators. Voltage instability takes on
the thermal power plants are underfrequency the form of a progressive drop of voltages at the
tripped. The main objective is to hold the system transmission level under the effect of load
frequency above a pre-set level (58 Hz on a 60 restoration. In turn, the sagging voltages may result
Hz network) and keep the network in a system collapse causes by generators loosing
interconnected with the power plants on-line. synchronism and indudion rnotors stalling.
• Automatic tripping of interconnection lines by r
A distinction is made between short and long-term
underfrequency relays. voltage instability according to the time scale of load
• Start-up of a unit in a hydro power plant, restoration. Induction motors restore their active
normally initiated when the 60 Hz frequency
drops below
230 59.5 Hz. power consumption in a time interval of one second
(short-term) while loads fed through Load Tap a large disturbance. Voltage instability may be caused by
Changers (LTCs) restore over one to several minutes a variety of single or multiple contingencies. With
(long-term). The same holds true for thermostatically respect to long-term voltage stability, the main con
controlled loads. This is also the time scale on which field cern is the loss of transmission facilities (mainly be
(and in some cases, armature) current limiters ad to tween generation and load centers) or the tripping of
protect generators from thermal stress, thereby generators (mainly those located close to the loads
removing voltage support. and supporting the voltages of the latter). With res
pect to short-term voltage instability, the slow clear ing
Although the simplest voltage instability scenario is a . load of a fault may cause an induction motor dominat ed
increase above the maximum deliverable power, most load (e.g. air conditioning) to become unstable.
experienced voltage incidents were caused by
The main factors influencing voltage stability are:
c System strength (long electrical distances between
generation and load centers)
• Lack of fast reactive power reserves (generators,
synchronous condensers and SVCs)
• Lack of other reactive power reserves such as
capacitors, etc.
• High power transfers and high loading conditions.
• Low power factor loads
• Load characteristics, in particular load power
restoration through LTCs
The following actions can be taken against voltage
instability:
• Shunt compensation: automatic switching of
shunt capacitors or tripping of shunt reactors,
• Emergency control of LTCs: blocking, return on a pre-
defined position, decrease in voltage set-point.
• Automatic tripping of interconnection lines (if it is
acceptable to the area which imports power).
• Modulation of HVDC power
• Fast unit start-up
• Fast increase of generator voltages (througn
AVR set-points)
• In the last resort, load shedding
A proper amount of load shedding, at the proper
location and with a proper tuning is very effective in
stopping a voltage instability process. The objective is to
restore a long-term equilibrium (operating point) for the
system. It is also aimed at avoiding the system to reach a
point where collapse occurs due to loss of synchronism,
motor stalling, etc. Low voltages at transmission buses
in load centers are typical signals but other variables
may enter the decision logic as well.
In many cases, the required amount need not be large
to restore an acceptable voltage profile for fre quency
instability resulting from a lack of spinning reserve, but
shedding must be fast enough. However, for voltage
instability the location plays an important role.
11.3.4 Cascade line tripping
Cascade line tripping refers to an uncontrolled
sequence of transmission line disconnections trigger ed by
an incident at a single location. In some situa tions, a
severe disturbance on a transmission system can initiate
major oscillations in real and reactive power flows
and instability in voltage levels. These oscillations may
initiate the operation of some pro tection devices or
control equipment, which can occasionally result in
uncontrolled cascade line trip ping. Overload or thermal
problems may also cause cascade line tripping. Cascade
line tripping will affect inter-ties between regions of the
power system and will be particularly problematic when
one regiqn is importing power and another exporting. In
such situa tions the consequence of a disturbance may
spread over a wide system area and could result in the
loss of supply to a large number of consumers.
Cascade line tripping is most likely to occur after the
 11.3.4

protection has responded to a fault or faults by trip- 231

11.3.4 ping a double circuit tie-line, multiple lines in the vici
nity of the fault, one/more generating units or a bus
bar in a substation. Alternatively, cascade line tripping
can occur during an unexpected extreme increase in
consumption or as a transfer effect between
parallel ties-lines, when one of them trips due to a
fault or incorrect protection operation. This
increases the power flow on the remaining lines
and may result in load encroachment into the
backup characteristics of distance relays or may be
detected as an overload
· condition by a time delayed phase overcurrent relay.
The system dynamics will determine which, if any,
relays are involved: i.e. zone 3 elements in a distance
relay will normally operate in approximately 1 s, time
delayed overcurrent relays set to detect an overload
will normally operate in several minutes. To prevent
cascade line tripping, it is important to ensure ade
quate coordination margins exist between the opera
ting characteristics of all the non-unit protection relays
used on the network and also where possible to use
high speed unit or communication aided protection
schemes. The dependability, security and selectivity of
the protection relays and schemes, including where
appropriate their communication systems, are of para
mount importance in reducing the risk of cascade line
tripping. However, improving the performance of
conventional equipment protection may not comple
tely eliminate the phenomena that leads to cascade
line tripping and an WAPS may be required.
The following types of WAPS are used by some
utilities:
• Preventive automatic load shedding or
generation rejection based on the circuit breaker
status (open and closed) on some important tie-
lines.
• Gas turbine start-up
• Power swings blocking of distance relays
The following tables shows an overview of the most
used WAPS actions to counteract power system phe
nomena:

c: CT• 0... I ?6 Q")Vl

I<i:
('"")
:J u
WAPS actions 0
_Q +-' ·- 0
c: c:
"i3 c:

I
QJ

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t
(\)
>-,
s c: -i3
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;lO"l :J 0
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"Q) I 0 ..c
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> 0...
Vl
:J-o 0...
+-'
Vl
0
QJ
c:
0 0 Vl
a: +--' (])
(\) (\) ·v; (])
+--' -oC:
Vl
c: c: +--'
(\)
'+- 0
Vl
0"-o
001 - 01
·¥ 01
o
(]) 0
01

+--' (]) (]) CO">

(]) c: (\)
(\) c: -
:J -
u
Vl
(])
01 (\) c:
Power System c: _c:
-ou
(]) +--' '+-(])
-o +--' u
c: Vl
<lJ-o UO"l E:.C c: _c: ·-
c:
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phenomena E-o oc: 0...
: (\) ::;· (\)

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C .-
Vl
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-a
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::::Jlll :r:-5 u
0 '+-

\..::) \..::) <t a:

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Transient instability X X X X X X

Frequency instability
- Frequency diminution X X X X X
.. -

- Frequency rise X
 Voltage instability X X X X X X X

Cascade line tripping X X X X

232 Table 11-2 Most used WAPS actions to counteract power system phenomena
11 .4 Classification of WAPS

Electric variables
Normally, WAPS ad after a disturbance such as a fault r--1 PCM'er System

on transmission facilities, loss of generation or loss of T Direct detection

large load. The system response to such a disturbance I Power System Disturbances
normally involves excursions of frequency, voltage
and generator angles. The WAPS provides the requir
ed stabilizing force necessary to preserve the system
stability. All WAPS consist of three main parts:
• Inputs (level of physical magnitudes, status of
Wide Area Protection S tstem {WAPS)
circuits breakers, etc.)
Switching or non-
• A decision-making system that, based on continuous actions r-
on: Decision
the inputs, initiate some actions
- •Generator Making Input
• Actions to perform (such as generator or <(
System
•Load
load tripping). •Line
•Set point I
Figure 11-2 illustrates the general structure of WAPS.
Figure 77-2 General w1de Area Protection
Generally, WAPS refer to controllers having some or System
all of the following characteristics: (\NAPS) Structure
11.4
• WAPS usually employ discrete, feed forward
laws, under-frequency load shedding, operates in steps.
The power system response from each step is thus
• WAPS are nominally "sleeping systems"
taken into account before the next step in the WAPS
and operates infrequently,
is activated. Classification of SPS according to their con
• The control action taken is, in most trol variables may be subdivided into two categories:
cases, predetermined, and
1. response-based WAPS and
• WAPS can be an·ned or disarmed
depending on the power system 2. event-based WAPS.
conditions.
11.4. 1.7 Response-based vs. event
There are numerous ways to separate and classify based WAPS
WAPS. The three classifications used here are
Response based WAPS use electric variables (voltage,
1. the type of WAPS input variable, frequency etc) and initiate non- continuous stabilizing
2. the impact of the WAPS on the system actions after the disturbance has caused the measu
and red variables to significantly degrade. The objective is
3. a classification according to WAPS operating time. to correct the deterioration of these variables l:;>y an
action, which is generally local. Two examples of this
type of WAPS are under-frequency load shedding
11.4.1 Classification of WAPS according and under voltage load shedding. This type of WAPS
to its input variables could be used if the robustness of the system is
suf ficient to allow these WAPS to ad before the
As shown on Figure 11-2 , WAPS refer to a special system is unstable (therefore mainly for "slow
class of controls that do not provide dynamic control phenomena").
of electric system quantities (open-loop or feed-for
ward controls). However, some of WAPS for example The variables used are selective according to events 233
of different severity and different type. For this class whose misoperation or failure to
operate would of WAPS, the effect of unintended operation is gene- have a significant
adverse impact outside of the rally limited because its actions are restricted and
local area. The corrective action
taken by the WAPS localized. This type of WAPS is simple and secure. Its along with
the actions taken by other protection reliability depends extensively on the selectivity of the
11.4. systems are intended to return
3 power system chosen variables and their behavior. parameters to a stable and
recoverable state.
 based WAPS are designed for operation only • Type II: An WAPS which recognizes or
E anticipates upon the recognition of a particular combination. of abnormal system
v conditions resulting from extreme events and are thus based on the direct detection of
e me contingencies or other extreme causes, and
n the event (e.g: the loss of several lines in a station). whose misoperation or failure to operate would
t have a significant adverse impact outside of the
Pre-planned actions could be local or local area. In the application of these systems, their
remote. This
type of WAPS is generally used for events whose security is
the prime concern. severity largely exceeds the robustness of the
system
or when the speed of phenomena concerned is too • Type Ill: An WAPS whose
misoperation or failure high to allow the use of a response based WAPS. ['•

to operate results in no significant

adverse impact These WAPS are rule-based, with rules developed outside
the local area. It should be recognized that from off line simulations. They are generally
high a Type Ill WAPS may, due to
system changes, speed because their actions must be carried out become
Type I or Type II.
before the behavior of the system is not too degrad-
ed and instability of the system cannot be avoided. Design and operating criteria
contingencies are They may be very effective since rapid control action contingencies
the system is designed to withstand, may quench electromechanical dynamics before they
for example a three phase fault with loss of a line. become stability threatening.
Extreme contingencies are more serious but less com-
mon than design criteria
contingencies, for example
The reliability of "event-based" WAPS is the loss of all the lines in a corridor. One or more of
often consi-
dered a concern, but good design and adequate the following conditions arising from
a fault or distur- levels of redundancy can ensure high reliability. The bance shall be
deemed to have a significant adverse relative effect of a failure to operate versus unintend-
impact:
ed operation must be weighed
carefully in selecting
design parameters. Examples of event-based WAPS •
System instability
are generation rejection and/or remote load shed- • Unacceptable system
dynamic t"esponse;
ding instigated by the tripping of a transmission line. •
Equipment tripping
e Voltage levels in violation of applicable
11.4.2 Classification of WAPS according
emergency limits
to its impact on the power system • Loading on
transmission facilities in vio- WAPS can also be classified according to the severity
lation of applicable
emergency limits and •
of the contingency and its impact on the system. This
Unacceptable loss off load.
kind of classification makes it
possible to consider the various
WAPS installed in a system
according to their
relative importance and to require different perfor- 11.4.3 Classification of
WAPS according
mance levels for their dependability, security and
to its
operating time
maintenance criteria. WAPS may be
sub-divided into
 three types: Figure 11-3 illustrates the
approximate time frame
• Type 1: An WAPS which recognizes or anticipates associated with each WAPS listed
and shows the rela-
abnormal system conditions resulting from tionship between the duration of major power sys-
234 design and operating criteria contingencies, and tern phenomena and the time frame of WAPS actions

·
most likely used to limit their consequences. The time
scale is logarithmic, full line represents the typical ope
11.5 Detailed description of the
rating range for each WAPS while the doted part various WAPS actions
indi cates the overall potential operating range.
There has been a marked increase in the use of
Also indicated in Figure 11-3 are the important areas
WAPS, particularly to withstand design criteria contin 11.5
at the extremes of the duration spectra which are not
gencies, as economics and regulatory problems have
covered in this document, but which deserve men
led to less robust transmission system. While impro
tioning since they represent Important areas of acti
ving system stability, the application of WAPS imposes
vity that could also be classified under the general
duties on system and equipment that must be based
subject of automatic actions but not under the sub
on a prudent assessment of the benefits and costs.
jed of switching WAPS. First extreme is the important
This Section presents short descriptions of the various
area of electro-magnetic switching transients c:mcern
WAPS actions available to improve system stability
ed with overvoltage and automatic measures taken
and reliability whilst discussing potential problems or
mainly to protect .equipment (protection system, over
harmful effects on the power system. The intention is
voltage protection and system separation). The other
to provide a starting point for detailed investigation of
extreme in the duration spectrum concern manual
a particular WAPS and to help designers of a new
operation and automatic actions taken to help sys
WAPS to select the most suitable type of WAPS to
tem operation after power system changes.
counter a specific phenomena.

Electromagnetic Transient stability Power system

switching transients (angle & voltage) operation

Small signal Long term stability

stability

Long terni voltage stability

 Figure 11-3 WAPS time frame related to power system phenomena
11.5.2 A large variety of WAPS are now in service, but most
are based on one or more of the following actions:
• Generation rejection
• Turbine fast valving/generator runback
• Gas turbine/pumping storage start-up
• Actions on the AGC such as set point
changes
• Under-frequency load shedding (UFLS)
• Under-voltage load shedding (UVLS)
• Remote load shedding
• HVDC fast power change
• Automatic shunt switching (shunt
reactor/capacitor tripping or closing)
• Dynamic braking or braking resistor
• Tap changers blocking and set points
adjustment
• Quick increase of voltage generator
set point
The majority of actions described above can be initiat
ed by a local detection system or by a wide area
detection system. Detection is considered local when
all the information required by the decision-making
process is available at the same location where the
realization of the action is performed. Generally ,,ocal
WAPS" are considered the most dependable type of
WAPS because they do not rely on telecommunica
tions facilities for their operations and are also consi
dered the most secure because their actions are
generally limited and localized. Under-frequency load
shedding is probably the best known of this type of
WAPS. Local WAPS are often distributed throughout a
region of the network and together fulfil the desired
level of action (for example: under-frequency load
shedding). High dependability is achieved by diversi
fication; failure of one local \fi/APS in a distributed sys
tem will not detrimentally affect the operation of the
other WAPS.
In a wide area detection system, the action is initiated
236 by information acquired at one or more key buses
235
located elsewhere in the power system. This type of
WAPS is generally used to counter complex and large
phenomena that may cause danger to the integrity of
the whole power system. They are consequently of a
higher level of complexity than the local WAPS and
strongly depend on telecommunication facilities. De
pendability is the principal concern whereas the im
pact of unintended operation is generally significant.
11.5.1 Generation rejection
Generation rejection is one of the most widely used
types of WAPS. Generation rejection schemes involve
tripping of one or more generating units and most of
them are event-based (based on event direct detec
tion such as a line trip). The practice of generator trip
ping is used on all kind of units but especially on
hydro-generator units. This is because they are quite
rugged as compared to thermal units and the risk of
damage to the unit from a sudden trip is less.
Generation rejection improves transient stability by
reducing the accelerating torque on the machines
that remain in service after a disturbance. The con
cept behind the generation rejection is to increase the
electrical power output of the remaining generators
and thus to reduce their rotor acceleration. Efficiency
depends on the location of generator participating to
primary frequency controls. Generation rejection can
also be used to reduce power transfers on certain
parts of a transmission system and thus solve over
load or voltage stability problems. For example, in a
remote generating area with a limited number of
transmission lines, generation rejection may be used
after the loss of critical line to reduce the overload of
the remaining lines. Normally the power shortage in
the load area is reduced to zero by bringing the spin
ning reserve on-line and increasing its output power
to that provided previously by rejected units.
The main negative aspect of generation rejection is
that it subjects the rejected unit to sudden changes in
electrical and mechanical loading, which may result in
over-speed, thermal stresses and a reduction in the
shaft life due to shock initiated fatigue.
11.5.2 Turbine fast valving
Turbine fast valving is applicable to thermal units and
involves closing and reopening of steam valves, in
order to reduce the accelerating power of generators

that remain connected to the network after a
severe transmission fault. It is an alternative to
generation rejection when a slower reduction in
generator out put is acceptable. Generation rejection
is usually used on hydro units and fast valving on
steam turbines. The advantage of fast valving is that
the unit remains synchronised, and for temporary
fast valving, it reco vers its pre-disturbance power
level. Fast valving can not be used on hydro turbines
due to the water Inertia.
Fast valving assists in maintaining system stability fol
lowing a severe fault by reducing the turbine
mecha nical power. Fast valving has been found to
be an effective and economical method to address
mainly transient stability. For maximum gains with
fast val ving when transient stability is involved,
the turbin driving power should be reduced as
rapidly as possi ble.
Momentary or sustained fast valving could be used.
Momentary fast valving is the rapid closure of inter
cept valves only and immediate full eopening at a
slower rate. Since the unit is restored to full load, this
method is an aid to stability when strong post-con
tingency transmission system is available. Sustained
fast valving is the rapid closure of main and intercept
valves, an immediate partial reopening finally fol
lowed by full reopening at a predetermined rate
with in minutes after the disturbance. Since the unit is
not immediately restored to full load, the post-
contingen cy transmission system need not to be
as strong as for momentary fast valving and
additional stability margins can be provided.
Potential problems resulting from turbine fast
valving are that a slow power reduction to a
pre-defined level may lead to transients on the
turbine. Use of fast valving has been limited mainly
because of the co ordination required between
characteristics of the power system, the turbine
and its controls and the energy supply system
(boiler). There are several
potential problems that must be considered in the
application of fast-valving.
11.5.3 Fast unit and pumping storage
unit start-up
Power support by fast unit\e.g. gas turbine) or pump
storage start-up could be used when frequency is
low or the risk of voltage collapse caused by inade 11.5.5
quate generation is high. The latter may rf,'sult from
the tripping of important tie-lines that interconnect
regions of high generation to regions of high
demand. WAPS that initiate gas turbine or pump sto
rage start-up are very efficient in recovering from
these stressed situations. The gas turbine start-up
process takes several minutes or tens of minutes and
consequently provides a solution to long term critical
situations. (In long term voltage stability, tap
changers blocking could be used to give enough
time to start the gas turbine.)
11.5.4 AGC set-point changes
For satisfactory operation of a power system, the fre
quency should remain nearly constant. The main ob
jectives of automatic generation control (AGC) are to
regulate frequency to the specified value e.g. 60 Hz)
and to maintain the interchange power between the
area at their scheduled values. AGC perform its
tasks through control of the load reference set-
points of a selected group of generator units in
the power system.
In interconnected power systems under normal con
ditions, actions of AGC is confined to its individual
area to held system frequency constant and to main
tain interarea power transfers at their scheduled
levels. Due to the lack of generation in a certain area
caused by a combination of line trips, set-point chan
ges an AGC could be used to correct for the genera
tion/load mismatch. In such a situation, other areas
may assist the affected area by allowing system fre
quency to depart from its pre-disturbance value or by
permitting the inter-area power transfer to deviate
from scheduled values.
11.5.5 Under-frequency load shedding
11.5.5.1 Description and main
characteristics
The most common type of WAPS is an under
frequency load shedding (UFLS) scheme. Schemes 237
 7 7.5.5.2 Improvement of system stability

The UFLS enables the frequency to recover to a nor

11.5.5.2 of this type are used to preserve the security of both
the generation and the transmission system during
disturbances that initiate a major reduction in system
frequency. Such schemes are essential, if a utility is to
minimise the risk of total system collapse, maximize
the reliability of the overall network and protect
system equipment against damages.
In the event of a loss of generation or the loss of a
tie-line used to import power, UFLS schemes are
employed to reduce the connected load to a level
that can be safely supplied by available generation.
Load shedding is initiated by under-frequency relays
designed to trip blocks of load when the
frequency drops below discrete frequency
thresholds and/or the rate of change of frequency
exceeds preset df/dt values. Load shedding is
generally done in several steps to prevent
excessive load dropping and to allow the
frequency to recover before the next step. The
settings for load shedding relays and their appli
cation philosophy are mainly based on turbine-
gene rator under-frequency operation limitations
and power plant auxiliary performance. Turbine
genera tors must be disconnected from the system if
the fre quency drops below 55 to 575 HZ (60 Hz
system), the exact value depends on the type of
turbine.
Main objectives of UFLS :;chemes include:
• Protecting the generating equipment and
transmission facilities against damage.
• Achieving a near equilibrium betvveen
generation and load following loss of
generation.
• Providing for equitable load shedding
among utility serving load.
• Minimizing the risk of total system collapse
in
the event of system separation or generation loss.
• Permitting rapid load restoration
and re-establishment of
interconnections.
mallevel and makes it possible to maintain the net
work integrity. Because generating units can operate
continuously within ± 0.5 Hz from normal frequency,
it is desirable that the UFLS restores the frequency fol
lowing a disturbance to a value within this range. This
minimises the potential for turbine loss of life.
The main requirements for a UFLS scheme are:
• they should coordinate with underfrequency
protection of generating unit;
• they should minimize the risk of further
separation, loss of generation, or excessive load
shedding accompanied by excessive over
frequency conditions and
• they should arrest frequency decline and
leave the system in such condition as to permit
rapid load restoration and re-establishment of
inter connections.
On large interconnected systems, close coordination
of different UFLS schemes are necessary because an
interconnected grid is generally closely meshed and a
sudden and severe power imbalance will not be
restricted to utility borders. To comply with all possi
ble situations and perturbations, the UFLS plan must
satisfy the following basic requirements:
• The load shedding plan should be adequately
coordinated throughout the interconnected
members to prevent unbalanced load shedding,
which may cause high transmission loading and
extreme voltage deviation.
• A uniform off-nominal frequency plan should be
adopted throughout the interconnected system,
sharing the risk among the partners and providing
for equitable load shedding among utilities serving
load.
• The operating time of the different load
shedding devices should be uniform, otherwise
only the fastest ones would operate (this means
that no intentional time delay must be added) The
load shall be divided into small amounts and the
maximum amounts reachable should be about
40 % to 50 % of the total demand.

238
11.5.5.3 Potential problems or harmful connected by over-speed protection. Methods event,
impact on equipment system of limiting over-frequency frequency include high- shunt
speed automatic load. restoration, braking resistors capaci
Special attention must be paid to establishing the and fast HVDC power change. tors
amount of load that can be disconnected by UFLS. If, that
following a UFLS action, the system or areas of the Due to the tripping of generators and the remain
s tstem have a power surplus (caused by over-shed operation of UFLS, large voltage variations often in
come with large frequency deviations. When loads service
ding), the system frequency will increase to an over
frequency condition and generating units may be dis are shed sud denly during an under-frequency may
cause serious over voltages. The same situation
may also happen on long UHV transmission lines
because of the high levels of charging current.
Because of this, shunt capacitors on the sub-
transmission system should ei ther have automatic
over-voltage protection or be tripped by under-
frequency relays. If the over-volta ges are severe
enough, they should be tripped as an integral part
of the UFLS scheme. When available, shunt reactors
on EHV transmission system could also be switched-
in by over-voltage relays used to control these over-
voltages.
11.5.6 Under-voltage load shedding
Power systems with heavy loading on transmission
facilities an united reactive power control can be vul
nerable to voltage instability. In some unplanned or
extreme situations, when all others solutions have fai
led, load shedding when voltage collapse is
imminent may preserve the system stability. Under-
voltage load shedding (UVLS) is analogous to
under-frequency load shedding and provides a low-
cost mean of pre venting system collapse.
An UVLS scheme uses under-voltage relays to moni
tor the voltage level in a substation. Normally, an
under-voltage relay will operate and trip a feeder cir
cuit breaker when the input level reduces below a
pre-set threshold for a time of greater than a few
11.5.9
seconds. It is expected that after the shedding, the
voltage will recover to an acceptable value.
Developing appropriate settings for the UVLS is a
challenging problem. Load shedding is often initiated
in steps to avoid over shedding and the selection of
appropriate time step is an important factor in effec
11.5.6
tive under-voltage load shedding.
UVLS plans should be examined to determine if
acceptable over-frequency, overvoltage, or transmis
sion overloads might result and all potential unaccept
able conditions should be mitigated. For example, if
over-frequency is likely, the amount of load shed
could be reduced or automatic over-frequency load
restoration could be provided. On the other hand for
over-voltages, the load shedding program could be
modified (e.g., change the geographic distribution) or
mitigation measures (e.g. coordinated tripping of
shunt capacitors or reactors) could be implemented
to minimize that probability. If transmission capacities
are exceeded, the relay settings (e.g. location, trip, or
time delay) could then be altered or other actions be
taken to maintain transmission loading within the
capabilities.
Coordination with other systems is also a primary
concern to assure selectivity in power system opera
tion. It is imperative that under-voltage load
shedding plans are coordinated with:
• Generation control and protection systems.
• Under-frequency load shedding
programs and manual load shedding
programs
• Load restoration
programs.
• Transmission protection and control programs
(e.g., timing of line reclosing, tap changing, over
excitation limiting, capacitor bank switching, and
other automatic switching schemes).
• Other system protection and control devices used
to interrupt electric supply to customers (coordi
nation between the time delay of UVLS relays, the
time settings of consumers minimum voltage
relays, and the break - time of automatic
reclosing of the feeders provided witf:dJIJLS).
Finally, the characteristics and locations of the loads to
be shed are more important for voltage problems
than they are for frequency problems and a careful
choice of the type of load to be shed must be made. 239
 11.5.7 Remote load shedding
Remote load shedding is similar in concept to gene
ration rejection but at the receiving end of the power
system. Remote load shedding is a dormant system
design to operate after extreme contingencies affec
ting the system's transmission capacity (e.g. loss of
several transmission lines), whose severity largely
exceeds the robustness of the power system. This
kind of extreme contingencies endanger transient,
dynamic or short term voltage stability. In these cases,
rapid and massive actions based on the direct detec
tion of the extreme contingency are required. Remote
240 load shedding is one of the means that could be
used to maintain power system stability in that
situa tion.
The components of a remote load shedding system
can be categorized as follows:
• Inputs: mainly direct detection of the disturbance
• A central co-ordinating system: usually
required to decide the proper action (quantity
and localisation offload to shed)
• Output: feeders tripping
Remote load shedding involve direct tripping of low
priority industrial/commercial load or residential load.
Remote load shedding can employ the same load
shedding relays used to perform underfrequency
load shedding. These relays could have a dual func
tion, allowing both the direct execution of remote
load shedding orders and the execution of load
shedding as a function of local frequency conditions.
11.5.8 HVDC fast power change
HVDC transmission link is a highly controllable device
and it is possible to take advantage of this
unique characteristic to improve transient stability of
the AC system. Power flow on HVDC links can be
modulated by controlling the converters. HVDC
modulation can provide powerful stabilization with
active and reactive power injection at each
converter.
these oscillations are not attenuated, system instabil
ity could occur. The DC power can be controlled to
improve transient stability by rapid discrete power
level changes or to improve damping by use of con
tinuous proportional control. The DC power can be
either ramped down or ramped up (taking advanta
ge of short-term overload capability) to assist power
system stability. 'The beneficial effect of DC modula
tion on the AC system is similar to the effect of gene
ration rejection or load shedding. HVDC controls
modulation may be used to:
• regulate reactive power,
• support dynamic AC voltage,
• damp frequency oscillations
and
• improve transient stability.
The controllability of HVDC links is often cited as an
important advantage of DC systems. This controllabi
lity can be valuable in improving dynamics perfor
mance of AC system but only if DC control systems
perform adequately for various disturbances and
system conditions. These controls, which could be
quite powerful must not interact unfavourably with
other high performance controls and systems. HVDC
control robustness is therefore a major concern.
When the DC line is the major connection between
two AC systems, the rapid modulation of the DC link
could be effective in attenuating transient disturban
ces. A problem with this control method is that a
disturbance in one AC system will be shared by both
AC systems. That is, a disturbance on one system will
appear as a sudden load change on the other
system. Unless there is some mutual benefit, the un
faulted system may not care to share the disturban
ce of the other system. Rapid modulation would also
require reactive power compensation capability on
the AC system near each converter to maintain pro
per voltage during the DC power flow modulation.
11.5.9 Automatic shunt switching (shunt
reactor/capacitor tripping or dosing)

During a transient disturbance such as a fault on an WAPS are widely used to control the voltage levels in
interconnected power system, generator rotors swing a substation. This is achieved by automatic switching
to new angle in response to accelerating power. If of shunt reactors and capacitor banks. Shunt reactors
can be installed at the HV busbar in a substation, or units. They ad like reactive power consumers and create
at the tertiary winding of a transformer in an determi ne which generating units need to d by
EHV/HV substation. Depending on the measured produce more reactive power. This results in a event
voltage level they can be tripped or reconnected. more favorable tran sient stability condition s that
Capacitor banks are installed in many substations during a short-circuit fault Switching out shunt cause
to improve the power factor of the consumers load reactors following a severe con tingency also a
or for feeder vol tage control. They are greatly improves transient stability. major
automatically switched in accordance with the reduct
Two basic functions could be
busbar voltage level. This is nor mally achieved using ion in
performed:
a minimum voltage relay. the
• Over-voltages control: The closing of shunt powe
Shunt reactors on the HV busbar in a power plant reactors (or the tripping of shunt capacitors) r
improve the transient stability of the generating could be used to deal with overvoltages previo
 usly flowing on the power system (e.g.
generation and/or load losses).
• Under-voltages control: The tripping of shunt
reactors could be used to deal with under-voltage
created by events that mainly affect the system's
transmission capacity (e.g. multiple loss of lines).
has been generally studied and applied as a 11.5.10
switch ing in of shunt resistors. This is normally for
11.5.10 Braking resistor a fixed insertion time and occurs immediately after
a fault has been cleared on the system. The
Dynamic braking is the concept of applying an components of an WAPS used for dynamic braking
artifi
can be catego rized as:
cial electric load to a portion of the power system. It
• a shunt
resistor,
• a switching equipment
and
• a control
system.

The control system is generally referred to as the

':Accelerating Power Level Detector" (APLD). A typical
control system is shown in the Figure 11-4. A signal
representing the total electrical output power of
those machines, whose accelerating power is to be
monitored, is fed into the control system. For a short
duration, and only for sharp changes in electrical
power, the difference between the second and the
first blocks approximates to accelerating power. The
accelerating power signal is further passed through a
second order low pass filter to form the APLD output.
This output is compared with an accelerating power
threshold set-point, and if it exceeds the (positive)
threshold, the braking resistor would be energised
after a short delay. The braking resistor would only be
energised for a sudden reduction in the
electrical power input. The Figure 11-4 shows a
typical control system with typical parameters.

0.5 < Tc < 5

ro
, -
..
.. _L_ .. _L_
s2 ..+ a.roOs + ro0
0
2
2

l+sT, l+sTc +

APLD lag
241
Figure 7 7-4 Accelerating power level detector (ADLP)
 :_·,,

1 ..

11.5.11 During system fault conditions, the machine output following a major disturbance involving loss of gene
power drops as a result of the depressed system vol ration or imminent instability between areas. Con- ·
tages. The machines in the vicinity of the fault accele trolled system separation is applied when specific
rate during this time. During the fault and also after load and generating areas can be defined within a
the removal of the fault, the speed gain continues to large interconnected system. The instability between
increase the angle differences between these and areas is usually characterized by sudden change in
more remote machines, which may lead to loss of tie-line power. The instability is detected by monito
synchronism. The drop in machine output power may ring one or more of the following quantities:
trigger the energisation of the braking resistor. The
increased power demand from the braking resistor • sudden change in power flow through
now opposes the speed increase acquired during the specific tie-lines,
fault incident and reduces the machine angle diffe • rate of power change,
rences. This generally improves stability for faults in • change of bus voltage angle.
the vicinity of the braking resistor.
As interconnected systems grow, it becomes more
A sensitive trigger setting may lead to the energisa difficult to define system separation points that will
tion of the braking resistor for more remote faults. be applicable for all possible system emergencies.
This may reduce the stability of the system. During a Controlled separation as a planned method to achie
fault machines electrically close to the fault tend to ve power system stability is not widely applied main
accelerate more than the machines remote from the ly because it is difficult to define points of separation
fault. Simultaneously the energisation of braking resi that will be acceptable for all system conditions.
stors tends to retard the acceleration of the machines Controlled system separation is mainly used in power
close to the fault more than those machines that are system where load and generation are reasonably
remote from the braking resistor. Consequently, if a matched and transmission tielines to external power
braking resistor is energized for a remote fault, it system are easily definable.
tends to increase the angle difference between the
machines close to the fault and the machines close to The opening of inter-area transmission interconnec
the braking resistor. This increases the likel"1hood of tions shall only be initiated after the coordinated load
instability. shedding program has failed to arrest frequency dec
line and intolerable system conditions exist.
The sudden shocks from the switching in braking
resistors on the turbine can result in high levels of When an operating emergency occurs, a prime con
shaft torque. Studies must be carried out to ensure sideration shall be to maintain parallel operation
there are no adverse effects on the shaft fatigue-life throughout the interconnected power system. This
resulting from the combined effect of a fault, its clear will permit rendering maximum assistance to the
ance, the switching in, or out of the braking resistor power system(s) in trouble. Because the facilities of
and the possibility of unsuccessful auto-reclosure. each power system may be vital to the-secure ope
ration of the interconnected system, every effort shall
11.5.11 Controlled opening of be made to remain connected to it. However, if a
interconnection power system determines that it is endangered by
remaining interconnected, it rnay take such action as
Controlled system separation generally represents it deems necessary to protect its own system.
242 the last measure toward saving the power system
Tripping tie-lines is not without risk. If the inter When machines of two areas are electrically separat ed, occurred.
connection is supporting the individual system, then pole slip protection should split the systEm at a location To initiate
tripping the tie-lines will almost certainly mean total designed to improve the generation, - load balance in a trip, the
collapse for that individual system. If the individual each of the two isolated systems. Pole slip protection impedanc
system is supporting the interconnection, then trip ping operates significantly slower than distance protection e locus
the tie-lines will put the interconnection at great er risk. and consequently, distance relays may operate and can enter
Unless sophisticated relaying is implemented, there is no prevent the pole slip relay from tripping at the desired the lens
way for an individual relay to discriminate between the two location. Effective pole slip protection depends on the from the
conditions. However, the ultimate decision rests with the success of power swing blocking elements in left or the
individual system. From an overall system perspective the conventional distance relays. Most pole slip protection right, but
preferred option is to not trip interconnection lines. relays have a lens characteristic and the time taken for must
the impedance vector to pass through the lens is the
criterion used to decide if a pole slip condition as
traverse completely through to the opposite side of the
lens.
11.5.1 2 Tap changers biocking and set-
points adjustment
The main goal of on-load tap-changers (OLTC) ope rating
on power transformers is to supply the con trolled side
of the transformer (normally the lower voltage) - with a
voltage level within a given range, according to the
dead-band and the set-point value. Typically as load
increases the OLTC will ad to raise the tap position in
order to maintain the voltage level. The time delay
between steps varies between 1 0 se conds and 4
minutes. This ensures that following a minor disturbance
the load voltage is restored to an acceptable value within
a few minutes.
Following a severe disturbance, the voltages will be
reduced over a regional area that may affect many
11.5.12.2
substations. The OLTCs applied to transformers at dif ferent 11.5.12
voltage levels all operate on local criteria and all
independently start the tap changing process de signed to
re-establish the controlled voltage. If the voltage
reductions start to progress towards a volta ge collapse
the bulk system voltages will slowly de crease whilst the
OLTCs are trying to restore distribu tion system voltages.
The transmission system will be further stressed until a new
steady state is achieved or voltage collapse has occurred.
Depending on the number of levels of cascaded tap-
changers, and their settings, this process may take from a
few to tens of minutes.
During a period of voltage collapse the OLTC will detect
a low voltage and after an appropriate time delay raise
the tap position of the transformer. Assuming no
change in the load demand on the transformer during
this period, the load can often be considered as constant
power as long as the tap changer can maintain a
constant load voltage. If the primary voltage level drops,
the current flow in the transmission system is increased to
maintain the load power. This increase in current flow will
further redu ce the transmission system voltage making a
voltage collapse more likely to appear.
It is common, at least in Europe, to have controlled OLTCs
on both EHV/HV transformers (connecting transmission
and subtransmission networks) and HV/ MV transformers
(connecting subtransmission to dis tribution levels). Sweden
has even up to four levels of OLTCs in cascade. The delays
in tapping are usually set to shorter values as one goes
higher in voltage.
Tap-changer blocking or set-point adjustment can be
beneficial to preserve system stability in stressed
situations that are close to voltage instability. The effect
depends on the load characteristics and the degree of
shunt compensation. It is also necessary to control the tap-
changer that is closest electrically to the customer.
Generally, just lowering the voltage at
the sub-transmission or medium voltage level, will 243
244
make the supply voltage high and hence does not affect the real
situation power consumption (which is relatively inde pendent of
worse, since voltage). This also maximizes the reactive support from the
the tap- power factor correction capacitors.
changer
nea rest the
consumer Local blocking schemes are implemented using vol tage
will try to re- 7 7.5. 7 2. 7 Improvement of system stability relays and a time delay to sense the voltage level on
establish the the high voltage bus at the substation. The threshold
Normally, where the real power loads have some vol tage voltage is usually chosen to be a level that is less than
load vol
dependency, appropriate control actions can be used with that which occurs during maximum acceptable overload
tage. This
the OLTC to reduce the severity of the vol tage collapse. conditions. Blocking is initiated if the abnormal
means that
Blocking operation of the OLTC has been widely undervoltage condition exists longer than a predetermined
the reactive
offered as a method to reduce the negative effect on time. The time period may vary from one to several seconds.
power
the system. Load voltage reduction can also be used to The OLTC is unblocked when the voltage has recovered
losses will
reduce the loading on the sys tem. This is similar to peak to an acceptable level for a predetermined period of
increase in
shaving systems based on voltage reduction, widely used at time, typically
the
many utilities. There fore the on-load tap-changer may 5 seconds. Since the blocking action will be removed
distribution
be both a cause and a partial solution to the problems if the voltage recovers, usually a single phase-phase
system at
of· voltage collapse. voltage measurement is adequate for this scheme.
the same
time as the
reactive The simplest method to eliminate the OLTC as a con A coordinated blocking scheme can be utilized to block
power tributor to voltage collapse is to block the automatic raise operation of OLTCs in an area where voltage instability is
generation operation during any period when voltage collapse imminent. The coordinated scheme can be accomplished
from shunt appears to be a concern. The decision to temporarily with undervoltage schemes acting independently (as
devices will block the tap-changer can be made using locally derived described above) in a coordinated fashion at various
decrease. information or can be made at a cen tral location and the stations within a region, or it can be a centralized scheme
supervisory system can send a blocking signal to the unit. that recognizes a pattern of low voltages at key locations. In
This action may result in a period of low voltage on the a centralized scheme, the OLTC blocking can be
In some
affected loads. The effect of reduced supply voltages in implemented in substations throughout the affected
cases, tap-
the whole servi ce area must be weighted against the region, even if the voltage at all locations is not yet below
changers
possible alter native of complete disconnection of some a specific threshold.
can have a
customers in a smaller area. Tap-changer blocking will be
beneficial The key to operation of a centralized system is the
more effective for voltage decays slower than the transient
effect. reliability of the communication system. The data
time frame. It will also be more effective on loads that have
Consider for needed for decision making must be collected at the
a relatively high voltage dependency.
instance a central location for analysis. Control decisions must then
case where a be sent to each affected transformer location.
transfor mer
is supplying
predominantly 7 7.5. 7 2.2 Reduction of set-point of OLTC
motor load As already mentioned, a m;re advantageous use of OLTCs
with power than just blocking them consists of decreasing their voltage
factor
set-points. A larger load relief can be achieved. in this
correction
way. As for the blocking of OLTCs the effectiveness is
capacitors.
largely dependant on the characte ristics of the power
The OLTC
system, such as the type of load, the degree of shunt
keeps the
compensation and the number of OLTCs on lower levels.

... --
An interesting strategy for controlling OLTCs is as • In an alert state, where credible contingencies 11.5.1 3
follows: would lead to voltage instability, the MV voltage set- Q
• In a secure state, all OLTCs are controlled as usual. The points of HV/MV OLTCs are decreased while EHV/HV
u
HV voltage set-points are chosen to minimize real losses OLTC set-points are increased. The objective is to
reduce reactive losses and get more reactive support i
in the subtransmission networks.
from shunt elements :n the sub-transmission c
• In emergency conditions, EHV/HV and HV/MV OLTCs
networks. k
are blocked, keeping the minimum possible transformer
ratio for EHV/HV transformers.
 increase of synchronous condenser
voltage set-point
Synchronous condensers can generate or absorb
reactive power depending on the control of their ex
citation system and are an excellent form of voltage and
reactive power control devices. The reactive power
production of synchronous condenser is not affected by
the system voltage and voltage regulator (AVR) can
automatically adjust this reactive power to maintain
constant terminal voltage. While AVR is con trolling the
terminal voltage, the reactive power out put can be
increased until heating limit is reached. The action of the
AVR is instantaneous and quite effi cient in case of voltage
collapse, if the synchronous condenser is located near the
load demand.
Following a severe event that is leading to voltage
decline, the synchronous condenser AVR performs a fast
corrective action. In order to optimize the effi ciency of
the synchronous condenser to counteract voltage
instability, automatic increase of its voltage set-point could
be used as supplementary action. The voltage set-point is
increased according to a steep ramp until the
synchronous condenser reactive power reaches some
percentages of the compensa tor capability or after some
maximum time (e.g. 30 s). This WAPS differs from
secondary voltage control because it is faster as needed
to counteract voltage instability following the loss of
several transmission lines and could thus be considered
as primary vol
tage control systems.
11.6.2
11.6 Voltage stability assessment
guidelines
11.5
Recognizing that voltage stability is a serious concern, which
must be examined during planning and ope rational
studies, there is a requirement to develop practical study
procedures, security margins, and cri teria. The traditional
approach to planning for voltage security relied on
ensuring that pre-contingency and post-contingency
voltage levels were acceptable for the system states
under study. As a result, utilities have developed suitable
voltage criteria which specify acceptable voltage limits.
These criteria are largely based on equipment
tolerances and although they ensure safe voltages, they
generally provide no assu rance that sufficient voltage
stability margin exists. Put it simply, a system may have very
healthy pre-contin gency and post-contingency voltage
levels, but be dangerously close to voltage instability.
The relatively recent concerns for voltage stability have
motivated the development of some study gui delines The
methods adopted will depend largely on the utilities'
experience, policies, and regulatory requi rements. For
example, if studies show that voltage instability may
occur when reactive reserves on spe cific generators reach
certain values, the utility may use such measures as
direct indicators of voltage security. The success of any
such method depends on an unders'"wnding of the mechanism
of, and proximity to, voltage instability for the particular
system under a wide variety of possible conditions. This
chapter pro vides some generalized guidelines for
developing and applying security assessment methods.
11.6.1 Off-line studies and on-line studies
Voltage Stability (VS) margin is a measure or how close
the system is to voltage instability. The approa ches
needed to assess margin will differ slightly be tween off-
line studies (such as operation planning) and on-line
studies (such as application of on-line vol tage stability
assessment tools in the EMS environ
ment). 245
246
In the more elements out-of-service. Studying conditions with one
off-line element out-of-service is necessary to provide margin for
environm the uncertainty of operating conditions. Because of main
ent, such tenance and forced-outages, the actual system is rarely
as in state with all elements in-service. Often, for study
operation purposes, each out-of-service element is com bined with
plan each design contingency, to form a set of double • For Models: The representation of loads, gene rator
ning, it is contingencies, which may include unrelated elements such capabilities, field current limiters, switched shunts, ULTC
necessary as loss of a line plus a generator. Care must be taken in this should be equivalent in on-line and off-line studies.
to case to account for the pre-con tingency system re-
determine adjustment which would normal ly occur for creating a In the absence of on-line analysis capability, the off line
the new base case with one ele ment out-of service. study results must be translated into operating limits and
margin indices that can be monitored by the ope rators. The next
for all For on-line studies, the system state and topology is known section describes some technical gui delines for VS
design (or at least approximately known) through system assessment, which can be applied for either off-line or on-
contingen measurements and state estimation. There fore, it is line studies. The present industry practice is to use
cies necessary to study only the criteria contin gencies for all deterministic methods for stability assessment. With
(such as elements in service. As a result, fewer scenarios need to be today's analytical methods and computer hardware, it is
single examined and, less margin may be required than for off- possible to assess a wide range of conditions and
element line studies, in which the system uncertainty is greater. contingencies in reasonable computation times. However,
outa ges, probabilistic assessment methods and criteria may become
double Off-line VS study tools have matured over recent years necessary as inter connected models grow, controls
outages (Figure 11-5) and now on-line analysis tools are being become more complex (including remedial action
of lines developed to compute VS margins, verify that criteria is schemes), and deregulation increases the volume and
on the met, and suggest remedial actions neces sary to meet uncertainty of energy transactions.
same the criteria. One important aspect of practical VS
tower assessment is the consistency between on-line and off- 11.6.2 Voltage stability margins and criteria
lost by line assessment methods. While the two approaches
LLG In general, VS margins are defined as the difference
may examine different scenarios and require different
between the value of a Key System Parameter (KSP) at the
faults, or margins, the basic procedures, and models used should be
double current operating condition and at the voltage stability
consistent. This is essen tial to ensure that the results
critical point. Different utilities may use diffe rent KSPs from
elements obtained from off-line studies can be compared to on-line
lost two main categories:
results.
through For example: • PV-based KSPs, such as an area load or power
brea ker transfer across an interface
• For procedures: The use of PV, QV. or time
failure) • QV-based KSPs, such as reactive power injection at a
domain simulations, should be consistent in
for bus or group of buses
on-line and off-line studies. The definition of how
system
margin is measured should be also equivalent.
conditions Voltage stability criterion defines how much margin is
with all deemed sufficient for voltage security of the system. It
elements can be stated as "the system must be operated such
in service that for the operating point and under all cre dible
and for contingencies, the VS margin remains larger than x% (or
condition y MWIMVAr) of the KSP':
s with
one or For example, when the KSP is defined as the area load,
and the criterion is defined as 7% of this KSP,
 v
the system must remain voltage stable under all con
tingencies when the area load is increased by 7 %
above the given operating level.
In addition to the criterion for VS margin, utilities may
establish other operating criteria for voltage security,
including:
• Voltage decline/rise criteria, which specify thet bus
voltages must remain within + x% and - y% of
the nominal (or pre-contingency) values under all
contingencies.
• Reactive reseNe criteria, which specify that the
reactive power reseNe of individual or groups of
VAr sources (generators and controllable shunts)
must remain above x% of their reactive power
output (or y MVAr) under all contingencies.
The combination of the above criteria define the ope
rating limits, or, in other words, voltage secure opera
ting range of the system.
As with any criterion, the VS criteria must be
selected to provide adequate security without
unduly restric ting system operation. It is common to
select different sets of criteria for different categories
of contingen cies. For example. the system may
be required to have 7% load increase margin
under single contin gencies and only 3 % load
increase margin under double contingencies. The
criteria appropriate for a given system can only be
determined after extensive analysis of the system in
order to establish the KSPs and the sensitivities of the
system stability to changes in KSP values.
11.6.3 Voltage stability assessment
7 7.63.7 PV-based margin computation
With the KSP being defined as the system load, the
process of calculating VS margins for the base case
and the contingency cases is as follows (the same
process applies to VS margin calculation with other
KSPs):
11.6.3.
2
Pre-Contingency
Post-Contingency
Post-Contingency Margin
Pre-Contingency Margin
p
Figure 7 7-5 PV curves and VS margins
1. Calculate VS margin for the base case using 11.6.3
Static Analysis. For PV CuNe computation, the
system load is increased step by step and at each
step (load level) the power flow is solved. The
voltage stability critical point is reached at the load
level beyond which power flow solution does not
exist. The increase in the system load from the
initial operating point (P0 ) to the voltage stability
critical point (nose of the PV cuNe Pm) is the VS
margin for the base case (see Figure 10-3). At
each load level, a generation dispatch scheme is
used to supply the increased demand for active
power and power flow solution is obtained with
loads modelled as constant MVA and control of
ULTCs and switchable shunts enabled.
2. Calculate VS margins for all the contingency
cases using Static Analysis. At each load level,
after solving the power flow for the base case,
the contingencies are applied one by one and
the power flows are solved. The last load level
where the post-contingency power flow solution
exists (Pem) is the post-contingency critical point
and the increase in the pre-contingency system
load from the initial operating point to this point
is the VS margin for that contingency (see Figure
11-5). Post-contingency cases are solved with
loads modelled as voltage dependent. Depending
on the time frame within which system
performance is to be evaluated, and the actual 247
 performance is to be evaluated, and the
actual system operation policy, a
generation dispatch scheme (e.g. governor
response, AGC, etc) is used to balance the
post-contingency powers and the control
of ULTCs, automatically switched
shunts and manually switched shunts are
enabled or disabled.
3. Calculate VS margins for a few
248 selected critical contingency cases
using Time Domain Simulation. The
approach is the same as that of step 2
above, except that the voltage stability of
the system following a contingency is
determined by time-domain simulation over
an appropriate time frame (which may
range from several seconds to tens of
minutes.) Starting with the solved cases
corresponding to the different load levels,
the system is disturbed by applying the
contingency, and the system dynamic res
ponse following this contingency is
calculated.
If the time-domain simulation shows that
the
system reaches its post-contingency steady-
state equilibrium point after a finite time
period, the system is post-contingency
steady-state equi librium point after a finite
time period, the system is stable. If the
steady-state equilibrium of the
post-contingency system does not exist,
time
domain simulation will show that the bus
voltages continue to decrease and therefore
the system is voltage unstable.
An operating point is voltage
secure if
• the VS margin of all contingencies
meet the margin criterion,
• the pre- and post-contingency voltages
at that operating point meet the voltage
decline/rise criteria, and
• the pre- and post-contingency reactive
reserve
of specified sources at that operating point
meet the MVAr reserve criteria.
11.6.3.2 QV-based margin
computation
In the above PV-based approach, the key
system parameter defined for margin
computation does not have to be limited to
area load or interface flow. The KSP can easily
be selected as any combination of real and
reactive load, as well as generation, in one or
more parts of the system. When the KSP is
selected as the reactive load at a group of
buses, the same procedure determines the
"Generalized" QV margin of the system.
However, traditionally, the QV margin at a
given bus, under pre- or post-contingency
conditions, is comput ed by the following
procedure:
1. A fictitious synchronous condenser
(generator) with unlimited reactive power
is placed at the bus to control its voltage.
2. The scheduled voltage of the condenser is
varied from Vmax to Vmin in discrete
steps.
3. At each point (scheduled voltage) the
power flow I
is solved and the MVAr output of the condenser
I
is calculated.
4. The plot of MVAr output versus the
scheduled
voltage of the condenser is the well-known QV
! .
curve for that bus (see Figure 11-6). The amount
of MVAr absorbed (negative of MVAr
output) at the minimum point (bottom of
the curve) is the MVAr margin at the
bus.
Q
\
i
v l
Figure 17- 6
QV curve
The reasons for popularity of this
procedure are:
a) It is easy to use conventional
power flow
programs for this procedure.
L
b) The power flow solution at each voltage
level converges easily because of the
fictitious con denser controlling the
voltage. Generally, the complete curve is
computed, showing the stable and
unstable operating regions.
The PV-based approach, with conventional power
flow techniques, determines the stable part of the
curve. Experience with VSTAB has shown that in this
approach, repeated solutions with automatically ad
justed step size, can reliably find the critical point
(nose of the curve). Although continuation method
can be easily applied to compute the unstable part of
the PV or QV curve as well, in practice this is not
necessary for determining the VS margin.
The advantages of PV-based KSPs over QV-based
KSPs are the following:
a) The PV-based KSPs, such as area load increase
or power transfer across an interface, provide the
system planners and operators with a direct and
physical measure of voltage security of the system
and show how much load or interface how an
increase can be safely accommodated by the
system.
b) In the QV approach, the way the system is
stressed, i.e. injecting reactive power at one bus
alone, is completely artificial and has no relation
with the way the system is operated. It provides·
only an artificial measure of robustness at a
given operating point. Small changes in the
operating point can have significant impact on
this measure due to the non-linearity of the
power system.
c) The voltage stability of the system can not be
assessed completely by computing QV curves at
a limited number of buses. In theory, the QV
curve at every bus in the system has to be
com puted to give a complete picture of
voltage
stability margins. On the other hand, one PV
curve
computation with a global load increase can
reveal the general stability margin of the system.
Additionally, a model analysis at the nose of PV
curve will identify those buses in the system
where the voltage instability occurs.
11.6.4 On-line VSA functional requirements ·11.6.4
This section specifies overall functional requirements
for on-line oltage tability 6ssessment (VSA). It is
developed in a format that may be used as a gene
ric starting point by an utility or an independent 'iYS
tem Qperator (ISO) to deve!op procurement specifi
cations for on-line VSA. It is also helpful as a
start ing point for use by the system suppliers to
develop detailed design specifications.
7 7.6.4. 7
Introduction
The on-line Voltage Stability Assessment (VSA) pack
age must determine the voltage security of the
system in its given condition. The system is
deemed voltage insecure if any credible
contingency would cause violation of Voltage
Stability (VS) criteria.
Different utilities have different VS criteria and diffe
rent needs for on-line VSA. In general. the VS criteria
may specify the required VS margins in terms of
load increase, transfer increase, or other key system
para meters, as well as required VAr reserves in
different parts (zones) of the system.
The list of contingencies to be considered may have
to be screened and/or augmented based on opera
ting system conditions.
If the system is found to become voltage insecure
for any credible contingency, preventive or
corrective control actions must be sought to
improve voltage security of the system. Preventive
control actions move the system state to a voltage
secure operating point Corrective control actions
would maintain vol tage stability of the system in
cas.e severe or unfore seen contingencies happen.
Even if the system state is voltage secure, it is desi
rable to know how far the system state can move
away from its operating point and still remain 249
volta ge secure. This is particularly true in the
Transmission Open Access environment where
computation of

11.6.4.4 Available Transmission Capability (ATC) must take into
account adequate static, dynamic, and voltage :;tabi
lity margins. When needed, control actions, similar to
the preventive controls for contingencies, should be
found to expand the secure re-gion around the ope
rating point.
Based on the above requirements, the on-line VSA
package must provide the following basic functions:
• Contingency selection and screening
• Voltage security evaluation
• Voltage security enhancement
Besides assessment of the voltage security of the
present system state, the on-line VSA must assess
voltage security of forecasted future states, and any
specific state specified by the operator.
11.6.4.2 Contingency selection and
screemng
It is impractical and unnecessary to analyze in detail
the impact of every conceivable contingency.
Generally, only a limited number of contingencies
might impose immediate threat to voltage stability
and these might be quite different from the contin
gencies critical for transient :;tability, thermal overload,
or voltage decline. It is required, therefore, to define a
credible list of contingencies and provide the capabi
lity to both augment and screen the contingencies
and select those most likely to cause problems, so
that they will be assessed in detail.
11.6.4.3 Voltage security evaluation
The operators need- to know whether the system
operating conditions meet the VS criteria. The VS cri
teria may specify how far the system should be from
the borderline of voltage instability in terms of load
increase, transfer increase, or other forms of stress,
when subjected to any of the selected contingencies.
250 There might be other criteria that must be met as
i.
well, such as required MVAr reserves in different parts
of the system and limits on post-contingency voltage
declines.
There are also cases where computation of VS must
be carried out in response to postulated conditions
(e.g., to determine if a requested transmission service
can be accepted).
In addition to evaluating the voltage security of the
given system's operating point, it is also necessary to
know the voltage secure region around this opera
ting point. This information is useful when, for exam
ple, the system load is increasing or transfers are
being increased, and the operator wants to know
how much the load or transfer can increase while the
system remains voltage secure. This is particularly
important for determination and posting of the ATC.
These computations involve detailed analysis of all
the selected contingencies at several system states.
Static analytical techniques (power-flow based) can
perform these computations in a majority of cases,
but dynamic analytical methods (time-domain simu
lation) may be occasionally required.
11.6.4.4 Voltage security enhancement
If it is found that the system does not have sufficient
voltage stability margin for one or more of the select
ed contingencies, actions must be determined to
modify the system state in such a way as to create
sufficient margin. These preventive control actions will
be taken before any contingency happens (pre-con
tingency system state). The on-line VSA should provi
de different control action alternatives, such as capa
citor/reactor switching, generation re-dispatch, etc.,
and determine the impact of eilch control action on
voltage security of the system.
In the event of multiple (or severe) contingencies,
special corrective control actions may be necessary to
prevent voltage instability. These generally affect
 Change Monitor

customers (interruption of service or degradation of 11.6.4.5

power quality) and therefore are reserved for use in Contingency Screening
response to very severe system disturbances. An .
example of a control action of this type is coordina
Contingency Analysis
ted load shedding. The on-line VSA must be able to
determine the best setting (location and minimum )

·--········C: ·-·-·------
amount of required load shedding) for remedial
action schemes involving automatic load shedding.
Steady-State Analysis i Dynamic Simulation
The on-line VSA must validate the effectiveness of ----------- _1 - -- ---· --- ----- -- -- ----------
the control actions. For corrective controls, this may 1------ ------J
require time-domain simulation of the events and
control sequences. For acceptable performance in an
on-line application, special time-domain simulation
Voltage Security Monitor
techniques are needed, which are computationally
much faster than the conventional methods and still
capture the dynamics and timings important to volta
ge stability.

7 7 .6.4.5 General requirements Operator Console .....-- 1---'----'------,

The on-line VSA function must operate in conjunction
with the EMS environment to monitor the state of
the power system periodically, on demand, and upon
occurrence of significant changes in the state of
power system, in order tp ensure power system
security against occurrence of predefined specific or
generic contingencies. It should also be available in a
study mode.
On-line VSA must allow automatic selection of speci
fic contingencies from a predefined contingency list,
based on actual system conditions. Generic contin
gency definitions must also be accommodated; on
line DSA should provide the capability to construct
relevant contingencies based on the existence of
recognizably vulnerable or stressed operating condi
tions in the system, and the nature, location, and
degree of stress. This means that additional contin
gencies should be automatically added to the select
ed list of specific contingencies based on system con
ditions. Automatic contingency augmentation capa
bility should also be provided to account for depen-
Security Enhancement
Figure 77-7 On-line VSA Model
dent contingencies (e.g. active arming for load
shed ding). The operator should be notified when
contin gencies are added or augmented
automatically. The operator should have the
capability to designate one or more specific
contingencies to be selected regard less of the
system conditions. The operator should also be
able to designate one or more specific con
tingencies to be subjected to full processing (i.e. not
be subjected to screening).
The selected contingencies should be dassified
·into two groups, namely voltage stable (secure)
and vol tage unstable (insecure) contingencies.
Capability should exist to rank the contingencies
according to indices or measures relevant to each of
a predefined set of voltage security criteria. 251

·
11.6.6 The VSA function must determine the relevant ope-
rating limits (line loading limits, interface flow limits,
export/import limits, and load change limits) to en-
sure voltage security of the system in the event of
occurrence of any of the contingencies designated by
the operator, the severe contingencies determined
automatically through screening and ranking, or both.
11.6.5 Contingency definition
A contingency consists of one or more events occur-
ring simultaneously or at different instants of time,
with each event resulting in a change in the state of
one or more power system elements. A contingency
may be initiated by a small disturbance, a fault, or a
switching action.

The VSA function should compute indices quantifying

the degree (margin) of voltage stability or instability The following types of switching actions should be
supported in the definition of a contingency:
of the system for contingencies designated by the
operator, the severe contingencies determined auto- • Breaker opening/closing
matically through screening and ranking, or both. • Shunt capacitor/reactor insertion and/or
removal
Trends and evolution of system-wide indices, as well
as indices per designated zone or area, should• be
Series capacitor insertion or
bypass
available based on prior VSA executions to indicate • Generator tripping
whether system voltage security is improving or deg- • Load shedding
rading. • Transformer tap changing i

• FACTS (Flexible AC Transmission System) device

Provisions should be available to accommodate auto- connectivity and operation
matic determination of preventive measures, and cor-
• Automatic transfer tripping (armed
redive actions. Figure 11-7 shows the main campo-
remedial action)
nents (modules) of on-line VSA. The Change Monitor
triggers event oriented execution of the VSA function On-line DSA must provide the capability to automati-
based on, status and analog data received from cally determine the initiation of some or all of the
SCADA. Alternatively, the available EMS Real-Time switching actions based on a combination of system
Sequence Control (RTSC) may be augmented to conditions or events.
include triggering of on-line VSA execution through
an EMSNSA messaging mechanism. Contingency The capability should be provided to include one or
selection and contingency screening are configured more contingency type attributes or flags in the defi-
separately to allow inclusion or exclusion of screening nition of a contingency to designate whether or not
as suitable for the utility. If desired, they may be com- the contingency must be subjected to time
sirnula- bined into a single module. Contingency analysis for tion or static analysis.
voltage stability assessment may be configured to
use either static (steady-state) analysis or dynamic 11.6.6 Contingency selection
simulation, depending on the characteristics of the
contingencies of interest to the utility. Voltage securi- The Contingency Selector should ad as a filter so that
ty monitor determines the secure operating limits or only relevant and appropriate contingencies are pro-
operating regions to ensure adequate voltage stabi- cessed each time VSA executes either in real-time or
lity margin. The security enhancement module assists study mode. Starting with a list of pre-defined con-
in determination of preventive and/or remedial tingencies, the intent is to avoid unnecessary process-
252 actions against voltage instability threat. ing of any pre-defined contingency that can be pre- I
I

\·

screened as irrelevant or non-critical under present
operating conditions. In case the contingency list includes
one or more groups of "similar" contingen cies, whose
relative severity can be logically establish ed based on
actual operating conditions,_ the Contingency Selector
should be able to select the n most severe contingencies in
each such group (with n user-adjustable; default n ='1).
Moreover, the Contingency Selector should have the
capability to generate new contingencies (add to the list)
based on operating conditions as determined by a set of
rules. These specific conditions must be recognized
automatically based on the operating data (SCADA) and the results of
other functions (such aStatic Security Analysis). The Contingency Selector
should also be able to augment a contingency definition based on active
arming of remedial action schemes. It should also recognize "must select"
contingencies. The must-select list should be dynamic; for example, it should
automatically include any contingencies that required remedial action arming
in the previous VSA execution.
The Contingency Selector rules should be applicable to any power system
data quantity that Contingency Selector can obtain or derive from the EMS
and/or VSA database. To support both real-time and study VSA, this
includes data from SCADA the State Estimator, Static
Security Analysis, OPF, and any Operating Orders coded
in the EMSNSA environ ment. Different rules should be
possible for real-time and study analysis. Mathematical
operations applica ble to Contingency Selector's current and
past data quantities must be supported. Logical as well as
alge braic statements should be possible.
The Contingency Selector must support rules that check
whether each contingency's related data quan tities represent
a certain status and/or range-of-ope ration condition that
warrants activation or deactivati on of the contingency. In
real-time mode, these checks should be possible on
an instantaneous, trend, rate-of-change, or time-duration
basis. This should include the ability to construct rules that
com bine multiple power system conditions via one or
more logical statements. The Contingency Selector should
also activate/deactivate contingencies based on Static
Security Analysis results, using generic or user-defined
rules.
.;..
.;..
11.6.7 Contingency screening 11.6.8
Contingency screening may be required to reduce the
number of contingencies selected by the Contingency
Selector before carrying out further de tailed analysis.
A number of voltage stability indices may be comput ed via
computational short-cuts to help rank the se lected
contingencies in an approximate order of seve rity, or identify
harmless contingencies that need not be subjected to further
analysis. Alternatively, rule based criteria may be used as
experience that is built up with the system. Finally, the
contingency screening module may be entirely disposed of if
the Contin gency Selector adequately filters the list of
possible contingencies.
The design of the on-line VSA should be flexible and modular
to accommodate easy adaptation of contin gency selection
and screening to the specific utility requirements. In particular
a number of screening and ranking criteria should be
provided for selection by the user. The user must have the
capability to include or exclude screening separately in the
study mode and in the real-time sequence execution of on-
line VSA.
11.6.8 Contingency analysis
The Contingency Analysis module should provide the capability
to select the method of analysis most sui table for the utility.
Both static (steady-state) analysis and dynamic simulation
methods should be provid ed.
(Note: Contingency Analysis as defined here must not be
confused with Steady-State Security Analysis which deals
only with steady-state contingencies. Here the contingencies
are of a dynamic nature, but
the method of analysis may be static or dynamic). 253
.;..

11.6.10 Static analysis may include power flow methods, sen
sitivity analysis, as well as traditional local analysis (e.g.
V-Q and P-V curves). Dynamic simulation should pro
vide for analysis of both fast and slow dynamics, pre
ferably with automatic time step adjustment It should
accommodate generator and governor dynamics,
field current limiting dynamics, load restoration dyna
mics, tap changing time delays, AGC, and prime
mover dynamics.
The user must have the capability to designate the
analysis method to be used for all contingencies, or
on a per contingency basis. In the latter case the
method of analysis may be included as part of the
contingency definition as specified in 11.6.5.
The results of contingency analysis must include
classification of each contingency as voltage stable
or unstable. Depending on the method of analysis
selected, a measure of voltage stability margin should
also be provided. Moreover, if the method of analysis
permits, sensitivity of the stability margin with respect
to designated operating parameters of interest may
be computed.
The capability must exist for iterations between the
Contingency Analysis module and the Security
Monitor. Both manual and automatic iterations
should be provided for. In automatic iteration, the
Security Monitor will modify designated parameters
(e.g., system load) and trigger a run of Contingency
Analysis. This will permit the Security Monitor to
determine secure operating limits or regions in
terms of operating parameters which are of interest
to the operators, rather than in terms of indices
which may be meaningful only to the analysts.
11.6.9 Voitage stabiiity criteria
Voltage security (or insecurity) of the power system
should be assessed based on voltage security criteria
254 of interest to, and accepted by, the utility. Lack of suf-
ficient voltage stability margin as defined by the vol
tage stability indices should be defined.
The user must have the capability to have a contin
gency which results in islanding or necessitates auto
matic load shedding beyond a designated threshold,
to be identified explicitly or labelled as insecure even
though the remaining part of the system meets
vc>l tage stability requirements.
11.6.10 Security monitor
Security Monitor must support voltage security analy
sis, in both the real-time and study modes, by inter
preting and presenting to the user the VSA contin
gency analysis results from the following perspec-·
tives:
1. Which contingencies result in voltage insecurity?
2. Which of the insecure contingencies are the most
limiting (for the system as a whole or for specific
zones and areas under study), and where?
3. What is the overall voltage security condition of
the power system as a whole, or of specific
zones or areas under study, as measured by
one or more individual or composite voltage
security indices?
4. Is the overall voltage security condition of the
power system getting better or worse as evi
denced by tracking appropriate voltage security
indices?
5. Do projected short-term operating conditions,
such as scheduled interchange or interface flows,
suggest that the overall voltage security condition
of the power system is going to get better or
worse?
Security Monitor should also provide the capability for
direct (scan rate) monitoring of voltage and genera
tor reactive power and reactive reserve for design
ated generators or plants.
7 7.6. 7 0. 7 Security monitor
capabilities
Security Monitor should have the ability to apply mul
tiple user-specified rules to assess the voltage secu
rity condition of the power system. The rules should
operate on the pre- and post-contingency power
system. The rules should operate on the pre- and
post-contingency power system data and/or the vol
tage security indices that Security Monitor must cal
culate using the Contingency Analysis module. The
rules must allow multiple conditions associated with
the data and indices to be combined via one or
more logical statements.
Security Monitor must be capable of establishing the
margins, sensitivities and other signatures that it
needs in order to calculate the various operating
limits of interest to the user, such as those needed for
computation of available transmission capability
(ATC).
The VSA Operating limits may be assumed to be of
the box type (i.e. maximin limits). However, the capa
bility to determine secure operating regions (interde
pendent operating limits or simultaneous transfer
limits) must be provided for each pair of operating
parameters designated by the user, with a third para
meter selected by the user to produce a family of
operating regions.
The user must have the ability to review Security
Monitor's results via tabular and graphical displays.
Presentations should include the insecure contingen
cies ranked in order of severity and convenient
means of comparing contingencies on the basis of
their relevant voltage security indices, operating limits,
and remedial actions. A convenient means of tracking
the overall voltage security condition of the power
system must also be included.
The user must have the ability to review Security
Monitor's voltage security index definitions and
secu rity assessment rules. On-line modifications of
these definitions and rules must be possible in the
study mode.
7 7 .6. 7 0.2 Direct (scan rate)
monitoring
The on-line VSA is expected to run normally as part
of the real-time sequence, starting the State Estimator
(SE) solution as explained in Section 11.6.11. It may
....
be set to execute following each SE solution or a 11.6.11
multiple thereof.' Therefore, in its normal execution,
the on-line VSA results are based on system snap
shots obtained once every few minutes (5 minutes to
30 minutes depending on the specific implementa
tion; 20 minutes being a reasonable reference
value). Direct monitoring of specific bus voltages or
generat ing unit reactive power refers to scan rate
(or mul tiple scan rate) monitoring of such
quantities, and would be best classified as a SCADA
Function. The relevant data update periodicity
would be in the range of 2 seconds to 30 seconds
depending on the implementation (1 0 seconds being
a reasonable refe rence value).
The Security Monitor should provide the capability to
monitor for the operator designated bus voltages, as
well as generator and static var system reactive
power and reactive reserve. Depending on the
design of the interface between the on-line VSA and
the SCADA systems, this capability may require either
opening a window into the SCADA system from the
on-line VSA environment. or scan rate (or multiple
scan rate snapshot) data transfer from SCADA to the
on-line VSA.
Reactive power and reactive reserve monitoring
capability should be provided for individual units,
groups of units, and power plants for which SCADA
scan rate data is available.
The capability should be able to graphically
display the selected monitored quantities and
their trend with time. The capability should also be
available to have composite voltage security
indices computed and displayed accordingly.
11.6.11 Security enhancement
Security Enhancement includes both Preventive and
Remedial Actions. The VSA functions should
assist the operator in determining the needed
security
enhancement measures. 255
... ....
 · ·
·
11.6. 11.1 On-line determination of
preventive actions
The preventive actions will consist of manipulating a
coordinated set of "controllable parameters" in the
pre-contingency state consisting of the following:
11.6.11.2 • VoltageNAR rescheduling
• Network element
switching
• Generation rescheduling
• Start-up of certain units (e.g., synchronous
condensers)
• Adjustment of interface flows across spec;fically
designated interfaces
• Adjustment of HVDC and FACTS device control
set points
• Curtailment of certain loads (interruptible
loads, load control schemes, etc)
Mechanisms for arriving at the final preventive action
decisions may consist of one or a combination of the
following:
a) User-suggested preventive actions,
b) Rule-based preventive actions, and
c) Preventive actions obtained through a
security-constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF).
The information available from the base-case VSA
execution run may provide sensitivity data and limit
data that are helpful in preventive action considera
tions. The sensitivity data could be in the form of a
"sensitivity matrix" that relates incremental changes in
the "cu,,trollable parameters" to the incremental chan
ges of "output variables". The latter may include vol
tage security indices and/or physical variables of inte
rest (line flows, inter-area transfers, bus voltages).
Limit data is obtained for specific critical variables (e.g.
interface flows across designated transmission corri
dors) by the Security Monitor using several iterations
with the Contingency Analysis module to arrive at the
exact limit. The limits could be of the "box" type, i.e.
upper and lower limits for a given variable, or in the
form of operating regions (interdependent limits or
simultaneous transfers).
Once the decision for preventive action is made, a
simulation check should be made to verify that the
256 resulting conditions would be secure. Otherwise, cor-
rections to that decision should be made and the re
sults tested until an acceptable condition is arrived at.
7 7.6.11.2 On-line determination
of remedial actions
The main objective of on-line remedial action deter
mination is to determine appropriate arming for the
remedial action schemes in case the preventive
actions and/or the present active arming is not ade
quate to ensure system security. The proper arming
for individual contingencies can be determined sepa
rately. The corresponding remedial action may invol
ve shedding different combinations of load groups at
one or several substations depending on the contin
gency, and the actual operating conditions.
Often many different arming schemes are possible to
ensure voltage stability. If the impact on the post-con
tingency operation is the same, then for operatorls
convenience, it is desirable to have VSA recommend
only incremental changes with respect to the existing
active arming. However, when the number of required
incremental changes (in a single VSA execution, or
cumulatively over successive VSA executions) ex
ceeds a threshold (user-enterable), it would be advis
able to have VSA ignore the existing active arming,
and determine a new arming scheme. Accordingly,
for on-line determination of remedial actions, provi
sions must be available for both "Flat Start Arming"
and "Incremental arming" as defined below.
In Flat Start Arming, the VSA is performed assuming
that all remedial action schemes are initially disarmed.
For those contingencies that cause voltage insecurity,
an "optimal" subset of arming schemes is sought
with the objective to arm the smallest amount of load
shedding to achieve the desired voltage stability mar
gin. This may be determined through the sensitivity
analysis, whereby the changes in voltage stability
margins are related to various possible control
actions. Flat Start Arming is performed following a
large change in system operating conditions, on
demand, or once every n (user-enterable) VSA cycles.
In Incremental Arming, the current arming state is
retained and is automatically considered by the on
line VSA. Depending on VSA results, an armed sche
me may be disarmed if the corresponding voltage
stability margins are high enough, and vice versa. The
 .

incremental arming patterns are determined so as to
minimize the number of changes in the active
arming, while ensuring system stability. Any sensiti
vity derivatives computed in this case are evaluated
with the existing active arming.
The operator must, in any case, have the capability
to request a graphical comparison of the existing
active arming and the one recommended by the
VSA func tion.
In the study mode, the engineer/analyst should be
able to study possible remedial action arming
options that would lead to system security. Both flat-
start and incremental arming capabilities must be
provided. The VSA system must have the tools to
allow easy modification of the arming patterns.
11.6.1 2 Modeling and data
requirements
This section specifies modelling and data
require ments of the VSA function. Some of these
require ments may be in line with the utility's
existing EMS models and data; others may have to
be added for on line VSA purposes.
and configuration of bus arrangements in substa
tions. The main purpose is to be able to adequately
represent switching operations in contingencies and
possible remedial action schemes. The
external model network may consist of two sub-
networks, namely:
11.6.12
• the inner external (or buffer zone), where the
identity of the external network model elements
is preserved, and
• the outer external, where reduced models
are used.
Depending on arrangements for data exchange with
other transmission control centers, little or no real
time data may be available about the external
model. There may be a need to change the
external model occasionally based on available
scheduling informa tion, seasonal variations, etc.
One or more external models may be required to
account for various ope rating conditions in the
system based on scheduling data or seasonal
variations. For both the internal and external
subsystems, busses are grouped into zones. Power
transfPr interfaces from any zone to an adja cent
one must be easy to identify for the purposes of
interface flow and transfer computations.

11.6.12.1.2 Device Static Models

7 7.6. 7 2. 7 Modeling
requirements The static models are load-flow models of device/ele
ment representations. The following static models
The VSA will require the following classes of should be supported at a minimum:
modek
• Lines: represented as pi-sections, possibly
• Network with unsymmetrical line charging
Models
• Transformers: represented as pi-sections where
• Device Static by the various impedance/admittance components
Models may be explicit functions of tap settings. Three
• Device/System Dynamic winding transformers must be properly modelled,
Models including any associated tap changers
• Load • Phase-shifting transformers: represented
Models by complex tap ratios, allowing both shift in
• Fault/Control angl and change in voltage magnitude
Models • Generators: represented as a real-power
source together with a reactive power capability
A description of the requirements for each model curve
type is presented below. as a function of terminal voltage
• Shunt elements: represented by their
11.6.12.1.1 Network Models impe
dances/admittances 257
There are two types of network models that will
have to be present, namely, internal and external
models. The internal model includes representation
of lines, generators, transformers, loads, DC
converters and shunt/series devices, as well as the
status of breakers,

11.6.13 • DC lines: represented as real-power injections,
with defined MVAr vs. MW characteristics
• Static Var Compensators {SVCs): represented
by static gain and maximum/minimum limits
• Loads: represented by the ZIP model. i.e., as a
combination of constant impedance (Z), constant
current (1), and constant real/reactive injection (P)
components
11.6.12.1.3 Device/System Dynamic Models
The device dynamic models to be considered are as
follows:
• Generator dynamic models including the
following:
• Machine mechanical dynamic equation
(swing equation with damping)
• Machine electrical dynamic equations
• Excitation systems of various types
• Governor systems of various types
• Selected prime mover models (selection
to be based on response times) ·
• Power system stabilizers
• DC Line dynamic models including various controls
• SVC dynamic models
• FACTS devices including modelling of their
connectivity and time delays
• ULTC transformers: to include time delays
associated with tap-changing controls
Flexibility must be provided to accommodate user
supplied device models easily.
258
• Transformer limits, both normal and emergency
• Phase-shifting transformer data and limits, both
normal and emergency
• Transformer limits, both normal and emergency
• Phase-shifting transformer data and limits, both
normal and emergency
• Generator static data: minimum and maximum
ratings, nominal terminal voltage, reactive power
capability curve as a function of terminal voltage and
coolant conditions
11.6.12.1.4 Load Models
Load models should include the following features:
• Non-linear voltage dependence either as in the
ZIP standard model (i.e. combination of constant
impedance, constant current, and constant power)
or as a gEOneral polynomial in voltage
• Large induction motor loads
• Slow thermostatically driven loads (heating/
cooling)
11.6.12.1.5 Fault/Control Models
This modelling requirement includes the following:
• Relay models: for those relays which may operate
due to a disturbance, e.g. load shedding relays
• Modelling of control actions in remedial action
schemes
11.6.13 VSA Data Requirements
VSA data requirements consist of data for the above
models, additional data needed by the VSA system
as a whole, and specific real-time data needed exclu
sively by the on-line VSA function.
7 7.6. 73.7 Model Data Requirements
11.6.13.1.1 Network model
These include connectivity/topology information for
lines, transformers, shunVseries devices, and genera
ting units. Additional network data will include:
• Limits on bus voltages for each voltage level
for normal and emergency operation
• Bus configurations in substations as functions
of breaker status (for internal network)
• Zone data
11.6.13.1.2 Device static model
The following data will be needed:
• Line pi-section impedances/admittances data
• Line thermal limits, both normal and
emergency
• Transformer pi-section data including tap settings
with impedance/admittance components as
explicit functions of tap settings
• Shunt element impedances/admittances and ratings
• DC lines: voltage levels, ratings
• Loads: default ZIP load partition ratios at nominal voltage (for the Z,
I, and P components), load limits, and default power factors
11.6.13.1.3 Device/system dynamic model
The following device dynamic model data require
ments must be met as a minimum:
• Generator dynamic model data:
 • Machine mechanical parameters: inertia
constant and damping coefficient
• Machine electrical parameters:
transient/sub-transient reactances and time
constants, saturation model data
• Excitation systems: data for each model
available in standard power system stability
analysis programs such as EPRI's ETMSP
• Governor systems data for each model
available in standard power system stability
analysis programs such as the EPRI ETMSP
• Selected prime mover model data
(selection to be based on response times)
• Power system stabilizer gains, time
constants and limits
• DC line dynamic model data including those for
various controls and their parameters - -
• FACTS device data (compatible with those
available in EPRI ETMSP)
• ULTC transformers and phase-shifters: time-delays
associated with tap-changing controls
11.7 On-line VSA execution modes
11.7 The VSA function must be able to execute periodi cally,
on demand, and upon occurrence of significant changes in
the state of the power system. It should also be available
in the study mode.
11.71 On-line VSA execution control
requirements
In the on-line mode (referred to also as real-time exe cution
mode) the VSA must execute in conjunction with the real-
Flexibility must be provided to accommodate data for 11.6.13.2
the user-defined models in a flexible user-friendly
manner.
11.6.13.1.4 Load models
Load model data should include the following as
needed:
• Percentages of Z, I and P for each load bus and for
real and reactive powers independently (percentages
specified for nominal base case conditions)
• Coefficient for polynomial representation of loads
as function of voltage
• Large induction motor loads data
• Slow thermostatically driven load data (including time
delay, time constant. gain, and sensitivity factors)
11.6.13.1.5 Switching/control modes
The switching/control data requirement may include the
following:
• Relay model data including timing of breaker
operation, protective action schemes, etc
• Model data of control actions in remedial action
schemes. Also, this may include threshold values for
various arming schemes.
11.6.13.2 Default data
The VSA system should have the capability to fill in
missing data using appropriate default values. It must also
detect and flag erroneous data based on _rea sonability
checks. The user must be able to fill in the correct
information and must have the option to use default data.
259
time sequence control (RTSC), which
coordinates execution of the network
security appli cation functions available in
the EMS environment. Figure 11-8 shows
where on-line VSA fits in the EMS real-time
sequence.
The EMS RTSC design is expected to
provide the fle xibility for the operator to
have an execution of the State Estimator
(SE), and possibly the Steady-State
Security Analysis (SSA) function be
automatically trig gered to precede each
VSA execution.
.----
 VSA
11.7.1.1 On-line VSA execution trigger
The following triggering mechanisms for on-line VSA
execution should be available:
1. Periodic Execution: It is expected that the
provisions in the EMS RTSC will allow the user
to specify the execution periodicity of the on-line
VSA based on absolute time (e.g., on the hour,
20 minutes past the hour, etc), time lapse since the
last VSA execution (e.g., 20 minutes after the last VSA
execution), or multiples of periodic State Estimator
executions (e.g. after every other SE execution). For
each utility the existing EMS RTSC
capabilities will be used to trigger periodic on-line
VSA execution.
2. Event-driven Execution: The on-line VSA must
execute upon changes in the operating state of the
power system detected by a "Change Monitor" that
triggers the RTSC execution. These changes should
include the following:
• Changes in system topology
• Variation of load, generation, or interface flow
level beyond designated thresholds
• Changes in the arming pattern of auto
matic corrective devices, whenever
applicable
• Changes in the status of reactive
resources (ON/OFF)
• Changes in the status of generator AVR,
blocked transformer taps, etc., where
tele-metered
• Change of state (ON/OFF) of stabilizers on
the machines
State
Model Estimation SSA Old The user must be able to specify a time delay
Update associated with each group of event triggers, so that
VSA execution starts only after the system has
settled down to a steady-state and the
SSA =Steady-State Security Analysis corresponding base case is available from the
VSA = Voltage Stability Analysis State Estimator.
DSA
DAS = Dynamic Security Analysis
Old = Operating Limits Determination - 3. On-demand Execution: The operator must be_ able
to request execution of on-line VSA at any time. In
case VSA is already executing, the opera
Figure -11-8 Real-time Sequence VSA Execution tor must be accordingly notified, and should be
given the option to have the requested on
260 demand VSA execution queued or ignored.

'?
7 7.77.2 VSA execution abort
The operator should be able to abort VSA execution
at any time regardless of the triggering mechanism
that started the execution.
It should be possible to assign execution and abort
priorities based on the type of triggering mechanism
that started the current VSA execution, and the source
of the incoming execution or abort request. For
example, it should be possible to have any periodic
VSA execution aborted by any event trigger, and
have any periodic trigger ignored or queued when an
event triggered VSA run is executing. It should also
be possible to have a forced execution mode such
that if VSA has not run to completion for a period of
time (specified by the user, and longer than normal
VSA execution periodicity), a forced execution is
start ed ignoring subsequent execution abort
requests (except for manual abort).
1 7 .71.3 Execution
control
The operator should be able to use a simple display
block diagram to include or exclude contingency
screening for on-line VSA execution. The operator
should also have the possibility to observe the on-
line VSA execution results (interface flow limits,
genera tion limits, etc.) and authorize or prevent
their use by other EMS functions. The operator
should also have the capability to enable automatic
transfer of the on line VSA results for use by
other EMS or SCADA applications.
The analyst/engineer must have the possibility to
enable/disable either static analysis or time simulation
for Contingency Analysis for all contingencies. If both
are enabled, the contingency type flag described in
11.6.5 will prevail.
1 7 .7.7.4 Validity of VSA
results
The on-line VSA should have the capability to deter
mine (and warn the operator) when the results of
the most recent VSA execution are no longer valid
due to changes in the system or arming conditions.
It is nor mally expected that the Change Monitor
will initiate
VSA execution under these conditions. However, it is 11.8
also possible that the VSA executions triggered by
the Change Monitor do not run to completion for
some time due to frequent changes in system
condi tions. The operator should then be notified
that the available VSA results are no longer valid.
11.72 Study mode execution control
requirements
In the study mode, the user must be able to execute
the VSA function using a save case steady-state or
system snapshot.
The real-time VSA mode should continue while stu
dies are being executed. The user must have the
capability to modify the save case conditions, choose
an existing contingency list, add, delete, or modify
contingencies, modify arming schemes, include or
exclude contingency screening, and change VSA exe
cution parameters and thresholds. The user must also
have the possibility to select or construct a specific
contingency to be analyzed without processing or
modifying the contingency list.
11.8 On-line VSA user Requirements
The user requirements for the integrated VSA func
tion are stated in this section. Subsection 11.8.1 pre
sents some general user requirements. Specific requi
rements for various user groups (operators, opera
tions planners/engineers, and managers) are present
ed in sections 11.8.2 through 11.8.4.
11.8.1 General VSA user requirements
This section presents user requirements common to
all users, i.e., operators, operations planners/engi
neers, and managers. 261
. ·
 7 7 .8. 7. 7 User interface environment
The VSA should have an effective and user-friendly
graphic user interface with point and click features,
pull-down menus and Windows. Modem graphics
should be used for the quick assessment of complex
11.8.1.3 situations.
The VSA user interface should provide facilities for
effective and efficient monitoring of the various indi
ces, margins and trends together with provisions for
implementation of preventive action recommendati
ons, and arming of automatic corrective actions (such
as comparison of sting and recommended arming).
The VSA should be able to store the results of inse
cure cases and the associated state estimator base
cases automatically when these appear in the on-
line mode (controlled by the real- time sequence
control). These cases should be archived for future
analysis and consideration by the Engineer.
In both on-line and study modes, the possibility
must be provided to show the run time since the
start of the VSA execution, as well as the progress of
the VSA run (e.g., screening in progress, the number
of con tingencies processed so far, the number of
remaining contingencies to be examined, etc).
A waiting symbol on the screen is required and copy
output capability is required for both tabular and
graphical displays.
7 7 .8. 7.2 User
interaction
The following display capabilities must be provided
as a minimum:
• Displays that indicate the available VSA execution
control parameters, their current value, and their
default value.
• Displays that graphically show the variation of a
voltage stability index with a given interface flow,
the critical interface flow limit for a single contin
gency, and its envelope curve for all contingencies
processed during VSA execution.
262 • Displays that show the unacceptable
(insecure)
contingencies for the previous VSA executions.
• Displays that indicate the "new" insecure contin
gencies that were not identified as insecure in the
previous VSA run, and the previously insecure
contingencies that are no longer insecure.
7 7 .8.7.3 Save case capability
The user must be able to request the on-line (real
time) or study mode VSA data and results to be
saved.
A save case should include the following data and
parameters:
1. The pre-contingency steady-state base case. The
base case may have been generated under real
time sequence control (State Estimator solution,
possibly augmented by other VSA or EMS satellite
functions, to provide a VSA base case), or via a
study power flow solution.
2. Additional status and analog·data needed by the
rule base (e.g. remedial action arming status).
3. All VSA execution parameters (tolerances, thresh
olds, etc) and configuration (e.g. screening
bypass).
4. The contingency list selected/produced by the
Contingency Selector.
5. SA results generated according to the execution
parameters. The user must have the capability to
call up a menu to select the VSA results to be
saved. This should include the capability to select
a variable category, and item, as follows:
• Screening results (contingencies discarded or
retained).
• Ranked lists of severe contingencies along with
the value of the ranking index for each
ranking index used.
• Overall VSA summary results, including grouping
of contingencies into voltage stable (secure) and
unstable (insecure), final ranking of severe contin
gencies, interface flow limits, recommended
remedial action arming, etc

11.8.1.4 User documentation
The VSA user documentation should address,
among other things, the following items:
1. What each function is supposed to do.
2. Low to adjust data, parameters, options, etc,
and what happens once those adjustments
are made.
3. Descriptions of how to accomplish various
tasks using the system and how to use its
features. These need to be very clear
step by-step instructions.
4. The documentation should be self-contained
and not reference other publications, except
for general information.
On-line "Help" facility is required to explain to the
user all commands, functions used, its and any other
fea tures of the VSA package.
11.8.2 Operator requirements
The on-line VSA environment should be easy to
understand and manipulate. Specifically the following
facilities should be provided: · key system indices and customized for
11.8.2.1 Operator interaction
The on-line VSA environment should be easy to
understand and manipulate. Specifically the following
facilities should be provided:
1. The on-line VSA must be initially consistent with
operating orders (see Section 11.6.13.1) based
on off-line analysis. New features, whether
based on indices or the use of modem graphic
facilities, should take into consideration the
structure and contents of the current operdling
orders so that the transition to the on-line VSA
is smooth and credible.
2. The operator should have the ability to include
or exclude screening in on-line VSA execution.
.;.. .;..
'?
11.8.2.2 Security related information
provided for the operator
As a minimum, the following security-related infor
mation should be provided to the operator:
1. Operating limits associated with a prescribed set 11.8.2.3
of contingencies, i.e. generation limits, VAR
support limits, voltage stability margins, reactive
margins, etc
2. Transfer limits on important individual or simul
taneous interfaces
3. Coordinated action to affect various transfers
securely against voltage instability threat.
4. Sensitivities of changes in the voltage stability
limits/margins to specific operator actions
(if available).
5. Time trends associated with expected system
changes which would allow the operator to
estimate the time available for intervention with
a given operator-initiated measure.
6. Warning when the current VSA results are no
longer valid due to changes in the power system
conditions. This can be implemented via an
appr priate alarm that indicates that system
conditions have changed and that prior VSA
results are no longer valid.
7. System trend information indicating whether
things are getting better or worse. This trend
information is to be based on changes in
indices applicable to the utility.
11.8.2.3 Applications of the on-line
VSA function
The operator should be able to utilize the on line VSA
for the following applications:
1. Compute the VSA limits needed to determine
Available Transmission Capability. This will be reali
zed by incorporating VSA limits along with-ther
mal limits, Steady-State Security Analysis (SSA)
limits,-and Dynamic Security Assessment (DSA)
limits in an Operating Limit Determination (OLD)
function. The OLD function (which is not part of
VSA) may accommodate box-type operating limits
or inter-dependent limits (operating regions).
263
'? ?
 2. Outage dispatching for possible outages of
gene
rators, lines, transformers and reactive
groups. This entails a study mode
application of the VSA function.
3. Incorporation of critical contingency
11.8.4 results in relevant on-line application
software like the optimal power flow.
4. Preventive actions: list of possible
preventive measures for operator
decision together with the "cost"
associated with each measure.
5. Arming: Arming recommendations for coor
dinated automatic corrective action to
ensure "vigilance" against the contingencies
of concern.
6. Corrective Action: following the possible
4. Capability to perform model
reduction/equiva lence for operator's use.
The model reduction capability may be an
off-line tool, but the VSA should offer the
possibility to test the impact of choosing
different external models, and compare
them.
5. Capability to compare cases with other
utilities
through standardized inputs and outputs and the
ability to interface with time-simulation stability
I.

occurrence of critical contingencies, a list of

potential corrective measures should be I programs. (This will be a feature to be specified
made available.
l
separately for each utility's VSA specification if
7 7 .8.2.4 Direct (scan rate)
needed.)
monitoring
Using a window into the SCADA system, or I
I
other wise, the operator should be able to 6. Capability to compare cases against each other
monitor design ated bus voltages, as well as l
generator and static VAr system reactive power through appropriate graphical means that focus
and reactive reserve for indivi dual units, groups on the key parameters associated with various
of units, and power plants for which SCADA
scan rate data is available. i.
comparisons (e.g., indices, margins, sensitivities
The capability should be provided to graphically and trends).
dis play the selected monitored quantities and
their trend with time, along with relevant Provisions should exist for efficient and easy-to-
computed composite voltage security indices. carry out database maintenance, including the
ability to define specific and generic
contingencies, and .to modify the contingency
list, the network, dev1ce models and the rule
base.

11.8.4 Manager user

requirements
3. Ability to recreate an actual event and study
11.8.3 Operations its
planners/engineers user 264 validity against measured data.
requirements
These include all of the user requirements
stated in Sections 11.8.1 and 11.8.2 for the
operators), except Section 11.8.2.4, plus the
following:
1. Ability to adjust certain system parameters:
this may apply to selection of fewer or
more contin gencies, together with the
ability to construct system scenarios for
study purposes.
2. Ability to include or exclude time
domain simulation for Contingency
Analysis.
This category of user requirements includes the fol are study reports based on Engineer's
lowing: activities in cases of severe
events on the system
1. Summary reports on system
performance as provided by the voltage I
stability indices and their corresponding l
time evolution 3. Reports on critical events
2. Reports on actual vs. computed results 4. Summary logs of critical variables
to assess validity of the results. These

... ...

'? '?

11.9 Interface requirements In the real-time mode, VSA must typically interface
Security
Analysis
with State Estimator results. Other options exist,
function
however, that depend on host-EMS capabilities. For
. in
example, if actual security violations are detected by
which
State Estimator, Optimal Power Flow may execute
case, if
This section addresses the main VSA interface requi automatically to determine appropriate corrective
the
rements with other au omated functions. correc
tive
11.9.1 Consideration of existing automated action is
operating orders projecte
d to
The operating orders involving determination of the give
interface flow limits and/or arming of remedial action rise to
schemes may be available in an automated environ a power
ment at the utility. In this case, most probably an system
automated table look-up process is available. Since the state
states in the look-up table cover only sample with
operating conditions, usually interpolation, extrapola tion conting
or scaling follows the table look-up process to adapt ency
the table look-up results to the prevailing ope rating problem
conditions. The VSA rule base should be a[Jie to s,
accommodate such rules. VSA should interface with Optimal
the Automated Operating Order subsystem to obtain Power
information regarding selected contingencies, interface Flow
flow definitions, interface flow limits, and the arming may
scheme. It should provide the capability to compare run
the operating limits, and arming, obtained by applying once
the operating orders, with those obtain ed based on more
VSA execution. to
determi
1.9.2 Interface with EMS functions ne
appropr
On-line VSA should be capable of using the output iate
results of existing host-EMS functions such as State preventi
Estimator, Dispatcher Power Flow, and Optimal Power ve
Flow to establish the power system conditions to be action.
analyzed by VSA. These conditions may take the This
form of a power flow solution that represents the means
state of the actual power system or the state of a that the
projected or study version of the power system. user
may wish to run VSA on a power flow solution
established from:
1. Actual real-time conditions, as reflected in the
State Estimator solution
2. Conditions corresponding to "steady-state"
corrective actions, or
3. Conditions corresponding to "steady-state"
preventive actions.
VSA implementation should allow the user to coordi nate
VSA execution with the host-EMS real-time sequence
accordingly.
In the study mode, VSA should typically interface with
Dispatcher Power Flow results. Host- EMS studies using
Optimal Power Flow may also be possible. Therefore,
VSA implementation must allow the user to demand the
execution of VSA on any study power flow solution that
can be created or retrieved via host-EMS facilities.
action. The host EMS may then run its Steady-State
Further, in real-time or study mode, VSA should use
both the power system model and the power flow
results of the EMS function to generate and initialize the
VSA power system model that will serve as a base
case and hence starting point for subsequent VSA
processing.
11.9
VSA should also be capable of using the output
results of the host-EMS real-time and study Steady State
Security Analysis functions. For example, for a given
power flow solution,the corresponding Steady State
Security Analysis results may help VSA deter mine the
relevant contingencies it should analyze.
VSA should use real-time sequence results as they are
generated in response to the existing demand, event,
and periodic execution mechanisms that serve steady-
state security analysis in the Host EMS. In addition,
however, VSA should be capable of using the output
results of host-EMS functions such as remedial action
arming status, the Operating Orders,
etc, to determine if a change in the status of breakers 265

11.10 and/or corrective device arming should trigger execu
tion of the real-time sequence solely for VSA purpo
se. In this case, the flexibility to execute a subset of
normal real-time sequence should be provided, e.g.
execution of State Estimator without subsequent
execution of Optimal Power Flow and Steady-State
Security Analysis.
The ability of existing EMS functions to access VSA
output results should also be provided. This should
include the use of recommended operating limits
(interface flow limits) and recommended corrective
device arming status and associated threshold levels.
11.9.3 Interface with EMS services
VSA should interface with EMS services to obtain
real-time or study power flow solutions, correspon
ding power system models, and the other results
from SCADA and Automated Operating Orders that
it needs. These services should provide facilities to
output VSA user messages such as convergence or
voltage insecurity warning messages, and provide
EMS access to VSA results such as interface flow
limits.
To permit direct (scan rate) monitoring of designated
voltage or reactive power quantities, data interface to
SCADA should have the capability to transfer selected
SCADA telemetered or computed data to VSA
every scan cycle (e.g. 2 seconds) or a user-
selectable mul tiple thereof (e.g. every 10 seconds).
266
· '?
11.1 0 The implementation
of Wide Area protection
Wide area protection is still an important topic since
system wide collapses occur fre(juently in many
power systems. Since several years much effort has
been taken to indicate voltage stability]. The propos
ed indicators are designed for the implementation in
control centers and base on SCADA data. Two major
kinds of indicators can be distinguished. The first ones
are the sensitivity-based indicators, the minimum sin
gular value of the load flow Jacobian. This kind of
indicators only consider the actual state of the system
and does not predict any influence by discontinuous
elements like reactive power limiters or under load
tap changing transformers. The second ones are all
types of power respectively stability margin calcula
tions in the sense of calculating the difference be
tween the actual system's state and a point on the
stability boundary. The continuation power flow is the
best-known algorithm for this application. All discon
tinuous and steady-state effects influencing voltage
stability are modelled.
However, the nowadays application of all these
approaches has the drawback that the basic SCADA
data assumes that the system is in a steady-state
equilibrium. For slow changes in the system, like
changes of the load over day, this assumption is suf
ficient However, a typical voltage collapse mostly
occurs after cascaded contingencies or faults, which
lead to an unstable system's state. This unstable state
is a dynamic transient process of several seconds up
to tens of minutes, which make the voltage stability
problem hard to handle with the nowadays steady
state approaches. In spite of a good theoretical knowl
edge, there are no practical realizations considering
the system dynamics for voltage stability assessment.
Pre-calculations of the stability for one or a combina
tion of two contingency events address only a part of
the problem. This needs a huge calculation effort and
the system's state, for which a case is calculated, must
fit most exactly to the actual system's state. For unex
pected contingency cases this approach is not useful.
Conclusively, the major drawbacks of all these
approa ches lie in the not appropriate steady-state
system view. The solution for this is a departure
from the SCADA-based approach to a transient
measurement system. Such a measurement system
together with the voltage stability assessment
and stabilization algorithms will be called wide area
protection system in the following.
Phasor measurement units (PMU), which are weil
known since several years, build the technical base
for the wide area protection system. They offer pha
sors of voltage and currents together with a satellite
triggered time stamp in time intervals down to 20 ms.
Single installations of such units are in an experimen
tal stage at many utilities. Also voltage stability indica
tors are proposed on phasor measurements for con
tinuous changes of power systems. This chapter con
centrates on the stability prediction after cascaded
outages. The described algorithms are designed es
pecially for the opportunities that are offered by the
transient system's view.
Current
Primary
Voltage
Figure 17-9 Principle of the phasor measurement unit
(PMU)
11.10.1 System Set-up
11.1 0.1.1 Hardware system set-
up
The PMUs must be installed throughout a critical area 11.10.1
of the system. Critical area of the system e.g. in the
sense of voltage stability means to look on critical
paths from generation to load areas or dedicated
transmission corridors. This critical area is the result
from a system assessment, e.g. with the help of
model analysis [11] together with critical contingency
screening algorithms. For such a critical area an inter
nal model with appropriate neighbouring models at
the boundaries must be formulated.
PMUs with several input channels are able to measu
re the primary voltage and currents at a substation at
the feeders and lines. The analogue values are trans
formed in to digital samples by the analogue
digital converter and processed in the
microcomputer. They are synchronized via GPS with
an accuracy of 1 11-sec (Figure 11-9).
267
Accuracy: 1 f.!S
. ·
 '•
,,
..
GPS
---------------------- --------- Satellite
System
-
Protection -- -- ---
-
11.10.1.2

:-,.JJ .

Phasor
-
rsnaps
hot

..
Figure 7 7-7 0 Set-up of a wide area protection scheme with PMUs

The measured data is transmitted from the PMUs
to a central system protection center (SPC)
where the evaluation algorithms are running.
The PMUs are located to make the critical
area completely obser vable. Together with
network data, the information of neighboring
stations can be calculated as well. There fore,
PMUs have to be installed only at each fourth
substation in the critical area. The
communication between the PMUs and the
state calculation considering the actual grid
topology. On this base the stability status is
determined in terms of the power margin (PM)
of the critical area. Optimized stabilizing actions
are initiated accordingly.
To let the system protection center operate in
real time, it receives information in the following
form:
I
• Cyclic data: snapshot of the power
J

system protection center can be realized via system in

satellite, fibre optics or other per manent
available communication channels. Because of
the time stamped information, the snapshots
show all transients and the dynamic behavior of
the system. Figure 11-10 shows the typical
system set up.
7 7. 70.7.2 System protection
268 center
The incoming data from the PMUs must be pre-
pro cessed and arranged in a database
structure. The system model for the actual
situation is generated via
predefined time intervals (20 - 250 ms).
• Event triggered respectively
contingency driven data: containing the
update of the network topology according
to contingencies.
In order to deliver a result both in normal steady-
state aQd contingency operations the functional
structure of the system protection center has
been designed as depicted in Figure 11-11.
As long as no contingency has been detected
and the power system is in a steady state, the
power mar-

l:•t::=::=:=::::: ,-------- PM
Power
Margin
Contingency .':=!·.' ; to
Detection ::;..-. Voltage
Collapse
TVSI Transient
Voltage State
Indicator
Figure 7 7-7 7 Principle of instability monitoring
gin is calculated all the time for the snapshots of the
power system supplied with the cyclic data. The
power margin is computed by the continuation
power flow (CPF). On this model stabilizing actions
are calculated, if the available power margin is too
low.
To be prepared against the most critical contingencies
in the sense of (n-1), a cyclic pre-calculation of the
power margin and stabilizing actions is carried out.
This is performed for all contingencies in a contin
gency list for an actual power system snapshot.
Thus power margins and stabilizing actions for all
proba bly worst contingencies, which can occur in
the cur rent system's state, are already prepared.
When the calculation for the whole contingency list
is finished, the next snapshot is processed the same
way.
If a contingency occurs, either pre-calculated results
are taken or the transient voltage stability prediction
is triggered. The transient voltage stability prediction
needs no pre- processed information, therefore it
can follow any contingencies also cascaded
ones. Whereas the power margin calculation on an
actual system state and the pre-calculation is more
or less standard, the transient voltage stability
prediction is
new and utilizes the capabilities of the dynamic
system view of the wide area protection system. It
will be presented and explained in detail in the
follow ing section.
The results of the power margin and stabilizing
action calculations are displayed on a VDU. The 11.10.2
stabilizing actions can be used for automatic in a
closed-loop power restoratior procedure.
11.10.2 Voltage Instability Prediction
Voltage stability is concerned with the ability of a
power system to maintain acceptable voltages at all
buses in the system under normal conditions and
after being subjected to a disturbance. The main fac
tor causing voltage instability is the inability of the
power system to meet the demand for reactive
power. A disturbance like an unexpected branch
outage may cause a progressive and uncontrollable
decline in voltage. The static analysis allows examina
tion of a wide range of power system conditions
and
can identify the weakest lines which are the key con
tributing factors ir voltage stability analysis.
The voltage stability study may be limited to identify
areas prone to voltage instability and to obtain infor
mation regarding now system voltage stability can be
improved most Effectively. Operation near the vol
tage stability limiTs is impractical and a sufficient
power margin is needed. Practically, the idea of P-V
cuNe is used to determine the maximal MW
margin at load buses to avoid voltage collapse.
The maximum power Pm, which can be transferred is
reached if the load impedance is equally low as the
line impedance. With increasing load power the vol
tage will decline gradually until P/Pm = 1. The
effect
of decreasing vo age is to monitor the operating
point at actual status moving to the right The
opera tor is to be alerted when it passes a
threshold point and he is informed about the safety
margin leftlmtil instability will occur. Once it passes
the instability limit, load shedding is automatically
initiated.
269
To find the weakest branch the N-1 post-contingency
load flow is analyzed. After the outage of a specific
branch the bus loads are increased along with the

P = Pm, Voltage collapse
Precisely calculated instability limit
Actual status
11.10.2 Vr/Vs
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
Figure 11-72 PV Curve of a transmission line
proportional increase of bus generation to meenhe
demand.
Even if the power system is stable after a contingen
cy, a transition takes place that brings the power sys
tem to a new the stable equilibrium. Right after the
contingency, it is not possible to determine with clas
sical steady-state based stability indicators if the
system state trajectory will end in a stable equilibrium.
The elements of the power system which cause this
delay of the collapse, are under load tap changing
transformers (ULTC), reactive power limiters of power
units with temporary overload characteristic and dyna
mic loads with a load recovery characteristic after vol
tage drops. If conventional voltage stability indicators
are applied to the power system in such a transient
phase, the results are faulty or the voltage in-stability
is detected too late, because the actual load is not
the load, which is demanded seconds later. Also it
will not be detected if power units are in reactive
power overload or if ULTCs are in a stable tapping
position.
Therefore the transient voltage stability prediction has
270 been invented to assess the voltage stability correctly
after contingencies during the transient phase.
'•
l
Vs = fixed source voltage
Vr = variable load voltage
P = Power delivered to load
Pm = maximum power
0.8 1.0
P/Pm = 1.0 Maximum power
delivering capability
The idea of the method is to make a prediction from
the beginning of the transient phase into the future
until the steady- state operation point is reached. For
this steady state operation point the stability can be
determined by calculating the power margin (Figure
11-1 3). If no steady-state operation point is available
the system will run into a collapse. The presented
approach maps the actual measured system's status
right after a contingency on an expected equilibrium
point in the near future.
The advantage of the whole process is, that the sta
bility can be indicated directly after the contingency
during the transient phase. If no equilibrium can be
found, this model can be used to determine stabili
zing actions, which bring this model and
therefore the real system back to a stable operation
point The time between the early detection of an
instability, seconds after the contingency, and the
occurrence of the expected voltage collapse can be
used to take these actions. Possible actions are
load shedding, blocking of ULTC-tapping,
activation of reactive power, change of voltage
set-points of voltage con trolling devices (FACTS-
devices, ULTC, secondary vol tage control, Automatic
Generation Control (AGC) or controlled islanding.
 1.:1, t2
Network model:
0-------c=J--.,
!
E Maximal power transfer
E =v;l +ZNEltl
ZNET
Network
E =v;z
- - - -
+ZNE/n
vu, t2
Power margin 85
Proximity to
voltage collapse
!JS =SforecastMAX-l<: xlt
a Load increase
Figure 7 7- 7 3 Power margin algorithm
The algorithm for the power margin LiS calculation is
based on the network model above with the voltage
source E, the line impedance ZNrr and the load
impe dance Zapp· The maximal power transfer
capacity is reached if line and load impedance
become equal. The power margin calculation
predicts the proximity to the voltage collapse by
taking the gradient of the voltage decline caused by
the current It, at the instant t, into account and
estimates the situation at the instant t2 with the
assumed current t2 .
The algorithm has four steps. A flow chart is shown
in Figure 11-13.
1. While the ystem is running in a steady-state
situation the steady-state values of bus voltages
V0 and load powers P0 and Q0 must be traced
and contingencies as changes in the topology
must be detected.
2. The parameters of a dynamic load model,
which describe the voltage dependency of the
power, are determined. For this a sliding window
of values of voltage V and load P, Q at each bus
is evaluated. These values are the output of the
state calculation in the SPC.
...
I
Zapp
=
IZNETI IZappl
load
11.10.2
Safety Margine:
AS = aefg - abed
d g PIP m
3. The determined load parameters together with
the base loads P0, 00 and voltage V0 are fed
into a power flow calculation considering also
under
load tap changers and power margins of devices.
This power flow model represents exactly the
steady-state behavior of the completely modelled
dynamical system. The convergence of the power
flow leads to the steady state solution respectively
to the equilibrium point of the dynamic system.
This equilibrium point is the predicted state of the
system, which might be tens of seconds in the
future. If the power flow does not converge and
no equilibrium is found the transient phase will
end up with a collapse.
4. If the power flow converges the power margin
is calculated with the continuation power flow.
The system set-up traces continuously the ·state
values of the system like voltages, currents and
active and reactive power. From the current
measurement at the minimum at one end of a line,
the outage of the line is detected (Step 1). After that
a sliding win dow of measured bus voltages and
feeder loads is
collected (Step 2). 271
...

'? '?
7 7. 7 0.2. 7 Options for
guided control
actions
Examinations of the many voltage collapse
incidents worldwide generally show that the
11.10.2. disturbance prog resses in two phases. The first
2 slow phase consists of a gradual voltage
decline over a period of many minutes. If
certain actions are initiated at that time the final
situation will be much less severe.
Following detection of power system
conditions, that require corrective actions the
system protection cen ter would identify
suitable locations and options of counter
actions. The selection of adequate control
actions is based on power system conditions
and the kind of recognized contingencies.
The extensive system wide measurements
are used to optimize locations and size of
actions. Coordination of wide area protection
with conventional control and protec tion is
vital to the reliability of transmission networks.
The following typical actions would be issued
in case the power system approaches
instabilities (Fig. 11-14).
• Alerting the system operator by indication
of the remaining safety margin VS and by
providing on line guidance to counteract.
this situation. In addi tion, corresponding
information is produced as input for the
energy management system (EMS).
• Control actions can be initiated if the
safety margin VS reaches a pre-set critical
level to avoid voltage instabilities to occur,
e.g.
eAdaptation of the power factor by
compensating the lack of reactive
power by means of FACTS (Flexible
AC Transmission Systems).
• Blocking of the OLTCs (On-line
Tap Changer Controller) in
order to avoid over
compensation of the voltage.
• Generation adaptation in order to
maximize the active power output
272
from synchronous machines to
compensate the lack of reactive
power.
• Load adaptationby means of
intelligent load shedding, which
takes the actual load condition
into account.
• Controlled system separation by
islanding part of the system.
'?
I,
II
I
Provisions to enable the appropriate action
require
ments aie typically identified in the course of
analyti cal system studies, taking into account
the set of con tingencies, operation policies
and procedures as well as current power
system load, as well as network an generation
conditions. The close cooperation of wide area
protection with conventional control and
protec tion is vital to the reliability of
transmission networks.
The following provisions have to be
provided to counteract a collapsing voltage
condition:
• Implementation of static VAR
Compensation
(SVC) in areas deemed to be at risk.
• In order to maximize the reactive power
output from synchronous machines, it is
necessary to overload stator and rotor field
circuits temporarily. These possibilities can
only be applied in connec tion with
numerical generator protection relays
which provide the features for automatic
para meter adaptation.
• It may also be advantageous to reduce
generator active power output in order to
maximize reactive power levels.
• Implementation of adaptive line protection
devices on critical lines to prevent tripping
on overload.
7 7. 7 0.2.2 Control of On-Load Tap
Changers
On load tap changers when equipped with
automa tic voltage regulators (AVR) operate
progressively tap up if the primary side
voltage decreases thus accele rating the
voltage collapse. In order to prevent this,
two options are possible, but they must be
applied to all transformers with OLTCs down
to the distribution level.
• Blocking the OLCT in case a risk situation
has been identified; unblocking ensues
once the voltage recovers to an acceptable,
stable level. A centrally coordinated scheme
is feasible if adequate com munication links
are available and if numerical
 EMS 11.10.2.3
System Operator
Guidance
(Display)
1-..
AS
·
Online Post-Fault AS
Analysis
Decision
Automated corrective control options Making
Logic

Load Tap
Load
Islanding Shedding AGC Changer FACTS
Control

Controlled Load Generation Tap Changer Cos<p dS: Safety margin as proximity
System Adaptation Adaptation Blocking Adaptation to voltage collapse
Separation

Figure 7 7-7 4 Options for corrective control actions

transformer protection relays are installed which
can respond to a prioritized blocking signal from
the SPC.
• Adaptation of the AVR set point, this is more
advantageous than simple blocking as it reduces
the load.
genuine voltage collapse and a voltage depression
for other reasons, e.g. transient fault, aftermath of
clear in a total loss of voltage supply.
In comparison with conventional load shedding sche
mes numerical technology offers new solutions as
outlined in Figure 11-1 5.

Conventional load shedding schemes are static and

7 7.7 0.2.3 Load
Shedding
The most common form of protection against volta
ge instability is undeNoltage actuated load shedding.
i ' It is the final defence in avoiding voltage collapse.
'
! Highly reactive loads are shed once the voltage drops
to a predetermined level for a preset time. It has to
ad automatically in order to avoid operator delays in
case of rapid voltage collapses. Such a scheme
requir
.i es careful design as it must distinguish between a
inflexible. The algorithm for shedding loads by trip
ping the feeder circuit breakers selected is based on
an assumed load pattern, which will more or less
deviate from the actual load situation. Load shedding
is performed in accordance with a priority list of con
sumers that are selected to be disconnected from
power supply.
Intelligent load shedding schemes, however, are
much more flexible as they obtain actual measure-
273

"?
Dynamic Load Shedding
Selection Release
11.10.3.1
current per voltage feeder
and frequency (f)
Figure 1 1-7 5 Intelligent load shedding scheme
ment of all load currents from the numerical overcur
rent protection relays, which are implemented in the
feeders of the distribution network. The measure
ments of the actual busbar voltage and the power
frequency allow to determine the actual sum of loads
involved, the frequency deviation (f) and the gradient
of the frequency deviation (df/dt). This additional in
formation enables to differentiate between patterns of
priorities depending on the actual load condition (L
P) and to compute an adapted shed table, which
assures that not more consumers than needed are
disconnect to restore the equilibrium between total
load and delivered power. Apart from this, the final
release computation for the dynamic selective feeder
tripping takes also the frequency deviation and the
gradient of the frequency deviation into account.
During the load shedding operation the degree to
which load must be shed is monitored by success or
failure of the actions in order to reduce the severity of
the power system disturbances, which are caused
during its initial phase as indicated below Fig. 11-16.
In this example, the load shedding is activated after
274 the detection of a rapid frequency drop due to power
·.:
Dynamic selective
feeder tripping
according to actual loads
Transmission
network
Busbar
Distribution network
shortage. After the disconnection of the first priority
category consumers, the intelligent load shedding
scheme detects a further decline of the frequency,
which is not as rapid as the first one. In a second
attempt the second priority consumers are discon
nected and the restoration of the equilibrium bet
ween load and power is monitored until it is balanc
ed.
This procedure does not only check in a closed loop
the success of the initiated load shedding but it also
prevents the system from becoming instable as result
of a load shedding operation.
11.10.3 Interaction with SA and
SCADA systems
7 7. 7 0.3. 7 Wide area protection on
JJetwork level
The interaction of wide area protection and monito
ring application on network level with the various
protection, monitoring and control systems is shown in
block diagram (Figure 11-17).
 f (Hz)
f N

11.10.3.1
f Lim 1
f Lim 2

-t------4---..,.- --------- t (s)

p (MVV)

Second attempt:
Load is Load of priority 2 shedded
re-balanced-1'-------;-_.:;.t.a J I:::::::::::::::::::::=:==::::::::::: :.......--

'-----.--+-----------.t (s)
Figure 7 7- 7 6 Load shedding procedure

Figure 7 7-77 Interaction of WAPS with protection, monitoring and control systems

Network
Level

Station
Level

Bay
Level

Remote
Control
Bay Control Load
shedding
PMU
Ull
Generator Transformer Busbar, Line, Disturbance
Protection Station Protection Recording
275
Phasors

I

The WAPS application on network level is consisting
11.10.3.4 of three applications, that mainly collect and process
phasor measurements from certain locati()ns of the
network (Figure 11-10):
1. Phasor Evaluation: The phasors are measured
by the phasor m asurement units (PMU)
Figure
11-9 located at certain stations and sent to WAPS
directly or via the local protection centres (LPC).
The phasor evaluation is responsible for collection,
pre-treatment, storage and providing of the
phasors for further processing by other appli
cations.
2. Voltage Instability Predictor (VIP) will take
the phasors from phasor evaluation, calculate
and display the instability factor of the network
(VS) continuously (Figure 11-13). The operator
can supervise this factor and take counter steps
in order to protect the network from voltage
collapse. These operational steps can also be
taken by the system automatically (Figure 11-14).
3. Automated Control Application will define
precise actions to be taken based on the results
of the VIP (e.g. load shedding Figure 11-15).
If the system is running in operation mode
'Automatic" the Automated Control will issue the
commands, which are necessary for perfor ming
the actions and send them to related SA systems
and devices. If the system is running in operation
mode "Manual" the actions will be displayed on
the monitors and can be used as guidance for
further operation steps. The operator will then
issue the necessary commands manually. The
operation mode of the system can be selected by
the operator. This allows optimum utilisation of the
results calculated by the system and optimise the
operation of the power system.
276
7 7. 7 0.3.2 Disturbance Recording
Disturbance recording comprises fault location and
recognition of the nature of the faults, which helps to
find and fix problems faster. Fault recorders should be
installed at several locations of the network. The
disturbance files of the recorders are collected and
processed by the substation monitoring system in
order to detect faults and to locate the faulty area.
The faults and their locations are displayed on
SCADA monitors in the network control center and
an alarm is issued. The operator can take
counter measures to maintain the power supply
and can advice the line maintenance crew
immediately to remedy the fault.
7 7. 7 0.3.3
Communication
to SCADAIEMS
Since the network related applications are running on
WAPS as well as on existing EMS, both systems
should be able to exchange data via a communica
tion link. This link can be a serial line with RTU emu
lation at WAPS side that it can easily be integrated
into existing EMS, as the EMS will see the WAPS as a
RTU.
The WAPS sends the commands from the Automatic
Control Application (ACA) to EMS for execution by
the Automated Generator Control (AGC) or by other
relevant EMS applications. The network instability fac
tor (VS) can also be provided as input to the power
application software (PAS) for further processing.
Apart from this data available from EMS may be used
by the WAPS.
7 7. 7 0.3.4 Communication to_
power system monitoring
Power system monitoring ensures reliability and inte
grity of the power delivery by around-the clock
moni toring of the power system. The WAPS delivers
inva luable information about the transients a"nd the
dyna mic behavior of the network and allows the
identifi cation of weak spots in the sense of
sensitivity against voltage and frequency declines on
a conti nuous basis.
11.1 0.3.5 Communication to station ·
level

The network level WAPS should have direct commu- ·

nication links to all substation control and automation
systems as well. The main data exchange could be
the following:

• Receiving fault record files from

disturbance recording application. These
files will be used by the fault evaluation
applications.
• Receiving asset condition data (conditions
of
circuit breakers, transformers etc.) from monitoring
application. These data could be used by the
asset management applications.
• Sending command to Substation Automation
systems (e.g. load shedding, TAP changer blocking
etc.).
• Providing network information to be used
in adaptive protection.

11.10.3.6 WAPS communication

to bay level

All phasor measurements shall be transferred to the

network level WAPS. Therefore a dedicated commu
nication link has to be established to all Phasor
Measurement Units (PMU), which are located on the
bay level.

This configuration allows the acquisition and process

ing of phasors centrally, from where monitoring can
be done and actions can be issued network-
wide. Further more PMUs can be placed at the
locations over all the network and linked to system
protection center directly. Station level equipment is
not neces sary for phasor measurement and
treatment If local phasor monitoring is required at
station level, the phasor measurements can be
transferred to the local SA as well.
7 7. 7 0.3.7 Substation monitoring system
11.10.3.8
Substation monitoring systems
enable condition monitoring, which
mainly addresses the wear and
ageing caused by normal or
temporarily abnormal working
conditions. First, in that they support
the eva luation of the actual condition
of assets, and second, in that they
might explicitly support the prediction
of the further evolution of a detected
problem, and the probability of
equipment breakdown.
7 7. 7 03.8 Protection
adaptation
Application for adaptive protection monitors the ope
ration conditions of associated lines, busbars, trans
formers and generators at station level. In certain
cases, it is necessary to adapt the prevailing protec
tion scheme to new network topology. The adaptive
protection application would recognise such cases
and issue necessary instructions for adapting para
meters to the related protection devices.

The condition related data of the

monitored equip ment will be
collected from monitoring units
proces sed, displayed and forwarded
to power system moni toring
applications at network level. Asset
condition related data and
information will be transmitted to the
back-offices for engineering and
maintenance. 277
 11.11 References

[1] Piere Cholley, Peter Crossley, Vincent Van Acker, Thierry Van Cutsem, Weihu Fu, Jose Soto lndiar'iez,
11.11 Franc liar, Daniel Karlsson, Yasuhiro Kojima, James McCalley, Marian Piekutowski, Goran Rundvik
Roberto Salvati, Olof Samuelsson, Gilles Trudel, Costas Yournas, Xavier Wayrnel,
System Protection Schemes in Power Networks, Cigre Study Committee Task Force SGF 38.02.19,
Final draft v5.0 Conference lnternationale des Grandes Reseaux Electriques (Cigre), 2000
[2] Christian Rehtanz · Online Stability Assessment and Wide Area Protection based on Phasor
Measurements, Bulk Power System Dynamics and Control V, August 26-31, 2001,
Onoomichi, Japan
[3] Claudio (anizares · Voltage Stability Report, http:!/www.power.uwaterloo.ca
[4] Defence plans major disturbances, Large Systems and International Connections Study
Committee 40.01 SYSTDEP, UNIPEDE, Paris/France

278
12 Standards and Quality Definition for Substation Automation

12.1 lntrodLJ,ction 281 12

12.1.1 The meaning of standards 281 Table of
12.1.2 The limits of standards 281 content
12.1.3 The structure of standard information 281
12.1.4 Dynamics of standards 282
12.1.5 Standards for substations 282
12.1.5.1 Standards for switchgear 282
12.1.5.2 Standards for substation automation 282
12.2 Standards for switchgear 282
12.2.1 SF6 isolation gas for GIS 282
12.3 Quality 283
12.3.1 General 283
12.3.2 Reliability 283
12.3.2.1 General 283
12.3.2.2 MTIF and MTBF 283
12.3.3 System availability 283
12.3.3.1 General 283
12.3.3.2 Automatic recovery 284
12.3.3.3 Graceful degradation and error recovery/backup 284
12.3.4 Maintainability 284
12.3.5 Security and Safety 284
12.4 Electrical Engineering Standards 285
12.4.1 Basic electrical standards 285
12.4.1.1 Basic definitions 285
12.4.1.2 Electric Relays 285
12.4.1.3 Electric Insulation Standard 285
12.4.1.4 Withstand capability of inputs and outputs of devices 285
12.4.1.5 Auxiliary supply 285
12.4.2 Grounding in Substations for low frequencies 287
12.4.3 Grounding in Substations for fast transients 287
12.5 Environmental Standards 287
12.5.1 General 287
12.5.2 Switchyard Environment 287
12.5.3 Weather and Climatic Conditions 288
12.5.3.1 Temperature 288
12.5.3.2 Humidity 288
12.5.3.3 Barometric pressure 288
12.5.4 Pollution and corrosion 288
12.5.5 Mechanical and seismic 288
12.5.6 Electromagnetic emission 288
279

,
12 12.6 Substation automation system 289
Table of 12.6.1 Device Standards 289
content 12.6.2 Information technology standards 289
12.6.3 Communication standards 289
12.6.3.1 Introduction 289
12.6.3.2 Data integrity 289
12.6.3.3 General network req'-lirement 289
12.6.3.4 Protocols 290
12.6.4 Communication Protocols 290
12.6.4.1 Modern Interface Protocol 290
12.6.4.2 Communication with Network Control Center 290
12.6.4.3 Communication within the Substation 291
12.6.5 EMI immunity 291
12.6.5.1 Introduction and general approach 291
12.6.5.2 Conducted disturbances 293
12.6.5.3 Radiated electromagnetic disturbances 294
12.7 Dedicated communication beyond substation boundaries 295
12.71 Power line carrier 295
12.7.2 Tele-protection 295
12.8 Power quality 296
12.9 Data and software standards 296
12.9.1 Disturbance recorder data 296
12.9.2 Function block programming · 296
12.10 Documentation and designations 296
12.10.1 Documentation 296
12.10.2 Graphical symbols 296
12.10.3 Classifications and designations 297
12.10.4 Designation and identification 297
12.10.5 Relationship between standards 297
12.11 System and project management 298
12.11.1 Introduction 298
12.11.2 System management and development process 298
12.11.3 Project execution process 298
12.12 Verification of Standard conformance 298
12.12.1 Application criteria 298
i2.12.2 Conditions to be met 298
12.12.3 Equipment functioning 299
12.12.4 Exceptions 299
12.12.5 Test points for EMI tests 299
12.13 Project Requirements and tests 299
280 12.14 References 300

. ?
12 Standards and Quality Definition for Substation Automation
12.1 Introduction
1 2.1.1 The meaning of standards
Standards define common rules how procedures,
devices, systems, etc have to be. All people who
refer to the same standards provide their products
with the same features. Therefore, all these products
are comparable and should provide the same
minimum reliability.
Standards define some kind of minimum functiona
lity and quality of the products. They are based on
the basic requirements and needs of the application
do main of the standard.
Standards are produced today mostly by international
bodies like the International Standard Organization
(ISO) or the International Electric Commission (IEC). In
the standards itself, there are parts with strict rules,
which shall be followed and which can be verified.
Other parts are recommendations only but they may
be declared as mandatory in many specifications.
Some rules are not issued as standards as such but
represent by its common use so-called de-facto
stand ards. Local and regional standards exist by
history but their importance is fading in a global
world. If new local or regional standards appear
today, they are normally complying entirely with
the corresponding International Standard. On the
other hand, local or regional standards might be
submitted to an interna tional standardization
authority like IEC to be declared as international
standards if applicable and accept able.
Many standards have been declared by govern
mental authorities as mandatory to guarantee a com
mon quality, security and reliability level. The users or
juridical bodies may make claims if the standards
are not fulfilled. Standards protect also producers.
If a
product meets the level defined in the standard, the 12.1
producer has fulfilled his obligations. The compliance
with standards results in mutual trust of all
involved parties.
Although products like substations automation
systems may be very application specific per station,
customer, region or country, the relevant International
standards to be applied have to be part of any indi
vidual specification apart from some very basic com
monly agreed standards. Therefore, these standards
have to be referenced, they may be negotiated if
needed, and should be in any case part of the con
tract.
12.1.2 The limits of standards
Standards are very comprehensive and mandatory
for consumer products. For industrial applications like
in substations, standards may not cover all needed
performance and quality requirements as they are
required for a specific substation automation system.
Sometimes, those requirements go beyond the
International standards, or there may not even exist a
standard for a specific application domain or a dedi
cated feature. Then the missing standards have to be
substituted by "best practices'The final goal is always
that a system is running safely and reliably in its spe
cific environment and performing its specified func
tions. Therefore, standards cannot replace specifica
tions but should be integral part of them.
12.1.3 The structure of standard information
In this chapter, you will find a short introduction to
the application area per section. Relevant standards
will be listed and complemented by short
descriptions or comments if needed or helpful. As
seen from the beginning, relevant standards are
referenced all over
the book 281
12.2 Standards itself are not allowed to be published in
any book but have to be ordered from standard
organizations like IEC itself for copyright reasons. Big
companies may have a special contract giving for
their employees access to the database of the stand
ardization body and, therefore, directly to the full
text of standards.
1 2.1.4 Dynamics of standards
tem requirements and communications and refer to
system production and testing. As mentioned
above, not for all aspects and features standards
exist.
A collection of standards for substation automation
systems is found in
IEC 61850-3 Communication networks and
systems in substations - General requirements.

The goal of this book is to list the most

important International standards applicable for
Substation Auto mation Systems but this list may not
be complete as new Standards are being
created permanently. Therefore, no liability can be
taken if this list is incom plete. Reference is made
12.2 Standards for switchgear
to the versions of the Standards, which are
12.2.1 SF6 isolation gas for GIS
known at the time when this book has been
written, but standards are living and may be
The following standard defines the quality of SF6 to
updated from time to time. Therefore, if Inter
be used for GIS equipment, which may contain mois
national standards are applied, only the latest ver
ture and decomposition products that are
sions should be used.
produced by discharges (overvoltages) and arcing
(switching of circuit breakers).
12.1.5 Standards for substations ·

7 2. 7.5. 7 Standards for IEC 60376 Specification and acceptance of new

switchgear sulphur hexafluoride (SF6 )
There are many standards referring to the mechani This standard applies to new and unused sulphur
cal and electrical design of the switchgear and the hexafluoride and gives the properties and methods
switchyard environment. These standards are outside of tests that are applicable to sulphur hexafluoride if
the scope of this book as long as they have no it is supplied for use in connection with any electrical
im pact on the substation automation system. Only equipment.
some switchgear standards referenced somewhere
in this book are listed here for the sake of IEC 60480 Guide to the checf<jng of sulphur
completeness. hexafluoride (SF6 ) taken from electrical
equipment
72. 7.5.2 Standards for substation This standard gives guidance to operational and
automation maintenance personnel as to the tests reqllired to
check the condition of sulphur hexafluoride gas in
The standards applicable for substation automation electrical equipment and to enable a unified method
systems and their components cover a wide range of of analysis to be used whenever possible.
aspects from general quality to electric and electronic
design, performance issues, software quality, and en Since the topic of this book is substation automation
282 vironmental requirements. They deal also with sys- all following sections refer to it
12.3 Quality In minimum, there will be some definitions helping to set up
requirements. For some parts, there exi5t clas ses with no default
application. In theses case, the conformance to particular level of
these classes as defined in
IEC 60870-4 Telecontrol equipment and systems Part 4:
Performance requirements
12.3.1 General
Classes have to be specified by the user, stated by the producer, or
This section refers to quality requirements such as . negotiated between both parties.
reliability, availability, maintainability, security, and
others that apply to substation automation systems.
12.3.2 Reliability
12.3.2.1
General
Reliability according to IEC 60870-4 is defined as a
measure of an equipment or a system to perform
its intended function under specified conditions
for a specified period of time.
The substation shall continue to be operable,
accord ing to the "graceful degradation" principle, if
anyone SA component fails. There should be no
single point of failure that would cause the
substation to be in operable. This is a matter of
system design. The relia bility requirements shall be
met as described in the sub-clause 3.1 of IEC
60870-4. The reliability class severity (R1, R2 or
R3), as defined in 3.1.2 of IEC
60870-4, has to be agreed between the producer
and the user.
12.3.2.2 MTTF and MTBF
The Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) is a basic mea
sure of reli;bility for omponents and systems. It is
the mean time expected until the first failure of
a piece of equipment occurs. No reference is made
to any repair.
..
· ·
The Mean Iime 6_etween Eailures (MTBF) is a
basic measure of reliability for components and
systems but including the Mean Time to Repair
(MTTR). MTIR can be described as the time (often
in number of hours) that passes in average until a
faulted com ponent or system is repaired.
Therefore,
MTBF = MTIF + MTIR 12.3
MTIF, MTIR and MTBF are statistical values
indicat ing average figures, which are experienced
over a long period of time taken from large number
of units.
For electronic devices the difference between MTIR
and MTIF is normally so big, that for many
practical reasons (except availability calculation)
MTBF and MTIF can be considered as identical.
The MTIR cannot be stated by the system supplier
alone as it is not independent from a specific
sub station and the repair organization. It depends
on the accessibility of the substation, the strategic
spares available, the maintenance concept and
facilities of the owner of the substation automation
system as well as on the maintenance contracts if
applicable.
The system supplier should clearly specify the MTIF
of the equipment delivered, including the reference
to the method of calculation.
There are rules how to calculate MTIF for systems
and devices based on its individual components. If
there is seNice experience of a reasonable number of
devices installed, the MTIF can be calculated out of
the number and operating times of the installed
de vices taking the number of devices into
account, which have been returned for repair or
replacement.
There exist no International standards for MTIF
requirements in substations but they are specified in
most user specifications.
12.3.3 System availability
12.3.3.1 General
Availability of a unit or a system according to
stand
ard IEC 60870-4 is its ability to perform its
required
function at any given moment. 283
..
12.3.5 Availability is measured by the ratio of uptirn.e of the
SA to the total service time, as defined in the sub
clause 3.2 of IEC 60870-4. The uptime is the time
during that the SA is able to perform its vital func
tions. What is vital has to be defined according to the
importance of a function in the context of the sub
station and power network operation. For example, if
secondary protection exists, failures of the primary
protection are not being considered as contributing
to downtime of the SA As a second example, the fail
ure of an HMI is not considered as downtime of the
SA if an alternative point of control exists.
The availability requirements shall be as described in
the sub-clause 3.2.1 of IEC 60870-4. The availability
class severity (A1, A2 or A3), as defined in the sub
clause 3.2.2 of IEC 60870-4, has to be agreed bet
ween the producer and the user.
7 2.3.3.2 Automatic recovery
System and data backup may be provided for the SA.
Where backup is provided, a single unit failure in the
SA shall neither cause loss of data nor prevent
normal operation of the system. After repair,
switching back to the normal configuration may
require manual intervention. Critical communication
links for SA func tionality may be redundant or with
alternate routing in order to avoid system outage
due to the damage in the information transmission
infrastructure. There are no standards available but
user requirements may have to be covered by the
system design.
7 2.3.3.3 Graceful degradation
and error recovery/backup
Increasing error rates should not cause a sudden
system outage but result in graceful degradation of
functionality. There should be facilities for error re
covery to restore reliable operation of the SA
There are no standards available but user
requirements may
284 have to be covered by the system design.
12.3.4 Maintainability
Maintainability according to IEC 60870-4 is the abi
lity of the system or equipment under given condi
tions of use, after detection of a failure, to be
restor ed to full worldng order and to be
maintained during normal worldng operation.
More details see in sub-clause 3.3 of IEC 60870-4.
The maintainability requirements shall be as describ
ed in 3.3.1 of IEC 60870-4. The maintainability class
severity (M1, M2, M3 or M4), as defined in 3.3.2 of
IEC 60870-4, has to be agreed between the produ
cer and the user.
12.3.5 Security and Safety
Security according to IEC 60870-4 is defined as its
ability to avoid placing the system in a potentially
dangerous or unstable situation.
It deals with the consequences of failures, arising out
of malfunctions of the equipment, undetected infor
mation errors as well as information losses. More de
tails can be found in sub-clause 3.4 of IEC 60870-4.
In the context of industrial automation in process
industries, the term safety is used according to the
definition above while security is the ability to avoid
intrusion and disturbances from the outside world,
e.g. from hackers, intruders or air plane crashes on the
substation. Therefore in this book mostly the term
safety is used instead of security.
Safety in industrial automation as defined in
IEC 61508 Functional safety of electrical/ ·-
electronicallprogrammable electronic safety
related systems
may be used in futuere for SA systems as
well.
12.4 Electrical Engineering Standards

12.4.1 R,asic electrical standards 72.4.7.4 Withstand capability of inputs 12.4

12.4.1.1 Basic definitions
IEC 600381EC Standard Voltages
The different voltage levels found in electric power
systems are not classified in any standard as low vol
tage (LV), medium voltage (MV), high voltage
(HV), extra-high voltage (EHV), or ultra-high voltage
(UHV). To avoid too many alternative solutions and
too close voltage levels, in IEC 60038
recommended sequen ces of voltage levels are
given, but without any refe rence to any voltage
level term.
and outputs of devices
IEC 60801 Electromagnetic compatibility for
industrial-process measurement and control
equipment
This standard is often referenced but withdrawn and
being replaced mainly by the series IEC 61000 (see
below).
IEC 60870 Telecontrol equipment and systems
In this standard some specifications and requirements
are also found, but the more general reference to
electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) is given in

7 2.4. 7.2 Electrical Relays IEC 61000 Electromagnetic compatibility

In this standard series, dedicated electromagnetic

IEC 60255 Electrical relays
withstand capabilities are specified for pulses and
This standard series covers a wide range of require electromagnetic interferences.
ments but has to be complemented by IEC 60068,
IEC 60870, and IEC 61000 if applicable. These
stand ards are described elsewhere below. 7 2.4.7.5 Auxiliary supply

·
12.4.1.3 Electrical Insulation Standard

IEC 60071 Insulation coordination

Part 1 (IEC 60071-1): Definitions, principles,
and rules
Part 2 (IEC 60071-2): Application
guide
This standard specifies the procedure for the selec
tion of the withstand test voltages for the three
phase-to-earth, phase-to-phase and longitudinal iso
lation above 1 kV.

IEC 606641nsulation coordination for

equipment within low-voltage systems.
This standard specifies the clearance, creepage dis
tances and solid isolation up to 1.5 kV.
12.4.1 • connection to a power supply device,
.5.1 interposed between the power source and the
Gene equipment;
ral
• auxiliary stand-by or back-up supply, which
This section specifies the characteristics provides power for operation of the equipment in
of the power supplied to substation case of maintenance or failure of the main power
automation equipment. Stand ards like supply. 285
the following provide specifications.

IEC 60870-2 Telecontrol equipment

and systems for components - Part
2: Operating conditions
The power may
be provided by
• direct connection to the
power source;

' ?

12.4.1.5.5
286 12.4.1.5.2 Voltage range

For this section, only direct current (DC) and alternat

ing current (AC) supplies having the same general
characteristics as those exhibited by the public net
work supply at 50 Hz or 60 Hz and DC supplies are
considered.
The voltage range for DC supplies should be as
detailed in IEC 60870-2-1, table 1.
The voltage range for AC supplies should be as
detailed in IEC 60870-2-1, table 5.

12.4.1.5.3 Voltage tolerance

Values for voltage tolerance are specified in

IEC 60870-2-1 Telecontrol equipment and systems
for component - Part 2: Operating conditions -
Section 7: Power supply and electromagnetic
compatibility

The classes of voltage tolerance for AC supplies

shall be as defined in IEC 60870-2-1, table 2.
The classes of voltage tolerance for DC supplies
shall be as defined in IEC 60870-2-1, table 6.

The relevant classes have to be agreed between the

producer and the user.

Equipment operating with DC supply shall not sustain

damage if the input voltage falls below the lower
limit specified or is reversed in polarity.

12.4.1.5.4 Voltage interruptions

The performance of the substation automation

equipment shall not be affected under the condition
of an The relevant standard for AC power supply 72.4. 7.5.5. 7 AC
interruption is supplies
of the DC
supply for a IEC 61000-4-11 Electromagnetic The nominal frequency of AC supplies should be
duration of compatibility (EMC) - Part 4-7 7: Testing and with
up to 10 measurement techniques in the tolerances defined in IEC 60870-2-1, table 3.
ms. No Voltage dips, short interruptions and voltage The harmonic content of AC supplies should be with
damage varia tions on AC input power port immunity in the tolerances defined in IEC 60870-2-1, table 4.
shall be tests re questing no affe'ction of voltage dips of
caused to .'\U 30 % for 72.4. 7.5.5.2 DC supplies
the 1 period and .'\U 60 %for 50 periods and of
equipment The earthing arrangements for DC supplies should be
voltage interruptions of .'\U 100 %for 5 periods and
by supply as defined in IEC 60870-2-1. table 7.
.'\U 100% for 50 periods.
interruptions
Ripple voltage (as defined in 4.3.3 of IEC 60870-2-1)
of any The relevant standard for DC power supply
should be within the tolerances defined in standard
duration, is
IEC 60870-2-1, table 8.
nor shall
IEC 61000-4-29 Electromagnetic
the
compatibility (EMC) - Part 4-29: Testing and 7 2.4. 7 .5.5.3 Ripple on DC
equipment
measurement techniques supplies
respond to
an Voltage dips, short interruptions and voltage Ripples on DC power supplies may impact
interruption varia tions on DC input power port immunity electronics and shall be, therefore, limited. to 10 %
in a tests reque sting no affection of voltage dips of Un according to
manner .'\U 30% for 0.1 s and .'\U 60 %for 0.1 s and of IEC 61000-4-17 Electromagnetic compatibility
that could voltage interruptions of (EMC) - Part 4-7 7: Testing and measurement
cause .'\U 1 00 % for 0.05 techniques - Ripple on DV input power port
danger to s. immunity test.
other
equip ment 12.4.1.5.5 Voltage
or quality
personnel.

12.4.2 Grounding in Substations for low
frequencies
Any substation has to have an earthing grid to cope·
with the high currents, which may flow in case of
earth faults. The design of the grid has to provide a
reliable grounding for normal operating conditions at
nominal frequency (50/60 Hz), in order to limitran
sient ground potential rises and to prevent danger for
people and damage to equipment. There are diffe
rent standards, i.e.
IEC 60621-2 Electrical installations for outdoor
sites under heavy-duty conditions (including open
cast-mines and quarries). Part 2: General
protection requirements
IEEE Std 80-1986 IEEE Guide for Safety in
AC Substation Earthing
12.4.3 Grounding in Substations
for fast transients
Lightning and switching surges produce fast tran
sients, i.e. high frequency traveling waves of currents
and/or voltages up to 50 GHz along wires. Normally,
they do not harm people and heavy equipment but
any kind of electronics. Additionally, such surges pro
duce also radiated disturbances. Both require a pro
per high frequency earthing and shielding. Standards
describing these requirements are mentioned in the
following.
IEC 60801 Electromagnetic compat1b!lity for indus
trial-process measurement and control equipment
This standard is withdrawn but being replaced
mainly by series IEC 61000 (below). Therefore, the
following two standards or standard series are valid,
i.e.
IEC 60870-2-1-Tefecontrol equipment and
systems for components - Part 2: Operating
conditions - Section 1: Power supply and
electro magnetic compatibility
IEC 61000 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)
... ...
12.5 Environmental Standards
12.5.1 General 12.5
This section refers to the climatic, mechanical, and
electrical influences that apply to the substation auto
mation system. It contains a number of references to
IEC normative documents but with frequent refer
ence to
IEC 60694 Common specifications for high-voltage
switchgear and control gear standards
and
IEC 60870-2-2 Telecontrol equipment and systems
for components - Part 2: Operating conditions -
Section 2: Environmental conditions (climatic,
mechanical and other non-electrical influences)
These standards list a number of classes for environ
mental climatic conditions, and each class provides
severity levels (or set of levels) for the various envi
ronmental climatic parameters. The equipment resi
dent in the substation is expected to meet virtually
the complete range of environmental classes. Process
level equipment is often installed in outdoor locations,
the bay level equipment in outdoor or sheltered
loca
tions, and the station level equipment in sheltered
or
indoor locations.
Where applicable, the classification and severity level
of environmental climatic conditions as defined in
IEC 60870-2-2, which are acceptable by the sub
station automation system, shall be stated by the
supplier. Where equipment forms an integral part of
high voltage switchgear and control gear (e.g. com
ponents of the process bus), IEC 60694 shall apply.
The user shall take care of the local environmental
conditions.
12.5.2 Switchyard Environment
IEC 60068 Environmental testing
This standard defines in many parts any kind of
envi
ronmental testing concerning heat, moisture, radi- 287
...
 ...
· r
 ation, vibration, acceleration, salt mist temperature, 12.5.4 Pollution and corrosion
damp, heat, shock, bump, etc
I i
The following standard is applicable as a guideline to
IEC 60721 Environmental classification take care of corrosive and erosive influences.
This standard series defines environmental parame- IEC 60654-4 Operating conditions for industrial- II :
ters and a limited number of their severities within process measurement and control equipment -
12.5.6
the range of conditions to be met by electro-technical Part 4: Corrosive and erosive influences.
products, when they are transported, stored, installed
and used. Particular attention has to be taken to the effect of
solid substances (e.g. sand, dust) since they may also
affect the thermal behavior of the substation auto-
12.5.3 Weather and Climatic Conditions mation equipment. Corrosive influences (e.g. salt) are
important as they may affect in short-term the con-
12.5.3.1 Temperature ductivity and/or isolation capacity of the equipment
and in long-term they may destroy contacts, electro-
The substation automation equipment shall operate nics and metallic structures.
satisfactorily over an air temperature range as recom-
mended in IEC 60870-2-2, table 1. Where equipment forms an integral part with high
I
voltage switchgear and control gear, clause 2 of I

i
I.

During storage and transportation the substation auto- IEC 60694 shall apply.
mation equipment shall be able to withstand an air
temperature range as recommended in standard
IEC 60870-2-2, table 2. 12.5.5 Mechanical and seismic
Note that air temperature is as defined in sub-clause Mechanical and seismic qualification of substation
3.3.1 of IEC 60870-2-2. automation equipment shall conform to national and
international standards according to its location and
Where equipment forms an integral part of high vol- service. Where applicable, the classification of tole-
tage switchgear and control gear, clause 2 of stand- rable mechanical conditions and seismic stress shall
ard IEC 60694 shall apply. be stated by the producer, as defined in clause 4 of
IEC 60870-2-2.
12.5.3.2 Humidity
The local requirements have to be provided by the
user.
The communications equipment shall operate satis-
factorily with a relative humidity as recommended in Where equipment forms an integral part of high vol-
IEC 60870-2-2, table 1. tage switchgear and control gear, clause 2 of stand- I

Where equipment forms an integral part of high val- ard IEC 60694 shall apply. I
tage switchgear and control gear, clause 2 of
stand-
ard IEC 60694 shall apply. 12.5.6 Electromagnetic emission

Substation automation equipment may also be the

12.5.3.3 Barometric pressure source of various kinds of electromagnetic disturban-
The substation automation equipment shall operate ces in a wide frequency range, that may be conduct-
satisfactorily between air pressures as recommended ed through power supply lines, control lines or direct-
in sub-clause 3.3.2 of IEC 60870-2-2. ly radiated by the equipment. The substation auto-
mation equipment shall meet the requirements of
Where equipment forms an integral part of high val- CISPR 22 classes A and B (EN 5022A and EN 50228) I
tage switchgear and control gear, clause 2 of stand- or FCC rules part 15 for class A and B digital devices
288 ard IEC 60694 shall apply. (USA). Requirements are found in the standards

CISPR 22 Information technology equipment -
Radio disturbances characteristics - Limits and
methods of measurement
and in the federal rules (US)
FCC rules part 15 Radio frequency devices
and in the standard series
IEC 61000 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)
12.6 Substation automation system
12.6.1 Device Standards
Substation automation systems comprise
intelligent electronic devices (lED). These IEDs have to
fulfill a lot of the standards mentioned already
above. In addi tion, the devices have to fulfill also
the following standards as far as applicable.
12.6.2 Information technology standards
Since there are more and more devices in substations
that perform information technology tasks, especially
also in the area of communication, the following
equipment standard series may be applicable.
IEC 60950 Information technology equipment
safety
12.6.3 Communication standards
7 2.6.3. 7 Introduction
Communication is the backbone of any substation
automation system. Therefore, it has to fulfil a lot of
strong reliability requirements. Since it connects all
devices of the system it has to fulfil also standards,
which allow a mutual communication (protocols).
7 2.6.3.2 Data integrity
The SAS communication system shall deliver timely
and reliable data under the stress of transmission and
procedural errors, varying delivery delays, and equip
ment failures in the communication facilities. It thus 12.6
must provide
• detection of transmission errors in the
harsh substation environment;
• recovery from link congestion;
• optionally provide support for link
media and equipment redundancy.
The integrity and consistency of the data delivered by
the SAS shall be as defined for integrity classes 11, 12
and 13 (sub-clause 3.5 of IEC 60870-4). The use of a
specific integrity class shall be determined by the
application that uses the delivered data.
7 2.6.3.3 General network requirements
12.6.3.3.1 Geographic requirements
The communication network within the substation
should be capable of covering distances up to 2 km
as stated in
IEC 61850-5 Communication networks and
systems in substations - Part 5: Communication
Requirements for Functions and Device Models
12.6.3.3.2 Numbers of devices
The communication network within the substation
should be capable of seNing all typical bay configu
rations in a high voltage switchyard, including sys
tems with 1112 circuit breaker arrangements and ring
busbars. More details on substation configuration see
in
IEC 61850-1 Communication networks and
systems in substations - Part 7: Introduction and
Overview
IEC 61850-5 Communication networks and
systems in substations - Part 5: Communication
Requirements for Functions and Device Models 289

12.6.4 7 2.6.3.4 Protocols
There are a lot of private and standardized commu
nication protocols. Therefore, a dedicated section is
allocated to the protocol standards.
12.6.4 Communication Protocols
72.6.4. 7 Modem Interface Protocol
EIA 232 E Interface between data terminal
equipment and data circuit-terminating equipment
employing serial binary data exchange
This is the actual version of the well-known RS232C
connector. It specifies signal voltage, signal timing,
signal function, a protocol for information exchange,
and a mechanical connector. It is intended for short
distances up to 15 m and the communication is du
plex or half-duplex.
ElA 485 Electrical characteristics of generators
and receivers for use in balanced digital
multipoint systems
This is the actual version of the well-known RS485
connector. It specifies signal voltage, signal timing,
signal function, a protocol for information exchange,
and a mechanical connector. It is intended as serial
link (point-to-point-duplex) for long distances up to
several km or as bus (half-duplex).
Further to the interface standards above there exist
also interface standards from ITU (CCITT), which con
cern different aspects like functional characteristic or
electrical characteristic separately, however mostly the
packaging in the RS standards are used. As an
exam ple the RS232C is identical to ITU V24
(functional)
+ ITU V28 (electrical) + ISO 2110 (mechanical).
The protocol standards from ITU like X25 are very
sel dom found in the area of substation automation,
and their usage outside the substation is more and
more replaced by TCP/IP. Therefore they are not
mentioned
290 further.
IEC 61970 Energy management system
applications programming interface
7 2.6.4.3 Communication within
This standard defines the ammon lnformation the
Model (CIM) and is intended to be used for model Substation
ing network information in the Energy Management
System (EMS). The users' request for seamless com 12.6.4.3.1 Proprietary protocols or
mu:lication between this system and the substations
requires some compatibility between modeling in
IEC 61850 and CIM. The feasibility of such compati • SPA
bility was proven already. (ABB)
72.6.4.2 Communication with Network
Control Centers
12.6.4.2.1 Proprietary protocols
• RP570/571 (ABB)
• lndactic 33/35 (ABB)
• 8fW (Siemens)
• DNP3.0 (GE-Harris, DNP User group)
• WISP (GE)
• Modbus (different users especially in the
power plant area)
• etc
Definitions are found in the literature or have to be
asked for from the suppliers or user groups.
12.6.4.2.2 Standard protocols (IEC)
IEC 60870-5-101 Te/econtrol equipment and
systems for components - Part 5: Companion
standards - Section 707: Companion
standard for basic tete-control tasks
This protocol is on dedicated communication lines
between Substation Automation Systems or RTUs
and Network Control Centers.
IEC 60870-5-104 Te/econtrol equipment and
systems for components - Part 5: Companion
standards - Section 7 04: Transmission protocols -
Network access for /EC 60870-5-101 using
standard transport profiles.
This protocol allows to transfer data according to
standard IEC 60870-5-101 over a communication
network
IEC 60870-6 Te/econtrol equipment and systems
for components - Part 6 (TAS£2) lntercenter
protocol
This protocol is intended for communication between
network control centers. Therefore, it is often called
ICCP Qnter enter ommunication Qrotocol)_ It is used
in some few cases for substation-Nee links also.
IEC 61850 Communication networks and systems
in substations
This protocol developed for communication in sub
stations may be used for substation-NCC links as well.
•
L
O
N
(
b
proprietary used standards u
i
l
d
i
n
 g automation protocol; used in substations
by ABB in a dedicated way)
• MVB (railway traction protocol; used in
substations by ABB)
• Profibus (automation protocol; used
in substations by Siemens)
• DNP3.0 (remote control protocol; used
in substations GE-Harris, DNP User
group)
• UCA.2 (utility communication
architecture by EPRI/IEEE used in
substations also)
•IEC 60870-5-101/104 (remote control
protocol; used in substations by SAT)
Definitions are found in the literature or have to be
asked from the suppliers or user groups. The MVB
used by ABB in Substation Automation is an IEC
Standard from the area of traction (trains), i.e.
IEC 61375-1 Electric railway equipment- Train
bus
- Part 7: Train communication network
12.6.4.3.2 Standard protocols (IEC)
The informative interface for protection devices in
substations is defined by
IEC 60870-5-103 Te!econtrol equipment and
systems for components - Part 5: Transmission
...
....
Protocols - Section 7 03: Communication
Standards for Substations, Companion Standard
for the Informative Interface of Protection
Equipment.
Some companies are using this standard against its
original purpose not only for protection information 12.6.5
but also for control and have added private exten
sions to the standard. The comprehensive standard
for communication in substations is the standard
series
IEC 61850 Communication networks and
systems in substations
This is the standard for all communication tasks with
in the substation, i.e. for control,.protection, monito
ring, etc Also new protection devices are offering
preferentially the more powerfuiiEC 61850 instead
of IEC 60870-5-103.
This standard series is much more than a communi
cation protocol only. Therefore, it is described in a
separate chapter (Chapter 13).
12.6.4.3.3 Proprietary protocols
For communication with third party IEDs having pro
prietary protocols, protocol conversion is needed. This
conversion is outside the scope of any standard but
needs the information about both involved stand
ards.
12.6.5 EMI immunity
7 2.6.5. 7 Introduction and general
approach
Substation automation equipment shall be designed
and tested to withstand the various types of induced
conducted and radiated electromagnetic disturban
ces that occur in substations.
Sources for disturbances are, for example:
• lightning and switching
surges,
• discharges and strokes in gaseous isolation
media, like the common SF6, producing fast
291
transients,
• traveling waves in GIS, producing fast
transients.
....
r
 Referenced Standard IEC 61000 levels according to IEC TS 61000-6-5

Signal Ports DC l/0 Power Ports AC l/0 Power Ports

Connections Connections to HV MV HV MV HV
in field equipment and telecom Substation Substation Substation Substation
IEC 61000-4-4 4 X 3 4 3 4
12.6.5 Fast Transient4 2 kV 4 kV 2 kV 3 kV 2 kV 3 kV

IEC 61000-4-5 2 3 2 2 2 2
Surges 1.2/50(s (a) 1 kV 2 kV 1 kV 1 kV 1 kV 1 kV
Line to line 3 I
4 3 3 3 3
Line to ground 2 kV 4 kV 2 kV 2 kV 2 kV 2 kV

IEC 61000-4-6 3 3 3 3 3 3
Conducted disturbances 10V 10V 10V 10 v 10V 10 v
induced by RF3

IEC 61000-4-12
2 3 2 3 2 3
Damped Oscillatory 1 kV
0.5 kV 1 kV 0.5 kV 1 kV 0.5 kV
differential (b) 2.5 kV
1 kV 2.5 kV 1 kV 2.5 kV 1 kV
common (b)

4 33 4
IEC 61000-4-16
30V 4 10V 30V
Conducted common mode Not defined
Cont. 30V Cont. Cont. Cont.
disturbances
300V 300 V for 1 s 100 v 300V
0 Hz to 150 Hz4
for 1 s for 1 s for 1 s

(a) For connections to telecom network or remote equipment, also surge waveform 10/700 (s with a 4 kV peak shall be
tested, (b) Test frequency 1 MHz. For GIS, higher frequencies have to be considered. Experience: at least up to 50 Ghz.
Table 12-1 Levels of EM/ immunity to be tested for ports of devices in substations

Equipment installed in

Referenced MV Substation HV Substation Remarks

Standard
Level Test value Level Test value

2 3 Aim 2 3 Aim Applicable only to CRT monitors

IEC 61000-4-8 continuous continuous according to clause B.2 of CISPR 24
Power frequency magnetic 100 Aim 100 Aim
field continuous Applicable only to apparatus containing
continuous
5 5 devices susceptible to magnetic fields,
1000 Aim 1000 Aim
e.g. magnetic field sensors
for 1 s for 1 s
IEC 61000-4-3 Radiated This level normally allows the use of
electromagnetic filed 10V/m 10 V/m portable radiating equipment at 1 m to
3 . .. 3
80 iviHz- 3000 MHz310 2m distance from installed equipment

IEC 61000-4-2 Higher test values shall be adopted

6 kV conact 6 kV conact
Electrostatic discharge 3 to equipment installed in a severe
8 kV air 3 8 kVair
electrostatic environment

292 Table 12-2 Levels of EM/ immunity of devices against radiation and discharges in substations
The general immunity requirements for industrial
environment are considered not sufficient for sub
stations. Therefore, dedicated requirements are defin
ed in
IEC TS 61000-6-5 Electromagnetic interference
(EMC) - Part 6: - Generic standards -Section 5:
Immunity of power station and substation environ
ment
The contents of this Technical Specification (TS) will
remain unchanged until 2005. At this date, this TS
will be transformed either to an International
Standard, or reconfirmed, or withdrawn, or replaced
by a revised edition, or amended.
There are differences in requirements between medi um voltage
(MV) substations and high voltage (HV) substations (AIS and
GIS). The term HV is taken for voltages of 36.5 kV or above,
MV for all voltages below. A different limit between HV and MV
can be agreed upon between the utility and the manufactu rer
influencing the EMC test level to be used for the SA equipment.
Special mitigation measures on site may create a "protected
environment" and reduce the immunity requirements. This may
include shielded cables pro perly grounded and fiber optical links.
The use of any kind of such measures has to be included in the
pro duct specification. In this case, all proofing tests shall be made
with these measures.
Details of these requirements and testing procedures
are given in other parts of the series
IEC 61000 Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC)
The most important cases and documents are refer
enced below. Very often, different test levels are de
fined in these test standards. Dedicated level refer
ences according to IEC TS 61000-6-5 are made if
applicable. The conformity to the standards has to be
proven by type tests. Criteria for acceptance are
sum marized in 12.12. The levels for ports are
summarized in Table 12-1.
The requirements for device enclosures regarding
radiated disturbances are summarized in Table 12-2.
r ·
72.6.5.2 Conducted disturbances 12.6.5.2
12.6.5.2.1 Induced disturbances
Radio frequency fields may induce disturbances that
are conducted by wires in the substation. The equip
ment shall meet either the standard
IEC 61000-4-6 Electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC)- Part 4-6: Testing and measurement
techniques - Immunity to conducted disturbances,
induced by radio-frequency fields
or
IEEE (37.90.2-1988 Trial-Use standard withstand
capability (SWC) tests for Protective relays and
Relay systems
12.6.5.2.2 Surges
Levels of surges to be withstand are specified in
IEC 61000-4-5 Electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC)- Part 4-5: Testing and measurement
techniques - Surge immunity.
12.6.5.2.3 Oscillatory waves
Damped oscillatory waves shall be tested with
lMHz according to
IEC 61000-4-12 Electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC) - Part 4-7 2: Testing and measurement
techniques - Oscillatory waves immunity test
12.6.5.2.4 Common mode disturbances
For common mode disturbances, of the folloyYing
standard is valid
IEC 61000-4-16 Electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC) - Part 4-7 6: Testing and measurement tech
niques - Test for immunity to conducted, common
mode disturbances in the frequency range 0 Hz
to 750kHz 293
'?
 12.6.5.2.5 Fast transients
For fast transients and bursts, in HV substations gene
2.6.5,.3 rally class 4 with 4 kV and a repetition rate of 2.5 kHz
is requested according to
IEC 61000-4-4 Electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC)- Part 4: Testing and measurement tech
niques - Section 4: Electrical fast transient/burst
immunity test.
7 2.6.5.3 Radiated electromagnetic
disturbances
The equipment shall meet either level 3 (1 0 V/m) of
IEC 61000-4-3 Electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC)-Part 4-3: Testing and measurement techni
ques - Radiated, radio-frequency, electromagnetic
field immunity test
or
IEEE (37.90.2-1988 Trial-Use standard withstand
capability (SWC) tests for Protective relays and
Relay systems
Regarding radiated, radio frequency, electromagnetic
fields. The specific requirements (IEC standard or IEEE
standard) shall be agreed between manufacturer and
user. Criteria for acceptance are summarized in 12.12.
12.6.5.3.1 Power frequency disturbances
Communications equipment may be subjected to va
rious kinds of electromagnetic disturbances induced
by power supply lines, signal lines or directly radiated
by the environment The types and levels of distur
bances depend on the particular conditions in which
the communication equipment has to operate.
Reference should be made to level 4 (30 V conti
nuous and 300 V for 1 s) of
IEC 61000-4-16 Electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC)- Part 4-16: Testing and measurement tech
niques - Test for immunity to conducted, common
mode disturbances in the frequency range 0 Hz
to 750kHz
For magnetic fields also to the following two stand
ards are applicable.
IEC 61000-4-8 Electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC) - Part 4-8: Testing and measurement
techniques - Power frequency magnetic field
immunity test
This standard is applicable also for CRT monitors
according to clause 8.2 of
CISPR 24 (EN 55024) Information technology
equipment - Immunity characteristics - Limits and
methods of measurements
The magnetic field requirements cited above are
complemented by
IEC 61000-4-10 Electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC) - Part 4-10: Testing and measurement
techniques - Damped oscillatory magnetic field
immunity test
In addition to these tests, it is known that to a certain
degree induced power frequency voltage will occur
on all copper circuits inside the substation, especially
caused by primary fault currents that are flowing in
and around the substation. This common mode
effect, resulting from magnetic flux linkages, causes
almost equal voltages being induced in each of the
cable cores.
With the introduction of serial data communications,
injected current tests on the cable circuits are requir
ed to ensure that the equipment is capable of with
standing typical induced voltages without interfering
with its correct operation. The substation equ1pment
shall operate correctly in the presence of a power fre
quency voltage in accordance with Table 12-3.
The induced transverse voltages at power system fre
quency are benchmark values for a substation en
vironment. and represent acceptable operating with
stand levels for equipment design.
The equipment should be tested using an injection
network to combine the required communications
signals with a povvgrJsequency interference signal.
With the interference suitably injected, the magnitude
of the communications signal levels should be reduc
ed to the receive level claimed by the manufacturer
and correct operation of the communications equip
ment should be maintained.
'.
 Unbalanced Balanced Balanced 12.7
Length of
Class communications communications communications communications
circuit [m] (V] (1% unbalance) [V] {0.1 % unbalance) (V]
1 1 to 10 0,5 0,005 0,0005
2 10 to 100 5 0,05 0,005
3 100 to 1000 50* 0,5 0,05
4 Greater than 1000 500* 5 0,5

*) The unbalanced class of communications circuit covers such cases as RS232. For practical reasons, such communica
tions systems are considered to be run over very short distances within the substation or to link equipment to intelligent
test equipment such as portable computers. It is not proposed that they be practical for substation applications
covering distances above 20 m. Standard balanced circuits are of the class associated with PTO circuits where up to
500 V of common mode voltage is balanced to within 1%. In addition, techniques such as transformer coupling can
achieve impedance balancing to within 0,1%.

Table 12-3 Power frequency voltage classes

12.6.5.3.2 Electrostatic discharges
Handling with sensitive electronics implies always the
risk of electrostatic discharges, which may result in
mal-functions of the lED of in destruction of electro
nic components. The risk is increasing with decreas-
ing air moisture level. The related standard is ·
IEC 61000-4-2 Electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC)- Part 4-2: Testing and measurement
techniques - Electrostatic discharge immunity test
12.7 Dedicated communication
beyond substation boundaries
12.7.1 Power line carrier
Apart from modern wide-band communication net
works, the narrow-band Qower jine 93rrier (PLC)
systems must not be neglected yet since PLC systems
provide economical communication links over long
distances, e.g. for very long HV overhead lines of
more
12.8 Power quality
12.10 At least in deregulated markets, power quality is a
negotiable issue between power suppliers and con
sumers. Power quality may be based on a lot of fac
tors, where frequency deviations, harmonics and
reactive power content belong to the well-known
and accepted ones. New measurement technologies
offer a lot of additional figures about the power qua
than 1000 km without the need of any repeater, and
electronic PLC systems have increased the band width
up to 64 kBit/s.
The relevant standards are
IEC 60353 Line traps for a.c. power systems
IEC 60481 Coupling devices for power
line carrier systems
IEC 60495 Single sideband power line carrier
terminals
IEC 60663 Planning of (single-sideband) power
line carrier systems
1 2.7.2 Tele-protection
Tele-protection allows to block or activate remote
protection actions, e.g. on the other side of a long
line. Therefore, it applies also for modern micro
processor based distance relays.
IEC 60834 Tete-protection equipment of power
systems - performance and testing (series). 295
lity but there is not a general
agreement what total power quality
really means. Therefore, the mentioned
standards (mainly about harmonics) are
only the first steps toward a general
power quality standard.
IEEE 519:19921EEE Recommended
Practices and Requirements for
Harmonic Control in Electrical
Power Systems
IEEE 1459:2000 IEEE Trial Use
Standard Definitions for the
 Measurement of Electric Power Quantities Under
Sinusoidal, Nonsinusoidal, Balanced or Un balanced
Conditions
IEC 61000-4-7 Electromagnetic compatibility
(EMC) - Part 4: Testing and measurement techni
ques - Section 7: General guide on harmonics and
interharmonics measurements and instrumen- ·
tation for power supply systems and equipment
connected thereto.
12.9 Data and software
standards
12.9.1 Disturbance recorder data
A standard storage format of disturbance recorder
data (COMTRADE format) is defined in the following
two related (i.e. identical) standards:
296
IEC 60255-24 Electric relays- Part 24: Common
format for transient data exchange (COMTRADE)
for power systems
IEEE Std C37.111-19991EEE Standard common
format for transient data exchange
12.9.2 Function block programming
Basically, functions in substation automation may be
programmed nearly in any programming language. It
is very convenient for the user to program not by
coding lines but to use high-level functions blocks
("function block language") as used by program
mable controllers. The related standard series is
IEC 61131 Programmable controllers
1 2.1 0 Documentation and
designations
12.1 0.1 Documentation
IEC 61082 Preparation of documents used in
the electro-technology
This basic document describes how to compose
documents used in the electro-technology and is,
therefore, also applicable for the domain of sub
stations.
IEC 61355 Classification and designation of
documents for plants, systems and equipment
This standard series is applicable to the classification
of documents for substation and substation automa
tion systems also.
12.1 0.2 Graphical symbols
Symbols for electrical diagrams, also especially for
protection devices/functions are defined in
IEC 60617 Graphical symbols for diagrams
Parts 2 to 11 are available by IEC in database form.
12.10.3 Classifications and designations
IEC 60750 Item designation in Electro-Technology

(Standard withdrawn and replaced by IEC 61346)

The following commonly used DIN standards are
based on the IEC standard above and give some
more details:
DIN 40719 T1 Schaltungsunterlagen:
Begriffe, Einleitung
DIN 40719 T1 Schaltungsunterlagen:
Kennzeichung von Betriebsmitteln
This standard series provides also the designat:on for
switchgear, e.g. the well-known Q-numbering for
switches. These standards are now being replaced by
IEC 61346-1 Industrial systems, installations and
equipment and industrial products- Structuring
principles and reference designations - Basic rules
IEC 61346-2 Industrial systems, installations and
equipment and industrial products - Structuring
principles and reference designations - Classification
of objects and codes for classes
12.10.4 Designation and identification 12.10.
More definitions for use in documentation are defin
ed in
IEC 60445 Basic and safety principles for man
machine interface, marking and identification -
Identification of equipment terminals and of
terminations of certain designated conductors,
including general rules for an alphanumeric
system
IEC 61175 Designations for signals and
connections
IEC 616661ndustrial systems, installations and
equipment and industrial products -
Identification of terminals within a system

The German version now replacing DIN 40719 is 12.10.5 Relationship between standards
DIN EN 61346-1 lndustrielle Systeme, Anlagen
-Plant objects (e.g.bay)
und Ausrustungen und lndustrieprodukte - -Designation of object

e.g. Drawings
Strukturierungsprinzipien und Referenzkenn
zeichnung - Teil 7: Allgemeine Regeln
Symbols
DIN EN 61346-2 lndustrielle Systeme, Anlagen For diagrams
und Ausrustungen und lndustrieprodukte - Struk
turierungsprinzipien und Referenzkennzeichnung -
Teil2: Klassifizierung von Objekten und Kodierung
von Klassen
Set of
documents
The standard Data exchange 'II\

between objects Object oriented

IEEE Std C37.2-1996 Electrical power system structuring of
device function number and contact documents

designation

provides the device functions numbers as issued by

IEEE especially for protection. The equivalent IEC
graph ical symbols are found in IEC 60617
mentioned above.
Figure 72-1 Relationship between standards for
designation and documentation, as used by
Project management and Engineering Tools
(example System and project management 297
 1 2.11 System and project
management
12.12 12.11.1 Introduction
No standards but requirements for the complete area
of system and project management are found in
IEC61850-4 Communication networks and systems
in substations - system and project management
1 2.11.2 System management and
development process
System management and development are business
processes addressed also by ISO 9000 (9001, 9002,
9003) series with its three quality assurance models
(see below). They are used to certify the quality stand-
ard of organizations. The type of certification to be
used depends on the kind of business. The appli-
cable standard for the substation automation busi-
ness is ISO 9001. Regarding the software develop-
ment process dominating today's development the
following standard applies:
ISO 9000-3 Quality Management and Quality
Assurance Standards- Part 3: Guidelines for the
Application of ISO 900 7 to the Development
Supply, and Maintenance of Software
12.11.3 Project execution process
Project execution contains project management,
design and engineering, and production and testing.
No dedicated standards exist for the substation auto-
mation execution process. For project requirements
see chapter 12.13 below.
General standards addressing the business processes
are the ISO 9000 (9001, 9002, 9003) series with its
three quality assurance models. They are used to cer-
298 tify the quality standard of organizations. The type of
certification to be used depends on the kind of
busi- ness. The applicable standard for the substation
auto-
mation business is ISO 9001.
ISO 9000:2000 Quality management systems -
Fundamentals and vocabulary
ISO 9001:2000 Quality management systems -
Requirements
ISO 9001 sets out the requirements for an organiza-
tion whose business processes range all the way
from design and development, to production, instal-
lation and service.
ISO 10001:1997 Quality management systems -
Guidelines to quality in project management
An additional quality assurance is the certification of
project managers by an internationally accepted
organization like IPMA Qnternational _Eroject Mana-
gernent sociation) or PMI (..Eroject Management
)nstitution).
12.12 Verification of standard
conformance
1 2.12.1 Application criteria
The criteria listed shall apply to the equipment being
directly tested, and any device linked to the equip-
ment via direct or remote connections. Examples of
connections are current loops and voltage circuits (DC,
audio, carrier or microwave). Serial, parallel, optical
fiber and radio frequency connections are included.
12.12.2 Conditions to be met
The equipment shall be considered to have passed
the tests if - during, or as a result of, the tests - all of
the following conditions are met for the equipment
and the connected devices:
•·
• no malfunction occurs;
• no hardware damage
occurs;
• no change in calibration beyond normal
tolerance is caused by the test;
• no loss or corruption of stored memory or
data occurs, including active or stored settings;
• system resets do not occur, and manual resetting
is not required;
• established communications are not permanently
lost;
• if disrupted, established communications automa
tically recovers within an acceptable time period;
• communication errors, if they occur, do not
jeopardize the protective or control functions;
• no changes in the states of the electrical,
mecha nical, or communication signal outputs
occur. This includes alarms and status outputs;
• no erroneous, permanent change of state of
the visual, audible, or message outputs occurs.
Momentary changes in these outputs during the
tests are permitted;
• no error outside the normal tolerances for data
communication signals (SCADA analogues) occurs.
12.12.3 Equipment functioning
During and after the tests, the equipment and the
connected devices shall bE! completely and accurate
ly functional as designed, unless otherwise stated by
the manufacturer.
12.12.4 Exceptions
Exceptions to the acceptance criteria pertinent to the
equipment shall be stated in the manufacturer's
spe cifications for the equipment.
12.12.5 Test points for EMI tests 12.13
Tests shall be included for:
• power supply inputs to each device;
• alarm and auxiliary 1/0 connections;
• permanently connected substation computers;
• keying and output connections between
bay equipment and telecommunications
interface equipment;
• all metallic connections to any Ethernet hub,
including power supply inputs, alarms, and ports
utilizing balanced twisted pair inputs;
• stimulus and response;
• response depending on background
load.
Items excluded from testing in most conventional test
are
• non-metallic connections, such as fiber;
• temporary connected maintenance computers;
• connections that, as stated by the manufacturer,
must be less than 2 m in length.
But these items shall be properly tested in a compre
hensive test of a Substation Automation System also.
12.13 Project Requirements
and tests
Standards are part of any specification. But the--sub
station automation system to be delivered has to ful
fil all features specified in addition. These specifica
tions are verified in the factory 6cceptance est (FAT)
and in the ite 6cceptance Iest (SAT) according test
plans agreed between the supplier and customer
(see chapter 21 of this book). 299
 1:
(

1
!
1 2.14 References

12.14 [1) Switchgear Manual,@ ABB Calor Emag Schaltanlagen Mannheim, 10th revised edition,
Cornelsen Verlag, Berlin, 2001
[2)1nternational Electricity Cornrnission (IEC): wv\lw.iecch
[3) Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE): wvwv.ieee.org
[4) Deutsches lnstitut fUr Normung (DIN): wvwv.din.de
[5) International Standard Organization (ISO): wvwv.iso.org

300

-
 13 The System Standard IEC 61850 for Substation Automation

13.1 IEC 61850 for interoperability in substations 302 13

13.2 lnteroperability and open systems 302 Table of
13.3 IEC 61850 as system standard for substations 303 content
13.4 Structure 303
13.5 Approach 305
13.5.1 The communication approach 305
13.5.2 The model approach 306
13.5.3 The engineering approach 307
13.6 Seamless Communication for Utilities 308
13.6.1 Network Control 308
13.6.2 Teleprotection 308
13.7 Benefits 309
13.8 References 310
13.8.1 Introduction 310
! 13.8.2 Read more 311

301

... ...
...

.,
 I
I
.
13 The System Standard IEC 61850 for Substation Automation I •

-·1I I

13.2 13.1 lnteroperability in substations Open to free information exchange between

devices form different suppliers: Not only the free
The objective of the new international standard
IEC 61850 Communication networks and systems i
terminal based access of human beings is request I
in substations is the interoperability between IEDs i
ed but also the exchange of understandable infor
that originate from various suppliers, to enable the
mation between devices and the mutual use for its
unrestricted exchange and usage of data to perform
own or common purposes. Functions from devices
their individual dedicated functionality.
of different supplies may be combined to
common modes of operation like sequences. This
lnteroperabtlity is the ability of two or more
feature is called global interoperability and is the
intelli gent electronic devices from the same vendor,
basic require ment for any kind of open systems
or dif ferent vendors, to exchange information and
and, therefore, the key for any modern
use that information for correct cooperation.
communication standard. The term global refers to
·
the requirement that there shall be one common
standard world wide for the global business
Note: The scope of IEC 61850 is interoperability but
emerging today, i.e. no split between the IEC and
not interchangeability. lnteroperability is a prerequisi
ANSI world is accepted.
te of interchangeability, which is the ability to
replace a device from the same vendor, or from Open to follow the state-of-the-art in commu
different vendors, utilizing the same communication nication: Despite the requested long-term stability
interface and as a minimum, providing the same of the communication system, advantageous deve
functionality, and with no impact on the rest of the lopments in communication technology may result in
system. If dif ferences in functionality are accepted, favor to use a more modern one. To safeguard all
the exchange may require some changes the costly applications the standard has to be
somewhere in the system also. Interchangeability future proof by approach. Any technological
implies standardization of func tions and, in a update shall have no impact on the application.
strong sense, of devices, which are both outside
Open to support different and changing
the scope of IEC 61850.
system philosophies: There are different
philoso phies, what functions are allocated to which
13.2 lnteroperability and open devices. Some utilities prefer decentralized
solutions, other
systems
Systems with interoperable data exchange are
;,open systems'In the past, substation automation
systems had been interoperable or open by
standardized vol tage and current levels used at the
device interfaces, e.g. 110/220 V, 1/SA, 20 mA, 10
V, etc. Today, the serial communication has to be
open. As. seen in Figure 13-1, systems may be
open to different direc tions.

302
Figure 73-1 The different kinds of
openness
ones more centralized solutions, some prefer to technology of the application domain preferred system
have a high level of integration of functions in one structures may change. For example, some sensor technologies
box. other ones prefer dedicated devices for any func prefer passive fibers, other ones full serial communications resultiY"Jg
tion. Therefore, the communication standard has to in different places for process interfaces, New functions may
support the free allocation of functions. emerge over the time. Therefore, the communication stand
ard has to support not only the free allocation of func
Open to support state-of-the-art system tech
tions but also to provide extension rules.
nology;Depending on the state-of-the-art in system
 Open to easy communication engineering and
maintenance: A device is defined by its allocated
functions. A system is defined by its devices and the
connections in between. Therefore, a communication
standard has to have some means to describe these
properties. If such a description is part of the standard the
system may be extended and modified civer the
complete life cycle with any tool using this formal
description, also by different suppliers.
All these kinds of openness are supported by stand
ard IEC 61850.
1 3.3 IEC 61850 as system standard .
for substations
This standard is not only the most advanced and uni
versal standard for communication but also a comp
rehensive system oriented standard for substation
automation systems, in view the fad that it standar
dizes not only the communication in terms of a se
lected ISO/OSI stack but also the system related
aspects like
• Recommendations for system and project
management
• Domain specific data model including rules for
functional (object) extension,
• Domain specific system services
• Substation configuration language,
• Conformance testing.
.... ...
'?
13.4 Structure 13.4
The Standard
IEC 61850 Communication networks and
systems in substations
comprises the following parts:
IEC 61850-1 Communication networks and
systems in substations - Part 1: Introduction and
overview
The part 1 gives a short overview and introduction
about the standard including history, goal. basic con
cepts and the document structure
IEC 61850-2 Communication networks and
systems in substations- Part 2: Glossary
The standard uses terms from different areas, i.e. from
substation automation, information technology and
communication. To support the reader, all impor tant
terms are collected and shortly explained in part 2.
IEC 61850-3 Communication networks and
systems in substations- Part 3: General
requirements
The devices of substation automation systems and of its
communication reside mostly in a harsh, dedicated
environment. All standards applicable for·the general
requirements of substations are collected in part 3.
IEC 61850-4 Communication networks and
systems in substations - Part 4: System and
project management
To improve the confidence between suppliers_ and
users of substation automation systems and its com
munication, rules for handling are neeaed for system
and project management Recommendations are
given in part 4.
303
... ...
'(
3.4 IEC 61850-5 Communication networks and
systems in substations - Part 5:
Communication requirements for functions
and devices models
Communication in substation follows the state-of
the-art in communication technology, but its only pur
pose is t:::> support all functions to be performed in
substations. Therefore, a lot of requirements arise
from these functions, i.e. from the domain
substation automation. All these requirements are
collected and defined in part 5.
IEC 61850-6 Communication networks and
systems in substations - Part 6:
Configuration description language for
communication in electrical Substations
related to lEOs
The impact of interoperability is that devices from dif
ferent suppliers have to be combined to one
system by the system integrator with his dedicated
engineer ing tool. Therefore, the complete system
with its en tire devices and communication links has
to be de scribed in a formal way in the
engineering process. The XML-based ubstation
onfiguration descripton
.Language (SCL) for IEC 61850 compliant systems is
standardized in part 6.
IEC 61850-7-1 Communication networks and
systems in substations - Part 7-1: Basic communi
cation structure for substation and feeder equip
ment - Principles and models
Part 7 defines - based on the requirements from
part
5 - the object oriented data and service model
need ed in substations. Part 7-1 introduces the
principles of modeling.
IEC 61850-7-2 Communication networks and
systems in substations - Part 7-2: Basic communi
cation structure for substation and feeder equip
ment - Abstract communication service interface
(ACSO
304
For interoperability, not only data have to be standar
dized but also the access to these data called servi
ces. In part 7-2, all general and domain specific servi
ces are defined.
IEC 61850-7-3 Communication networks and
systems in substations - Part 7-3: Basic communi
cation structure for substation and feeder equip
ment - Common data classes
Part 7-3 combines all common data attributes to
common data classes to be used in part 7-4. This
combination facilitates both the overview for the
rea der and the implementation for the software
en gineer.
IEC 61850-7-4 Communication networks and
. systems in substations - Part 7-4: Basic communi
cation structure for substation and feeder equip
ment - Compatible logical node classes and data
classes
Part 7-4 shows the content of standardized data to
be exchanged in the substation. It uses terms well
known to any user of switchgear: The user can check
if he finds in the standard all data items he needs.
Extension rules show how to overcome application
limits.
IEC 61850-8-1 Communication networks and
systems in substations - Part 8-7: Specific commu
nication service mapping (SCSM) - Mapping to
MMS (ISOIIEC 9506 Part 7 and Part 2) and to
ISO/IEC 8802-3
The abstract data model and services have to be rea
lized by the application layer of the communication
stack. The standardized procedure how to do this is
called "mapping" and given in part 8 and 9. Part 8-1
specifies the mapping of common services between
client (mostly an HMI) and server (lED) and of the
communication of eneric Qbject Qriented ubsta
tion Events (GOOSE) between devices (IEDs).

IEC 61850-9-1 Communication networks and
systems in substations - Part 9-1: SpeCific commu
nication service mapping (SCSM) - Sampled values
over serial unidirectional multidrop point-to-point
link
Part 9-1 specifies the mapping of analog samples
over serial unidirectional multidrop point-to-point link,
e.g. the serial communication between an electronic
voltage or current transformer/transducer and bay
units e.g. for protection.
IEC 61850-9-2 Communication networks and
systems in substations- Part 9-2: Specific commu
nication service mapping (SCSM) - Sampled values
over !SO/IEC 8802-3
Part 9-2 specifies the mapping of analog samples over
bi-directional, bus type serial link As an add-on to
part 8-1 it allows e.g. the multi-use of data, changing
parameters of the electronic transformers/trans
ducers and the transmission of supervision data,
commands and trips.
IEC 61850-10 Communication networks and
systems in substations - Part 10:
Conformance testing
To guarantee interoperability according to the global
standard IEC 61850 between all suppliers and to
minimize the risks for system integration, the compli
ance with the standard has to be tested in the same
way all over the world. Therefore, the conformance
testing is standardized in part 10.
1 3.5 Approach
13.5.1 The communication approach 13.5
The communication technology is changing very
rapidly while substations have lifetimes of 30 years
and longer. The functionality of substation automa
tion is, therefore, changing very rarely. Normally, addi
tional functionality is added over the years. Therefore,
the standardization has to be focused not so much
on the fast changing communication technology but
more on the domain specific object data model. Such
a domain specific object model consists of objects, i.e.
part of functions, which are very common in sub
stations like breakers, controllers, and protection,
which exchange data with each other. All these data
have attributes like time stamps or the validity of data,
which have to be known or set for a proper
opera tion of the substation automation system. The
access and exchange of data is defined by
standardized ser vices.
The 7-layer ISO/OSI model describes state-of-the-art
communication. The layers in decreasing order
are (Figure 13-2):
(7) Application Layer (Words of the communication
with semantic meaning like voltage, position,
indication, time)
(6) Presentation Layer (Language or coding like
ASCII, double bit indication 16 bit analog)
(5) Session Layer (Start/stop talking, who of the
partners is allowed to talk)
(4) Transport Layer (Connection exists, sequence
numbers/order, completeness)
(3) Network Layer (Address like phone
number)
(2) Data Link Layer (Length of telegram, error ..
_
detection/correction)
(1) Physical Layer (Medium/connectors,
frequency/level of electrical/optical pulses)
As these layers may change fast corresponding to the
changes in the state-of-the-art for communication. 305
 They are not suited very well for long-term standardi
zation purposes. Nevertheless, they have to be
defin ed in order to achieve common plug
properties (Figure 13-2).
In order to enable long term oriented standardization,
13.5.2 the approach that has been taken for the IEC 61850
(Figure 13-3) is that the domain specific applications
(i.e. object model, services) is decoupled from the
communication stack. This allows always the imple
mentation of the state-of-the-art in communication;
i.e. presently the stack with MMSITCP/IP/Ethernet
with optical physical layer is selected.
It should be noted that mapping to the full stack is
used for Client-Server connections only. For time criti
cal communication, i.e. the eneric Qbject Qriented
ystem _Events (GOOSE) like trips, blackings, and all
indications for automatics, the messages are
mapped directly to the Ethernet link layer. Same
holds for the analog sampled values.
The communication stack or some layers of it could
be substituted in the future for example by a wireless
physical layer or a multi Gigabit link layer. The benefit
from the decoupling is that all investments into
appli cations are safeguarded, as the object model
and the correlated services have not to be
changed if the communication is changed and only
the mapping of data and services to the stack has
to be adapted. ·
13.5.2 The model approach
To identify the communication requirements and the
data modeling requirements, all functions in the sub
station have been split into smallest objects (Logical
nodes, LN), which communicate with each other and
contain all information to be transmitted. The alloca
tion of Logical Nodes to multiple devices and
control levels is completely free to support any
feasible system philosophy of the user. Multiple
instances of Logical Nodes may be implemented in
the system.

0) Outgoing Frame Incoming Frame

Reduction APY
Construction
"I
I
I
(7) Application I
Appi.Data

PH Data unit
I (7) Application
I
.
I (6) Presentation _ --------·-·---·-----·-·1 1 I _ ..,.(..,6..,)_P_re_s_e_n_ta_ti_o_n..... -1
I SH Data unit
(5) Session 1 1 1 (5) Session
I
TH Data unit 1

I
(4) Transport 1 1 (4) Transport 1
(3) Network NH Data unit 1
·- I I I__ ·-I-·-I-. ,......
(3...)..N_e_tw_._o_rk
I
(2) Data link F A c Data unit (1 Field) FCS F (2) Data link 1
I 1111 I II I
I (1) Physical ;·I sme -- (1) Physical
1

PH = Presentation Protocol Control Information F =Flag

SH = Session Protocol Control Information A =Address
TH = Transport Protocol Control Information C =Control
NH =Network Protocol Control Information FCS = Frame check sequence

306 Figure 73-2 Communication over a 7-layer /SOlOS/ stack i

I

L
The function model is always implemented as soft 13.5.3 The engineering approach 13.5.3
ware package in devices. Therefore, the function
model has to be complemented by a device The data model with all its options used, the alloca
model. (Physical Device, PD), which describes all the tion of LNs to devices, all the communication links,
common properties of the device. Logical Nodes are and the allocation of functions to the switchgear as
grouped in Logical Devices (LD). The common per the substation single line diagram are described
device pro perties are described in the Logical by means of a standardized Substation Configuration
Node LPHD (Logical Node of the Physical Device). ·description Language (SCL) that is based on XML.
An example of such a model is shown in Figure 1 3- This language is used to exchange data between
4. the system configuration tools of different
suppliers during the engineering process. It allows
easy exten dibility and maintainability of a substation
automation system over a long time (Figure 13-5).

Application (Objects,Services) Long-term

SLOW definitions
CHANGES Sate-guarding
Application
Domain / '\. investments

Substation Sampled Client- Server

GOOSE
values communication Abstract

f +· +
Interface

Adaptation per
Mapping

+ Stack
Interface

FAST
MMS --'-

CHANGES Real-time -
Communication
Technology requirements TCP Stack selection
following
state-of-the-art ·-
r L- IP communication
--·-- -·--
technology
Ethernet Link Layer

Ethernet Physical Layer with Priority tagging

Figure 73-3 The approach of IEC 67850: Splitting the Application Model from Communication Stack 307
 13.6 Seamless Communication
for Utilities

13.6 All communication capabilities f the involved IEDs
are provided to the system configurator as configura
tion files by communication from the IEDs, on dedi
cated data media, or from an lED database. The allo
cation of the functions to the single line diagram and
all needed communication links are added. Using this
information, the system configuration file can be
engineered and loaded (back) into the IEDs. Dedi
cated device tools may be needed to configure the
functions and marshal the data inside the lED but
all have to support the import and export of
configura tion files in the SCL format for system
engineering.
13.6.1 Network Control
·The basic models and services may be used for utili
ty communication tasks also beyond the substation
since communication concepts of network control
and substation automation have been merged with
industrial communication technologies (MMS,
TCP/IP). Broadband communication systems of utilities
using TASE.2 and IEC 60870-5-104 are today mostly
based on TCP/IP networks as used by IEC 61850
also. Seamless communication requests only a har
monization of the data models used at network level
i=

PO "Bay Unit"

LD for the device

·8>· 8> !

e (§) @)

LD "Line protection" LD "Bay control"

Figure 13-4 Device model according to IEC 67850 with the Logical Nodes LLNO (Common properties),
PD/S (Distance), PTOC (Timed overcurrent), CSWI (Switch controO. C/LO (Interlocking),
308. LPHD (Physical device information)

'? . ? . '?
Engineering environment
lED Capabilities
(LN, DO, etc)
System
Confi

13.7
Engineering Association, relation to
Workplace
& J . i1-- Single line diagram,
preconfigured, reports,
ConlfEigDurator etc
File transfer remote
--------------- File transfers and
File transfer

SA system local parameterization with

IEC61850 services

;_ --
§!' B) ·.;J2J]
. -,-_ - --:;..,.,.-- .---

Figure 13-5 SCL exchange during engineering process

ommon Information Model (CIM) according to IEC
61970) and used at substation level (IEC 61850 data
model). IEC TC57 already proved the feasibility of this
concept.
1 3.6.2 Teleprotedion
The data model and the services of IEC 61850 pro vide
already the functionality for line protection sche mes
(refer to Logical Node PSCH) as releases and blackings
for distance protection and other schemes used to
increase the selectivity of protection. The transmission
of samples as needed for line differen tial protection is
outside the substation basically the same as inside. This
provides seamless communica tion also for protection.
13.7 Benefits
The main benefits of the standard result from the fact
that IEC 61850 is a
• global system standard for lnteroperability between
devices from various suppliers that are installed in a
substation. This allows optimizing
the selection of devices for dedicated applications and
will improve competition.
• future proof standard because of the split between
the application model and the communication stack
This allows modifying and extending the application
(functions, data) without touching the
communication stack. Reverse, any update of the
communication stack according to state-of-the-art
in communi cation technology will have no impact
both
on functions and databases. 309

. ·
 ; '

13.8 • comprehensive standard for all functions in

substations including rules for functional exten
sions_ This allows to cover all types of substations
and to evolve substation automation systems
with increasing requirements.
• standard with a comprehensive standardized
Substation Configuration Description Language
(SCL). This allows for easy engineering and
maintenance of substation automation systems.

1 3.8 References

13.8.1 Introduction

[1] L_ Andersson, K-P. Brand · The Benefits of the coming Standard !EC16850 for
Communication in Substations
Southern African Power System Protection Conference, Johannesburg, November 8-9, 2000
[2] R. Dinges ·Standardisierung in der Schutz- und Stationsleittechnik (Standardization
in Protection and Substation Automation)
ETG-Fachtagung "Schutz- und Stationsleittechnik'; NOmberg, 23124.10.2001
[3] K-P. Brand, W. Wimmer·Der Standard IEC 61850- Offene Kommunikation in Schaltanlagen
im deregulierten Strommarkt (The Standard /EC 6-1850- Open Communication for Substations
in the deregulated Electric Energy Market) Bulletin SEVNSE 93, 1 (2002) 9-13

310
1 3.8.2 Read more 13.8.2

[4] Ch. Brunner, A. Ostermeier · Serial Communication Between Process and Bay Level- Standards
and Practical Experience
CIGRE 2000, Paper 34-106 (9 pages), Paris, September 2000

[5] J. Haude, A. Janz, Th. Rudolph, Th. Schaffler, H. Schubert · A pilot Project for testing the Standard
Drafts for Open Communication in Substations - First Experiences with the future
Standard IEC 67850
CIGRE 2000, Paper 34-109 (6 pages), Paris, September 2000

[6] 0. Preiss, A. Wegmann· Towards a composition model problem based on /EC67850,

Preceding of the 4th Workshop on Component-Based Software Engeneering, Toronto,
May 14-15, 2001

[7] L. Andersson, K-P. Brand, W. Wimmer· The Communication Standard IEC67850 supports flexible
and optimised Substation Automation Architectures
2nd International Conference on Integrated Protection, Control and Communication - Experience,
Benefits and Trends, Session IV. Paper 3, New Delhi, India, October 10-12, 2001

[8] L. Andersson, K -P. Brand, W. Wimmer · Some Aspects of Migration from present Solutions
to SA Systems based on the Communication Standard IEC 61850
2nd International Conference on Integrated Protection, Control and Communication - Experience,
Benefits and Trends, Session IV. Paper 4, New Delhi, India, October 10-12, 2001

[9] L. Andersson, K-P. Brand, W. Wimmer · The Impact of the coming Standard IEC 67850 on the
Life-cycle of Open Communication Systems in Substations
Transmission and Distribution 02001, Brisbane, Australia, November 11-14, 2001
[10] Eric Udren, Steven Kunsman, Dave Dolezilek ·Significant substation communication
standardization developments
Paper presented at the Western Protective Area Distribution Automation Conference (WPDAC),
Apri/2002
[11] Ch. Brunner, G. Schimmel, H. Schubert ·Standardisation of serial/inks replacing parallel wiring
to transfer process data - Approach, state and practical experience
CIGRE 2002, Paper 34-209 (6 pages), Paris, September 2002

[12] R. Baumann, K-P. Brand, Ch. Brunner, W. Wimmer · Der Standard IEC 67 850 in Schaltanlagen
als Kern einer durchgangigen Kommunikation!osung fUr den Netzbetre1ber
(The StanEfard IEC 61850 in Substations as nucleus of a transparent Communication Soiution
for Network Operators), Bulletin ElectroSuisse 94, 3 (2003)

311
14 Phase Models of Substation Automation Systems

14.1 The concept and limits of life cycles and phases 315 14
14.1.1 Life cycles 315 Table of
14.1.1.1 Cycles and metacycles 315 content
14.1.1.2 From cycles to phases 315
14.1.2 Two kinds of life cycles for substation automation 315
14.1.2.1 System or manufacturer life cycle 315
14.1.2.2 Project or customer life cycle 316
14.1.2.3 Related standards 316
14.1.3 Responsibilities 316
14.1.4 From device to system 317
14.2 System or manufacturer life cycle 317
14.2.1 Market observation and continuous development 317
14.2.2 Concept and design 317
14.2.3 The impact of platforms and application modules 317
14.2.4 Prototypes and testing 317
14.2.5 First production and conformance certification 317
14.2.6 Production with quality control 317
14.2.7 Change requirements and updates 317
14.2.8 Outphasing and continuation 318
14.3 Project or customer life cycle 318
14.3.1 Acquisition and offer phase 318
14.3.1.1 Sales activities 318
14.3.1.2 Requirement Specification 318
14.3.1.3 Specification Evaluation 319
14.3.1.4 Design Specification and tender 319
14.3.1.5 Offer Evaluation 319
14.3.2 Project Execution 319
14.3.2.1 Project manager 319
14.3.2.2 Organization 320
14.3.2.3 Tools 320
14.3.3 Project Execution Phase I (Factory) 320
14.3.3.1 Set-up of Project Management 320
14.3.3.2 Refinement of System Design 320
14.3.4 System Production 320
14.3.4.1 Prerequisites 320
14.3.4.2 System engineering 320
14.3.4.3 SW Engineering 320
14.3.4.4 HW Engineering 321
14.3.4.5 Production of adaption of software 321
14.3.4.6 Production of hardware 321
14.3.4.7 System integration 321 313
14 14.3.4.7 System in,tegration 321
Table of 14.3.4.8 Factory Acceptance Test (FAD 321
content 14.3.4.8 Factory Acceptance Test (FAD 321
14.3.5 Project Execution Phase II (On-site) 321
14.3.5.1 Shipping of the system 321
14.3.5.2 Commissioning on-site . 322
14.3.5.3 Site Acceptance Test (SAD 322
14.3.6 Maintenance Phase 322
14.3.6.1 Warranty period 322
14.3.6.2 Life cycle maintenance 322
14.3.6.3 Decommissioning 322
14.4 References 323

314
 14 Phase Models of Substation Automation Systems
14.1 The concept and limits of life
cycles and phases
14.1.1 Life cycles
14.1.1.1 Cyc!es and metacyc!es
Every individual, organism, organization, product, and
system show an important feature of life, i.e. they
appear, exist for some time and disappear. They are
replaced by identical successors, or by ones transfor
med by evolution. Substation automation systems
also show such a life cycle.
The strictness of the life cycle concept for substation
automation is limited since there may be a
conti nuous development (updates) of systems and
com ponents by the manufacturer or a stepwise
upgrade of installed systems on-site. This may results
in some kind of meta-cycles and short cuts (see
Figure 14-1).
Problems,
Idea for
new
requirements
new soluti on
Figure 74-7 Cycles and metacyc/es
14.1.1.2 From cycles to. phases 14.1
If we cut off any cycle we get a linear sequence of
phases with start and end. Despite the complexity of
real life cycles, the resulting phase model is a good
guideline in structuring both system development
and project management (see Figure 14-2).
Idea for Approval
new solution
Test
No upgrades
Problems possible
New requirements
Figure 74-2 Phases derived from cycles
14.1.2 Two kinds of life cycles for
substation automation
Any product or system has its life cycle inside the
manufacturer from design over production to out
phasing. Any project delivered to a customer has its
dedicated life cycle from acquisition over delivery to
maintenance.
14.1.2.1 System or manufacturer life cycle .
This cycle goes from market supervision over design
and development to production, resulting in a pool of
solutions. The solutions itself (products, systems) may
either be maintained, updated from time to time or
out-phased. This cycle is driven by the product and
315
 · .,
·
'?

and system business of the manufacturer. Key factors
14.1.3 are customer needs realized in development accord
ing to state of the art, competitive cost for both
deve lopment and production and, finally, the related
mar ket success (see Figure 14-3).
7 4. 7 .2.2 Project or customer life
cycle
This cycle starts also with market supervision in the
background. It goes then from customer specification
over manufacturer offer, production, and commission
ing to operation. It is continued by some maintenan
ce time until decommissioning. Looking for replace
ment closes this cycle. This cycle is driven by the
power business of the customer. Key factors are the
production and transmission cost of power, the
policy for investment in infrastructure, the cost and
mana gement of assets and, finally, the related
market suc cess (see Figure 14-4).
7 4. 7 .2.3 Related standards
The standard IEC 61850 Communication networks
and systems in substations provides in its part 4 (IEC
61850-4 System and project management) recom
mendations for some aspects for both types of the
life cycles.
14.1.3 Responsibilities
During the life cycles alternating responsibilities may
appear. For the system life cycle inside the manufac
turer, sales people, product manager, and develop
ment engineers are involved. Typically for the project
life cycle is the interaction of manufacturer, system
integrator and customer. Very often, the manufactu
rer of the main components and the system
integra-
Figure 74-3
Detailed System or Manufacturer Life Cycle (example).
OM = Order manager, 80 = Business development,
E = Engineering, F = Fabrication, OH = Order
handler,
PL =Project management, PM= Product management,
T = Technical staff, S = Sales people

Strategic
Product Management Decision for Actions
Marketing

Functional Strategies

PRS Product URS Update MRS

Project maintenance Requ.Spec. . Market
Requ.Spec (Information) PM Requ.Spec
SID PM PM

Akquisjtion
Promotion
Offers § s L
Market
obser
a ;! OH OMIPL
.E
Project
develop SA
Product
maintenance
Product
develop·
ment
vation
e standard
team
(Missing ment
T
PMIS.Eff issues)

--· I I
Bt:YPMIS SIOMIPM c. F T I T j,
c
I ..,
I §
i
r
0
Market Out.

Solutions
"mc' introduction phasing
.c.
c
Offers
I
OelivP-riP-S Deliveries
I ti5 (j S/PMIBO S/PM.ED
I
I
COncepts Solutions Standard solutions Products
Concepts . on about existence 1 Introduced Streamlined
Documents Informati 1
... Products product pool

r J
Competitive Product Pool
Hardware, Software, Services, Tools, Ucensable Know-how, Documents, Information
316

.;,.
tor are the same. In any case, a clear definition or
negotiation of responsibilities is essential for substa
tion automation projects.
14.1.4 From device to system
Substation automation is a system composed of pro
ducts and interconnected by· communication. There
may be dedicated life cycles for platforms, devices,
product families, etc At any time, a system has to
exist but maybe with changing components. The sys
tem as such will also have a life cycle defined by a
system generation. Without special comments, the
text will refer always to substation automation sys
tems as whole.
14.2 System or manufacturer
life cycle
14.2.1 Market observation and continuous
development
Close contacts with the customers, continuous
obser vation of the market, and fast following the
needs of the customers is at the beginning of this
cycle (see Figure 14-3). It is the joint task of sales
and product management.
To monitor the trends in technoloqy is mainly the task
of the development. Its impact to-solutions has to be
closely discussed with the product management.
14.2.2 Concept and design
Defining solutions or a solution pool with benefit
labels for customers and competitive market prices
has to be the joint effort of product management
development and sales. ideas have to be
transfor med to solutions by design and
development.
14.2.3 The impact of platforms and
application modules
The split of products and systems in the basic plat
form and the application makes the manufacturer life
cycle as shown in Figure 14-3 more complicated.
The most visible process is the life cycle for
products but behind we have the life cycles for
platforms, applica tions, and system concepts. All
these cycles may be completely asynchronous.
Important is the conti nuous compatibility best
provided by internal and external standards like 14.2
IEC 61850 de-coupling the application from the
implementation of the commu- nication stack.
·
14.2.4 Prototypes and testing
In this phase, the feasibility is verified and basic fea
tures are tested internally. Also testing against appli
cable standards may be included. If all products are
part of systems, the system behavior has to be includ
ed also. System testing implies testing of functiona
lity, behavior and performance over several commu
nicating devices. Therefore, the guidelines for com
munication testing in the substation domain found in
the report of the CIGRE Task Force TF34.01 (2002)
are necessary but not sufficient for a comprehensive
system testing in any case.
14.2.5 First production and conformance
certification
Normally, the first series has to be out for approval
regarding performance testing in independent labs or
conformance testing according to important stand
ards. Conformance testing according to IEC 61850 is
found in part 10 of this standard (IEC 61850-1 0).
14.2.6 Production with quality control
Over the product lifetime, the system and their com
ponents are produced continuously under state-of
the-art quality control (standard ISO 9001). This pro
duction keeps the pool of solutions filled.
14.2.7 Change requirements and updates
Experience from projects and production, from pro
gress in technology, and the extension of market
requirements, may trigger changes. These changes
will result in updates of devices and systems. 317
 Approval?

14.3 ' ,...,

.... ;

' I
\ Fixing
deviations
I
I
/

1 I
I Exten5ion \
\
I \
I \

- .;
Fixing '
\
_
on-site
'...... Sys.lntegr
FAT
problems

Figure 7 4-4 The project or

customer life cycle

14.2.8 Outphasing and continuation
If all updates regarding technology, production cost
(market price!), and functions are exhausted,
devices and systems will be out-phased.
Recommendations for out-phasing procedures will
also be found in IEC
61850-4. As long as the business is continued, next
generations of devices and systems have to be intro
duced continuously.
beginning of this cycle also (see Figure 14-4). Now
the focus is on the early identification of coming pro
jects. There are three checkpoints:
• Collect information about utility environment,
needs and coming projects.
• Propose solutions in the sense of consultative
selling with benefits for the customer.
• Respond fast on project specifications issued
by the customer.

14.3 Project or customer life cycle 7 4.3. 7.2 Requirement Specification

14.3.1 Acquisition and offer phase
7 4.3. 7. 7 Sales
activities
318 For manufacturers,close contacts with the customers,
continuous obseNation of the market and fast follow
ing the needs of the customers is important at the
devices and configuration for the substation automa tion
system may be left to the manufacturer. Only if the
statements of the customer are clear and leave no room
for interpretation of his needs, the customer will get
comparable offers. Guidelines for specificati on and a
sample specification are given in chapter 16.
The following points should be in the checklist:
• Problem and process needs
The customer has to define in the specification his
requirements as precise as possible. Precise means
not in any case specifying all details. It could be a
description of the switchyard, a definition of all func
tions needed, some performance figures like availabi
lity, and life cycle cost. In this case, the selection of
• Financial (budgets) and time (schedule) goals •
• Switchgear to be controlled Cons
• Functions and performance
• Physical boundary conditions like space
restrictions and environment
• Logical boundary conditions like connections
with other systems
• Life-cycle expectations
• Standards to be followed
ulting and maintenance needs if applicable • develop a project schedule and calculate a
competitive price,
The result of this phase will be a specification (see
• write the offer text as precise as possible and close
chapter 21) made by the customer or a consultant in
to the specification to avoid any misinter pretation by
charge.
the customer,
• explain deviations,
7 4.3.1.3 Specification Evaluation 14.3.2
• tender a maintenance contract if applicable.

The result of this phase will be an offer issued by the

manufacturer for the customer.

74.3. 7.5 Offer Evaluation

The customer has to check any offer for compliance with
the requirement specification, i.e. for
• functionality and performance,
• reasons for deviations if any,
• for delivery and price conditions,
• for maintenance and life cycle cost if applicable.

The result will be an order by the customer. Only in the

worst case, none of the offers may be accepta ble. This is
an indication for some problems left in the specification. In
this case, an updated specification should be issued.
The manufacturer has to evaluate the specification for 14.3.2 Project Execution
content and completeness. Points for the checklist are
The project execution may be a very complex task
• functions, signals and performance requirements, depending on the size and complexity of the project. The
• HMI requirements, project manager and its team have to perform this task.
They have to be supported by the orga nization and
• connection requirements with other systems,
proper tools.
• project plan and time schedule,
• life-cycle aspects,
14.3.2.1 Project manager
• commercial, legal and financial aspects.
The project manager is fully responsible for all aspects of the
14.3.1.4 Design Specification and tender project including the results. Therefore, he has to have many
skills, e.g.
Now the manufacturer has to translate the evaluated • he is an entrepreneur regarding his complex
specification to fit to his soiution pooi, preferentially to his project (manager),
set of pre-defined and pre-tested standard solu tions. He
• he has to know all legal aspects of the contract where
has carefully
his project is based on (law),
• transform the requirements into functions and its • he has to know the context or process back
standard system design as far as possible, ground of his project (power system), 319
7 4.3.3.2 Refinement of System Design
The order has to be reviewed by the project team and
checked for deviations from the offer. Points for the
checklist are listed below.
• Clarification of discrepancies
14.3.4 • he has to know all functions and implementations of • Refin€ment of the design if applicable
the substation automation system at least regarding his • Setting up a test plan if applicable and not yet
project (domain specialist), included in the offer
• he has to have close contacts with the customer • Asking for approval of the customer if applicable
based on mutual trust (personal relationship),
• Revision handling
• he has to have close contacts to his base
organization (full support), 14.3.4 System Production
• he has to be able to lead a team (team coach)
including conflict management. 7 4.3.4. 7 Prerequisites
Besides the project management tools, competitive
7 4.3.2.2 Organization system production for a project needs a lot of tools or a
tool set for
The project manager may have all skills requested but he
cannot do all by himself, especially in complex pro jects. He • System Engineering,
needs a team of experts (resources) cover ing all aspects • Software Engineering,
over the long run of his project. He has to know where he • Hardware Engineering,
can get fast additional support in his base organization.
• Device and system configuration,
• Documentation,
7 4.3.2.3 Tools
• Testing.
The project manager needs a tool, which allows con trolling
the progress of his project and its financial sta tus. It has to 7 4.3.4.2 System engineering
indicate milestones, to allow planning of resources, to
The standard IEC61850 Communication networks and
follow the schedule, to manage the resources, and to
monitor the financial status at any time. A remote access
systems in substations has standardized also a
of the customer to some aspects of the project status Substation automation system configuration de
may increase the trust of the customer in the supplier and scription language (SCL in IEC 61850-6). This is a for mal
description of the substation automation system
its project manage ment.
from the communication point-of-view. It includes the
allocation of functions and devices to the switchgear also.
14.3.3 Project Execution Phase I (Factory)
Important is the production and archiving of all
7 4.3.3. 7 Set-up of Project Management requested project documents in electronic form. This
should include also all project specific programs and data.
The sales people have to pass the received order to A part could be configuration and engineering files (SCL)
project management. Thfirst steps to do are to according to IEC 61850-6.
• install a project manager,
• review and detail the time schedule if applicable, 7 4.3.4.3 SW Engineering
• allocate resources and define a project team,
SW engineering may include the writing of programs but it means
increasingly configuring and combining
320 • ask for approval of the customer if applicable.
Configuring refers to instantiation and setting para
meters of functions and data objects including pro
cess connections, and services per data. Combining
means to set up the communication with all its para
meters.
14.3.4.4 HW Engineering
HW engineering comprises the cubicle layout inclu- .
ding the allocation of devices to cubicles and its local
wiring.
A second step takes care of the allocation of the
cubicles to the substation and its substation-wide
wiring or cabling. This includes both cables for data
and power supply. Data may be completely transmit ted
over serial links, which are implemented as opti cal
fibers, but it means HW also.
14.3.4.5 Production or adaptation of
software
The result of SW engineering is implemented similar as
the result of HW engineering in the devices and
system. Action items are
• buying SW licenses if applicable,
• writing programs or activate these in SW libraries,
• production or collection of relevant documen
tation,
• filling up data bases.
14.3.4.6 Production of hardware
The result of HW engineering has to be produced
including the following steps.
• Buying devices
• Producing of cubicles
7 4.3.4.7 System integration
• Integration of HW and SW as far as not yet
covered in the previous steps
• Preparation of test set-up including data and
power interconnection (cabling)
• Production or collection of relevant documentation
• Pre-Testing of the system (Pre-FAT)
I
existing modules.
14.3.4.8 Factory Acceptance Test (FAT) 14.3.5
The factory acceptance test has benefits both for the
manufacturer and for the customer.
The customer or one of his representatives is witnes sing
the FAT. Therefore, he may see in time, if all his
requirements are fulfilled not only on paper but also by
the running substation automation system. He may help
clarifying last misunderstandings, and request fixing
deviations.
The manufacturer can fix all problems with the back up
of all his techrical facilities and experts resulting in much
less problems than at commissioning on-site. By the
acceptance of the customer, he has reached an
important milestone in project execution, which is often
related with some payment.
The limit of facr.ory acceptance test is that not all
components anc interfaces of the system may be
available in the factory. Especially, the switchgear is
missing and has w be simulated as good as possible.
The key for a successfully performed FAT is the test
plan negotiated between the manufacturer and
customer.
14.3.5 Project Execution Phase II
(On-site)
7 4.3.5. 7 Shipping of the system
After the FAT, the material from the factory has to be
shipped to the site of the customer. Then, the recep tion
of the material on-site has to be organized and
supervised.
Since this phase is outside the direct control both of the
manufacturer and of customer, it has the covered
by a proper insurance and an appropriate contract. 321
 7 4.3.5.2 Commissioning on-site
On-site, the system has to be erected according to
the site plan and has to be properly assembled.
Some parts like building of houses and cabling may
be excluded from the project contract and provided Spare parts, diagnosis and replacement procedures
14.3.6 locally. These contracts need to be known to the influence the availability and safety of the system.
system provider in advance since they may refer to
crucial interfaces. After erecting and connecting all The main task during this period is a fast response of
parts, the system has to be set in operation the manufacturer in case of failures. The meaning of
(commis sioning). "fast" has to be defined also in the contract.
All functions have to be tested by the commissioning
team. If the FAT was very comprehensive, nearly no

problems should appear. 7 4.3.6.2 Life cycle maintenance

Maintenance after the warranty period is the task of

7 4.3.5.3 Site Acceptance Test (SAT)
The site acceptance test (SAT) is a crucial milestone
both for the manufacturer and for the customer.
The key for the SAT is the test plan negotiated bet
ween the manufacturer and customer.
the customer. In more and more cases, this mainte
nance is delegated to the manufacturer by a
mainte nance contract.
The maintenance over the life cycle includes also
extensions or upgrades if applicable.

The customer is witnessing the SAT. Therefore, he 7 4.3.6.3

may proof that all his requirements are fulfilled
not only by a test set-up but by the real system
connect ed with the switchgear and all other
external equip ment and systems, e.g. with the
network control system. He may proof also that
the system operates as specified in its dedicated
environment. All devia tions will be fixed
immediately if possible or accord ing proper
negotiations.
Decommissioning
Every system has a limited life cycle. If all possibilities
for upgrades are exhausted, the system will be
decommissioned. If the customer continuous his busi
ness he will replace the decommissioned system by
a new one.

If the SAT is successfully passed, the manufacturer will

get according to the contract nearly all of the out
standing price. Some very small amount of the price
may be kept for the warranty period but all that is
a matter of the contract.

14.3.6 Maintenance Phase

74.3.6.7 Warranty period

Every manufacturer has its standard warranty period.

If this figure is valid or some extension of this period
322 is accepted has to be part of the contract.
14.4 References

[1] ICE 61850 Communication networks and systems in substations 14.4

[2] IEC 61850-4 Communication networks and systems in substations - Part 4:
System and project management
[3] IEC 61850-6 Communication networks and systems in substations- Part 6: Configuration
description language for communication in electrical substations related to lEOs
[4] IEC 61850-10 Communication networks and systems in substations - Part 10: Conformance testing
[5] ISO 9001 : 2000 Quality management systems- Requirements
[6] CIGRE TF 34.01 (2002) Conformance Testing Guideline for Communication in Substation
(to be published by CIGRE in 2003)

323
15 Benefits of Substation Automation

15.1 Introduction 326 15

15.2 Enhanced power system operation to improve performance 326 Table of
15.2.1 A new approach to predict voltage instabilities 327 content
15.2.2 Options to counteract power system collapse 328
15.3 Substation automation to increase reliability and flexibility 328
15.3.1 Integrated protection and control to accelerate response to problems 328
15.3.2 Under-frequency initiated load shedding to avoid blackouts 330
15.3.3 High speed power transfer fer uninterrupted power supply 330
15.3.4 Adaptive line distance protection to improve selectivity and flexibility 331
15.3.5 Bay oriented busbar protection to maintain system integrity 331
15.3.6 Integrated generator bay protection and control 332
15.3.7 Power transformer protection control and monitoring 333
15.4 Power system monitoring to work systems harder and to save costs 334
15.4.1 Data acquisition 335
15.4.2 Disturbance recording for fault location and power quality assessment 335
15.4.3 Power system condition assessment for better knowledge 336

325
 15 Benefits of Substation Automation
15.2 1 5.1 Introduction
The benefits of Substation Automation that are sum
marized in this chapter shall allow more manage
ment and business performance oriented readers an
easy to read overview. For more detailed information
especially on the technical issues, the reader may
refer to the dedicated chapters that prGvide compre
hensive information and argumentation.
Figure 15-1 Wide Area Protection and Monitoring Scheme
326
15.2 Enhanced power system operation
to improve performance
Due to the pressure to improve the performance of
the power systems in order to satisfy the ever-increas
ing demand for electric power, the networks have to
be operated closer to the limits of their power trans
mission capacity. This, however, causes higher risks
for wide area disturbances to occur due to the lack of
 0
1.
Decreasin
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.
0.0 0.2
Power- voltage characteristic
Figure 15-2 Voltage instability prediction and load shedding
reliable assessment of the actual power system sta
bility limits.
A Wide Area Protection System 0/VAP), which com
plements existing protection and control systems, pro
vides new solutions for power system monitoring
and for the detection of incipient abnormal system
conditions early enough that predetermined defen
sive actions can be initiated either manually by the
operator or automatically in emergency situations to
counteract system instabilities and to maintain power
system integrity (Figure 15-1).
Phasor measurement units (PMU) that are installed at
critical locations throughout the transmission network
sample voltage and currents phasor to deliver accu
rate and actual real time data about the power
system stability conditions. They are synchronized via
the global positioning system (GPS) satellites so that
simultaneous snapshots of phasors can be taken,
15.2.1
:Shed load
PIPm
0.4
0.6 0. 1.0
Maximum power
capability
which are collected at the protection center. This
approach allows to measure by gathering a large
amount of measurands what has to be estimated
otherwise, and it results in power system state
meas urement rather than power system state
estima tion.
15.2.1 A new approach to predict
voltage instabilities
The power transfer capacity of transmission lines is
defined by its specific PowerNoltage characteristic
WAP allows monitoring the voltage decline depen
ding on theJoad for voltage instability prediction and
to asses the safety margin for the power system ope
rator as critical operating information. In case of rapid
voltage decline, under-voltage initiated load shedding
is automatically conducted in the substation to main
tain power system integrity (Figure15-2) 327
15.3 15.2.2 Options to counteract power
system collapse
As soon as loss of synchronism occurs in the net
work. violent transients are induced on the genera
ting units located inside or at the border of the out
of-step area and consumers have to stand with
large disturbances. The strategy against transient
instabili ties to be chosen is to initiate load shedding
on fre quency criteria and to isolate out-of-step areas
as fast as possible and thus save the rest of the
grid.
With such a strategy WAP is the solution to
• detect transient
instabilities,
• provide early indications for slower actions
enabling a possible re-synchronization,
• initiate rapid action in emergency situations
to avoid the spreading of disturbance,
• disconnect the out-of-step areas only with
high selectivity.
Examples of predetermined defense options accord
ing to (Figure 15-3) are described with more techni
cal details in Chapter 11.
1 5.3 Substation automation to
increase reliability and flexibility
To exploit all the benefits of advanced power system
management the automation of local operations is
required as well as the collection, the evaluation
and forwarding of data on the power system status
and plant condition to higher-level systems. But not
only to the network control center but also to all
the staff involved with engineering and
maintenance at the right time.
328 In this context, substation automation provides the
remote basic control and monitoring functions for
·Phasor
Measurements
Phasor
Evaluation
transmission and distribution level substations. Solu
tions for substation automation reflect the structure
and requirements for reliability and availability of a
spedfic substation (Figure 15-4).
At station level, they comprise substation automation
systems (SA). An ideal system platform offers a set of
function modules, which can easily be extended by
the user stepwise by adding further higher-level func
tions to the basic power system control and monitor
ing systems.
On the bay level, they include a range of application
specific solutions for control, automation, protection,
and monitoring of lines, transformers, cable feeders,
bus-couplers, bus section couplers and busbar confi
gurations. The Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) for
protection and control are integral part of these solu
tions. The SA system including the capabilities of the
specific IEDs lays the foundation for all the higher
level remote functions such as advanced power
system management and the condition monitoring
of the equipment while it is in service.
15.3.1 Integrated protection and control
to accelerate response to problems
SA concepts with integrated protection and control
can further be enhanced with functionality for auto
mated real-time corrective control actions beyond
autoreclosure in order to avoid shortage of power
supply due to spontaneous faults. In this context pro
tection relays have seized just to protect single objec
ts by reliable detection of faults and initiation of se
lective tripping the associated circuit breaker (CB).
Programmable automatics for power restorations can
enhance its functionality, e.g. for by-passing faulty sec
tions of a substation, and for transfer of loads to
sound areas in a substation or on to lines as well as
for load shedding. So the power flow can be re-estab
lished faster, resulting in higher power availability.
E
MS Voltage
I
frequency .----1----. Safety
Voltage instability
monitoring
prediction
 margin
AS

If !J. S or !J. f < x % ! 15.3.1

• • •
A S : Safety
Defence actions against collapse Emergency control schemes
margin as
proximity to
voltage
collapse

Loa Automatic
d
FACTS.
Islanding
Tap

shedding generatio

changer
control
Figure 75-3
control
Wide area protection

l!! !!! !!! !!! options to mainta1n

power system
integrity

!!!
Split of power Load Generation Tap
Changer Power flow system
adaptation adaptation
blocking control

Network Center I SCADA

Figure 75-4 "'-,
Substation
-
··,,"
Automation c=_ - ---=---
System with
lEOs for - =----
protection and Corporate-information system (CIS)_ -----
control ---c In t ra n e t
-- --------- - - - - - -_,..,.-===::::

Local
workplace
Maintenance process

-·..d
Server database ---

Gate way

- I :. :I_
)
; ter- GPs

..
ill_ "l:L.. _z::_

_
--1 I :
I
.I,.!"........................................................................-(--- ::::::...; Station Bus Ethernet TCP /IP

:..1 IL j Starcoupler :_J iji

'J Star coupler

Switch yard ----------

m
c- Cabling
Cabling

)· 66kV

329
 . !

15.3.3 This integration also enables more effective usage of
lines by allowing switching protection parameter sets
e g. depending on weather conditions. This is one
prerequisite to the effective usage of a line's power
bearing capacity.
15.3.2 Under-frequency initiated load
shedding to avoid blackouts
When tripping of power generation occurs on a net
work, the variation of frequency depends of several
dynamic factors in interaction such as the quantity of
spinning reserve, the limitations of the prime mover
system and the speed of governors, the inertia of the
power system or the sensitivity of customer load. This
phenomenon is particularly important on isolated
power systems where the largest generating unit
represents a high proportion of the total demand. On
these kinds of power systems, many blackouts can
be avoided with the aid of well-tuned load
shedding plans.
Conventional load shedding with hard-wired relay
logic is static In case of system voltage or frequency
decline, the scheme activates tripping of pre-selected
circuit breakers regardless of the actual load condi
tions. Microprocessor based load-shedding schemes,
however, are in the position to take the actual loads
into account and to dynamically select only those
feeders to be opened, which are needed to regain
the frequency stability (Figure 15-5)
15.3.3 High speed power transfer for
uninterrupted power supply
This is another typical example enhancing the power
availability for an industrial process. In case of a trans
former fault the load is transferred to a second trans
former fast enough that the industrial process can
continue without interruption (Figure 15-6). For a more
detailed description refer to chapter 6.3.5.8.

F1gure 15-5 Dynamic load shedding via !ED

IntelIIgent Ioad 132 kV 132 kV

shedding unit

Se!ective tripping
according
132166kV
to actual loads

I
I
II ..1
I 1
u Busbar

J----------- -$--
. .
330

+
I, T.·················r·········
tu. ,I
j

Line F1
Line Protection Line Protection

15.3.5

High-Speed
Busbar Transfer

Transformer
Protection
 Figure 75-6 High speed busbar transfer
1 5.3.4 Adaptive line distance protection to
improve selectivity and flexibility
The term "adaptive" is related to a protection philo
sophy, which permits automated adjustments of pro
tection settings to make them more attuned to the
prevailing power system conditions. A typical exam ple
is adaptive distance protection (see Figure 15-7).
Transmission corridors often comprise lines that are
running parallel over long distances. Load shifting
from one line to another as a preventive or corrective
measure, has to take into account the mutual impe
dance between the parallel lines. In addition to this, the
allowed power transmission capacity of one of the lines
may have to be increased by corresponding adaptation of
the protection setting.
It is crucial that the communication links between sta tion
1 and 2 are of very high quality with regard to reliability
and real time behavior.
· ·
15.3.5 Bay oriented busbar protection to
maintain system integrity
A transmission substation busbar is a very sensitive
node in the network. Due to the convergence of
many supply circuits high current values are involved.
Busbar failures due to lightning strokes or connect ors
melting because of overload are relatively rare, but
when a fault occurs the damage can be wide spread
by causing disastrous cascade tripping of generators
and lines and finally the collapse of the entire power
system.
Busbar protection schemes have to be very reliable to
prevent unnecessary tripping and selective to trip only
those breakers necessary to clear the ousbar fault. The
clearing time is important to limit the dama ge caused by
the fault current and the power resto ration time is
crucial to maintain the power system integrity.
331
· '(
 r----------------------------------1
I

& t

15.3.6
.... .r (: --······················ ------1 1--
Station 2
Station 1

........._f-, .,----...................---.,
_{ _{
•• 'P1 t= n} l;l•- --
I
---------------------------------1
Figure 7 5-7 Adaptive distance protection for parallel transmission lines
•
A bay oriented numerical busbar protection with
communication to a central evaluation unit· can be
upgraded to a complete station protection scheme to
contain in addition to the busbar protection function
also line or transformer protection functions and even
station level interlocking. This integration of functions
can further be used for fast auto-reclosure of those
busbar sections and transmission lines that are not
affected by the busbar fault. Thus the same hardware
provides in addition to the busbar protection a back
up protection or main 2 object protection, thus en
hancing the reliability of the station and reducing
costs for spare parts and maintenance (Figure 1 5-8).

1 5.3.6 Integrated generator bay

protection and control
In case of extending existing power plants by one
332 further generator unit an integrated solution forge- Figure 75-8 Bay segregated busbar protection

GP
Figure 7 5-9 Power generator block control, protection and monitoring system
nerator protection and control together with SA may.
be more cost effective than to extend the legacy
power plant control system.
A solution with numerical control and protection IEDs
for HV bay control (BC), transformer protection (TP),
generator protection (GP) and combined MV con
trol/protection (C/P) also allows monitoring of the
complete bay which comprises generator, DC exita
tion system, generator circuit breaker, auxiliaries with
regulation transformer 6.3/22.0 kV, generator block
transformer 22/400 kV and the 400 kV switchgear
(Figure 15-9). The voltage figures are typical exam
ples only.
Again, more functionality with less hardware
enhan ces the system reliability and reduces
maintenance costs.
15.3.7
1 5.3.7 Power transformer
protection control and
monitoring
Periodic, off-line tests play an important role in eva
luating the general condition of transformers. But
more and more utilities wish to have better informa
tion and are turning to a sophisticated process to
collect information while the equipment is still in
ser vice. This on-line monitoring of the transformer
aims at improved reliability, at early stage detection
of pro blems, and at reduced maintenance cost
But in the majority of cases, there are neither
com munication links nor suitable sensors
available for transformer monitoring from remote,
which is an ob stacle to install remote monitoring.
333
The installation of a modern transformer protection
IED together with a load tap changer control lED
in conjunction with
 '? '-?
'? '? '?

15.4 a cheep wide-area communication like Internet is a
cost effective package for remote control of the tap
changer, load dependent control of the cooling sys
tem, and for load adaptive protection as well as for
remote transformer monitoring.
The benefits are optimized transformer load control
and better exploitation of the transformer capacity
(Figure 1 5-10).
..
Figure 15-10 Transformer online monitoring Transformer
334 and remote control via Internet protection
1 5.4 Power system monitoring
to work systems harder and
to save costs
For once neglecting outages as a result of wrong
human operation, there are basically three reasons
for power interruptions:
• The breakdown of a utility asset through
normal wear and ageing under working
conditions.
• The outage of an asset being effected by an
external event or fault.
• A temporary system disturbance where the
external influence disappears.
Condition monitoring mainly addresses the wear and
aging caused by normal or temporarily abnormal
working conditions. Firstly, in that they support the
Maintenance
Transformer
control
evaluation of the actual condition of assets, and
secondly, in that they might explicitly support the
prediction of the further evolution of a detected pro-
. blem, and the probability of breakdown.
1 5.4.1 Data acquisition
The use of intelligent electronic devices (lED) for pro
tection and control in substation automation
provides from the data acquisition point of view a
sound foun dation for basic monitoring systems. It is
cost-efficient and relatively easy to enhance with
additional, speci fic monitoring task functionality. This
may comprise (Figure 15-11)
• Disturbance recorders,
• Event recorders,
• Statistical value recording,
• Power quality analyzers,
• General purpose programming capabilities.
With computing power making its way into the
pri mary equipment like the ABB PASS, more and
more internal data from high voltage equipment
can be made available to the outside at reasonable
costs like
• Switching counters,
• Thermal information,
• Quality of isolation media,
• Entire timing curves of switching operations,
• Switching currents,
• Manufacturing data,
• Original value of key performance criteria.
This kind of data isthe source of valuable condition
information and exploited for introducing condition
monitoring from remote.
For more details on condition monitoring and asset
management please refer to chapter 9.
1 5.4.2 Disturbance recording 15.4.2
for fault location and power
quality assessment
In the last decades, the power systems have been
monitored in order to be able to determine the
exact type of fault, to find the proper ways to
clear the faults, and to check the reactions of the
protective devices. This was rather done for reporting
purposes, that means extracting the exact picture of
the fault, to include these data in reports. Another
goal for this monitoring system, was engineering
oriented, that is improving the theoretical models of
the electrical net works, thus studying the
appropriateness, between the "calculated behavior
of the network" regards of the "actual behavior of
the network':
The monitored data was used as well in
litigation context, where the responsibility
between several actors in the electrical networks
was to be looked into for cost assignment in
particularly severe conse quences of faults on the
electrical network. In some cases, a very accurate
analysis of the fault was requir ed to know the
exact values of the electrical para meters just
before the faults, to see whether such piece of
equipment was ,right" to have failed or not.
With the power quality concerns, the goals are diffe
rent. While the use of the data for internal engineer
ing purposes is still valid, a new requirement is to
eva luate the level of quality of the electrical
supply for giving information, on which legal
contractual agree ments can be based upon, and
providing data that can be issued to the public This
is particularly true with the deregulation occurring
on the markets, where legal interfaces have to be
defined between, more than one actors of the
_energy market.
335
 ·
·
r

· '-!
15.4.3 Such data can be derived from disturbance record 1 5.4.3 Power system condition assessment
ings, which are either conducted by dedicated devic
for better knowledge
es or by IEDs with integrated disturbance recorders,
which belong to substation monitoring or substation
Centralized retrieval and transmission of data, and
automation systems as described in Chapter 9 (Figure
transforming data and information into knowledge
15-13).
enables the maintenance and protection engineer to
asses the condition of the entire power system.

Such a system is a decision support tool for the sub

stitution of time-based maintenance policies by con
dition oriented and reliability centered maintenance
concepts and offers the following benefits:

lntenuplions

IVVVVVV
Sags

A4_/\_hJ
'j ·- ----- tianoi..C!I
>·.
I
-··.:.,·
·. -1\ /\-A f\ I

'E· t;r
If vv.,. v ' ·.· ,.,....... ··

Figure 15-13 Disturbance recording and VoltageftuCtuations

I
power quality assessment
336
• Protection related information as input for 15.4.3
protection system evaluation
• Direct access to substation monitoring and
automation system in emergency cases or for
getting dedicated analysis data .
• Parameter setting from remote making
protection system maintenance more efficient
• Assessment of power quality
• Historical data base for enterprise resource
planning
• Visualization of critical areas via geographical
information system (GIS)
• Identification of weak spots in combination
with lightning data base
• Support of maintenance and asset
management systems

Substation

" -- • .:>.1.-·· ·..

l I

Figure 7 5-7 4 Central retrieval and evaluation of event and fault records 337
16 Guide to SA System Specification

16.1 Introduction 340 16

16.2 Specification of user specific requirements 340 Table of
16.2.1 Crucial Questions to be addressed by the Specification 341 content
16.2.2 Example of a SA System Specification 344
16.3 Addressing IEC 61850 in the specification 344

339
 16 Guide to SA System Specification

16.2 16.1 Introduction
One of the prime objectives of this book is to guide
utilities being the users of SA systems to elaborate a
technical system specification, which reflects their
specific needs and requirements in terms of
pen that a solution is selected that does not repre-
sent the state-of-the-art or is not optimised. On the ,I .
other hand, the specification should allow enough
flexibility that reputable manufacturers' standard tech-
nology can be used that assures comprehensive, safe
and cost-effective substation automation solutions.

• operation philosophy, Any effort spent into the elaboration of this specifica-
• performance, tion is well invested as it results in high quality
tenders
• availability, that are submitted by the vendors and make the
eva-
luation and decision making process for contract
• maintainability, etc award easy.

The Specification should be comprehensive enough

to provide the vendors of SA systems with a clear pic-
ture of the utility specific scope of functionality and
preferences as well as of the required system
struc- ture. Further, utility specific boundary conditions
have to be included as well.
16.2 Specification of user specific
requirements
The technical change of substation control, forcasted

in the beginning of the eighties, started slowly but A substation automation system shall provide on one
has been more rapid in the last few years. The origi- hand all the functions that are required for the
cor- nal question of whether microprocessor techno- red and safe operation of the primary
equipment logy should be applied in HV substations, has com- that is contained in a specific substation
as well as for pletely given way to the question of how it should the adequate protection and
condition monitoring. be applied, which is crucial for a SA system imple- On the other hand it has to
incorporate compatible mentation to succeed. But the specification should interfaces for the connection
of the substation with not restrict the vendor to a specific solution and be the switchgear (process
interface) and to one or general enough that vendors can design cost effec- more network control
centres (tele-control interface). tive solutions to meet the customer requirements.
The scope of functionality of a substation automation
The descriptions and recommendations contained in system depends on the following aspects:
Chapter 6: The functions of substation automation • Size and significance of the substation as well
Chapter 7: The substation automation structure as the range of voltage levels concerned.
Chapter 8: The substation automation architecture • Operational processes available to the ].Jser for
testing commissioning and operation, as well as
for maintaining bulh the substation and the SA--
provide comprehensive background knowledge and
address the most common users requirements and system. ,I
needs. It is recommended to specify mainly the tunc- • Availability requirements as a criterion related to II
tiona! requirements rather than giving preference to the substation's criticality and significance in the
340 any vendor specific solution. Otherwise, it may hap- grid or for consumers. I
l
• Integration of the substation control functions Self-monitoring of devices and communication by 16.2.1
into the user's network management concept, checking each function constantly whether all of its
with a varying number of network control levels corresponding functional partners are available will
and a different distribution of functions between have an impact on the system availability and safety.
network control centres and substation control.
• Decoupiing of the renewal cycles between The requirement to provide for easy future exten
substation control, power system management sions or upgrade of the system functionality at
and transmission technology. com petitive prices will most probably make the
supplier to use standard modular components.
• In case of retrofit, the integration into the user's
existing substation environment in terms of inter
faces to the existing equipment and coordination
with secondary devices dedicated for protection
and monitoring that are not substituted by 16.2.1 Crucial Questions to be addressed
new IEDs and have to be integrated in the
new substation automation system.
by the Specification

The check list on the following pages shall assure that

These influencing factors require the software and
the answers to the most crucial questions is given to
hardware components of a substation automation
the vendors of SA systems.
system to be very flexible with regard to combination
and parameterisation.

Due to the numerous influencing factors and the

required flexibility, no suggestion should be made for
a certain hardware architecture or a certain data trans- ·
mission procedure for internal communication but IEC
61850 should be referenced as indicated in section
16.3. Therefore, the focus should be on the descrip
tion of the functionality and performance require
ments to allow for solutions with high economic
effectiveness and availability.

The required availability of the individual functions

depends on the significance of the substation and the
primary reseNe strategy of the user. These require
ments should be specified by the user to allow for
redundancy of function modules, or complete func
tions, as well as for the exchange of data, if applica
ble. These requirements may also result in the combi
nation of several functions in one lED, but such details
should not be specified. The detailed project specific
execution should be offered by the supplier according
to his expertise and the capabilities of his products. 341

·
 What are the utility specific data?
Where is the location and what are the
environmental conditions?
16.2.1
What is the type and size of substation (SIS)
that has to be covered by the SA system?
How shall the substation automation system be
integrated in the power system
management?
What is the role and importance of the
substation in the power system?
What are the availability requirements for
the SA system?
What are the general requirements for the
SA system, i.e. the boundary conditions?
What kind of process interfaces are available?
342
What is the scope of functionality?
What is the required performance?
What kind of standards and quality measures
are required?
• Name, address, type of business
• Responsible person
• Geographical location
• Environnemental site condition
e Location in the power grid
• Transmission or distribution S/S
• Voltage levels
• Single line diagram
• Type of switchgear bays
• Air insulated (AIS) or gas insulated (GIS) S/S
• New or extended S/S
• Communication to network control centers
• Communication to engineering and maintenance
centers
• Common data model and allocated functions if
applicable
• The impact of loss of power supply
from specific lines
• Sensitivity of customers supplied
• Indication of specific availability figures, or "low';
"medium·;,high"
• Trouble shooting from remote (access,
response time)
• Availability of spares
• New S/S or refurbishment of conventional
control and protection of an existing substation
• Details about the control building, switchyard
layout, cable trenches, lengths of cables
• Details of the grounding system and EMI condition s
• Outdoor or indoor installation of the kiosks
• Air conditioned relay and control rooms, yes/no
• Auxiliary power supply
• Conventional CT and VT
• Non-conventional sensors and actuator with
sample rates and accuracy classes
• Pre-processing of data in cases of "intelligent"
switchgear
• Integrated lED functionality in cases of "intelligent"
switchgear
• Operative functions for control,
protection, monitoring, and automation
• Functions for parameterization, testing and
diagnostics
• System configuration and maintenance procedures
• Communication including the related standards 16.2.1
• Remote access
• Response times for HMI
• Response times for specific automation functions
• Response times for protection
• Other quality attributes
• International standards to be applied • Utility specific requirements
• Specific utility standards • Quality assurance

What additional aspects have to be considered? • Preferred system architecture

• Homologated protection devices and schemes
• Extendibility and maintainability
• Maintenance concept
• Maintenance contract

What are the delivery requirements? • Scope of delivery

• Time schedule
• Acceptance tests
• Approval process
• Others
• Payments
What are the commercial conditions and !
• Liabilities
ega!
commitments? • Legal issues
• General contractor
What are the contractors and buyer's • Subsupplier
responsibilities? • System integrator
• Work to be supplied locally
• Contributions of the utility personnel

More information needed? • Project management organization

• System and product development philosophy
of the supplier (information about new
functions, conditions for SW update, etc)
• Others
343

..,
16.3 ,16.2.2 Example of a SA System
Specification
The example of a substation automation system
spe cification enclosed in chapter 21 :Annex' is to be
con sidered a guidance only. For the various
requirements specified, a comprehensive description
is available in this book.
16.3 Addressing IEC 61850
in the specification
The standard IEC 61850 (see chapter 13) will be
completely finalized in 2003/2004, and compatible
products and systems will be available for delivery
by
2004/2005, but the first readers of this book will
find the following references to this standard
already in
2003.
344
If a Substation Automation system is needed very
soon, the proprietary protocols may still be the right
solution, in particular for extensions of existing SA
systems. Nevertheless, it may be advisable to address
IEC 61850 in the specification for migration scena
rios if applicable.
In any case, the following parts of IEC 61850 may be
helpful for writing the specification:
IEC 61850-3 Communication networks
and systems in substations - Part 3: General
requirements
IEC 61850-4 Communication networks and
systems in substations - Part 4: System and
project management
IEC 61850-5 Communication networks and
systems in substations - Part 5: Communication
requirements for functions and devices models
For future projects, IEC 61850 should be a key
requi rement both for retrofit and new substations
(see chapter 13).
17 Strategy to Cope with the fast Changing Technology

17.1 Introduction 346 17

17.2 Vendor commitments 346 Table of
17.3 Availability of Spares on Site 346 content
17.4 Use of standardized communication 346
17.5 Use of a standardized system description language 347
17.6 Functional specification 347
17.7 References 347

345
17.4 17.1 Introduction
Substations are living very long, and although ·their
secondary system might be exchanged two or three
times during the substation life time, its life time .
remains in the order of 10 to 15 years. During this
time, the system has to be maintained. This means in
minimum the replacement of failed parts, and very
often also extension of the system either by new
bays or new functions.
For conventional systems, extensions were not a big
issue as the electromechanical parts lived quite long.
For the other parts, manufacturers were selected and
contracts made that assured delivery of spare parts
for this time, thus shifting the solution of problem to
keep spares available to the manufacturers. However,
with the introduction of mainstream digital
technolo gy, where every year a new HW
generation or ope rating system version appears
on the market, the solution of the problem
becomes more difficult. There are different
approaches to handle this pro blem. Some are
more organizational, others more technical.
17.2 Vendor commitments
Vendor commitments, as already done now, should
be part of the negotiations. For numerical technology
they result normally in steps. For a very short period
(e.g. 2 years), originally parts will be available. After
this time, compatible parts may be delivered.
Someyears later, devices with compatible functiona
lity will be produced only. Part of the negotiation will
be the length of these steps and the way of
informa tion of the manufacturer about product
replacement strategies and backward compatibility
of products respective product versions.
Recommendations are found in IEC 61850-4. Do
not forget that in a system the communication has
to stay compatible if only
346 some parts are exchanged.
17.3 Availability of spares on site
A conventional way to protect investments against a
fast changing technology is to order a reasonable
stock of spare parts. There is a trade off between the
numbers needed, the related cost and the aging of
spare parts meaning at least the expiration of the
warranty. If there are too many spare parts any
improvement of the system over the time might be
restricted. Also the costs of keeping spares for 10
years or longer are quite high, and there will always
remain a risk that there are not enough spares. So
normally only an amount of spares to bridge delivery
time span should be kept on site, and a contract with
the manufacturer should assure spares for the remain
ing lifetime. As the manufacturer can make these
contracts with many customers, his cost in
minimizing the risk to run out of spares is much
lower. He can further decide himself if it is better
to keep original parts, or compatible parts with new
technology, even if they require a bit more
adaptation effort at their first implementation.
17.4 Use of standardized
communication
The use of international standards like IEC is always
recommended for long-term compatibility. As men
tioned above, the key for system maintenance is a
standardized communication, i.e. for substations IEC
61850. The standard IEC 61850 has also the advan
tage that it is based on a concept, which separates
the application layers from the basic communication
layers, thus allowing to exploit the benefits from the
technical advances in communication (especially the
lower layers of the stack) without loosing compatibi
lity on the application level. The selection of lower lay
er standards like Ethernet and TCP/IP, which have al
ready proven backward compatibility across a de
velopment time of 10 years or more, supports this
strategy further.
1 7. 5 Use of a standardized 17.6 Functional specification 17.7
system description language
. To cope with the fast changing technology and not to
specify the past. it is strongly recommended to spe
To avoid starting any re-engineering for updates and
cify functions, quality and interfaces of systems only
extensions from the scratch, a standardized system
but not boxes and softwnre (see Chapter 16 "Guide
description language in form of computer read
to SA System Specification").
able files shall be used. The Substation Configuration
description Language (SCL) language of the standard The system description language mentioned above
IEC 61850 is such a language. As this language is can be part of this functional specification. It describes
manufacturer independent. it would allow with the needed functionality and its connection to the
relati vely low effort to replace devices from one switchyard in a form, which can be relatively easy
manufac turer with functional compatible ones used by a manufacturer to derive his system solution.
from another manufacturer, beneath allowing to
use technically advanced and functionally compatible It can then be complemented by a more detailed
devices of the same manufacturer. description of each function block

17.7 References

[1] Standards see chapters 12 and 13 of this book

[2] I EC 61850-4 Communication Networks and Systems in Substations - Part 4:
System and Project Management
[3]1EC 61850-6 Communication Networks and Systems in Substations- Part 6: Substation
Automation System Configuration Language
[4] L. Andersson, K-P. Brand, W. Wimmer · The Impact of the coming Standard IEC 67 850 on the
Life-cycle of Open Communication Systems in Substations
Transmission and Distribution 02001, Brisbane, Australia, November 11-14, 2001 347

. ·
18 Trends and Outlook

18.1 Changes in the Power Industry 350 18

18.2 The Impact of Future Trends in Technologies 350 Table of
18.3 Dedicated look at Internet technologies 350 content
18.4 Prospects in the Substation Automation Business 352
18.5 References 352

349
 18 Trends and Outlook

1.

18.3 18.1 Cha,nges in the Power Industry
There are a lot of indications that the future_ power
systems will be much more decentralized than today,
i.e. moving towards an Energy Web with the power
network as connection of a lot of small, distributed
energy generation units, comparable with the
Internet based World Wide Web. Maybe also other
energy forms like Hydrogen will compete the electric
power.
drastically, and, at least in technically developed coun
tries, each home will be accessible by communication
with relatively high bandwidth at reasonable costs.
The new communication technologies via radio and
with Web technologies will also push the use and
coordination of distributed generation e.g. with micro
turbines, by allowing centralized control and mainte
nance of these units from several competing compa
nies.

18.3 Dedicated look at Internet

18.2 The Impact of Future Trends
in Technologies
Besides new energy sources and media, the commu
nication capacity and processing power will increase
technologies
Internet technologies belong also to mainstream
technologies and comprise not only data communi
cation but also higher-level information handling tech-

Fault evaluation
;,f· f,§tecti a- c· report (manual
·'-Ma1htenanC:"e evaluation)

,· ':.- :: _.: .··.

. Simul tion se "6es Faul evaluation

. Training .)Ei}·. ,
. --,·...

Fault data
Disturbance Fault location,
recordings Short fault report,
SA/SMS
Systems (automatics)

RTU Internet Customers,

Disturbance Maintenance staff
recorders etc

Network
Control
Systems Maintenance
Asset Management
Systems

350 Figure 78-7 Non time-critical services for power system management

(asset owner)
Monitoring data
--------------'flllll#
Assets
Figure 18-2 Maintenance procedures supported by Internet
nologies. As mentioned above, they will support the
access from and to any private home, to all offices
and factories at reasonable costs.
As impact on industries including power system
management, the Internet provides some alternatives
to the existing information and control channels. In
chapter 13 was mentioned, that also modern com
munication standards like IEC 61850 are using TCP/IP,
which is the core element of Internet for information
routing. A mapping of IEC 61850 to Internet will be
possible in the future as well. The Internet client may
replace the HMis from today.
Critical are real-time applications or applications, which
need a well-defined response time or data through
put. This is important especially for communication
between devices constituting a distributed automa-
18.3
Utility
.... --or-de rs
-·
.,J
\ Maintenance Service
Company,
Maintenance
management
system
tion function. The feasibility of Internet technologies
for such applications cannot be claimed today but
has to be carefully evaluated in the future. The
access security is also critical but there may be
solutions from the home banking business. The
studies in WG 15 of IEC TC57 address already the
security aspects for all communications in power
system applications.
Non time-critical applications today like status super
vision, maintenance services, post-mortem fault ana
lysis, asset management, meter reading and billing
are already in the trend using Internet technologies.
Distribution automation or the distributed generation
according to the concept of virtual utilities may also
cause some challenges in Internet technologies.
Some of those applications are oulined in Fig. 18-1
and Fig. 18-2. 351
 18.4 Prospects in the Substation
Automation Business

The topics mentioned above, the distribution of ener • Central gathering of statistical and maintenance
18.5 gy generation and the general availability of low cost information can be taken over by central monitor
communication channels with high bandwidth might ing systems via Internet in combination with asset
influence the substation business as follows: · management.

• More decentralized power systems may A consequence of deregulation is that consistent

result in smaller substations, but the
requirements for automation will strongly
increase.
• Communication between substations can lead to
higher safety, e.g. if the Interlocking scheme knows
the states of switches at the other end of a line,
or automatic load restoration schemes can initiate
switching sequences in the neighboring station.
• Network control functions might be
allocated down to substation level, some
substation functions to the switchgear.
• Fast communication links might cause pure
SCADA on network level to become superfluous.
Remote control of the substation can be done
with remote HMI or Web browser directly.
metering information from substations has to be dis
tributed to a lot of different business partners: Trans
mission companies, Distribution companies, Genera
tion companies, Power Trading companies, etc. This
needs a lot of communication connections in a
stand ardized way, which is enabled by the
technology trends in communication.
The conclusion out of all these trends is that the
importance of substation automation will be increas
ing in the future.

18.5 References

[1] Steve Silbermann · The Energy WEB,

Wired Magazine, Issue 9.07. July 2001

[2] Georg Hellack, Wolfgang Wimmer· lnternet-Technologien in der Energietechnik

(Internet Technologies in Power System Technology)
ETG-Tagung, Eisenach, 2001

[J] R. Baumann, K-P. Brand, Ch. Brunner, W Wimmer

Der Standard IEC 61850 in Schaltanlagen als Kern einer durchgangigen Kommumkations
losung fur den Netzbetreiber (The Standard IEC 61850 in Substations as Nucleus of a
transparent Communication Solution for Network Operators), Bulletin ElectroSuisse 3 (2003)

352
r
· .,
19 References

Chapter 2 19
References
[1] Volker Lohmann (BBC/Switzerland), Andrew C. Bolton. (ESGOM/South Africa)
Gas insulated switchgear developed for 765 kV, Modern Power Systems,
February 1985, published by United Trade Press Ltd. London/UK
[2] Eric Engelbrecht (ESCOM/South/Africa), Bernhard Sander, Hermann Schachermayr (BBC/Switzerland)
Integrated control for ECOM's 800 kV ALPHA Substation, Transmission and Distribution,
Modern Power Systems, October 1987, published by United Trade Press Ltd. London/UK
[3] Klaus-Peter Brand, JUrgen Kopainsky, Wolfgang Wimmer · Topology based interlocking
of electrical substations, IEEE Trans. on Power Delivery PWRD-1, 3, 118-126 (1986)

Chapter 3
[1.1] Olle I. Elgerd · Electric Energy Systems Theory, 2nd ed., Mac Graw Hill, 1982
[1.2] Olle I. Elgerd, Patrick. D. van der Puije ·Electric Power Engineering,
2nd ed., Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997
[2.1] Walter A. Elmore (Ed.) · Protective Relaying Theory and Applications,
Marcel Dekker, New York (1994)
[2.2] Helmut Ungrad, Wilibald Winkler, Andrej Wiszniewski · Protection Techniques in Electrical
Energy Systems, Marcel Dekker, New York (1995)
[3] Switchgear Manual, © ABB Calor Emag Schaltanlagen Mannheim, 1Oth revised edition,
Cornelsen Verlag, Berlin, 2001

Chapter 4
Ryan Bird ·Justifying Substation Automation, Black & Veatch, http//:tasnet.com/justa.shtml

Chapter 5
Switchgear
[1] Switchgear Manual· ©ABB Calor Emag Schaltanlagen Mannheim, 10th revised edition,
Cornelsen Verlag, Berlin, 2001
[2] KP. Koppel, B. Stepinski, H. Ungrad, K-P. Brand· New Sustation Concepts,
5th Conf. on Electric Power Supply Industry (CEPSI), Manila (1984)
SF6
[3] K-P. Brand, H. Jungblut · The Interaction Potentials of SF 6 /ons in SF 6 parent Gas
Determined from Mobility Data, Journal of Chemical Physics 78, 4, 1999-2007 (1983) 353

I
19 [4] K-P. Brand ·Dielectric Strength, boiling Point and Toxicity of Gases- Different Aspects
References of the same Basic Molecular Properties
IEEE Trans. on Electrical Insulation El-17, 5, 451-456 (1982)
[5] K-P. Brand, W. Egli, L. Niemeyer, K Ragaller, E. Schade · Dielectric Recovery of an Axially blown
SF6 -Arc after current Zero: Pt.!II- Comparison of Experiment and Theory
IEEE Trans. on Plasma Science PS-10, 3, 162-172 (1982)
[6] K Ragaller, W. Egli, K-P. Brand ·Dielectric Recovery of an Axially blown SF 6 -Arc after
current Zero: Pt./1- Theoretical Investigations, IEEE Trans. on Plasma Science PS-10, 3,
154-162 (1982)
[7] E. Schade, K Ragaller · Dielectric Recovery of an Axially blown SF 6 -Arc after current Zero:
Pt./ - Experimental Investigations, IEEE Trans. on Plasma Science PS-10, 3, 141-153 ( 1982)
[8] K-P. Brand ·A Model Description of the /on Mobility in SF6 at elevated Pressures,
Proc 15th lnt.Conf.on Phenomena in Ionized Gases (ICPIG) Minsk (1981), Part I, 301-302
[9] K-P. Brand, J. Kopainsky · Model Description of Breakdown Properties for Unitary
electronegative Gases and Gas mixture, Proc 3rd Int. Symp. on High Voltage Engineering (ISH),
Milan (1979), Paper 31.05 (4 pages)
[10] K-P. Brand, J. Kopainsky ·Breakdown Field strength of Unitary attaching Gases
and Gas mixtures, Applied Physics 18, 321-333 (1979)
[11] K-P. Brand, J. Kopainsky ·Particle Densities in a decaying SF 6 Plasma
Applied Physics 16, 425-432 (1978)

Sensors
[12] F. Engler et al. · Test and Service Experiences on Gas insulated switching Systems
and Substations with intelligent Control, Cigre 2000, Paper 34-101 (7 pages), Paris, September 200

Chapter 6
[1] Walter A. Elmore (Ed.) · Protective Relaying Theory and Applictions,
Marcel Dekker, New York (1994)
[2] Helmut Ungrad, Wilibald Winkler, Andrej Wiszniewski · Protection Techniques in Electrical
Energy Systems, Marcel Dekker, New York (1995)
[3]1EC 61850-5 Communication netvl/orks and systems in substations- Part 5: Communication
requirements for functions and device models ·

354
(4] K-P. Brand, J. Kopainsky, W. Wimmer · Mikroprozessor-gestatzte Verriegelung von Schaltanlagen mit
beliebiger Sammelschienenanordnung (Microprocessor-aided interlocking of substations with arbitrary
busbar arrangement),
Brown Boveri Technik 74, 5, 261-268 (1987)

[5] K-P. Brand, J. Kopainsky, W. Wimmer · Topology-based interlocking of Electrical Substation,

IEEE Trans. on Power Delivery PWRD-1, 3, 118-126 (1986) 19
[6] K-P. Brand, W. Wimmer ·An Expert System for Topology based interlocking in digital References
Substation Control, CIGRE SC34 Colloquium, Brasil.. 21-26 September 1991, Paper 02-10
(7] K.-P. Brand, D. Weissgerber · Adaptive Load Shedding for industrial power networks,
CIGRE SC34 Colloquium, Stockholm, 11-17 June 1995, Paper 34-209

[8] B. Sander, S. Laderach (Eiektrizitatsgesellschafl: Laufenburg/Switzerland), H. Ungrad, F. liar,

I. De Mesmaecker, (ABB Relays AG/Switzerland) ·Adaptive protection based on interaction between
protection and control, Cigre Paper 34-205, September 1994 Session in Paris
Chapter 8
[1] G. W. Scheer, D. A. Woodward · Speed and Reliability of Ethernet networks for Teleprotection and Control,
Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories Inc (SEL), 2001
[2] G. W. Scheer, D. J. Dolezilek ·Comparing the reliability of Ethernet network topologies in Substation control and
Monitoring Networks, Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories Inc (SEL),
(Western Power Delivery Automation Conference 2000, Spokane, Washington), 2000

[3] L. Andersson, K-P. Brand, W. Wimmer· The impact of the coming standard IEC67850 on the life
cycle of Open Communication Systems in Substations.
Distribution 2001, Brisbane, Australia, November 2001

[4] L. Andersson, K-P. Brand, W. Wimmer· The communication standard /EC67850 supports flexible
and optimised substation automation architectures, Integrated Protection, Control and Communication
Experience, Benefits and Trends, Session IV - Communication for protection and control. (pages IV-17
to IV-23), New Delhi, India, 10-12 October 2001.

(5] T Skeie, S. Johannessen, 0. Holmeide · Highly Accurate Time Synchronization over Switched Ethernet.
In Proceedings of 8th IEEE Conference on Emerging Technologies and Factory Automation (ETFA'01), pages 195-204,
2001.
[6] T Skeie, S. Johannessen, and C. Brunner· Ethernet in Substation Automation, IEEE Control Systems
Magazine, 22(3): 43-51, June 2002

[7] K-P. Brand, K Frei, 0. Preiss, W. Wimmer· A coordinated Control and Protection Concept
Medium Voltage Substations and its Realization, CIRED 1991
[8] 0. Preiss, W. Wimmer· Goals and Realization of an Integrated Substation Control System,
DPSP&C 1994, Peking, 1994 . .

[9] EWICS TC7, Dependability of critical computer systems, Elsevier Applied Science, London, 1988 [10] CIGRE

-Technical Report, Ref. No.180 · Communication requirements in terms of data flow

within substations. CE/SC 34 03, 2001, 112 pp. Ref. No 355

. ·
 Chapter 9
[1] F. Engler, AW Jaussi ·Intelligent substation automation- monitoring and diagnostics in
HV switchgear /nsta!lations, ABB Review 3/1998

[2] R. ltschner, C. Pommerell, M. Rutishauser 0 GLASS - Remote Monitoring of Embedded Systems

in Power Engineering, IEEE Internet Computing, May/June 1998
19
References [3] Xiaobing Qiu, Wolfgang Wimmer 0 Applying Object-Orientation and Component Technology
to Architecture Design of Power System Monitoring, PowerCon 2000, 4th International Conference
on Power System Technology, Perth, Australia, December 4-7, 2000

[4] I. De Mesmaeker, H. Ungrad, G. Wacha, W. Wimmer 0 The role of SMS in enhancing

protection and control functions, CIRED 93, Birmingham, 1993

[5] K.-P. Brand, H. Singh, H. Ungrad, W. Wimmer 0 Enhancement of distribution protection

by communication, 2nd Int. Symposium, Singapore, 1991

[6] V. Lohmann Integrated Substation Automation System Support: New Maintenance Strategies
°

for T&D Equipment Electrical Engineering Technical Exchange Meeting at Saudi Arabian Oil Company,
November 1998

[7] V. Lohmann, I. De Mesmaeker, B. Eschermann ° New Maintenance Strategies for Power Systems
supported by Substation Automation, Cigre Conference June 1999 in London/UK

[8] V. Lohmann, 0. Preiss · Less Impact of Power Failures Due to Substation Automation,
CIRED Conference, 1999 in Nice

Chapter 10
[1] Ryan Bird ·Justifying Substation Automation, Black & Veatch http/ /tasnet.com/justa.shtml

[2] V. Lohmann, H. Kattemoelle 0 Enhanced Customer Values enabled by Synergies between

Protection dnd Control in HV Substations, lEE International Conference on Power System Control
and Management in London/UK April 1996

[3] V. Lohmann, J. Bertsch · Information Technology (IT) and the Application of Numerical Protection
and Control Devices to enhance management and Utilization of Power Networks, International
Distribution Utility Conference, Sydney/Australia, November 1997

[4] V. Lohmann ° Integrated Substation Automation enables new Strategies for Power T&D,
Southern Africa Power System Conference in Johannesburg/South Africa, November 2000

[5] V. Lohmann ° Advances in Power System Management Conference on Global Participation in Indian
International Grid, Energy Management and Convergence, Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd.
and Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in Mumbai/lndia, August 2001 -

[6] RT Earp, MA. Lee, C. Proudfoot 0 Worldng the Protection Engineer Harder,
Cigre Symposium June 1999, in London/UK Paper No. 320-1

356
Chapter 11 ' 19
References
[1] Piere Cholley, Peter Crossley, Vincent Van Acker, Thierry Van Cutsem, Weihu Fu, Jose Soto lndianez,
Franc liar, Daniel Karlsson, Yasuhiro Kojima, James McCalley, Marian Piekutowski, Goran Rundvik,
Roberto Salvati, Olaf Samuelsson, Gilles Trudel, Costas Yournas, Xavier 'vVaymel,
System Protection Schemes in Power Networks, Ogre Study Committee Task Force SQF 38.02.19,
Final draft vS.O Conference lnternationale des Grandes Reseaux Electriques (Cigre), 2000
[2] Christian Rehtanz · Online Stability Assessment and Wide Area Protection based on
Phasor Measurements, Bulk Power System Dynamics and Control V, August 26-31, 2001,
Onoomichi, Japan
[3] Claudio Canizares · Voltage Stability Report, http:/ /www.power.uwaterloo.ca
[4] Defence plans major disturbances, Large Systems and International Connections Study
Committee 40.01 SYSTDEP, UNIPEDE, Paris/France

Chapter 12
[1] Switchgear Manual, @ ABB Calor Emag Schaltanlagen Mannheim, 1Oth revised edition,
Cornelsen Verlag, Berlin, 2001
[2]1nternational Electricity Commission (IEC): www.iecch
[3]1nstitute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE): www.ieee.org
[4] Deutsches lnstitut fUr Normung (DIN): www.din.de
[5] International Standard Organization (ISO): www.iso.org

Chapter 13
[1] L. Andersson, K-P. Brand ·The Benefits of the coming Standard IEC16850 for
Communication in Substations
Southern African Power System Protection Conference, Johannesburg, November 8-9, 2000
[2] R. Dinges · Standardisierung in der Schutz- und Stationsleittechnik (Standardization
in Protection and Substation Automation)
ETG-Fachtagung "Schutz- und Stationsleittechnik'; Nurnberg, 23./24.10.2001

[3] K-P. Brand, W. Wimmer · Der Standard IEC 61850 - Offene Kommunikation in Schaltanlagen
im deregulierten Strommarkt (The Standard IEC 61850 - Open Communication for Substations
in the deregulated Electric Energy Market) Bulletin SEVNSE 93, 1 (2002) 9-13

357

., '? · I
19 (4] Ch. Brunner, A. Ostermeier ·Serial Communication Between Process and Bay Level - Standards
References and Practical Experience
CIGRE 2000, Paper 34-106 (9 pages), Paris,"September 2000

(5] J. Haude, A. Janz, Th. Rudolph, Th. Schaffler, H. Schubert · A pilot Project for testing the Standard
Drafts for Open Communication in Substations - First Experiences with the future
Standard /EC 67850
CIGRE 2000, Paper 34-109 (6 pages). Paris, September 2000

(6] 0. Preiss, A. Wegmann· Towards a composition model problem based on IEC6785Q

Preceding of the 4th Workshop on Component-Based Software Engeneering,
Toronto, May 14-15, 2001

(7] L. Andersson, K-P. Brand, W. Wimmer· The Communication Standard IEC61850 supports flexible
and optimised Substation Automation Architectures
2nd International Conference on Integrated Protection, Control and Communication - Experience,
Benefits and Trends, Session IV, Paper 3, New Delhi, India, October 10-12, 2001

[8] L. Andersson, K.-P. Brand, W. Wimmer · Some Aspects of Migration from present Solutions
to SA Systems based on the Communication Standard /EC 67850
2nd International Conference on Integrated Protection, Control and Communication - Experience,
Benefits and Trends, Session IV, Paper 4, New Delhi, India, October 10-12, 2001

(9] L. Andersson, K-P. Brand, W. Wimmer· The Impact of the coming Standard IEC 61850 on the
Life-cycle of Open Communication Systems in Substations
Transmission and Distribution D2001, Brisbane, Australia, November 11-14, 2001
[10] Eric Udren, Steven Kunsman, Dave Dolezilek · Significant substation communication
standardization developments
Paper presented at the Western Protective Area Distribution Automation Conference (WPDAC),
April 2002
[11] Ch. Brunner, G. Schimmel. H. Schubert · Standardisation of serial/inks replacing parallel wiring
to transfer process data - Approach, state and practical experience
CIGRE 2002, Paper 34-209 (6 pages), Paris, September 2002

[12] R. Baumann, K-P. Brand, Ch. Brunner, W. Wimmer · Oer Standard IEC 61850 in Schaltanlagen
a/s Kern einer durchgangigen Kommunikationlosung fOr den Netzbetreiber
(The Standard /EC 61850 in Substations as nucleus of a transparent Communication Solution
for Network Operators), Bulletin ElectroSuisse94, 3 (2003)

358

· · ? '.:
Chapter 14 6.1.1.4.4.8

[1] ICE 61850 Communication networks and systems in substations

[2] IEC 61850-4 Communication networks and systems in substations - Part 4: System
and project management
[3] IEC 61850-6 Communication networks and systems in substations- Part 6: Configuration
description language for communication in electrical substations related to lEOs
[4] IEC 61850-10 Communication networks and systems in substations - Part 7 0: Conformance testing
[5] ISO 9001 : 2000 Quality management systems- Requirements
[6] CIGRE TF 34.01 (2002) Conformance Testing Guideline for Communication in Substation
(to be published by CIGRE in 2003)

Chapter 17
[1] Standards see chapters 12 and 13 of this book
[2]1EC 61850-4 Communication Networks and Systems in Substations- Part 4: System
and Project Management
[3]1EC 61850-6 Communication Networks and Systems in Substations- Part 6: Substation
Automation System Configuration Language
[4] L. Andersson, K-P. Brand, W. Wimmer· The Impact of the coming Standard IEC 67 850 on the
Life-cycle of Open Communication Systems in Substations
Transmission and Distribution 02001, Brisbane, Australia, November 11-14, 2001

Chapter 18
[1] Steve Silbermann · The Energy WEB,
Wired Magazine,Issue 9.07. July 2001

[2] Georg Hellack, Wolfgang Wimmer ·lnternet-Technologien in der Energietechnik

(Internet Technologies in Power System Technology)
ETG-Tagung, Eisenach, 2001

[3] R. Baumann, K-P. Brand, Ch. Brunner, W. Wimmer

Der Standard IEC 67850 in Schaltanlagen als Kern einer durchgangigen Kommunikations
losung fur den Netzbetreiber (The Standard IEC 67850 in Substations as Nucleus of a
transparent Communication Solution for Network Operators), Bulletin ElectroSuisse 3 (2003)

359
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20 Glossary

Abbreviation Explanation Chapter 20

Glossary
ND Analog Digital conversion 6.2
ND Analog/Digital 5.5
ABB Asea Brown Boveri 12.6.4.2.1
AC Alternate Current 3.3.3, 6.2
ACA Automatic Control Application 11.1
AGC Automatic Generation Control 11.5
AI Analog Input 6.2
AIS Air Isolated Switchgear 3.5.1
ALPD Accelerating Power Level Detector 11.5
ANSI American National Standard Institution 5.2
AO Analog Output 6.2
ASCII American Standard Code for Information Interchange 13.5.1
ATC Available Voltage Transmission Capability 11.6
AVR Automatic Voltage Regulator 11.5
BCD Binary Coded Decimal, a number code where each
decimal number is coded in 4 bits 6.2
BCU Bay Control Unit 6.3
Bl Binary Input 6.2
BO Binary Output 6.2

CAD Computer Aided Design 21.1.18

CB Circuit Breaker 5.5
CBM Condition Based Maintenance 5.1
CD Compact Disc 6.3
CIGRE Conseil International des Grand Reseaux Electriques 5.1, 10.1.2
CIM Common Information Model 10.2.3
CISPR International Special Committee on Radio Interference 12.5.6
CRT Cathode Ray Terminal (Screen) 12.6.3.3.1
CSR Controlled Shunt Reactor 5.6
CT Current Transformer 6.2, 16.2.1

DD Delta, Difference 3.3.2

DA Distribution Automation 4.2, 10.2.8
DAS Distribution Stability Assessment 11.6
DC Direct Current 3.3.3, 6.2
DCF77 European time radio sender 6.3
DDE Dynamic Data Exchange (between applications) 21.1.5.1.2
DIN Deutsche lndustrie-Norm (German Standard) 12.10.3

361
20 ECB Electronic Circuit Board 21.1.12
Glossary EHV Extra High Voltage 3.3.5, 6.3
EN European Norm 12.5.6
EM Energy Management 3.6.1.2
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility 5.5, 12.5.6
EMI Electromagnetic Interference 3.4.3.2, 6.2
EMS Energy Management System 6.6, 10.2.2
Est. Estimated 10.2.4

f Frequency (power frequency) 3.3.2

FACTS Flexible AC Transmission Systems 5.1, 15.2.2
FAT Factory Acceptance Test 12.13
FCC Federal Communications Commission (US) 12.5.6
FDS Functional Design Specification 21.1.8
cp Phase angle between current and voltage 3.3.6

G Conductance 3.3.4
GE General Electric 12.6.4.2.1
GIL Gas Isolated Line 3.3.4
GIS Gas Isolated Switchgear 3.5.1' 6.3
GIS Geographical Information System 15.4.3
GOOSE Generic Object Oriented System Event 13.5.1
GPS Global Positioning System; satellite system which beneath
location also broadcasts the exact time 6.3, 15.2.2

HMI Human Machine Interface; interface for an operator

to operate a control system 3.4.3.3, 6.3
HV High Voltage 3.3.5, 6.2
HVDC High Voltage Direct Current 3.3.3, 5.2
HW Hardware 17.1

I Current 3.3.6
1/0 Input Output - signal or hardware category 6.2
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission 3.3.5
lED Intelligent Electronic Device, microprocessor based
programmable piece of electronics 3.7.2, 6.2
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
ISO International Standard Organization 12.1.1
ISQ Independent System Operator 9
IT Information Technology 4.1, 10.2.3

KPS Key System Parameter 11.6

362
L lnductance 3.3.4
LCD Liquid Crystal Display 6.2
LD Logical Device 13.5.1
LED Light Emitting Diode 6.2
LLG Line-Line-Ground 11.6
LN Logical Node 13.5.1
LPC Local Protection Center 11.1 20
LV Low Voltage 3.3.5, 6.3 Glossary
M Motor 3.3.4
MMS Manufacturing Message Specification 13.5.1
MTBF Mean Time Between Failures 12.3.2.2
MTIF Mean Time ·ro Failure 12.3.2.2
MTIR Mean Time To Repair 12.3
MO Metal Oxide 5.5
MV Medium Voltage 3.3.5, 6.3

NC Normally Closed: contact is closed as normal state 6.2

NCC Network Control Center 3.6.1, 6.6
NO Normally Open: contact is open as normal state 6.2

O&M Operation and Maintenance 10.2

OSI Open System Interconnection 13.5.1
OLTC On-Line Tap Changer Controller 11.1
OLTC On-Load Tap Changer 5.6
OLE Object Link Embedded (Microsoft) 21.1.5.1.2
ODBC Open Data Base Communication standard 21.1.5.1.2
p Real power 3.3.2
PAS Power Application Software 6.6
PASS Plug And Play Switching System 5.5
PC Personal Computer 4.2, 10.2.4
PD Physical Device 13.5.1
PISA Process Interface Sensor Actuator 5.5
PLC Programmable Logic Controller 4.2
PLC Power Line Carrier 12.7.1
PMU Phasor measuring unit 4.1, 15.2
PSS Power System Stabilizer 11.1
PSM Power System Monitoring 21.1.10
PT Potential Transformer, other word for VT 6.2
PV Power Voltage 11.6

Q Reactive Power 3.3.2

Qty Quantity
QV Reactive Power Voltage 11.6

R Resistance 3.3.4
R Reliability (used for class indications: R1, R2, etc) 12.3.2.1
RCC Regional Control Center 3.6.1
RMS Root Mean Square, average (integrated) values for
AC current or voltage 6.2 363
20 RTNA Real Time Network Analysis 10.1
Glossary RTSC Real Time Sequence Control 11.6
RTU Remote Terminal Unit; data acquisition device of a network
control system within a substation 3.72, 6.6

s Apparent power 3.3.3

SIS Substation 16.2.1
SA Substation Automation 6.2
SAS Substation Automation System 3.72, 12.3.2.1
SAT Site Acceptance Test 12.13
SBO Select Before Operate 6.3
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 3.6.1.2, 6.3
SCD Substation Configuration file for Devices 12.10.5
SCL Substation Configuration description Language 12.10.5
SCOPr Security Optimal Power Flow 11.6
scs Substation Control System 4.1
SER Sequence of Event Recorder 4.2
SER State Estimator 11.6
SF6 Sulphur Hexafluorid 5.5, 12.2.1.1.1
SIL Switching Insulation Level 6.3
SMS Short Messages Service 6.3
SMS Station Monitoring System 6.2, 18.3
SPC System Protection Center 11.1
SPS Special Protection Scheme · 11.1
svc Static Var Compensator 5.7
sw Software 10.3

T Period of alternating current or voltage 3.3.6

TC Technical Committee 18.3
TCP/IP Transport Connection Protocol/Internet Protocol; the transport
level communication protocol used as base in the Internet 6.5
TCR Thyristor Controlled Reactor 5.7
TS Technical Specification 12.6.3.1
TSG Thyristor Switched Capacitor 5.7
TV Television 3.2

u Voltage 3.3.6
UHV Uitra High Voltage 3.3.5, 5.2
ULG Under Load Tap Changer Control 11.6
ULF Under-Frequency Load Shedding 11.5
UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply 4.1' 21.1.18
us United States of America 3.3.3
364 UVLS Under-Voltage Load Shedding 11.5
VDU Visual Display Unit 11.1 20
VIP Voltage Instability Predictor 11.1 Glossary
vs Voltage Stability 11.6
VSA Voltage Stability Assessment 11.6
vsc Voltage Source Converter 5.6
VT Voltage transformer 6.2, 16.2.1

WAN Wide Area Network 6.6, 10.2.8

WAP Wide Area Protection 15.2
WAPS Wide Area Protection Scheme 11.1
WG Working Group 18.3

XML Extended Mark-up Language 13.5.1

z Impedance 3.3.4
ZIP Impedance (Z)-Current (I)-Power (P) 11.6
(J) Circular frequency 3.3.6

365
21 Annex

21.1 Example of a system specification 369 21

21.1.1 Utility data 369 Table of
21.1.2 General Requirements 369 content
21.1.2.1 Scope of supply 369
21.1.2.2 Compliance with standards 370
21.1.2.3 Specific Utility standards 371
21.1.3 Site Conditions 371
21.1.4 Design and operating requirements 372
21.1.4.1 General 372
21.1.4.2 Project specific requirements 373
21.1.4.3 Vendor's experience and local support 373
21.1.4.4 Quality assurance and inspection 373
21.1.5 System design 373
21.1.5.1 General 373
21.1.5.2 Flexibility and scalability 374
21.1.5.3 System hardware 374
21.1.6 Software design 376
21.1.6.1 Station level software 376
21.1.6.2 Bay level software 376
21.1.7 System testing 376
21.1.8 System functions 377
21.1.8.1 Control unit functions 377
21.1.8.2 HMI functions 378
21.1.8.3 Function Assignments 381
21.1.9 Protection 387
21.1.9.1 Line protection 387
21.1.9.2 Transformer protection terminal 388
21.1.10 Transformer tap changer control 389
21.1.11 Substation Monitoring 389
21.1.11.1 Substation monitoring system 389
21.1.11.2 Access via the control center 389
21.1.11.3 Disturbance analysis 390
21.1.11.4 Terminal parameter setting 390
21.1.12 System performance 390
21.1.12.1 System behavior and time response 390
21.1.13 System design features 391
21.1.14 System engineering 391
21.1.14.1 System configuration 391
21.1.15 Documentation 392
21.1.16 Hardware documentation 392
21.1.17 Parameter documentation 392 367
21.1 21.1.18 General documentation 392
21.1.18.1 Standard documentation 392
21.1.18.2 System specific description 393
21.1.19 List of project specific documents 393
21.2 Assessment of Wide Area Protection 393

i.

368

I
 21 Annex
21.1 Example of a system
specification
21.1.1 Utility data (at least contact address)
21.1.2 General Requirements
21.1.2.1 Scope of supply
This specification covers the design, manufacture, ins pection,
testing at the manufacturer's works and at site, packing for
export, shipment, insurance, trans port and delivery to site,
installation, commissioning, and maintenance during guaranty
period including replacement of defective material for a period
of 12 months starting from the date on which the system has
been taken over or for a period of 18 months after the
last delivery.
The substation automation system (SA) shall comprise full station
and bay protection, control, monitoring and
F1gure 2 7-7 General system architecture of a SA System
Station Level
lnterbay bus
Data Exchange
Bay Level Bay Control Bay Protection
lED !ED
Bay1
• Equipment status information input (single and
double pole)
• Double command output for switchgear control
• Single output for binary information
• Analog input for measured values
The bay controllED must contain all functions need ed to
21.1.2.3
control a bay safely locally and from remote. In addition,
it has to provide a serial interface for infor mation
exchange with other autonomous lED of the bay level as
well as station level and comply with the International
Standard IEC 61850 for communica tions within
substations.
Depending on the process interface it has to prov1de also
a serial interface to the switchgear (commands, position
indications) according to IEC 61850.
communication functions. It shall enable local station control
via PC by means of a human machine interface (HMI)
and control software package, which shall contain an
comprehensive range of system con trol and data acquisition
(SCADA) functions. It shall include the communication
gateway, inter-bay-bus, intelligent electronic devices (lED) for
bay control and protection as shown in the general system 21.1
architec ture in Figure 21-1.
21.1.2.2 Design principles
21.1.2.2.1 Concept of levels
The concept of station and bay level as indicated in Figure
21-1 results from the requirement that all pro cess and bay
oriented functions are to be processed on bay level while all
functions, which either concern more than one bay or need
information from more than one bay are to be allocated on
station level.
21.1.2.2.2 Bay controllED
The bay level intelligent electronic devices (lED) for control
shall provide the direct connection to the switchgear
without interposing and perform the fol lowing control and
monitoring functions:
Bay Protection Bay Protection
lED lED . 369
Bayn
21.1.2.2.3 Bay protection /ED
The bay level I ED for protection shall provide the direct connection to
the switchgear without interpos ing to perform protection, and
monitoring functions. The IEDs shall allow that the protection and
control functions can be combined into one intelligent termi nal, while
maintaining the high availability and reliabi lity requirements together
with bay independence through self-supervision.
The bay protection EHV applications must be design ed so that they can
carry out their protective functions completely independent of the bay
controL This requires an independent and direct process interface for
measured values, information and command out put. The interface for
data exchange with the station level shall be serial and comply with the
International Standard IEC 61850 or with IEC 60870-05-103 in cases
where IEC 61850 is not applicable. Depending on the process interface, i
has to pending on the functional requirements.
provide an The inter-bay bus communication 2 7. 7 .2.3 Compliance with standards
optional protocol shall enable indepen dent
serial For design and type testing of the protection and
station-to-bay and bay-to-bay data
interface control equipment the following standards shall be
exchange.
to applicabie as far as relevant for the specific installation:
instrumen The data exchange with the process
t 21.1.2.3.1 General
level (switch gear and instrument
transforme transformers) may also be pro vided via a
rs (digital • IEC 60255: Electrical Relays
serial process bus and in compliance with
samples) • IEC 60038: IEC Standard voltages
the applicable International Standard IEC
and to 61850. The structure of this data • IEC 60068: Environnemental testing
the exchange and the resulf1ng • IEC 60664: Insulation coordination for equipment
switchgear communication system architecture within low-voltage systems
(trips) shall not only meet the functionality but
according also the performance, avai lability and
to IEC reliability/safety requirements.
61850.
21.1.2.2.5
2 Te/econtrol
1
. The communication gateway shall assure
1 the infor mation flow with remote
. network control centers. It has the task
2 of pre-processing information for the
.
control center and performing protocol
2
. conversion. Depending on the availability
4 requirements, the gate way shall either
be an integral part of the station PC or a
D completely separated lED that is
a independent of the station PC
t
a
21.1.2.2.6 Design
responsibility
e
x
The detailed design of the SA to meet
c
h the require ments of this Specification is
a within the supplier's res ponsibility but
n subject to approval by the buyer if not
g stated otherwise in the Specification.
e

Data exchange between the bay control level and 21.1.2.3.2 CE-marking
station control level, as well as between the different
IEDs depends on the function assignments. Each lED • EN 50081-2 Emissive (Industry)
370 shall exchange data directly with any other !ED de- • EN 50082-2 lmmun!ty (Industry)

j
21.1.2.3.3 General for Substation Automation

•IEC 61850

21.1.2.3.4 Detailed

• IEC 60255-6: Measuring relays and
protection equipment
• IEC 60255-7: Test and measurement
procedures for electromechanical ali-or-nothing
relays
• IEC TS 61000-6-5 Electromagnetic interference 21.1.3
(EMC)- Part 6:- Generic standards- Section 5:
Immunity of power station and substation envi
ronment including all referenced and applicable
parts of the standard family IEC 61000.

• IEC 6068-2-3: Test Ca: Damp heat steady state

. 21.1.2.3.4 Communication
• IEC 6068-2-30: Test Db and guidance; Damp
heat, cyclic
•IEC 61850 for Communication in the substation
• IEC 60255-5: Insulation tests for electrical relays •IEC 60870-5-103 for Communication with third
• IEC 60255-22: Electrical disturbance tests party protection devices having von IEC 61850
for measuring relays and protection interface
equipment: •IEC 60870-5-101 for Connection with the
network control center
• IEC 60255-22-1: 1 MHz
burst disturbance test
• IEC 60255-22-2: Electrostatic discharge 21.7.2.4 Specific utility standards
test
Specific utility internal standards have to be met e.g.
• IEC 60255-22-3: Radiated electro
dynamic colouring of the single line diagram shall
magnetic field disturbance test
comply with the utility standard.
• IEC 60255-22-4: Fast transient (Details have to be specified)
disturbance test

• IEC 60255-11: Interruptions to and 21.1.3 Site Conditions *)

alternating component (ripple) in DC auxiliary To be specified by the user
energising quantity to measuring relays
• IEC 60255-6: Measuring relays and Climatic conditions
protection equipment
Ambient temperatures 10 to 40 oc
• IEC 60255-21: Vibration, shock, bump and
seismic tests on measuring relays and protection Extremes*) .•...•..••.••••• c to
0
.............. c
equipment:
Humidy *) 95 % whitout condensation
• IEC 60255-21-1: Vibration tests
(sinuosoidal) Outdoor*) ··························································:·:···············
• IEC 60255-21-2: Shock and bump tests
Indoor*) % whitout
•IEC 60255-21-3: Seismic tests air conditioning

• IEC 60255-0-20: Contact performance·or-- Seismic conditions If applicable

electrical relays
Special conditions If applicable
• IEC 60870-3 class 2: Digital I/O, Analogue 371
1/0 dielectric tests
• IEC 60870-3/class 2: Radio interference test
 .

21.1.4 Design and operating

requirements
2 7. 7 .4. 7
General
This SA shall be suitable for operation and
21.1.
mainte nance of the complete substation
4
including future extensions that may be
defined Jhe offered pro ducts shall be
suitable for efficient and reliable opera tion
and maintenance support of outdoor or
indoor substations for distribution and
transmission.
The systems shall be of the state-of-the art
for ope ration under electrical conditions
present ir high vol tage substations, follow
the latest engineering prac tice, ensure long
term compatibility requirements and continuity
of equipment supply and the safety of the
operating staff.
As indicated in the typical functional structure
in Figure 21-2, the bay cubicles shall
incorporate the control, automation,
monitoring and protection func tions as far as
specified, as well as self-monitoring,
signalling and testing facilities,
measuring and memory functions, event
recording and disturbance recording. The
basic control functions are to be deriv ed
from a modular standardized and type
tested software library.
i·
As protection is an integral part of the SA system the
'
protection IEDs shall be directly connected
to the
interbay bus in order to provide unrestricted
access to all data and information stored in
the relays and for adapting protection
parameters from remote.
Deviations from this functional structure
may be re quested either by the use of a
process bus or by some supplier dependent
optimisation of the request ed SA system.

Figure 27-2 Functional structure of SA Functions

systems Allocation Netwoli(
Control Center
Networ11
Control Remote
CenterNCC Communication
Human-Machine-Interface
Automation
·Data evaluation/Archiving
Monitoring
Events and Alarms
Protection
Status Supervision
= -

372
 2 7. 7 .4.4 Quality assurance and inspection

Quality assurance of design and development, pro

duction, installation and servicing of material and
workmanship shall be governed by ISO 9001.

2 7. 7 .4.2 Project specific requirements The SA system shall be full-sized pre-assembled and 21.1.5
tested at the vendor's workshop before shipment
Specific functionality and boundary condition of the and subject to inspection by the responsible person
SA shall be adapted to the requirements, which are nel of the buyer.
related to the particular voltage level and the
specific substation layout. The project specific
drawings are attached:
21.1.5 System design
• Overall single line diagram
• General system architecture 2 7. 7 .5. 7
• Location of substation General
buildings
• Control and operation The system shall be designed so that personnel with
principles out any background in microprocessor based tech
• Protection nology is in the position to operate the system easily
schemes after they have been provided with some basic train
Ing.

2 7. 7.43 Vendor's experience and local System control via a Personal Computer (PC) shall be
support mouse operated and the following HMI (Human
Machine Interface) functions shall be provided (Figure
Only experienced and technically capable manufactu 21-2):
rer of control and protection systems for electricity
transmission and distribution applications will be • Acquisition and plausibility check of switchgear
accepted. Preferred manufactures are those who status
have experience in deliveries of the full scope of sta
• Control of switchgear
tion automation systems, and services. This
experien ce has to be substantiated by means of • Remote checking of protection parameters
reference installations being in service under and optional activation of alternative parameter
similar environ mental conditions for at least 2 years. sets
If a new func tionality is requested, this time span • Display of actual measured values (U, :, P, Q,
may be reduced or skipped for this special f)
functionality. • Display of events
In order to assess the vendor's experience with the • Display of
enquiry, the vendor is required to present the follow alarms
ing with his bid: • Display of measurands and
trends
• Technical design specification and description
of SA • Sequenced control functions
• Catalogues and brochures of equipment • Disturbance records and fault location
and devices offered • System self-supervision
• Reference list • Hard copy printing
The vendor shall assure for long-term maintenance The offered SA shall support remote control and
and availability of spares. Moreover, a guarantee monitoring from NCC/SCADA centers via gateways
shall be submitted for the availability of spares that are either integrated into the station PC or inde
during the pendent IEDs depending on the availability require-
lifetime of the SA equipment (not less than10 years). ments. · 373
 '( '?
,

The main process information of the station

21.1.5.3 Maintenance, modification or extension of
compo nents must not require a shut-down
of the whole station automation system. Self-
monitoring of single components, modules
and communication shall be incorporated to
increase the availability and the relia bility of
the equipment and minimize maintenance.
The entire substation shall be controlled and
super vised from the station level PC The
individual bays shall be controlled, monitored
and protected from the bay level equipment
in case of maintenance or defective
communication links. Clear control priorities shall
prevent that operation of a single switch can
be initiated at the same time from more than
one of the various control levels, i.e. SCADA.
station, bay level or apparatus level. The priority
shall always be on the lowest enabled control
level.
shall be stored in distributed databases. The
system shall be based on a concept of bay
oriented distributed intel ligence for availability
reasons. Functions shall be
decentralised, switchgear bay oriented and located as
i
I
close as possible to the
process.
21.1.5.2 Flexibility and
scalability
The offered·SA system concept shall be
adaptable to various system requirements
depending on the actual substation, on size,
voltage levels, importance and configuration
complexity. Preference will be given to
suppliers who are in the position to provide
protection and control devices, which can be
freely adapted to the required application
functionality.
21.1.5.3 System
hardware

21.1.5.3.1 Operator
station

Each bay control unit shall be independent of

each other and its functioning shall not be
affected by any fault occurring in any of the
other bay control units of the station.

Each SA shall contain the following main

functional parts allocated according to the
functional structure (Figure 21-2):

• Human Machine Interface (HMI) with

process database -

• Gateway function for remote control

integrated in the station level PC
• Separate gateway for remote supervisory
control via SCADA (optional)
• Data exchange between the different
system components via serial bus
• Bay level devices for control, monitoring
and protection
• Bay oriented local control panels with
mimic diagram (option)
• Process interface parallel wired or
374 connected by a process bus
T shall be based on commercially 21.1.5.3.2
h available PC hardware and Printers
e preferably use the latest
Windows operating system, An event printer shall be connected to the
high-resolution full graphics operator station either directly or via the
o
screen. Peripheral units, such as station level LAN. Events shall be printed out
p
printers, shall be connected to the spontaneously as they arri ve into the operator
e
operator station either directly or via station.
r
a station level WAN. If more than
one monitor is required, a second Each event shall be reported on one ine that
t
operator monitor or second PC shall contain:
o
r based HMI client shall be able to • The event date and
be added as an option. time
s • The name of the event
t object
a • A
t descriptive
i text
o • The state or value of the
n object
The information fields above shall be structured in Uninterrupted_power supply will come from the sta
columns for maximum readability. An additional tion battery.
event or hardcopy printer may be connected to the
system directly at the operator station or via the The IEDs shall be placed together with all necessary input and
station level LAN. Any picture (or part thereof) in the output equipment either connected by par allel wires or via the
operator sta tion shall be possible to be printed out, process bus in panels, which can
using easily accessible commands from the
window menus.

21.1.5.3.3 Protection and controllED's

The control IEDs shall allow select-before-operate

control principles as a safety measure. They shall per
form all bay related functions, such as protection,
commands, bay interlocking, data acquisition, data
storage, event and disturbance recording and shall
provide inputs for status indication and outputs for
commands, which can be d'1rectly connected to the
switchgear without any need for separate interposing
or transducers.
. ·
The input boards shall be provided with binary and
analogue input channels, which are galvanically isolat
ed both from the SA system and individually separat
ed between the channels. HV switchgear and
instru ment transformers shall be directly connected
with out any interposing required.

To ensure a high degree of security against unwan

ted operations of the primary equipment, the binary
output boards shall be able to supervise the opera
ting coils, e.g. for circuit breakers and isolators.

If there exists a process interface with serial connec

tion, the same functionality shall be provided via the
process bus.

The devices shall meet the requirements of the

elec tromagnetic interference according to relevant
parts of IEC 255 to comply with the high
requirements on secondary equipment for the
operation of HV switch gear.

either be located next to indoor gas-insulated
switch- 21.1.5.3.4
gear (GIS) or in the control room of
the substation building or in the
respective local relay buildings in the
outdoor switchyard.
Direct manual control facilities will be
incorporated in the switchgear, which
can be used in case of mainte nance
or emergency. Direct switchgear control
would be conducted without any
interlocking. Local bay control via
local HMI shall provide the same
user safety measures e.g. bay
interlocking, synchro-check as well as
user guidance etc. as the station HMI.
Local bay control shall be key-locked
and the control either from station
HMI or from remote shall be disabled
if the local/remote selector switch is
in the local posi tion.
The electronic system has to be provided with func
tions for self-supervision.
Faults in a terminal have to be indicated on a front
HMI and a message shall be sent to the station
level HMI. The time for fault tracing and
replacement of a faulty unit shall be reduced to a
minimum. The super vision shall also cover the
power supply system, the internal device bus and
the ability of the central pro cessing module to
communicate with different prin ted circuit boards.
Failure of any single component within the equip
ment shall neither cause unwanted operation nor
lead to a complete system breakdown. The n-1 crite
ria must be maintained also in worst case scenarios.
Further, a single failure must not have any affect on
the primary system that is monitored and controlled.
21.1.5.3.4 Required quantity of inputs
and outputs
The signal quantity is as listed below for each bay:
(to be specified in the specific enquiry) 375

21.1.7 21.1.6 Software design
An extension of the station shall be possible with
minimal efforts. Maintenance, modification or an ex
tension of components of any feeder may not force
a shut-down of the parts of the system that are not
affected by the system adaptation.
27. 7.6. 7 Station level
software
21.1.6.1.1 Human-machine interface (HMI)
The base HMI software package for the operator
sta tion shall include the main SA functions and it
shall be independent of project specific hardware
version and operating system. It shall further include
tools for pic ture editing and changing of
configuration parame ters. The system shall be easy
to use, to maintain, and to adapt according to
specific user requirements. Systems shall contain a
comprehensive library with standard functions and
applications.
21.1.6.1.2 Operating system
The latest Windows operating system for worksta
tions shall be used for the station PC, that it supports
state-of-the-art standard system features, e.g. multi
tasking, security levels, data exchange mechanisms
(DOE, OLE), open data base communication stand
ards (ODBC) and a standardized, user-friendly look &
feel HMI as well as several Windows office applica
tions.
27. 7.6.2 Bay level software
21.1.6.2.1 System software
The IED system software shall be structured in
various levels. This software shall be placed in a
non volatile memory. It lowest level shall assure
system performance and contain basic functions,
376 which shall not be accessible by the application and
maintenance
engineer for modifications. The system software shall
support the generation of typical control macros and
comprise a process database for user specific data
storage.
21.1.6.2.2 Application software
In order to ensure robust quality and reliable software
functions, the main part of the application software
shall consist of standard software modules built as
functional block elements. The object specific functio
nal blocks belonging to a standard library shall be
documented and thoroughly tested.
The project specific application software within the
control/protection devices shall be configured in a
functional block language.
21.1.7 System testing
The supplier shall submit a test plan and a test speci
fication for factory acceptance test (FAT) and com
missioning tests of the station automation system up
to the site acceptance test (SAT) for approval. For the
individual bay levellED's applicable type test certifica
tes shall be submitted.
The manufacturing phase of the SA shall be
conclud ed by the factory acceptance test (FAT). The
purpose is to ensure that the Contractor has
interpreted the specified requirements correctly The
scope of the FAT is subject to the User's approval.
The general philosophy shall be to delivea system to
site only after it has been thoroughly tested and its
specified performance has been verified, as far as site
conditions can be simulated in a test lab. If the FAT
comprises only a certain portion of the system for
practical reasons, it has to be assured that this test
configuration is representative to the actual installa
tion and contains at least one unit of each and every
type of equipment incorporated 1n the delivered
system.
If the complete system consists of parts from various
suppliers or some parts are already installed on site,
the FAT shall be limited to sub-system tests. In such a
case, the complete system test shall be performed on
site together with the site acceptance test (SAT).

21.1.8 System functions
2 7. 7 .8. 7 Control unit
functions
21.1.8.1.1 Control
The different high voltage apparatuses within tre sta
tion shall either be operated manually by the
opera tor or automatically by programmed
switching sequences.
The control functions shall comprise:
• Commands from different operator places, e.g.
from the associated control center (NCC), station
HMI, or local control panel according to the
principles
• Select-before execute commands
• Operation from only one operator place
at any control level at the same time.
• Operation functions that depend on conditions
from related status conditions, such as interlocking,_
synchro-check, operator mode, or external status
conditions.
• Safety related functions:
• Prevention of double operation
• Command
supervision
• Selection of operator place
• Blocking/de-blocking of operation
• Blocking/de-blocking of updating of
position indications
• Manual setting of position indications
• Overriding key in the local control ..···---possible(;;,; 0.25% of full scale for U and 1). To get total
cubicle for the interlocking function
• Switchgear run time supervision
• Pole discrepancy supervision
21.1.8.1.2 Status SupetVision
The position of each switchgear, e.g. circuit breaker,
isolator, earthing switch, transformer tap changer etc,
shall permanently be supervised. Every detected
change of position shall be immediately visible on the
21.1.8
screen in the single-line diagram, recorded in the
event list, and a hard copy printout shall be
produced. Alarms shall be initiated in cases when
spontaneous position changes have taken place.
Each position of an apparatus shall be indicated by
two binary auxiliary switches, which are opposite
each other in normally closed (nc) and normally open
(no) position. An alarm shall be initiated if these
posi tion indications are inconsistent or indicate an
exces sive a running time of the operating
mechanism to change position. Same functionality
has to be provid ed by an intelligent process
interface if applicable.
21.1.8.1.3 Interlocking
The interlocking function prevents unsafe operation
of apparatuses such as isolators and earthing swit
ches within a bay or station wide.
An override function shall be provided, which can be
enabled in cases of maintenance or emergency situa
tions to by-pass the interlocking function via a key/
password.
21.1.8.1.4 Measurements
Analog inputs for voltage and current measurements
shall be connected directly to the voltage transformers
(Vf) and the current transformers (CT) without inter-
mediate transducers. The correlated values of active
power (W), reactive power (VAr), frequency (Hz), and
the rms values for voltage (U) and current (I) shall be
calculated. As alternative to this requirement the
connection to digital instrument transformers via pro-
cess bus may be applied.
A high accuracy of the measurement inputs shall be
optimal accuracy, the measuring channels shall be
connected to the measuring coil of the vrs and CTs.
The measured values shall be displayed locally, on the
station HMI, and in the control center. Threshold limit
values shall be selectable for alarm indications. 377
 21.1.8.1.5 Event and alarm handling

Events and alarms shall be generated either by the

switchgear, by the control devices, or by the station
level unit. They shall be recorded in an event list in the
station HMI.
21.1.8.2 HMI functions
21.1.8.2
Alarms shall be listed in a sep rate alarm list and
21.1.8.2.1 Presentation and dialogues
dis played on the screen when they occur. All or a
freely selectable group of events shall also be 21.1.8.2.1.1 General
printed out on an event printer. The alarms and
events shall be time tagged with a time resolution The operator station HMI shall provide basic func
of 1 ms. tions for supervision and control of the substation.
The operator shall give commands to the switchgear
21.1.8.1.6 Time synchronization on the screen via mouse clicks on soft-keys.

The time reference within the SA system shall be set
from the station HMI or from an external clock
syn chronization unit. The time shall then be
distributed to the control/protection devices via the
interbay bus. The time synchronization shall be
performed either via the bus or via a separate
wiring for the minute pulse. The required accuracy
is ± 1 ms within the bay and within the station. For
sampling, the time accu racy has to be better than
25 f.!S.
21.1.8.1.7 Synchronism and energizing check
The synchronism and energizing check functions shall
be distributed to the control and/or protection devi
ces and have these features:
• Adjustable voltage, phase angle, and
frequency difference.
• Energizing for dead line - live bus, or live
line - dead bus.
• Settings for manual close command
and
The HMI shall provide the operator with access to
alarm and event lists to be displayed on the screen.
Besides of these lists on the screen, there shall be a
print out of hard copies of alarms or events in an
event log.
An acoustic alarm shall indicate abnormalities and all
unacknowledged alarms shall be accessible from any
screen selected by the operator.
Following standard pictures shall be available from
the HMI:
• Single line diagram showing the switching
status and measured values
• Control dialogues
• Measurement dialogues
• Blocking dialogues
• Alarm list, station/bay oriented
• Event list, station/bay oriented including
acknowledgement functionality
• System status
• Checking of parameter setting (optional)
l·

auto-reclose command shall be adaptable to the

operating times of the specific switchgear.
21.1.8.2.1.2 HMI design principles
21.1.8.1.8 Voltage selection Consistent design principles shall be provided with
the HMI concerning labels, colors, dialogues and
The voltages, which are relevant for the synchro fonts. Non-valid selections shall be dimmed out.
check functions, depend on the station topology i.e.
on the positions of the circuit breakers and/or the iso- . Object states shall be indicated using different states
lators. The correct voltage for the synchronizing and colours and/or indications of states for:
378 energizing is derived from the auxiliary switches that
indicate the positions of of the circuit breakers, isola
tors, and earthing switches and shall be selected
automatically by the control and protection lED.
 non-functioning including the interlocking reason if
applicable.

21.1.8.2.1.4 System supervision display

• Selected object under

command
• Selected on the . ·
screen
• Not updated, obsolete value, not in
use or not sampled
• Alarm or faulty
state
• Warning or blocked
• Update blocked or manually updated
• Control blocked
• Normal
state

21.1.8.2.1.3 Process status displays and command

procedures

The process status of the substation in terms of

actual values of currents, voltages, frequency, active
and reactive powers as well as the positions of circuit
breakers, isolators and transformer tap changers are
displayed in the station single line diagram (Optional
supported by soft keys or symbols).

In order to ensure a high degree of security against

unwanted operation, a special "select-before-execu
te" command procedure shall be provided. After the
"selection" of a switch, the operator shall be able to
recognize the selected device on the screen and all
other switchgear shall qe blocked. After the "execu
tion" of the command the operated switch symbol
shall blink until the switch has reached its final new
position.

The operator shall only be in the position to execute

an command if the switch is not blocked and if no
interlocking condition is going to be violated. The
interlocking statements shall be checked by the
inter locking scheme which is implemented on bay !
eve!.

After command execution the operator shall receive

a confirmation that the new switching position is
reached or an indication that the switching procedure
was unsuccessful with the indication of the reason for
The SA system shall be • Trend reports:
comprehensively self-moni- • Day (mean, peak)
tored that faults will be immediately detected and
21.1.8.2.1.6 • Month (mean, peak)
indicated to the operator before they • Semi-annual (mean, peak)
develop into serious situations. Such • Year (mean, peak)
faults are listed as faulty sta- tes in a
system supeNision display. This display • Historical reports:
shall cover the status of the entire
• Day
substation including all switchgear,
IEDs, communication links, and printers •Week
at the station level etc. • Month
• Year
21.1.8
.2.1.5 It shall be possible to select displayed values from the
Repor database on-line in the process display. Scrolling or
ts easy switching between e.g. days shall be possible.
Unsure values shall be indicated. It shall be possible
The reports shall provide time related to select the time period for which the specific data
follow-ups of measured values and are kept in the memory.
calculated values. The data dis played
shall comprise: The report shall be able to be printed out on request
and/or automatically at pre-selected times. ··-

21.1.8.2.1.6 Trend display (historical data)

A trend is a time-related follow-up of process data.

All types of process objects - input and output data,
binary and analogue data - shall be able to be illus- 379
trated as trends. The trends shall be displayed in • Exceeding pre-set limits of analogue measured
graph ical form as column or curve diagrams, e.g. 1 0 value
trends per screen as maximum. • Loss of communication
• Problems with IEDs
Type of value logging (direct mean, sum, or differen
ce) shall be possible to change on-line in the Filters for selection of a certain type or group of
21.1.8.2.1.9 window. The update intervals shall also be possible events shall be available. The filters shall be designed
to change on-line in the picture as well as the to enable viewing of events grouped per:
selection of thresh old values for alarming purposes.
• Date and time
2 7. 7 .8.2. 7.7 • Bay
Eventlist • Device
The event list shall contain events in a chronological • Function
order, which are defined as important for the control • Alarm class
and monitoring of the substation. The time of occur
rence has to be displayed for each event.

The operator shall be able to call up the chronologi

cal event list on the monitor at any time for the whole
substation or sections of it.

A printout of each display shall be possible on the

hard copy printer.

It shall be possible to store all events in the compu

ter. (The required storage capacity for events has to
be specified) The chronological event list shall con
tain:

• Operator actions
• Position changes of circuit breakers, isolators
and earthing devices ·
5 Indication of protective relay operations

• Fault signals from the

switchgear
2 Faults and errors occurring in the substation shall displayed on the monitor. Acknowledged alarms
7 be listed in the alarm list in the station level shall be marked at the list.
. workplace and shall be immediately transmitted
to the control center at the network control Faults that appear and disappear without being ac
7 center as well. The alarm list shall substitute a knowledged shall be specially presented in a separa
. conventional alarm tab leau, and shall constitute te list for fleeting alarms.
8 an evaluation of all station alarms. It shall contain
. unacknowledged alarms and persisting faults. Date Filters for selection of a certain type or group of
2 and time of occurrence shall be indicated. alarms shall hP available as for events.
.
7
The alarm list consists of a summary display of
. 2 7. 7 .8.2. 7.9 Object
8 the present alarm situation. Each alarm shall be picture
reported on one line that contains:
A • The alarm date and When selecting an object such as a circuit breaker or
l time isolator in the single line diagram, first the associated
a bay picture shall be presented. In the selected object
r • The name of the alarming
object picture, all attributes like
m
• A. descriptive • type of blocking
l text
• authority
i • The acknowledgement
s state • local/remote control .
t • NCC/SA control
The operator shall be forced to acknowledge • errors
alarms, which shall be either audible or only shall be displayed.
380 • Region
2 7. 7 .8.2. 7. 7 0 Control For maintenance and configuration purposes of the
dialogues station HMI, the following authorization levels shall
be available:
The operator shall give commands to the system by
means of soft keys located on the single line • No configuration
diagram. The keyboard shall also be possible to allowed
be used for soft key activation. Data entry is • Configuration
performed with the. keyboard. allcwed
• Entire system managing
21.1.8.2.2 User-authority allowed
21.1.8.3
levels
The access rights shall be defined by passwords
The activation of the process pictures of each assigned during the log-in procedure. Only the sys
object (bays, apparatus...) shall be able to be tem administrator shall be able to add/remove
restricted to belong to a certain user authorization users and change access rights.
group. Each user shall then be given access-rights
to the related group of objects, e.g.:
• Display 21.1.8.3 Function
only Assignments
• Normal operation (e.g. open/close 21.1.8.3.1
apparatus) Information
• Restricted operation (e.g. by-passed
interlock) The following information functions have to be
assign
• System ed to the various system levels according to the
administrator table
21-1:

Assignment to Bay control Station and network control level

or process
level
Functions Bay control Local Telecontrol Archiving Central
unit control function
Acquisition from the process X
Suppression of fluttering information X
 I
Suppression of transient information X
Intermediate status information X
handling
Forming of group alarms X X X
Provision of detailed information X X
Breaker tripped indication X
Generation of audible alarms X X
Suppression of dependent X X -
information
Information data base management X X X X
Processing of general interrogation X X X X

Table 21-7 Assignment of information functions

381

. '?

• Acquisition from the process: Acquisition of

status information and alarm/fault events from the
process
• Time tagging: For internal information this means
tagging of the real time process; for external
information tagging of the real time process. This
21.1.8.3.2 · time must be recorded for all information messages
at its source of generation with a precision of
s 3 ms and a resolution of 1 ms and transmitted
together with the information to each sink.
• Suppression of transient alarms: Alarms/
events that occur only for a short time and are not
needed for (power) system supervision should be
optionally suppressed at the appropriate location.
• Handling of intermediate status information:
382 For a definable time, the switch position indications
neither ON nor OFF (running) and ON as well as OFF
(FAILURE) may be suppressed. At the end
of this time the "intermediate" position status must
be processed. Normally, they are used for breaker
position supervision. If the state "running" exceeds
some predefined time, "running" has to be changed
to "failure" as well.
• Forming group alarms: Individual types of
alarms can be combined to a group alarm. Alarms
that are combined into groups should be proces
sed like a single point alarm.
• Provision of detailed information: Preparation
of detailed information concerning group alarms
on request.
• wledgements, an audible alarm must be
"Break generated.
er
• Suppression of dependent alarms: Due to the
tripped
" information of an alarm hierarchy, subordinated
indicati alarms are suppressed by higher - order alarms.
on: The • Information data base management: • Processing of general interrogations: It must
informat Information data bases are to be maintained at be possible to retrieve information from a general
ion the suitable location for the supply of all interrogation e. g. during system start up, and to
"circuit compo use the information for updating the process data
breaker" nents of substation control system. The consistency base.
from and synchrony of all data have to be secured
ON to by means of data interchange. 21.1.8.3.2 Measured values
OFF and
the The following measuring functions have to be assign
infor ed to the various system levels according to the Table
mation 21-2.
"no
control • Acquisition from the process: The station
by control system must be able to acquire measured
operato values in different ways:
r" must • Digital values: serial transmission to
genera and from numerical protection lEOs
te the • Digital values: parallel or serial trans
informat mission from transformer tap positions
ion • Analog values directly wired from
"breake current transformers (CT) and voltage
r transformers (VT) 1A/1OOV or via the
tripped' process bus
:
• Analog values from measuring trans
• ducers for electrical as non-electrical
Gener
values either wired as iow level signals
ation
(20 rnA, 10 V, etc.) or serially tranc;mitted
of
audibl via the process bus
e
The acquired analog measured values are to be digi
alarms
tised at source side and evaluated.
: On
receipt • Conversion: Physical values for display, archiving,
of limit control etc, must be calculated on the basis
alarms of the digitised measured values. Furthermore,
requiri conversions for digital transmission witb a different
ng resolution must be possible.
ackno
• Calculation of active and reactive power:
If only current and voltages are acquired from
the process the relevant values of active power,
reactive power, frequency cos (must be calculated).
• The integral of change since the last •
transmission is larger than an Unbalanc
individually defined quantity. e
• A slow time cycle monitorin
g:
Checking
• Limit-value monitoring: For each measured the
value it must be possible to have at least two balance of
limits for each user, namely either an upper or voltages
and
a lower limit Limit value violation produce
currents.
warnings/malfunction alarms.
Limit
• Measured value damping: This functions violations
assures that measured values are only updated produce
when the following criteria are provided: warnings
• The value changes suddenly by and
an individually defined quantity malfunction
 alarms, if not directly handled by a protection
relay.
• Summation of measured values: The addition
of individually measured values to a sum of
measured values. It should be possible to process/
condition the sum of measured values like single
measured values.
• Integration: Calculation of metered measurands
or mean values for defined period of time.
• Determination of maximum/minimum
values: The determination of the minimum or
maximum of a measured value within a
defined time frame. The determination can
either be applied to instantaneous values and/or
to mean values.
21.1.8.3.2
• Value substitution: If a measured value
fails or is missing, it must be possible to
substitute
a new value either automatically or manually.

Assignment to Bay control Station and network control level

or process
level
Functions Bay control Local Telecontrol Archiving Central
unit control function
Acquisition from the process X
Conversion X X X
Calculation of active and X
reactive power
Limit-value monitoring X X
Measured value damping X X
Unbalance monitoring X
Summation of measured values X X X
Integration X
-
Determination X
maximum/minimum values
Value substitution X X X X

Table 27-2 Assignment of measuring 383

functions

. ·.

. ·
21.1.8.3.3 Closed-loop commands to switching devices and
control auxilary equipment.
• Tap changing of transformers,
The following closed-loop control functions
have to be assigned to the various system earth-fault neutralizers: Tap changing
levels according to the Table 21-3. of transformers or earth fault neutralizers
start up and shut down of tap change
control.
21.1.8.3.3 • Unit/individual control: Output of
single, double and adjusting
• Double command lock-out: Checking if • Monitoring of command delay:
parallel commands are selected with the Command release disconnection after
aim to avoid the output of several execution or after
commands at the same time. a defined time if commands have
not been executed properly.
• Switching sequences: For various
tasks, switching sequences may be
stored as a chain consisting of individual
controls or to simplify operating
processes or to make them safer (e.g.
transformer change, by isolation and
earthing).
• Automatic change over switching:
Switching sequences which are carried
out when certain external events occur,
without interference of an operator.
• Automatic acknowledgement:
Command output for resetting the
transient earth-fault relay after a defined
time.

Assignment to Bay control Station and network

control level or process
l
e
v
e
l
Functions Bay control Local Telecontrol
Archiving Central unit control

function
Unit/individual control X
Transformer tap changing, X
earth-fault neutralizers
I
Double command lock out X

I
Monitoring of command delay
X
Switching sequences I

X X
Automatic change-over switchi11g X X
X
Automatic acknowledgement
X
Synchrocheck
X
Bay interlocking
X
Station interlocking X
! •

Monitoring the parallel

X
operation
of
transform
er
 Safety test

X Control transformers

X Earth-fault neutralizer control

X

384 Table 21-3 Assignment of closed-loop control functions

• Synchrochecks: Checking if the voltages on
both sides of the open breaker are synchronized
with regard to amplitude, frequency and phase
angle within an allowed range before closing
the circuit breaker. The command must only be
released if these conditions are satisfied.
• Bay interlocking: Mutual interlocking of switch
gear within a bay ( e.g. disconnector against circuit
breaker and earthing switch, or earthing switch
against disconnector).
• Station interlocking: Mutual interlocking of
switchgear within a substation, talking several
bays into consideration. (e.g. interlocking of bus
disconnector against the busbar earthing switches,
interlocking of the bus disconnectors of a bay
depending on the bus-coupler position.
• Monitoring the parallel transformer
position: For transformers which are connected
in parallel on the high and low voltage side, it
must be constantly checked whether the
difference of the transformer ratios lies within
the given range.
• Safety test: Command inputs from regulating
equipment, automatic switching controls or
controls are to be checked whether they are
permissible before they are conducted. In the
case of certain events like earth fault indication,
lack of compressed air or faulty circuit breakers
the control commands are to be blocked and
an information message to be generated.
• Regulating transformers: Automatic trans
former tapping via control algorithm which
describes the dependencies of current and voltage.
It must be possible that the number instances and
of action actions are documented.
• Regulating earth-fault neutralizers: Automatic
resetting of earth-fault neutralizers by means of
a control algorithm. It must be possible that the
number instances and of action actions are
documented.
. r
21.1.83.4 System tasks functions 21.1.8.3.4
The following system task functions have to be assign
ed to the various system levels according to the Table
21-4.
• Time synchronization: Supply of all station
units with the GPS synchronized absolute time,
plus monitoring of the synchronism
• Information blocking: If work is carried out
on individual components, command blocking is
required, and it may be that also blocking of
information (indications) is required to avoid
higher control levels being burdened with super
fluous information. Information blackings shall be
set from a central point separately according to
the sources or sinks. In case blackings have
been set to all levels involved, this should be
notified accordingly.
• System configuration: It shall be possible to
set individual components of the substation
control system into defined states, e.g. operation,
stand-by, test. This function is especially important
if single components are duplicated. It must be
possible to interrogate the current status of each
individual component.
• System information: It should be possible to
interrogate the status of the functional blocks of
the substation control system and to process them
like the process event signals.
• Self-monitoring: Monitoring of all hardware
and software functions are to be performed as
far as possible. If faults are detected, system
fault alarms must be generated, and local
indicators
set at the components concerned. If necessary;
process information must be marked as invalid
and/or not updated as a function of systems
faults.
• Acquisition of metered measurements:
The acquisition of metered measurands coming
from external meters must be possible, either by 385
 Assignment to Bay control Station and network control level
or process
level
System tasks Bay control Local Telecontrol Archiving Central
or process
interface unit
control function
21.1.8.3.4 Time synchronization X X
Information inhibition X
System configuration X X
System information X
Self-monitoring X X X X X
Other functions
Acquisition of metered X
measurands
Archiving X X
Data listing X
Information data base
management X
Protocol conversion X
Fault recording X
Protection device interfacing (X) X

Table 21-4 Assignment of system tasks

adding up impulses offered via a time frame or
by an accepted International Standard for meter
readings.
• Archiving: Information like measured
values, metered measurands, alarms and
events must be archived in a non-erasable
way for later evaluation.
• Event and status listing: If necessary, sponta
neous or requested operational events and status
print-outs as defined by certain sorting criteria,
on a VDU or printer.
• Protocol conversion: The conversion of the
internal representation of information and
commands into other formats for network control
386 centers.
• Fau!t recording: There are three possibilities of
fault recording:
• Via digital protection devices
• Via external fault recording devices
• Via an internal function of the control
equipment
• The faults must be archived in
the station control system,
including their time tag, and
stored there
for evaluations.
• Protection device interfacing: The serial
interfacing of the protection devices shall be
possible according to international communication
standard, i.e. IEC 60870-5-103 or IEC 61850.

. · .
. (

21.1.9 Protection
The protection scheme shall be an integral part of
the SA system. AIIIEDs shall be integrated for data
shar ing, and meet the real-time communication
require ments for automatic functions. The data
presentation and the configuration of the various
IEDs shall be compatible with the overall system
communication and data exchange requirements.
The project specific protection requirements shall be
specified accordingly. The following describes the pro
tection functions in general terms.
21.1.9.7 Line protection
The numerical line protection devices shall be select
ed for the protection of lines according to specific
the network configurations and conditions. The
sche me must ensure reliable isolation for all kind of
faults, which might occur on the specific line.
Depending on voltage level and complexity, the
following line protection functions may be
required.
21.1.9.1.1 Distance function
The maximum operate time of distance protection
Zone 1, specified for a SIR 10 and faults within 50%
of a set reach, must not exceed 45 ms (MV), 40 ms
(HV), 20 ms (EHV). This shall be substantiated by
isochrone diagrams, which have been measured on
protection terminals connected to similar capacitive
voltage transformers and to current transformer as
specified. The guaranteed tripping time shall include
the output relays. The minimum operate time of a
protection shall not exceed 30 ms (MV), 25 ms HV.
13ms (EHV). The earth fault measurement in
distance
zone 1 shall be compensated for load currents. The
directional discrimination shall be based on the use of
phase-locked positive sequence voltage, and shall
provide unlimited directional sensitivity for all unsym
metrical faults. The positive-sequence memory volta
ge shall be used at close three-phase fault. The me-
mary voltage shall not be used for more than 100
ms.mory voltage shall not be used for more than 100
ms. For the close on a three-phase faults, which
last longer than 100 ms, a seal-in function shall be
ap plied that prevents auto-reclosure.
21.1.9.1.2 Earth fault function 21.1.9
It shall be possible to select between the directional
and non-directional alternative, when choosing the
earth-fault current protection function. Its operation
shall be based on the measurement of the zero
sequence quantities of the protected line. The mini
mum operate current should be < 10 %. The mini
mum operate voltage must be < 1 % of the rated
vol tage. The time delay should be selectable
between independent and all standardised
dependent time characteristics (IEC curves).
Separate communication schemes must be available
for the earth fault function.
As an alternative for high impedance grounded
systems, additional sensitive earth-fault protection,
operating on a watt-metric or transient (Wischer)
principle, may be required, if it is required to detect
transient earth faults.
21.1.9.1.3 Communication
links
A wide range ·of permissive tripping and blocking
scheme communication logics shall be available for
the distance protection as well as for the
directional earth-fault current protection. Scheme
logics should be independent for both protection
schemes with independent communication links.
For EHV. the distance protection scheme shall
have a logic for phase segregated communication
for current single pole tripping also in case of
simultaneous fault on double circuit lines Standard
logics such as current reversal, weak end infeed
echo and trip shall be pro vided for both protection
functions. Logics operating without separate
reverse directed measuring-- ele ments are not
acceptable.
21.1.9.1.4 Event and disturbance
recording function
A line protection terminal shall provide the user local
ly or remotely with complete information on the last 387
 . '(
. '
ten disturbances. The event recorder shall be able
to store at least 1 50 time-tagged events per
recorded disturbance. A disturbance recorder with
a minimum of 5 seconds of recording time for at
least 10 distur bances shall provide the user
with time-tagged disturbance records. At least
21.1.9.2 16 analogue and 48 binary signals must be
recorded, with a sampling rate that guarantees
the presentation of a fifth harmonic component
of any recorded analogue signal. The phasors
of the pre-fault and fault currents and volta ges
shall be recorded for each disturbance and avail
able for further evaluation purposes.
In addition service values of current and voltages
as well as active and reactive power shall be
available.
21.1.9.1.5 Fault
location
The fault location function shall have an accuracy
of better than 2 %. The fault location assessment
shall be independent of fault resistance, load
current or the supply of a data from different
sources.
21.1.9.1.6 Local
HMI
The local human machine interface (HMI) shall
be front mounted and based on a user-friendly,
menu structured program, and performed by the
use of a permanently installed man machine
interface unit, type tested together with the line
protection terminal. The terminal shall also be
provided with a serial port for connecting a PC for
maintenance.
21.1.9.1.7 User
configuration
The monitoring, controlling and configuration of
all input and output logical signals and binary inputs
and relay outputs for all built-in functions and
signals shall be possible both locally and remotely.
It shall also be possible to configure the built-in
functions with addi tional logics (AND-gates, OR-
gates and timers) as well as additional functions
388 such as over-current, over voltage, etc The use of
these options has to be agreed in the contract.
21.1.9.1.8 Self
supervision
Continuous self-supervision function with self-
diag nostic possibilities shall be included in a line
protec tion terminal.
21.1.9.2 Transformer protection
terminal
21.1.9.2.1
General
The transforrrer protection terminal shall be
suitable for p otectior. control and monitoring of
two- or three-windinc transformers,
autotransformers, reac tors, and ge;erator-
transformer block units and also for applicatics
with multi-circuit breaker arrange ments. The r
Jmerical transformer terminal shall be designed to
cperate correctly over a wide frequency range
and tc accommodate for system frequency
variations anc block generator start-ups.
21.1.9.2.2 Dffferential
function
The differemal protection function shall be
provided with 2nd hc'monic restraint to avoid
tripping at magnetizing rush and 5th harmonic
restraint to avoid trippin;; at over-excitation.
Recovery inrush and CT saturatior shall not
influence the differential func tion. The ditf-::rential
protection shall have an adjusta ble restraint
:.:haracteristic and be provided with an adaptive
dif-::rential feature for multi-circuit breaker
arrangemen-c.S as needed e.g. in the diameter of a
1 112 circuit break-::r configuration. The differential
protec tion shall be stable in case of high through-
faults also in multi-circ .'t breaker arrangements.
Tap-changer position indication shall be included, to
provide maxi mum sensiti,rity for the differential
protection. A high set unrestra -:ed differential
current protection shall be included.
21.1.9.2.3 Other
functions
Three-phase time over-current protections,-
restricted earth-fault orotections, second harmonic
restrained time earth-fault over-current protections,
three-phase under- and over-voltage protections and
neutral over voltage protections shall be available
for all windings. A thermal overload protection and
an over-excitation protection shall be included.
. ·
21.1.9.2.4 User configuration
The protection terminal shall be provided with a pro
grammable logic for trip and indications. User confi
guration of the included protection, control and moni
toring functions shall be possible. The basic structure
shall be modular for binary inputs and binary outputs .
to facilitate user adaptation. A mA transducer input
module shall be possible to be added. The inputs and
outputs may be connected also via a process bus if
applicable .
21.1.9.2.5 Local HMI
The local human machine interface (HMI) shall be
front mounted and based on a user-friendly, menu
structured program, and performed by the use of a
permanently installed man machine interface unit,
type tested together with the line protection terminal.
The terminal shall also be provided with a serial
front port for PC connection for maintenance.
21.1.9.2.6 Event and disturbance
reporting function
The transformer shall provide the user locally or
remotely with complete information on the last ten
disturbances. The event recorder shall be able to
store at least 1 50 time-tagged events per recorded
disturbance. A disturbance recorder with a minimum
of 10 seconds of recording time shall provide the
user with timectagged disturbance records. At
least 10 analogue and 48 binary signals must be
recorded, with a sampling rate that guarantees the
presenta tion of a fifth harmonic component of any
recorded analogue signal.
21.1.9.2.7 Self supervision
Continuous self-supervision function with self-diag
nostic possibilities must be included in a transformer
terminal.
21.1.10 Transformer tap changer control 21.1.11
Voltage regulation for single transformer or parallel
transformers with On-Load-Tap-Changer shall either
be included in the numerical transformer terminal or
located in a separate tap-changer control device,
which is associated with the. power transformer. In
case a separate tap-changer control device is selected
this shall be integral part of the SA system like any
protection relay.
21.1.11 Substation Monitoring
It is envisaged that monitoring shall generally be
applied not only to specific and individual pieces of
substation but also to the complete substation. This
Power System Monitoring (PSM) approach shall be
come integral part of substation automation (SA) and
the results shall provide the input for risk manage
ment and maintenance systems.
One important aspect is that the wealth of data avai
lable from numerical protection devices shall be used
for monitoring the condition of circuit breakers, trans
formers, tap changers etc. by means of a cost
effec tive data sharing approach.
2 7. 7. 7 7. 7 Substation monitoring
system
The substation monitoring system shall provide all
information on a dedicated station level server direct
ly accessible for the protection and maintenance
engineer and fully independent of the control centers.
The information shall be retrieved via the corporate
communication network directly from a r r:note
engineering center.
2 7. 7. 7 7.2 Access via the control
center
Remote access to the substation data shall be enabl 389
ed from the control centers and from Engineering
centers upon request. All information which are relat-
. '.: . ·
 21.1.12 System performance

The updating times on the operator station under

normal and calm conditions in the substation shall be:

21.1.12 ed to the condition of high voltage apparatus shall be Function Typical values
directly accessible by the respective owners in the uti-
lity organization. Exchange of display (first reaction) <1s
.Presentation of a binary change < 0,5 s
The communication with control centers shall be in the process display
single or redundant (option) and comply with the fol
lowing protocols: Presentation of an analogue change < 1s
in the process display
(to be specified in tender)

From order to process output < 0,5 s

21.1.11.3 Disturbance analysis
In case of disturbances, today, the protection
engineers are using different kind of information to
find the cause of a fault. However, it is becoming
more and more important to find these failures in a
very short time and to react efficiently with suitable
measures to restore power supply very fast.
The substation monitoring system shall provide all
relevant information for fault finding, analysis, and
trouble shooting. Suitable and user-friendly fault eva
luation software shall be included in the scope of
supply and provide short fault summaries and auto
matic printouts about fault history and fault location.
The protection engineer should have his own PC
based system w1th direct access to the substation to
evaluate all the required information for proper fault
analysis independently of the network control cen
ters.
From switching command to < 1.5 s
update of the display
21.1.12.1 System behavior and time
response
When DC voltage is restored after a DC auxiliary vol
tage failure, the entire system must perform automa
tically a start up on its own. (Automatic restart time
:s: 5 min.) After each restart, an automatic general in
terrogation with old/new comparison is to be carried
out and changes are to be communicated to all func
tional modules that require the new information.
In addition to securing the parameter values in each
functional module, the process data base including
manual entries must also be secured against failures
in order to avoid new inputs during restarts.

21.1.11.4 Terminal parameter setting
It shall be possible to access all protection and control
devices for reading the terminal parameters (settings).
_The setting of parameters or activation of parameter
sets shall be restricted by e.g. password to the au
thorized protection engineer.
Each action by the operator must be logged as event
and result in a reaction from the system. The latter
may be visible or audible, and either confirms the
operator input or rejects it. Rejections must contain an
explanation with easily understandable error mes
sages. The starting and ending of an operator input
must be user friendly at all control levels.

If a local/remote transfer switch is operated, this must

initiate automatically an acknowledgement and can
390 cellation procedure.

21.1.13 System design features • Thoroughly developed and tested

modular software
The SA system shall be designed to satisfy the very
• Easy-to-understand programming
high demands for reliability and availability mncer
language for application programming
nlng:
• Detailed graphical documentation, IEC 61131-
• Solid mechanical and electrical 3,
design of the application software, if
• Protection against electrical interference (EMI) applicable
• High quality components and electronic • Built-in supervision and diagnostic
circuit boards (ECB) functions
• Modular, well-tested • Security
hardware aspects
• Experience of security requirements
 • Process know-how
• Select before execute at operation
• Process status representation as
double indications
• Distributed solution
• Independent units connected to the
local area network
• Back-up functions
• Panel design appropriate to the harsh electrical
environment and ambient conditions
• Panel grounding immune against
transient ground potential rise
21.1.14 System engineering
27. 7. 74.7 System
configuration
For the specific configuration and required adapta
tions of a substation control system as well as for
system maintenance the support of an appropriate
tool is indispensable. This tool shall allow to generate
and manage documents and assure a consistent data
model for all functions of a substation control system.
Essential components of this tool are the input and
output modules as well as data management.
This tool should be able to run on a standard PC 21.1.14
and provide open interfaces for data ex-change.
21.1.14.1.1 System maintenance
The process related parameters describe all types of
data and information, which is exchanged between
the process level, (switchgear and its auxiliaries), the
bay control and station control levels, as well as the
network control level. They define the possible status
of process information with their physical input/out
put points as well as their functional assignments.
The configuration of the station HMI shall be made
with the aid of the operator station in the
Windows environment. The various functions shall
be customiz ed with the aid of easy to use
interactive c-onfigura tion tools. Configuration shall
include the visual pre sentation of the object,
adaptations needed in the process database, and
adaptations of the communi cation configuration
data.
A portable Personal Computer (PC) as a service unit
shall be foreseen for on-site modifications of the
con trol and protection devices. The service unit
shall be used for documentation, test and
commissioning.
The PC based engineering tool shall be used for
the following purposes:
• System configuration
• System testing
• Help functions
• Program documentation
• Down- and up-loading of
programs
& System comm;ss;on1ng
• Data base
management 391
• Changing peripheral
parameters
21.1.18 The engineering system shall be able to monitor data The identification of the inqividual components and
in the running substation control system and to pre the structure shall be in accordance with the relevant
sent changing variables on the display screen in gra IEC standards.
phic representation.

21.1.17 Parameter documentation .

21.1.1 5 Documentation
The following information is required for complete
The complete documentation of a station consists of parameter documentation.
three types:
• Listing of substation system software
• Hardware documentation version
• Circuit diagrams • Information regarding the configuration tool
• Control system function diagrams • Information regarding the data model

• Documentation of the parameters The parameter documentation must be complete

• Parameter lists and consistent. and contain all necessary signals and
• Graphical representation a description of the parameters necessary for the
operation of the systems. It shall comprise the follow
• Control system function diagrams
ing documentation for:
• General documentation
• System parameters
• Standard descriptions
• Functional parameters
• System-specific descriptions
• Process parameters
• Operator manual
• Operational parameters
• Communication manua!

• Electronic
information 21.1.18 General documentation
• Standardized substation configuration
file written in SCL according to 2 7. 7.7 8.7 Standard
IEC 61850-6 documentation
All documentation should be consistent and include Standard documentation is the description of
all information required for operation, maintenance, systems, equipment and functions of a manufacturer,
inspection and repair of the station. which is universally valid and which should not be
adapted to a specific project. It includes:
• Equipment documentation
21.1.16 Hardware documentation • Equipment instruction
manual
The hardware documentation of the control system
• System description
is to be carried out according to the same structure
as the documentation of the other station units and • Description of functions
392 is an integral part of the complete documentation. • Operating instructions
• Fault description
• Service programs
 21.2 Assessment of
Wide Area Protection

2 7. 7. 7 8.2 System specific description The

following
The system specific description shall contain: checklist
• System specific extracts from the standard shall
docmentation serve an
power
• User specific operating instructions
utility to
assess
Supplemented with actual setting values such as
. '?
. the
transfer rates etc., these descriptions shall further '? needs
include user specific functions such as special tele
and
control protocols.
requirem
ents for
21.1.19 List of project specific documents the
imple
The following documentation to be provided for the mentatio
systems in the course of the project shall be con n of
sistent, CAD supported, and of similar look/feel: wide
• List of area
Drawings protectio
• Control Room Lay- n
out solutions
. The
• Assembly intention
Drawing
is to
• Single Line Diagram provide
• Block Diagram a
• Circuit starting
Diagram point
for
• List of Apparatus
detailed
• List of investiga
Labels tions of
• Functional Design Specification (FDS) particular
• Test Plan and Specification of Factory Acceptance WAPS in
Test (FAT) ) and of Site Acceptance Test (SAT) order to
select
• Standardized substation configuration file
the most
written in SCL according to IEC 61850-6
suitable
• Logic one to
Diagram counter
• List of specific
Signals pheno
• Operator's mena.
Manual
• Product
Manuals
• Calculation for uninterrupted power supply
(UPS)
dimensioning
21.2

393
 :_-._

21:2 Present power system performance

1 How often do instabilities occur in know power system? Yes No
1.1 No instabilities occur
1.2 Instabilities occur every more than five years
1.3
Instabilities occur less than every five years
1.4
Instabilities occur often
1.5 How often? (please fill in)
2 What kind of wide area system disturbances occur? Yes No
2.1 Voltage instabilities
2.2 Frequency instabilities
2.3 Undamped power swings
2.4
Loss of synchronism
2.5
Cacade tripping
2.6 Some of the phenomena occure together
Present measures to maintain power system integrity
3 Voltage instability control Yes No
What preventive measures are taken?
3.1 Adjusting generation schedule
3.2 Adjusting voltage set points on generators
3.3 Adjusting voltage set points on synchronous condensers
3.4
Adjusting taps on some transformers
3.5
Switching on/off shunt capacitors
3.6 Switching on/off shunt rectors
3.7 Others
What curative actions are taken?
3.8 Blocking on load tap changers (OLTC) on transformers
3.9
Reduction of voltage references on OLTCs
3.10
Early automatic load shedding following important line trip
3.11
Others

394
4 Frequency instability control Yes No 21.2
4.1 The primary spining reserve ...........% of demand maintained all the time
4.2 Network splitting on under-frequency at the boundaries of the utility
4.3 Load shedding from ........... Hz with ........... seconds time delay
4.4 Others
5 Undamped power swing control Yes No
What preventive measures are taken?
5.1 Real transfer power transfer limits must not be exeeded
5.2 Reactive power absorption limits must not be exeeded
5.3 Low voltage limits on generators must not be exeeded
5.4 WAPS implemented on important generators
5.5 Others
What are the curative actions taken?
5.6 Reduction of real power transfer
5.7 Increase of reactive power generation on concerned generators
5.8 Increase of reactive power generation on synchronous compensators
5.9 Actions on DC lines
5.10 Disconnection of radially connected part of the system
5.11 Others
6 Loss of synchronism control Yes No
What preventive measures are taken?
6.1 Security rules in planning and operation stage are to be followed
6.2 Fast valving is conducted on thermal generation units
6.3 Preventive automatic load shedding
6.4 Preventive automatic unit shedding
6.5 Others
What curative actions are taken?
6.6 Generators are disconnected by out-of-step relays
6.7 Generators are disconnected by under-voltage protection relays ·-
6.8 Generators whitout fast valving are tripped rapidly
6.9 Out-of-step relays on some lines
6.10 Blocking of distance protection relays against power swings
6.11 Others

395

. · . '(
21.2 7 Cascade line tripping control Yes No
What preventive measure are taken?
7.1 Security rules are followed in planning and operation stage
7.2 Provision of power swing blocking relays
73 Provision of out-of-step relays
7.4 Early automatic load shedding
75 Early automatic unit shedding
7.6 Others
What curative actions are taken?
7.7 Fast manual load shedding by remote control from control center
7.8 Fast manual action on generators power set-point
79 Starting fast power reserves (gas turbines, hydro units)
7.10 Others
8 Coordination of problems with interconnected utilities Yes No
Exchange of information related to
8.1 Non-availability or loss of important lines
8.2 Temporary weak points in generation
8.3 Major disturbances in power generation
8.4 Deviations os scheduled power exchange
8.5 Changes of reactive power flows and voltage conditions
8.6 Load on tie-lines
8.7 Signals of tie-lines breakers
8.8 Voltage values on busbars
8.9 Real and reactives power values on tie-lines
8.10 Common studies to meet future reqirements
8.11 Others

396

-.
·
Recommended compementary measures or actions for
1 Voltage instability control Required Notrequ.
1 '1 Coordination between neighbouring utilities on reactive margin management
1.2 Coordination between neighbouring utilities on voltage profile control
1.3 Implementation of OLCT blocking at all critical transformers 21.:
1.4 Coordination of OLCT voltage references
1.5 WAPS like load shedding subject to particular network conditions/events
2 Frequency instability control Required Notrequ.
2.1 Automatic load shedding plan for the interconnencted power system
2.2 The load shedding plan should operate in the range of 48 - 49 Hz
2.3 The maximum load shedding shouid be about 40 - 50 % of the demand
2.4 Coordination of the main steps for power restoration
3 Undamped power swings control Required Notrequ.

3.1 Facts devises (cos <p adaption, supply of reactive power)

3.2 Adaption of real power transfer ·
3.3 WAPS on important generators
3.4 WAPS for disconnection of part of the system
4 Loss of synchronism control Required Notrequ.
11 1 -r. Implementation of WAPS as unit shedding
I

4.2 Implementation of WAPS as load shedding in interconnected operation

4.3 Suitably located WAPS as out-of-step relays for network splitting
4.4 Preventing automatic reclosing during out-of-step conditions
5 Cascade tripping control Required Notrequ.
5.1 Implementation of adaptive numerical distance protection
5.2 Single phase auto-reclosing on all important lines
5.3 Synchronizing equipment on all major interconnection points
5.4 Implementation of WAPS as unit sheddding in interconnected operation
5.5 Implementation of WAPS as load shedding in interconnected operation
6 Monitoring of the dynamic behaviour of critical part of the system Required Notrequ.
6.1 Implementation of PMUs for on-line detection of critical situations
6.2 Dedicated planning and operation planning studies
6.3 Coordination between neigbouring utilities for using data exchange
7 Additional measures to increase power system stability & capacity Required Notrequ.
7.1 On-line monitoring (Substation/transformer) -
7.2 Asset management
7.3 Power quality monitoring
7.5 Others (please fill in)
7.6 Others (please fill in)

. ...
397